TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
ST54L A01
Sponsor and developer: STMicroelectronics
190 avenue Celestin Coq, ZI de Rousset-Peynier
13106 Rousset
France
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0638980-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0638980
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 12 April 2023
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0638980-CR, dated 12 April 2023
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ST54L
A01. The developer of the ST54L A01 is STMicroelectronics located in Rousset, France and they also
act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE is a serial access microcontroller designed for secure mobile applications and compliant with
[PP_0084]. It incorporates the most recent generation of Arm® processors for embedded secure
systems.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 12 April 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ST54L A01, the security requirements, and the
level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security
requirements. Consumers of the ST54L A01 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ST54L A01 from STMicroelectronics located
in Rousset, France.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware ST54L
IC Masket name: K450, IC version: C, Master identification
number:0x0276
Software Firmware 3.2.2
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ST54L A01. For
details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.7.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE offers dedicated features for high level security:
• Two instances of the Arm® Cortex-M35P CPU connected in lockstep mode
• Die integrity
• Monitoring of environmental parameters
• Protection against faults
• AIS20/31 class PTG.2 compliant True Random Number Generator
• Memory Management Functions
• Hardware security AES accelerator
• Hardware security enhanced DES accelerator
• Secure Flash Loader
• Secure Diagnostics
• Nescrypt coprocessor for public key cryptography algorithm (the TOE offers this functionality,
there is no TOE security requirement that relies on this coprocessor however, in order to support a
composite evaluation, the Vendor asked the Lab to carry out additional testing that is included in
the [ETRfc])
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
The ST54L chip includes on a single die a Secure Element (the TOE) and an NFC Controller. The two
subsystems are called "ST54L_SE" and "ST54L_CLF", respectively. Only the “ST54L_SE” is part of
the TOE (see [ST] section 1.5 for more details).
Page: 7/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0638980-CR, dated 12 April 2023
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Please note that although the TOE contains HW accelerators for SM3, SM4, MIFARE, CRC and public
key cryptography (Nescrypt), the functionality and security of these features have not explicitly been
addressed in this evaluation. Therefore, if these features are required by the composite product the
developer/evaluator should do their own security analysis and/or testing. In case of Nescrypt, in order
to support this analysis, the Vendor asked the Lab to carry out additional testing that is included in the
[ETRfC].
2.4 Architectural Information
The top-level architecture and block diagram of the TOE is depicted in the following figure.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
NFC controller and secure element system in package, DS_ST54L 0.6
ST54L SE OS developer’s guide (preliminary version), UM_ST54L_SE 0.5
ST54L_SE firmware V3 - User manual, UM_ST54L_SE_FWv3 2
Arm Cortex-M35P Processor, Technical Reference Manual,
100883_0102_00_en
r1p2
Security guidance of the ST54L_SE secure MCU subsystem – Application note,
AN_SECU_ST54L_SE
1.0
Random number generation V1.4 for ST54L_SE – User manual,
UM_ST54L_SE_TRNG14
3
ST54L_SE platform TRNG reference implementation: compliance tests,
AN_ST54L_SE_TRNG
1
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers whether
potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified behaviour in
such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE. During
this attack-oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained
from all evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential vulnerabilities.
This analysis will be using the attack methods in [JIL-AM] and [JIL-AAPS].
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by
penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 27 weeks. During that test campaign, 30%
Perturbation attacks, 63% on side-channel testing, and 7% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was on
the current version and also on an earlier revision of the TOE. The assurance gained from testing on
an earlier revision has been assessed to be valid for the final TOE version, because the changes
introduced did not have an impact on the TSF.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
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2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 2 site certificates and 19 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ST54L A01.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ST54L A01, to be CC Part 2
extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 6 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
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3 Security Target
The ST54L A01 SECURITY TARGET, SMD_ ST54L_ST_21_001, Rev A01.0, March 2023 [ST] is
included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “ST54L A01” – EAL6+, 22-RPT-1214, version 4.0,
12 April 2023
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “ST54L A01” – EAL6+, 23-RPT-
289, version 3.0, 12 April 2023
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] ST54L A01 SECURITY TARGET, SMD_ ST54L_ST_21_001, Rev A01.0,
March 2023
[ST-lite] ST54L A01 SECURITY TARGET FOR COMPOSITION, SMD_
ST54L_ST_22_001, Rev A01.0, March 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)