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REF: 2012-4-INF-1418 v1
Target: Expediente
Date: 14.01.2015
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2012-4 HUAWEI CGP v1.r5.c1
Applicant: 440301192203821 HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
References:
[EXT-1683] Certification request of HUAWEI CGP v1.r5.c1
[EXT-1416] Evaluation Technical Report of HUAWEI CGP v1.r5.c1.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1
Release 5 (Unique version identifier: CGP V100R005C01) patch
V100R005C01SPC506, as requested in [EXT-1683] dated 13-02-2012, and
evaluated by the laboratory Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A., as detailed in
the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-1416] received on 19-12-2014.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS......................................................... 6
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................ 7
IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................................... 8
SECURITY POLICIES................................................................................................ 8
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT........................................... 8
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS............................................... 9
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY............................................ 10
ARCHITECTURE ..................................................................................................... 11
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................. 11
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................... 13
DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 14
PRODUCT TESTING............................................................................................... 14
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION............................................................................. 15
EVALUATION RESULTS ......................................................................................... 16
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM............. 17
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 17
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................. 17
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 18
SECURITY TARGET................................................................................................ 18
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 (Unique version
identifier: CGP V100R005C01) patch V100R005C01SPC506.
The TOE is Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platform, a software for the management of
(cellular) core network devices, such as Home Location Registers, Mobile Softswitch
Centers, Service GPRS Support Nodes, or Call Session Control Functions. It is
commonly used as a component throughout a number of Huawei networking
products to offer management functionality for these products.
The central (server) side of CGP runs within a physical Operation and Management
Unit (OMU) on top of a Linux operating system. OMUs are boards (blades) that get
inserted into network device cabinets (racks) which also contain application-specific
boards, resulting in a product offering. Remote clients (a GUI, called LMT client) are
available for management access to the server.
The major security features implemented by CGP and subject to evaluation are:
• Authentication. Operators using the GUI client to access the TOE in order to
execute device management functions are identified by individual user names
and authenticated by passwords.
• Role-based access control. CGP implements role-based access control, limiting
access to different management functionality to different roles as defined in
administrator-defined access control associations.
• Communications security. CGP offers SSL/TLS channels for FTP, and SOAP
access to the OMU, as well as the encryption of X1/X2 channels for LIG
communication. This includes the possibility to restrict remote sessions to the
CGP server to specific client IP addresses.
• Auditing. Audit records are created for security-relevant events related to the use
of CGP.
• Security function management. The TOE offers management functionality for its
security functionality.
The operational environment of the TOE comprises, on the server side, an operating
system that runs within the OMU board hardware and hosts both the TOE and a
relational database (which is part of the operational environment as well) used by the
TOE to store configuration and audit data.
The LMT client part of the TOE runs on top of a Windows operating system.
The remaining parts of the assembly products, where the TOE is located, are part of
the operational environment.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
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Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF:Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A..
Protection Profile: No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
Evaluation Level: EAL3.
Evaluation end date: 10/12/2014.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL3 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory LGAI Technological Center
S.A. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator
actions are satisfied for the EAL3, as defined by the EAL3 and the Common Criteria
v3.1 R3 (CC_P1, CC_P2, CC_P3) and the CEM v3.1 R3.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 (Unique
version identifier: CGP V100R005C01) patch V100R005C01SPC506, a positive
resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platform – in particular the software that
provides the Operation Administration and Maintenance (OAM) functionality for core
network devices to their users. The TOE is implemented based on a client/server
architecture – the server functionality is located in the network device itself, while a
client GUI – commonly referred to as Local Maintenance Terminal (LMT) – can be
run on PCs for remote management of the device.
Physically, the server part of the TOE is located on an OMU board, a type of
Universal Process Blade that is located within the network device. The TOE server
communicates product-internally with application-specific boards (Network Elements)
of the product in order to provide management and maintenance functionality for the
device.
Remote communication between LMT client and the OMU of a device is based on
TCP/IP, it using the proprietary link between the LMT client software and the OMU.
Also, a SOAP interface is available for communication with the operational
environment (namely Huawei’s Enterprise Management System, a separate product
offering), as well as an SNMPv3 interface.
Via these interfaces, the OMU offers management functionality for the network
device. To be more precise, the LMT GUI implements security function
management.
