JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
Certification Report
SAITO Yutaka, Commissioner
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2024-03-26 (ITC-4876)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0827
Product Name
RICOH IM C7010, nashuatec IM C7010,
Rex Rotary IM C7010, Gestetner IM C7010
with Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option
Type M52 320GB
Version and Release Numbers E-1.00
Product Manufacturer RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Conformance of Functionality PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S.
Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009)
Assurance Package EAL2 Augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Name of IT Security Evaluation
Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2024-09-09
YANO Tatsuro, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards
prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification
Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
Evaluation Result: Pass
"RICOH IM C7010, nashuatec IM C7010, Rex Rotary IM C7010, Gestetner IM C7010 with
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option Type M52 320GB version E-1.00" has been
evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the
"Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology Promotion Agency,
Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published
by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................4
1.1 Product Overview..............................................................................................4
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package........................................................4
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality...................................................................4
1.1.3 Disclaimers ................................................................................................5
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation .......................................................................................6
1.3 Certification......................................................................................................6
2. Identification...........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy ........................................................................................................8
3.1 Security Function Policies..................................................................................9
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies .........................................................9
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies....................10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ...................................................................13
4.1 Usage Assumptions .........................................................................................13
4.2 Environmental Assumptions ............................................................................13
4.3 Clarification of Scope.......................................................................................15
5. Architectural Information ......................................................................................16
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components.......................................................................16
5.2 IT Environment ..............................................................................................18
6. Documentation......................................................................................................19
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results .........................................20
7.1 Evaluation Facility..........................................................................................20
7.2 Evaluation Approach .......................................................................................20
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity........................................................................20
7.4 IT Product Testing...........................................................................................21
7.4.1 Developer Testing......................................................................................21
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing ..................................................................23
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing....................................................................25
7.5 Evaluated Configuration..................................................................................27
7.6 Evaluation Results ..........................................................................................28
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations............................................................28
8. Certification..........................................................................................................29
8.1 Certification Result .........................................................................................29
8.2 Recommendations ...........................................................................................29
9. Annexes................................................................................................................30
10. Security Target ..................................................................................................30
11. Glossary ............................................................................................................31
12. Bibliography ......................................................................................................32
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
4
1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "RICOH IM C7010, nashuatec IM C7010, Rex Rotary IM C7010,
Gestetner IM C7010 with Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option Type M52 320GB version
E-1.00" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by RICOH COMPANY, LTD., and
the evaluation of the TOE was completed on 2024-08-30 by ECSEC Laboratory Inc.,
Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to
report to the sponsor, RICOH COMPANY, LTD., and provide security information to
procurement entities and consumers who are interested in the TOE.
Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements
of the TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes procurement entities who purchase the TOE to be readers.
Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance
requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product
itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer
to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
The TOE conforms to the following protection profile [14] [15] (hereinafter referred to as the
"conformance PP").
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009)
Assurance Package of the TOE is EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is a Multifunction Product (hereinafter referred to as "MFP"), which provides the
functions of copy, printer, scanner, fax and document server.
The TOE provides security functions required for the conformance PP in order to prevent
unauthorised disclosure or alteration of the document data processed by MFP and the
setting information affecting security.
For these security functionalities, the evaluation for the validity of the design policy and the
correctness of the implementation is conducted in the scope of the assurance package.
The next clause describes the assumed threats and assumptions in the TOE.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
5
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
The TOE assumes the following threats.
There are threats of unauthorised disclosure and alteration of assets such as document data
processed by the TOE and the setting information relevant to security functions due to
unauthorised access to the TOE or the communication data on the network.
To counter such threats, the TOE provides security functions required for the conformance
PP such as identification and authentication, access control, encryption, etc.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The TOE is assumed to be operated under the following assumptions.
It is assumed that the TOE is located in an environment where physical components and
interfaces of the TOE are protected from the unauthorised access. For the operation, the
TOE shall be properly configured, maintained, and managed according to the guidance
documents.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
The following operation is not ensured by this evaluation:
- Operational environments and configurations different from those described in "4.2
Environmental Assumptions"
- The TOE with settings different from those described in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration"
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
6
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2024-
08, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according to
the publicised documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document"[1],
"Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for Approval of IT
Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] prepared by the
Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and confirmed that the TOE
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The certification
oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process.
