© 2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced in full without any modification.
1
Cisco Network Convergence System
1004 (NCS1004) Running IOS-XR 24.1
Security Target
Version: 1.0
Date: March 4, 2025
Cisco Network Convergence System 1004 (NCS1004) Running IOS-XR 24.1
Security Target
2
Table of Contents
1. Security Target Introduction .........................................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 ST and TOE Reference...............................................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 TOE Overview ..............................................................................................................................................................................................6
1.3 TOE Product Type .......................................................................................................................................................................................6
1.3.1 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware ..........................................................................................................................7
1.4 TOE Description...........................................................................................................................................................................................7
1.5 TOE Evaluated Configuration.....................................................................................................................................................................8
1.6 Physical Scope of the TOE.........................................................................................................................................................................8
1.7 Logical Scope of the TOE...........................................................................................................................................................................9
1.7.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................................................................................................9
1.7.2 Cryptographic Support ........................................................................................................................................................................9
1.7.3 Identification and Authentication......................................................................................................................................................11
1.7.4 Security Management........................................................................................................................................................................11
1.7.5 Protection of the TSF.........................................................................................................................................................................11
1.7.6 TOE Access........................................................................................................................................................................................11
1.7.7 Trusted Path/Channels......................................................................................................................................................................11
1.8 Excluded Functionality ..............................................................................................................................................................................12
2. Conformance Claims...................................................................................................................................................................................13
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim ....................................................................................................................................................13
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance Claim....................................................................................................................................................13
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale ..................................................................................................................................15
2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness........................................................................................................................................................................15
2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ..............................................................................................................................15
2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency........................................................................................................................15
3. Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................................................................................................16
3.1 Assumptions ...............................................................................................................................................................................................16
3.2 Threats.........................................................................................................................................................................................................17
3.3 Organizational Security Policies ..............................................................................................................................................................19
4. Security Objectives......................................................................................................................................................................................20
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE...............................................................................................................................................................20
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment.................................................................................................................................................20
5. Security Requirements................................................................................................................................................................................21
5.1 Conventions................................................................................................................................................................................................21
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements..................................................................................................................................................21
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5.3 SFRs drawn from the NDcPPv2.2e.........................................................................................................................................................23
5.3.1 Class: Security Audit (FAU).............................................................................................................................................................23
5.3.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation 23
5.3.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 – User Identity Association 25
5.3.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 – Protected Audit Event Storage 25
5.3.2 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)..............................................................................................................................................26
5.3.2.1 FCS_CKM.1– Cryptographic Key Generation 26
5.3.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement) 26
5.3.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 – Cryptographic Key Destruction 26
5.3.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) 26
5.3.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) 26
5.3.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) 27
5.3.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) 27
5.3.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation 27
5.3.2.10 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 – SSH Server Protocol 27
5.3.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 – TLS Client Protocol 28
5.3.3 Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)...............................................................................................................................28
5.3.3.1 FIA_AFL_EXT.1 – Authentication Failure Management 28
5.3.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 – Password Management 28
5.3.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 – User Identification and Authentication 28
5.3.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 – Password-based Authentication Mechanism 28
5.3.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 – Protected Authentication Feedback 29
5.3.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev – X.509 Certificate Validation 29
5.3.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication 29
5.3.3.8 FIA_X509_EXT.3 – X.509 Certificate Requests 29
5.3.4 Class: Security Management (FMT) ..............................................................................................................................................29
5.3.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate – Management of Security Functions Behavior29
5.3.4.2 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData – Management of TSF Data 29
5.3.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys – Management of TSF Data 30
5.3.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions 30
5.3.4.4 FMT_SMR.2 – Restrictions on Security Roles 30
5.3.5 Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................................................30
5.3.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 – Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) 30
5.3.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1 – Protection of Administrator Passwords 31
5.3.5.3 FPT_STM_EXT.1 – Reliable Time Stamps 31
5.3.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing 31
5.3.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Trusted Updates 31
5.3.6 Class: TOE Access (FTA)................................................................................................................................................................31
5.3.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 – TSF-initiated Session Locking 31
5.3.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 – TSF-initiated Termination 31
5.3.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 – User-initiated Termination 31
5.3.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 – Default TOE Access Banners 31
5.3.7 Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) .............................................................................................................................................31
5.3.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel 31
5.3.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin – Trusted Path 32
5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale.........................................................................................................................................................32
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements ..........................................................................................................................................................32
5.5.1 SAR Requirements............................................................................................................................................................................32
5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ................................................................................................................................33
5.6 Assurance Measures.................................................................................................................................................................................33
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6. TOE Summary Specifications ....................................................................................................................................................................33
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures .................................................................................................................................33
7. Annex A: Key Zeroization ................................................................................................................................................................................46
8. Annex B: References........................................................................................................................................................................................48
9. Annex C: Acronyms and Terms ......................................................................................................................................................................49
Table of Tables
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification.......................................................................................................................................................6
Table 2. IT Environment Component....................................................................................................................................................7
Table 3. Hardware Models and Description..........................................................................................................................................9
Table 4. CAVP Certificates.................................................................................................................................................................10
Table 5. TOE Provided Cryptography.................................................................................................................................................10
Table 6. Excluded Functionality and Rationale...................................................................................................................................12
Table 7. Protection Profile Conformance............................................................................................................................................13
Table 8. NIAP Technical Decisions Applied to This ST ......................................................................................................................13
Table 9. TOE Assumptions.................................................................................................................................................................16
Table 10. Threats................................................................................................................................................................................18
Table 11. Organizational Security Policies .........................................................................................................................................19
Table 12. Security Objectives for the Environment.............................................................................................................................20
Table 13. Security Requirement Conventions ....................................................................................................................................21
Table 14. Security Functional Requirements ......................................................................................................................................21
Table 15. Auditable Events.................................................................................................................................................................23
Table 16. Assurance Requirements....................................................................................................................................................32
Table 17. Assurance Measures ..........................................................................................................................................................33
Table 18. How TOE SFRs Measures..................................................................................................................................................34
Table 19. Key Zeroization...................................................................................................................................................................46
Table 20. References .........................................................................................................................................................................48
Table 21. Acronyms and Terms..........................................................................................................................................................49
Table of Figures
Figure 1. TOE and Environment ...........................................................................................................................................................8
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Document Introduction
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Cisco Network Convergence
System 1004 (NCS1004). This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list
of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security
functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as
administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE administrators, semi-privileged, privileged administrators, and security
administrators in this document.
Cisco and the Cisco logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Cisco and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries.
To view a list of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: www.cisco.com/go/trademarks. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the
property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and
any other company. (1110R)
© 2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Cisco Network Convergence System 1004 (NCS1004) Running IOS-XR 24.1
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1. Security Target Introduction
This Security Target contains the following sections:
■ Security Target Introduction
■ Conformance Claims
■ Security Problem Definition
■ Security Objectives
■ Security Requirements
■ TOE Summary Specification
■ References
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and
Part 2.
