TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
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NL-6827 AV Arnhem
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
MF3D(H)x3
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Unit Security & Connectivity, Troplowitzstrasse 20,
D-22529 Hamburg, Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0011955-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 0011955_2
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 10 March 2023
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations. Check whether this section is appropriate; if not, remove the relevant logo and section(s).
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
MF3D(H)x3. The developer of the MF3D(H)x3 is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in
Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is to be used with Proximity Coupling Devices (PCDs, also called "terminal") according to
ISO 14443 Type A. It is primarily designed for secure contactless transport applications and related
loyalty programs as well as access control management systems as well as closed loop payment
systems.
The TOE is a smart card comprising a hardware platform and a fixed software package. The software
package is stored in Flash and ROM memory and provides an operating system with a set of
functions, used to manage the various kinds of data files stored in Flash memory. The operating
system supports a separation between the data of different applications and provides access control if
required by the configuration.
The TOE includes also IC Dedicated Software to support its start-up and for test purposes after
production. The Smart Card Controller hardware comprises a 16-bit CPU, volatile and non-volatile
memories, cryptographic co-processors, security components and one communication interface.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 16/04/2020. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight
B.V. and was completed on 10 March 2023 with the approval of the [ETR]. The re-certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are:
An additional production facility has been added to the lifecycle of the TOE.
An updated ROM code to incorporate previous patches in the main code and to support the 16kB
versions of MF3D(H)x3.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the MF3D(H)x3, the security requirements, and
the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the MF3D(H)x3 are advised to verify that their own environment
is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the MF3D(H)x3 from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
IC
Hardware
MF3D(H)x3 Hardware
A1.A04
A1.A05
IC
Dedicated
Test
Software
Test Software
A1.A04
A1.A05
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software
Boot Software
A1.A04
A1.A05
Firmware
A1.A04
A1.A05
MIFARE DESFire Software 3.0
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the MF3D(H)x3. For
details, see section 0 “The IC Hardware CPU has a 16-bit architecture. The on-chip hardware
components are controlled by the MIFARE DESFire software via Special Function Registers. These
registers are correlated to the activities of the CPU, the memory management unit, interrupt control,
contactless communication, Flash, timers, the DES co-processor and the AES co-processor. The
communication with the MF3D(H)x3 can be performed through the contactless interface.
The IC Dedicated Test Software (Test ROM Software) located in ROM of the TOE is used by the
TOE Manufacturer to test the functionality of the chip. The test functionality is disabled before the
operational use of the smart card. The IC Dedicated Test Software includes the test operating system,
test routines for the various blocks of the circuitry and shutdown functions to ensure that security
relevant test operations cannot be executed illegally after phase 3 of the TOE Life cycle.
The IC Dedicated Support Software contains Boot Software, Firmware and MIFARE DESFire
Software. The Boot Software ensures that the TOE is booting after reset in a correct manner. The
Firmware component provides memory management functionality and cryptographic library that
performs the cryptographic operations required for this TOE. Finally, the MIFARE DESFire Software
contains the relevant functionality required for the MIFARE features including a flexible file system,
authentication, data encryption and other features. The features of the TOE are described in detail in
Section 1.4.2 [ST].
Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.4.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a smart card comprising a hardware platform and a fixed software package. The TOE is to
be used with Proximity Coupling Devices (PCDs, also called "terminal") according to ISO 14443 Type
A. The communication protocol complies to part ISO 14443-4.
Cryptographic functionality provided by the TOE includes Triple-DES (3DES) and AES, including
CMAC and various modes of operation (e.g. CBC). Furthermore, the TOE provides hardware random
number generation according to class PTG.2 of AIS 31.
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.3 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
For DESFire EV1 backward compatible mode, the certification scope is limited to the AES mode (both
for authentication and secure messaging) and 3TDEA (only authentication). Please note that the
MIFARE DESFire D40 backward compatible mode is not part of any SFR and therefore not in the
certification scope. Also the MIFARE Classic compatible mode, including all DESFire applications that
enable MIFARE Classic mapping, are excluded from the certification scope
2.4 Architectural Information
The IC Hardware CPU has a 16-bit architecture. The on-chip hardware components are controlled by
the MIFARE DESFire software via Special Function Registers. These registers are correlated to the
activities of the CPU, the memory management unit, interrupt control, contactless communication,
Flash, timers, the DES co-processor and the AES co-processor. The communication with the
MF3D(H)x3 can be performed through the contactless interface.
