Huawei IP Camera Series
products V200R003C20 Security
Target
Issue 1.0
Date 2018-03-27
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2017. All rights reserved.
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Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Address: Huawei Industrial Base
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Shenzhen 518129
People's Republic of China
Website: http://www.huawei.com
Email: support@huawei.com
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Contents
1 ST Introduction .............................................................................................................................1
1.1 ST Reference ................................................................................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Reference .............................................................................................................................................................1
1.3 TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................................................1
1.3.1 TOE Type...................................................................................................................................................................1
1.3.2 TOE usage & Major Security Features ......................................................................................................................2
1.3.3 Non TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware ...................................................................................................................2
1.4 TOE Description...........................................................................................................................................................3
1.4.1 TOE Logical Scope....................................................................................................................................................3
1.4.2 TOE Physical Scope ..................................................................................................................................................5
2 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................................10
3 Security Problem Definition.....................................................................................................11
3.1 Threats to Security...................................................................................................................................................... 11
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................................................................12
4 Security Objectives.....................................................................................................................14
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ................................................................................................14
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................................................15
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................................................15
4.3.1 Tracing of security objectives to SPD......................................................................................................................15
4.3.2 Justification of tracing .............................................................................................................................................16
5 Extended Components Definition...........................................................................................19
6 Security Requirements...............................................................................................................20
6.1 Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................................................20
6.1.1 SECURITY AUDIT (FAU)......................................................................................................................................20
6.1.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS)....................................................................................................................21
6.1.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)...........................................................................................23
6.1.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT).....................................................................................................................23
6.1.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT) .......................................................................................................................24
6.1.6 TOE ACCESS (FTA)...............................................................................................................................................24
6.1.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS (FTP)....................................................................................................................24
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements...............................................................................................................................24
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6.3 Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................................................................26
6.3.1 SFR Necessity and Sufficiency Analysis .................................................................................................................26
6.3.2 SFR Dependency Analysis.......................................................................................................................................29
6.3.3 SAR Rationale .........................................................................................................................................................32
6.3.4 SAR Dependency Analysis......................................................................................................................................32
7 TOE Summary Specification ....................................................................................................34
8 Acronyms......................................................................................................................................38
9 Glossary of Terms.......................................................................................................................39
10 Document References...............................................................................................................40
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Figure 1-1 TOE Deployment Diagram..................................................................................................................2
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Tables
Table 1-1 IT Environment Components ................................................................................................................3
Table 1-2 Excluded Functionality..........................................................................................................................4
Table 1-3 Physical Specifications..........................................................................................................................5
Table 3-1 Information Assets............................................................................................................................... 11
Table 3-2 Threats................................................................................................................................................. 11
Table 3-3 Assumptions ........................................................................................................................................12
Table 4-1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.........................................................................14
Table 4-2 Security Objectives for the TOE..........................................................................................................15
Table 4-3 Tracing of security objectives to SPD..................................................................................................16
Table 4-4 Threat Rationale ..................................................................................................................................17
Table 4-5 Assumption Rationale..........................................................................................................................17
Table 6-1 Auditable Events..................................................................................................................................20
Table 6-2 Security Assurance Requirements .......................................................................................................25
Table 6-3 Tracing of security SFR to Security Ojectives.....................................................................................26
Table 6-4 Justification of tracing .........................................................................................................................28
Table 6-5 SFR Missing dependencies justification..............................................................................................29
Table 6-6 SAR Missing dependencies justification .............................................................................................32
Table 7-1 Justification of tracing .........................................................................................................................34
Table 8-1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................................................38
Table 9-1 Glossary of Terms................................................................................................................................39
Table 10-1 Document References........................................................................................................................40
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1 ST Introduction
ST Reference
1.1
Title Huawei IP Camera Series products running V200R003C20 version Security Target
Version 1.0
Author Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Date of publication 2018-03-27
TOE Reference
1.2
TOE Name Huawei IP Camera Series products
TOE Version V200R003C20
TOE Developer Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
TOE Overview
1.3
TOE Type
1.3.1
The TOE is an IP Camera system composed of a hardware platform and a firmware running within the platform as
a whole system. This TOE provides video over IP networks with some security features such as Security Audit,
Cryptographic support, Identification and Authentication, Security Management, Protection of the TSF, TOE
access, Trusted Path. We provide 8 IP Cameras include IPC6125-WDL-FA, IPC6225-VRZ, IPC6285- VRZ,
IPC6325-WD-VRZ, IPC6385-VRZ, IPC6525-Z30, IPC6625-Z30, IPC6681-Z20 (more details in 1.4.2),Some can
be used in indoors, such as IPC6125-WDL-FA, IPC6325-WD-VRZ. Some can be used in outdoors, such as
IPC6225-VRZ, IPC6285- VRZ, IPC6681-Z20.
.
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TOE usage & Major Security Features
1.3.2
A network camera, often known as an IP camera, is used to send video over an IP network
such as a local area network (LAN) or the Internet. A network camera enables live viewing
and/or recording, either continuously, at scheduled times, on request or when triggered by an
event. there are two usage scenarios regarding the video distribution:
1.The video data distribution is only accessed using the web interface .
2.The video data is sent and stored in a server using a different interface than https used for
the web access.
This certification is only about the first scenarios.
The major security features include: Security Audit, Cryptographic support, Identification and
Authentication, Security Management, Protection of the TSF, TOE access, Trusted Path.
Non TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
1.3.3
The Figure 1-1 shows a sample TOE deployment, and the logical interconnections to/from
TOE components.
Figure 1-1 TOE Deployment Diagram
The figure above shows a sample TOE deployment, and the logical interconnections to/from
TOE components. This certification does not include decoder and IVS
This environment includes one network which is separated from external networks (e.g. other
LANs or Internet) by a Firewall/Gateway/Physical segregation device. In the TOE network
there are only the following components: IP cameras, one (or a very limited number of)
computer for cameras management and the video recording equipment (e.g. IVS and
decoders). Furthermore the TOE network shall be setup so connection of any other devices is
not possible.
