Ärendetyp 5.3 Diarienummer: 24FMV6701-41
Dokument ID CSEC2024029
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2026-02-26
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including
SSLO
Issue: 2.0, 2026-feb-26
Authorisation: Theodora Arvanitidis, Junior Certifier , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 2 (24)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 Cryptographic Support 6
3.3 Identification and Authentication 7
3.4 Security Management 7
3.5 Protection of the TSF 8
3.6 TOE Access 8
3.7 Trusted Path / Channels 8
3.8 User Data Protection 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
4.1 Usage Assumptions 10
4.2 Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 15
6 Documentation 16
7 IT Product Testing 17
7.1 Evaluator Testing 17
7.2 Penetration Testing 17
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 19
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 21
11 Glossary 22
12 Bibliography 23
Appendix A Scheme Versions 24
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 24
A.2 Scheme Notes 24
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 3 (24)
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Networking Device. When running on iSeries
and VIPRION devices, the TOE is a physical Network Device. When running on
F5OS on rSeries or VELOS devices, the TOE is a virtual Network Device. The TOE
claiming conformance to this ST is identified as BIG-IP Version 17.5.0 including
SSLO (Build Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.0.0.190.15-ENG, also referred to as 17.5). The TOE
consists of following:
Supported Physical Network Devices:
• I15000 model series, including I15600, I15800 and I15820-DF
• C2400 model series, including C2400-AC
• C2400 with B2250
• C4480 model series, including C4480-AC
• C4480 with B4450
Supported Virtual Network Devices:
• R4000 model series, including R4600 and R4800
• R5000 model series, including R5600, R5800, R5900 and R5920-DF
• R10000 model series, including R10600, R10800, R10900 and R10900-DF
• R12000 model series, including R12600DS, R12800DS and R12900DS
• CX410 model series, including CX410-AC
• BX110 with CX410
• CX1610 model series, including CX1610-AC
• BX520 with CX1610
• BX520 with CX410
The Security Target [ST] claims exact conformance to PP-Configuration for Network
Device and SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy (STIP) (CFG_NDcPP-STIP_V2.0), version 2.0
(2024-04-25). CFG_NDcPP-STIP_V2.0 consists of the following components:
• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 3.0e (2023-
12-06)
• PP-Module for SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy (STIPM), Version 1.1 (2022-11-17)
The [ST] claims exact conformance to the Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH)
(PKG_SSH), version 1.0 (2021-05-13).
A list of the NIT technical decisions considered during the evaluation is available in
the ST.
There are seven assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and the
operational environment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the sixteen
threats and comply with the two organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST.
The assumptions, threats, and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB and was com-
pleted in 2026-02-09, with additional testing 2026-03-02.The evaluation was con-
ducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1, revision
5.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec infor-
mation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC
according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 4 (24)
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports.The certifier determined that the evaluation results con-
firm the security claims in the Security Target [ST].
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target and the Final
Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 5 (24)
2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2024029
Name and version of the cer-
tified IT product
F5 BIG-IP® 17.5.0 including SSLO
Security Target Identification F5 BIG-IP® 17.5 including SSLO Security Target,
F5, Inc., 2026-March-05, version 17.60
EAL CFG_NDcPP-STIP_V2.0
Sponsor F5, Inc.
Developer F5, Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
CEM version 3.1 revision 5
QMS version 2.6.1
Scheme Notes Release 22.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, EA-MLA
Certification date 2026-02-26
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 6 (24)
3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Function Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path / Channels
• User Data Protection
3.1 Security Audit
BIG-IP implements auditing functionality based on standard syslog functionality. This
includes the support of remote audit servers for capturing of audit records. Audit rec-
ords are generated for all security relevant events, such as the use of configuration in-
terfaces by administrators, the authentication of traffic, and the application of network
traffic rules.
While the TOE can store audit records locally for cases when an external log server
becomes unavailable, in the evaluated configuration an external log server is used as
the primary means of archiving audit records.
In the evaluated configuration, BIG-IP logs a warning to notify the administrator when
the local audit storage exceeds a configurable maximum size. Once the configurable
maximum size is reached, BIG-IP overwrites the older audit records.
3.2 Cryptographic Support
All cryptographic operations, including algorithms and key generation used by the
TOE are provided by the F5 cryptographic module (OpenSSL) within the TMOS.