The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns were fully resolved, and that the TOE
evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or
[7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification
Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report and fully concluded certification activities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
7
2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: RICOH IM C7010, nashuatec IM C7010,
Rex Rotary IM C7010, Gestetner IM C7010
with Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option Type M52 320GB
TOE Version: E-1.00
Developer: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
The TOE consists of the MFP and optional products. The TOE components are listed in Table
2-1.
Table 2-1 TOE Components
MFP Optional Product
Product Name Model Code
IM C7010 D0F2-17 Fax Option Type M52, HDD Option Type M52 320GB
IM C7010 D0F2-27 Fax Option Type M52, HDD Option Type M52 320GB
The TOE version is a combination of multiple software and hardware versions in the TOE.
Refer to Chapter 1.2 of the ST for the TOE version in detail.
Users can verify that a product is the TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the following
means.
- Confirm that the product name and model code displayed on the product exterior match
those listed in Table 2-1.
- Confirm that the name described on the label sticker of the packing box for the optional
products (Fax Unit, HDD Option) matches the optional products listed in Table 2-1.
- Operate as described in the product guidance, and confirm that the software and
hardware names, versions and the part numbers displayed on the operation panel of the
product match those listed in Chapter 1.2 of the ST.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
8
3. Security Policy
This chapter describes security function policies that the TOE adopts to counter threats, and
organisational security policies.
The TOE provides the MFP basic functions such as copy, printer, scanner, fax and document
server. It has the functionality to store user document data in the TOE and to communicate
with user terminals and various servers via a network.
The TOE provides security functions that satisfy the requirements of the Conformance PP,
to protect the document data processed by the TOE and setting data etc. affecting security.
Table 3-1 describes users of the TOE. The TOE users are classified into normal user and
administrator, and administrators are classified into supervisor and MFP administrator.
Table 3-1 TOE Users
User Definition Explanation
Normal user A user who is allowed to use the TOE basic
functions.
Administrator MFP
administrator
A user who is allowed to manage the TOE.
Supervisor A user who is authorised to modify the login
password of the MFP administrator and to
release the lockout status of the MFP
administrator.
Tables 3-2 and 3-3 describe assets of the TOE.
Table 3-2 TOE Assets (user data)
Type Definition
Document data User's documents under the TOE management.
User job data Information related to the user's document or document
processing job.
Table 3-3 TOE Assets (TSF data)
Type Definition
TSF confidential
data
Data that requires integrity and confidentiality
among the data used by security functions.
For the TOE, it includes Login password and audit
logs.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
9
TSF protected
data
Data that requires only integrity among the data
used by security functions.
For the TOE, it includes login user name, minimum
character number of password, access control related
settings, etc., which are setting values for security
functions, excluding the TSF confidential data.
3.1 Security Function Policies
The TOE possesses the security functions to counter the threats described in Section 3.1.1
and to satisfy the organisational security policies described in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies
3.1.1.1 Threats
The TOE assumes the threats described in Table 3-4 and provides the security functions to
counter them.
Table 3-4 Assumed Threats
Identifier Threat
T.DOC.DIS
(Document data
disclosure)
Document data under the TOE management may be
disclosed by unauthorised persons.
T.DOC.ALT
(Document data
alteration)
Document data under the TOE management may be
altered by unauthorised persons.
T.FUNC.ALT
(User job data
alteration)
User job data under the TOE management may be
altered by unauthorised persons.
T.PROT.ALT
(Alteration of TSF
protected data)
TSF Protected Data under the TOE management may
be altered by unauthorised persons.
T.CONF.DIS
(Disclosure of TSF
confidential data)
TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management
may be disclosed by unauthorised persons.
T.CONF.ALT
(Alteration of TSF
confidential data)
TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management
may be altered by unauthorised persons.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
10
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats
The TOE counters the threats described in Table 3-4 with the following security function
policies. The details of each security function are described in Chapter 5.
1) Countermeasure against the threats "T.DOC.DIS", "T. DOC.ALT" and "T.FUNC.ALT"
These are threats to the user data described in Table 3-2. The TOE counters the threats
with "Identification and Authentication Function", "Use-of-Feature Restriction Function",
"Document Access Control Function", "Residual Data Overwrite Function" and "Network
Protection Function".
"Identification and Authentication Function" allows only users who have succeeded in the
identification and authentication to use the TOE.
