CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10
-Security Target V2.2
Issue V2.2
Date 2025-08-26
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
Issue V2.2 (2025-08-26) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. i
Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2025. All rights reserved.
No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior
written consent of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Trademarks and Permissions
and other Huawei trademarks are trademarks of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
All other trademarks and trade names mentioned in this document are the property of their respective
holders.
Notice
The purchased products, services and features are stipulated by the contract made between Huawei and
the customer. All or part of the products, services and features described in this document may not be
within the purchase scope or the usage scope. Unless otherwise specified in the contract, all statements,
information, and recommendations in this document are provided "AS IS" without warranties, guarantees or
representations of any kind, either express or implied.
The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Every effort has been made in the
preparation of this document to ensure accuracy of the contents, but all statements, information, and
recommendations in this document do not constitute a warranty of any kind, express or implied.
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Address: Huawei Industrial Base
Bantian, Longgang
Shenzhen 518129
People's Republic of China
Website: https://www.huawei.com
Email: support@huawei.com
Issue V2.2 (2025-08-26) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. ii
Security Declaration
Vulnerability
Huawei's regulations on product vulnerability management are subject to the Vul. Response Process. For
details about this process, visit the following web page:
https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/vul-response-process
For vulnerability information, enterprise customers can visit the following web page:
https://securitybulletin.huawei.com/enterprise/en/security-advisory
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
Target V2.2 Contents
Issue V2.2 (2025-08-26) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. iii
Contents
1 About This Document..................................................................................................................1
2 Introduction....................................................................................................................................2
2.1 ST Reference ................................................................................................................................................................2
2.2 TOE Reference .............................................................................................................................................................2
2.3 TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................................................2
2.3.1 TOE Usage and Major Security Features ..................................................................................................................3
2.3.2 TOE Type...................................................................................................................................................................4
2.3.3 Non-TOE Hardware and Software.............................................................................................................................4
2.4 TOE Description...........................................................................................................................................................7
2.4.1 TOE Definition Scope ...............................................................................................................................................7
2.4.1.1 Physical Scope........................................................................................................................................................7
2.4.1.2 Logical Scope .......................................................................................................................................................10
3 CC Conformance Claims ...........................................................................................................13
4 Security Problem Definition.....................................................................................................14
4.1 Assumptions ............................................................................................................................................................... 14
4.2 Threats ........................................................................................................................................................................15
4.2.1 Assets and Agents....................................................................................................................................................15
4.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE ................................................................................................................................ 15
4.2.2.1 T.UnauthenticatedAccess......................................................................................................................................15
4.2.2.2 T.UnauthorizedAccess ..........................................................................................................................................15
4.2.2.3 T.Eavesdrop ..........................................................................................................................................................16
5 Security Objectives.....................................................................................................................17
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................................................17
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................................................ 17
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................................................18
5.3.1 Coverage..................................................................................................................................................................18
5.3.2 Sufficiency............................................................................................................................................................... 19
6 Security Requirements for the TOE ........................................................................................22
6.1 Conventions................................................................................................................................................................ 22
6.2 Security Requirements................................................................................................................................................22
6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)...............................................................................................................................................22
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6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation ....................................................................................................................22
6.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association ................................................................................................................23
6.2.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review...................................................................................................................................23
6.2.1.4 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review..................................................................................................................24
6.2.1.5 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review..................................................................................................................24
6.2.1.6 FAU_STG.2 Protected audit data storage.............................................................................................................24
6.2.1.7 FAU_STG.4 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss ....................................................................................25
6.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP).....................................................................................................................................25
6.2.2.1 FDP_ACC.2 Completing Access Control.............................................................................................................25
6.2.2.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute-Based Access Control.........................................................................................25
6.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)...................................................................................................................26
6.2.3.1 FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before Any Action.............................................................................................. 26
6.2.3.2 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before Any Action ..........................................................................................26
6.2.3.3 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms .............................................................................................. 26
6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating............................................................................................................................. 27
6.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback..................................................................................................27
6.2.3.6 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition ..................................................................................................................27
6.2.3.7 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling.......................................................................................................28
6.2.3.8 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets .......................................................................................................................28
6.2.4 Security Management (FMT) ..................................................................................................................................29
6.2.4.1 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.........................................................................................29
6.2.4.2 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles ................................................................................................................................ 29
6.2.4.3 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour ..............................................................................30
6.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data..............................................................................................................30
6.2.4.5 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes................................................................................................ 31
6.2.4.6 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization..........................................................................................................31
6.2.5 TOE Access (FTA)...................................................................................................................................................31
6.2.5.1 FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment..............................................................................................................31
6.2.5.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination.................................................................................................................31
6.2.5.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination ................................................................................................................32
6.2.5.4 FTA_TAH.1 TOE Access History.........................................................................................................................32
6.2.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)...................................................................................................................................32
6.2.6.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path.......................................................................................................................................32
6.2.6.2 FTP_ITC.1 External System Inter-TSF Trusted Channel .....................................................................................32
6.2.6.3 FTP_ITC.1 NE Inter-TSF Trusted Channel..........................................................................................................33
6.2.7 Cryptographic Support (FCS)..................................................................................................................................33
6.2.7.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation.......................................................................................................33
6.2.7.2 FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access ...............................................................................................................34
6.2.7.3 FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction........................................................................34
6.2.7.4 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation...................................................................................................................34
6.2.7.5 FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (RBG).........................................................................................................35
6.2.7.6 FCS_RBG.2 Random bit generation (external seeding) .......................................................................................35
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
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6.2.8 Protection of The TSF (FPT) ...................................................................................................................................35
6.2.8.1 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection........................................................................................35
6.2.8.2 FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification....................................................................................................36
6.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale..............................................................................................................36
6.3.1 Coverage..................................................................................................................................................................36
6.3.2 Sufficiency............................................................................................................................................................... 38
6.3.3 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale........................................................................................................43
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements............................................................................................................................... 46
6.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..............................................................................................................47
7 TOE Summary Specification ....................................................................................................48
7.1 TOE Security Functionality........................................................................................................................................48
7.1.1 User Management....................................................................................................................................................48
7.1.2 Authentication..........................................................................................................................................................50
7.1.3 Access Control.........................................................................................................................................................52
7.1.4 IP-based ACL........................................................................................................................................................... 53
7.1.5 Communication Security .........................................................................................................................................53
7.1.6 User Session Management.......................................................................................................................................53
7.1.7 Auditing...................................................................................................................................................................54
7.1.8 Security Management Function ............................................................................................................................... 55
7.1.9 Cryptographic Functions..........................................................................................................................................55
8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References........................................................................57
8.1 Abbreviations.............................................................................................................................................................. 57
8.2 Terminology................................................................................................................................................................ 59
8.3 References ..................................................................................................................................................................60
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
Target V2.2 1 About This Document
Issue V2.2 (2025-08-26) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 1
1 About This Document
Change History
Version Date Change Description Author
V1.0 2024-08-25 Initial Draft Wangzunzhi, Rao Lei
V1.1 2024-10-24 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.2 2024-11-22 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.3 2025-02-22 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.4 2025-03-20 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.5 2025-03-28 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.6 2025-04-07 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.7 2025-04-09 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.8 2025-06-16 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V1.9 2025-06-19 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V2.0 2025-06-24 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V2.1 2025-08-20 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
V2.2 2025-08-26 Address Review
Comment
Wangzunzhi
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
Target V2.2 2 Introduction
Issue V2.2 (2025-08-26) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2
2 Introduction
This Security Target is for the evaluation of HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10.
2.1 ST Reference
2.2 TOE Reference
2.3 TOE Overview
2.4 TOE Description
2.1 ST Reference
Title: CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 - Security Target
Version: V2.2
Author: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Publication date: 2025-08-26
2.2 TOE Reference
TOE name: HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10
TOE version: V100R024C10SPC210
TOE Developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
TOE release date: 2024-08-25
2.3 TOE Overview
MAE Network Management system provides centralized operation and maintenance (OM) for
mobile network element management solution, provides external interfaces for
interoperability with other systems. By providing automatic network OM capabilities, MAE
can implement automatic network management.
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
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Figure 2-1 MAE network positioning
The core and base of MAE is the CloudSOP platform. The CloudSOP platform provides the
basic framework for OSS application deployment, monitoring and secondary development, as
well as public services, such as user management, rights management, session management,
log management, license management, alarm management, and topology management. The
architecture of CloudSOP is highly reliable, flexible, open, and easy to be integrated, meeting
the requirements from future OSS large-scale distributed clusters.
The TOE includes MAE software, which includes the CloudSOP platform, but does not
include Database, Euler OS, Virtualization Platform, and Hardware Platform.