The IC Dedicated Test Software (Test ROM Software) located in ROM of the TOE is used by the
TOE Manufacturer to test the functionality of the chip. The test functionality is disabled before the
operational use of the smart card. The IC Dedicated Test Software includes the test operating system,
test routines for the various blocks of the circuitry and shutdown functions to ensure that security
relevant test operations cannot be executed illegally after phase 3 of the TOE Life cycle.
The IC Dedicated Support Software contains Boot Software, Firmware and MIFARE DESFire
Software. The Boot Software ensures that the TOE is booting after reset in a correct manner. The
Firmware component provides memory management functionality and cryptographic library that
performs the cryptographic operations required for this TOE. Finally, the MIFARE DESFire Software
contains the relevant functionality required for the MIFARE features including a flexible file system,
authentication, data encryption and other features. The features of the TOE are described in detail in
Section 1.4.2 [ST].
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
MF3D(H)x3, MIFARE DESFire EV3 contactless smartcard IC, Product
data sheet
3.3
MF3D(H)x3C, MIFARE DESFire EV3C
contactless smartcard IC, Product data sheet (for MFC unlocked
configurations only)
3.5
MF3D(H)x3, MIFARE DESFire EV3 Post Delivery Configuration,
Preliminary data sheet addendum
2.0
MF3D(H)x3, Wafer and Delivery Specification, Product data sheet
addendum
3.3
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MF3D(H)x3, Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and
Operation Manual
1.3
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem and SFR-enforcing module and
module interface level. The tests are performed by the developer through execution of test scripts
using an automated and distributed system. Test tools and scripts are extensively used to verify that
the tests return expected values. The identification was checked based on the SVN revision
corresponding to the version control system repository.
The tests covered all security functions and aspects of the TSF. To further support the hardware,
component testing was used that verifies several aspects e.g. return values, registers, CPU and
others in an automated manner. Code coverage analysis was used by the developer to verify overall
test completeness.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, repeated/witnessed tests have been selected that cover
various aspects of the TOE, as well as test areas of the developer code coverage analysis.
Additionally, witness testing was used to sample and check the actual test results.
The evaluator-defined tests were focussed on supplementing the developer’s tests since the
developer tests are extensive. Three evaluator defined tests were performed.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The penetration tests were devised after performing the evaluator Vulnerability Analysis. Potential
vulnerabilities were identified via review of evidence for the classes ADV, AGD, ASE and ADV_IMP.
For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE. Potential
vulnerabilities were grouped per similarity and addressed by penetration testing aiming at the weakest
case.
Vulnerability Analysis activities were performed for each group of components with the vulnerability
analysis for the MIFARE DESFire Software also considering the TOE in its entirety.
In the baseline certification 30% of the test effort expended by the evaluators was on perturbation
attacks, 50% on side channel attacks and 20% on software attacks.
For this first re-certification 100% of the test effort expended by the evaluators was spent on
perturbation attacks.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The developer provided the environment for independent evaluation testing. The TOE was tested in all
memory sizes in the following configurations:
• FPGA Emulator
• TOE (SO28 package)
• Using ISO14443 interface
For penetration testing, the TOE was tested in configurations commensurate to MF3Dx3 (with 8KB
storage size) as present in the version control system repository corresponding to MIFARE DESFire
3.0 with hardware A1.A04.
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2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 18 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number MF3D(H)x3.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR].
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the MF3D(H)x3, to be CC Part 2
extended, CC Part 3 conformant and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
For clarity on the scope of backward compatibility and certification see section 2.3.2.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: NONE
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3 Security Target
The MF3D(H)x3 Security Target, Rev. 2.4, 04 January 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report MF3D(H)x3, 20-RPT-082, Version 1.0, 09 April
2020 amended by Evaluator Assessment of Changes Report (EAR) NXP
MF3D(H)x3, 22-RPT-1219, Version 4.0, 08 March 2023
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages,
Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version
1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] MF3D(H)x3 Security Target, Rev. 2.4, 04 January 2023
[ST-lite] MF3D(H)x3 Security Target Lite, Rev 2.4, 04 January 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)