"Use-of-Feature Restriction Function" checks the permission given to the identified and
authenticated users when they try to use the MFP basic functions, and allows only
authorised users to use these functions.
"Document Access Control Function" performs access control when users try to access the
user data and allows only authorised users to access the user data.
"Residual Data Overwrite Function" overwrites the HDD area where deleted document
data and their fragments were stored to prevent the residual data from being reused.
"Network Protection Function" performs encrypted communications to protect
communication data when the TOE communicates to client computers and various servers.
With the above functions, the TOE prevents unauthorised disclosure and alteration of the
user data due to unauthorised use of the TOE or unauthorised access to the
communication data.
2) Countermeasure against the threats "T.PROT.ALT", "T.CONF.DIS" and "T.CONF.ALT"
These are threats to the TSF data described in Table 3-3. The TOE counters the threats
with "Identification and Authentication Function", "Security Management Function" and
"Network Protection Function".
"Identification and Authentication Function" and "Security Management Function" allow
only authorised users to access the TSF data.
"Network Protection Function" performs encrypted communications to protect
communication data when the TOE communicates to client computers and various servers.
With the above functions, the TOE prevents unauthorised disclosure and alteration of the
TSF data due to unauthorised use of the TOE or unauthorised access to the
communication data.
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
11
Organisational security policies required for the TOE are described in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5 Organisational Security Policies
Identifier Organisational Security Policy
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
(User identification and
authentication)
To maintain operational accountability and security,
give users the authority to use the TOE only when
authorized by the TOE owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICAION
(Software verification)
To detect corruption of the executable code in TSF,
implement procedures to self-test the executable code.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING
(Management of audit log
records)
To maintain operational accountability and security,
create and maintain records that provide audit trail of
TOE use and security-relevant events, protect them
from unauthorised disclosure and alteration, and make
them viewable only by authorised persons.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
(Management of external
interfaces)
To prevent unauthorised use of the external interfaces
of the TOE, control the operation of those interfaces by
the TOE and its IT environment.
3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies
The TOE provides the following security functions to meet the organisational security
policies described in Table 3-5. The details of each security function are described in Chapter
5.
1) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.USER.AUTHORIZATION"
The TOE implements this policy by "Identification and Authentication Function" and
"Use-of-Feature Restriction Function".
"Identification and Authentication Function" allows only users who have succeeded in the
identification and authentication to use the TOE.
"Use-of-Feature Restriction Function" checks the permission given to the identified and
authenticated users when they try to use the MFP basic functions, and allows only
authorised users to use these functions.
2) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION"
The TOE implements this policy by "Integrity Verification Function".
"Integrity Verification Function" verifies the integrity of the executable codes of security
functions at the TOE start up.
3) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.AUDIT.LOGGING"
The TOE implements this policy by "Audit Function".
"Audit Function" records events relevant to security functions as an audit log. The audit
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
12
log stored in the TOE can be read and deleted only by the identified and authenticated
MFP administrator.
4) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT"
The TOE implements this policy by "Identification and Authentication Function" and "Fax
Line Separation Function".
"Identification and Authentication Function" allows only users who have succeeded in the
identification and authentication to use the TOE. It also terminates the session after a
certain period of no operation by a user. In addition, it prevents unauthorised transfer of
data received from the operation panel or the LAN.
"Fax Line Separation Function" controls the data received from telephone lines and
prevents unauthorised data transfer from telephone lines to the LAN.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the TOE
as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 describes assumptions to operate the TOE. The effective performances of the TOE
security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions in Use of the TOE
Identifier Assumptions
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
(Access management)
The TOE is placed in a restricted or monitored
environment that is protected from unauthorised access
to the physical components of the TOE and data
interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING
(User training)
Users of the TOE are aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organisation, are trained to follow
those policies and procedures, and gain competence to
follow them.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING
(Administrator training)
Administrators are aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organisation, are trained to follow
the guidance and documents of the manufacturer, gain
competence to follow them, and are able to configure
and operate the TOE properly according to those
policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST
(Trusted administrator)
Administrators do not use their access rights for
malicious purposes.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
Figure 4-1 shows the assumed operational environment of the TOE. The TOE is installed in
a general office and connected to a local area network (hereinafter referred to as "LAN") and
the telephone line to use. Users use the TOE through the operation panel of the TOE itself
and client computers that are also connected to the LAN.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
14
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The components of the operational environment of the TOE are as follows:
1) Client computer
It is a general-purpose computer used by users. Web browser, mail client that supports
S/MIME, PCL6 Driver (version 1.0.0.0 or later) and Enhanced LAN FAX Driver (version
13.1.0.0 or later) provided by Ricoh are required. The following software is used in this
evaluation.
