National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
MAGNUM-SC-CC2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11639-2025
Dated: December 18, 2025
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
LaChiah Fugh
Matthew Downey
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Rupendra Kadtan
Fathi Nasraoui
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................. 5
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information....................................................................................................... 7
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 Security Audit.................................................................................................................................................10
4.2 Cryptographic Support...................................................................................................................................10
4.3 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................................................11
4.4 Security Management....................................................................................................................................11
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................12
4.6 TOE Access .....................................................................................................................................................12
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels..................................................................................................................................12
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope.................................................................................. 13
5.1 Assumptions...................................................................................................................................................13
5.2 Clarification of Scope.....................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation ..................................................................................................................... 14
7 IT Product Testing ................................................................................................................. 15
7.1 Developer Testing..........................................................................................................................................15
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .........................................................................................................15
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 16
8.1 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................................................16
8.2 Excluded Functionality...................................................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 19
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)...............................................................................................................19
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)......................................................................................19
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD) ...................................................................................................19
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..........................................................................................20
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ...................................................................20
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity.................................................................................................................20
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.....................................................................................................................21
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ......................................................................... 22
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 23
12 Security Target ...................................................................................................................... 24
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................. 25
14 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 26
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the MAGNUM-SC-CC2 V24.11.8 Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the
product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in December 2025. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the
below listed PPs.
• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E].
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 14 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_v1.0].
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev.5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev.5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The Validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions
justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in
the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products
against PPs containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE MAGNUM-SC-CC2 V24.11.8
Protection Profile • Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06
December 2023 [CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 14 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_v1.0]
Security Target MAGNUM-SC-CC2 Security Target, version 1.0
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for MAGNUM-SC-CC2, Version 1.3
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor and Developer Evertz Microsystems Ltd
Common Criteria Testing
Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Lisa Mitchell, Linda Morrison, Lori Sarem (MITRE)
LaChiah Fugh, Matt Downey (NIAP)
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is classified as a network device (a generic infrastructure device that can be connected
to a network). The TOE hardware device is the Evertz MAGNUM-SC-CC2 which includes the
MAGNUM-SC-CC2 (1 RU) with an AMD EPYC 7313P (16C/32T) in a Gigabyte E152-ZE1, running
MAGNUM-OS firmware v24.11.8. The MAGNUM-OS firmware is based on Ubuntu version 24.04
LTS (Noble). The MAGNUM-OS serves as the primary user and network interface device for the
MAGNUM control application.
Evertz MAGNUM software (v24.11.8) is a custom-developed application written primarily in
python. MAGNUM-SC-CC2 operates as a combination of an application layer and as part of the
integrated Linux platform stack, using a customized Ubuntu operating system. The TOE version
of MAGNUM (MAGNUM-SC-CC2) is only operable on Evertz provided platforms and hardware.
The TOE is an infrastructure network device that provides secure remote management, auditing,
and updating capabilities. The TOE provides secure remote management using an HTTPS/TLS web
interface and an SSH command line interface. The TOE generates audit logs and transmits the
audit logs to a remote syslog server over a mutually authenticated TLS channel. The TOE verifies
the authenticity of software updates by verifying the digital signature prior to installing any
update.
The scope of the evaluated functionality includes the following,
• Secure remote administration of the TOE via TLS and SSH.
• Secure Local administration of the TOE.
• Secure connectivity with remote audit servers.
• Secure access to the management functionality of the TOE.
• Identification and authentication of the administrator of the TOE.
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Figure 1 – Representative TOE Deployment
The physical boundaries of the TOE are outlined in Figure 1. The media and video components of
the IT environment are NOT part of the TOE physical boundary. The TOE is shipped to the
customer via commercial courier.
The IT Testing Environment Components used to test the TOE are shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2: IT Testing Environment Components
Component Required Purpose/Description
Syslog server Yes • Conformant with RFC 5424 (Syslog Protocol)
• Supporting Syslog over TLS (RFC 5425)
• Acting as a TLSv1.2 server
• Supporting Client Certificate authentication
• Supporting at least one of the following cipher suites:
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
IPX Video Switch Yes • Provides switching of video signals
• Acting as a TLSv1.2 server
• Supporting Client Certificate authentication
• Supporting at least one of the following cipher suites:
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
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Component Required Purpose/Description
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Management
workstation with web
browser
Yes • Supported browser: Chrome or Safari
• Supporting TLSv1.2
• Supporting at least one of the following ciphersuites:
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Management
workstation with remote
CLI
Yes • Supported SSH version: SSHv2
• Conformant with RFCs 4251-4254, 5647, 5656, 8308
and 8332.
Local Management
Workstation
Yes • Computer with terminal emulation software to access
the console interface (CLI)
CRL Server Yes • Conformant with RFC 5280
• Provides a list of revoked certificates.
• TOE uses the CRL server to check the revocation status
of a server’s presented certificate.
• Communication between the TOE and the CRL server
occurs over HTTP.
