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REF: 2004-2-INF-65 v1
Difussion: Público
Date: 20.01.2006
Created by: CERT3
Reviewed by: TECNICO
Approved by: JEFEAREA
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier: 2004-2 KEY ONE 3.0
References:
EXT-18 Certification request, dated 09-07-2004
EXT-125 Evaluation Technical Report, dated 29-12-2005
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria
Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security,
May 2000.
Certification report of the of the KeyOne 3.0 product, a Public Key Infrastructure
software solution, version 3.0, release 04S2R1 with patches 3.0_04S2R1_B01,
3.0_04S2R1_B02, 3.0_04S2R1_B03, 3.0_04S2R1_B04, 3.0_04S2R1_B05,
3.0_04S2R1_B06 and3.0_04S2R1_B07, as requested by [EXT-18], and evaluated
by CESTI-INTA, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-125], received
on the 11th of January, 2006, and in compliance with [CCRA].
This is a courtesy translation of the Scheme documentation for the purposes of its shadow
certification.
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Index
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................................5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................6
Requirements expressed as of [CC_P2]: ......................................................................................................6
Requirements augmented by [CIMC]: ..........................................................................................................6
IDENTIFICATION..............................................................................................................................................8
SECURITY POLICY...........................................................................................................................................8
ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE ...................................................................................8
USAGE ASSUMPTIONS.........................................................................................................................................8
Personnel ......................................................................................................................................................8
Connectivity ................................................................................................................................................10
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................................................10
Physical assumptions..................................................................................................................................10
TOE Users...................................................................................................................................................10
Suitable usage environments.......................................................................................................................11
CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.................................................................................................................................11
Authorized Users.........................................................................................................................................11
System .........................................................................................................................................................11
Cryptography ..............................................................................................................................................12
External Attacks..........................................................................................................................................12
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE ENVIRONMENT ............................................................13
Requirements expressed as of [CC_P2]: ....................................................................................................13
Extended requirements: ..............................................................................................................................14
ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................................15
KEYONE CA. CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY.......................................................................................................15
KEYONE LRA: REGISTRATION AUTHORITY.....................................................................................................15
KEYONE VA. VALIDATION AUTHORITY ..........................................................................................................15
KEYONE TSA SERVER. TIME STAMPING AUTHORITY ...................................................................................15
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................................16
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE .................................................................................................................................17
DOCUMENTATION .........................................................................................................................................18
IT PRODUCT TESTING ..................................................................................................................................18
FUNCTIONAL TESTS..........................................................................................................................................18
PENETRATION TESTS ........................................................................................................................................18
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .................................................................................................................19
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION................................................................................................................20
EVALUATOR COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................20
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................................20
RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................................20
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................23
GLOSSARY........................................................................................................................................................23
BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................................24
SECURITY TARGET........................................................................................................................................24
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Executive Summary
This document is the Certification Report of the KeyOne 3.0 product, a Public Key
Infrastructure software solution, version 3.0, release 04S2R1 with patches
3.0_04S2R1_B01, 3.0_04S2R1_B02, 3.0_04S2R1_B03, 3.0_04S2R1_B04,
3.0_04S2R1_B05, 3.0_04S2R1_B06 and3.0_04S2R1_B07.
Developer: Safelayer Secure Communications, S.A.
Sponsor: Safelayer Secure Communications, S.A.
Certification Body: National Cryptological Centre (CCN)
ITSEF: IT Security Evaluation Centre (CESTI), of the Technical Aerospace National
Institute “Esteban Terradas”(INTA).
PP claims: [CIMC], Certificate Issuing and Management Components Family of
Protection Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003.
Evaluation Level: EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2)
Strength of Function: Basic
Evaluation Technical Rreport date: 2006-01-11
All the assurance components required by the level EAL4+ (augmented with
ALC_FLR.2, SOF high) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the
laboratory (CESTI /INTA) assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due
all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL4+ methodology, as define by of the
Common Criteria [CC-P3] and the Common Methodology [CEM].
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the KeyOne 3.0 product, version: 3.0, release 04S2R1 with patches
3.0_04S2R1_B01, 3.0_04S2R1_B02, 3.0_04S2R1_B03, 3.0_04S2R1_B04,
3.0_04S2R1_B05, 3.0_04S2R1_B06 and3.0_04S2R1_B07, a positive resolution is
proposed.
