National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
MMA10G-EXE Series II
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11474-2024
Dated: 08/20/2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Shehan D Dissanayake
Ashish Panchal
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 7
3.1 TOE Overview and Description ....................................................................................................................7
3.2 Physical Boundaries .......................................................................................................................................8
3.3 TOE Environment..........................................................................................................................................8
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 11
4.1 Security Audit...............................................................................................................................................11
4.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................................11
4.3 Identification and Authentication ...............................................................................................................12
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................13
4.5 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................14
4.6 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................14
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................14
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope............................................................................... 15
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................15
5.2 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................16
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 18
7 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 19
7.1 Developer Testing.........................................................................................................................................19
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................19
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 20
8.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................20
8.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 21
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................21
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................21
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................21
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................22
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................22
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................22
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................22
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 23
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 24
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 25
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 26
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14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 27
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT)
product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific
security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were
tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should
carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in
Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the MMA10G-EXE Series II Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR
applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the
ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in August 2024. The information in this report is
largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by
Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by
the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions
of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings, the validation team concludes that
the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against PPs containing
Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work
units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with CCTL and pay a
fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1 – Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE MMA10G-EXE Series II
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020
Security Target MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Target, Version 1.2, August 12, 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Evertz MMA10G-EXE Series II Version 1.1
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor & Developer Evertz Microsystems Ltd.
5292 John Lucas Drive
Burlington, Ontario
CANADA
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Lisa Mitchell, Linda Morrison, Lori Sarem
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3 Architectural Information
3.1 TOE Overview and Description
The MMA10G-EXE Series II switches are Internet Protocol (IP) switches optimized for video-over-IP
traffic (compressed or uncompressed). The TOE is classified as a network device (a generic infrastructure
device that can be connected to a network). Models of the EXE included in the evaluation provide
identical functionality. The only differences between them are the supported speed, the physical size,
and the number of physical interfaces supported, and the processor. These differences are detailed at
the end of this section.
The EXE builds on the capabilities of the existing Evertz line of video routing switches. Video routers
receive video signals in various formats, such as Serial Digital Interface (SDI), Serial Data Transport
Interface (SDTI), or Asynchronous Serial Interface (ASI), and switch dedicated physical input ports to
dedicated physical output ports based on external commands. The EXE provides the same capability
within the context of packet-based networks using shared network infrastructure.
The TOE provides a packet-based switching fabric from a video perspective, rather than relying on
traditional packet-based network architecture.
A typical EXE installation will also include a standard video routing switch software platform (such as
Evertz Magnum) to route data between program streams in a manner sufficient to meet broadcast video
standards for signal availability and integrity. Equipment to prepare video for IP transport, or to convert
it into other video formats, and non-network-based video switching/processing, is outside the scope of
this TOE. Such equipment includes, but is not limited to, cameras, KVMs, codecs, video servers and video
displays. Equipment to perform functions such as embedding audio and/or other information within the
video stream is also outside the scope of this TOE.
The TOE provides secure remote management using an HTTPS/TLS web interface. Administrators only
may access EXE via a dedicated management workstation operating over an Out-of-Band Management
(OOBM) network. Sites may close this OOBM network or may operate EXE within an existing OOBM as
long as the topology is compliant with the security parameters listed below. Users and administrators
may also access EXE software via direct connection using a terminal session.
The TOE generates audit logs and transmits the audit logs to a remote syslog server over an
authenticated TLS channel. The TOE verifies the authenticity of software updates by verifying the digital
signature prior to installing any update.
The summary of the evaluated functionality provided by the TOE includes the following,
• Secure connectivity with remote audit servers and secure retention of audit logs locally
• Identification and authentication of the administrator of the TOE
• Secure remote administration of the TOE via TLS and secure Local administration of the TOE
• Secure access to the management functionality of the TOE
• Secure software updates
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• Secure communication with the non-TOE ‘video switch control systems’ via TLS.
The TOE hardware devices are the Evertz:
Table 2 – TOE hardware models
The EXE firmware version 1.5 will be referred to as EXE throughout this document.
The EXE appliances are Ethernet switches optimized for video content.
