National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
[Apriva ISS, LLC.]
[Apriva MESA VPN server, v1.0, build 21.16]
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10602-2015
Dated: August 7, 2015
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
National Security Agency
Information Assurance Directorate
9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
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Acknowledgements
Validation Panel
Daniel Faigin
The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA
Meredith M Hennan
The Aerospace Corporation, Houston, TX
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Scott Cutler, Ryan Day
InfoGard Laboratories, Inc.
San Luis Obispo, CA
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................5
2 Identification of the TOE ..............................................................................7
3 Interpretations.............................................................................................8
4 Security Policy..............................................................................................8
4.1 Audit................................................................................................................................. 9
4.2 Cryptographic Operations................................................................................................ 9
4.3 User Data Protection........................................................................................................ 9
4.4 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................... 9
4.5 Security Management.................................................................................................... 10
4.6 Packet Filtering............................................................................................................... 10
4.7 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 10
4.8 TOE Access...................................................................................................................... 10
4.9 Trusted Path/Channels................................................................................................... 10
5 TOE Security Environment..........................................................................11
5.1 Secure Usage Assumptions ............................................................................................ 11
5.2 Threats Countered by the TOE....................................................................................... 11
5.3 Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................... 12
6 Architectural Information...........................................................................12
6.1 Architecture Overview ................................................................................................... 12
6.1.1 TOE Hardware.....................................................................................................................12
6.1.2 TOE Software ......................................................................................................................12
7 Documentation ..........................................................................................13
7.1 Guidance Documentation .............................................................................................. 13
7.2 Security Target ............................................................................................................... 13
7.3 Validator and NIAP Guidance......................................................................................... 13
8 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................14
8.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .......................................................................... 14
8.2 Vulnerability Analysis ..................................................................................................... 14
8.2.1 NDPP ...................................................................................................................................14
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8.2.2 VPN......................................................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation............................................................................15
9.1 Clarifications of Scope.................................................................................................... 16
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations....................................................16
11 Security Target ...........................................................................................16
12 Terms.........................................................................................................16
12.1 Acronyms.................................................................................................................... 16
13 Bibliography...............................................................................................18
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the NIAP validators’ assessment of the CCEVS evaluation of the Apriva
MESA VPN server, v1.0, build 21.16.
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product with determining the suitability of
this IT product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target (ST),
which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this Validation Report
(VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated.
The Apriva MESA VPN server is an IPsec VPN gateway designed to provide mobile devices with a
secure connection to a protected network.
This table identifies components that must be present in the Operational Environment to
