TrustCB B.V.
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TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
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Version
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Certification Report
AKD eID 2.0 SSCD
Sponsor and developer: AKD d.o.o.
Savska cesta 31,
10 000 Zagreb,
Republic of Croatia
Evaluation facility: Riscure B.V.
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300144-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300144-01
Author(s): Haico Haak
Date: 30 September 2024
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 7
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the AKD
eID 2.0 SSCD. The developer of the AKD eID 2.0 SSCD is AKD d.o.o. located in Zagreb, Republic of
Croatia and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification A Certification Report is
intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of
the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, import, use and
manage signature creation data (SCD). The SSCD protects the SCD during its whole lifecycle as to be
used in a signature creation process solely by its signatory. The TOE is intended as a qualified
signature creation device and qualified seal creation device in accordance with Article 29 and Article
39 of Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014.
The TOE comprises all IT security functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD and the
security of the electronic signature:
• to generate or to import signature-creation data (SCD) and the correspondent signature-
verification data (SVD),
• to export the SVD for certification through a trusted channel to the CGA,
• to, optionally, receive and store certificate info,
• to switch the SSCD from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
• if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data.
The TOE has been evaluated by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was
completed on 30-09-2024 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the AKD eID 2.0 SSCD, the security requirements,
and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the AKD eID 2.0 SSCD are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
The TOE is stated as a Qualified Signature Creation Device and Qualified Seal Creation Device for
the purposes of electronic identification and trust services as detailed by the [EU-REG]. The
evaluation by Riscure B.V. included an examination of the TOE according to the eIDAS Dutch
Conformity Assessment Process Version 6 0.
TrustCB B.V., as the Dutch eIDAS-Designated Body responsible in The Netherlands for the
assessment of the conformity of qualified electronic signature and/or qualified electronic seal creation
devices declares that the evaluation meets the conditions for eIDAS certification for listing on the EU
eIDAS compiled list of Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Devices.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300144-01-CR, dated 30 September 2024
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the AKD eID 2.0 SSCD from AKD d.o.o. located
in Zagreb, Republic of Croatia.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item type Identifier Version
Smartcard including
Personalization key set
AKD eID 2.0 SSCD 2.0 rev8
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the AKD eID 2.0
SSCD. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, import, use and
manage signature creation data (SCD). The SSCD protects the SCD during its whole lifecycle as to be
used in a signature creation process solely by its signatory.
The TOE comprises all IT security functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD and the
security of the electronic signature:
• to generate or to import signature-creation data (SCD) and the correspondent signature
verification data (SVD),
• to export the SVD for certification through a trusted channel to the CGA,
• to, optionally, receive and store certificate info,
• to switch the SSCD from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
• if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a combination of hardware and software, embedded in a smartcard form. The TOE
provides user authentication and cryptographic services to securely create, import, use and manage
signature creation data (SCD). The Application-TOE (developed by AKD) is installed on top of an NXP
JCOP 4.5 P71 platform. The AKD eID 2.0 SSCD can be installed alongside additional applets. The
TOE applet disallows other applets to be installed after it has been configured, preventing additional
applets to be installed post-issuance. The diagram below shows the components of the TOE. The
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Application-TOE boundary is marked red.
Figure 1: Composite TOE components
The TOE is named "AKD eID 2.0 SSCD". It is available in a single configuration.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
AKD Electronic Identity Card User Guidance. v1.12
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The test results of the underlying base TOE are extendable to composite evaluations, as the base
TOE is used according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
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For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have verified the execution of a selection of the developer tests, and
conducted a number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The VA focused on the functionality implemented by the applet TOE, but considers the entire
composite TOE where needed. Any potential vulnerabilities that may arise from the usage of the
underlying platform are considered and assessed. The assessment is structured based on the JHAS
attack methods for smartcards and similar devices [JIL.AMS].
For each attack method, it is described how the attack method applies to the TOE. The following is
considered foreach attack method:
• The design and implementation of the features relevant for the attack method
• Specific attack techniques from the evaluator’s attack repository
• Implemented countermeasures
• Observations from the platform evaluation
• Platform user guidance
Based on these items, we determine whether an attack method is applicable to the TOE and should
be tested during the penetration testing phase.
During the assessment, the evaluator also examined the results of the evaluation of the underlying
platform, and confirmed that any obligations or guidance from the platform have been correctly
covered and followed.
In total two Fault Injection attacks and one Logical attack was performed as part of the independent
penetration testing effort.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 8 weeks. During that test campaign, ; 62.5% of
the total time was spent on TOE characterization, 25% on Perturbation attacks, 0% on side-channel
testing, and 12.5% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST]. The state of the TOE that is tested is the OPERATE state.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number AKD eID 2.0 SSCD.
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2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the AKD eID 2.0 SSCD, to be CC
Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profiles [EN419211-2], [EN419211-
3], [EN419211-4], [EN419211-5], [EN419211-6]
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
The Applet-TOE does not implement any cryptographic mechanisms; it uses those of the certified
underlying platform, as reported in [HW-CERT].
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3 Security Target
The Security Target AKD eID 2.0 SSCD, v2.4, 20 September 2024 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
QSCD Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device
SCD Signature Creation Device
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[eIDAS-REP[ eIDAS conformity assessment for AKD eID 2.0 SSCD, 20230029-D15, Version
1.1, 20 September 2024
[EN419211-2] EN 419 211-2:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 2: Device with key generation, V2.0.1, registered under the reference BSI-
CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02
[EN419211-3] EN 419 211-3:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 3: Device with key import, V1.0.2, registered under the reference BSI-CC-
PP-0075-2012-MA-01.
[EN419211-4] EN 419211-4:2013 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to
certificate generation application, Version 1.0.1, 2013-11-27, registered under
the reference BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01.
[EN419211-5] EN 419 211-5:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to
signature creation application, V1.0.1, registered under the reference BSI-CC-
PP-0072-2012-MA-01.
[EN419211-6] EN 419211-6:2014 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 6: Extension for device with key import and trusted channel to signature
creation application, Version 1.0.4, Registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-
0076- 2013-MA-01.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report for AKD eID SSCD 2.0, 20230029-D1, Version
1.2, 20 September 2024
[PLT-CERT] JCOP 4.5 P71 certificate NSCIB-CC-2300127-01, issued 16-01-2024
[PLT-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “NXP JCOP 4.5 P71” – EAL6+,
23-RPT-1350, version 2.0, 20 December 2023
[PLT-ST] JCOP 4.5 P71 Security Target Lite for JCOP 4.5 P71, Revision 2.6, 11
December 2023
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[ST] Security Target AKD eID 2.0 SSCD, v2.4, 20 September 2024
[ST-lite] Security Target Lite AKD eID 2.0 SSCD, v2.4, 20 September 2024
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[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)