3.2 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the TOE hardware. The TOE hardware is identified in section 3.1,
Table 1. The media and video components of the IT environment are NOT part of the TOE physical
boundary. The TOE is shipped to the customer via commercial courier.
3.3 TOE Environment
The IT Testing Environment Components used to test the TOE are shown in the table below:
Model
AV/
Broadcast
Supported Ports
Form
Factor
Chassis
Supported
Frame
Controller
Processor
NATX-8-100G-CC broadcast 4 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
NATX-16-100G-CC broadcast 8 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
NATX-32-100G-1-CC broadcast 16 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
NATX-64-100G-2-CC broadcast 32 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
MMA10G-NATX-8-CC AV 4 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
MMA10G-NATX-16-CC AV 8 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
MMA10G-NATX-32-CC AV 16 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
MMA10G-NATX-64-CC AV 32 x DD QSFP (QSFP200G) 1
DragonFire
frame
N/A
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
MMA10G-IPX128 AV 32 x QSFP+ 3 or 6 EV Frame
ev3-FC or
ev6-FC
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
3080IPX-48-25G-CC
AV/
broadcast
12 x QSFP+ 3 or 6 EV Frame
ev3-FC or
ev6-FC
Intel(R)
Core(TM)
i3-
6102E
9
Table 3 – TOE Physical Boundary Components
Component Required Purpose/Description
Syslog server Yes • Conformant with RFC 5424 (Syslog Protocol)
• Supporting Syslog over TLS (RFC 5425)
• Acting as a TLSv1.2 server
• Supporting Client Certificate authentication
• Supporting at least one of the following cipher suites:
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Local Management
Workstation
Yes • Computer with terminal emulation software to access the
console interface (CLI)
Remote Management
Workstation with web
browser
Yes • Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, or Firefox
• Supporting TLSv1.2
• Supporting Client Certificate authentication
• Supporting Server Certificate authentication
• Supporting at least one of the following ciphersuites:
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
CRL Server Yes • Conformant with RFC 5280
Magnum Yes • Provides remote management of the TOE’s routing and
switching of video signals.
• Supporting TLSv1.2 with at least one of the following
ciphersuites:
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
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Component Required Purpose/Description
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Media Gateway No • Optional component for converting media streams. Not
required for TOE operations
Video Source devices No • Optional component for creating video streams that are sent
to the TOE. Not required for TOE operations.
• Supporting packetized or digital video streams.
Video Destination
devices
No • Optional component for receiving video streams that are sent
from the TOE. Not required for TOE operations.
• Supporting packetized or digital video streams
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices, hereafter referred to as NDcPP v2.2e or NDcPP.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE’s Audit security function supports audit record generation and review. The TOE provides date
and time information that is used in audit timestamps. The Audit events generated by the TOE include:
• Establishment of a Trusted Path or Channel Session
• Failure to Establish a Trusted Path or Channel Session
• Termination of a Trusted Path or Channel Session
• Failure of Trusted Channel Functions
• Identification and Authentication
• Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate
• Changes to trust anchors in the TOE’s trust store
• Any update attempts
• Result of the update attempt
• Management of TSF data
• Changes to Time
• Session termination for inactivity
• Power-on self tests verification
• Changes to audit server configuration
• Users locked out due to failed authentication attempts.
The TOE can store the generated audit data on itself, and it can be configured to send syslog events to a
syslog server, using a TLS protected collection method. Logs are classified into various predefined
categories. The logging categories help describe the content of the messages that they contain. Access
to the logs is restricted to only Security Administrators, who are authorized to edit them, copy, or delete
(clear) them. Audit records are protected from unauthorized modifications and deletions.
The TSF provides the capability to view audit data by using the Syslog tab in the local console. The log
records the time, host name, facility, application, and “message” (the log details). The previous audit
records are overwritten when the allocated space for these records reaches the threshold on a FIFO
basis.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes an OpenSSL library (Version 1.1.1k with Fedora Patches) that implements CAVP
validated cryptographic algorithms for random bit generation, encryption/decryption, authentication,
and integrity protection/verification. These algorithms are used to provide security for the TLS/HTTPs
connections for secure management and secure connections to a syslog and authentication servers. TLS
and HTTPs are also used to verify firmware updates. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are
described below:
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Table 4 – TOE Cryptographic Protocols
Cryptographic Protocol Use within the TOE
HTTPS/TLS (client)
Secure connection to syslog
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
HTTPS/TLS (server)
Peer connections to MAGNUM and remote management
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
AES
Provides encryption/decryption in support of the TLS protocol.