Various security functions in BIG-IP rely on cryptographic mechanisms for their ef-
fective implementation. Trusted paths for the TOE administrator are provided by SSH
for the tmsh administrative interface and by TLS for the Configuration utility, iControl
API and iControl REST API. For administrative sessions, the TOE always acts as a
server. For traffic sessions, the TOE may act as a TLS client or server. Trusted chan-
nels between the TOE and external entities, such as a syslog server, are provided by
TLS connections.
For TLS sessions, the TOE implements certificate validation using the OpenSSL
crypto library. Time synchronization with an NTP server uses SHA-1 message digests
to verify the integrity of the NTP packets.
The TOE utilizes cryptographic algorithms that have been validated using the NIST
ACVP tests.
For F5 devices, the underlying hardware platforms of the TOE include a third party
proprietary cryptographic acceleration card that is used to provide both sufficient en-
tropy to support random number generation (RNG) and acceleration.
Key Generation
The TOE can generate asymmetric keys using RSA schemes and ECC schemes. For
F5 devices, the underlying hardware platforms of the TOE include a third party propri-
etary cryptographic acceleration card that is used to provide sufficient entropy to sup-
port RNG. For F5 devices, the TOE provides a total of four entropy sources. The TOE
can generate keys (and certificates) for a number of uses, including:
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 7 (24)
• Keypairs for the SSH server functionality
• TLS server and client certificates
• Session keys for SSH and TLS sessions
SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy
The TOE implements an administrator-configurable SSL/TLS Inspection proxy. The
administrator configures SSL forward proxy profiles to define which TLS connections
are subject to inspection, to define the TLS session parameters of the connections, and
to define any inspection services that will be performed on the connection.
The SSLO module accomplishes the inspection operation by terminating TLS sessions
between a monitored client and the requested server that meet the SSLO policy condi-
tions, then replacing the end-to-end connection with two TLS sessions that terminate
at the TOE. The TOE establishes a TLS session between the TOE (acting as the moni-
tored client) and the requested server and a second TLS session between the TOE (act-
ing as the requested server) and the monitored client. By intercepting the TLS session,
the TOE can send the decrypted traffic to an external inspection service for pro-
cessing.
As configured by the SSL forward proxy profiles, SSLO also determines which TLS
sessions should bypass inspection processing and be routed without decryption, in-
spection, and modification. When SSLO determines that a session is not authorized,
the session is blocked and the traffic is not routed to the other endpoint.
3.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE identifies individual administrative users by user name and authenticates
them by passwords stored in a local configuration database; the TOE can enforce a
password policy based on overall minimum length and number of characters of differ-
ent types required. BIG-IP obscures passwords entered by users.
Authentication of administrators is enforced at all configuration interfaces, i.e. at the
shell (tmsh, via SSH), the Configuration utility (web-based GUI), iControl API, and
iControl REST API.
3.4 Security Management
The TOE allows administrators to configure all relevant aspects of security functional-
ity implemented by the TSF. For this purpose, BIG-IP offers multiple interfaces to ad-
ministrators:
• Configuration utility
The Configuration utility presents a web-based GUI available to administrators via
HTTPS that allows administration of most aspects of the TSF.
• traffic management shell (tmsh)
tmsh is a shell providing a command line interface that is available via SSH. It allows
administration of all aspects of the TSF.
• iControl API
The iControl API is a SOAP based protocol interface that allows programmatic access
to the TSF configuration via HTTPS.
• iControl REST API
The iControl REST API is effectively a front-end to tmsh and is built on the Represen-
tational State Transfer (REST), which allows programmatic access to the TSF via
HTTPS.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 8 (24)
The TOE provides the ability to administer the TOE both locally and remotely using
any of the four administrative interfaces. Local administration is performed via the se-
rial port console. By default and in the evaluated configuration, remote access to the
management interfaces is only made available on the dedicated management network
port of a BIG-IP system.
BIG-IP implements a hierarchy of roles that are pre-defined to grant administrators
varying degrees of control over the basic configuration of the TOE, and additional
roles are introduced for module-specific tasks. These roles can be assigned to users by
authorized administrators.
In addition to roles, the TOE allows the definition of partitions. Configuration objects,
such as server pools or service profiles, can be assigned to individual partitions, as can
administrative users. This allows administrative access of individual administrators to
be restricted to configuration objects that belong to the partition that has been assigned
to the user.