2.3.1 TOE Usage and Major Security Features
MAE is the software for managing mobile networks. It provides a centralized network
management platform for supporting telecom operators in their long-term network evolution
and shielding the differences between various network technologies. The MAE provides
various OM solutions and meets various requirements, such as network deployment, network
monitoring, network adjustment, and service management. The MAE focuses on continuous
efforts that telecom operators have made for network OM and inherits the existing OM
experience.
To cope with the TOE security threats, the TOE provides many security measures to
effectively reduce security risks. The major security features implemented by the TOE and
subject to evaluation are:
1. User management
2. Authentication
3. Access control
4. IP-based ACL
5. Communication security
6. User session management
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7. Auditing
8. Security management function
9. Cryptographic functions
2.3.2 TOE Type
The TOE is a centralized network management software. The MAE is located at the
management and control layer of the cloud network. It can manage and control ubiquitous
network devices such as global system for mobile (GSM), wideband code division multiple
access (WCDMA), long term evolution (LTE), 5G New Radio(5G NR). It provides open
interfaces to quickly integrate with upper-layer application systems such as BSS and OSS.
Various apps can be developed and customized to accelerate service innovation and achieve
e-commerce-style operations.
The MAE software architecture is shown in the figure below. The CloudSOP platform is the
underlying platform of the MAE software.
In the northbound direction, it provides Web Portals, Northbound interface for O&M
personnel and BSS/OSS. In the southbound direction, it provides configuration and
management capabilities for Huawei network devices and provides third-party driver
management to manage and access third-party network adaptation drivers and third-party
controllers outside the trusted zone. The system also interconnects with external SFTP servers,
external AAA authentication servers, third-party Syslog servers, CA server and SMS/SMTP
servers.
Figure 2-2 TOE overview
2.3.3 Non-TOE Hardware and Software
The MAE can be deployed in on-premises or private cloud mode. In this evaluation only
on-premises deployment is in scope, and the following non-TOE Databases, Euler OS,
Virtualization Platform, Hardware Platform, and Environment components are required.
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The Non-TOE includes Databases, Euler OS, Virtualization Platform, Hardware Platform and
Environment components.
Hardware Configurations:
Table 2-1 Hardware configurations requirements
Hardware Model Requirements
TaiShan
200 (Model
2280)
TaiShan 200
(Model 2280)
CPU: 2*920 48 Core/2.6GHz
Memory: 24 * 32 GB
Hard disk: 2/4 * 1.92 TB SSD
Configuration for the Databases, Euler OS, Virtualization Platform:
Table 2-2 Databases, Euler OS, Virtualization Platform version requirements
Item Type Version
Delivered
software
configurations
OS EulerOS V200R011 and above
Database Gauss100 OLTP 1.7.1.SPC210 and above
Compatible
software
configurations
Virtualization software FushionSphere OpenStack
NFV_FusionSphere 22.1 and above
Configuration for the MAE Client:
Table 2-3 Client configuration requirements
Type Requirements
CPU The CPU clock speed is 2.6 GHz or higher, and the CPU has at least two
physical cores.
Memory 4 GB or larger
Hard disk 500 GB or larger
Accessories Integrated NIC, Gigabit Ethernet NIC, integrated audio card, internal
speaker
OS The following OSs are supported:
Windows 10 (64-bit)
Windows Server 2012 (64-bit)
Windows Server 2016 (64-bit)
Windows Server 2019 (64-bit)
Web You are advised to use Chrome or Firefox of the latest version. Chrome
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
Target V2.2 2 Introduction
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Type Requirements
browser 108.0 or later (stable channel version) and Firefox 102.8.0 or later (ESR
version) are supported.
Browsers of the latest versions usually contain more security updates and
new features, which helps MAE provide more stable user experience. If you
use a browser whose version is earlier than the recommended version, the
product security may be affected, and certain functions may be abnormal.
Resolution Optimal resolution: 1920 x 1080
Minimum resolution: 1366 x 768
Environment components:
The environment for TOE also comprises the following components:
Table 2-4 Environment components
Compone
nt
Required/
Optional
Usage/Purpose Description for TOE Performance
Firewall Required Firewall used by customers to ensure communication security
between different communication planes.
Network
Elements
(NEs)
Required NEs that are managed by the TOE and support different
communication protocols with the TOE.
Web
portal,
OSSs,
service
orchestrato
rs and
service
application
s
Required The web portal connects to the TOE using HTTPS. And the
OSSs, service orchestrators and service applications that
connect to the TOE through external interfaces including
SNMPv3, CORBA, SFTP, and some customized RESTful
interfaces.
AAA
server
Optional The external AAA server used to authenticate users. The TOE
can correctly leverage the services provided by this AAA
server to authenticate administrators.
The security mechanisms for remote LDAP/RADIUS
authentication depend on the third-party AAA server. Security
mechanisms, such as anti-brute force cracking, password
complexity check, and anti-DoS attack, must be enabled on the
third-party server. Especially the communication channel
between TOE and RADIUS server should be protected.
Syslog
server
Optional Syslog server used to transmit syslog messages.
SFTP
server
Optional SFTP server used to upload performance files and back up NE
data.
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Compone
nt
Required/
Optional
Usage/Purpose Description for TOE Performance
SMS/SMT
P server
Optional MAE sends notifications by emails or messages.
CA server Optional CA server can apply for a certificate, update the certificate,
and publish the CRL certificate revocation list (CRL) file.
NTP server Required NTP server is used to sync the time of the MAE server.
Figure 2-3 TOE physical environment
2.4 TOE Description
2.4.1 TOE Definition Scope
2.4.1.1 Physical Scope
The TOE is MAE software installed on-premises only.
Users can log in to the HUAWEI support website to download the software packages in
accordance to the version of the TOE. Users can verify the software by digital signature (The
digital signature is also published on the HUAWEI support website).
MAE software packages consist of binary compressed files. The following software packages
and documents are required and are part of the TOE.
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
Target V2.2 2 Introduction
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Table 2-5 TOE software list
Type Delivery Item Version
Software MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Access_EulerOS-aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Deployment_EulerOS-aarch
64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Jre_EulerOS-aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Common_EulerOS-aarch64.
zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_KPI_EulerOS-aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_TSP_EulerOS-aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Evaluation_EulerOS-aarch6
4.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Common_HD_EulerOS-aarc
h64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Optimization_EulerOS-aarch
64.zip
iPowerStar_3.1.5.1_MAE12410-EulerOS-aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_TSF_EulerOS-aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_TSF_CBB_EulerOS-aarch64
.zip
5GtoBSuite_3.1.5.1_MAE12410-EulerOS-aarch64.zip
MAE-OSMU_V100R024C10SPC210_EulerOS-aarch64_pk
g.tar
MAE-OSMU_V100R024C10SPC210_VNFLCM-IAASDep
loy_EulerOS_pkg.tar
V100R024C
10SPC210
Software
Signature
File
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Access_EulerOS-aarch64.zip
.p7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Deployment_EulerOS-aarch
64.zip.p7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Jre_EulerOS-aarch64.zip.p7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Common_EulerOS-aarch64.
zip.p7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_KPI_EulerOS-aarch64.zip.p
7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_TSP_EulerOS-aarch64.zip.p
7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Evaluation_EulerOS-aarch6
4.zip.p7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Common_HD_EulerOS-aarc
h64.zip.p7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_Optimization_EulerOS-aarch
64.zip.p7s
iPowerStar_3.1.5.1_MAE12410-EulerOS-aarch64.zip.p7s
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_TSF_EulerOS-aarch64.zip.p
7s
V100R024C
10SPC210
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
Target V2.2 2 Introduction
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Type Delivery Item Version
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_TSF_CBB_EulerOS-aarch64
.zip.p7s
5GtoBSuite_3.1.5.1_MAE12410-EulerOS-aarch64.zip.p7s
MAE-OSMU_V100R024C10SPC210_EulerOS-aarch64_pk
g.tar.p7s
MAE-OSMU_V100R024C10SPC210_VNFLCM-IAASDep
loy_EulerOS_pkg.tar.p7s
Platform
Software
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_CloudSOP_EulerOS-aarch64
.zip
V100R024C
10SPC210
Platform
Software
Signature
File
MAE_V100R024C10SPC210_CloudSOP_EulerOS-aarch64
.zip.p7s
V100R024C
10SPC210
Table 2-6 TOE guidance list
Delivery Item Document Obtaining
Method
Version
(For Customer)iMaster MAE
Product Documentation (EulerOS,
TaiShan)-(V100R024C10_07)(HDX
)-EN.hdx
The documents can be
obtained from Huawei
support.
Product version:
V100R024C10,
Library Version: 07,
date: 2025-07-11
iPowerStar 3.1.5 Product
Documentation 05-EN.hdx
The documents can be
obtained from Huawei
support.
Product version:
V100R024C10(iPow
erStar 3.1.5), Library
Version: 05, date:
2025-03-28
5GtoB Suite 3.1.4 Product
Documentation 02-EN.hdx
The documents can be
obtained from Huawei
support.