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
DRBG
Deterministic random bit generation use to generate keys.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2, FCS_RBG_EXT.1
Secure hash
Used as part of digital signatures and firmware integrity checks.
FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
HMAC
Provides keyed hashing services in support of TLS.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
EC-DH
Provides key establishment for TLS.
FCS_CKM.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
ECDSA
Provides components for EC-DH key establishment.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
RSA
Provide key establishment, key generation and signature generation and verification
(PKCS1_V1.5) in support of TLS.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/SigVer, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
Each of these cryptographic algorithms have been validated for conformance to the requirements
specified in their respective standards and are part of the EXE Cryptographic Module.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
All Administrators wanting to use TOE services are identified and authenticated prior to being allowed
access to any of the services other than the display of the warning banner. (“Regular” EXE users do not
access EXE directly; they control IP video switching through the EXE using a switch control system, such
as Evertz’s Magnum. The switching of those IP video transport streams is outside the scope of the TOE.)
Once an Administrator attempts to access the management functionality of the TOE, the TOE prompts
the Administrator for a username and password for password-based authentication. The identification
and authentication credentials are confirmed against a local user database. Only after the Administrator
presents the correct identification and authentication credentials will access to the TOE functionality be
granted. If the user fails to provide the correct authentication credentials, the user will be locked out
after a configurable threshold until the user is manually unlocked by an Administrator.
13
The TOE provides the capability to set password minimum length rules. This is to ensure the use of
strong passwords in attempts to protect against brute force attacks. The TOE also accepts passwords
composed of a variety of characters to support complex password composition. During authentication,
no indication is given of the characters composing the password.
Remote administrators are locked out after a configurable number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts.
The EXE requires a password-protected serial connection to perform initial configuration of the system
IP address(es). Once each address is established, administrators use IP connectivity for all further
administrative actions, including configuration, operations, and monitoring.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS/HTTPS
connections.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the
security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure session
or a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to perform the following actions:
• Administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Configure the access banner;
• Configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
• Update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing
those updates;
• Specify the time limits of session inactivity;
• Ability to modify the IP address and the port of the remote syslog server;
• Generate Certificate Signing Requests, import and manage x509 certificates, delete/replace
x509 certificates;
• Re-enable an Administrator account;
• Set the time which is used for timestamps.
All these management functions are restricted to Security Administrators who are authorized to
administer the TOE via a local CLI and a remote web interface. Administrators are individuals who
manage specific types of administrative tasks. The EXE implements role-based access control of these
management functions to users that have been identified, authenticated, and authorized with the
Security Administrator role.
Primary management is done using the Webeasy web-based interface using HTTPS. This provides a
network administration console from which one can manage various identity services. These services
include authentication, authorization, and reporting. All these services can be managed from the
interface, which uses a menu-driven navigation system.
14
There is also a very simple serial-based connection (DB9) that provides a simple menu interface. This is
used to configure the IP interface (IP address, etc.). It is password-protected, and is typically only used
once, for initial set-up.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE will terminate inactive sessions after an Administrator-configurable time period. Once a session
has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. The TOE
provides protection of TSF data (authentication data and cryptographic keys). In addition, the TOE
internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the time stamp that is applied to
TOE generated audit records. The TOE also ensures firmware updates are from a reliable source. Finally,
the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation.
An administrator initiates update processes from the web interface for all update installations. EXE
automatically uses the RSA digital signature mechanism to confirm the integrity of the product before
installing the update.
4.6 TOE Access
Aside from the automatic Administrators session termination due to inactivity described above, the TOE
also allows Administrators to terminate their own interactive session. Once a session has been
terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
The TOE will display an Administrator-specified banner on the web browser management interface prior
to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE allows the establishment of a trusted channel between a video control system (such as Evertz’
Magnum) and the EXE. The TOE also establishes a secure connection for sending syslog data to a syslog
server using TLS.
