BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
for
Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1
Version 2.1.6.3
from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.1
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
Signaturanwendungskomponente
Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1
Version 2.1.6.3
from OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure
states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
Common Criteria
Arrangement
for components
up to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 augmented and guidance specific for the
technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 February 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
IV
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition
of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC
for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national
certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised
under the terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies
of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory
nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site:
http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that
this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are
relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1, v2.1.6.3 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007. Specific results from the evaluation process based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1,
v2.1.6.3 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
completed on 20. Februar 2008 . The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
The product was developed by: OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the
Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over
time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack
methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified
product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI
Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a
regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for
assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation
does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-28 and D1 to D-2.
The product Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1, v2.1.6.3 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
A-4
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form
at the internet address stated above.
7
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Zugerstr. 76B
CH-6341 Baar, SCHWEIZ
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 7
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 17
6 Documentation 19
7 IT Product Testing 19
8 Evaluated Configuration 20
9 Results of the Evaluation 21
9.1 CC specific results 21
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment 22
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE 23
11 Security Target 23
12 Definitions 24
12.1 Acronyms 24
12.2 Glossary 24
13 Bibliography 25
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) is the
software application Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1, v2.1.6.38
.
Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 is an electronic signature
application compliant to the German electronic signature law9
and ordinance on
electronic signatures10
. The application itself is a set of executables and
programming libraries.
The Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 were developed for the use
on the operating systems from Microsoft since Microsoft Windows NT 4.0. In the
IT-security environment a smart card terminal with secure pin entry mode as
well as a smart card are required to run the required cryptographic operations in
the process of electronic signature creation.
The product provides additional cryptographic functionality like data encryption
based on symmetric encryption algorithms. These product capabilities are not
part of the Common Criteria evaluation of this product.
The TOE itself is limited to the creation of hash values, using the SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160 algorithms and the RSA-Algorithm
for signature validation. It is therefore able to check and ensure the integrity as
well as the trustworthiness of signed data based on the components
responsible for CRL-processing, OCSP-processing, timestamp processing and
PDF processing.
The TOE can be used as a standalone application or can be integrated into
third party products. For third party products the TOE includes an API (called
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Job Interface or OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.1) that
allows access to the following core functionality of the TOE:
• Computation of hash values implementing the algorithms mentioned above.
• Creation of electronic signatures.
• Timestamp processing.
• Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature
creation.
• Support for OCSP-processing in the process of electronic signature creation.
• Electronic signature verification.
• Integrity protection of the installed product.
8
Also named Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 in this report.
9
see [10]
10
see [11]
B-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
Furthermore, the TOE provides a legal binding displaying unit (OPENLiMiT
SignCubes Viewer) for the Text, TIFF and PDF format. The displaying unit of
the TOE allows the examination of the files in order to ensure that the user is
assured about the content to be signed or the content of the signed file.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a
certified Protection Profile.
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are
outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are selected from
Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is
CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of
the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.1 Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature
creation process using certificates, smart card terminals and
secure signature creation devices.
The user can optionally include OCSP-responses for the validation
of certificates and add timestamps to a digital signature.
Furthermore, the Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1
allow the creation of more than one signature without entering the
PIN for every document11
. This feature is only available for the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Job Interface and not for the graphical
user interface included in the Openlimit SignCubes
Basiskomponenten 2.1.
SF.2 Verification of hash values and electronic signatures using
certificate revocation lists, OCSP responses (optional) and
timestamps (optional)
Apart from the extraction of the original and the comparison with
the calculated hash value the Openlimit SignCubes
Basiskomponenten 2.1 verify the certificate chain using the chain
model or RFC 3280.
SF.3 Program module manipulation detection
The files and libraries constituting the Openlimit SignCubes
Basiskomponenten 2.1 are digitally signed. Each time the
application starts a specific module is responsible for verfying
these signatures mathematically.
11
Though the software provides this functionality, the supported smart cards require
entering the PIN for every document.
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.4 Unambiguous presentation of the data to be signed
The Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 present the data
to be signed unambigiously to the user. To accomplish this, a
parser determines whether the format of the data to be signed
complies to the Adobe PDF-, the TIFF-standard or is a text file.