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and the TOE.
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Cisco Network Convergence System 1004 (NCS1004)
Running IOS-XR 24.1 Security Target
ST Version 1.0
Publication Date February 27, 2025
Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference Cisco Network Convergence System 1004
TOE Hardware Models NCS 1004
TOE Software Version IOS-XR 24.1
Keywords Routers, Data Protection, Authentication
1.2 TOE Overview
The Cisco Network Convergence System 1004 (herein after referred to as the NCS 1004) TOE is a purpose-built, routing
platform that’s primarily used for interconnecting data centers for mass scale. The TOE includes the hardware models as
defined in Table 3 – Hardware Models and Descriptions.
1.3 TOE Product Type
The TOE is a network device as defined in NDcPP v2.2e.
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The NCS 1004 optimizes Data Center Interconnect and is designed to scale with flexibility and automated operations. The
NCS 1004 also scales efficiently and flexibly through its fully programmable, high-bandwidth capacity.
The NCS 1004 router runs IOS-XR that is a distributed micro kernel-based network operating system. IOS-XR can process
data as it comes into the router without buffering delays. The microkernel is responsible for specific functions such as memory
management, interrupt handling, scheduling, task switching, synchronization, and inter-process communication. The
microkernel's functions do not include other system services such as device drivers, file system, and network stacks; those
services are implemented as independent processes outside the kernel, and they can be restarted like any other application.
1.3.1 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE requires the following hardware/software/firmware in the IT environment when the TOE is configured in its evaluated
configuration.
Table 2. IT Environment Component
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Management Workstation with
SSH Client
Yes This includes any Operational Environment Management
workstation with an SSH client installed that is used by the TOE
administrator to support TOE administration through SSH
protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may
be used.
Certificate Authority Yes This includes any Operational Environment Certificate Authority
on the TOE network. This can be used to provide the TOE with
a valid certificate during certificate enrollment.
Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly
connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used
by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.
Authentication (AAA) Server Yes This includes any IT environment AAA server that provides
single-use authentication mechanisms. This can be any AAA
server that provides single-use authentication. The TOE
correctly leverages the services provided by this AAA server to
provide single-use authentication to administrators.
Syslog Server Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would
transmit syslog messages.
1.4 TOE Description
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Network Convergence System 1004 (NCS1004). The TOE is comprised of both
software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of NCS1004. The software is comprised of the Universal
Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS-XR) software image release IOS-XR 24.1.
NCS1004
The NCS1004 chassis is a 2RU chassis and is the component of the TOE in which all other TOE components are housed. The
NCS 1004 chassis provides four-line card slots. Each slot can host a 1.2Tbps coherent DWDM line card with 12 Quad Small
Form-Factor Pluggable (QSFP)-28 based clients and 2 DWDM trunk ports. Each line card can provide up to 12 100Gbe/OTU4
or 3 400GE client ports.
The system supports up to 4.8Tbps of client and 4.8Tbps of trunk traffic. The NCS 1004 has two redundant and field
replaceable AC & DC power supply units and three redundant and field replaceable fans. It also provides a field replaceable
controller card and Solid-State Drive (SSD) disks both on-board the chassis and on the controller card for resiliency.
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For connections to the Syslog audit server, the TOE authenticates those devices with X.509v3 certificates and protects
communication channels with the TLS protocol. Secure remote administration is protected with SSH which is implemented with
authentication failure handling.
1.5 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of one physical device as specified in section “Physical Scope of the TOE” below and includes the Cisco
IOS-XR software. The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and one external
network. The Cisco IOS-XR configuration determines how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The
router configuration will determine how traffic flows received on an interface will be handled. Typically, packet flows are passed
through the internetworking device and forwarded to their configured destination.
An external syslog server must be used to store audit records. For remote administration, a secure session using SSHv2 must
be established.
Figure 1. TOE and Environment
1.6 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the router models as follows: NCS1004. The network, on which
they reside, is considered part of the IT environment. The TOE guidance documentation that is considered to be part of the
TOE can be found listed in the Cisco NCS 1004 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures
document and are downloadable from the https://www.niap-ccevs.org web site. The TOE is comprised of the following physical
specifications as described in Table 3 – Hardware Models and Descriptions below.
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Table 3. Hardware Models and Description
Hardware Platform Processor Software Size Power Interfaces
NCS 1004 Intel Atom
C3758
(Goldmont)
IOS-XR 24.1 2RU
3.5 in. x 17.5
in. x 19 in.
(8.9 cm x
44.45 cm x
48.26 cm)
1+1 FRU AC
or DC
<30W per
100G
1300 W
(typical)
1400 W (max)
2 (two) slots for 2.1kW AC
redundant Power Supply Units
(PSU)
3 (three) redundant
and field replaceable fans
1.7 Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features consists of several security functionalities, as
identified below.
■ Security Audit
■ Cryptographic Support
■ Identification and Authentication
■ Security Management
■ Protection of the TSF
■ TOE Access
■ Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE implements all RFCs of the NDcPP
v2.2e as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures prescribed there.
1.7.1 Security Audit
Auditing allows Security Administrators to discover intentional and unintentional issues with the TOE’s configuration and/or
operation. Auditing of administrative activities provides information that may be used to hasten corrective action should the
system be configured incorrectly. Security audit data can also provide an indication of failure of critical portions of the TOE
(e.g. a communication channel failure or anomalous activity (e.g. establishment of an administrative session at a suspicious
time, repeated failures to establish sessions or authenticate to the TOE)) of a suspicious nature.
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security
relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The TOE provides circular audit trail.
Audit logs are transmitted to an external audit server over a trusted channel protected with TLS.
1.7.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the algorithms claimed have CAVP
certificates (Operational Environment –Intel Atom). The TOE leverages the Cisco FIPS Object Module 7.3a which resides in
the IOS-XR software.
The table below lists the CAVP certificates for the TOE.
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Table 4. CAVP Certificates
Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
CAVP Cert. # Module SFR
AES Used for symmetric
encryption/decryption
CBC, CTR,
GCM (128,
256)
A4446 FOM 7.3a FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
SHS (SHA-1,
SHA-256 and
SHA-512)
Cryptographic
hashing services
Byte Oriented A4446 FOM 7.3a FCS_COP.1/Hash
HMAC
(HMAC-SHA-
1, HMAC-
SHA-256 and
HMAC-SHA-
512)
Keyed hashing
services and
software integrity test
Byte Oriented A4446 FOM 7.3a FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
DRBG Deterministic random
bit generation
services in
accordance with
ISO/IEC 18031:2011
HMAC_DRBG
(256)
A4446 FOM 7.3a FCS_RBG_EXT
RSA Signature Verification
and key transport
FIPS PUB 186-
4 Key
Generation
PKCS #1 v1.5
2048, 3072,
and 4096 bit
keys
A4446 FOM 7.3a FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
FFC Signature Verification
and key transport
NIST Special
Publication
800-56A
Revision 3,
Safe-Primes
Tested with a
known good
implementation
FOM 7.3a FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
The TOE provides cryptography in support of remote administrative management via SSHv2 and secures the session between
the NCS1004 and remote syslog server using TLS. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table 5
below.