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The Firewall/Gateway/Physical segregation blocks all the traffic except for TOE management
and video distribution from the specific external equipment intended for such purpose, by
using NAT and IP source white list and protect the TOE network from attacks from the
outside (e.g. DDOS). A more restrictive firewall configuration is also valid (e.g. complete
network isolation).
Table 1-1 IT Environment Components
Component Required Usage/purpose Description for TOE
performance
PC Yes This includes any IT Environment
Management workstation with TLS-enabled
browser installed that is used by the TOE
administrator for remote administration of
the TOE. The browser must support
HTTPS.
Switch Yes Switch means a local area network (LAN)，
which composed of one or more swatches.
Firewall/Gateway/Physic
al segregation
Yes The Firewall/Gateway/Physical segregation
must be deployed to prevent the any attacks
if the TOE is used from the Internet.
TOE Description
1.4
TOE Logical Scope
1.4.1
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified
above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below:
1. Security Audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and Authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted Path
These features are described in more details in the subsections below.
Security Audit
The TOE generates the audit data and provides authorised users with the capability to read
audit information from the audit records.
Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography support for secure communications. The cryptographic
services provided by the TOE include: symmetric encryption and decryption using AES;
digital signature using RSA; Hash Algorithm using SHA-256,SHA-1; and keyed-hash
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message authentication using HMAC-SHA-256,HMAC-SHA-1. The TOE also implements
HTTPS for secure remote administration, also include video data transfer.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users of the TOE who connect
remotely by HTTPS. The TOE requires administrators to authenticate prior to being granted
access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a
minimum password length and to enforce mandatory password complexity rules. When the
defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed, the TOE will
terminate the session of the user trying to authenticate and block the user account for
authentication for default 5 minutes.
Security Management
The TOE provides security management for users of the TOE who can manage the different
roles and security functions.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE can be able to provide reliable time stamps.
TOE access
Administrative sessions can be set to terminate after a configurable idle-time limit. The TOE
can restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to the same user. Once a
session has been terminated the TOE requires administrators to re-authenticate to establish a
new session. The TOE can allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive
session.
Trusted Path
Remote administrators or users can establish trusted communication paths to the TOE using
HTTPS.
The following Table 1-2 is excluded from the evaluation.
Table 1-2 Excluded Functionality
Excluded
Functionality
Exclusion Rationale
SSH SSH will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
SNMP SNMP will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
SDK SDK will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
SOAP SOAP will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
T28181 T28181 will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
Genetec Genetec will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
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TOE Physical Scope
1.4.2
The TOE is comprised of the following physical specifications as described in Table 1-3
documents below:
AGD_PRE (CC Huawei IP Camera Series products V200R003C20 AGD_PRE V04.doc)
AGD_OPE (CC Huawei IP Camera Series products V200R003C20 AGD_OPE V03.doc.)
IPC V200R003C20 Product Documentation01.
Table 1-3 Physical Specifications
Model Feature Interface
IPC6125-WDL-FA
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression standard
 Dual-channel 1080p HD
video encoding
 Intelligent analytics
 Auto Back Focus(-FA)
 1x SFP slot for SFP fiber
optic modules(-FA)
 Ethernet: 1x RJ-45
10/100/1000Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 SFP slot: 1x SFP slot
 Opto-electronic
cascade(OEC):
Supporting cascade
connection of two
cameras via
opto-electronic Eth ports
 Serial: 1x RS-485
port ,supporting
PELCO-P/D protocol
 Alarm : 1-channel alarm
input and 1-channel
alarm output
 Analog video: 1-channel
CVBS output
 Audio: 1-channel audio
input and 1-channel
audio port
 Memory card slot: 1x
Micro SD/SDHC/SDXC
slot
 Lens interface: C- or
CS-mount interface
IPC6225-VRZ
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression standard
 Invisible IR(-SP)
 Built-in motorized
zoom and focus lens
 Intelligent analytics
 Ethernet: 1x RJ-45
10/100Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 Serial: 1x RS-485 port
(PELCO-P/D protocol)
 Alarm: 2-channel alarm
input and 2-channel
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Model Feature Interface
alarm output
 Analog video: 1-channel
CVBS output, BNC
connector
 Audio： 1-channel audio
input and 1-channel
audio port ,3.5mm mono
connector
 Memory card slot：1x
MicroSD/SDHC/SDXC
slot
IPC6285- VRZ
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 Up to 4K(3840×2160)
UHD
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression
 Wide dynamic range
120dB
 Intelligent behavior
analytics, color
recognition, vehicle and
pedestrian classification,
exception audio
detection
 IP67 protection class
 Ethernet: 1x RJ-45
10/100、1000Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 Serial: 1x RS-485 port
(PELCO-P/D protocol)
 Alarm: 2-channel alarm
input and 2-channel
alarm output
 Analog video: 1-channel
CVBS output, BNC
connector
 Audio： 1-channel audio
input and 1-channel
audio port
 Memory card slot：1x
MicroSD/SDHC/SDXC
slot
IPC6325-WD-VRZ
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression standard
 Wide dynamic range
120dB
 2.8-12 mm Motorized
and smart focus
 Intelligent analytics
 Intelligent IR
control(-VRZ)
 IP66 protection class
 IK10 Vandal-proof class
 Railway application
standards
 Ethernet interface: 1x
RJ-45 10/100Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 Serial interface: 1x
RS-485 port
 Alarm interface:
1-channel alarm input
and 1-channel alarm
output
 Analog video interface:
1-channel CVBS output
 Audio interface:
1-channel audio input
and 1-channel audio port
(3.5mm mono connector)
 Memory card slot: 1x
MicroSD/SDHC/SDXC
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Model Feature Interface
slot.
