BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012
for
SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0,
build version 1.0.308_6236
from
Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.64
BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012
SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0
build version 1.0.308_6236
from Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile for an
ArchiSafe Compliant Middleware for Enabling the
Long-Term Preservation of Electronic Documents
Version 1.0, 31 October 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0049-
2008
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 10 September 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................13
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
7.1 Exact Description of the evaluated TOE configuration..........................................15
7.2 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN...............................................................15
7.3 Evaluator Tests......................................................................................................16
7.3.1 Exact Description of the Test configuration.....................................................16
7.3.2 Independent Testing according to ATE_IND...................................................16
7.3.3 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN....................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................18
11 Security Target............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0, build version 1.0.308_6236 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0, build version
1.0.308_6236 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 3 August 2012. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH.
The product was developed by: OpenLimit SignCubes GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0, build version 1.0.308_6236 has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH
Mies-van-der-Rohe-Straße 8
80807 München
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The TOE is a software product providing the core of an ArchiSafe compliant archive
middleware which acts as secure archive gateway. It provides the following general
security functionalities:
• preventing the access to the archive from unknown client software application (CS)
by reliable identification and authentication of these external entities,
• preventing the storage of invalid submission data objects (SDO) by reliable
verification of the submission data object before forwarding them to the long-term
storage unit (SU) or another trusted application which in turn forwards the SDO to
the SU,
• forwarding of successfully checked SDOs to the dedicated SU only or another
trusted application which in turn forwards the SDO to the dedicated SU only,
• preventing the erasure of archive data objects (ADOs) by any other CS than the CS
which has also submitted this ADO and preventing the erasure of ADOs before
expiry of their retention time without a justification.
The complete TOE reference is given by:
• SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0, build version 1.0.308_6236.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Common Criteria Protection Profile for an ArchiSafe Compliant Middleware for Enabling
the Long-Term Preservation of Electronic Documents Version 1.0, 31 October 2008, BSI-
CC-PP-0049-2008 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.2. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
SF 1 Secure Client TOE Access
SF 2 Data Object Verification
SF 3 Secure Storage Unit Access
SF 4 Invalid Archive Data Object Erasure Prevention
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2. .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.4 to 3.6.
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This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: TOE in build version
1.0.308_6236 and under consideration of Java SDK 1.6.0_24 in its 64 bit version (running
on the operating systems RHEL 5.6/6.0 64bit). For details refer to chapter 8 of this report..
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0, build version 1.0.308_6236.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release (Static) SHA-256 hash value
1 SW MigSafeLibrary.jar8
1.0.308_6236
29d3d248903915909032431f58b7f98e
4af9c73e674fa7be2ec3067879725c7c
2 SW OverSignLibrary.jar9
3 SW CredentialStore.jar10
4 DOC MigSafeOverSign-
V1.0_Documentation.tgz
55cb8691150ae77b3171ab7d7c7149211
da29678a4cdc9613b19d202fe871d68
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered as a piece of software with accompanying guidance [10]. The
integrity of the TOE can be assured using cryptographic hash values. It consists of a set of
jar files that have to be integrated in a software component by the TOE integrator. In other
terms the TOE can only been used in its integrated form. The listed TOE libraries are
specific for each TOE integrator. For checking the TOE integrity, at first the integrity of the
TOE documentation archive has to be verified as following: The calculated SHA-256 hash
value of the file “MigSafeOverSign-V1.0_Documentation.tgz” has to be equal to the value
listed in table 2.
As second step, the so-called static SHA-256 hash value of the TOE’s libraries (aka. JAR
archives) has to be verified according to the procedure described in the user
documentation [10] as part of the verified TOE documentation archive: The calculated
SHA-256 hash value of the TOE’s libraries has to be equal to the value listed in table 2.