- OS: Windows 10, Windows 11
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge 107
- Mail client: Thunderbird 102.6.0
- Printer driver: PCL6 Driver 1.0.0.0
- Fax driver: Enhanced LAN Fax Driver 13.1.0.0
2) SMB server, FTP server, Mail server
They are servers used to send the user document data scanned by the TOE. Each server
requires software that supports IPsec and SMB protocols, IPsec and FTP protocols, or
SMTP protocol, respectively. The following software is used in this evaluation.
(SMB server)
- OS: Windows 10
- SMB software: Included in the OS
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
15
(FTP server)
- Configuration a:
- OS: Windows 10
- FTP software: IIS10 V10.0.19041.804
- Configuration b:
- OS: Linux (Ubuntu 20.04)
- FTP software: vsftpd 3.0.3
(Mail server)
- OS: Windows 10
- SMTP software: P-Mail Server Manager 1.91
3) syslog server
It is a server to store the audit logs generated by the TOE. It is used when audit log
transfer is enabled in the TOE settings. Software that supports syslog protocol with TLS
is required. The following software is used in this evaluation.
- OS: Linux (Ubuntu 20.04)
- syslog software: rsyslogd 8.2001.0
Although the reliability of hardware and software other than the TOE shown in this
configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation, it is assumed to be trustworthy.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The functions provided by the TOE or ensured by this evaluation have the following
restrictions.
1) Servers and client computers
The secure operation of servers and client computers cooperating with the TOE is the
responsibility of the administrators of these devices.
2) Encryption Function for the HDD
The function that encrypts data stored on the HDD in the TOE is not ensured by this
evaluation.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
16
5. Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE. The TOE is the entire MFP product.
Figure 5-1 TOE Components
The TOE functions consist of security functions and basic functions. The TOE security
functions are described below. Refer to Chapter 11 for the basic functions.
1) Identification and Authentication Function
This function is to identify and authenticate a user by the login user name and login
password when the user uses the TOE from the TOE operation panel or a client computer
(Web browser, printer driver, or fax driver).
In addition, the following functionalities are provided to reinforce the identification and
authentication.
- Account lockout after consecutive failed authentication attempts
- Restriction on minimum number of password characters and mandatory character types
- Session termination when no operation is performed for a certain period of time after
successful authentication
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
17
2) Use-of-Feature Restriction Function
This function is to restrict the use of the MFP basic functions to authorised users. When a
user tries to use any of the MFP basic functions, it is determined whether the user is allowed
to use the function based on the user's role and permissions set for each user.
3) Document Access Control Function
This function is to control access to data when a user operates document data and user job
data with any of the MFP basic functions. Access control is performed based on the owner
information of the document data and the user job data, as well as user's identification
information and role.
4) Residual Data Overwrite Function
This function is to overwrite the HDD area where document data was stored, with
specified data. This function is executed at the following timing:
- When a user deletes document information
- When a user job is complete
- When the MFP administrator specifies batch overwriting
In the case of batch overwriting, its overwriting method can be set by the MFP
administrator. On the other hand, in the case of deletion by user or user job completion,
the HDD is overwritten with random numbers.
5) Network Protection Function
This function is to protect communication data between the TOE and IT devices with the
cryptographic communication protocol.
6) Fax Line Separation Function
This function is to restrict data received from telephone lines to fax data and prevent
unauthorized data transfer from telephone lines to the LAN.
7) Security Management Function
This function is to restrict the settings, etc. of the security functions to the MFP
administrator. However, all users can change their own login password, and the supervisor
can change the login password of the MFP administrator.
8) Integrity Verification Function
This function is to verify the integrity of the executable codes of the security functions at
the time of TOE start-up. The verification uses hash values or digital signatures of various
software in the TOE. However, for the fax unit control software in the TOE, this function
outputs information for integrity verification, and a user compares the output information
with the information described in the guidance documents.