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TOE summary
The TOE, KeyOne 3.0 product, 3.0 or KTS (KeyOne Trusted System), is a Public
Key Infrastructure software solution. The system consists of the following elements:
- KeyOne LRA. Lightweigh Registration Authority.
- KeyOne RA. Registration Authority.
- KeyOne CA. Certification Authority.
- KeyOne VA. Validation Authority.
- KeyOne TSA. Time Stamping Authority.
The TOE offers the following services:
Core services
- Registration Service: Verifies the identity and, if applicable, any specific
attributes of a Subscriber. The results of this service are passed to the
Certificate Generation Service.
- Certificate Generation Service: Creates and signs certificates based on the
identity and other attributes of a Subscriber as verified by the Registration
Service.
- Revocation Management Service: Processes requests and reports relating to
revocation to determine the necessary action to be taken. The results of this
service are distributed through the Revocation Status Service.
- Revocation Status Service: Provides certificate revocation status information
to relying parties. This service is based on revocation status information that
is updated at regular intervals.
TOE Additional Services
- Subscriber Device Provision Service: Prepares and provides a Signature
Creation Device (SCD) to Subscribers.
- Time Stamp Service: A third party, trusted to provide a Time Stamp Service.
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This table enumerates the services supported by the system, and relates them with
the KeyOne subsystem where them resides.
Subsystem Services
KeyOne LRA
Registration Service
Subscriber Device Provision Service
KeyOne RA Registration Service
KeyOne CA
Certificate Generation Service
Revocation Management Service
KeyOne VA Revocation Status Service
KeyOne TSA Time Stamping Service
Security Assurance Requirements
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfill EAL4, augmented
with the component ALC_FLR.2.
Assurance Class Assurance Component
Configuration Management ACM AUT.1, ACM CAP.4, ACM SCP.2
Delivery and Operation ADO DEL.2, ADO IGS.1
Development
ADV_FSP.2, ADV_HLD.2, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_LLD.1, ADV_RCR.1, ADV_SPM.1
Guidance AGD ADM.1, AGD USR.1
Life Cycle
ALC DVS.1, ALC LCD.1, ALC FLR.2,
ALC TAT.1
Tests
ATE COV.2, ATE FUN.1, ATE IND.2,
ATE DPT.1
Vulnerability Analysis AVA SOF.1, AVA VLA.2, AVA MSU.2
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Security Functional Requirements
The product security functionality satisfies, with the support from the environment,
the [CIMC], Certificate Issuing and Management Components Family of Protection
Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003, protection profile.
The functional requirements satisfied by the product are:
Requirements expressed as of [CC_P2]:
- FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
- FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
- FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
- FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
- FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
- FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
- FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
- FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
- FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
- FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
- FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
- FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
- FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
- FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
- FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
- FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Requirements augmented by [CIMC]:
- FPT_CIMC_TSP.1 Audit log signing event
- FDP_ACF_CIMC.2 User private key
- FDP_ACF_CIMC.3 User secret key
- FDP_SDI_CIMC.3 Stored public key integrity monitoring and action
- FDP_ETC_CIMC.5 Extended user private and
- FDP_CIMC_BKP.1 CIMC backup and recovery
- FDP_CIMC_BKP.2 Extended CIMC backup and recovery
- FDP_CIMC_CSE.1 Certificate status export
- FDP_CIMC_CER.1 Certificate Generation
- FDP_CIMC_CRL.1 Certificate revocation list
- FDP_CIMC_OCSP.1 OCSP basic response
- FCO_NRO_CIMC.3 Enforced proof of origin and verification of origin
- FCO_NRO_CIMC.4 Advanced verification of origin
- FMT_MTD_CIMC.4 TSF private key confidentiality protection
- FMT_MTD_CIMC.5 TSF secret key confidentiality protection
- FMT_MTD_CIMC.7 Extended TSF private and secret key export
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- FMT_MOF_CIMC.3 Extended certificate profile management
- FMT_MOF_CIMC.5 Extended certificate revocation list profile management
- FMT_MOF_CIMC.6 OCSP Profile Management
- FCS_CKM_CIMC.5 CIMC private and secret key
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Identification
Product: KeyOne 3.0 product, a Public Key Infrastructure software solution, version
3.0, release 04S2R1 with patches 3.0_04S2R1_B01, 3.0_04S2R1_B02,
3.0_04S2R1_B03, 3.0_04S2R1_B04, 3.0_04S2R1_B05, 3.0_04S2R1_B06
and3.0_04S2R1_B07.