support the operation of the TOE.
Component Description
Syslog Server Syslog Server supporting Syslog over TLSv1.2 with ciphersuites:
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Conforming to:
 RFC 5424 (Syslog)
 RFC 5425 (Syslog over TLS)
 RFC 5246 (TLSv1.2)
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VPN Clients VPN Clients supporting:
 IPsec/IKEv2 (RFC 5996)
o Authentication with X.509 using:
 RSA
 ECDSA
o Symmetric ciphers:
 AES-CBC-128
 AES-CBC-256
o Integrity Algorithms:
 HMAC-SHA-256
 HMAC-SHA-384
 HMAC-SHA-512
o Key Agreement
 Diffie-Hellman Group 14
 Diffie-Hellman Group 19
 Diffie-Hellman Group 20
 Diffie-Hellman Group 24
 IPsec/ESP (RFCs 4301 & 4303)
o Tunnel Mode
o Symmetric ciphers:
 AES-GCM-128
 AES-GCM-256
o Integrity:
 N/A (provided by AES-GCM)
NTP Server NTP Server supporting NTPv4 (RFC 5905)
Local Console Local Console supporting RS-232 connection
SSH Client SSH Client (Remote Console) supporting:
 SSHv2 (RFCs 4250, 4251, 4252, & 4253)
 Symmetric Ciphers:
o AES-CBC-128
o AES-CBC-256
 Integrity Algorithm:
o HMAC-SHA-1
 Key Agreement:
o Diffie-Hellman Group 14 SHA-1
 Server Authentication:
o SSH_RSA
 Client Authentication:
o SSH_RSA
o Password
Table 1: Operational Environment Components
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2 Identification of the TOE
Table 2 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated;
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product;
 The conformance result of the evaluation;
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Evaluation Scheme United States Common Criteria Evaluation Validation Scheme
Evaluated Target of
Evaluation
Apriva MESA VPN server, v1.0, build 21.16
Protection Profile  Protection Profile for Network Device Protection Profile,
Version 1.1, June 8, 2012
 Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #3,
November 3, 2014
 Network Device Protection Profile (NDPP) Extended Package
VPN Gateway, Version 1.1, April 12, 2013
 TD0013: AVA_VAN.1 in VPN GW EP, September 15, 2014
 TD0004: FCS_TLS_EXT Man-in-the-Middle Tests, May 28,
2014
Security Target Apriva MESA VPN Server Security Target, Version 0.10, July 15,
2015
Dates of Evaluation March 2, 2015 – July 15, 2015
Conformance Result Pass
Common Criteria Version v3.1 Revision 3
Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) Version
v3.1 Revision 3
Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR)
Common Criteria Evaluation Technical Report, DOC ID: 15-
3117-R-0011 V1.1, July 20, 2015
Assurance Activities Report
(AAR)
Common Criteria Assurance Activity Report, DOC ID: 15-3117-
R-0012 V1.1, July 20, 2015
Sponsor/Developer Apriva ISS, LLC.
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Common Criteria Testing Lab
(CCTL)
InfoGard Laboratories, Inc.
709 Fiero Ln, Ste. 25
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401
CCTL Evaluators Scott Cutler, Ryan Day
CCEVS Validators Daniel Faigin, Meredith M Hennan
Table 2: Product Identification
3 Interpretations
The Evaluation Team performed an analysis of the international interpretations of the CC and
the CEM and determined that none of the International interpretations issued by the Common
Criteria Interpretations Management Board (CCIMB) were applicable to this evaluation.
The TOE is also compliant with all international interpretations with effective dates on or before
March 2, 2015.
During the course of the evaluation, interpretations were made by both TD and the TRRT.
Please refer to Section 7.3 - Validator and NIAP Guidance for a complete list of evidence
containing these interpretations.
4 Security Policy
This section contains the product features and denotes which are within the logical boundaries
of the TOE. The following Security Functions are supported by the TOE:
 Audit
 Cryptography
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Packet Filtering
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
The following features were not evaluated and the impact of their use has not been assessed:
 Local redundancy
 NTP server
 DNS client
 SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol)
 OSPF (Open Shortest Path First)
 DMCC support (DoD Mobility Classified Capability)
 Single-user mode (allows the user to recover the device)
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Additional details and warnings are provided in guidance that inform the user of any commands
or options that may violate the CC evaluated configuration.
4.1 Audit
The TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. The TOE maintains a local audit
log as well as sending the audit records to a remote Syslog server. Audit records sent to the
remote server are protected by a TLSv1.2 connection. Each audit record includes identity
(username, IP address, or process), date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome
of the event. The TOE prevents modification to the local audit log.
4.2 Cryptographic Operations
The TOE implements CAVP validated cryptographic algorithms for random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, authentication, and integrity protection/verification. These algorithms
are used to provide security for the SSH, TLS, and IPsec (IKEv2 and ESP) protocols.
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel Crypto Module
o AES-GCM (Cert #2983)
 OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0.5 (FIPS 140-2 Cert #1747)
o AES (Cert #2484)
o SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 (Cert #1526)
o HMAC SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 (Cert #1526)
o CTR_DRBG (AES-256) (Cert #342)
o RSA (Cert #1273)
o ECDSA (Cert #413)
 QuickSec
o CTR_DRBG (AES-256) (Cert #570)
The TOE zeroizes all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs once they are no
longer required.