Product version:
V100R024C10(5Gto
B Suite 3.1.4),
Library Version: 02,
date: 2024-06-29
OSMU User Guide(EulerOS,
TaiShan)(V100R024C10_06)(WOR
D)-EN.zip
The documents can be
obtained from Huawei
support.
Product version:
V100R024C10,
Issue: 06, date:
2024-08-20
iMaster MAE
V100R024C10SPC210 Release
Documents(EulerOS,
TaiShan)-EN.zip
The documents can be
obtained from Huawei
support.
Product version:
V100R024C10SPC2
10, date: 2025-01-22
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE
V100R024C10 - Operational user
Guidance.pdf
The guidance for CC
certification, delivered upon
customer request by e-mail
Product version:
V100R024C10,
Issue: 02, date:
2025-03-13
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
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Delivery Item Document Obtaining
Method
Version
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE
V100R024C10 - Preparative
Procedures.pdf
The guidance for CC
certification, delivered upon
customer request by e-mail
Product version:
V100R024C10,
Issue: 02, date:
2025-06-25
Users can log in to the Huawei support website to read the document directly or download the
product documentation in accordance with the version of the TOE. The download file formats
are *.hdx, *.chm or *.zip, user can download the *.hdx reader from the same website.
2.4.1.2 Logical Scope
The TOE boundary from a logical point of view is represented by the elements that are
displayed with a red frame within the rectangle in the figure below. The TOE is a software
running on the Euler OS.
The non-TOE part is marked with a black dashed line(include Database, Euler OS,
Virtualization Platform, Hardware Platform).
Figure 2-4 TOE logical scope
The major security features of MAE that are subject to evaluation are:
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE V100R024C10 -Security
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User Management
On the management plane and O&M plane, the TOE provides user management based on role
management.
It has the default user groups on the O&M plane including Administrators, SMManagers,
Maintenance Group, Operator Group, Operators, Guests, WebNIC User Group,
AppUsers, Assurance User Group, CAAdministrator Group, CA Operator Group,
HOFS Group, Monitoring Group, NBI Admin Group, NBI OpenAPI User Group, NBI
User Group and Viewers.
It has the default user groups on the management plane including Administrators,
SMManagers, Operators, Monitors.
The TOE also allows admin and the SMManagers to create custom user-defined User Group
on all planes.
Authentication
The TOE authenticates all users who access the TOE by username and password. The TOE
provides a local authentication mode. The TOE optionally provides authentication decisions
obtained from an external AAA in the IT environment.
Access Control
The TOE supports SMManagers to grant permissions to users by means of security
management. Then users can access and perform operations on the TOE and NEs based on
their permissions.
IP-based ACL
The TOE offers a feature access control list (ACL) based on IP addresses for controlling
which terminals can access the TOE through the TOE client.
Communication Security
The TOE supports encrypted transmission within the MAE server, between NEs and the MAE
server, between a browser and the MAE server, and between an OSS/service application and
the MAE server.
User Session Management
The TOE monitors and presents all online user sessions in real time. The TOE also provides
session establishment, TSF-initiated session termination, user-initiated session termination.
Auditing
The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant management and stores the records in
the database.
Logs record routine maintenance events of the TOE. For security purposes, the TOE provides
security logs and operation logs.
Security logs record operation events related to account management, such as modification of
passwords and addition of accounts.
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Operation logs record events related to system configurations, such as modification of IP
addresses and addition of services.
The TOE provides a Syslog solution to resolve the problem of limited storage space. Both
security logs and operation logs can be saved on an external Syslog server.
The TOE also collects operation and security audit logs from managed network elements, and
stores the logs in the database.
The query and filter functions are provided on the GUI, which allow authorized users to
inspect audit logs.
Security Management Functions
The TOE offers security management for all management aspects of the TOE. Security
management includes not only authentication and access control management, but also
management of security-related data consisting of configuration profiles and runtime
parameters. Security management can be customized.
Cryptographic Function
Cryptographic functions are dependencies required by security features. The TOE supports
cryptographic algorithms as described in section 6.2.7 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
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3 CC Conformance Claims
This ST is CC Part 2/3/4/5 conformant [CC]. The CC version of [CC] is CC:2022 Release 1.
This ST is EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2.
The methodology to be used for evaluation is CEM:2022.
No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
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4 Security Problem Definition
4.1 Assumptions
4.2 Threats
4.1 Assumptions
A.PhysicalProtection The hardware that the TOE is running on is operated in a physically
secure and well managed environment.
This document assumes that the software platform of the server that the TOE is running on (as
listed in section 2.4.1 TOE Definition ScopeTOE Definition Scope) is protected against
unauthorized physical access.
This document assumes that the database is protected against data file damage.
A.NetworkSegregation This document assumes that the network interface of the server and
the TOE client will be accessed only through subnets where the TOE hosts are installed. The
subnet is separate from public networks. Communications with the TOE server are performed
through a firewall.
A.AdministratorBehaviour This document assumes that the super user admin, a user that
belongs to the SMManagers and Administrators groups and the users of the underlying
operating system will behave correctly and will not perform any harmful operation on the
TOE.
A.NTP This document assumes that operating environment should provide an accurate time
source, in order to ensure normal operations of the TOE server.
A.NetworkElements This document assumes that the managed network elements are trusted
and can support the TLS /SNMPv3 /SSHv2 /SFTP connection with the TOE, and the private
interface defined by Huawei.
A.Components It is assumed that the 3rd party components (like NTP server, SFTP server,
AAA server, syslog server, SMS/SMTP server, and CA server) are considered trusted and will
not attack the TOE.
A.TrustedPlatform This document assumes that the platform like OS, DB, hardware, virtual
machine used by the TOE is trusted, and is properly hardened by the Administrator.
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4.2 Threats
The threats described in this chapter are addressed by the TOE.
4.2.1 Assets and Agents
Asset Description
TOE security function
(TSF) data
The integrity and confidentiality of TSF data (such as user
account information, passwords and audit records) should be
protected against threat agents.
OM data The confidentiality and integrity of the OM data of NEs (such as
configuration data) should be protected against threat agents.
Agent Description
Attacker An external attacker, who is not a user of the TOE.
Eavesdropper An eavesdropper, who has access to communication channels
through which the OM and TSF data are transferred.
Unauthorized user An unauthorized user of the TOE, who gains unauthorized
access to the TOE.
4.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE
4.2.2.1 T.UnauthenticatedAccess
Threat: T.UnauthenticatedAccess
Attack An attacker who is not a user of the TOE, gains access to the TOE,
modifies and compromises the confidentiality of the TSF and OM
data.
Asset TSF and OM data
Agent An attacker
4.2.2.2 T.UnauthorizedAccess
Threat: T.UnauthorizedAccess
Attack An unauthorized user who gains unauthorized access to the TOE and
compromises the confidentiality and integrity of the TSF and OM data.
The user also performs unauthorized operations on NEs through the
TOE.
Asset TSF and OM data
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Threat: T.UnauthorizedAccess
Agent An unauthorized user
4.2.2.3 T.Eavesdrop
Threat: T.Eavesdrop
Attack An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management network served
by the TOE, who is able to intercept, modify, or re-use information
assets that are exchanged between the TOE and NEs, between the TOE
client and server, and between the TOE server and OSS/service
orchestrator/service application client/CA server.
Asset TSF and OM data
Agent An eavesdropper
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5 Security Objectives
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following objectives must be met by the TOE:
1. O.Communication The TOE implements logical protection measures for network
communication between the TOE and NEs from the operational environment, also for
the network communication between the TOE and the OSS/service orchestrator/service
application/CA server.
2. O.Authorization The TOE authorizes different roles that can be assigned to
administrators in order to restrict the functions available to individual administrators,
including limitation to session establishment and to actions performed on NEs.
(The TOE authorizes different roles that can be assigned to users in order to restrict the
functions available to a specific user.)
3. O.Authentication The TOE authenticates users before access to data and security
functions is granted. The TOE provides configurable system policies to restrict user
session establishment.
4. O.Audit The TOE generates, stores and reviews audit records for security-relevant
administrator actions.
5. O.SecurityManagement The TOE manages security functions that it provides.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
1. OE.NetworkElements The operational environment ensures that the trusted NEs
support the TLS /SNMPv3/SSHv2/SFTP/HTTPS connection with the TOE and private
interface defined by Huawei.
2. OE.Physical The TOE is protected against unauthorized physical access.
3. OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment protects the network where the
TOE hosts are installed by separating it from the application (or public) network. A
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firewall is installed between the TOE server and untrusted domain to filter unused
communication ports.
4. OE.Database The operational environment protects the database against unauthorized
physical access and data file damage.
5. OE.AdministratorBehaviour The super user admin, the users who belong to the
SMManagers and Administrators groups and the users of the underlying operating
system will behave correctly and will not perform any harmful operation on the TOE.
