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Common Criteria Certification Report
NetApp E-Series and EF-Series with SANtricity
v11.90R5
2 July 2026
v1.0
CAN-684-LSS
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Foreword
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief,
Communications Security Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated
certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate,
applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria
Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and
its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs
and would like more detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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Overview
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for evaluating the
security of IT products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common
Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements
of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration
Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated security target (ST). A security target is a
requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The
consumer of certified IT products should review the ST, in addition to this certification report, to gain
an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended
environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the
CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and ST are posted to the Common Criteria
portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword.......................................................................................................................................................1
Overview .......................................................................................................................................................2
Executive Summary CAN-684-LSS .............................................................................................................4
Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................5
Common Criteria Conformance ..............................................................................................................5
TOE Description........................................................................................................................................5
TOE Architecture.......................................................................................................................................6
Security Policy..............................................................................................................................................7
Cryptographic Functionality.....................................................................................................................7
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ...................................................................................................8
Usage and Environmental Assumptions ................................................................................................8
Clarification of Scope...............................................................................................................................9
Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................10
Documentation .......................................................................................................................................10
Evaluation Analysis Activities...................................................................................................................11
Development...........................................................................................................................................11
Guidance Documents.............................................................................................................................11
Life-Cycle Support ..................................................................................................................................11
Testing Activities .......................................................................................................................................11
Assessment of Developer tests ............................................................................................................11
Conduct of Testing.................................................................................................................................12
Independent Testing...............................................................................................................................12
Vulnerability Analysis ................................................................................................................................13
Vulnerability Analysis Results ...............................................................................................................13
Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................14
Recommendations/Comments.............................................................................................................14
Supporting Content....................................................................................................................................15
List of Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................................15
References ..............................................................................................................................................15
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Executive Summary CAN-684-LSS
NetApp E-Series and EF-Series with SANtricity v11.90R5 (hereafter referred to as the Target of
Evaluation, or TOE), from NetApp, Inc. , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The
results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the following conformance claim:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v3.0e.
Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 2
July 2026 and was conducted in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria
Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance
requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with
that specified in the security target, and to consider the comments, observations, and
recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets
all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the
product is listed on the Certified Products list for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the
Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version NetApp E-Series and EF-Series with SANtricity v11.90R5
Developer NetApp, Inc.
See the Evaluated Configuration section for more details on the evaluated configuration of the TOE.
Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the following methodology:
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v3.0e.
TOE Description
The TOE is a network device that provides networked storage for dedicated, high bandwidth
applications like data analytics, video surveillance, and disk-based backup that need simple, fast,
reliable SAN storage.
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TOE Architecture
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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Security Policy
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Trusted Path/Channels
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 Identification and Authentication
 TOE Access
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target.
Cryptographic Functionality
The TOE makes use of the following CAVP validated cryptographic implementation:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation
Cryptographic Implementation Certificate Number
NetApp, Inc. Bouncy Castle BC-FIPS version 11.90 A7093
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Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as
requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper
and secure operation of the TOE.
Usage and Environmental Assumptions
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This
protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result,the cPP does not
include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect
the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass
other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption appliesto the physical platform on which
the VM runs.
 The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services
that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform
for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality). If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following
Case 2 vNDs as specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each
physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of a distributed TOE run inside more than one
virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform.
 A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it.
The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is
not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular
types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
 The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to
lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending
against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the
TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
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 The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response
to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
 The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on which
they reside.
 The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or
removed from its operational environment.
Clarification of Scope
The SMcli client application is not included in the scope of the TOE evaluation.
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Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
Table 3: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Software/Firmware SANtricity OS 11.90R5 Build11.90.00.9134
TOE Hardware E4012 (DE212C), E4060 (DE460C), EF300, EF600, EF300C, EF600C
Environmental Support Audit Server, LDAP Server, OCSP Responder
Documentation
The following documents are available to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation
of the TOE:
a) E-Series and EF-Series w SANtricity v11.90R5 Common Criteria Guide, v1.3 June 22, 2026
b) EF300 and EF600 E-Series storage systems June 12, 2026
https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/e-series/pdfs/sidebar/EF300_and_EF600.pdf
c) NetApp Install hardware E-Series storage systems, June 12, 2026
https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/e-series/pdfs/sidebar/Install_hardware.pdf
d) NetApp E4000 E-Series storage systems, June 12, 2026
https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/e-series/pdfs/sidebar/E4000.pdf
e) NetApp Linux express configuration E-Series storage systems, June 12, 2026
https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/eseries/pdfs/sidebar/Linux_express_configuration.pdf
f) NetApp SANtricity System Manager SANtricity software, April 23, 2026
https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/e-series-santricity-
119/pdfs/sidebar/SANtricity_System_Manager.pdf
g) NetApp Get Started SANtricity commands, March 17, 2026
https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/e-series-cli/pdfs/sidebar/Get_started.pdf
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Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation activities comprised a structured assessment of the TOE. Documentation and
processes related to Development, Guidance Documentation, and Life-Cycle Support were reviewed
and analyzed.
Development
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design
completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF
implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization
process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that
security domains are maintained.
Guidance Documents
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and
determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into
its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators exercised the
preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed
to result in a secure configuration.
Life-Cycle Support
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was
performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the
procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
Testing Activities
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent
tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.
Assessment of Developer tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their
test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR).
The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test documentation and the
functional specification was complete.
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Conduct of Testing
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional
and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases,
expected results and observed results are documented in a separate proprietary test results
document.
Independent Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by
examining design and guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the
testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the
claimed PP; and
b. Validation of Cryptographic Implementation: The evaluator confirmed that the claimed
cryptographic implementation is present in the TOE.
Independent Testing Results
The testing produced the expected results, supporting the conclusion that the TOE correctly
implements the functional requirements specified in the ST and the TOE functional specification.
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Vulnerability Analysis
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain
vulnerability databases, and technical community sources. Additionally, the evaluators used
automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer
vulnerabilities. Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses, which they used in
their vulnerability analysis.
Public domain searches were conducted on 25 May 2026 and included the following search terms:
SANtricity v11.90 E4012 (DE212C), E4060 (DE460C), EF300, EF600, EF300C,
EF600C
Intel Xeon D-1715TER, Intel Xeon D-2164IT, Intel Xeon
D2123IT
Bouncy Castle-FIPS
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
NetApp Security Advisories NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD)
Maven Repository CISA - Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
CVE
Vulnerability Analysis Results
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in
the intended operating environment.
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Results of the Evaluation
The Information Technology product identified in this certification report, and its associated
certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the
specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
The overall verdict for this evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
Recommendations/Comments
It is recommended that all guidance be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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Supporting Content
List of Abbreviations
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
References
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
NetApp E-Series and EF-Series w SANtricity v11.90 R5 Security Target, v1.9, July 2,
2026.
NetApp E-Series and EF-Series w SANtricity v11.90 R5, Evaluation Technical Report,
Version 1.4, July 2, 2026.
NetApp E-Series and EF-Series w SANtricity v11.90 R5 Assurance Activity Report,
Version 1.4, July 2, 2026.