The data is checked for active content, unknown tags and
elements or control characters that cannot be displayed. If any
irregularities are detected, the user is informed with appropriate
error messages or warnings.
SF.5 Protection against hash value manipulation
Before the electronic signature is initiated, the Openlimit
SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 compute the hash value of the
data to be signed. After the electronic signature creation process
the Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 verifiy the
electronic signature using the public key of the given signer
certificate. If the original hash value and the hash value encoded in
the electronic signature are not identical, the signature is
discarded.
SF.6 Assurance of the TOE’s integrity
For the integrity check the Openlimit SignCubes
Basiskomponenten 2.1 comprise a JAVA-applet that is provided
online. When assessing this applet it calculates the hash value of
each file belonging to the Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten
2.1 and compares it to the values that were initially caluculated by
the manufacturer. If any value does not match, an error message is
displayed.
SF.7 Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation
The Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 is able to
process OCSP-responses. First the mathematical correctness of
the signature of the OCSP-response is checked. If the OCSP-
response is used for the validation of a certificate, the complete
chain for the signing certificate of the OCSP-response is verified.
B-5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.8 Application of Timestamps
The Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 apply
timestamps to files if the timestamp is electronically signed and the
certificate belonging to the signature of the timestamp is already
available. Otherwise the timestamp is not imported.
SF.9 Validation of Timestamps
The Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 validate the
electronic signature of a timestamp mathematically. Furthermore,
the certificate underlying the electronic signature of the timestamp
is validated according to the chain model or RFC 3280. A
prerequisite for this security function is that the signing certificate of
the timestamp is already available.
SF.10 Management of Security Functions depending on licenses
The Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 support different
licenses. E.g. for the verification of electronic signatures no special
license key must be purchased, whereas the creation of embedded
PDF-signatures requires the availability of the most comprehensive
license
Table 1: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions high (SOF-high ) for specific functions
as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 8 is confirmed. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details
see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms
of assumptions, threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE is a
software application that does not require a special configuration. The TOE has
to be configured in accordance with the Security Target and the respective
guidance documents. This means among other aspects that for the application
of qualified electronic signatures a smartcard reader and a secure signature
creation device must be used that was approved in accordance with the
German signature law [11]. The Security Target names the products the TOE
can be used with.
Further information about the configuration of the TOE and the technical
environment is available in
• the Security Target [6],
• chapter 1.6, chapter 4.2 and chapter 8 of this report,
• the user guidance [9],
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
• and the guidance of the API provided by the TOE [9].
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1, v2.1.6.3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
1. SW OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1
2.1.6.3 12.12.2007 File
2. SW Integrity Tool
IntegrityTool.jar
see Table 12.12.2007 File
3. DOC OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1 – User Guidance
(English)
2.1.6.3 21.02.2007 chm-File
4. DOC OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1 – User Guidance
(German)
2.1.6.3 21.02.2007 chm-File
5. DOC OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.1
Documentation
1.2 05.03.2007 PDF-
File
6. SW
(Header
file)
siqSDK.h see Table 10.04.2006 File
B-7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
7. SW
(Library
file)
siqSDK.lib see Table 05.12.2007 File
8. DOC Developer Documentation
OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK
1.6 06.10.2005 PDF-
File
9. SW
(Header
File)
SiqVendor.h see Table 8 23.03.2006 File
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE deliverables No.1 to No.4 are delivered to customers who purchase
the TOE as a standalone application.
The TOE deliverables No.5 to 7 are intended for developers who want to
integrate the API provided by the TOE into their own application. The TOE
deliverables No.8 and No.9 can be used internally by the developer of the TOE.
To identify the Header and Library Files of the API and the OPENLiMiT
SignCubes Integrity Tool the SHA-1 values of these files are listed in the next
table.