Security Target: SECURITY TARGET KeyOne 3.0 (B4E6DBC0), 1.38.
PP claims: CIMC, Certificate Issuing and Management Components Family of
Protection Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003.
Evaluation Level: EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2)
Strength of Function: Basic
Evaluation Technical Report date: 2006-01-11
Security Policy
The TOE installation and operation must comply with the following security policies,
as mandated in [CIMC]:
P.AUTHORIZED USE OF INFORMATION
Information shall be used only for its authorized purpose(s).
P.CRYPTOGRAPHY
FIPS-approved or NIST-recommended cryptographic functions shall be
used to perform all cryptographic operations.
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Usage Assumptions
The usage assumptions are organized in three categories: personnel, physical and
connectivity. The physical assumptions are detailed in the environmental
assumptions section.
Personnel
Assumptions about administrators and users of the system as well as any threat
agents.
A.Auditors Review Audit Logs
Audit logs are required for security-relevant events and must be reviewed
by the Auditors.
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A.Authentication Data Management
An authentication data management policy is enforced to ensure that
users change their authentication data at appropriate intervals and to
appropriate values (e.g., proper lengths, histories, variations, etc.) (Note:
this assumption is not applicable to biometric authentication data).
A.Competent Administrators, Operators, Officers and Auditors
Competent Administrators, Operators, Officers and Auditors will be
assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
A.CPS
All Administrators, Operators, Officers, and Auditors are familiar with the
certificate policy (CP) and certification practices statement (CPS) under
which the TOE is operated. This documentation is conformant with [NPKI]
certificate policy.
A.Disposal of Authentication Data
Proper disposal of authentication data and associated privileges is
performed after
access has been removed (e.g., job termination, change in responsibility).
A.Malicious Code Not Signed
Malicious code destined for the TOE is not signed by a trusted entity.
A.Notify Authorities of Security Issues
Administrators, Operators, Officers, Auditors, and other users notify
proper authorities of any security issues that impact their systems to
minimize the potential for the loss or compromise of data.
A.Social Engineering Training
General users, administrators, operators, officers and auditors are trained
in techniques to thwart social engineering attacks.
A.Cooperative Users
Users need to accomplish some task or group of tasks that require a
secure IT environment. The users require access to at least some of the
information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a cooperative
manner.
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Connectivity
Assumptions about other IT systems that are necessary for the secure operation of
the TOE.
A.Operating System
The operating system has been selected to provide the functions required
by this CIMC to counter the perceived threats for the CIMC level 3 PP, as
identified in this Security Target.
A.NTP Client
All the hosts included in the TOE have installed an NTP client that
synchronises the system clock with a reliable clock that obtains the
Coordinated Universal Time from a reliable source.
Environmental assumptions
Physical assumptions
Assumptions about the physical location of the TOE or any attached peripheral
devices.
A.Communications Protection
The system is adequately physically protected against loss of
communications i.e., availability of communications.
A.Physical Protection
The TOE hardware, software, and firmware critical to security policy
enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification.
TOE Users
The intended users of the TOE services are classified in two main groups.
External Users
End User / Certificate Entity, is the subject of the certificate that binds its
identity with its public key. There are other types of entities that can be
certified, for example applications, servers.
Relying Parties, users or agents or any external trust services that rely on
the data in a certificate in making decisions, following the verification
processes and limitations established in the certificate policies for each
type of certificates issued by KTS.
Auditing Entities, who require access to audit trails for conducting
evaluation processes to review certificate practices.
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Internal Users
PKI administrators, who can configure and administer the different
applications supported by the TOE: Registration, Certificate Authority,
Validation Authority, Time Stamping authority.
Registration Officer is responsible for the operation of the Lightweight
Registration Authority and the Registration Authority, according to
established registration procedures.