6. OE.NTP The operational environment provides an accurate time source, in order to
ensure normal operations on the TOE server.
7. OE.TrustedPlatform The operation environment provides a trusted platform like OS,
DB, hardware, virtual machine.
8. OE.Components The 3rd
party components are considered trusted and will not attack the
TOE. The administrator shall ensure the NTP server, SFTP server, AAA server, syslog
server, SMS/SMTP server, and CA server is secured when these servers are used.
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
5.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of security objectives for the TOE to threats, showing
that each security objective is at least covered by one threat.
Security Objective for the TOE Threat
O.Communication T.Eavesdrop
O.Authentication T.UnauthenticatedAccess and
T.UnauthorizedAccess
O.Authorization T.UnauthorizedAccess
O.Audit T.UnauthorizedAccess and
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
O.SecurityManagement T.UnauthenticatedAccess, T.UnauthorizedAccess
and T.Eavesdrop
The following table provides a mapping of security objectives for the operational environment
to assumptions and threats, showing that each security objective for the operational
environment is at least covered by one assumption or threat.
Security Objective for the
Operational Environment
Threat / Assumption
OE.NetworkElements T.Eavesdrop
A.NetworkElements
OE.Physical A.PhysicalProtection
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
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Security Objective for the
Operational Environment
Threat / Assumption
OE.NetworkSegregation A.NetworkSegregation
OE.Database A.PhysicalProtection
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.UnauthorizedAccess
OE. AdministratorBehaviour A.AdministratorBehaviour
OE.NTP A.NTP
OE.TrustedPlatform A.TrustedPlatform
OE.Componets A.Components
5.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale justifies that security objectives can counter each individual threat
and that the achievement of each security objective can contribute to the removal, diminishing
or mitigation of a specific threat:
Threat Rationale for Security Objectives
T.UnauthenticatedAccess The threat of unauthenticated access to the TOE is
countered by requiring the TOE to implement an
authentication mechanism for its users (O.Authentication).
Authentication mechanisms can be configured by users
with sufficient permissions (O.SecurityManagement). The
audit records record modification of usernames and
passwords, user logins and logouts, login successes and
failures (O. Audit).
And the threat is countered by requiring the system and
database to implement an authentication mechanism for its
users (OE.Physical and OE.Database).
T.UnauthorizedAccess The threat of unauthorized access is countered by requiring
the TOE to implement an access control mechanism
checking the operations that may be performed on the TOE
and NEs (O.Authorization). The threat is also countered by
authenticating the users in the TOE (O.Authentication).
Access control mechanisms (including user levels and
command levels) can be configured by users with sufficient
permissions (O.SecurityManagement).
The threat is also countered by audit records showing that
if someone indeed performs unauthorized operations, they
can be traced to (O.Audit).
In addition, OE.Database ensures that user account data
stored in the database will not be altered maliciously.
T.Eavesdrop The threat of eavesdropping is countered by requiring
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Threat Rationale for Security Objectives
security communications:
- Securing network communication between the portal and
MAE server over SFTP/HTTPS (O.Communication).
- Over TLS/SSHv2/SFTP between the MAE server and
NEs (O.Communication and OE.NetworkElements).
- Over TLS/SNMPv3/SSHv2/SFTP/HTTPS between the
MAE server and the OSS/service orchestrator/service
application client (O.Communication).
-Over CMPv2 between the MAE server and the CA server
(O.Communication).
Management of secure communication channels can be
performed by users with sufficient permissions
(O.SecurityManagement).
The following rationale justifies that security objectives for the operational environment can
cover each individual assumption and that the achievement of each security objective can
contribute to the consistency between a specific assumption and environment. If all security
objectives for the operational environment are achieved, the intended usage is realized:
Assumption Rationale for Security Objectives
A.PhysicalProtection The assumption that the TOE will be protected against
unauthorized physical access is addressed by OE.Physical
and OE.Database.
A.NetworkSegregation The assumption that the TOE is not accessible through the
application networks hosted by the networking device is
addressed by OE.NetworkSegregation.
A.AdministratorBehaviour The assumption that super user admin and the users who
belong to the SMManagers and Administrators groups
and the users of the underlying operating system will
behave correctly and will not perform any harmful
operation is addressed by OE.AdministratorBehaviour.
A.NTP The assumption that the operational environment provides
an accurate time source is addressed by OE.NTP
A.NetworkElements The assumption that the managed network elements are
trusted and support secure channel is addressed by
OE.NetworkElements.
A.Components The assumption that the 3rd
party components are trusted
and support secure channel is addressed by
OE.Components.
A.TrustedPlatform The assumption that the platform used by the TOE is
trusted, and is properly hardened by Administrators is
addressed by OE. TrustedPlatform.
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The following table provides a matrix of TOE objectives and threats.
T.Eavesdrop T.UnauthenticatedAcc
ess
T.Unauthorized
Access
O.Communication X
O.Authentication X X
O.Authorization X
O.Audit X X
O.SecurityManagement X X X
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6 Security Requirements for the TOE
6.1 Conventions
6.2 Security Requirements
6.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements
6.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
6.1 Conventions
The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:
⚫ Strikethrough indicates text removed as a refinement
⚫ (Underlined text in parentheses) indicates additional text provided as a refinement.
⚫ Bold text indicates the completion of an assignment.
⚫ Italicized and bold text indicates the completion of a selection.
⚫ Iteration/N indicates an element of the iteration, where N is the iteration
number/character.
6.2 Security Requirements
6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate audit data of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [The following auditable events:
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1. User login and logout
2. User account management
a. Creating, deleting, and modifying user accounts
b. Changing user passwords, mobile numbers and email addresses
c. Granting access rights to user accounts
3. User group (role) management
a. Creating, deleting, and modifying user groups
b. Granting access rights to user groups
4. Security policy management
a. Modifying password policies
b. Modifying user account policies
5. User session management
a. Kicking out individual user sessions
6. ACL management
a. Creating, deleting, and modifying ACLs
b. Specifying ACLs for individual user account.
7. Region, operation set and device set management
8. Audit log management
9. Certificate management
10. NE management].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within the audit data at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the auditable event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event;
b) For each auditable event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP, PP-Module, functional package or ST, [none].
6.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate
each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
6.2.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [users attached to SMManagers, users with log query rights] with
the capability to read [correspondent information] from the audit data.
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FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
Application Note:
Operation rights required for querying and exporting logs vary based on log types.
Log Type Permission
Security logs generated by all users Query Security Log
System logs Query System Log
Operation logs generated by all users Query Operation Log
Operation logs generated by the current user Query Personal Operation Log
Security logs generated by the current user Query Personal Security Log
6.2.1.4 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit data, except the users who have been
granted explicit read access.
6.2.1.5 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3.1
The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [selection] of audit data based on [filter criteria of
audit fields including start time, end time, operation, level, operator, terminal IP address,
result, operation object and details].
6.2.1.6 FAU_STG.2 Protected audit data storage
FAU_STG.2.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit data in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.2.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit data in the
audit trail.
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6.2.1.7 FAU_STG.4 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall [store audit records in the database and export them into files] if the audit
data storage exceeds [occupies over the default value of 80% of the database capacity and
lasts for over the default duration of 45 days].
6.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.2.1 FDP_ACC.2 Completing Access Control
FDP_ACC.2.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE access control policy] on [subjects: users, roles; objects:
NE, NE attributes and System data; operation: access, query, create, modify, delete,
start, and stop operations on the object] and all operations among subjects and objects
covered by SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2
The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any
object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
6.2.2.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute-Based Access Control
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE access control policy] to objects based on the following: [
1. Subjects Users and their following security attributes:
a. User ID
b. User type
c. User role assignment
2. Roles and their following security attributes:
a. Role name
3. Objects:
NE and their security attributes:
a. Device ID
MML command groups and their security attributes:
a. Command group name
]
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
1. Only authorized users are permitted access to operation.
2. Authorized roles are permitted access to operation.
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3. Users can be configured with different user role to control the MAE access
permission.
4. An operation set contains many operation rights that are assigned to specific user
roles.]
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [explicitly assigned security functions].
Application Note: in TOE, there is operation set which are assigned to specific user to
authorize access of subjects to objects.
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [none].
6.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.2.3.1 FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before Any Action
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.3.2 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before Any Action
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.3.3 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide [local, remote LDAP, remote RADIUS, CAS and SAML SSO
capability] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [
1. When local authentication is enabled, user authentication is implemented by TOE
itself.
2. When LDAP authentication is enabled, user authentication is implemented by a
remote LDAP server.
3. When RADIUS authentication is enabled, user authentication is implemented by a
remote RADIUS server.
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4. When CAS and SAML SSO configuration is enabled, user authentication is
implemented by the SSO server of the TOE, and the user can log into all trusted
SSO clients of other TOE instances without being authenticated again after logging
in to one of the trusted TOEs.]