No. File SHA-1-value
1. siqSDK.h 488c09f809df9b6fbbbb225649dcc890f6b52461
2. SiqVendor.h dba6e5fbedd12d3f2e50c173c3e6fb1cafb05b74
3. siqSDK.lib c9f82151769caf7552c1a85acaf988da59d794e4
4. IntegrityTool.jar 75126c6ee89ea9b4b66f655dafbaef6f365826a8
Table 3: Hash Values of TOE deliverables
The vendor provides the product either as a complete setup that comprises the
user guidance in both languages and supports all smart cards as well as all
smart card terminals that are listed in chapter 4.2.
Alternatively, the TOE is distributed in different parts comprising the compulsory
minimal setup and optional add-on setups.
The minimal setup contains the following constituent parts of the evaluated
product:
• the user guidance and user prompting either in English or in German,
• all binary files with exception of the ones that are required for the support of
the smart cards and smart card terminals listed in chapter 4.2 and
• especially the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
After the installation of the minimal setup all functionalities of the product are
available that the most restrictive license allows to use.
The add-on setups are composed according to the needs of the customer and
contain the libraries required to support specific smart cards and smart card
terminals. To use the functionalties of other licenses of the product than the
most restrictive one the installation of the corresponding add-on setup in
addition to the installation of the minimal setup is required.
As a third alternative the vendor provides single setups that contain the minimal
setup and the support for a selected set of smart cards and smart card
terminals. This alternative may be chosen to provide a software package for a
set of hardware that a Trust Center or a major reseller dispenses.
The end-customer can acquire the TOE through different sales channels:
• The costumer buys a CD-ROM that contains the required setup directly from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG or resellers.
• Resellers or the OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG make the software available on
their webpages. The download process must comply to the following
guidelines:
• The webpage where the software is offered must be secured by means
of https. The fingerprint of the certificate must be published separately on
the website of the corresponding company.
• The website must explicitly instruct the user to execute the integrity tool
first before using the TOE.
After installing the product the user is compelled to execute the OPENLiMiT
SignCubes Integrity Tool. This applet is provided by OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
on the website
https://www.openlimit.com/integritytool
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool checks whether the TOE is correctly
installed on the computer of the user and displays the versions of the different
files composing the TOE. Thus, the user can easily recognize whether he
installed the correct version of the software and which parts of the evaluated
product are installed.
The TOE deliverables No. 5 to No. 7 can only be acquired from OPENLiMiT
SignCubes AG. They are handed over to end customers (i.e. application
developers) either online or by a delivery service on CD-ROM as a compressed
zip-archive. The archive is digitally signed with a qualified electronic signature.
The belonging qualified certificate can be identified by means of the following
information:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
Subject: Armin Lunkeit
Issuer: S-TRUST Qualified Signature CA 2005-001:PN
Valid From: 11th of October 2005
Valid Until: 31 of December 2009
Serial Number: 0x6A 41 76 EC AB 31 41 3B DC B3 87 A0 2A 62 E6 BF
SHA-1 Fingerprint: 49 DA 34 B5 BF C2 8A 41 38 1D 52 2C 6E C6 24 BD C3
0E 08 38
The receiver of the archive must verify this qualified electronic signatur to
ensure the integrity and authenticity of the software.
3 Security Policy
The Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1, v2.1.6.3 is a signature
application component compliant to the German signature law and ordinance on
electronic signature and thus enforces the following security policies:
• The TOE clearly indicates the creation of a qualified electronic signature and
enables the user to unambigiously identify the data to be signed.
• The TOE ensures that the identification data are not disclosed and are
stored only on the relevant secure signature creation device. The application
enforces the rule that a signature is provided only at the initiation of the
authorized signing person.
• The TOE shows, to which data the signature refers, whether the signed data
is unchanged and to which signature-code owner the signature is to be
assigned.
• The TOE presents the contents of the qualified certificate on which the
signature is based, the appropriate qualified attribute certificates and the
results of the subsequent check of certificates.
• If data to be signed or data already signed is displayed by the TOE certain
rules for the treatment of nonreadable signs are enforced.
• For the verification of a qualified electronic signature the TOE reliably
verifies the correctness of a signature and displays this fact appropriately.
• Using the TOE it can be clearly determined whether the verified qualified
certificates were present in the relevant register of certificates at the given
time and were not revoked.