8
Integrator specific TOE library used in ATE.IND
21f96aae8865406f775fd49b6445fdd2692d3792906d33cd479ae2fc32a19cc6
9
dfd66fdae8f9f59d29930cc043c5adb92defac1353d8c9a7ae2a05aaacd9ae66
10
65cc937e6516d43eecb77f49d8ea4f307ab3dc1ceb80f9439831db317562c9fa
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The TOE controls the access to
the archive permitting archive requests only from successfully authenticated CS. For a
successfully identified and authenticated CS the TOE allows the following request types:
• Request for storing data objects in the storage
• Request for retrieving data objects from the storage
• Request for erasing data objects from the storage
• Request for retrieving evidence records
• Request for reading meta information
Thereby it prevents the storage of invalid data objects by reliable verification of the
submitted data objects before forwarding them to the SU. In case of a successful
verification the TOE securely passes the data objects to be archived to the SU. Moreover
TOE prevents the erasure of ADOs by any other CS than the CS which has submitted this
ADO and the erasure of ADOs before expiry of their retention time without a justification
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
• Trained and trustworthy TOE administrators
• All CS authenticate the TOE before data transfer
• Protected communication interconnections
• Secure configuration of the TOE
• Trustworthy applications for evidence data
• Storage access by the CS must pass the TOE
• TOE runs on a physically protected server
• Secure server configuration
• Reliable and secure storage of data in the SU
• Reliable time-stamps provided by the environment
• Reliably generated unique archive object identifier (AOID) provided by the
environment
• Secure CS with reliable authentication and access authorization of users
• Use of trustworthy cryptographic components
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE mainly decouples the data flow (i.e. the flow of archive objects) between third
party applications, such as document management systems, and the long-term storage
solutions. The architecture of the complete system is shown in Figure 1.
Internally TOE consists of three subsystems as shown in the following table:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
Subsystem Description
Common (including
Credential Store)
The subsystem “Common” includes
• functionalities to access the crypto provider component (module
"SDKEngine"),
• definitions of the interfaces to the storage plugin and the audit and
logging interfaces (module "Plugin-Interfaces"),
• functions for user-profile data storage (module "CredentialStore"),
• logging functions (module "logging"), and
• auxiliary functions, such as data conversion (module "Utilities").
MigSafe The subsystem MigSafe includes
• a definition of the interfaces of the CS to the subsystem MigSafe of
the TOE (module „MS-Interfaces“),
• accesses the long-term-storage via the the module Plugin-Interfaces
of the subsystem Common,
• the validation of data objects with a XML-Schema (module
„Validiation“),
• the filtering of XML-documents (module „Filter“).
OverSign The subsystem “OverSign” provides primarily functions for the preservation
and renewal of the evidentiary value of electronic signatures and the integrity
of the archived data objects.
Table 3: Subsystems of the TOE
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Exact Description of the evaluated TOE configuration
The TOE as identified in section 2 has been evaluated. The TOE has been tested in the
following configurations:
• TOE as delivered to customer / integrator
7.2 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The developer considered the TOE environment as defined in the Security Target. The
developer tests cover the following subsystems:
• Subsystem S1: MigSafe,
• Subsystem S2: OverSign and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012
• Subsystem S3: Common
and the following TSF interfaces:
• External Programming User Interface (EPUI) for client software.
Moreover, mechanisms of the security architecture of the TOE are also covered by tests.
Each test is implemented as an automatic test based on the JUnit test framework and is
executed on both operating systems RHEL 5.6 and 6.0. In addition a small subset of tests
requires manual interaction.
The test documentation consists of a test coverage and depth of testing analysis, test
plans for each of the test aspects (SF1, SF2, SF3, SF4, Integrity) and test result logs. The
test plans show the goal, execution, test steps and expected results of the tests. The test
result logs show that the tests identified in the test coverage and depth of testing analysis
(if not redundant to other tests) have been executed as expected by the developer or are
covered by manual tests.