6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [changing the password or user
inactivity by default 30 minutes].
6.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [an obscured feedback] to the user while the authentication is in
progress.
6.2.3.6 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [
1. User ID
2. Username
3. Password
4. User type
5. Mobile number, optional
6. Email address, optional
7. Welcome message, optional
8. Status of the account(locked/unlocked)
9. Login time policy
10. Client IP address policy
11. User role assignment
12. Maximum online sessions, optional
13. Account validity period (days), optional
14. The number of allowed login times, optional
15. Select the policy (Disable user, Delete user, Unlimited) if no login within a period
(configurable days), optional
16. Auto-logout if no activity within configurable period, optional
17. Compulsory password renewal (Password validity period (days), In advance
warning before password expires (days), Minimum password usage period (days)),
optional].
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6.2.3.7 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer within [1, 99]]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [consecutive failed logins].
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met], the TSF
shall [lock the common user account or IP address for 30 minutes by default].
6.2.3.8 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet: [
1. Min. password length
2. Min. system administrator password length
3. Max. password length
4. Configurable number of latest passwords that cannot be reused
5. Password repetition not allowed within configurable number of months
6. Min. password usage period (days)
7. Password validity period (days)
8. Min. characters different between new and old passwords
9. Min. number of letters
10. Min. number of uppercase letters
11. Min. number of lowercase letters
12. Min. number of digits
13. Min. number of special characters
14. Password that cannot contain spaces
15. Password that cannot contain its username in reverse order
16. Password that cannot be an increasing, decreasing, or interval sequence of digits or
letters
17. Policy about max. consecutive characters used in both username and password
18. Policy that the password cannot contain repeated character sequences
19. Max. times a character can consecutively occur
20. Password that cannot contain user's mobile number or email address
21. Password that cannot contain words in the uploaded password dictionary file or
hacker language dictionary configured in the backend file]
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6.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
6.2.4.1 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
1. Authentication mode configuration
2. User management
3. Role management
4. Account policy
5. Password policy
6. Audit log management
7. Certificate management
8. NE management
9. Client IP Address Policies (ACL)
10. Login time policy
11. Configuration of the time interval of user inactivity for terminating an interactive
session
12. Command group management
13. Configuration of trusted channels for connecting to the external entities
14. Certificate Authority Service management
].
6.2.4.2 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles: [
1. Administrators
2. SMManagers
3. Operator Group
4. CA Administrator Group
5. CA Operator Group
6. user-defined User Group].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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6.2.4.3 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of, disable, enable] the
functions [all the security functions defined in FMT_SMF.1] to [users assigned with roles
as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or with explicitly assigned security functions].
Application Note:
The detail privilege of each role is defined in the following table:
Role Name Security Functions
Administrators Certificate management
Command group management
NE management
SMManagers Authentication mode configuration
User management
Role management
Account policy
Password policy
Audit log management
Client IP Address Policies (ACL)
Login time policy
Configuration of the time interval of user inactivity
for terminating an interactive session
Operator Group NE Management
Command group management
Configuration of trusted channels for connecting to
the external entities
CA Administrator Group Certificate Authority Service management
CA Operator Group Certificate Authority Service management
user-defined User Group Granted by SMManagers
6.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the [certificates, private keys,
and symmetric keys] to [Users assigned with roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or with
explicitly assigned security functions].
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6.2.4.5 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE access control policy] to restrict the ability to [query,
modify] the security attributes [all the security attributes defined in FDP_ACF.1 and
FIA_ATD.1] to [Users assigned with roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or with explicitly
assigned security functions].
6.2.4.6 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE access control policy] to provide [restrictive] default values
for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow [Users assigned with roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or with
explicitly assigned security functions] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
6.2.5 TOE Access (FTA)
6.2.5.1 FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment
FTA_TSE.1.1
The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [
a. User identity (username and password)
b. Client IP address policies (IP address range for login)
c. Login time policies (limited time segment for account login)
d. User lock status and enablement status
e. Password validity period (days)
f. Maximum online sessions
g. System login mode]
Application Note:
System login mode only affects local user login from web interfaces, and does not affect
third-party user login.
6.2.5.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [administrator-configured time
interval, by default 30 minutes of user inactivity].
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6.2.5.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive session.
6.2.5.4 FTA_TAH.1 TOE Access History
FTA_TAH.1.1
Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [date, time, location] of the
last successful session establishment to the user.
FTA_TAH.1.2
Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [date, time, location] of the
last unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of unsuccessful attempts
since the last successful session establishment.
FTA_TAH.1.3
The TSF shall not erase the access history information from the user interface without giving
the user an opportunity to review the information.
6.2.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
6.2.6.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote] users that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the communicated data from [disclosure and modification].
FTP_TRP.1.2
The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [remote management].
6.2.6.2 FTP_ITC.1 External System Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
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FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit [the TSF and (the external system including the OSS, service
orchestrator, service application and 3rd
party component)] to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [authentication, dumping
audit logs, backing up NE Data and restoring NE data].
6.2.6.3 FTP_ITC.1 NE Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit [the TSF and (the NEs)] to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [managing NE devices].
6.2.7 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.2.7.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [PBKDF2] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet
the following: [RFC8018 chapter 5.2]
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [RSA] and specified cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096
bits, 8192 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3]
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [ECDSA] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits(secp256r1),
384 bits(secp384r1), 521 bit(secp521r1) ] that meet the following: [FIPS 186-4 appendix
B.4]
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6.2.7.2 FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access
FCS_CKM.3.1
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic key backup] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key access method [encrypted by the encryption key specified by the user]
that meets the following: [none].
6.2.7.3 FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.6.1/SYM
The TSF shall destroy [encryption Key] when [no longer needed].
FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG
The TSF shall destroy [digital signature RSA&ECDSA private key] when [no longer
needed].
FCS_CKM.6.2
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS_CKM.6.1 in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [overwriting with 0] that
meets the following: [none].
6.2.7.4 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM
The TSF shall perform [symmetric de- and encryption] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [AES GCM Mode] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet
the following: [FIPS 197 chapter 5, NIST SP 800-38A chapter 6.2]
FCS_COP.1.1/PBKDF2
The TSF shall perform [password hashing] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [PBKDF2 (SHA256)] and cryptographic key sizes [None] that meet the following:
[RFC8018 chapter 5.2].
FCS_COP.1.1/RSASSA
The TSF shall perform [digital signature operation] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [RSASSA-PSS, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5] and cryptographic key
sizes [2048bits, 3072bits, 4096bits, 8192bits] that meet the following: [RFC8017 section 8.1
(RSASSA-PSS) and 8.2 RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5), FIPS 186-4 chapter 5].
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA
The TSF shall perform [digital signature operation] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [ECDSA] and cryptographic key sizes [256bits, 384bits, 521bits]
that meet the following: [ANSI X9.62，FIPS 186-4 chapter 6].
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6.2.7.5 FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (RBG)
FCS_RBG.1.1/JDK
The TSF shall perform deterministic random bit generation services using
[NativePRNGBlocking] in accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1, FIPS 140-2] after
initialization.
FCS_RBG.1.1/OPENSSL
The TSF shall perform deterministic random bit generation services using [CSPRNG] in
accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1] after initialization.
FCS_RBG.1.2
The TSF shall use a [/dev/random] for initialization and reseeding.
FCS_RBG.1.3/JDK
The TSF shall update the DRBG state by [reseeding] using a [/dev/random] in the following
situations: [on the condition:[When the entropy value in the entropy pool is less than 1024
bits]] in accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1].
FCS_RBG.1.3/OPENSSL
The TSF shall update the DRBG state by [reseeding] using a [/dev/random] in the following
situations: [on the condition:[OPENSSL will automatically reseed every 7 minutes or after
obtaining 2^16 random numbers. The product will actively call OPENSSL's RAND_seed to
reseed after obtaining 2^23-1 random numbers.]] in accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A
Rev. 1].
6.2.7.6 FCS_RBG.2 Random bit generation (external seeding)
FCS_RBG.2.1
The TSF shall be able to accept a minimum input of [256 bits] from a TSF interface for
obtaining entropy.
6.2.8 Protection of The TSF (FPT)
6.2.8.1 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1.1
The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE.
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6.2.8.2 FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification
FPT_ITI.1.1
The TSF shall provide the capability to detect modification of all TSF data during
transmission between the TSF and another trusted IT product within the following metric:
[CMPv2].
FPT_ITI.1.2
The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of all TSF data transmitted
between the TSF and another trusted IT product and perform [rejection of the data] if
modifications are detected.
6.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each
security functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.