Table 5. TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
Secure Shell Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session.
RSA Signature Services Used in SSH session establishment.
HMAC Used for keyed hash, integrity services in SSH session
establishment.
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AES CBC, CTR, GCM (128, 256) Used to encrypt SSH session traffic.
SHA Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
TLS Used to secure traffic to the syslog server
1.7.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the TOE’s secure CLI administrator
interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory
password complexity rules.
After a configurable number of incorrect login attempts, the NCS1004 will lockout the account until a configured amount of time
for lockout expires.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be
performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS connections.
1.7.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality
provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection.
The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative users; all identification and authentication; all audit
functionality of the TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the TOE; and updates to the TOE.
The TOE supports privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant
management functions.
Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login and can also define an inactivity timeout
for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of inactivity.
1.7.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and
access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and
passwords. Additionally, Cisco IOS-XR is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XR memory space
is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XR functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records
generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify
correct operation of the router itself and that of the cryptographic module.
The TOE can verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of
unauthorized software.
1.7.6 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period. Once a session has been
terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any
administrative access to the TOE.
1.7.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE establishes a trusted path between the appliance and the CLI using SSHv2 and the syslog server using TLS.
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1.8 Excluded Functionality
The functionality listed below will be disabled by configuration, as described in the Guidance documents (AGD). The excluded
functionality does not affect conformance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e.
Table 6. Excluded Functionality and Rationale
Function Excluded Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed
operations.
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2. Conformance Claims
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. The TOE and ST
are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are conformant with the following Protection Profiles This ST applies the NIAP Technical Decisions as
described in Table 8:
Table 7. Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile Version Date
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices [NDcPP] 2.2e March 23, 2020
The following NIAP Technical Decisions (TD) have also been applied to the claims in this document. Each posted TD was
reviewed and considered based on the TOE product type, the PP claims, and the security functional requirements claimed in
this document.
Table 8. NIAP Technical Decisions Applied to This ST
TD Identifier TD Name Protection Profiles Applicable? Exclusion Rationale
TD0800 Updated NIT Technical Decision for IPsec
IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance
CPP_ND_V2.2E No IPSec is not claimed
TD0792 NIT Technical Decision: FIA_PMG_EXT.1 -
TSS EA not in line with SFR
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0790 NIT Technical Decision: Clarification Re-
quired for testing IPv6
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0738 NIT Technical Decision for Link to Allowed-
With List
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0670 NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and
Non-Mutual Auth TLSC Testing
CPP_ND_V2.2E No Mutual authentication
is not claimed
TD0639 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification for
NTP MAC Keys
CPP_ND_V2.2E No NTP is not claimed
TD0638 NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair Gener-
ation for Authentication
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0636 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of
Public Key User Authentication for SSH
CPP_ND_V2.2E No SSH client is not
claimed
TD0635 NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and
Key Agreement Parameters
CPP_ND_V2.2E No TLS server is not
claimed
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TD0632 NIT Technical Decision for Consistency
with Time Data for vNDs
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0631 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of
public key authentication for SSH Server
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0592 NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of
Audit Records
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0591 NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs
and hypervisors
CPP_ND_V2.2E No The TOE is not a vND
TD0581 NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-
based key establishment and NIST SP 800-
56Arev3
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0580 NIT Technical Decision for clarification
about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0572 NiT Technical Decision for Restricting
FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0571 NiT Technical Decision for Guidance on
how to handle FIA_AFL.1
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0570 NiT Technical Decision for Clarification
about FIA_AFL.1
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0569 NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Us-
age Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7
CPP_ND_V2.2E No DTLS is not claimed.
TD0564 NiT Technical Decision for Vulnerability
Analysis Search Criteria
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0563 NiT Technical Decision for Clarification of
audit date information
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0556 NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 ques-
tion
CPP_ND_V2.2E No TLS server is not
claimed
TD0555 NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference
incorrect in TLSS Test
CPP_ND_V2.2E No TLS server is not
claimed
TD0547 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on
developer disclosure of AVA_VAN
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0546 NIT Technical Decision for DTLS – clarifica-
tion of Application Note 63
CPP_ND_V2.2E No DTLS client is not
claimed
TD0537 NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect refer-
ence to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
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TD0536 NIT Technical Decision for Update Verifica-
tion Inconsistency
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
TD0528 NIT Technical Decision for Missing Eas for
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
CPP_ND_V2.2E No NTP is not claimed
TD0527 Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing
(FIA_X509_EXT.1)
CPP_ND_V2.2E Yes
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale
2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness
The ST claims exact conformance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.2e. The ST
does not include any additions to the functionality described in the NDcPPv2.2e.
2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency
The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the Assumptions,
Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e
for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile Security Problem Definition are
included in the Security Target Statement of Security Objectives Consistency.
The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives specified in the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the
Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Objectives are included in the Security Target.
2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements
specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim.
All concepts covered the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Requirements are included in the Security Target.
Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in the Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance
Requirements included in the claimed Protection Profiles.
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3. Security Problem Definition
This section identifies the following:
■ Assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the
development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
■ Threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment.
■ Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization on the TOE to address its security needs.
This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a unique name. Threats are identified as
T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name. Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are identified as P.osp with “osp”
specifying a unique name.
The security problem definition below has been drawn verbatim from [NDcPPv2.2e].
3.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s environment. These assumptions
include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions
on the use of the TOE.
Table 9. TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected
in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the
device’s physical interconnections and correct operation.
This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does
not include any requirements on physical tamper protection
or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the
device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical platform
on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality
as its core function and not provide functionality/ services
that could be deemed as general-purpose computing. For
example, the device should not provide computing platform
for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking
functionality).
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Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any
assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses
it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that
originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is
traversing the network device, destined for another network
entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this
protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of
network devices (e.g, firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are
assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes being
appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to
ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and
entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the
device. The network device is not expected to be capable
of defending against a malicious administrator that actively
works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected
to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded
into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key
Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to
be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the network device are protected by the platform on
which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The administrator must ensure that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs,
passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
3.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of expertise of the
attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
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Table 10. Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to
the network device by nefarious means such as
masquerading as an administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an administrator, replaying
an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected
portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which
would provide access to the administrative session, or
sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining
administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device and the
network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms
or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space.
Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or
brute force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate
and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that
do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to
protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take
advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key
management to successfully perform man-in-the middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in
loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network
traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the
network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that
use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g.,
shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly
designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
administrator or another device, and the attacker could
insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network
traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of
confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network
device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines the
security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak
cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the network device
without administrator awareness. This could result in the
attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in
the product) to compromise the device and the
administrator would have no knowledge that the device has
been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device
data enabling continued access to the network device and
its critical data. The compromise of credentials include
replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials,
modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the
administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may
allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with
other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed
or compromised security functionality and might therefore
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data,
critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
The following table lists the Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization to address its security needs.
Table 11. Organizational Security Policies
Policy Name Policy Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing
restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other
appropriate information to which users consent by
accessing the TOE.
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4. Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the
responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the security needs.
This document identifies objectives of the TOE as O.objective with objective specifying a unique name. Objectives that apply to
the IT environment are designated as OE.objective with objective specifying a unique name.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e does not define any security objectives for the TOE.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
The following table identifies the Security Objectives for the Environment. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to
counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies. The security objectives below have been drawn verbatim
from [NDcPPv2.2e].
Table 12. Security Objectives for the Environment
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE
and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other
than those services necessary for the operation,
administration and support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that
traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will
be covered by other security and assurance measures in
the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed
to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the
TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the
TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no longer be
trusted.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an
administrator on a regular basis in response to the release
of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the TOE must be protected on any other platform
on which they reside.
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Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs,
passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
5. Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements in this section
are drawn from [CC_PART2], [NDcPPv2.2e] and NIAP Technical Decisions.
5.1 Conventions
[CC_PART1] defines operations on Security Functional Requirements. This document uses the following conventions to
identify the operations permitted by [NDcPPv2.2e] and NIAP Technical Decisions.
Table 13. Security Requirement Conventions
Convention Indication
Assignment Indicated with italicized text
Refinement Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs
Selection Indicated with underlined text
Assignment within a Selection Indicated with italicized and underlined text
Iteration indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g.
“FCS_COP.1/Hash”)
Where operations were completed in the [NDcPPv2.2e] itself, the formatting used in the [NDcPPv2.2e] has been retained.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The TOE Security Functional Requirements that
appear in the following table are described in more detail in the following subsections.
Table 14. Security Functional Requirements
Class Name Component Identification Component Name
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
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Class Name Component Identification Component Name
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and
Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
FMT: Security
management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric
keys)
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps
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Class Name Component Identification Component Name
FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path
5.3 SFRs drawn from the NDcPPv2.2e
5.3.1 Class: Security Audit (FAU)
5.3.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrator actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for
Administrators).
• Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it
shall be logged what has been changed).
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key
name or key reference shall be logged).
• Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
• [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 15.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the
cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 15.
Table 15. Auditable Events
SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
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SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH session Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish an TLS session Reason for failure.
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is
met or exceeded.
Administrator lockout due to excessive
authentication failures
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP ad-
dress).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt
(e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt
(e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate a
certificate
Any addition, replacement or removal
of trust anchors in the TOE's trust
store.
Reason for failure of certificate
validation
Identification of certificates added,
replaced or removed as trust anchor in
the TOE's trust store.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual
update
None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys None None.
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of TSF data. None.
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SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the
update attempt (success or failure)
None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time - either
Administrator actuated or changed via
an automated process.
For discontinuous changes to time:
The old and new values for the time.
Origin of the attempt to change time
for success and failure (e.g., IP
address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 The termination of a local session by
the session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session
by the session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive
session.
None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
Identification of the initiator and target
of failed trusted channels
establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted path.
Failures of the trusted path functions.
None.
5.3.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 – User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable
event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.3.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 – Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel
according to FTP_ITC.1.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition
• [The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally].
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [oldest audit records are
overwritten] when the local storage space for audit data is full.
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5.3.2 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.3.2.1 FCS_CKM.1– Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
• FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC 3526,
RFC 7919].
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
5.3.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
establishment method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of
RFC 3447, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”;
• FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: ‘NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups
listed in RFC 3526];
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.3.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 – Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided
by a part of the TSF that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single-pass] overwrite consisting of
[zeroes]
]
that meets the following: No Standard.
5.3.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption : The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES used in [CBC, CTR, GCM] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as
specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].
5.3.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm
[
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048, 3072, and 4096 bits],
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]
that meet the following:
[
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature
Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital
Signature scheme 3,
]
5.3.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest
sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.3.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160 bits, 256 bits, 512
bits] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm
2”.
5.3.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC
18031:2011 using [HMAC_DRBG (any)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [[1]
platform-based noise source] with minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.3.2.10 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 – SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [4344,
6668, 8308 section 3.1, 8332].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication
methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password based].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [1262094] bytes in an SSH
transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms
and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [rsa-sha2-256,
rsa-sha2-512] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-
sha2-512, implicit] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1] and [no other methods] are the only allowed key
exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no
longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds
are reached a rekey needs to be performed.
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5.3.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 – TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all other TLS and SSL
versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:
[
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section
6].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server
certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [
• Not implement any administrator override mechanism
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall [not present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Group Extension] in the Client Hello.
5.3.3 Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.3.3.1 FIA_AFL_EXT.1 – Authentication Failure Management
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [2-6] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [prevent the
offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using any authentication method that involves a
password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed].
5.3.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 – Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:
a. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the
following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”];
b. Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [15] and [253] characters.
5.3.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 – User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and
authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [no other actions]
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated action on behalf of that administrative user.
5.3.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 – Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative
user authentication.
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5.3.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 – Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress
at the local console.
5.3.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev – X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation supporting a minimum path length of three
certificates.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
• The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the
basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in
RFC 5759 Section 5].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing
purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present
and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.3.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS], and [no
additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [ not
accept the certificate].
5.3.3.8 FIA_X509_EXT.3 – X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the
following information in the request: public key and [Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate
Response.
5.3.4 Class: Security Management (FMT)
5.3.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate – Management of Security Functions Behavior
FIA_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security
Administrators.
5.3.4.2 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData – Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.
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5.3.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys – Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.
5.3.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash comparison] capability prior to installing those
updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
[
o Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when
local audit storage space is full);
o Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
o Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
o Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE’S trust store;
o Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;
]
5.3.4.4 FMT_SMR.2 – Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
5.3.5 Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.3.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 – Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
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5.3.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1 – Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.
5.3.5.3 FPT_STM_EXT.1 – Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].
5.3.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF: [
• AES Known Answer Test
• HMAC Known Answer Test
• RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test
• SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test
• RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification)
• Software Integrity Test].
5.3.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Trusted Updates
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the
TOE firmware/software and [the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [published
hash] prior to installing those updates.
5.3.6 Class: TOE Access (FTA)
5.3.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 – TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security Administrator-specified
time period of inactivity.
5.3.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 – TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time interval of
session inactivity.
5.3.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 – User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own interactive session.
5.3.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 – Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified
advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.
5.3.7 Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.3.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and
authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [no other capabilities] that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data
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FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [
• Syslog server over TLS.