IPC6385-VRZ
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 Up to 4K(3840×2160)
UHD
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression
 Wide dynamic range
120dB
 Intelligent behavior
analytics, color
recognition, vehicle and
pedestrian classification,
exception audio
detection
 IP66 protection class
 Ethernet interface: 1x
RJ-45 10/100Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 Alarm interface:
1-channel alarm input
and 1-channel alarm
output
 Audio interface:
1-channel audio input
and 1-channel audio port
(3.5mm mono connector)
 The power input
interface. supports
DC12V±25% and
AC24V±24.9% power
input.
IPC6525-Z30
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression standard
 Dual-channel 1080p HD
video encoding
 Ultra WDR 120dB
 Auto defogging
 Gyroscopic image
stabilization
 Intelligent analytics
 SFP slot for SFP fiber
optic modules
 Opto-electronic
cascade(OEC)
 Railway applications
 Ethernet interface:1x
RJ-45
10/100/1000Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 SFP slot:1x SFP slot for
SFP fiber optic modules
 Opto-electronic
cascade(OEC):Supportin
g cascade connection of
two cameras via
opto-electronic Eth ports
 Serial interface:1x
RS-485 port
(PELCO-P/D protocol)
 Alarm
interface:8-channel
alarm input and
2-channel alarm output
 Analog video
interface:1-channel
analog video output
through the CVBS
interface, BNC
connector
 Audio
interface:1-channel audio
input and 1-channel
audio port
 Memory card slot:1x
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Model Feature Interface
MicroSD/SDHC/SDXC
slot
IPC6625-Z30
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression standard
 Dual-channel 1080p HD
video encoding
 Intelligent IR
 Ultra WDR 120dB
 Highlight suppression
 Auto defogging
 Gyroscopic image
stabilization
 Intelligent analytics
 IK10 Vandal-proof class
 IP66 protection class
 Ultra wide operating
temperature range -40℃
~ 60℃
 Ethernet interface:1x
RJ-45 10/100Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 Serial interface:1x
RS-485 port
(PELCO-P/D protocol)
 Memory card slot:1x
MicroSD/SDHC/SDXC
slot, up to 64 GB
 Alarm
interface:8-channel
alarm input and
2-channel alarm output
 Analog video
interface:1-channel
analog video output
through the CVBS
interface, BNC
connector
IPC6681-Z20
firmware version：
V200R003C20
 Up to 4K(3840×2160)
UHD
 H.265, H.264 and
MJPEG video
compression
 Wide dynamic range
120dB
 Intelligent behavior
analytics, color
recognition, vehicle and
pedestrian classification,
exception audio
detection
 IP66 protection class
 Ethernet interface：1x
RJ-45
10/100/1000Base-T
self-adaptive Ethernet
port
 Serial interface：1x
RS-485 port
(PELCO-P/D protocol)
 Alarm interface：
4-channel alarm input
and 2-channel alarm
output
 Analog video interface：
1-channel analog video
output through the
CVBS interface,BNC
connector
 Audio interface：
1-channel audio input
and 1-channel audio
port,RCA connector
 Memory card slot：1x
MicroSD/SDHC/SDXC
slot
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Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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2 Conformance Claims
This Security Target and the TOE described are in accordance with the requirements of
Common Criteria 3.1R4.
This Security Target claims conformance with the following parts of Common Criteria:
Conformance with [CC31R4P2].

Conformance with [CC31R4P3].

The methodology to be used for the evaluation is described in the “Common Evaluation
Methodology” of the Common Criteria standard of September 2012, version 3.1 revision 4
with an evaluation assurance level of EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2.
This Security Target does not claim conformance with any protection profile.
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3 Security Problem Definition
Threats to Security
3.1
The information assets to be protected are the information stored, processed or generated by
the TOE. Configuration data for the TOE, TSF data (such as user account information and
passwords, etc.) and other information that the TOE facilitates access to (such as system
software, patches) are all considered part of information assets.
Table 3-1 InformationAssets
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Log data X X
Configuration data X X
Video data X X
User interaction traffic X X X
This section identifies the threats to assets that require protection by the TOE. The threats are
defined in terms of assets concerned, attackers and the adverse action that materializes the
threat.
Table 3-2 Threats
Threat Description
T.UNAUTHOR
IZED_ADMINI
STRATOR_AC
CESS
threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to the network
device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an administrator to
the device, masquerading as the device to an administrator, replaying an
administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or
performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to
the administrative session, or sessions between network devices.
Successfully gaining administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on
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Threat Description
which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRY
PTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a
cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption
algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the
algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give the
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control
the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTE
D_COMMUNI
CATION_CHA
NNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use
standardized secure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network
traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or
poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and
potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.
T.UNDETECT
ED_ACTIVIT
Y
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security
functionality of the network device without Administrator awareness.
This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g.,
misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the
Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
T.NETWORK_
ATTACKS
Threat agents may attempt to attack TOE from internet or external
networks with flooding, malformed packages or other means intended to
subvert the TOE TSF. Successful attacks will result in loss of
availability of the TOE, such as losing of control or device restarting.
Assumptions
3.2
The assumptions when using the TOE are the following:
Table 3-3 Assumptions
Assumption Description
A.PHYSICAL_
PROTECTION
The TOE is assumed to be physically protected in its operational
environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the
security and/or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and
correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect
the device and the data it contains. As a result, the ST will not include
any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack
mitigations. The ST will not expect the product to defend against
physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract
data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_F
UNCTIONALI
TY
The TOE is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as
general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide
a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to
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Assumption Description
networking functionality).