Security Functional Requirements Objectives
FAU_GEN.1 O.Audit
FAU_GEN.2 O.Audit
FAU_SAR.1 O.Audit
FAU_SAR.2 O.Audit
FAU_SAR.3 O.Audit
FAU_STG.2 O.Audit
FAU_STG.4 O.Audit
FDP_ACC.2 O.Authorization
FDP_ACF.1 O.Authorization
FIA_UID.2 O.Audit
O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_UAU.2 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_UAU.5 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_UAU.6 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
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Security Functional Requirements Objectives
FIA_UAU.7 O.Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
O.SecurityManagement
FIA_AFL.1 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_SOS.1 O.Authentication
O.SecurityManagement
FMT_SMF.1 O.Audit
O.Authentication
O.Authorization
O.Communication
O.SecurityManagement
FMT_SMR.1 O.Authorization
FMT_MOF.1 O.SecurityManagement
FMT_MTD.1 O.SecurityManagement
FMT_MSA.1 O.Authorization
FMT_MSA.3 O.Authorization
FTA_TSE.1 O.Authentication
FTA_SSL.3 O.Authentication
FTA_SSL.4 O.SecurityManagement
FTA_TAH.1 O.Authentication
FTP_TRP.1 O.Communication
FTP_ITC.1/External System O.Communication
FTP_ITC.1/NE O.Communication
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2 O.SecurityManagement
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA O.Communication
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA O.Communication
FCS_CKM.3 O.SecurityManagement
FCS_CKM.6.1/SYM O.Communication
O.SecurityManagement
FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG O.Communication
FCS_CKM.6.2 O.Communication
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Security Functional Requirements Objectives
O.SecurityManagement
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM O.SecurityManagement
FCS_COP.1.1/PBKDF2 O.Authentication
O.SecurityManagement
FCS_COP.1.1/RSASSA O.Communication
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA O.Communication
FCS_RBG.1 O.Communication
O.SecurityManagement
FCS_RBG.2 O.Communication
O.SecurityManagement
FPT_ITT.1 O.Communication
FPT_ITI.1 O.Communication
6.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE,
showing that the security functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security
objectives.
Security objectives Rationale
O.Audit The generation of audit records is implemented by
(FAU_GEN.1). Audit records are supposed to include user
identities (FAU_GEN.2) where applicable, which are supplied
by the identification mechanism (FIA_UID.2). Audit records are
stored in the database, and are filtered to read and search with
conditions, and restricted audit review requires authorized users
(FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3). Management
functionality for the audit mechanism is spelled out in
(FMT_SMF.1). The audit record is stored in the database, and
exported into a file if the size of the audit record exceeds the
configured maximum size (FAU_STG.2, FAU_STG.4).
O.Communication Communication security is implemented by data integrity
protection (FPT_ITI.1) between TOE and the CA server, trusted
channels (FTP_ITC.1/External System, FTP_ITC.1/NE) between
TOE and external servers, and (FTP_TRP.1) between TOE and
the web clients.
Performance and inventory text files are transmitted to the
OSS/service application. (FTP_TRP.1)
Management functionality to configure the trusted channel for
NE communication is provided in (FMT_SMF.1).
Services are accessed through the TLS security protocol.
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Security objectives Rationale
(FPT_ITT.1)
The TOE integrates a private CA called LiteCA for issuing TLS
certificates to internal services or NEs (FCS_COP.1.1/RSASSA,
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA). The certificate key type can be either
RSA (FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA) or ECDSA
(FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA), (FCS_RBG.1 and FCS_RBG.2
provides the random number required by FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA
and FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA).
When the digital signature key is not required, the digital
signature key is destroyed.(FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG, FCS_CKM.6.2)
O.Authentication User authentication (including re-authentication) is implemented
by (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6) and supported by
individual user identities in (FIA_UID.2). The necessary user
attributes (passwords) are spelled out in (FIA_ATD.1). The
authentication mechanism supports authentication failure
handling (FIA_AFL.1), restrictions as to the validity of accounts
for login (FTA_TSE.1), and a password policy (FIA_SOS.1).
Management functionality is provided in (FMT_SMF.1). The
TOE logs off sessions when they are inactive for a configured
period of time (by default 30 minutes) (FTA_SSL.3). The
session establishment shall be denied based on security attributes
(FTA_TSE.1). Authentication feedback information is protected
by (FIA_UAU.7). TOE shall display access history of the last
successful and unsuccessful logins (FTA_TAH.1).
For password verification hash values of passwords are used
which are generated using PBKDF2(FCS_COP.1.1/2).
The authentication mechanism for NBIs and NEs to connect to
MAE is also implemented by FIA_UAU.2.
O.Authorization The requirement for access control is spelled out in
(FDP_ACC.2), and the access control policies are modeled in
(FDP_ACF.1) for accessing the MAE server.
Unique user IDs are necessary for access control (FIA_UID.2),
and user authentication (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5).
User-related attributes are spelled out in (FIA_ATD.1). Access
control is based on the definition of roles as subjects and
functions as objects (FMT_SMR.1). Management functionality
for the definition of access control policies is provided
(FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1).
User re-authentication is implemented by (FIA_UAU.6).
If a user fails to log in to the system for multiple consecutive
times, the locking policy for the account and IP address is
executed (FIA_AFL.1).
O.SecurityManagement Management functionality is provided in
(FMT_SMF.1/FIA_ATD.1/FIA_SOS.1/FMT_MOF.1/FTM_MT
D.1/FTA_SSL.4).
The symmetric encryption key is generate by use
PBKDF2(FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2), (FCS_RBG.1 and
FCS_RBG.2 provides the random number required by
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Security objectives Rationale
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2).
The system backs up the symmetric encryption
key.(FCS_CKM.3)
When the symmetric encryption key is not required, the
symmetric encryption key is destroyed.(FCS_CKM.6.1/SYM,
FCS_CKM.6.2)
The irreversible encryption algorithms PBKDF2 are used to
protect web user passwords.(FCS_COP.1.1/PBKDF2)
The AES algorithm is used to encrypt service data(such as
configuration data). (FCS_COP.1.1/SYM)
The following table provides a matrix of SFRs and the security objectives.
O.Audit O.Authoriz
ation
O.Authenti
cation
O.Commun
ication
O.Security
Manageme
nt
FAU_GE
N.1
X
FAU_GE
N.2
X
FAU_SA
R.1
X
FAU_SA
R.2
X
FAU_SA
R.3
X
FAU_ST
G.2
X
FAU_ST
G.4
X
FDP_AC
C.2
X
FDP_ACF
.1
X
FIA_UID.
2
X X X
FIA_UAU
.2
X X
FIA_UAU
.5
X X
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O.Audit O.Authoriz
ation
O.Authenti
cation
O.Commun
ication
O.Security
Manageme
nt
FIA_UAU
.6
X X
FIA_UAU
.7
X
FIA_ATD
.1
X X X
FIA_AFL.
1
X X
FIA_SOS.
1
X X
FMT_SM
F.1
X X X X X
FMT_SM
R.1
X
FMT_MO
F.1
X
FMT_MT
D.1
X
FMT_MS
A.1
X
FMT_MS
A.3
X
FTA_TSE
.1
X
FTA_SSL
.3
X
FTA_SSL
.4
X
FTA_TA
H.1
X
FTP_TRP.
1 Trusted
Path
X
FTP_ITC.
1/External
System
X
FTP_ITC.
1/NE
X
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O.Audit O.Authoriz
ation
O.Authenti
cation
O.Commun
ication
O.Security
Manageme
nt
FCS_CK
M.1.1/PB
KDF2
X
FCS_CK
M.1.1/RS
A
X
FCS_CK
M.1.1/EC
DSA
X
FCS_CK
M.3
X
FCS_CK
M.6.1/SY
M
X X
FCS_CK
M.6.1/SIG
X
FCS_CK
M.6.2
X X
FCS_COP
.1.1/SYM
X
FCS_COP
.1.1/PBK
DF2
X X
FCS_COP
.1.1/RSAS
SA
X
FCS_COP
.1.1/ECD
SA
X
FCS_RB
G.1
X X
FCS_RB
G.2
X X
FPT_ITT.
1
X
FPT_ITI.1 X
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6.3.3 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale
Dependencies within the EAL4 package selected for the security assurance requirements have
been considered by the authors of CC Part 3 and are not analyzed here again.
The security functional requirements in this Security Target do not introduce dependencies on
any security assurance requirement; neither do the security assurance requirements in this
Security Target introduce dependencies on any security functional requirement.
The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how
the SFRs for the TOE resolve those dependencies.
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Resolved by external
time source.