]
5.3.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin – Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication path between itself and
authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification
of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the
channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote
administration actions.
5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale
[NDcPPv2.2e] contain all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such the dependencies are not applicable since
the PPs themselves have been approved.
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements
5.5.1 SAR Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the [NDcPPv2.2E] which are derived from [CC_PART3].
The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.
Table 16. Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment
(ASE_OBJ.1)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
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Assurance Class Components Description
Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – sample (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs identified in the [NDcPPv2.2E]. As
such, the [NDcPPv2.2E] SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since the PPs themselves have been approved.
5.6 Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. The table below identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to
satisfy the assurance requirements.
Table 17. Assurance Measures
Assurance Component Rationale
ADV_FSP.1 No additional “functional specification” documentation was
provided by Cisco to satisfy the Evaluation Activities.
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Cisco will provide the guidance documents with the ST.
ALC_CMC.1
ALC_CMS.1
Cisco will identify the TOE such that it can be distinguished
from other products or versions from the Cisco and can be
easily specified when being procured by an end user.
ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for Vulnerability Analysis.
6. TOE Summary Specifications
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures
The table below identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.
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Table 18. How TOE SFRs Measures
TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FAU_GEN.1 The TOE generates an audit record whenever an audited event occurs. The types of
events that cause audit records to be generated include: startup and shutdown of the
audit mechanism cryptography related events, identification and authentication related
events, and administrative events (the specific events and the contents of each audit
record are listed in the table within the FAU_GEN.1 SFR, “Auditable Events Table”).
Each of the events is specified in syslog records in enough detail to identify the user
for which the event is associated, when the event occurred, where the event occurred,
the outcome of the event, and the type of event that occurred such as generating
keys, including the type of key(rsa) and the label of the key. Additionally, the startup
and shutdown of the audit functionality is audited.
Feb 21 15:38:19.075 UTC: syslogd[309]: %OS-SYSLOG-5-LOG_NOTICE : Secure Logging:
Successfully established TLS session , server :10.105.227.148
In the above log events a date and timestamp is displayed as well as an event de-
scription.
FAU_GEN.2 The TOE shall ensure that each auditable event is associated with the user that trig-
gered the event and as a result they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a
human user, user identity, or related session ID would be included in the audit record.
For an IT entity or device, the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other config-
ured identification is presented. A sample audit record is below:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:Feb 28 18:20:13.419 UTC: config[69603]: %MGBL-CONFIG-6-DB_COMMIT :
Configuration committed by user 'root'. Use 'show configuration commit changes 1000000011' to
view the changes
RP/0/RSP0/CPU0:Feb 28 18:20:13.433 UTC: config[69603]: %MGBL-SYS-5-CONFIG_I : Con-
figured from console by admin
FAU_STG_EXT.1 The TOE is configured to export syslog records to a specified, external syslog server
in real time. The TOE protects communications with an external syslog server via
TLS. The TOE transmits its audit events to all configured syslog servers at the same
time logs are written to the local log buffer and to the console. The TOE is capable of
detecting when the TLS connection fails.
The TOE also stores a limited set of audit records locally in a circular file on the TOE
and continues to do so if the communication with the syslog server goes down. The
default value for the size of the logging buffer on the TOE is 2097152 bytes. If the
TLS connection fails, the TOE will buffer a small amount of audit records on the TOE
when it discovers it can no longer communicate with its configured syslog server and
will transmit the buffer contents when connectivity to the syslog server is restored.
When the local audit data storage is full, the NCS1K will overwrite the oldest stored
audit records when writing new audit records. The local audit records are stored in a
directory that does not allow administrators to modify the contents.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
The TOE generates asymmetric keys in accordance with the RSA schemes using key
sizes of 2048-bit or greater that are conformant to the FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix
B.3. The TOE can create an RSA public-private key pair that can be used to gener-
ate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). Via offline CSR or Simple Certificate Enroll-
ment Protocol (SCEP), the TOE can: send the CSR to a Certificate Authority (CA) for
the CA to generate a certificate; and receive its X.509 certificate from the CA. Integ-
rity of the CSR and certificate during transit are assured through use of digital signa-
tures (encrypting the hash of the TOE’s public key contained in the CSR and certifi-
cate). The TOE can store and distribute the certificate to external entities including
Registration Authorities (RA). The IOS-XR Software supports embedded PKI client
functions that provide secure mechanisms for distributing, managing, and revoking
certificates. The TOE can also use X.509v3 certificates for authentication of TLS ses-
sions. The TOE acts as both a sender and receiver for RSA -based key establish-
ment schemes. The RSA key establishment meets the RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman (DH) group 14 (2048) bit key finite field-based
key generation in conformance with RFC 3526 section 3 and RFC 7919. The TOE
acts as both a sender and receiver for Diffie-Helman based key establishment
schemes. The DH key generation meets the RFC 3526, Section 3 and RFC 7919.
Scheme SFR Service
RSA FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
Support for SSH and
TLS key
establishment
Remote
Administration for
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FFC FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
SSH Remote
Administration
Syslog Server
FCS_CKM.4 The TOE meets all requirements specified in FIPS 140-2 for destruction of keys and
Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) in that none of the symmetric keys, pre-shared
keys, or private keys are stored in plaintext. See Table 19 for more information on the
key zeroization.
FCS_COP.1/DataEnc
ryption
The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in
CBC, CTR and GCM mode (128, 256 bits) as described in ISO 18033-3 and ISO
10116 and 19772. AES is implemented in the following protocols: SSH and TLS.
Through the implementation of the CAVP validated cryptographic module, the TOE
provides AES encryption and decryption in support of SSHv2 and TLS for secure
communications. Management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through
the CLI with auditing of those commands.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FCS_COP.1/SigGen The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using the following:
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with key size of 2048, 3072, and 4096 as
specified in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”
Through the implementation of the CAVP validated cryptographic module, the TOE
provides cryptographic signatures in support of SSH and TLS for secure communica-
tions. Management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI with
auditing of those commands. The TOE provides the RSA option in support of SSH
and TLS key establishment. RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, and 4096-bit) is used in the es-
tablishment of SSHv2 key establishment. For SSH, RSA host keys are supported.
FCS_COP.1/Hash The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256 and
SHA-512 as specified in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
Through the implementation of the CAVP validated cryptographic module, the TOE
provides Secure Hash Standard (SHS) hashing in support of SSH and TLS for secure
communications. Management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through
the CLI with auditing of those commands.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedH
ash
The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512, key size 160, 256, 512 bits, and mes-
sage digest sizes 160, 256, 512 as specified in ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7
“MAC Algorithm 2”
Through the implementation of the CAVP validated cryptographic module, the TOE
provides SHS hashing and HMAC message authentication in support of SSHv2,
TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 for secure communications. Management of the cryptographic
algorithms is provided through the CLI with auditing of those commands. SHS
hashing and HMAC message authentication (SHA-1) is used in the establishment of
TLS and SSHv2 sessions.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE implements a NIST-approved HMAC Deterministic Random Bit Generator
(DRBG), as specified in ISO/IEC 18031:2011 seeded by an entropy source that ac-
cumulates entropy from a TSF-hardware based noise source.