9) Audit Function
This function is to record audit events relevant to security functions as an audit log. The
audit log stored in the TOE can be read or deleted only by the identified and authenticated
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
18
MFP administrator. The audit log can be sent to the syslog server by the TOE settings.
5.2 IT Environment
The TOE communicates with servers and client computers via the LAN. The network
protection function of the TOE works in cooperation with those IT devices and uses the
following protocols:
- Client computer (Web browser): HTTP over TLS (TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3)
- Client computer (Printer driver, Fax driver): IPP over TLS (TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3)
- SMB server: IPsec
- FTP server: IPsec
- Mail server: S/MIME
- syslog server: Syslog over TLS (TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3)
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
19
6. Documentation
The identification of documents attached to the TOE is listed in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2.
There are two sets of the guidance documents depending on the sales region. TOE users are
required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy the
assumptions.
Table 6-1 Product-attached documents (English 1)
Document Name Version
Notes for Users D0E3-7543
Safe Use of This Machine D0E3-7546
Safety Information D0F2-7519
User Guide IM
C2010/C2010A/C2510/C2510A/C3010/C3010A/C3510/
C3510A/C4510/C4510A/C5510/C5510A/C6010/C7010
D0F27520
Security Reference D0E37534
Notes for Administrators: Using This Machine in a Network
Environment Compliant with IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009
D0F2-7522
2024.07.29
Notes on Security Functions D0F2-7523
2024.07.29
Help 83NHFB-
ENZ1.00 v284
Table 6-2 Product-attached documents (English 2)
Document Name Version
Notes for Users D0E3-7543
Safe Use of This Machine D0E3-7546
Safety Information D0F2-7518
User Guide IM
C2010/C2010A/C2510/C2510A/C3010/C3010A/C3510/
C3510A/C4510/C4510A/C5510/C5510A/C6010/C7010
D0F27520
Security Reference D0E37534
Notes for Administrators: Using This Machine in a Network
Environment Compliant with IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009
D0F2-7522
2024.07.29
Notes on Security Functions D0F2-7523
2024.07.29
Help 83NHFB-
ENZ1.00 v284
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
20
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the
Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute
of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual Recognition
Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It is
periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the
appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of
evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in
accordance with the assurance requirements in the CC Part 3. Details for evaluation
activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The Evaluation Technical
Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the
verdict of each work unit in the CEM.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
The evaluation started in 2024-03 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2024-08. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation
deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence
in relation to a series of evaluation conducted.
Additionally, the evaluator examined the implementation of the requirements for each work
unit of configuration management and delivery by visiting the development site and remote
inspection to the manufacturing sites in 2024-04 and 2024-05. For some manufacturing sites,
the Evaluation Facility determined that the site examination could be omitted and the
examination results in the past CC certification could be reused. Furthermore, the evaluator
conducted the sampling check of the developer testing and the evaluator testing by using
the developer testing environment at the Evaluation Facility or the developer site in 2024-
05 and 2024-07.
Concerns in the evaluation process that the Certification Body found were described as the
certification oversight reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility. After the
Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, those were reflected in the
Evaluation Technical Report.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
21
PSTN PSTN
Internal Network
7.4 IT Product Testing
The evaluator confirmed the validity of the testing that the developer had performed. As the
verification results of the evidence shown in the evaluation process and the testing
performed by the developer, the evaluator performed the reproducibility testing, additional
testing and penetration testing based on vulnerability assessments judged to be necessary.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The evaluator evaluated the integrity of the developer testing that the developer had
performed and the documentation of actual test results. The content of the developer testing
evaluated by the evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Developer Testing Environment
Figure 7-1 shows the testing configuration performed by the developer, and Table 7-1 lists
the main configuration items.