Suitable usage environments
The use of this TOE is more suitable to certain registry schemes. This configuration
adapts perfectly to:
- Distributed register environments, due to the fast and easy deployment of
different RAs, without increasing maintenance needs.
- Mobile or travelling registers, guaranteeing the security of the register service
without very restrictive physical protections measures.
Clarification of scope
The following threats, organized in four categories (authorized users, system,
cryptography, and external attacks) are covered by the TOE or by the environment
or by both of them.
Authorized Users
T.Administrative errors of omission
Administrators, Operators, Officers or Auditors fail to perform some
function essential to security.
T.User abuses authorization to collect and/or send data
User abuses granted authorizations to improperly collect and/or send
sensitive or security-critical data.
T.User error makes data inaccessible
User accidentally deletes user data rendering user data inaccessible.
T.Administrators, Operators, Officers and Auditors commit errors or
hostile actions
An Administrator, Operator, Officer or Auditor commits errors that change
the intended security policy of the system or application or maliciously
modify the system’s configuration to allow security violations to occur.
System
T.Critical system component fails
Failure of one or more system components results in the loss of system
critical functionality.
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T.Malicious code exploitation
An authorized user, IT system, or hacker downloads and executes
malicious code, which causes abnormal processes that violate the
integrity, availability, or confidentiality of the system assets.
T.Message content modification
A hacker modifies information that is intercepted from a communications
link between two unsuspecting entities before passing it on to the
intended recipient.
T.Flawed code
A system or applications developer delivers code that does not perform
according to specifications or contains security flaws.
Cryptography
T.Disclosure of private and secret keys
A private or secret key is improperly disclosed.
T.Modification of private/secret keys
A secret/private key is modified.
T.Sender denies sending information
The sender of a message denies sending the message to avoid
accountability for sending the message and for subsequent action or
inaction.
External Attacks
T.Hacker gains access
A hacker masquerades as an authorized user to perform operations that
will be attributed to the authorized user or a system process or gains
undetected access to a system due to missing, weak and/or incorrectly
implemented access control causing potential violations of integrity,
confidentiality, or availability.
T.Hacker physical access
A hacker physically interacts with the system to exploit vulnerabilities in
the physical environment, resulting in arbitrary security compromises.
T.Social engineering
A hacker uses social engineering techniques to gain information about
system entry, system use, system design, or system operation.
Any other threats not included in this section are NOT covered by the evaluated
TOE, and no claim of resistance is made by the certification.
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Security functional requirements for the TOE environment
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfill the
[CIMC], Certificate Issuing and Management Components Family of Protection
Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003, protection profile.
The security functional requirements that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment
are the following:
Requirements expressed as of [CC_P2]:
- FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
- FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
- FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
- FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
- FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
- FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
- FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
- FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
- FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
- FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
- FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
- FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
- FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine test
- FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles
- FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
- FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
- FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
- FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
- FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
- FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
- FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
- FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
- FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
- FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
- FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
- FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
- FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
- FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
- FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
- FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
- FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
- FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
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Extended requirements:
- AccessDatabaseTools Access to the Database Tools
- ControlDatabaseTools Control and supervision of the Database Tools
- FPT_TST_CIMC.2 Software/firmware integrity test
- FPT_TST_CIMC.3 Software/firmware load test
For further details on the security environment definition or on the security
requirements, please refer to the Security Target of the TOE.
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Architectural Information
As before mentioned, this system has the following described components.
KeyOne CA. Certification Authority
KeyOne CA is an application that provides the Certificate Generation Service, the
Revocation Management Service and the Key Recovery Service. Therefore, it allows
a CSP, to perform the following tasks:
- To create certificates based on the identity and other attributes of a
Subscriber, once verified by the Registration Service. To process requests
and reports related to revocation to determine the necessary action to be
taken. The results of this service are distributed through the Revocation
Status Service.
- To securely store Subscriber keys generated by this KeyOne CA. The stored
keys can be recovery through the Key Recovery Service.
The certificates and the CRLs, which are issued by KeyOne CA, are created
according to the X.509 v3 certificate format and the X.509 v2 CRL format
respectively.