The TOE supports Lawful Interception (LI) technology. CGP offers the management
of LI functionality via X1/X2 channels. In particular, this includes the configuration of
communication parameters that instruct CGP how to interoperate with a Lawful
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Interception Gateway (LIG) in the operational environment for exchanging control
messages and alerts.
The TOE stores configuration data, such as user attributes and access control
associations, as well as audit records, in a configuration database in the operational
environment.
Authentication
The TOE authenticates its users via individual user names and passwords. The TOE
is able to enforce password policies as well as “lockout” policies to deter password
guessing attacks.
Further, it is possible to limit login of specific users to specific time frames and to
define expiry dates for accounts and passwords.
The TOE entertains two user domains: LI user domain and service user domain.
LI user domain includes two roles: LI user super user, and administrator-defined
roles of LI user.
Service user domain includes two roles: service user super user, and administrator-
defined roles of service user.
LI users differentiate between service users, i.e. the operators responsible for the
day-to-day operation of the TOE, and LI users who can access the TOE in order to
configure lawful interception functionality to be executed by network elements.
By means of implementing a separate user ID space described above, the TOE
ensures that the realms of service and LI management are kept completely separate
– service users do not know about the existence of and cannot interfere with the
operations of LI users, and vice versa.
Access control
The TOE offers the management of network devices.
The TOE implements access control that allows limitation of access both in terms of
operations that a user is authorized to perform and in terms of objects that a user
can perform these operations on.
The TOE allows the definition of User Groups, as well as Command Groups and
Managed Object Groups, in order to define roles that can be assigned to users.
The TOE differentiates between service users and LI users by implementing a
separate access control functionality for two user domains.
Communications security
The TOE offers SSL/TLS encryption for communication between the LMT client and
the OMU, and for communication between the operational environment and the TOE
via SOAP.
The TOE is furthermore able to restrict session establishment to administrator-
specified IP source addresses in LMT client requests.
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CGP implements encryption for the FTPS protocol that allows users to access the
FTP server hosted by CGP.
The TOE also implements encryption of the communication between its Lawful
Interception module and a Lawful Interception Gateway in the operational
environment, commonly referred to as the X1 / X2 interfaces.
Auditing
The TOE records and reviews audit data, which is stored in the database and it can
be queried using TOE-provided tools (i.e., via the LMT client).
The TOE differentiates between service users and LI users, service users can use
the LMT client to review the audit records available in the database for everything
except LI-related actions. LI users can review only audit records related to LI
functionality and actions initiated by LI users.
Security function management
The following means are provided by the TOE for management of security
functionality:
• User and group management
• Access control management (by means of defining command groups, managed
object groups, and association of users with particular managed elements,
managed objects, and commands)
• Supporting of SSL for communications security.
• Enabling and disabling of the LI feature.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL3, according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R3 (CC_P1, CC_P2, CC_P3).
Assurance Class Assurance components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
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Assurance Class Assurance components
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R3 (CC_P1, CC_P2, CC_P3):
SECURITY
FUNCTIONAL CLASS
FAMILY/COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
SECURITY AUDIT (FAU) FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 AUDIT DATA GENERATION
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2 USER IDENTITY ASSOCIATION
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 AUDIT REVIEW
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.3 SELECTABLE AUDIT REVIEW
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.3 ACTION IN CASE OF POSSIBLE
AUDIT DATA LOSS
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SUPPORT (FCS)
FCS_COP.1A FCS_COP.1: CRYPTOGRAPHIC
OPERATION
FCS_COP.1B FCS_COP.1: CRYPTOGRAPHIC
OPERATION
USER DATA
PROTECTION (FDP)
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1: SUBSET ACCESS CONTROL
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1: SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BASED
ACCESS CONTROL
IDENTIFICATION AND
AUTHENTICATION (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_AFL.1: AUTHENTICATION FAILURE
HANDLING
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1: USER ATTRIBUTE DEFINITION
FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.1: VERIFICATION OF SECRETS
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2: USER AUTHENTICATION
BEFORE ANY ACTION
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.2: USER IDENTIFICATION BEFORE
ANY ACTION
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SECURITY
MANAGEMENT (FMT)
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1: MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY
ATTRIBUTES
FMT_MSA.3A FMT_MSA.3: STATIC ATTRIBUTE
INITIALIZATION
FMT_MSA.3B FMT_MSA.3: STATIC ATTRIBUTE
INITIALIZATION
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1: SPECIFICATION OF
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1: SECURITY ROLES
PROTECTION OF THE
TSF (FPT)
FPT_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1: BASIC INTERNAL TSF DATA
TRANSFER PROTECTION
TOE ACCESS (FTA) FTA_TSE.1 FTA_TSE.1: TOE SESSION
ESTABLISHMENT
TRUSTED
PATH/CHANNELS (FTP)
FTP_TRP.1 FTP_TRP.1: TRUSTED PATH
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 (Unique
version identifier: CGP V100R005C01) patch V100R005C01SPC506.