• The TOE ensures, that security-relevant changes in the technical
components are apparent to the user.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats
and organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-
Environment. The following topics are of relevance:
Usage assumptions
According to the ST [6], chapter 3.1, the following assumption for the usage of
the TOE is made:
• A.Personnel
The user, the administrator and the maintenance staff are trustworthy and
follow the user guide of the TOE. Especially the user verifies the integrity of
the installed TOE as described in the user documentation and on the
website where from the different setups can be downloaded.
Environmental assumptions
• A.Platform
The user utilizes an Intel 586 compatible computer as hardware platform,
which contains at least 64 MB of RAM and 120 MB of free disk space. On
the computer one of the following operating systems is installed:
• Windows NT 4.0 SP 6
• Windows 2000 SP 2
• Windows 2003
• Windows XP Home
• Windows XP Professional
• Windows XP Tablet PC Edition
• Windows XP 64 Bit Edition
• Windows Vista
Additionally the TOE supports a terminal server environment under Windows
operating systems Windows 2000 with Citrix Metaframe and Windows 2003
with and without Citrix Metaframe.
In a terminal server environment the communication between server and
client/s is conducted via an encrypted channel and is therefore to be considered
trustworthy.
In addition to these requirements, the Internet Explorer version 5.01 or
higher is installed. Moreover, the Microsoft smart card base components are
installed on the computer12
.
12
The manual installation of the Microsoft SmartCard base components is required for
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008
In addition to that, a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is installed on the
computer, which complies at least with the Java Runtime Environment v1.4.
The user ensures that all components of the operating system are correct.
The user ensures that no malicious or harmful program is installed on the
system.
The user utilizes a secure signature creation system, which consists of a
smart-card terminal with secure pin entry capabilities together with a smart
card. The user utilizes one of the following SigG approved smart cards:
• STARCOS 3.0 with Electronic Signature Application V3.0 from
Giesecke & Devrient
• Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
• ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from
Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke &
Devrient
• ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke &
Devrient
• ZKA Banking signature card v6.32, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.4 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.51 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.6 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
• ZKA signature card, ZKA 680 V5A from Gemplus-mids GmbH
• ZKA signature card, version 5.11 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
• ZKA signature card, version 5.11 M from Gemplus GmbH (Gemalto)
• ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 from Sagem Orga GmbH
• CardOS V4.3B Re_Cert with Application for Digital Signature from
Siemens AG
• TCOS 3.0 Signature Card, Version 1.1
In addition to the listed smart cards, the user utilizes any smart card that
provides a PKCS #15 interface or a SigG-application for qualified electronic
signatures.
The user utilizes one of the following smart-card terminals:
• Cherry ST-2000
• Cherry G83-6700 LQ
• Cherry G83-6744 LU
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• Kobil B1 Pro USB
• Kobil KAAN AdvancedFehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.
• SCM Microsystems SPRx32
• Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
• Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v3.0
• Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
• Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
• Omnikey Cardman 3621
• Omnikey Cardman 3821
• Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS:01
The used components are approved components according to the German
signature law. The certificates can be obtained from the BSI
(www.bsi.bund.de).
• A.Network
The computer where the TOE is installed may have internet access. In this
case a firewall is used to ensure that no system services or components are
compromised through internet attacks. In addition to this, the user utilizes a
virus scanner, which is able to detect virus programs as well as backdoor
programs and root kits. At least the virus scanner is able to inform the user
about attacks or detected malicious programs.
• A.Access
The computer on which the TOE is installed is located in an environment
where the user has full control about inserted storage devices and shared
network storage places. The TOE is protected in such way that it is not
possible to access parts of the TOE or the TOE as a whole through existing
network connections.
Clarification of scope
The TOE cannot assure the correctness of the following functions:
• Private Key material. The secure signature creation device must assure the
correctness and integrity of the private key material.
• Assurance of the operating system integrity. The TOE does not contain any
capabilities for ensuring the integrity of the operating system and its
environment. The user must assure that sufficient actions are undertaken to
avoid that the operating system may be compromised.
• Strength and security of cryptographic operations. The TOE uses libraries
for hash value creation and the RSA algorithm for signature validation.