A.TRUSTED_
USERS The Security Administrator(s) for the TOE are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes
being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and to lack malicious
intent when administering the device. The TOE is not expected to be
capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively
works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
All users of the TOE having access to the TOE management computers
or the TOE network are trusted in the sense that they will not perform
malicious actions intended to subvert the availability of the TOE assets.
A. NETWORK
_SEGREGATI
ON
The network environment of TOE (the LAN where the TOE is
connected) is assumed to be trusted and to prevent attacks from internet.
This environment includes one network which is separated from external
networks (e.g. other LANs or Internet). In the TOE network there are
only the following components: cameras, one (or a very limited number
of) computer for cameras management and the video recording
equipment (e.g. IVS and decoders). Connection of any other devices is
not possible If access from Internet is necessary, a boundary protection
device such as Firewall/Gateway/Physical segregation device is required
to prevent attacks from the internet.
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4 Security Objectives
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
4.1
The security objectives for the Operational Environment determine the responsibility of the
environment in countering the threats, enforcing upholding the assumptions. Each objective
must be traced back to aspects of identified threats to be countered by the environment.
Table 4-1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Security
Objective
Description
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENE
RAL_PURPOS
E
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or
user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services
necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
OE.TRUSTED
_USERS
Users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a
trusted manner.
Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance
documentation in a trusted manner.
All users of the TOE having access to the TOE network are trusted in
the sense that they will not perform malicious actions intended to
subvert the availability of the TOE assets.
OE.NETWOR
K_SEGREGAT
ION
The operational environment shall provide segregation from Internet by
deploying TOE into a LAN with a firewall or gateway, and it shall
restrict the physical access to the TOE network to TOE authorized
users..
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Security Objectives for the TOE
4.2
The security objectives for the TOE must determine (to the desired extent) the responsibility
of the TOE in countering the threats. Each objective must be traced back to aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE.
Table 4-2 Security Objectives for the TOE
Security
Objective
Description
O.SYSTEM_M
ONITORING
The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit data.
O.AUDIT_VIE
W
The TOE will provide only the authorized administrators the capability
to review audit data, and overwrite the oldest stored audit records if the
audit trail is full.
O.CRYPTOGR
APHIC_FUNC
TIONS
The TOE shall provide cryptographic functions
(i.e.,encryption/decryption and digital signature operations) to maintain
the confidentiality.
O.PROTECTE
D_COMMUNI
CATIONS
The TOE will provide protected communication channels for
administrators.
O.SESSION_A
CCESS
The TOE shall provide mechanisms that can set basic limitation on
multiple concurrent sessions and initiated termination.
O.ID_AUTH The TOE must uniquely identify and authenticate the claimed identity of
all administrative users before granting management access.
O.SECURITY_
MANAGE
The TOE will provide management tools/applications to allow
authorized administrators to manage its security functions.
O.ADMIN_RO
LE
The TOE will provide administrator levels to isolate administrative
actions, and to make the administrative functions available remotely.
Security Objectives Rationale
4.3
Tracing of security objectives to SPD
4.3.1
The following table provides a mapping of security objectives tracing each security objective
for the TOE back to threats countered by that security objective enforced by that security
objective, and each security objective for the operational environment back to threats
countered by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective. This
illustrates that the security objectives counter all threats, the security objectives for the
operational environment uphold all assumptions.
Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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Table 4-3 Tracing of security objectives to SPD
T.UNAU
THORIZ
ED_AD
MINIST
RATOR_
ACCESS
T.WEAK
_CRYPT
OGRAP
HY
T.UNTRUST
ED_COMM
UNICATIO
N_CHANNE
LS
T.UND
ETECT
ED_AC
TIVIT
Y
T.NETW
ORK_AT
TACKS
A.PHYSI
CAL_PR
OTECTI
ON
A.LIMITE
D_FUNCT
IONALITY
A.TRUSTE
D_USERS
A.
NETWOR
K
_SEGREG
ATION
O.SYSTEM_
MONITORIN
G
X
O.AUDIT_VI
EW
X
O.CRYPTOG
RAPHIC_FU
NCTIONS
X
O.PROTECT
ED_COMMU
NICATIONS
X X
O.SESSION_
ACCESS
X
O.ID_AUTH X
O.SECURIT
Y_MANAGE
X X X X
O.ADMIN_R
OLE
X
OE.PHYSIC
AL
X
OE.NO_GEN
ERAL_PURP
OSE
X
OE.TRUSTE
D_USERS
X X
OE.NETWO
RK_SEGREG
ATION
X X X
Justification of tracing
4.3.2
The following table maps the threats of the security problem established to the security
objectives of the TOE and the security objectives of the operational environment.
Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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Table 4-4 Threat Rationale
Threat Security Objectives
T.UNAUTHOR
IZED_ADMINI
STRATOR_AC
CESS
The O.SESSION_ACCESS objective requires that the TOE can
provide the lock of session. The O.ID_AUTH objective requires the
users to enter a qnique identifier and authentication before management
access is granted. The O.ADMIN_ROLE objective ensures that only
authorized administrator, with the proper privilege level have access to
the TOE management functions. The O.SECURITY_MANAGE
objective requires that the TOE can manage the above functions.
T.WEAK_CRY
PTOGRAPHY
The O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS objective requires that the
TOE can provide the security cryptographic functions. The
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS objective requires to use the
security cryptographic functions. The O.SECURITY_MANAGE
objective requires that the TOE can manage the cryptographic functions.
T.UNTRUSTE
D_COMMUNI
CATION_CHA
NNELS
The O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS objective requires that
the TOE can use the secure protocols for identified communication
channels. The O.SECURITY_MANAGE objective requires that the
TOE can manage the communication channels.