The TOE uses HTTPS/TLS to provide a trusted path between itself and remote administrative users. The
TOE does not implement any additional methods of remote administration. The remote administrative
users are responsible for initiating the trusted path when they wish to communicate with the TOE.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security
requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
The assumptions included in Table 4 are drawn directly from NDcPP.
Table 5 – Assumptions
ID Assumption
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected
in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the
device’s physical interconnections and correct operation.
This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does
not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP
does not expect the product to defend against physical
access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to
extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise
manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies
to the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality
as its core function and not provide functionality/services
that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For
example, the device should not provide a computing
platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to
networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs
as specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the
TOE with only one vND instance for each physical
hardware platform. The exception being where
components of a distributed TOE run inside more than
one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no
non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any
assurance regarding the protection of traffic that
traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to
protect data that originates on or is destined to the device
itself, to include administrative data and audit data.
Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for
another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is
assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and
PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g.,
firewall).
16
ID Assumption
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are
assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes appropriately
trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and
entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering
the device. The Network Device is not expected to be
capable of defending against a malicious Administrator
that actively works to bypass or compromise the security
of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected
to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded
into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA
Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to
be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the Network Device are protected by the platform
on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material,
PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in NDcPP as
described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of
this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the NDcPP.
17
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific Software
Application models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be
relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for, nor
seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to
objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily
exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation.
18
6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Target, Version 1.2, August 12, 2024
• MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Administrative Guide Addendum for Common Criteria, Version
1.5, August 12, 2024
19
7 IT Product Testing
This Section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in ETR for MMA10G-EXE, which is not publicly available. The AAR provides an
overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27
March 2020. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available,
and is not duplicated here.
20
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
Section 3 provides an overview of the TOE architecture, including physical boundaries, security
functions, and relevant TOE documentation and references.
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
• SNMP Traps (Alarms)
• SNMP
• VistaLINK PRO module
• Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server
• External Authentication Servers for administrator authentication
These functions are outside the TOE. Alarm monitoring is the sending of SNMP traps to an alarm
monitoring system (which is assigned by an Administrator).
In addition, EXE provides IP video stream switching. This IP video switching does not provide security
functionality and was therefore not evaluated and is outside the scope of the TOE. The nature of video
encryption and decryption is that a video stream is encrypted at the sending end and decrypted at the
receiving end; since EXE is a midpoint device and therefore does not perform encryption or decryption
functionality. This functionality, while present in the TOE, was not evaluated.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this Section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR. The reader of this
document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 Rev.
5 and CEM version 3.1 Rev. 5. The evaluation determined the TOE Name to be Part 2 extended, and
meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the MMA10G-EXE Series II that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the
evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST's TOE
Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of
the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE.
The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the MMA10G-EXE
Series II Security Target related to the examination of the information contained in the operational
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guidance documents.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was
identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified
by the Assurance Activities in the MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Target and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in
the MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Target, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public search
for vulnerabilities on August 13, 2024, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues
with the TOE.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in
the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the procedures defined in the CEM and the
Assurance Activities, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the evaluated configuration instructions in the MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Administrative Guide
Addendum for Common Criteria, Version 1.5, August 12, 2024. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the
evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the ST,
and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All
other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can
be drawn about its effectiveness.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment need to be
assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
24
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
25
12 Security Target
MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Target, Version 1.2, August 12, 2024.
26
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020.
6. Assurance Activity Report for Evertz MMA10G-EXE Series II, Version 1.1, August 13, 2024.
7. Evaluation Technical Report for Evertz MMA10G-EXE Series II Version 1.1, August 13, 2024.
8. MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Administrative Guide Addendum for Common Criteria, Version
1.5, August 12, 2024.
9. MMA10G-EXE Series II Security Target, Version 1.2, August 12, 2024.
10. Vulnerability Assessment for Evertz MMA10G-EXE Series II, Version 1.1, August 13, 2024.