Security Target: Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5
Customization 1 Security Target Version 2.0.
Protection Profile: No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R3 (CC_P1, CC_P2, CC_P3) EAL3.
SECURITY POLICIES
This Security Target defines no Organizational Security Policies.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
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could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Physical
Assumption 01: A.PhysicalProtection
It is assumed that the TOE and its operational environment (in particular, the network
device that the TOE is a component of, but also the workstation that is hosting the
client part of the TOE) are protected against unauthorized physical access.
Personnel
Assumption 02: A.TrustworthyUsers
It is assumed that the organization responsible for the TOE and its operational
environment has measures in place to establish trust into and train users of the TOE
commensurate with the extent of authorization that these users are given on the
TOE. (For example, super users and users belong to administrators group are
assumed to be fully trustworthy and capable of operating the TOE in a secure
manner abiding by the guidance provided to them. Note that the users who do not
belong to administrators group or unauthorized, are untrustworthy and not eligible for
this assumption.)
Connectivity
Assumption 03: A.NetworkSegregation
It is assumed that the network interfaces that allow access to the TOE’s user
interfaces are in a management network that is separate from the application (or,
public) networks that the network device hosting the TOE serves.
This includes the assumption that the operational environment implements measures
that ensure that the source IP address in remote client session establishment
requests has not been tampered with, and that no bogus OMU servers exist in the
management network.
Assumption 04: A.Support
The operational environment must provide the following supporting mechanisms to
the TOE:
• Reliable time stamps for the generation of audit records.
• The database that stores the data of TOE must be protected and available.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Huawei Carrier Grade
Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 (Unique version identifier: CGP V100R005C01)
patch V100R005C01SPC506, although the agents implementing attacks have the
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attack potential according to the “Basic” of EAL3 and always fulfilling the usage
assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
Threat 01: T.AccountabilityLoss
Records of security-relevant actions of users for forensic and accountability purpose
are not created properly.
Threat 02: T.Eavesdrop
An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management network that is served by the
TOE is able to intercept, and potentially modify or re-use, information assets that are
exchanged between TOE (LMT) client and the TOE server part (OMU).
Threat 03: T.UnauthenticatedAccess
A user who is not a user of the TOE gains access to the TOE.
Threat 04: T.UnauthorizedAccess
A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain actions and access certain
information gains access to commands or information he is not authorized to access.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
Environment objective 01: OE.Administration
Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational environment must
ensure that only authorized users have access to the OMU, and in particular to the
part of the TOE and its data that is running on the OMU. This includes ensuring that
audit records stored in the operational environment are protected against
unauthorized access, and that cryptographic keys and certificates are properly
managed to support the communications security mechanisms implemented by the
TOE.
This also includes the restriction of physical access to the network device that
contains the OMU to authorized personnel, and making the OMU unavailable to
access from the consumer/application networks served by the network device.
The TOE must be operated in its evaluated configuration as specified in this ST and
the guidance that is part of the TOE.
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Environment objective 02: OE.Support
Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational environment must
ensure that the operational environment provides the following supporting
mechanisms to the TOE:
• Reliable time stamps for the generation of audit records.
• The database that stores the data of TOE must be protected and available.
Environment objective 03: OE.Users
Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational environment must
be trustworthy, and trained such that they are capable of securely managing the
TOE and following the provided guidance. Note that the users who do not belong to
administrators group or unauthorized, are untrustworthy and not eligible for this
environmental objective.
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and
organisational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in
the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platform – in particular the software that
provides the Operation Administration and Maintenance (OAM) functionality for core
network devices to their users. As depicted in Figure 1, the TOE is implemented
based on a client/server architecture – the server functionality is located in the
network device itself, while a client GUI – commonly referred to as Local
Maintenance Terminal (LMT) – can be run on PCs for remote management of the
device.