The deterministic RBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy, which is at
least equal to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it will gener-
ate.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 The TOE implements SSHv2 (telnet is disabled by default in the evaluated configura-
tion). SSHv2 is implemented according to the following RFCs: 4251, 4252, 4253,
4254, 4344, 5647, 5656, and 6668. The TOE supports both public key-based and
password-based authentication. For public key-based authentication, the TOE veri-
fies that the SSH client's presented public key matches one that is stored within the
SSH server's authorized_keys file. Remote CLI SSHv2 sessions are limited to an ad-
ministrator configurable session timeout period and will be rekeyed after no more than
1 gigabyte (binary) of data is transmitted or an hour has passed. Both thresholds are
checked by the TOE and a rekeying is performed on whichever threshold is reached
first.
SSHv2 connections will be dropped if the TOE receives a packet larger than 1262094
bytes. Large packets are detected by the SSH implementation and dropped internal
to the SSH process. The key exchange methods used by the TOE is a configurable
option but diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 is the only allowed method within the evalu-
ated configuration. Any session where the SSH client offers only non-compliant algo-
rithms or key sizes per the NDcPP will be rejected by the SSH server. SSH sessions
can only be established when compliant algorithms and key sizes can be negotiated.
The TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports the following:
• public key algorithms for hostkey authentication: rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-
512.
• public key algorithms for client authentication: ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-
sha2-512
• password-based authentication for administrative users accessing the TOE's
CLI through SSHv2.
• encryption algorithms, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,
aes256-gcm@openssh.com to ensure confidentiality of the session.
Note: When aes*-gcm@openssh.com is negotiated as the encryption algo-
rithm, the MAC algorithm field is ignored and GCM is implicitly used as the
MAC.
• hashing algorithms hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512 to ensure
the integrity of the session.
Please refer to Table 4 for all the CAVP references
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 The TOE supports TLSv1.1 and TLS v1.2 to protect the sessions to the remote audit
server.
TLS is also used to protect the TLS sessions with the TOE, which supports the man-
datory ciphersuite as well as the following optional ciphersuite:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
The TOE does not support NIST Curves in the TLS Client Hello.
The TOE will only establish a connection if the peer presents a valid certificate dur-
ing the handshake.
Any session where the server offers the following in the server hello: SSL 2.0, SSL
3.0 and TLS 1.0 will be rejected by the TOE (client).
Using wildcards is not supported in identity certificates.
Certificate pinning is not supported.
The TOE requires Subject Alternative Names (SANs) “the reference identifiers” for a
successful connection. SANs contain one or more alternate names and uses any vari-
ety of name forms for the entity that is bound by the Certificate Authority (CA) to the
certified public key. These alternate names are called “Subject Alternative Names"
(SANs). Possible names include:
• DNS name
IP addresses are not supported in the SAN or CN.
FIA_AFL.1 The TOE enforces a timed lockout after an Administrator defined number of unsuc-
cessful password attempts is exceeded. While the TOE supports a range from 2-6, in
the evaluated configuration, the maximum number of failed attempts is recommended
to be set to 3.
Once the remote user is locked out, their account will not be accessible until the con-
figured timer for lockout has been exceeded. Once the lockout time is over, then the
administrator user can attempt to login again. At no point is administrator access com-
pletely unavailable when remote administrators are locked out due to unsuccessful
password attempts. Local console access is always available. Administrator lockouts
are not applicable to the local console
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The
passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”. “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“,
and “)”. Minimum password length is settable by the Authorized Administrator and
can be configured for minimum password lengths of 15 characters.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before al-
lowing any TSF mediated actions to be performed except for the login warning banner
that is displayed prior to user authentication.
Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through the TOE’s CLI. The TOE medi-
ates all administrative actions through the CLI. Once a potential administrative user
attempts to access the CLI of the TOE through either a directly connected console or
remotely through an SSHv2 secured connection, the TOE prompts the user for a
username and password. Only after the administrative user presents the correct au-
thentication credentials will access to the TOE administrative functionality be granted.
No access is allowed to the administrative functionality of the TOE until an administra-
tor is successfully identified and authenticated.
The TOE provides a local password-based authentication mechanism for authentica-
tion of authorized administrators. The TOE also provides a password based or SSH
public key-based mechanism for remote authentication of authorized administrators.
The process for authentication is the same for administrative access whether admin-
istration is occurring via a directly connected console or remotely via SSHv2 secured
connection.
At initial login, the administrative user is prompted to provide a username. After the
user provides the username, the user is prompted to provide the administrative pass-
word associated with the user account. The TOE then either grant administrative ac-
cess (if the combination of username and password is correct) or indicate that the
login was unsuccessful. The TOE does not provide a reason for failure in the cases of
a login failure.
FIA_UAU.7 When a user enters their password at the local console, the TOE displays only ‘*’
characters so that the user password is obscured. For remote session authentication,
the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered. The TOE does not
provide a reason for failure in the cases of a login failure.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication
for TLS connections. Public key infrastructure (PKI) credentials, such as private keys
and certificates are stored securely. The identification and authentication, and
FIA_X509_EXT.2
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FIA_X509_EXT.3 authorization security functions protect an unauthorized user from gaining access to
the storage. The certificate request message includes the public key and the follow-
ing information per RFC 2986.
The device specific information includes
• Common Name
• Organization
• Organizational unit
• Country
The certificate validation checking takes place during the TLS session establishment
and at time of import. The TOE conforms to standard RFC 5280 for certificate and
path validation (i.e., peer certificate checked for expiration, peer certificate checked if
signed by a trusted CA in the trust chain, peer certificate checked for unauthorized
modification, peer certificate checked for revocation).
The TOE supports Self-signed certificate enrollment for a trust point to obtain a certifi-
cate from a CA:
The certificate chain establishes a sequence of trusted certificates, from a peer cer-
tificate to the root CA certificate. Within the PKI hierarchy, all enrolled peers can
validate the certificate of one another if the peers share a trusted root CA certificate
or a common subordinate CA. Each CA corresponds to a trust point. When a certif-
icate chain is received from a peer, the default processing of a certificate chain path
continues until the first trusted certificate, or trust point, is reached.
Both the certificate request message and the certificates themselves provide protec-
tion in that they are digitally signed. If a certificate is modified in any way, it would be
invalidated. The digital signature verifications process would show that the certificate
had been tampered with when the hash value would be invalid.
Checking is also done for the basicConstraints extension and the CA flag to deter-
mine whether they are present and set to TRUE. The local certificate that was im-
ported must contain the basic constraints extension with the CA flag set to true, the
check also ensure that the key usage extension is present, and the keyEncipherment
bit or the keyAgreement bit or both are set. If they are not, the certificate is not ac-
cepted. Only one certificate is imported since the only device is a syslog server, so
the TOE chooses this certificate.