7.3 Evaluator Tests
7.3.1 Exact Description of the Test configuration
The following test resources were used for the evaluator’s testing within the environment
of TÜViT:
• HW:
• Intel Core2 Quad Core CPU Q8200 @ 2.33 GHz
• 4 GB main memory
• 750 GB hard disk space
• Internet connectivity for access to time stamping provider and certificate
status information
• SW:
• RHEL 5.6/6.0 64bit
• JDK 1.6.0_24 x64
• Eclipse Platform 3.5.2
• Eclipse project zip file containing the developer tests
• JUnit version 4.8.2 (integrated in Eclipse project)
• Configuration file for crypto component (siqVirtualTerminal.cfg)
• OpenLimit Middleware Version 3 Server 1.2.0-2012022801 (x86_64)
7.3.2 Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The functional testing was performed using the test environment of the CLEF. All
configurations (RHEL 5.6/6.0 64bit) of the TOE being intended to be covered by the
current evaluation were tested. The overall test result is that no relevant deviations were
found between the expected and the actual test results.
Functional testing approach:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
The developer provided the TOE which the evaluator installed on a test machine. The
configuration of hardware and software on the test machine is consistent with the Security
Target.
TOE test configurations:
The TOE as delivered to the customer has been tested.
Subset size chosen:
All interfaces of the TOE Security Functions (i.e. the interface to the Client Software) as
well as all Security Functions are covered by independent functional tests.
Developer tests performed:
All automated developer tests have been repeated. The non-automated tests cover only a
small subset of the overall functionality and have therefore not been repeated.
Verdict for the activity:
The overall test result is that no relevant deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results. No attack scenario was actually successful in the TOE’s operational
environment, see below.
7.3.3 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
The penetration testing was performed using the test environment of the CLEF. All
configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested. The overall test result is that no relevant deviations were found between the
expected and the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
The developer provided the TOE which the evaluator installed on a test machine. The
configuration of hardware and software on the test machine is consistent with the Security
Target.
TOE test configurations:
The TOE as delivered to the customer has been tested.
Attack scenarios having been tested:
The four different attack scenarios having been tested are covering e.g. the authentication
process and unexpected input values.
SFRs penetration tested:
All SFRs have been penetration tested with an emphasis on the authentication
functionality of the TOE.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no critical deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results. No attack scenario was actually successful in the TOE’s operational
environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are
applied.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
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The version information and hash values of the TOE as depicted in Table 2: Deliverables
of the TOE executed with Java SDK 1.6.0_24 in its 64 bit version on the operating systems
RHEL 5.6 and RHEL 6.0 64bit (see chapter 7.3.1 for further details).
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile for an ArchiSafe Compliant
Middleware for Enabling the Long-Term Preservation of
Electronic Documents Version 1.0, 31 October 2008, BSI-CC-PP-
0049-2008 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
• SHA-256 according NIST FIPS Pub. 180-3 [12]
• RSA signature algorithm according PKCS#1 [11] with key length from 2048 to 4096
Bit
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012 Certification Report
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available, the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
As the TOE is a set of jar files that have to be integrated in a software component by the
TOE integrator, it is of utterly importance that the integrator follows the guidelines as given
in the integrator manual part of the file MigSafeOverSign-V1.0_Documentation.tgz
referenced in Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ADO Archive Data Object
AOID Archive Object IDentifier
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLEF Commercial Licensed Evaluation Facility
CS Client Software
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JDK Java Development Kit
PP Protection Profile
RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SDO Submission Data Object
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SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
ST Storage Unit
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TÜViT TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE11
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0685-2012, Version 1.8, 10.07.2012, Security Target
for SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0, OpenLimit SignCubes GmbH
[7] Common Criteria Protection Profile for an ArchiSafe Compliant Middleware for
Enabling the Long-Term Preservation of Electronic Documents Version 1.0, 31
October 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0049-2008
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 5, 02.08.2012, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH, (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, 10.07.2012, EVG-CM-List.xls (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE as part of MigSafeOverSign-
V1.0_Documentation.tgz: SecDocs Security Komponenten Version 1.0 – Handbuch
für Integratoren, Version 2.3, 24.07.2012 and SecDocs Security Komponenten
Version 1.0 – Handbuch für Administratoren, Version 2.0, 20.07.2012
[11] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, 14. June 2002
[12] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, FIPS Pub. 180-3, Secure
Hash Standard (SHS), U.S. Department of Commerce / National Institute of
Standards and Technology, October 2008
11
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
CC Part 3:
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Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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