3.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE is designed to protect critical security data, including keys and passwords. In
addition, the TOE includes self-tests that monitor continue operation of the TOE to
ensure that it is operating correctly. The TOE also provides a mechanism to provide
trusted updates to the TOE firmware or software and reliable timestamps in order to
support TOE functions, including accurate audit recording. Time is provided by a lo-
cal real-time clock managed by either the Security Administrator setting the time or
synchronizing with an NTP server
3.6 TOE Access
The TOE implements session inactivity time-outs for Configuration utility and tmsh
sessions and displays a warning banner before establishing an interactive session be-
tween a human user and the TOE.
3.7 Trusted Path / Channels
This chapter in the [ST] summarizes the security functionality provided by the TOE in
order to protect the confidentiality and integrity of network connections described be-
low.
Generic network traffic
The BIG-IP allows the termination of data plane TLS connections on behalf of inter-
nal servers or server pools. External clients can thus connect via TLS to the TOE,
which acts as a TLS server and decrypts the traffic and then forwards it to internal
servers for processing of the content. It is also possible to (re-) encrypt traffic from the
TOE to servers in the organization with TLS, with the TOE acting as a TLS client.
Administrative traffic
The TOE secures administrative traffic (i.e., administrators connecting to the TOE in
order to configure and maintain it) as follows:
• Remote access to the traffic management shell (tmsh) is secured via SSH.
• Remote access to the web-based Configuration utility, iControl REST API, and
iControl API is secured via TLS.
OpenSSH
The TOE SSH implementation is based on OpenSSH; however, the TOE OpenSSH
configuration sets the implementation via the sshd_config as follows:
• Supports two types of authentication, RSA public-key and password-based
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 9 (24)
• Packets greater than (256*1024) bytes are dropped
• The transport encryption algorithms are limited to AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256,
AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-256
• The SSH public-key authentication algorithms are limited to ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
and ecdsa-sha2- nistp384
• The transport data integrity algorithm is limited to HMAC-SHA2-256
• The SSH protocol key exchange mechanism is limited to ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and
ecdh-sha2- nistp384.
Remote logging
The TOE offers the establishment of TLS sessions with external log hosts in the oper-
ational environment for protection of audit records in transfer.
3.8 User Data Protection
The TOE implements certificate profiles for TLS server certificates issued by the CA
embedded in the TOE and issues certificates as specified by these profiles. The TOE is
also capable of providing a method to link the TLS server certificates validated by the
TOE to the forged certificate issued by the TOE to represent that server. The TOE per-
forms TLS plaintext processing policies when the policy authorizes inspection pro-
cessing. Residual information contained in TLS buffers is not available upon alloca-
tion of the resource. Trusted public keys and certificates used in SSLO are protected.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 10 (24)
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes seven assumptions on the usage and the operational
environment of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with
the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is as-
sumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical
attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical ac-
cess to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other con-
trols, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the
physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing.
For example the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as specified in Section
1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physi-
cal hardware platform. The exception being where components of a distributed TOE
run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no
non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform.
The assumed functionality of the TOE includes the behavior needed to satisfy the
functional claims of STIPM.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the pro-
tection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data
that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and
audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network
entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered
by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
This assumption only applies to the interfaces of the TOE that are defined by the
NDcPP and not STIPM.
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropri-
ately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administra-
tors are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is
not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that ac-
tively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 11 (24)
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Adminis-
trator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store
(aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
The functional claims of STIPM offer a limited ability to protect against malicious ad-
ministrators, which is not within the scope of the original assumption.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Adminis-
trator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are
protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensi-
tive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords,
etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment. Residual information is expanded to include information rel-
evant to STIP operation (e.g. decrypted SSL/TLS payload, ephemeral keys).
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains sixteen threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by ne-
farious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading
as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety,
or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide
access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Success-
fully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the secu-
rity functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic
exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key
space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or
control the traffic with minimal effort.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 12 (24)
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized se-
cure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take ad-
vantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform
man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead
to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The re-
sult is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidential-
ity and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firm-
ware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firm-
ware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality
of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the at-
tacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access
to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes
replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing cre-
dentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
Threat agents may also be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to
gain privileged access to the device.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security
functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without
prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or
security functionality of the device.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 13 (24)
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION
Untrusted intermediate systems have access to provide unauthorized communications
to the TOE, or to manipulate authorized TLS messages in an attempt to compromise
the TOE, the monitored clients, or the requested servers. Within this PP-Module, the
focus is on an adversary that controls or exploits a requested server that may attempt
to cause the device to inappropriately bypass inspection.