The basicConstraints extension checking is performed at the time of authentication
during the connection attempt. If the connection to determine the certificate validity
cannot be established, the certificate is not accepted.
The administrators can configure a trust chain by importing the CA certificate(s) that
signed and issued the server (syslog) certificate. This will tell the TOE which CA certif-
icate(s) to use during the validation process. If the TOE does not find the trusted root
CA, the TLS connection to the syslog server will fail. When the TOE is able to contact
the CRL distribution point for certificate revocation checking, the TOE will reject the
TLS session if the remote trust point’s (e.g. syslog server’s) certificate has been re-
voked.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FMT_MOF.1/Manual
Update
FMT_MTD.1/CoreDat
a
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoK
eys
The TOE provides administrative users with a CLI to interact with and manage the
security functions of the TOE.
The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has
been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action;
therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions. There-
fore, semi-privileged administrators with only a subset of privileges may also manage
and modify TOE data based on the privileges assigned.
The TOE provides the ability for Authorized Administrators to access TOE data, such
as user accounts and roles, audit data, audit server information, configuration data,
security attributes, X509 certificates, login banners, inactivity timeout values, pass-
word complexity setting, TOE updates and session thresholds via the CLI. The TOE
provides the ability for Authorized Administrators to manage cryptographic keys. This
ability takes the form of a management activity that will create keys, import keys, con-
figure the use of keys, and destroy keys. The keys that can be managed are associ-
ated with a CSR, x509v3 certificates, and SSH public keys.The TOE restricts the ac-
cess to manage TSF data that can affect security functions of the TOE to the Author-
ized Administrator/Security Administrator roles.
Manual software updates can only be done by the authorized administrator through
CLI. These updates include software upgrades.
The Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) can query the software
version running on the TOE and can initiate updates to (replacements of) software
images. When software updates are made available by Cisco, the Authorized
Administrators can obtain, verify the integrity of, and install those updates.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FMT_SMF.1 The TOE provides all the capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE. The
administrative user can connect to the TOE using the CLI to perform these functions
via SSHv2, a terminal server, or at the local console. Refer to the Guidance docu-
mentation for configuration syntax, commands, and information related to each of
these functions.
The management functionality provided by the TOE includes the following adminis-
trative functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely
• Ability to manage the cryptographic functionality - allows the Authorized Ad-
ministrator the ability to identify and configure the algorithms used to provide
protection of the data, such as generating the RSA keys to enable SSHv2,
and if used the configuration of remote authentication
• Ability to manage the audit logs and functions - allows the Authorized Admin-
istrator to configure the audit logs, view the audit logs, and to clear the audit
logs
• Ability to manage the warning banner message and content – allows the Au-
thorized Administrator the ability to define warning banner that is displayed
prior to establishing a session (note this applies to the interactive (human)
users; e.g. administrative users
• Ability to manage the time limits of session inactivity – allows the Authorized
Administrator the ability to set and modify the inactivity time threshold and
lockout after surpassing the configured number of incorrect passwords
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash comparison]
capability prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1
• Ability to configure audit behaviour; FMT_MTD.1
• Ability to mange the cryptographic keys;
• Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
• Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
• Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
• Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
• Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as
trust anchors;
• Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE’S trust store;
• Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
FMT_SMR.2 The TOE platform maintains both privileged and semi-privileged administrator roles.
The terms “Authorized Administrator” and "Security Administrator" are used inter-
changeable in this ST to refer to any user that has been assigned to a privilege level
that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privi-
leges to perform the requested functions. The assigned role determines the functions
the user can perform; hence the authorized administrator with the appropriate privi-
leges.
The TOE supports both local administration via a directly connected console and re-
mote authentication via SSH
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 and
FPT_APW_EXT.1
The TOE stores all private keys in a secure directory that is not readily accessible to
administrators. All pre-shared and symmetric keys are stored in a hashed format that
are non-readable, hence no interface access.
All passwords are obscured via hashing in a secure directory. The passwords are
non-readable. In this manner, the TOE ensures that plaintext user passwords will not
be disclosed even to administrators. This is provided by default.
Refer to the Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures for command description and usage information.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 The TOE provides a source of date and time information used in audit event
timestamps and in validating service requests. This function can only be accessed
from within the configuration exec mode via the privileged mode of operation of the
router. The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying
hardware.
This date and time are used to track inactivity of administrative sessions and vali-
date certificates.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FPT_TST_EXT.1 The TOE is designed to run the suite of power-on self-tests that comply with the
FIPS140-2 requirements for self-test (e.g. know answer tests (KATs) and zeroization
tests), during initial start-up to verify its correct operation. If any of the tests fail the
security administrator will have to log into the CLI to determine which test failed and
why. If the tests pass successfully the router will continue bootup and normal opera-
tion.
During the system bootup process (power on or reboot), all the Power on Startup Test
(POST) components for the cryptographic module perform the POST for the corre-
sponding component (hardware or software). These tests include:
• AES Known Answer Test - For the encrypt test, a known key is used to en-
crypt a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted
value is compared to a known encrypted value to ensure that the encrypt op-
eration is working correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a
known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting
plaintext value is compared to a known plaintext value to ensure that the de-
crypt operation is working correctly
• RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) - This test
takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the pub-
lic key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted
value to verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted data
is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the origi-
nal plaintext value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly
• RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test - For this test, known seed values are pro-
vided to the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses these values to gener-
ate random bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits to
ensure that the DRBG is operating correctly
• HMAC Known Answer Test - For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC
implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values
are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC to ver-
ify that the HMAC and hash operations are operating correctly
• SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test - For each of the values listed, the SHA
implementation is fed known data and key. These values are used to gener-
ate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value to verify they match,
and the hash operations are operating correctly.
• Software Integrity Test - The Software Integrity Test is run automatically
whenever the IOS-XR system image is loaded and confirms that the image
file that is about to be loaded has maintained its integrity. The software con-
tains a SHA-512 hash. This hash is compared to a pre-loaded hash. If the
hash values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.
If any component reports failure for the POST, the system crashes and appropriate
information is displayed on the screen and saved in the file called crashinfo.
All ports are blocked from moving to forwarding state during the POST. If all compo-
nents of all modules pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and
ports are allowed to forward data traffic.
These tests are sufficient to verify that the correct version of the TOE software is run-
ning as well as that the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected.
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TOE SFR How the SFR is Met
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 An Authorized Administrator can query the software version running on the TOE and
can initiate updates to software images. When software updates are made available
by Cisco, an administrator can obtain, verify the integrity of, and install those updates.
The updates can be downloaded from the software.cisco.com. The cryptographic
hashes (i.e., public hashes/SHA-512) are used to verify software/firmware update files
(to ensure they have not been modified from the originals distributed by Cisco) before
they are used to update the applicable TOE components.