T.UNDETECT
ED_ACTIVIT
Y
The O.SYSTEM_MONITORING objective requires that the TOE can
generate audits records. The O.AUDIT_VIEW requires the TOE to
provide the capability to prevent the unauthorized users from reviewing
audit data, and overwrite the oldest stored audit records if the audit trail
is full. The O.SECURITY_MANAGE objective requires that the TOE
can manage the audit functions.
T.NETWORK_
ATTACKS
The OE.TRUSTED_USERS objective requires that users having access
to the TOE network are trusted. The
OE.NETWORK_SEGREGATION requires protects the TOE network
against attacks from external networks and prevents physical access to
the TOE network.
The following table maps the assumptions of the problem established to the security
objectives of the TOE and the security objectives of the operational environment.
Table 4-5 Assumption Rationale
Assumption Security Objectives
A.PHYSICAL_
PROTECTION
The OE.PHYSICAL objective ensures that the TOE should be
physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to
physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the
device's physical interconnections and correct operation.
A.LIMITED_F
UNCTIONALI
TY
The OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE objective ensures that the TOE
provides networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose
computing.
A.TRUSTED_
USERS
The OE.TRUSTED_USER objective ensures that the TOE users should
be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization.
This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and
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Assumption Security Objectives
adhering to guidance documentation.
The OE.NETWORK_SEGREGATION objective ensures that access
to non-authorized personnel is prevented.
A.
NETWORK_S
EGREGATION
The OE.NETWORK_SEGREGATION objective ensures that any
Internet attacks are prevented by LAN which the TOE is connected to,
which is also protected against unauthorized access.
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Huawei Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
19
5 Extended Components Definition
No extended components have been defined for this ST.
Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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6 Security Requirements
Security Functional Requirements
6.1
SECURITY AUDIT (FAU)
6.1.1
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- All auditable events for the [ selection, choose one of: not specified ] level of audit; and
- [assignment: Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 6-1]
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
- Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
- For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [assignment:none ] .
Table 6-1 Auditable Events
Requirement Auditable Events
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts
limit is met or exceeded.
FMT_MOF.1 Configure the management
function
FPT_STM.1 Configure the timestamp
FTA_MCS.1 Unsuccessful login attempts
limit is met or exceeded.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an
interactive session.
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Requirement Auditable Events
FTP_TRP.1 1. Initiation of the trusted
path.
2. Termination of the
trusted path.
3. Failure of the trusted
path functions.
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be
able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: System administrator and Advanced
Operator] with the capability to read [assignment: all audit information] from the audit
records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS)
6.1.2
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: RSA] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [assignment: 2048 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: U.S. NIST FIPS PUB
186-4 ].
FCS_CKM.1/DATA_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [[assignment: random number generation] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment:
NONE].
Application Note:
The algorithm used to encrypt the video stream is directly uses the random number as the
AES256 KEY.
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [[assignment: Key derivation function] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 128, 256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment:
RFC5246].
Application Note:
The Key of the AES256 algorithm using in TLS1.2 is generated by Key derivation function of
RFC5246.
FCS_CKM.1/ KeyedHash Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [[assignment: Key derivation function and specified
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cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 160, 256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment:
RFC5246].
FCS_CKM.4/RSA Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: full flash erase by overwriting with 0]
that meets the following:[assignment: NONE].
FCS_CKM.4/DATA_AES Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: full flash erase by overwriting with 0]
that meets the following:[assignment: NONE].
FCS_CKM.4/TLS_AES Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: full flash erase by overwriting with 0]
that meets the following:[assignment: NONE].
FCS_CKM.4/ KeyedHash Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: full flash erase by overwriting with 0]
that meets the following:[assignment: NONE].
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption，decryption] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: AES used in CBC mode] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 128, 256 bits] that meet the following:[assignment:
FIPS197].
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: cryptographic signature services
(generation and verification)] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[assignment: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm ] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
2048 bits bits] that meet the following:[assignment: U.S. NIST FIPS PUB 186-4].
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: cryptographic hashing services] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: SHA-256，SHA1] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: : cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes
[assignment: 256，160] that meet the following:[assignment: FIPS180-4].
Application NOTE:SHA256 is only one used in Signature Generation and Verification.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: keyed-hash message authentication] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
HMAC-SHA-1,HMAC-SHA-256 ] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 160 bits used
in HMAC-SHA-1, 256 bits used in HMAC-SHA-256] and message digest sizes [selection:
160,256 bits] that meet the following:[assignment: FIPS198].
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IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)
6.1.3
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: an administrator configurable positive
integer within [assignment: 5] ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
[assignment: Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely.].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
[selection: surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: terminate the session of the user trying
to authenticate and block the user account for authentication for default 5 minutes].
* Max. incorrect password inputs shall be at least set to 1.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [assignment:
1. user ID
2. user level
3. SHA256 hashes of passwords
4. temporary blocking time for user accounts after unsuccessful authentication
attempts
5. time when users are logging in and logging off
].
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT)
6.1.4
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of]
the functions [assignment: defined in FMT_SMF.1] to [assignment: System administrator
and Advanced Operator].
Application Note
Just the System Administrator has the ability to configure the authentication failure
parameters for FIA_AFL.1.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[assignment:
1. Ability to administer the TOE remotely;
2. Ability to configure the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to the
same user;
Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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3. Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
4. No other capabilities.].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment:
1. System Administrator
2. Advanced Operator
3. Common Operator].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT)
6.1.5
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
TOE ACCESS (FTA)
6.1.6
FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_MCS.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong
to the same user.
FTA_MCS.1.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [assignment: 10] sessions per
user.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: 10 mins].
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive
session.
TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS (FTP)
6.1.7
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection:
remote] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection:
modification, disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: remote users] to initiate communication via
the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user
authentication].