4.3 User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that previous content of network packets is not reused in subsequent network
packets. The TOE zeroizes IPsec buffers when the packet has been transmitted. The TOE
ensures that all other network buffers are zeroized upon allocation of the buffer.
4.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE authenticates administrative users using a username/password combination or a
username/SSH_RSA key combination. The TSF does not allow access to any administrative
functions prior to successful authentication. The TOE has the capability to lock a remote user’s
account if that user exceeds the configured number of failed authentication attempts.
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4.5 Security Management
The TOE implements a limited command line interface (CLI) to allow authorized administrators
to configure the TOE. This interface restricts the administrator to executing commands required
to configure and administer the TOE.
4.6 Packet Filtering
The TOE filters packets received on the physical interfaces and virtual interfaces (IPsec tunnels).
The TOE reads each packet’s header and can be configured to allow or deny the packet based
on IPv4 source address, IPv4 destination address, Transport Layer Protocol (if specified in an
IPv4 header), TCP or UDP source port, and TCP or UDP destination port.
4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects itself through a number of features. The CLI does not provide commands for
the administrator to display secret and private keys. The TOE ensures timestamps and timeouts
are accurate by maintaining a real-time clock for measuring time as well as polling an NTP
server to mitigate drift.
The TOE implements self-tests to verify its correct operation prior to offering protected services
(VPN functionality). If the initial self-tests fail or the ongoing health tests fail, the TOE shuts
down the VPN functionality and blocks all traffic to or from the network interfaces that were
running VPN tunnels.
The TOE automatically verifies the authenticity and integrity of updates by requiring the
updates to be digitally signed. TOE verifies that every update is signed by Apriva prior to
installing the update.
4.8 TOE Access
The TOE can be configured to display a warning and consent banner when an administrator
attempts to establish an interactive session. The TOE also enforces a configurable inactivity
timeout for remote administrative and IPsec sessions.
The TOE can be configured to deny establishment of a VPN client session based on the time,
day, and/or remote client’s IP address.
4.9 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE uses IPsec or TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and all
authorized IT entities. The trusted channels utilize X.509 certificates to perform mutual
authentication. The TOE initiates the TLS trusted channel with the Syslog server while the TOE
allows the remote VPN clients to initiate the IPsec trusted channel.
The TOE uses SSH to provide a trusted path between itself and remote administrative users.
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5 TOE Security Environment
5.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following assumptions are made about the usage of the TOE:
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available to the TOE, other than
those services necessary for the operation, administration and support
of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator
guidance in a trusted manner.
A.CONNECTIONS It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a
manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will be enforced on
all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks
5.2 Threats Countered by the TOE
The TOE is designed to counter the following threats:
T.ADMIN_ERROR An administrator may unintentionally install or configure the TOE
incorrectly, resulting in ineffective security mechanisms.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of
the TSF.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take actions that
adversely affect the security of the TOE. These actions may remain
undetected and thus their effects cannot be effectively mitigated.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE
executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may
masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain unauthorized
access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external
IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification and
authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update to the
product that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by
the original sender.
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE Sensitive information on a protected network might be disclosed
resulting from ingress- or egress-based actions.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS Unauthorized access may be achieved to services on a protected
network from outside that network, or alternately services outside a
protected network from inside the protected network
T.NETWORK_MISUSE Access to services made available by a protected network might be
used counter to Operational Environment policies.
T.REPLAY_ATTACK If malicious or external IT entities are able to gain access to the
network, they may have the ability to capture information traversing
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throughout the network and send them on to the intended receiver.
T.DATA_INTEGRITY A malicious party attempts to change the data being sent – resulting in
loss of integrity.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_CONNEC
TION
While a VPN client may have the necessary credentials (e.g., certificate,
pre-shared key) to connect to a VPN gateway, there may be instances
where the remote client, or the machine the client is operating on, has
been compromised and attempts to make unauthorized connections.
T.HIJACKED_SESSION There may be an instance where a remote client’s session is hijacked
due to session activity. This could be accomplished because a user has
walked away from the machine that was used to establish the session.