The audit time depends
on the reliable time
stamp. Reliable time
stamp depends on
external time sources
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.2 FAU_STG.2
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.2
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.2
FMT_MSA.3
FIA_UID.2 None None
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.5 None None
FIA_UAU.6 None None
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2
FIA_ATD.1 None None
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2
FIA_SOS.1 None None
FMT_SMF.1 None None
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Resolution
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.2
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FTA_TSE.1 None None
FTA_SSL.3 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FTA_SSL.4 None None
FTA_TAH.1 None None
FTP_TRP.1 None None
FTP_ITC.1/External System None None
FTP_ITC.1/NE None None
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2 [FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_CKM.5, or
FCS_COP.1]
[FCS_RBG.1, or
FCS_RNG.1]
FCS_CKM.6
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM
FCS_RBG.1
FCS_CKM.6.1/SYM
FCS_CKM.6.2
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA [FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_CKM.5, or
FCS_COP.1]
[FCS_RBG.1, or
FCS_RNG.1]
FCS_CKM.6
FCS_COP.1.1/RSASS
A
FCS_RBG.1
FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG
FCS_CKM.6.2
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA [FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_CKM.5, or
FCS_COP.1]
[FCS_RBG.1, or
FCS_RNG.1]
FCS_CKM.6
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA
FCS_RBG.1
FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG
FCS_CKM.6.2
FCS_CKM.3 [FDP_ITC.1, or FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKD
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Resolution
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1, or
FCS_CKM.5]
F2
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDS
A
FCS_CKM.6.1/SYM [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKD
F2
FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDS
A
FCS_CKM.6.2 [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKD
F2
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDS
A
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1, or
FCS_CKM.5]
FCS_CKM.6
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKD
F2
FCS_CKM.6.1/SYM
FCS_CKM.6.2
FCS_COP.1.1/PBKDF2 [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1, or
FCS_CKM.5]
FCS_CKM.6
None
Only irreversible
hashing of password,
and the dependency is
not required.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSASSA [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1, or
FCS_CKM.5]
FCS_CKM.6
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG
FCS_CKM.6.2
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1, or
FCS_CKM.5]
FCS_CKM.6
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDS
A
FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG
FCS_CKM.6.2
FCS_RBG.1 [FCS_RBG.2, or
FCS_RBG.3]
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
FCS_RBG.2
FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1 are not
required.
JDK SecureRandom
does not require a
self-test upon
invocation, as it is
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Resolution
designed to be a
cryptographically
strong pseudo-random
number generator
(CSPRNG). It
automatically ensures
compliance with FIPS
140-2 randomness
requirements and
produces
non-deterministic
output.
OpenSSL's
cryptographically
secure pseudo-random
number generator
(CSPRNG) ensures that
it is properly seeded
and maintained, which
includes internal
integrity checks.
FCS_RBG.2 FCS_RBG.1 FCS_RBG.1
FPT_ITT.1 None None
FPT_ITI.1 None None
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 4
components as specified in [CC] Part 3. The following table provides an overview of the
assurance components that form the assurance level for the TOE.
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
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Assurance class Assurance components
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
6.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The evaluation assurance level has been commensurate with the threat environment that is
experienced by typical consumers of the TOE.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
7.1.1 User Management
The TOE supports user management. User management involves user permission
management, region management, and user maintenance and monitoring. User management
grants permissions to users with different responsibilities, and adjusts the permissions based
on service changes. This ensures that users have the necessary permissions to perform tasks
and that other management tasks are carried out in order, avoiding unauthorized and insecure
operations.
Security administrators can create roles, assign operation rights to the roles, and attach users
to roles to grant them corresponding operation rights based on service requirements. This
implements quick user authorization, improving O&M efficiency.
To improve management efficiency, security administrators divide the network into regions
based on service requirements and allow different personnel to manage users and services in
different regions.
During user permission maintenance period, security administrators can view and modify user,
role, and operation set information, and monitor user sessions and operations in real time,
ensuring system security.
The default roles on the management plane are listed in the table below.
Role Name Description
Administrators The user group has all rights except user management, query
security log, query personal security log and view online users.
SMManagers The user group has permission to manage users, query security
logs, view online users, and update ACL policies.
Operators The user group has permission to perform non-security
operations of backup and restore, deployment, system
monitoring, maintenance, system settings, alarms, the disaster
recovery (DR) system, product planning, trace server product
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Role Name Description
tool, configure NAT tool, information collection, trouble
shooting, emergency system, cloud service management,
infrastructure, commissioning wizard, etc.
Monitors The user group has permission to monitor non-security
operations of backup and restore, deployment, system
monitoring, maintenance, system settings, alarms, the disaster
recovery (DR) system, product planning, trace server product
tool, configure NAT tool, information collection, trouble
shooting, emergency system, cloud service management,
infrastructure, commissioning wizard, etc.
The default roles on the O&M plane are listed in the table below.
Role Name Description
Administrators The user group has all rights except user management, query
security log and view online users.
SMManagers The user group has permission to manage users, manage
licenses, query security logs, view online users, and update ACL
policies.
NBI User Group The user group has the permissions on operations and interface
configurations for all northbound interfaces.
Guests The user group has the permissions only to view fault
management and system operations and to query personal
operation logs.
Maintenance Group The user group has permissions to maintain the OSS and NEs.
Users attached to this role can perform operations such as
adding, deleting, modifying, and querying the OSS and NEs.
Operator Group The user group has NE maintenance-related permissions, such as
fault management, log management, topology management, and
system operations. Users attached to this role can set network
device parameters, monitor device status, handle faults, and
upgrade software.
WebNIC User Group The user group has WebNIC-related permissions, such as
collecting network information, querying all operation logs, and
managing tasks.
Operators The user group has rights of maintenance management,
configuration management, northbound management, and assist
tool management.
AppUsers The user group has rights of application access.
Assurance User Group The user group has MAE-Optimization/MAE-Evaluation system
services-related permissions, such as querying OSS basic
information, managing threshold alarms, and issuing MML
commands to NEs.
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Role Name Description
CA Administrator
Group
The user group has the operation permissions on all functions of
the CA service.
CA Operator Group The user group has the operation permissions on some functions
of the CA service.
HOFS Group The user group has the File Management Operation Set
permission.
Monitoring Group The user group has permissions only to perform basic operations
such as browsing and viewing.
NBI Admin Group The user group has the permissions on operations and interface
configurations for all management interfaces.
NBI OpenAPI User
Group
The user group has device-level operation rights for all objects
and application-level operation rights for northbound open APIs.
Viewers The user group has rights of maintenance browsing,
configuration browsing, and northbound data browsing.
The role Administrators is to administer the TOE; the role SMManagers is the security role
of the TOE, who can complete security management of TSF data, user management, audit
review and authorization.
The TOE also has a default and super user admin, who belongs to Administrators and
SMManagers. The super user admin can complete all the functions, including security and
administrative functions.
(FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1)
Note: The role is the same as user group in the TOE. The user roles can be managed at the
ManagementWeb and the OMWeb interface.
7.1.2 Authentication
Authentication based on security attributes is enforced prior to any other interaction with the
TOE for all interfaces of the TOE(FIA_UAU.2).
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interfaces, the TOE provides the following
security mechanisms:
The TOE identifies administrators by a unique ID and enforces their authentication before
granting them access to any TSF management interfaces(FIA_UID.2).
The TOE authenticates users based on the user attributes defined in FIA_ATD.1. The
passwords should meet the defined password policy; otherwise the input of password shall be
refused. When a user uses an expired password for login, the system will refuse the login
request, the user must request the administrator to reset the password (the administrator can
deactivate the password expiration policy).
The TOE verifies that the ManagementWeb and OMWeb user passwords meets the following
password policies: [
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1. Min. password length
2. Max. system administrator password length
3. Max. password length
4. Configurable number of latest passwords that cannot be reused
5. Password repetition not allowed within the configurable number of months
6. Min. password usage period (days)
7. Password validity period (days)
8. Min. characters different between new & old passwords
9. Min. number of letters
10. Min. number of uppercase letters
11. Min. number of lowercase letters
12. Min. number of digits
13. Min. number of special characters
14. Password that cannot contain spaces
15. Password that cannot contain its username in reverse order
16. Password that cannot be an increasing, decreasing, or interval sequence of digits or
letters
17. Policy about max. consecutive characters used in both the username and password
18. Policy that the password cannot contain repeated character sequences
19. Max. times a character can consecutively occur
20. Password that cannot contain user's mobile number or email address
21. Password that cannot contain words in the password dictionary or hacker language
dictionary](FIA_SOS.1, FTA_TSE.1)
Advanced parameters have such as Min. Different characters between new and old passwords,
Min. Letter, Min. Lowercase, Min. Numbers.
User IDs are unique within the TOE and are stored together with associated passwords and
other attributes including extended security attributes in the TOE's configuration database. If
the user is in the disabled status, the login will be refused.
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, if the user password is entered incorrectly for
five consecutive times within 10 minutes, the client IP address will be locked for 10
minutes(FIA_AFL.1).
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, the TOE supports the account and IP address
lockout policy on the Account Policy page. The default account lockout policy is that when
you enter the password incorrectly for 5 consecutive times within 10 minutes, the account will
be locked for 30 minutes and automatically unlocked afterwards. The default IP address
lockout policy is that when you enter the password incorrectly for 10 consecutive times within
1 minute, the IP address will be locked for 30 minutes and automatically unlocked
afterwards(FIA_AFL.1).