Security Assurance Requirements
6.2
ASE_REQ.2.1C: The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
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ASE_REQ.2.2C: All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C: The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C: All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.9C: The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
The development and the evaluation of the TOE shall be done in accordance to the following
security assurance requirements: EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2
The following table shows the assurance requirements by reference the individual components
in [CC31R4P3]
Table 6-2 SecurityAssurance Requirements
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1: Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1: Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1: ST introduction
ASE_TSS.1: TOE summary specification
ASE_OBJ.2: Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2: Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1: Security problem definition
ALC: Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.3: Authorisation controls
ALC_CMS.3: Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1: Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1: Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1: Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_FLR.2: Flaw reporting procedures
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1: Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.3: Functional specification with complete
summary
ADV_TDS.2: Architectural design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2: Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1: Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1: Functional testing
ATE_IND.2: Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2: Vulnerability analysis
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Security Requirements Rationale
6.3
SFR Necessity and Sufficiency Analysis
6.3.1
Table 6-3 Tracing of security SFR to Security Ojectives
O.SYS
TEM_
MONI
TORI
NG
O.AU
DIT_V
IEW
O.CR
YPTO
GRAP
HIC_F
UNCT
IONS
O.PR
OTEC
TED_
COM
MUNI
CATI
ONS
O.SES
SION_
ACCE
SS
O.ID_
AUTH
O.SEC
URIT
Y_MA
NAGE
O.AD
MIN_
ROLE
FAU_
GEN.1
X
FAU_
GEN.2
X
FAU_S
AR.1
X
FCS_C
KM.1/
RSA
X
FCS_C
KM.1/
DADA
_AES
X
FCS_C
KM.1/
TLS_A
ES
X
FCS_C
KM.1/
Keyed
Hash
X
FCS_C
KM.4/
RSA
X
FCS_C
KM.4/
DADA
_AES
X
FCS_C
KM.4/
TLS_A
ES
X
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O.SYS
TEM_
MONI
TORI
NG
O.AU
DIT_V
IEW
O.CR
YPTO
GRAP
HIC_F
UNCT
IONS
O.PR
OTEC
TED_
COM
MUNI
CATI
ONS
O.SES
SION_
ACCE
SS
O.ID_
AUTH
O.SEC
URIT
Y_MA
NAGE
O.AD
MIN_
ROLE
FCS_C
KM.4/
Keyed
Hash
FCS_C
OP.1/D
ataEncr
yption
X
FCS_C
OP.1/Si
gGen
X
FCS_C
OP.1/H
ash
X
FCS_C
OP.1/K
eyedHa
sh
X
FIA_A
FL.1
X
FIA_A
TD.1
X
FIA_U
AU.2
X
FIA_UI
D.2
X
FMT_
MOF.1
X
FMT_S
MF.1
X
FMT_S
MR.1
X X
FPT_S
TM.1
X
FTA_
MCS.1
X
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O.SYS
TEM_
MONI
TORI
NG
O.AU
DIT_V
IEW
O.CR
YPTO
GRAP
HIC_F
UNCT
IONS
O.PR
OTEC
TED_
COM
MUNI
CATI
ONS
O.SES
SION_
ACCE
SS
O.ID_
AUTH
O.SEC
URIT
Y_MA
NAGE
O.AD
MIN_
ROLE
FTA_S
SL.3
X
FTA_S
SL.4
X
FTP_T
RP.1
X
Table 6-4 Justification of tracing
Security
Objective
Rationale
O.SYSTEM_M
ONITORING
This objective is satisfied by:
FAU_GEN.1-specifying the audit events generated by the TOE
FAU_GEN.2-recording within each audit record information.
FPT_STM.1-Timestamps associated with the audit record must be
reliable.
O.AUDIT_VIE
W
This objective is satisfied by:
FAU_SAR.1-specifying a mechanism for authorized users to review all
audit records.
O.CRYPTOGR
APHIC_FUNC
TIONS
This objective is satisfied by:
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-specifying cryptographic key generation by RSA.
FCS_CKM.4/RSA-specifying cryptographic key destruction by RSA.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption-specifying encryption and decryption by
AES.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen-specifying cryptographic signature services by
RSA Digital Signature Algorithm.
FCS_COP.1/Hash-specifying Hash Cryptographic Operation by
SHA***.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash-specifying KeyedHash Cryptographic
Operation by HMAC-SHA***.
O.PROTECTE
D_COMMUNI
CATIONS
This objective is satisfied by:
FTP_TRP.1-specifying the security trusted path by HTTPS.
O.SESSION_A
CCESS
This objective is satisfied by:
FTA_MCS.1-specifying basic limitation on multiple concurrent
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Security
Objective
Rationale
sessions by same user.
FTA_SSL.3-specifying terminate an interactive session after a
configurable time.
FTA_SSL.4-specifying user-initiated termination of the user's own
interactive session.
O.ID_AUTH This objective is satisfied by:
FIA_AFL.1-specifying that an account is locked after a specified
number of unsuccessful authentication attempts on the account.
FIA_ATD.1-specifying the user security attributes associated with
users.
FIA_UAU.2-specifying the authentication of TOE administrators.
FIA_UID.2-specifying the identification of TOE administrators.
O.SECURITY_
MANAGE
This objective is satisfied by:
FMT_MOF.1-specifying management of security functions behaviour.
FMT_SMF.1-specifying the management of security functions.
FMT_SMR.1-specifying the user roles supported by the TOE.
O.ADMIN_RO
LE
This objective is satisfied by:
FMT_SMR.1-specifying the user roles supported by the TOE.