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Figure 1: TOE architecture and boundaries
Physically, the server part of the TOE is located on an OMU board, a type of
Universal Process Blade that is located within the network device. The TOE server
communicates product-internally with application-specific boards (Network Elements)
of the product in order to provide management and maintenance functionality for the
device.
Remote communication between LMT client and the OMU of a device is based on
TCP/IP, it using the proprietary link between the LMT client software and the OMU.
Also, a SOAP interface is available for communication with the operational
environment (namely Huawei’s Enterprise Management System, a separate product
offering), as well as an SNMPv3 interface.
Via these interfaces, the OMU offers management functionality for the network
device. To be more precise, the LMT GUI implements security function
management.
The TOE supports Lawful Interception (LI) technology. CGP offers the management
of LI functionality via X1/X2 channels. In particular, this includes the configuration of
communication parameters that instruct CGP how to interoperate with a Lawful
Interception Gateway (LIG) in the operational environment for exchanging control
messages and alerts.
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The TOE stores configuration data, such as user attributes and access control
associations, as well as audit records, in a configuration database in the operational
environment.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is software only. It is used in a number of Huawei’s core network devices
that are comprised of elements compatible with the Advanced Telecommunications
Computing Architecture (ATCA). Within these networking devices, the OMU board
hosting the server part of the TOE is a common board that is paired with different
combinations of application-specific boards (network elements). The server part of
the TOE is the actual Carrier Grade Platform software running on the OMU that
implements the generic device management capabilities for these products.
For the guidance of TOE, the registered personnel can download the guidance from
Huawei’s website: http://support.huawei.com.
The guidance of the TOE comprises the following documents:
• CGP Product Documentation, V100R005C01, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.,
2013-02-21, v02.
• LI User Guidance, V100R005C01, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., 2013-02-
21, v02.
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
The server part of the TOE depends on the following hard- and software in its
operational environment:
• the cabinet (rack and subrack) housing the OMU and application-specific
boards, comprising an actual network device product assembly
• the physical OMU board providing processing resources and physical
interfaces
• the operating system running on the OMU, SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10
• a database product used to store configuration and other maintenance data,
PROTON Database based on postgreSQL
The client part of the TOE is comprised of the LMT client, running on a designated
LMT workstation. The web browser needed to access the web-based WebUI
provided by the server is part of the operational environment.
The client part of the TOE depends on the following hard- and software in its
operational environment:
• the workstation providing the processing resources and physical interfaces for
the LMT client, or a web browser for access to the WebUI
• Windows 2000/XP/Vista as operating system
The TOE is distributed as a component of a larger product assembly, and the
guidance that is part of the TOE is integrated into the product manuals of the
individual product.
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The product assemblies supported by this evaluation of CGP are:
• Huawei ENS, offering the Domain Name System (DNS) and Telephone
Number Mapping (ENUM) in IMS networks
• Huawei CCF, a Charging Gateway for IMS networks, offering an interface for
offline charging
• Huawei UGC3200, offering Media Gateway Control Function (MGCF) in IMS
networks and Gateway Mobile Switching Center (GMSC) in mobile networks
• Huawei SPG2800, a universal service provisioning gateway, offering the
universal northbound service provisioning interface for the IMS components
• Huawei MRP6600, a multimedia resource function processor, is used to carry
multimedia resources and supports multimedia services
• Huawei SAE-HSS9820, offering Home subscriber server (HSS) in the evolved
packet core (EPC) network and Home location register (HLR) in mobile
networks
• Huawei UPCC, a Unified Policy and Charging Controller(UPCC) for IMS
networks
The LMT client is shipped with the respective network device.
Please note that the application-specific functionality offered by these product
assemblies is not subject to this evaluation. The TOE is only concerned with the
provision of operational and maintenance functionality that is common to these
products.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
The guidance of the TOE comprises the following documents:
• CGP Product Documentation, V100R005C01, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.,
2013-02-21, v02.
• LI User Guidance, V100R005C01, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., 2013-02-
21, v02.
PRODUCT TESTING
The evaluator has tested all the SFRs defined through the TOE TSFIs. It has been
checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results. The evaluator has
performed an installation and configuration of the TOE and its operational
environment following the steps included in the installation and operation Manuals.
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been
performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result. During the
evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
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CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
Página 15 de 18
Dossier: 2012-04
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Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate
to the function that is intended to test.
