KECS-CR-23-64
INISAFE Nexess V4.3
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1270-2023
2023. 10. 19.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2023.10.19. -
Certification report for INISAFE Nexess V4.3
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for INISAFE Nexess V4.3 of
INITECH Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory Co., Ltd. (KSEL)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
5. Architectural Information ....................................................................................9
6. Documentation...................................................................................................10
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................10
8. Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................... 11
9. Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................. 11
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................ 11
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................13
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................12
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................12
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................13
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................13
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................15
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................15
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................15
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................17
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the evaluation of INISAFE Nexess V4.3 of INITECH Co., Ltd. with reference
to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Single Sign-On (SSO) software to be used to enable
the user to access various business systems and use the service through a single user
login without additional login activities. The TOE consists of software components
operating as SSO server and SSO Agent. The SSO Server verifies user login attempts
using the user information stored in the DBMS. The SSO Agent is installed in each
business system and requests user login verification to the SSO Server. The
authorized administrator performs the security management by accessing the SSO
Server via a web browser. Wrappers which are used to support compatibility with
business systems are out of the TOE scope. A mail server is used as an external entity
for the operation of the TOE. The TOE uses cryptographic modules validated under the
Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Security Evaluation
Laboratory (KSEL) and completed on 26 September 2023. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) KSEL had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST)
[6][7].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Single
Sign On V1.1 [9]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of the
PP [9]. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC
Part 2 and newly defined components in the Extended Component Definition chapter of
the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting
TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
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[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
SSO
Server
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-1165G7 2.8Ghz or higher
RAM 16GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of SSO Server
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS Windows 10 Pro 64bit
Required S/W JDK 1.8.0_202
Apache Tomcat 9.0.80
Oracle 19c(19.3)
SSO Agent CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6500U 2.5GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of SSO Agent
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS Windows 10 Pro 64bit
Required S/W JDK 1.8.0_202
Apache Tomcat 9.0.80
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
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[Table 2] shows minimum requirements necessary for the administrator’s PC.
Category Contents
Required S/W Chrome 114
[Table 2] The minimum requirements for the administrator’s PC
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE INISAFE Nexess V4.3
Version V4.3.1.2
TOE
Components
SSO Server Nexess Server V4.3.1.2
(Nexess_Server_4.3.1.2.zip)
SSO Agent Nexess Agent V4.3.1.2
(Nexess_Agent_4.3.1.2.zip)
Guidance
Document
CCP.C_NX43_PreparativeProcedure(PRE)_V1.1
(CCP.C_NX43_PreparativeProcedure(PRE)_V1.1.pdf)
CCP.C_NX43_OperationalGuidance(OPE)_V1.1
(CCP.C_NX43_OperationalGuidance(OPE)_V1.1.pdf)
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(October 31, 2022)
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Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (May
17, 2021)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.1,
KECS-PP-0822a-2017, December 11, 2019
Developer INITECH Co., Ltd.
Sponsor INITECH Co., Ltd.
Evaluation
Facility
Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
September 26, 2023
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [6][7] for the TOE claims strict conformance to the National Protection Profile
for Single Sign On V1.1 [9], and complies security policies defined in the PP [9] by
security requirements. Thus, the TOE provides security features defined in the PP [9]
as follows:
 Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events
including the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation and
self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic operation and
cryptographic key management using cryptographic modules (INISAFE Crypto
for Java V4.2.0, INISAFE Crypto for C v5.4) validated under the KCMVP.
 Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators and end users using ID/password, mutually authenticate TOE
components when they communicate each other, and authenticates end-users
based on the authentication token after initial identification and authentication
using ID/password.
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 Security management: Security management of the TOE is restricted to only
the authorized administrator who can access the management interface
provided by TOE.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides secure communications amongst
TOE components to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data
between them. The TOE also protects TSF data against unauthorized
exposure and modification through encryption.