DNS Server Yes • Conformant with RFC 1035.
• Communication between the TOE and the DNS server
occurs over TCP.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the Collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, hereafter referred to as NDcPP v3.0e or NDcPP and Functional Package for SSH,
Version 1.0, hereafter referred to as PKG_SSH_v1.0.
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1.) Security audit
2.) Cryptographic support
3.) Identification and authentication
4.) Security management
5.) Protection of the TSF
6.) TOE access
7.) Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. Audit data are stored internally and
are only accessible to privileged administrators. The TOE supports access to the TSF using
administrator accounts for authentication and authorization to management and security
functions.
The TOE also supports sending audit records to a remote Syslog server. Audit records sent to the
remote server are protected by a TLS connection. Each audit record includes identity (username,
IP address, or process), date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome of the event.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes an OpenSSL library (openssl_3.0.13-0ubuntu3.5, openssl_fips version 3.0.9et2
and linux-image-generic_6.8.0.71) that implements CAVP validated cryptographic algorithms for
random bit generation, encryption/decryption, authentication, and integrity
protection/verification. These algorithms are used to provide security for the TLS, HTTPs, and SSH
connections for secure management and secure connections to a syslog and authentication
servers. TLS and HTTPs are also used to verify firmware updates. The cryptographic services
provided by the TOE are described below:
Table 3: TOE Cryptographic Protocols
Cryptographic Protocol Use within the TOE
TLS (client)
Secure connection to syslog and IPX video switches
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
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Cryptographic Protocol Use within the TOE
HTTPS/TLS (server)
Remote management
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
SSH(server)
Remote management
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
AES
Provides encryption/decryption in support of the TLS and SSH protocol.
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption ,FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
DRBG
Deterministic random bit generation use to generate keys.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
Secure hash
Used as part of digital signatures and firmware integrity checks.
FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
HMAC
Provides keyed hashing services in support of TLS.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
EC-DH
Provides key establishment for TLS.
FCS_CKM.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
ECDSA
Used to generate EC-DH components for key establishment for TLS.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
RSA
Provide key generation and signature generation and verification (PKCS1_V1.5) in
support of TLS.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/SigVer, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE authenticates administrative users using a username/password combination. The TOE
does not allow access to any administrative functions prior to successful authentication. The TOE
validates and authenticates X.509 certificates for all certificate uses.
The TOE supports passwords consisting of alphanumeric and special characters and enforces
minimum password lengths. The TSF supports certificates using RSA signature algorithms.
Certificates are used to authenticate trusted channels, not administrators. The TOE only allows
users to view the login warning banner prior to authentication. Remote administrators are locked
out after a configurable number of unsuccessful authentication attempts.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE allows users with the Security Administrator role to administer the TOE over a remote
web UI, remote CLI, or a local CLI. These interfaces do not allow the Security Administrator to
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execute arbitrary commands or executables on the TOE. Security Administrators can manage
connections to an external Syslog server, as well as determine the size of local audit storage.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements several self-protection mechanisms. This protection includes self-tests to
ensure the correct operations of cryptographic functions. Firmware upgrades, performed by a
Security Administrator, must pass two authentication tests. The TOE does not provide an
interface for the reading of secret or private keys. The TOE ensures timestamps, timeouts, and
certificate checks are accurate by maintaining a real-time clock.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE can be configured to display a warning and consent banner when an administrator
attempts to establish an interactive session over the CLI (local or remote) or remote web UI.
The TOE also enforces a configurable inactivity timeout for remote administrative sessions.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE uses Syslog over TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and
remote audit server and IP Video switch. The trusted channels utilize X.509 certificates to
perform mutual authentication. The TOE initiates the TLS trusted channel with the remote server.
The TOE uses HTTPS/TLS and SSH to provide a trusted path between itself and remote
administrative users. The TOE does not implement any additional methods of remote
administration. The remote administrative users are responsible for initiating the trusted path
when they wish to communicate with the TOE.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 14 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_v1.0]
That information has not been reproduced here and the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0 should
be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0 as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for,
nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities
to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one
that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be
relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• MAGNUM-SS-CC2 Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria, Version
0.7.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified
in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
15
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in ETR for MAGNUM-SC-CC2 V24.11.8, which is not publicly
available. The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the below claimed PPs.
• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 14 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_v1.0].
The Independent Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not
duplicated here.
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8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The scope of the evaluated functionality includes the following,
• Secure remote administration of the TOE via TLS and SSH
• Secure Local administration of the TOE
• Secure connectivity with remote audit servers
• Secure access to the management functionality of the TOE
• Identification and authentication of the administrator of the TOE
The following environmental components are required to operate the TOE in the evaluated
configuration:
Table 4: Required Environmental Components
Component Purpose/Description
Syslog server • Conformant with RFC 5424 (Syslog Protocol)
• Supporting Syslog over TLS (RFC 5425)
• Acting as a TLSv1.2 server
• Supporting Client Certificate authentication
• Supporting at least one of the following cipher suites:
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
IPX Video Switch • Provides switching of video signals
• Acting as a TLSv1.2 server
• Supporting Client Certificate authentication
• Supporting at least one of the following cipher suites:
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Management
workstation with web
browser
• Supported browser: Chrome or Safari
• Supporting TLSv1.2
• Supporting at least one of the following ciphersuites:
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Management
workstation with remote
CLI
• Supported SSH version: SSHv2
• Conformant with RFCs 4251-4254, 5647, 5656, 8308 and 8332.