Figure 7-1 Configuration of the Developer Testing
TOE Fax machine
Client
computer
SMB
server
FTP
server
Telephone
switchboard
simulator
Mail
server
syslog
server
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
22
Table 7-1 Test Configurations
Configuration Item Detail
TOE - IM C7010 with Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option
Type M52 320GB E-1.00 (D0F2-17)
- IM C7010 with Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option
Type M52 320GB E-1.00 (D0F2-27)
Client computer OS: Windows 10, Windows 11
Web browser: Microsoft Edge 107
Mail client: Thunderbird 102.6.0
Printer driver: PCL6 Driver 1.0.0.0
Fax driver: Enhanced LAN Fax Driver 13.1.0.0
SMB server OS: Windows 10
SMB software: Included in the OS
FTP server - Configuration a:
OS: Windows 10
FTP software: IIS10 V10.0.19041.804 (Included in the
OS)
- Configuration b:
OS: Linux (Ubuntu 20.04)
FTP software: vsftpd 3.0.3
Mail server OS: Windows 10
SMTP software: P-Mail Server Manager 1.91
syslog server OS: Linux (Ubuntu 20.04)
syslog software: rsyslogd 8.2001.0
Telephone
switchboard
simulator
XF-A150 (Panasonic Corporation)
Fax machine RICOH IM C6000F, MFC-J877N (Brother Industries)
The TOE items tested by the developer are all the models included in the TOE.
The developer testing was performed in the TOE testing environment consistent with the
TOE configuration identified in the ST.
2) Summary of the Developer Testing
A summary of the developer testing is as follows.
a. Developer Testing Outline
An outline of the developer testing is as follows.
<Developer Testing Approach>
The external interfaces of the TOE are stimulated by operating the operation panel of the
TOE or the client computer, and the response, the behaviour of the TOE, the communication
data and the audit log are confirmed. For behaviours that cannot be confirmed on the
external interface of the TOE, the developer interface of the TOE and the TOE software
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
23
modified for the testing are used to confirm the internal operation of the TOE.
<Content of the Performed Developer Testing>
The expected values of testing results described in testing specifications which are provided
in advance by the developer were compared to the values of the actual developer testing
results described in the testing result reports which are also provided by the developer. As a
result, it was found that the values of the actual testing results are in conformity to those of
the expected testing results.
b. Scope of the Performed Developer Testing
The developer testing was performed on about 500 items by the developer.
By the coverage analysis, it was verified that all security functions and external interfaces
described in the functional specification had been tested.
c. Result
The evaluator confirmed the approach of the performed developer testing and the validity of
tested items, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the
testing plan and the actual testing approach.
The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected test results by the developer
and the actual test results performed by the developer.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator performed the sample testing to reconfirm the implementation of security
functions using the test items extracted from the developer testing. In addition, the
evaluator performed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the
"independent testing") to gain further confidence that security functions are certainly
implemented, based on the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.
The independent testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Independent Testing Environment
The configuration of the independent testing performed by the evaluator was the same as
the configuration of the developer testing as shown in Figure 7-1.
2) Summary of the Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing is as follows.
a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing
Viewpoints of the independent testing are described below, which are devised by the
evaluator based on the analysis of developer testing and the evaluation documentation
provided.
<Independent Testing Viewpoints>
1. Confirm variations of input data and operations that are different from the developer
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
24
testing.
2. Confirm execution timing of several TSFs and execution combinations that are not tested
by the developer.
3. Select the testing items for the sampling testing from the following viewpoints:
- The testing items are selected to include all of security functions and TSF interfaces.
- The testing items are selected to cover the different testing approaches and testing
environments.
- The testing items that contribute to the vulnerability evaluation are selected.
b. Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing that the evaluator performed is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
The independent testing was performed using the same testing approach as the developer
testing.
<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>
Based on the viewpoints of the independent testing, 11 items for the independent testing
and 59 items for the sampling testing were performed.
The outline of the main independent testing corresponding to the viewpoints is described in
Table 7-2.
Table 7-2 Outline of the Performed Independent Testing
Viewpoints for the
Independent Testing
Outline of the Independent Testing
1 - Confirm that the access control etc. are as specified under
the changed conditions.
- Confirm that the disabled functions and interfaces are
actually disabled.
2 - Confirm that the behaviour of the auto logout for multiple
logins and for changing its settings during login is as
specified.
- Confirm that the behaviour when operating the same data
from multiple interfaces is as specified.
c. Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the
evaluator confirmed the behaviour of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies
between the expected behaviour and all the test results.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
25
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing
(hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable
vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the
evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.
The penetration testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
1. Unauthorised access to the TOE may be caused by unexpected interfaces.
2. Security functions may be bypassed in case of entering data, for interfaces, which have
the values and formats that are unintended by the TOE.
3. There may be some vulnerabilities when implementing secure channels, and
consequently the security functions of the TOE may be bypassed.