SFR Dependency Analysis
6.3.2
Table 6-5 SFR Missing dependencies justification
SFR Required Fulfilled
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FCS_CKM.1/RSA FCS_CKM.4/RSA
[
FCS_CKM.2/RSA
or
FCS_COP.1/RSA
]
FCS_CKM.4/RSA
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.1/DATA
_AES
FCS_CKM.4/
DATA_AES
[
FCS_CKM.2/
FCS_CKM.4/ DATA_AES
FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption
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SFR Required Fulfilled
DATA_AES or
FCS_COP.1/
DataEncryption
]
FCS_CKM.1/TLS
_AES
FCS_CKM.4/ TLS
_AES
[
FCS_CKM.2/ TLS
_AES or
FCS_COP.1/
DataEncryption
]
FCS_CKM.4/ TLS _AES
FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption
FCS_CKM.1/Keyed
Hash
FCS_CKM.4/
KeyedHash
[
FCS_CKM.2/
KeyedHash or
FCS_COP.1/
KeyedHash
]
FCS_CKM.4/ KeyedHash
FCS_COP.1/ KeyedHash
FCS_CKM.4/RSA [
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
]
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.4/
DATA_AES
[
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/
DATA_AES
]
FCS_CKM.1/ DATA_AES
FCS_CKM.4/
TLS_AES
[
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/ TLS
_AES
]
FCS_CKM.1/ TLS _AES
FCS_CKM.4/
KeyedHash
[
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/
FCS_CKM.1/ KeyedHash
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SFR Required Fulfilled
KeyedHash _AES
]
FCS_COP.1/DataEn
cryption
FCS_CKM.4/AES
[
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/AES
]
FCS_CKM.4/DATA_AES
FCS_CKM.4/TLS_AES
FCS_CKM.4/DATA_AES
FCS_CKM.4/TLS_AES
FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_CKM.4/RSA
[
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
]
FCS_CKM.4/RSA
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_CKM.4
[
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
]
This SFR specifies keyless hashing
operations, so initialisation and destruction
of keys are not relevant
FCS_COP.1/Keyed
Hash
FCS_CKM.4/
KeyedHash
[
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/
KeyedHash
]
FCS_CKM.4/ KeyedHash
FCS_CKM.1/ KeyedHash
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2
FIA_ATD.1 None None
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2
FIA_UID.2 None None
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 None None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2
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SFR Required Fulfilled
FPT_STM.1 None None
FTA_MCS.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2
FTA_SSL.3 None None
FTA_SSL.4 None None
FTP_TRP.1 None None
SAR Rationale
6.3.3
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were chosen.
The Evaluation Assurance Level 3+ has been chosen to commensurate with the threat
environment that is experienced by typical consumers of the TOE.
SAR Dependency Analysis
6.3.4
ASE_REQ.2.5C: Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
Table 6-6 SAR Missing dependencies justification
SAR Required Fulfilled Missing
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_INT.1,
ASE_ECD.1,
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_INT.1,
ASE_ECD.1,
ASE_REQ.1
None
ASE_ECD.1 None None None
ASE_INT.1 None None None
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.1,
ADV_FSP.1
ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.1,
ADV_FSP.1
None
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1 None
AGD_PRE.1 None None None
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1 None
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_ECD.1
None
ASE_SPD.1 None None None
ALC_CMC.3 ALC_CMS.1,
ALC_DVS.1,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.1,
ALC_DVS.1,
ALC_LCD.1
None
ALC_CMS.3 None None None
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SAR Required Fulfilled Missing
ALC_DEL.1 None None None
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.1,
ADV_TDS.1
ADV_FSP.1,
ADV_TDS.2
(hierarchically
above ADV_TDS.1)
None
ADV_FSP.3 ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.2
(hierarchically
above ADV_TDS.1)
None
ADV_TDS.2 ADV_FSP.3 ADV_FSP.3 None
ALC_DVS.1 None None None
ALC_LCD.1 None None None
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.2,
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.3
(hierarchically
above ADV_FSP.2),
ATE_FUN.1
None
ATE_DPT.1 ADV_ARC.1,
ADV_TDS.2,
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.1,
ADV_TDS.2,
ATE_FUN.1
None
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 ATE_COV.2
(hierarchically
above ATE_COV.1)
None
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.2,
AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_COV.1,
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.3
(hierarchically
above ADV_FSP.2),
AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_COV.2
(hierarchically
above
ATE_COV.1),
ATE_FUN.1
None
AVA_VAN.2 ADV_ARC.1,
ADV_FSP.2,
ADV_TDS.1,
AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1
ADV_ARC.1,
ADV_FSP.3
(hierarchically
above ADV_FSP.2),
ADV_TDS.2
(hierarchically
above
ADV_TDS.1),
AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1
None
ALC_FLR.2 None None None
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7 TOE Summary Specification
Table 7-1 Justification of tracing
TSF Rationale
Security Audit This TSF is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
FAU_GEN.1- The TOE generates an audit record that is stored
internally within the TOE whenever an audited event occurs.
The TOE is able to generate the audit record of the following auditable
events:
 Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions, automatically
operating with the restarting process.
 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.
 Configure the management function
 Configure the timestamp
 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.
 The termination of an interactive session
 The function of the TLS session, which involve the initiation,
termination and failure.
And for all the audited event, the TOE will generate the log with the
following information:
 Date and time of the event
 type of event
 subject identity
 and the outcome (success or failure) of the event
With these log information, Each of the events is specified in enough detail
to identify the user for which the event is associated, when the event
occurred, where the event occurred, the outcome of the event, and the type
of event that occurred.
FAU_GEN.2- The TOE shall ensure that each auditable event is associated
with the user that triggered the event and as a result they are traceable to a
specific user.
FAU_SAR.1-the TOE fulfills this requirement by providing admin user,
And admin user has the privilege to review the audit log.