Local Management
Workstation
• Computer with terminal emulation software to access the console interface (CLI)
CRL Server • Conformant with RFC 5280.
• Provides a list of revoked certificates.
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Component Purpose/Description
• TOE uses the CRL server to check the revocation status of a server’s presented
certificate.
• Communication between the TOE and the CRL server occurs over HTTP.
DNS Server • Conformant with RFC 1035.
• Communication between the TOE and the DNS server occurs over TCP.
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
• External Authentication Servers for administrator authentication
• SNMP traps
• Media streaming systems and devices controller feature
The MAGNUM is a software module that unifies control and interfacing to Evertz and 3rd party
media steaming devices. As a unified controller, the MAGNUM supports the following
functionalities that are outside of the scope of this evaluation:
• MAGNUM serves as the control interface for Evertz’s proprietary IPX media streaming
switch fabric that allows the general user to establish, change, and tear down multicast
IP video streams. MAGNUM may also serve as a general control interface for similar Evertz
and third-party systems and devices.
• Equipment to prepare video for IP transport, or to convert it into other video formats, is
outside the scope of this TOE. Such equipment includes, but is not limited to, cameras,
KVMs, codecs, video servers and video displays. Equipment to perform functions such as
embedding audio and/or other information within the video stream is also outside the
scope of this TOE.
• MAGNUM issues commands (via dedicated internal API) to Evertz’s proprietary IPX
switching fabric and other production endpoints for the purpose of initiating, maintaining,
and tearing down virtual routing paths. The MAGNUM-SC-CC2 device serves as the
primary operational and administrative management interface to the closed multicast
switching environment.
• MAGNUM provides Out-of-Band Management (OOBM) of Evertz IPX, EXE, and other 3rd
party devices. To perform primary operational and administrative management functions
on the closed multicast switching environment, Security Administrators may access
MAGNUM software via direct connection using a terminal session. Security
Administrators may also access MAGNUM via a dedicated management workstation
operating over an OOBM network to perform these OOB management functions. In
addition to Security Administrators, general users may also access the MAGNUM software
via a dedicated management workstation over an OOBM network.
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Note: Sites may close this OOBM network or may operate MAGNUM within an existing OOBM, if
the topology is compliant with the security parameters listed below.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 Rev. (5) and CEM version 3.1 Rev. (5). The Evaluation team determined the MAGNUM-SC-
CC2 V24.11.8 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the
Evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities specified in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the MAGNUM-SC-CC2 V24.11.8 that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the Evaluation team performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified
in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0 .
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the Evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST's
TOE Summary Specification (TSS) and the Guidance documents. Additionally, the Evaluation
team performed the Assurance Activities specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0 related
to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
20
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the Evaluation team performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0 related to the examination of
the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the Evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
was provided by the Evaluation team to show that the Evaluation activities addressed the test
activities in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The Evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
the TOE.
The Evaluation team searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln.search), MITRE CVE Database (http://cve.mitre.org/cve) CVE
Details (https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php), and Evertz database
(https://evertz.com/) on March 12, June 4, September 10th, and November 18, 2025 for search
terms including the vendor name, product name, and key platform features and libraries
leveraged by the product. A full list of the search terms can be found in Section 6.4.1.2 of the
21
AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed
the vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the MAGNUM-SS-CC2 Supplemental
Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria, Version 0.7. As stated in the Clarification of
Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the
SFRs claimed in the ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed
separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained. It is important to note the excluded functionality
listed in Section 8.2 and follow the configuration instructions to ensure that this functionality is
disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_v1.0 and accompanying Supporting Documents. Consumers and
integrators of this TOE are advised to understand the inherent limitations of these activities and
take additional measures as needed to ensure proper TOE behavior when integrated into an
operational environment.
23
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
24
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: MAGNUM-SC-CC2 Security Target, Version 1.0.
25
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by
the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria
using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete,
consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements
for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E].
6. Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 14 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_v1.0].
7. MAGNUM-SC-CC2 Security Target, Version 1.0.
8. Assurance Activity Report for MAGNUM-SC-CC2, Version 1.4.
9. Evaluation Technical Report for MAGNUM-SC-CC2, version 1.3.
10. Test Plan Report for Magnum-SC-CC2, version 1.2.
11. MAGNUM-SC-CC2 Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria, Version
0.7.
12. Vulnerability Assessment for Evertz Microsystems: MAGNUM-SC-CC2 v24.11.8, Version
1.7.