Therefore the TOE can only assure the compliance to given standardization
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documentation and test vectors but must not make any statement about the
strength of the cryptographic operations.
The capability characteristics of the TOE are limited to the computation of hash
values and the usage of secure signature creation devices for electronic
signature creation and the usage of the RSA algorithm for signature verification.
Manipulations on the IT-security environment cannot be recognized or even
prevented by the TOE.
Applications that use the TOE via the evaluated API are not in the focus of this
evaluation.
Restrictions and Exceptions
The following tables show the combinations between operating system, smart
card and smart card reader that are not supported.
Table 4 depicts which smart card terminals are not supported by the
corresponding operating system.
Operating system Smart card terminal
Cherry G83-6744 LU
Cherry ST2000
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v3.0
Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS: 01
Omnikey Cardman 3621
Windows NT 4 SP 6
Omnikey Cardman 3821
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Windows XP 64 Bit Edition
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows 2003 Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows Vista
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
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Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil B1 Pro USB
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
Windows Vista 64 Bit Edition
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Windows 2000 Server with
Citrix Meta Frame
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Windows 2003 Server with
Citrix Meta Frame
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Windows 2003 Terminal
Server
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Table 4: Incompatibility between operating system and smart card terminals
Tabel 5 depicts the combinations of operating system and smart cards that are
incompatible with the smart card terminal Cherry G83-6700 LQ.
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Operating system13
Smart card
Windows NT 4.0 SP 6
Windows 2000
Windows XP
Windows 2003 Server
with Citrix Meta Frame
ZKA Banking Signature card, v6.2 NP Type 3
ZKA Banking Signature card, v6.2b NP, 6.2f NP
Type 3
ZKA Banking signature card, v6.31 NP, Type 3
ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.32, Type 3
ZKA Banking signature card, Version 6.4
ZKA Banking signature card, Version 6.51
ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.6
ZKA signature card, version 5.11
ZKA signature card, version 5.11 M
ZKA signature card, version 5.10
ZKA signature card, version 5.02
ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3
13
If the operationg system „Windows XP“ is mentioned, the different versions Windows XP
Home, Windows XP Professional, Windows XP Tablet PC Edition and Windows XP 64 Bit
Edition are meant.
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Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Operating system13
Smart card
STARCOS 3.0 with Electronic Signature Application
V3.0
Table 5: Incompatibilities of the smart card terminal Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Table 6 summarizes the combination of operating system and smart cards that
cannot be used together with the smart card terminal Kobil B1 Pro USB.
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Operating system13
Smart Card
Windows 2000
Windows XP
Windows 2003
Windows Vista
Windows 2003 Terminal
Server
Siemens CardOS V4.3B
CardOS V4.3B Re_Cert with Application for
Digital Signature
Windows 2003 Terminal
Server
TCOS 3.0 Signature Card, Version 1.1 (NetKey
3.0)
TCOS 3.0 Signature Card, Version 1.1 (NetKey
3.0 M)
Table 6: Incompatibilities of the smart card terminals Kobil B1 Pro USB
Table 7 shows the combination between operating systems and smart card
terminals that are not supporting the smart cards TCOS 3.0 (NetKey 3.0,
NetKey 3.0 M).
TCOS 3.0 (NetKey 3.0, NetKey 3.0 M)
Operating system13
Smart card Terminals
Windows NT 4 SP 6
Windows 2000
Windows XP
Windows 2003
Windows Vista
Windows 2000 Server
with Citrix Meta Frame
Windows 2003 Server
with Citrix Meta Frame
Kobil KAAN Advanced
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
Omnikey Cardman 3621
Omnikey Cardman 3821
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TCOS 3.0 (NetKey 3.0, NetKey 3.0 M)
Operating system13
Smart card Terminals
Windows 2003 Terminal
Server
Windows 2000
Windows XP
Windows 2003 Terminal
Server
Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS: 01
Table 7: Incompatibilities of the smart card TCOS 3.0 (NetKey 3.0, NetKey 3.0 M)
These combinations are not included in the evaluation and therefore not
included in the certificate.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6].