KeyOne LRA: Registration Authority
KeyOne LRA is an application that provides both the Registration Service and the
Subscriber Device Provision Service. Therefore, the main goal of this system is to
send certification, revocation, suspension and unsuspension requests to KeyOne
CA.
For a certification request, the requested certificate can be obtained immediately
(online) from KeyOne CA. Once received, KeyOne LRA offers the possibility to store
the certificate in a smart card (SSCD).
KeyOne VA. Validation Authority
Key One VA is the application that provides the Revocation Status Service.
Therefore, it allows a CSP to provide certificate revocation status information to
Relying Parties.
Communication with KeyOne VA takes place according to the OCSP protocol and
HTTPS is used as the mechanism for conveying the OCSP messages.
KeyOne TSA SERVER. Time Stamping Authority
Key One TSA is an application that provides the Time Stamping Service. Therefore,
it allows a CSP to create an evidence that a Subscriber’s data item existed before a
certain point in time (proof of existence).
Communication with KeyOne TSA takes place according to the Time Stamping
Protocol and both HTTPS and HTTP are supported as mechanisms for conveying
the TSP messages.
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Physical Architecture
The physical architecture of the KTS is shown in the figure below.
All KeyOne components are connected to a Database where the information related
to the service that the component provides is stored.
The database related to the KeyOne CA component stores generated certificates
and CRLs, KeyOne batches (batches contain sets of certification or revocation
requests, or certificates, depending on the entity that issued it.
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The main purpose of batches used in KeyOne is to send certification or revocation
requests and to receive responses between the RA and the CA and logs generated
by the KeyOne CA subsystem.
The database related to the KeyOne VA component stores the status related to the
certificates, the messages interchanged with the KeyOne CertStatus component
(part of the KeyOne CA product), and the logs generated by the KeyOne VA
subsystem.
The database related to the KeyOne TSA component stores TSTs requests and
responses, and the logs generated by the KeyOne TSA subsystem.
The database related to the KeyOne RA component stores certificates, KeyOne
batches and logs generated by the KeyOne RA subsystem.
The database related to the KeyOne LRA component stores logs generated by the
KeyOne LRA subsystem.
All KeyOne components are connected to an HSM (Hardware Security Module) in
order to generate and store the keys related to the service, and also they are
connected to a clock that provides reliable time stamps for the service use.
Logical Architecture
The logical architecture of the KTS is shown in the figure below.
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Documentation
The product as evaluated is to be shipped with the following documentation, required
for the secure installation and operation of the TOE:
- KeyOne 3.0 Installation and Uninstallation Tool Manual, A98558AB 1.18
- KeyOne 3.0 Installation and Administration Manual, 65128EAB 1.6
- KeyOne 3.0 Signing scripts C3133BBD 1.4
- KeyOne 3.0 Batch Format Description, 269C9E2F 1.4
- KeyOne 3.0 CA Administration Manual, 40B3123A 1.23
- KeyOne 3.0 CA User Manual, 8B4B9CFE 1.31
- KeyOne 3.0 Certificate, Keys and CRL Management, EA99A2FE 1.14
- KeyOne 3.0 Console 3999D586 1.23
- KeyOne 3.0 I3D Database Management, DD01D2DA 1.3
- KeyOne 3.0 Logs Registration Administration, 1CBF9472 1.6
- KeyOne 3.0 Master Document, C7342558 1.32
- KeyOne 3.0 RA Administration and User Manual 1.8
- KeyOne 3.0 TSA Administration and User Manual, 7246994C 1.17
- KeyOne 3.0 Template Textual Specification Syntax, E204D730 1.4
- KeyOne 3.0 VA Administration and User Manual, F24E6F5E 1.20
- KeyOne 3.0 CRLA Manual EDFD484B 1.22
- KeyOne 3.0 LRA Administration and User Manual 513BE36C 1.19
IT Product Testing
Both, developer and ITSEF carried out tests on the product. This tests are divided
into two categories: functional tests and penetration tests.
Functional Tests
ITSEF verified that functional tests, documented and carried out by the
developer was suficient to demonstrate that TOE was sistematically
tested according its functional specification. In addition, ITSEF verified the
results obtained by the developer.
Penetration Tests
ITSEF carried out several penetration tests against TOE, searching for
vulnerabilities o trying exploit the vulnerabilities assessed by developer
analisys.