T.UNPROTECTED_TRAFFIC A remote machine’s network traffic may be exposed to a hostile
network. A user may be required to use a hostile (or unknown) network
to send network traffic without being able to route the traffic
appropriately.
5.3 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE enforces the following OSPs:
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use,
legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users
consent by accessing the TOE.
6 Architectural Information
The TOE is classified as Virtual Private Network for Common Criteria purposes. The TOE is made
up of hardware and software components.
6.1 Architecture Overview
The TOE consists of a Dell™ PowerEdge™ R720 running Apriva MESA VPN server v1.0, build
21.16.
6.1.1 TOE Hardware
 Dell™ PowerEdge™ R720
o CPU: Intel® Xeon® processor E5-2600 series
o RAM: 16GB
o NICs: Qty 4, 1Gb/s
o Disks: Qty 4, 300GB SAS Hot Pluggable, RAID-1
o Power Supply: Qty 2, Hot Pluggable
o CD/DVD: Qty 1, SATA
o Enhanced Hardware Entropy Generation: QUANTIS PCIe card
6.1.2 TOE Software
 Apriva MESA VPN server v1.0, build 21.16
o Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.4
o QuickSec
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o OpenSSL FIPS 2.0.5
o Syslog-ng Premium Edition 5
7 Documentation
This section details the documentation that is (a) delivered to the customer, and (b) was used
as evidence for the evaluation of the Apriva MESA VPN server. In these tables, the following
conventions are used:
 Documentation that is delivered to the customer is shown with bold titles.
 Documentation that was used as evidence but is not delivered is shown in a normal
typeface.
 Documentation that is delivered as part of the product but was not used as evaluation is
shown with a hashed background.
The TOE is delivered using an insured and tracked commercial courier service. The guidance
documents are provided on a CD and apply to the CC Evaluated configuration:
7.1 Guidance Documentation
Document Revision Date
Apriva MESA VPN, NIAP Guidance Version 1.0 July 16, 2015
APRIVA MESA VPN VERSION 1.0 VPN 21 16
Release_Notes
N/A N/A
7.2 Security Target
Document Revision Date
Apriva MESA VPN Security Target 0.10 July 15, 2015
Entropy Documentation and Assessment N/A January 13, 2015
Analysis of the Linux Random Number Generator N/A March 6, 2006
RANDOMNESS TEST REPORT 2.0 April 2010
TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR BASED ON
QUANTUM PHYSICS N/A N/A
ID Quantique White Paper RANDOM NUMBER
GENERATION USING QUANTUM PHYSICS 3.0 April 2010
7.3 Validator and NIAP Guidance
Document Date
TD0004: FCS_TLS_EXT Man-in-the-Middle Tests May 28, 2014
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TD0013: AVA_VAN.1 in VPN GW EP September 15, 2014
NDPP VPN EP Questions_Response.docx January 2014
Re NDPP FIPS question.msg October 2014
VPN TRRT Questions.docx, Re trrt-vpngateway VPN
GW EP Questions.msg
December 2014
TRRT_Questions_VID10602_scutler_InfoGard_v2.docx,
Re trrt-vpngateway VID 10602 Question 1.msg
January 2015
May 2015.zip May 2015
vid10602-0001-MR-Pre-Kickoff-Comments-
dpfaigin.docx
December 2014 - January
2015
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the Developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Common Criteria Evaluation Technical Report,
Version 1.1, July 20, 2015, which is not publically available. The Assurance Activity Report,
Version 1.1, July 20, 2015, provides a non-proprietary overview of testing and the prescribed
assurance activities.
8.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation Team verified the product in June 2015 at the vendor facility according to the
Apriva MESA VPN Server Security Target, Version 0.10, July 15, 2015 document and ran the
tests specified in the Protection Profile for Network Device Protection Profile Version 1.1,
Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #3, and Network Device Protection Profile
(NDPP) Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1.