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a signature application component compliant to the German
electronic signature law and ordinance on electronic signatures. The application
itself is a set of executables and programming libraries. This means that the
Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 may be used as a single
application but also may be integrated into third party products. The TOE
comprises three different parts:
– the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Security Environment Manager
– the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer
– the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool
The first two parts represent the main components of the TOE whereas the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool is a separate application implemented as
a Java Applet. The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool is used to allow the
user to check the integrity of the installed product.
The figure below provides an overvierw of the main components and their
interfaces as described in the High-Level Design.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of the main components of the TOE
In Figure 1 the lined boxes represent the subsystems of the main components
of the TOE whereas the arrows indicate interfaces between subsystems.
Dashed boxes refer to external subsystems that are part of the IT environment
of the TOE (see chapter 4 in this report).
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer is a software component for displaying
signed data or data to be signed according to the signature law §17 paragraph
2. The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer is able to display TIFF documents
following the Adobe TIFF specification, PDF documents that follow the PDF 1.7
document format as well as documents that contain ASCII characters. If the
user decides to sign the document that is currently displayed with the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer, he can start the process of electronic signature
creation using the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer as an indirect interface to that
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functionality provided by the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Security Environment
Manager.
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Security Environment Manager provides the
following functionality that may be accessed in parts or completely through the
use of the OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK:
• Computation of hash values using the SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
and RIPEMD-160 algorithms.
• Creation of electronic signatures using a smart card and a secure pin entry
device (smart card reader).
• Timestamp processing during the process of electronic signature creation.
• Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature
creation.
• Support for OCSP processing during the electronic signature creation.
• Electronic signature verification including OCSP and CRL processing as well
as timestamp processing. The use of attribute certificates is supported.
• API’s for applications/product parts that want to use the provided
functionality.
• Ensuring the integrity and correctness of the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components installed on the user’s computer.
• Providing graphical interfaces in the process of signature creation,
verification and product configuration
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information
for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in
chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Developer tests
The tests of the developer were conducted with the smard cards, smart card
terminals and operating systems listed in chapter 4 assumption A.Platform and
thus in accordance with the ST [6]. All additional prerequisites mentioned in the
assumptions on the operating environment (see chapter 1 and chapter 4 in this
report) concerning the installation of modules of the operating systems (e.g. the
correct version of the Internet explorer) or firewalls and virus scanners were
fullfilled for the computers of the testbed.
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All tests of the developer were conducted with the same version of the TOE that
is listed in the configuration list [8]. The test description demonstrates that the
developer performed his testing on an adequate level for the evaluation
assurance level EAL4+. According to the verdict of the evaluator mentioned in
the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR, [7]), the test effort of the developer
demonstrate that the security functionalities defined in the ST [6] have been
implemented as required.
Evaluator tests
Due to the evaluation assurance level EAL4+ the ITSEF is obliged to repeat a
subset of the developer tests as well as conduct independent and penetration
tests to a commensurate extent.
For the repetition of the developer tests the testbed of the developer was used.
The independent evaluator tests follow two different test approaches. On the
one hand tests are derived from the developer tests to examine the behaviour
of the TOE in a broader approach. This kind of tests strengthen the confidence
of the evaluators in the test approach of the developer. On the other hand the
evaluators developed new tests to examine special reactions of the TOE. Due
to this probing the existence of certain vulnerabilities can be eleminated.
For the evaluator tests at the ITSEF facility in Bonn the following configuration
was employed:
• Computer with Windows 2000, Service Pack 4 and JRE 1.4.2_08
• Card reader SCM Microsystems SPR x32
• Smart card ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from
Giesecke & Devrient
Test results
The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected. The depth of testing is
adequate for the evaluation assurance level chosen (EAL4+). The TOE
successfully passed independent testing. The tests performed by the evaluators
confirmed that under the given assumptions no vulnerabilities can be exploited.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1
Version 2.1.6.3 was evaluated in the configuration as described in the
Evaluation Technical Report [7] and summarized in chapter 2 of this report.