An authorized administrator can compare the hash of the downloaded file to the hash
that is posted on the Cisco website. The hash value can be displayed by hovering
over the software image name under details on the Cisco.com web site. If the hashes
do not match, contact Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC).
To activate a package, use the “install activate” command.
To verify the system software release version at the CLI the command “show version”
is used, while the command “show install active” command will display the currently
running system image filename and the system software release version.
Detailed instructions for how to verify the hash value and verify the software version
are provided in the administrator guidance for this evaluation.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
FTA_SSL.3
An administrator can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both local and
remote administrative sessions through the use of the “exec-timeout” setting applied
to the console and vty for remote sessions. These settings are not immediately acti-
vated for the current session. The current line console session must be exited. When
the user logs back in, the inactivity timer will be activated for the new session. If a lo-
cal user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be termi-
nated and will require re-authentication to establish a new session. If a remote user
session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and
will require authentication to establish a new session.
FTA_SSL.4 An administrator is able to exit out of both local and remote administrative
sessions
FTA_TAB.1 The TOE displays a privileged Administrator specified banner on the CLI
management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE. This
interface is applicable for both local (via console) and remote (via SSH) TOE
administration
FTP_ITC.1 The TOE protects communications with the external audit server using TLS to secure
the communications channel. The TOE acts as a TLS client. TLS uses the keyed
hash as defined in FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash and cryptographic hashing functions
FCS_COP.1/Hash. This protects the data from modification of data by hashing that
verify that data has not been modified in transit. In addition, encryption of the data as
defined in FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption is provided to ensure the data is not disclosed
in transit.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSHv2
session. The SSHv2 session is encrypted using AES encryption. The remote users
are able to initiate SSHv2 communications with the TOE.
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7. Annex A: Key Zeroization
The table below describes the key zeroization referenced by FCS_CKM.4 provided by the TOE
Table 19. Key Zeroization
Name Description Zeroization
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
The value is zeroized after it has been given back to the
consuming operation. The value is overwritten by 0’s. This key is
stored in DRAM
Automatically after completion of
DH exchange.
Overwritten with: 0x00
Diffie Hellman
private exponent
The private exponent used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange. Generate by
the module. Zeroized after DH shared secret has been generated.
. This key is stored in DRAM
Zeroized upon completion of DH
exchange.
Overwritten with: 0x00
SSH Private Key Once the function has completed the operations requiring the RSA key
object, the module over writes the entire object (no matter its contents)
using memset. This overwrites the key with all 0’s.
when the command “crypto key zeroize rsa” is issued it will delete all RSA
keys.
This key is stored in NVRAM
Zeroized using the following
command:
# crypto key zeroize rsa
Overwritten with: 0x00
SSH Session Key Once the function has completed the operations requiring the RSA key
object, the module over writes the entire object (no matter its contents).
. This is called by the ssh_close function when a session is ended.
This key is stored in DRAM.
Automatically when the SSH
session is terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
User Password This is a variable 15+ character password that is used to authenticate
local users. Passwords are not stored in plaintext. The password is
stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized by overwriting with new
password
Enable Password (if
used)
This is a variable 15+ character password that is used to authenticate
local users at a higher privilege level. Passwords are not stored in
plaintext. The password is stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized by overwriting with new
password
RNG Seed This seed is for the RNG. The seed is stored in DRAM. Zeroized upon power cycle the
device
RNG Seed Key This is the seed key for the RNG. The seed key is stored in DRAM. Zeroized upon power cycle the
device
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Name Description Zeroization
AES Key The results are zeroized by overwriting the values with 0x00. This
is called by the ssh_close function when a session is ended.
This key is stored in DRAM
Automatically when the
SSH/TLS session is terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
TLS server private
key
This key is used for authentication, so the server can prove who it
is. The private key used for SSLv3.1/TLS secure connections.
The key is stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized by overwriting with new
key
TLS server public
key
This key is used to encrypt the data that is used to compute the
secret key. The public key used for TLS secure connection. The
key is stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized by overwriting with new
key
TLS pre-master
secret
The pre-master secret is the client and server exchange of
random numbers and a special number, the pre-master secret,
This pre-master secret is using asymmetric cryptography from
which new TLS session keys can be created. The key is stored in
SDRAM.
Automatically after TLS session
terminated.
The value is overwritten with
“0x00.”
TLS session
encryption key
The session encryption key is unique for each session and is
based on the shared secrets that were negotiated at the start of
the session. The Key is used to encrypt TLS session data. The
key is stored in SDRAM.
Automatically after TLS session
terminated.
The value is overwritten with
“0x00.”
TLS session
integrity key
This key is used to provide the privacy and TLS data integrity
protection. The key is stored in SDRAM.
Automatically after TLS session
terminated. The entire object is
overwritten with zeros
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8. Annex B: References
The documentation listed below was used to prepare this ST
Table 20. References
Identifier Description
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model,
dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional components,
dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance components,
April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation Methodology, April
2017, version 3.1, Revision 5
[NDcPP] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
[800-56Arev3] NIST Special Publication 800-56Arev3, April 2018
[800-56Brev2] NIST Special Publication 800-56Brev2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise, March 2019
[FIPS 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
[FIPS PUB 186-4] FIPS PUB 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July
2013
[NIST SP 800-90A Rev 1] NIST Special Publication 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators January 2015
[NIST SP 800-90Brev1] NIST Special Publication 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Genera-
tion January 2018
[FIPS PUB 180-3] FIPS PUB 180-3 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS) October
2008
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9. Annex C: Acronyms and Terms
The following acronyms and terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.
Table 21. Acronyms and Terms
Acronym/Term Definition
AC Alternating Current
ACL Access Control Lists
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-CCM AES Counter with CBC-MAC
AP Access Point
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM Configuration Management
DC Direct Current
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DWDM Dense Wavelength-Division Multiplexing
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPoL Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over LAN
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GE Gigabit Ethernet port
GMK Group Master Key
GTK Group Temporal Key
HTTP Hyper-Text Transport Protocol
HTTPS Hyper-Text Transport Protocol Secure
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IOS-XR Universal Cisco Internet Operating System
IT Information Technology
KCK Key Confirmation Key
KEK Key Encryption Key
MIC Message Integrity Check
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NCS Network Convergence System
NDcPP collaborative Network Device Protection Profile
OS Operating System
PMK Pairwise Master Key
PoE Power over Ethernet
PRF Pseudo-random function
PP Protection Profile
PTK Pairwise Transient Key
QSFP Quad Small Form-Factor Pluggable
RSN Robust Security Network
RU Rack Unit
SA Security Association
SFP Small–form-factor pluggable port
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSD Solid-State Drive
SSHv2 Secure Shell (version 2)
SSID Service Set Identifier
ST Security Target
Supplicant The client software used for WLAN authentication
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User datagram protocol
WAN Wide Area Network
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