In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the security function of the product
verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by the
developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in
the cases where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the
evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither represents any security problem
nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are
indicated below. Therefore, for the operation of the product Huawei Carrier Grade
Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 (Unique version identifier: CGP V100R005C01)
patch V100R005C01SPC506 it is necessary the disposition of the following software
components:
The evaluated configuration of CGP is based on the physical and logical scope and
security functions described above. In addition, the following configuration specifics
are applicable to the TOE:
• CGP supports standby configurations between two OMUs for the same
product. This functionality has not been evaluated.
• CGP supports LI user security management, during the evaluation SET
TTSEC command must be executed to enable the LI user security function.
• CGP supports DES encryption for various communication channels, such as
the channel between CGP and a Lawful Interception Gateway, for legacy
reasons. This evaluation does not cover the use of the DES algorithm for LI
feature.
• CGP supports DES for encryption of configuration data. During the evaluation
CGP must be configured so that AES is used instead of DES for LI feature.
• CGP supports COMMON communication between LMT clients and the OMU.
This evaluation does not cover the use of the COMMON communication.
During the evaluation CGP must be configured so that SSL communication
mode is used instead of COMMON communication mode.
• CGP supports DES communication between the operational environment
(EMS server) and the OMU in SNMP interface. During the evaluation CGP
must be configured so that the parameters SNMP Protocol version as
SNMPv3, and Private protocol as DES (CBC-DES).
• CGP supports security policy, during the evaluation security policy data must
be configured and parameters value should be:
o Password policy = Enable
o Change password upon first login = Enable
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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Dossier: 2012-04
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Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
o Password expiration warning period(day), customized account default
as 5 and build-in account default as 20
o Minimum password length = 8
o Character set, enable all character sets.
o Enforce password history = 5
o Enforce password days = 10
o Minimum password age, customized account default as 5 and build-in
account is not available.
o Account lockout policy = Enable
o Number of login attempts before lockout = 5
o Count reset interval(minute) = 10
o Lockout duration(minute) = 30
o Unused account lockout period(day), customized account default as 30
and build-in account is not available.
o Repeated login rejection policy = Enable
• CGP supports session establishment management. During the evaluation
the parameters value of Account validity period, Password validity period,
Start login time, and End login time must be specified when adding the
new user through the ADD USER command.
• CGP supports workstation management. During the evaluation workstation
access control function must be enabled through the SET WS command.
• CGP supports network time protocol, during the evaluation the parameter
values of Authentication flag must be configured as Yes, and other
parameters value should match with the NTP server side when adding the
NTP server data through the ADD NTPSVR command.
Regarding the hardware components, the only requirement is that they shall support
the software elements previously detailed.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 (Unique
version identifier: CGP V100R005C01) patch V100R005C01SPC506 has been
evaluated against the Security Target Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version
1 Release 5 Customization 1 Security Target Version 2.0.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL3 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory LGAI Technological Center
S.A. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator
actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL3, as defined by the Common
Criteria v3.1 R3 and the CEM v3.1 R3.
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
Página 17 de 18
Dossier: 2012-04
C/ Argentona nº 20
Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product.
The evaluator evaluated the TOE Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1
Release 5 Customization 1 and its evidences from 07/08/2012 to 26/11/2014.
Each assurance class has a positive evaluation result Pass.
During the evaluation process, the developer has provided evidences and
resolutions as soon as required.
The Observation Reports were related to the documentation evidences, no
vulnerabilities have been found in any part of the TOE. Therefore, no issue was
detected according to the standard and evidences used for the evaluation. The
product fulfilled the whole set of Security Functional Requirements established in the
Security Target.
There is no additional recommendation from the Laboratory in order to use the TOE
since guidance documentation is enough to make a secure usage of the TOE.
Since all the classes of the evaluation have a Pass verdict, the overall evaluation
verdict is Pass. Therefore, from the Laboratory point of view, the product is
considered to be compliant with the CC standard with an assurance level of EAL 3.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 (Unique
version identifier: CGP V100R005C01) patch V100R005C01SPC506, a positive
resolution is proposed.
During the evaluation, the publication of the Heartbleed vulnerability leads the
Laboratory to examine its impact on the TOE. The version of openSSL running on
the TOE was not affected by the vulnerability. Nevertheless, the Laboratory made a
search of public vulnerabilities in order to discard any potential security flaw.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
Página 18 de 18
Dossier: 2012-04
C/ Argentona nº 20
Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
available in the Certification Body: Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1
Release 5 Customization 1 Security Target Version 2.0.