4. Security functions may be bypassed by maintaining the TOE overloaded.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially exploitable
vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing configuration is identical with those of the developer testing shown
in Figure 7-1, and evaluator independent testing.
Table 7-3 lists key tools used in the penetration testing.
Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools
Name (Version) Outline
ZAP (2.14.0) Inspection tool of Web vulnerabilities with Proxy traffic
nmap (7.92) Port Scanning Tool
Burp Suite Professional
(1.7.37)
Inspection tool of Web vulnerabilities with Proxy traffic
Wireshark (3.6.2) Packet Capture Tool
PRET (0.40) A tool to inspect various vulnerabilities in print
processing.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
26
<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-4 describes outline of the penetration testing corresponding to the vulnerabilities of
concern.
Table 7-4 Outline of the Performed Penetration Testing
Vulnerability Outline of the Penetration Testing
1 - Confirm that there are no unexpected available interfaces by
using the port scanning tool, etc.
2 - Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities on Web
interfaces of the TOE by using Web browser and proxy tool.
- Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in the print
processing of the TOE using the inspection tool for the print
processing.
- Confirm that unintended behaviour is not observed even if
character strings that may cause unauthorized processing are
entered into the operation panel of the TOE.
3 - Confirm that there are no implementation-specific
vulnerabilities in the IPsec and TLS processing of the TOE.
- Confirm that parameters are not easily predicted by verifying
the randomness of numbers as parameters used in Web
interfaces.
4 - Confirm that the TOE is not unsecured when the fax reception
capacity is full or when all TOE functions are used
simultaneously.
c. Result
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any
exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could
exploit.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
27
7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The configuration conditions of the TOE, which are the prerequisites for this evaluation, are
described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to use the TOE securely
as ensured by the evaluation, the TOE must be set as described in the guidance documents.
Different settings from those described in the guidance documents are not subject to the
assurance of this evaluation.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
28
7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM as
per the Evaluation Technical Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009)
The TOE also conforms to the following SFR packages defined in the above PP.
- 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Document Storage and Retrieval Functions,
Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions,
Operational Environment B
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance
components.
- All assurance components of EAL2 package
- Additional assurance component ALC_FLR.2
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
29
8. Certification
The Certification Body performed the certification from the following viewpoints based on
the materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.
1. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
2. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
3. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed
such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and
the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report and related evaluation
documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification Body determined that
the TOE evaluation satisfies all assurance requirements for EAL2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2 in the CC Part 3.
8.2 Recommendations
Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer to the description
of "4.2 Environmental Assumptions" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" and to see whether
or not the evaluated scope of the TOE and the operational requirements meet the operational
conditions assumed by each individual.
To make sure of the TOE identification, checking the sticker on the surface of package as
well as display of the TOE should be required, as described in Chapter 2. Be sure to keep
the information described on this sticker to certainly identify the TOE.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
30
9. Annexes
There is no annex.
10. Security Target
The Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this
Certification Report.
RICOH IM C7010, nashuatec IM C7010, Rex Rotary IM C7010, Gestetner IM C7010 with
Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option Type M52 320GB Security Target, Version 1.00,
August 26, 2024, RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
31
11. Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
MFP Multifunction Product
The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Copy function A function to scan paper documents by the operation of the
TOE operation panel and duplicate them.
Document Server
function
A function to store or retrieve document data.
Fax function A function to send and receive faxes using the telephone line.
Printer function A function to receive user document data sent from the printer
driver of a client computer and print them by operating the
TOE operation panel.
Scanner function A function to scan paper documents by the operation of the
TOE operation panel and send the scanned data to an external
server.
Web Image Monitor
function
A function to operate the TOE from a Web browser of a client
computer.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0827-01-2024
32
12. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, December 2023,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, December 2023,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, October 2021,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
002, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
003, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[12] RICOH IM C7010, nashuatec IM C7010, Rex Rotary IM C7010, Gestetner IM C7010
with Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option Type M52 320GB Security Target,
Version 1.00, August 26, 2024, RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
[13] RICOH IM C7010, nashuatec IM C7010, Rex Rotary IM C7010, Gestetner IM C7010
with Fax Option Type M52 and HDD Option Type M52 320GB E-1.00 Evaluation
Technical Report, Version 1.2, August 30, 2024,
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center
[14] U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009)
[15] CCEVS Policy Letter #20, 15 November 2010, National Information Assurance
Partnership