Use of weak cryptography can allow adversary access to plaintext intended by the
monitored clients to be encrypted. Such access could disclose user passwords that fa-
cilitate additional activities against users of monitored clients. Within this PP-Module,
the focus is on the use of weak cryptography and adversary attempts to degrade the
cryptographic operations within the TLS protocol.
External network security devices may communicate with the TOE to apply security
services to the exposed plaintext. An adversary may attempt to gain access the
plaintext via misrouting of traffic or manipulate the traffic in such a way as to cause
unauthorized exposure, denial of service, or corruption of the underlying plaintext.
T.AUDIT
Certificates issued by the device are trusted by monitored clients, and are required for
analysis if traffic processed by the device causes the client to fail or become compro-
mised. Unknown activity related to the issuance and use of certificates can allow an
adversary to mask client exploits through or via the TOE, especially if the device fails
before the incident can be understood. Unknown activity associated to routing config-
urations, communications with the TOE, as well as the decision to bypass inspection
of traffic can allow an adversary to mask attempts to access monitored clients.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_USERS
In addition to managing administrative credentials, authorized users may have role re-
strictions to limit their access to the device’s certification authority functionality. In
addition to the threat of disclosure or modification of authorized user credentials to
users without authorized access to the device, a user with limited access might attempt
to extend their access by gaining access to other user’s credentials.
T.CREDENTIALS
In addition to device credentials used in protected communications, the device main-
tains a trusted certification authority signing key. A malicious user or flawed TOE im-
plementation may cause the disclosure or unauthorized manipulation of the signing
key which can result in unintended certificates, signed executables, or signed data that
would be trusted by monitored clients. Any modification of the signing key can result
in denial of service to inspection capabilities, or to the monitored clients.
T.SERVICES
Manipulation of the device can result in issued certificates being used for unauthorized
purposes or abuse of inspection services. An authorized user (AU) (or adversary able
to gain access to AU credentials) can access or misuse device services, or disclose
sensitive or security critical data.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 14 (24)
T.DEVICE_FAILURE
Failure of the certification authority component can result in unauthorized or improp-
erly constrained certificates, or the inability to properly manage the validity of issued
certificates. Failure of routing traffic to inspection processing (internal or external) can
result in unauthorized disclosure or modification of traffic, or denial of service to
monitored clients.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DISCLOSURE
In addition to general threats to network devices, the TOE controls access to sensitive
data that is intended by the monitored client to be encrypted. A malicious user or
flawed TOE implementation could cause data to be transmitted in cleartext for which
a user has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
T.INAPPROPRIATE_ACCESS
Decryption services applied to traffic between monitored clients and unintended serv-
ers can violate privacy laws, or disclose unauthorized traffic to inspection processes.
Certification authority signature applied to unauthorized data could facilitate adver-
sary exploits of monitored clients.
The Security Target contains two Organisational Security Policy (OSP), which have
been considered during the evaluation.
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which Administrators consent by ac-
cessing the TOE.
P.AUTHORIZATION_TO_INSPECT
The authority to inspect client traffic may be limited by law, regulation, or policies
based on the monitored client, requested server, or nature of the traffic. The TOE may
be required to additionally provide a consent to monitor notice for users whose traffic
is inspected by the device, if the monitored client might not provide such a banner
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 15 (24)
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane.
The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary sys-
tems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE.
The data plane passes user traffic through the TOE. The TOE implements and sup-
ports the following network protocols: TLS (client and server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP.
The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and
SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS.
The cryptographic functionality implemented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.
The TOE is divided into the following subsystems:
• F5 Device Hardware,
• F5 platform layer for rSeries or VELOS devices,
• Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS),
• Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM),
• SSL Orchestrator (SSLO), and
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM).
BIG-IP Subsystems for F5 iSeries and VIPRION Devices in Application Delivery
Controller Deployments
BIG-IP Subsystems for F5 rSeries and VELOS Devices in Application Delivery Con-
troller Deployments
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 16 (24)
6 Documentation
[ECG] BIG-IP Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP Re-
lease 17.5.0 Including SSLO
The [ST], section 1.6.3.2 provides a full list of the guidance documents that are part of
the TOE.