As conclusions of those tests ITSEF stated that vulnerabilities are not
exploitable according to the intended usage environment.
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Evaluated Configuration
The TOE evaluated configuration is based on the elements described below:
Subsystem OS Database HSM SCD/SSCD
KeyOne
CA
Microsoft
Windows
2000
Oracle 9i nCipher nShield F3
Ultrasign SCSI, firmware
version 2.0.5, Hardware
version nC4032W
STARCOS SPK
2.4
KeyOne
LRA
Microsoft
Windows
2000
Oracle 9i nCipher nShield F3
Ultrasign SCSI, firmware
version 2.0.5, Hardware
version nC4032W
STARCOS SPK
2.4
KeyOne
RA
Microsoft
Windows
2000
Oracle 9i nCipher nShield F3
Ultrasign SCSI, firmware
version 2.0.5, Hardware
version nC4032W
STARCOS SPK
2.4
KeyOne
VA
Microsoft
Windows
2000
Oracle 9i nCipher nShield F3
Ultrasign SCSI, firmware
version 2.0.5, Hardware
version nC4032W
STARCOS SPK
2.4
KeyOne
TSA
Microsoft
Windows
2000
Oracle 9i nCipher nShield F3
Ultrasign SCSI, firmware
version 2.0.5, Hardware
version nC4032W
STARCOS SPK
2.4
Additionally, it is necessary the following components:
- NTP client installed in the same host where the KeyOne CA, KeyOne RA,
KeyOne LRA, KeyOne TSA and KeyOne VA subsystems.
- Reliable clock that obtains the Co-ordinated Universal Time from a reliable
source, and that synchronizes the system clock by means the NTP protocol,
using the NTP client installed in the same machine that the KeyOne CA,
KeyOne RA, KeyOne LRA, KeyOne TSA and KeyOne VA subsystems.
- Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 for the KeyOne CA, KeyOne LRA, KeyOne
RA, KeyOne VA and KeyOne TSA components.
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Results of the Evaluation
All the assurance components required by the level EAL4+ (augmented with
ALC_FLR.2) present the “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory (CESTI
/INTA) assigns the “PASS” verdict to the whole evaluation with all the evaluator
actions being satisfied for the EAL4 methodology, as defined by the third part of the
Common Criteria and the Common Evaluation Methodology.
Compliance with the [CIMC], Certificate Issuing and Management Components
Family of Protection Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003, has also been
evauated, and assigned a “PASS” verdict.
Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
Conclusions
According to the evaluation carried out by CESTI, it is concluded that, at this
moment:
- All activities has a “PASS” verdict . So the evaluator team has assigned a
PASS verdict to the evaluation of KeyOne 3.0 04S2R1 with patches B01, B02,
B03, B04, B05, B06 and B07 product.
- The TOE KeyOne 3.0 04S2R1 with patches B01, B02, B03, B04, B05, B06
and B07 satisfies its Security Target, SECURITY TARGET KeyOne 3.0
(B4E6DBC0), 1.38, according to CC, EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2), SOF Basic.
- The TOE KeyOne 3.0 04S2R1 with patches B01, B02, B03, B04, B05, B06
and B07 conforms to the requirements for the protection profile CIMC.
- The result of the evaluation, collected in this ETR, are valid only for the
evaluated product as follows:
o Product: KeyOne 3.0 04S2R1 with patches B01, B02, B03, B04, B05,
B06 and B07.
o Security Target: SECURITY TARGET KeyOne 3.0 (B4E6DBC0), 1.38.
Recommendations
In order to fulfill with the EAL4+ security guarantees of the KeyOne product included
in SECURITY TARGET KeyOne 3.0 (B4E6DBC0), 1.38, the license file used in the
TOE does not have to allow the execution of scripts launched in unsecure mode
(activation of the –unsecure flag).
For secure usage of the TOE, the fulfillment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target has to be taken into account. These requirements
are stated in SECURITY TARGET KeyOne 3.0 (B4E6DBC0), 1.38 section 3 ’TOE
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Security Environment’ (this section incorporate all assumptions about the
environment that appears in CIMC, Certificate Issuing and Management
Components Family of Protection Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003.)