 TOE access: The TOE manages the authorized administrator’s and end user’s
access to itself by terminating interactive sessions after defined time interval of
their inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions
section in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational environment
are added to those of the PP [9] in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be
used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of the
operational environment, refer to the ST [6][7], chapter 3.):
This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this document,
and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for the detailed information
of TOE version and TOE Components version refer to the [Table 4])
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 SSO Server, and
 SSO Agent.
Cryptographic modules (INISAFE Crypto for Java V4.2.0, INISAFE Crypto for C v5.4)
validated under the KCMVP are embedded in the TOE components.
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6. Documentation
The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the
developer to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
CCP.C_NX43_PreparativeProcedure(PRE)_V1.1 V1.1 August 29, 2023
CCP.C_NX43_OperationalGuidance(OPE)_V1.1 V1.1 August 29, 2023
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. The
developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the assurance
component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, performed all tests provided by developer, and conducted independent
testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator set up the test
configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST [6].
[Figure 2] Architectural Information of the TOE
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In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. No
exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential were found
from penetration testing.
The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results are
summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 TOE: INISAFE Nexess V4.3
 TOE Components: Nexess Server V4.3.1.2, Nexess Agent V4.3.1.2
The TOE is identified by TOE name and version number including release number. The
TOE identification information is provided via GUI and API.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 6] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
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ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFIs, in
terms of descriptions of their purpose, method of use and all parameters. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
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9.4 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration list includes the TOE itself, the evaluation evidence required by the
SARs, and the parts that comprise the TOE (required by the PP). Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance Assurance Evaluator Verdict
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Class Component Action
Elements
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
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10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE is implemented to ignore audit data without saving it if the audit data
storage is saturated. Therefore, when an authorized administrator receives an
e-mail notification due to exceeding or saturation of the audit data storage
threshold, an audit log backup must be performed immediately to prevent audit
data from being lost.
 The authorized administrator must ensure that the password used to generate
the key encryption key (KEK) is different from the password used for
administrator login, and must not use information that can be easily inferred by
an attacker, such as personal information. To ensure the safety of the KEK, it is
recommended to set and use the KEK at a level equivalent to the security
strength of the administrator's password (set a rule combination of 3 or more of
English letters/numbers/special characters and use 9 or more characters).
 SSL communication is implemented to perform secure communication
between SSO Server and mail server to send warning mails for security
violation events. Authorized administrators should note that a public certificate
must be used as the SSL certificate of the mail server that works with SSO
Server to send warning mails normally.
11. Security Target
INISAFE Nexess V4.3 Security Target V1.1 [6] is included in this report for reference.
For the purpose of publication, it is provided as sanitized version [7] according to the
CCRA supporting document ST sanitizing for publication [8].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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ETR Evaluation Technical Report
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Attack potential Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE,
expressed as an attacker’s expertise, resources and
motivation
Authentication token Authentication data that authorized end-users use to
access the business system
Business System An application server that authorized end users access
through ‘SSO’
Database Management
System (DBMS)
A software system composed to configure and apply the
database
Decryption The act that restores the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
Encryption The act of converting the plaintext into the ciphertext
using the encryption key
End user Users of the TOE who want to use the business system,
not the administrator of the TOE
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
TOE Security Functionality
(TSF)
Combined functionality of all hardware, software and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the
correct enforcement of the SFRs
Validated cryptographic
module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
Wrapper Interfaces for interconnection between the TOE and
various types of business systems or authentication
systems
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13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (24 August 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)
[5] KSEL-CC-2022-07 INISAFE Nexess V4.3 Evaluation Technical Report V1.00, 26
September 2023
[6] INISAFE Nexess V4.3 Security Target V1.1, 4 September 2023 (Confidential
Version)
[7] INISAFE Nexess V4.3 Security Target (ST Lite) V1.0, 22 September 2023
(Sanitized Version)
[8] ST sanitizing for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[9] Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.1 (KECS-PP-0822a-
2017, December 11, 2019)