The TOE documentation is collected in an ISO file that can be downloaded via https
from the F5 website.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 17 (24)
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator has conducted testing on the BIG-IP running version 17.5.0 on the TOE
running on hardware appliance (i15820), on the TOE's running on hardware appliance
with platform layer (r10920, r12900, VELOS). For [CPP_ND_V3.0E], the TOE run-
ning on VMWare ESXi Hypervisor (VMWare) was also tested. All models were fully
tested. The evaluator testing of the TOE was performed between January 2026 and
February 2026. The cryptographic algorithm testing is covered by Cryptographic Al-
gorithm Validation System (CAVS), and the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Pro-
gram (CAVP) certificates.
Algorithm test vectors were generated by ACVT tool to test all cryptographic algo-
rithms of the TOE. The testing is valid for all hardware appliance and hypervisors sup-
ported by the TOE, which is evident from the certificates: KVM, VMWare and Hyper-
V.
There was additional testing added due to technical decision TD0967, performed
2026-03-02.
All test verdicts were successful and did not reveal any errors.
7.2 Penetration Testing
In addition to the testing as mandated by the Protection Profile(s), i.e. the Fuzz testing
and ROBOT tests, the evaluator performed a port scan. The scan was performed to
mitigate the risk of undocumented or unexpected open ports in the default conigura-
tion.
The evaluator found the following TCP ports open. All of these ports are expected to
be open.
● 22/tcp: ssh: OpenSSH 7.4 (protocol 2.0)
● 161/tcp: snmp
● 443/tcp: ssl/http: Apache httpd
● 4433/tcp: ssl/ssl: Apache httpd (SSL-only mode)
● 4353/tcp: ssl/f5-iquery
The port scanning results do not indicate any certainly-open UDP ports. Therefore the
port scanning did not reveal any potential flaws in the TOE. The evaluator determined
the TOE in its operational environment is resistant to an attacker who possesses a
Basic attack potential.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 18 (24)
8 Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE:
● Appliance mode is licensed. This results in root access to the TOE operating system
and bash shell being disabled.
● Certificate validation is performed using CRLs (for non-SSLO functions)
● Disabled interfaces:
o All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other
user-serviceable shells are excluded.
o Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
o Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled.
o Remote (i.e., SSH) access to the Lights Out / Always On Management2 capa-
bilities of the system is disabled.
o TLS v1.1 (for non-SSLO functions)
● SSL Orchestrator is licensed, enabling the SSL/TLS inspection proxy functionality,
with the associated cryptographic options.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 19 (24)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The evaluators also applied all assurance activities implied by the collaborative PP
[NDcPP], [STIP-PPM] and [SSH_PKG].
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC] and the evaluation ac-
tivities implied by the collaborative PP [NDcPP] and [STIP-PPM].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introducation ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
ASE_NDCPP.1 PASS
ASE_STIPPPM.1 PASS
ASE_SSHPKG.1 PASS
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
ADV_NDCPP.1 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
AGD_NDCPP.1 PASS
AGD_STIPPPM.1 PASS
AGD_SSHPKG.1 PASS
Life-Cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 20 (24)
ATE_NDCPP.1 PASS
ATE_STIPPPM.1 PASS
ATE_SSHPKG.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analasis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
AVA_NDCPP.1 PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 21 (24)
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 22 (24)
11 Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
LTM Local Traffic Manager
PP Protection Profile
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 23 (24)
12 Bibliography
ST F5 BIG-IP® including SSLO Security Target, F5 Inc., 2026-03-05,
Document version 17.60
CPP_ND collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 3.0e
_V3.0e 2023-12-06
MOD_STIP PP-Module for SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy Version 1.1
_V1.1 2022-11-17
PKG_SSH Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0, NIAP, 2021-05-13
_V1.0
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including SSLO
24FMV6701-41 2.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024029 24 (24)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.6.1 2025-10-16 None
2.6 2025-03-27 None
2.5.2 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
The following Scheme Notes have been considered during the evaluation:
• Scheme Note 15 – Testing
• Scheme Note 18 – Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
• Scheme Note 21 – NIAP PP Certifications
• Scheme Note 22 – Vulnerability assessment
• Scheme Note 23 – Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
• Scheme Note 25 – Use of CAVP-tests in CC
• Scheme Note 27 – ST Requirements at the Time of Application for Certification
• Scheme Note 28 – Updated procedures for application, evaluation and Certification
• Scheme Note 31 – New procedures for site visit oversight and testing oversight