For secure usage of the TOE, the fulfillment of the security objectives for the
environment in the Security Target has to be taken into account. These requirements
are stated in SECURITY TARGET KeyOne 3.0 (B4E6DBC0), 1.38 section 4.2
’Security Objectives for the Environment’ and section 4.3 ’Security Objectives for
both the TOE and the Environment’ (this section incorporate all security objectives
for the environment that appears in CIMC, Certificate Issuing and Management
Components Family of Protection Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003.)
For secure usage of the TOE, the fulfillment of the security requirements for the IT
environment has to be taken into account. These requirements are stated in
SECURITY TARGET KeyOne 3.0 (B4E6DBC0), 1.38 section 5.2 ’Security
Requirements for the Environment’ (this section incorporate all security requirements
for the IT environment that appears in CIMC, Certificate Issuing and Management
Components Family of Protection Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003.) For
secure usage of the TOE it is very important that persons who are responsible of IT
environment elements (basically, operative system, database and HSM) know how
each of this elements must be configured in order to give the necessary support to
the TOE.
In this product there is not a clear Administrator and a clear User; there are users
with a role that have the privileges that their role allows them and therefore they can
carry out or not an action depends of the privileges that this action demands. So, in
general, there are no independent Administrator Manual and User Manual and in the
common document Administrator and User Manual there are no clear and
independent sections for each one. This manual is a description of the functionality
for the application and, for each step, it is said if a specific role is needed for carrying
it out.
For a good understanding of users guides and developer testing documentation, it is
very important to make clear that KeyOne 3.0 04S2R1 with patches B01, B02, B03,
B04, B05, B06 and B07 is a product developed to work with several security policies
defined by the developer. At least, it is possible to work with two different security
policies: [CWA] and [CIMC], each one with its own profile. In the context of this
evaluation, only [CIMC] policy applies, but in relation with roles there is no a well-
defined use of its names and, so, sometimes role names from both policies are used.
In order to make it clear, it is important to say that, where in [CIMC] policy there are
four roles: Administrator, Officer, Auditor and Operator,
- Administrator role would be the System Administrator and Security Officer.
- Officer role would be Registration Officer.
- Auditor would be System Auditor.
- Operator role would be System Operator.
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The FPT_CIMC_TSP.1.3 security requirement is accomplished because for each
modification (addition, update or delete) of a database registry, the i3D mechanism
assures the generation of a digital signature that guarantees the database integrity,
then KeyOne system works as if it was configured at the maximum frequency, and
therefore the frequency most secure (refinement of the FPT_CIMC_TSP.1.3
requirement).
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Certifier Recommendations
At the light of the results of the evaluation, and after checking that the security
properties of the product, as well as the developer evidence and the applied
development practices fulfill with the requirements stated in the Security Target,
including the compliance of the [CIMC], Certificate Issuing and Management
Components Family of Protection Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+, october 2003, a
positive resolution is proposed for the certification request of the KeyOne 3.0 product
as identified in section 2.
Glossary
CA Certification Authority
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CESTI Centro de Evaluación de la Seguridad de las Tecnologías
de la Información
CIMC Certificate Issuing and Management Components
CPS Certification Practices Statement
DPC Declaración de Prácticas de Certificación
DS Declaración de Seguridad
ETR Evaluation Thecnical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HSM Hardware Security Module
KTS KeyOne Trusted System
INTA Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial
LRA Local Registry Authority
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPKI NATO PKI
NTP Network Time Protocol
OC Organismo de Certificación
OCSP On-line Certificate Status Protocol
OE Objeto de Evaluación
PC Política de Certificación
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Perfil de Protección
RA Registry Authority
TI Tecnologías de la Información
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSA Time Stamping Authority
UTC Universal Time Coordinated
VA Validation Authority
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Bibliography
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation- Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 2.2, rev 256, January 2004.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional requirements, Version 2.2, rev 256, January 2004.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, Version 2.2, rev 256, January 2004.
[CEM] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security:
Introduction and general model, Version 2.2, rev 256, January 2004.
[CIMC] Certificate Issuing and Management Components Family of Protection
Profiles v1.0, Level 3, EAL 3+.
Security Target
It is published jointly with this certification report the “Security Target of KeyOne 3.0”,
code B4E6DBC0, version 1.38.
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