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TSF Rationale
Cryptographic
support
The TOE provides cryptographic support for the following security
functionality:
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation- The TOE shall
generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm RSA2048. RSA is implemented in the following
protocols: TLS/HTTPS
FCS_CKM.4/RSA Cryptographic key destruction-The TOE shall
destroy cryptographic keys by overwriting the flash with zero . RSA is
implemented in the following protocols: TLS/HTTPS
FCS_CKM.1/DATA_AES Cryptographic key generation- The TOE
shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm random number generation with
specified cryptographic key sizes 256 bits.
FCS_CKM.4/DATA_AES Cryptographic key destruction- The TOE
shall destroy cryptographic keys by overwriting the flash with zero .
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic key generation- The TOE
shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Key derivation function n with
specified cryptographic key sizes 128,256 bits. TLS_AES is implemented
in the following protocols: TLS1.2
FCS_CKM.4/TLS_AES Cryptographic key destruction- The TOE
shall destroy cryptographic keys by overwriting the flash with zero .
FCS_CKM.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic key generation - The TOE
shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Key derivation function n with
specified cryptographic key sizes 160,256 bits. KeyedHash is
implemented in the following protocols: TLS1.2
FCS_CKM.4/TLS_AES Cryptographic key destruction- The TOE
shall destroy cryptographic keys by overwriting the flash with zero .
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption-The TOE provides symmetric encryption
and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC mode (128, 256bits).AES is
implemented in the following protocols: TLS/HTTPS
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature
Generation and Verification)-The TOE shall perform in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA2048 with SHA 256. RSA is
implemented in the following protocols: TLS/HTTPS
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)-The
TSF provides a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA256，SHA1 for
digest. SHA256 and SHA1-160 is implemented in the following protocols:
TLS/HTTPS
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash
Algorithm)-The TOE provides HMAC-SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA256 for
digest. HMAC-SHA256 is implemented in the following protocols:
TLS/HTTPS
Identification
and
Authentication
The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the
following security functional requirements:
FIA_AFL.1-the TOE fulfills this requirement by preventing login of
Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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TSF Rationale
administrators who have reached a defined threshold of unsuccessful
authentication attempt.
The TOE provides the authorized administrator the ability to specify the
maximum number (default to 5 times) of unsuccessful authentication
attempts through remote administrative interface (login unsuccessfully by 3
times, and Verified code is required), before an offending account will be
locked out for an administratively defined time period. When an account
attempting to log into an administrative interface reaches the
administratively set maximum number of failed authentication attempts, the
account will not be granted access to the administrative functionality of the
TOE until the time period has elapsed(default to 5 min).
FIA_ATD.1-the TOE fulfills this requirement by maintaining individual
accounts with the following attributes:
 user name
 user level
 SHA256 hashes of passwords
 temporary blocking time for user accounts after unsuccessful
authentication attempts
 time when users are logging in and logging off
With these user attributes, the TOE could identify, authenticate,
authorize all users, and manage the authentication process.
FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2-the TOE fulfills these requirements by
preventing user access to the TOE until the user is successfully
identified and authenticated, even the the least privilege role account
which is the common operator.
Security
Management
The admin user creates all initial users uniformly. When creating users,
the admin user can bind roles to the users and assign rights to the roles.
The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following
security functional requirements:
FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_SMF.1-
The system can log in remotely through the admin account and
password. The passwords can also be changed. All access attempts to
systems or data must be authenticated, authorized, and recorded in logs.
You can change the maximum number of multipoint logins (default to
10) of a user. The system administrator can specify the maximum
number (5times) of incorrect password attempts for an account. If the
maximum number of incorrect password attempts is reached, the
account is locked.
FMT_SMR.1- The system administrator can audit logs and use log
records to detect potential risks in the system.
The system must record the operations on major services in logs. Access
to log files must be controlled to ensure log file security. The system
administrator must maintain logs as follows: Assign the rights to query
logs to dedicated personnel.
Protection of The protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following
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TSF Rationale
the TSF security functional requirements:
FPT_STM.1-The TOE provides a source of date and time information
used in audit event timestamps. User can optionally be set to receive clock
updates from website.
TOE access The TOE access function is designed to satisfy the following security
functional requirement:
FTA_MCS.1-the TOE fulfills this requirement by restricting the
maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to the same user.
And the maximum number of defaults is 10, supported configurable.
FTA_SSL.3- Authorized administrators can configure maximum inactivity
time-out values for remote administrative sessions. When the idle time limit
has been reached, the session will be terminated, and any administrator who
was using the session will be required to initiate and authenticate a new
session.
FTA_SSL.4-Administrators are able to initiate termination (logout) of their
own authenticated interactive sessions.
Trusted Path The trusted path function is designed to satisfy the following security
functional requirement:
FTP_TRP.1-the TOE fulfills this requirement by providing secure
channels (via TLS) when a remote user communicates with the TOE.
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Huawei Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
38
8 Acronyms
The following table shows the acronyms used in this Security Target
Table 8-1 Acronyms
Acronym Meaning
ST Security Target
PP Protection Profile
CC Common Criteria
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFi TSF Interface
IT Information Technology
OSP Organisational Security Policies
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSS TOE Summary Specification
IPC IP Camera
Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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9 Glossary of Terms
Table 9-1 Glossary of Terms
Term Meaning
Augmentation Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package
Evaluation
Assurance
Level
Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a
point on the CC predefined assurance scale, that form an assurance
package
Operational
Environment
Environment in which the TOE is operated
Protection
Profile
Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE
type
Security
Target
Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE
Target Of
Evaluation
Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by
guidance
Huawei IP Camera Series products running
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10 Document References
The following table shows the documents referenced in this Security Target
Table 10-1 Document References
Reference Document
CC31R4P1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, Part 1: Introduction and general model
CC31R4P2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, Part 2: Security functional components
CC31R4P3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, Part 3: Security assurance components
CEM31R4 Common Criteria Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4