The TOE allows only one mode of operation though several different
functionalities are bound to purchasing a corresponding license. Depending on
the license, the user may use only parts of the functionality evaluated and
certified. In any case, the evaluation and the certificate cover all functionalities
that the purchase of the most comprehensive license provides.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up
to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 4 augmented and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4]
(AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS20, Version
1, 02.12.1999, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI), Bonn, Ein Vorschlag zu: Funktionsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
(see [4], AIS 20) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following
assurance components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL 4 augmented package as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
• The components
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
• AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
• All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2 and defined in
the CC (see also part C of this report).
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out
as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007, re-use of
specific evaluation tasks was possible.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• for the functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure
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states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
high:
(i) the TOE Security Function
• SF.1 (Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature
creation)
• SF.2 (Verification of hash values and electronic signatures)
• SF.3 (Program module manipulation detection)
• SF.5 (Protection against hash value manipulation)
• SF.6 (Assurance of the TOE’s integrity)
• SF.7 (Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation)
• SF.8 (Application of Timestamps)
• SF.9 (Validation of Timestamps)
• SF.10 (Management of Security Functions depending on licenses)
(ii) and for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in
chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for:
• the TOE Security Function SF.1 and
• SF.2.
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its
security policy:
– hash functions:
– SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160
– algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
RSA-Algorithms with bitlengths between 1024-2048 bits.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to
Bundesnetzagentur – Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem
Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete
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Algorithmen), vom 17.12.2007 the algorithms are suitable for - Erzeugung und
Prüfung von qualifizierten elektronischen Signaturen -.
The following table describes the validity period of hash functions according to
the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur [14].
Hash function Valid until end of
SHA-1 2007
RIPEMD 160 2010
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 2014
Table 8: Validity period of hash functions
As the Openlimit SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1 implement certain
cryptographic algorithms for the verification of electronic signatures, the
following table summarizes the validity period of these algorithms as published
by the Bundesnetzagentur.
Algorithm with bitlength Valid until end of
RSA 1024 2007
RSA 1280 2008
RSA 1536 2009
RSA 1728 2010
RSA 1976 2014
Table 9: Validity period of cryptographic algorithms
A bitlength of 2048 Bits is recommended for an acceptable long term security
level.
Detailed information about suitable algorithms for the application of qualified
electronic signatures can be obtained from the website of the
Bundesnetzagentur (see www.bundesnetzagentur.de).
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
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Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
specifically:
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- AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 2.0, CCDB-
2006-04-003, April 2006
- AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.3, CCDB-
2007-04-001, April 2007
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 35 ST-lite
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and CC
Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
- AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation
results
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0494-2008, Version 2.1, 02.01.2008, Electronic
Signature Application OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1,
Version 2.1.6.3, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 25.01.2008, T-Systems GEI
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1,
Version 2.1.6.3, 23.01.2008, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH
Guidance documentation
[9] OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, Version 2.1.6.3 user
guidance, Version 2.1.6.3, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH, file:
engOPENLiMiT SignCubes.chm, 1.673.986 bytes, 05.12.
[10] Auslieferungshinweise für Terminalserverlizenzen, OPENLiMiT
SignCubes Basiskomponenten 2.1, v2.1.6.3, Version 1.0, OPENLiMiT
SignCubes GmbH
Legal regulations
[11] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen
(Signaturgesetz - SigG)1) vom 16. Mai 2001 (BGBl. I S. 876) zuletzt
geändert durch Art. 1 des Ersten Gesetzes zur Änderung des
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Signaturgesetzes (1. SigÄndG), 01/04/2005, BGBl. volume 2005 part I p.
2
[12] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur (Signaturverordnung - SigV),
11/16/2001, BGBl. volume 2001 part I p. 876
[13] Maßnahmenkatalog für technische Komponenten nach dem
Signaturgesetz, Stand 15. Juli 1998, publisher RegTP
[14] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen),
published February 05, 2008, in the Bundesanzeiger No. 19, p. 376 and
available on the web-pages of the Bundesnetzagentur
(www.bundesnetzagentur.de).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC
Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC
Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as
part of the conformance result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for
inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 10 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 11 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 12.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 12: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 13: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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