8.2 Vulnerability Analysis
8.2.1 NDPP
The evaluator began by searching cvedetails.com for the following search terms:
 Apriva
 VPN
 Mesa VPN
 RHEL 6
 NTP
The evaluator performed the searches listed above, and found several NTP and OpenSSL CVEs:
NTP
 http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9295/
OpenSSL
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 http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3470/
 http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0224/
 http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0221/
 http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0195/
To determine whether the TOE is theoretically vulnerable to these attacks, the evaluator
contacted the vendor and asked them to provide the versions of the OpenSSL and NTP
packages. They stated that the TOE contains the following versions: openssl-1.0.1e-
30.el6_6.8.x86_64, ntp-4.2.6p5-3.el6_6.x86_64, and ntpdate-4.2.6p5-3.el6_6.x86_64.
The evaluator found that the CVEs were addressed in previous RHEL package updates that are
covered by the vendor's versions and are therefore not vulnerable:
 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2014-0625.html
 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2014-2024.html
 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2015-0690.html
8.2.2 VPN
Based on discussions with TRRT and TD decisions, the evaluator reduced the scope of testing to
the following components:
IPv4
o Type of Service
o Total Length
o Identification
o Flags
o Fragment Offset
o Time to Live
o Transport Layer Protocol
The evaluator used a script "fuzzIPv4.py" to perform fuzz testing and confirmed that no erratic
or unusual behavior occurred on the TOE as a result of the fuzzing, and that the TOE dropped all
traffic generated by the fuzzing tool. The tool fuzzes the IP length, IP flag, Type of Service, Time
to Live, Protocol, Identification, and Fragment Offset.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against the
criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. The evaluation methodology used by the Evaluation Team to conduct
the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3.
InfoGard has determined that the TOE meets the security criteria in the Security Target, which
specifies an assurance requirements specified in the Protection Profile for Network Device
Protection Profile, Version 1.1, June 8, 2012, Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata
16
#3, November 3, 2014, and Network Device Protection Profile (NDPP) Extended Package VPN
Gateway, Version 1.1, April 12, 2013. A team of Validators, on behalf of the CCEVS Validation
Body, monitored the evaluation. The evaluation was completed in July 2015.
9.1 Clarifications of Scope
This evaluation only examines and proves the security claims contained within the Network
Device Protection Profile and VPN Extended Package. The security claimed by this Common
Criteria certification does not exceed the assurance provided by the evaluation activities
defined by NIAP, and performed by the CCTL. In addition, this evaluation only covers the
specific functionality defined within the Security Functional Requirements written in the NDPP
and VPN EP. Though other functionality is included in the TOE, those features are not covered
by this evaluation and are documented clearly in Section 4 and in the guidance documentation.
This evaluation only applies to the certified TOE: Apriva MESA VPN server 1.0, software version
21.16. Any other software version or hardware version is not covered by this certification
process and no Common Criteria assurances can be claimed by a version other than the
certified TOE.
In addition, the CCTL has only performed a vulnerability assessment within the scope of the
AVA_VAN Security Assurance Requirement defined in the NDPP and VPN EP. This vulnerability
assessment included IPv4 fuzzing and public domain vulnerability searches; only limited security
can be claimed from the AVA_VAN analysis performed by the CCTL and should not be
considered a substitute for an in-depth penetration test.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration,
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
11 Security Target
Apriva MESA VPN Security Target, Version 0.10, July 15, 2015
12 Terms
12.1 Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
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CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CD/DVD Compact Disc / Digital Video Disc
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSP Critical Security Parameter
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
I/O Input/Output
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ISS Information Security Systems
IT Information Technology
LLC Limited Liability Company
NIC Network Interface Card
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OS Operating System
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect (express)
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RFC Request for Comments
RHEL RedHat Enterprise Linux
18
RSA Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
VR Validation Report
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction
and general model, dated July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001.
[2] Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, July 2009, Version 3.1, Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-002.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, July 2009, Version 3.1, Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-003.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
methodology, July 2009, Version 3.1, Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-004.