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, if three accounts using a client IP address are
locked within 10 minutes, this client IP address will be locked for 30 minutes(FIA_AFL.1).
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, all users can log in to the O&M plane again
after the lockout period expires. Local users can also contact security administrators to unlock
their accounts for re-login(FIA_AFL.1).
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The user authentication modes include local authentication and remote authentication. In
remote authentication mode, users are authenticated by an AAA server through AAA
protocols. The TOE supports Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) for AAA authentication. The TOE supports
CAS SSO. SSO configuration allows users to access multiple mutually trusted application
systems after only one login authentication. (FIA_UAU.5).
The TOE can re-authenticate the user under the condition of changing passwords
(FIA_UAU.6).
The TOE displays the asterisk (*) that has the same length as the entered password, and
returns a username or password error when login failed (FIA_UAU.7).
For other interfaces, the TOE provides the following security mechanisms:
All interfaces provide certificate authentication or user name password authentication to
ensure that all interfaces verify the legitimacy of the peer.(FIA_UAU.2)
7.1.3 Access Control
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, the TOE enforces an authorization policy by
defining access rights that are assigned to users and roles by the security roles or the super
user admin.
At the OMWeb interface, the TOE enforces the access control policy on users and groups as
subjects, domains as objects, functional operations issued by subjects on objects. The domains
as objects shall define the scope of NEs. Operations shall not be performed on NEs not
contained in domains.
At the OMWeb interface, the access control is based on users or groups and objects; and the
security attribute object ID of an object must have a domain, including the specified NE,
device type, and NEs in the subnet.
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, the access control is used to identify all the
operations over objects through the MAE client if the operation rights have been assigned by
the SMManagers or the super user admin (identification and authentication of operation
rights)
(FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1, and FMT_MSA.3)
At the OMWeb interface, the MML commands defined by the managed NEs, are used to
directly perform the operations on the corresponding NE through the channel between the NE
and TOE. The access rights with MML command group (containing some MML commands)
can be assigned to users and roles. The MML command groups are classified into System
Command, Alarm Query, Alarm Management, Performance Query, Performance Management,
Device Query, Device Management, Trace Query, Trace Management, Wireless Query,
Wireless Management, Transport Query, Transport Management, Security Query, Sucurity
Management, Time Query, Time Management, Software Query, Software Management, Test
Query, Test Management, Fault Information Collection. The MML command access control is
only used to identify the commands through the MML client function of the MAE client.
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, before any operations through the client of
TOE, the access rights related with these operations shall be authenticated with the token of
corresponding user session.
(FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3)
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7.1.4 IP-based ACL
At the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface, the TOE can offer an access control list (ACL)
of features based on IP addresses for controlling which terminals can access the TOE through
the TOE client. The ACL is based on IP addresses. The security role SMManagers and the
super user admin can specify each individual IP address or IP address range in the ACL of a
specified user ID. The user can log in to the TOE only from terminals whose IP addresses are
in the ACL.
(FMT_SMF.1 and FTA_TSE.1)
7.1.5 Communication Security
The TOE supports encrypted transmission between NEs and the TOE, the external system and
the TOE, remote user and the TOE. It provides secure protocols, such as TLS, SNMPv3,
SSHv2 and SFTP, for data transmission. The TOE integrates a private CA called LiteCA for
issuing TLS certificates to internal services or NEs (FCS_COP.1.1/RSASSA,
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA). The certificate key type can be either RSA (FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA) or
ECDSA (FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA), (FCS_RBG.1 and FCS_RBG.2 provides the random
number required by FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA).
⚫ Communication Security between NEs and the TOE:
As a client, the TOE can initiate SSHv2 and TLS connections to establish secure channels
with the NEs.
As a server, the TOE also provides secure channels for the communication with NEs to
perform performance data bulk collection and software backup and update. The secure
channels are based on TLS connections initiated by NEs.
⚫ Communication Security between the external system and the TOE:
As a client, the TOE can establish secure channels with the external system (like AAA server,
syslog server) over TLS, SNMPv3, or SSH.
As a client, the TOE can initiate SSH connections to establish secure channels with the OSS,
service orchestrator or service application.
As a server, the TOE can receive the TLS, HTTPS, and SNMPv3 connections initiated by the
OSS, service orchestrator, or service application to establish secure channels.
The TOE supports communicating with a CA server to apply the certificates. To prevent
modification, insertion and replay, the communication uses CMPv2 protocol over an HTTPS
channel with RSA or ECDSA signature protection of the certificate. (FPT_ITI.1)
⚫ Communication Security between remote users and the TOE:
The remote users access MAE through web portal by initiating HTTPS connections.
(FTP_TRP.1, FTP_ITC.1/NE, FTP_ITC.1/ External System)
⚫ Communication Security inside the TOE:
Services are accessed through the TLS security protocol. (FPT_ITT.1)
7.1.6 User Session Management
The TOE provides user session management. The TOE provides the following user session
management at the ManagementWeb and OMWeb interface:
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1. Session establishment
The session will be established after successful login authentication. When more than
three unsuccessful login attempts are detected since the last successful login, The TOE
will generate an alarm. The session establishment will be denied based on the policy
below (FTA.TSE.1).
Upon successful session establishment, the TOE will display the welcome message, last
successful login date, time and IP address, last unsuccessful login date, time and IP
address, login failure times since last successful login (FTA_TAH.1).
2. TSF-initiated session Termination
If a user does not perform any operation within the period of the default value 30 mins)
specified by this parameter, the user will be logged out. The setting takes effect only for
local and remote users and does not take effect for third-party users. If this parameter is
set to Unlimited, user sessions will not be automatically logged off (FTA_SSL.3).
3. User-initiated session termination
Login user can click the user name in the upper right corner of the page and choose
Logout (FTA_SSL.4).
4. Users and their following security attributes:
a. Time segment for login, which means that the user shall log in to the TOE within a
specific time segment.
b. ACL, addressed in the previous section.
c. Maximum online sessions, which indicates that the number of online sessions shall
not exceed the maximum sessions, otherwise the user login requests after the
maximum online sessions shall be refused by the TOE. The default is none.
d. Disabled status, which means the user cannot log in to the TOE in the disabled
status.
5. System security policy, which is prior to the security attributes of individual users
System login mode, which supports the multi-user login mode and single-user login
mode. During system operation and maintenance, the single-user mode is recommended
to prevent other users from logging in to the system and performing operations that may
affect O&M efficiency. When the single-user login mode is selected, the TOE refuses all
login requests including those for online sessions except that of the super user admin.
The multi-user login mode is a normal mode and has no special limits.
7.1.7 Auditing
The TOE can generate audit records for security-relevant events as described in FAU_GEN.1.
The audit record has the following information: the activity name, level, user ID, operation
type, operation date and time, terminal, object, operation result, and details.
The audit review can be implemented with filter criteria on the MAE client by users attached
to SMManagers, users with log query rights. Any user cannot delete and modify the audit
records.
Conditions for dumping logs: The number of logs in the database exceeds 1 million, the size
of the logs in the database exceeds 80% of the capacity, or the number of days for storing the
logs exceeds 45 days. To ensure sufficient database space, the system checks logs every hour
and saves logs that meet the requirements to the hard disk of a server. Then the dumped logs
are automatically deleted from the database.
Conditions for deleting log files: The size of the log files is greater than 1024 MB (default
value), the log files are stored for more than 45 days (default value), or the total number of log
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files exceeds 1000 (default value). To ensure sufficient disk space, the system checks log files
every hour and deletes log files meeting the requirements from the hard disk.
By default, a maximum of 1 million logs can be stored in the database. If the database space
of log management is greater than or equal to 16 GB. The logs that exceed the maximum
number of logs stored in the database will be dumped.
The values in the preceding log dump conditions are default values.
Log service start/stop of the O&M plane will be recorded in audit logs of the management
plane. Log service start/stop of the management plane will be recorded in the
/var/log/messages directory of the OS.
(FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.2,
FAU_STG.4)
7.1.8 Security Management Function
The TOE provides security management if necessary. Only administrators have the privilege
to manage the behaviors of TOE security functions. This is partially already addressed in
more details in the previous sections of the TSS. It includes security attributes below.
1. Users and their following security attributes:
a. User ID, which is a user identifier, defined as a username in the TOE.
b. User Group, which is the same as a role definition.
c. Password, which should meet the predefined password policy, is encrypted with
PBKDF2 and stored in the database.
d. Time segment for login, addressed in the previous section.
e. ACL, addressed in the previous section.
f. Maximum online sessions, addressed in the previous section.
g. Disabled status, addressed in the previous section.
2. System security policy, which is prior to the security attributes of individual users
a. System login mode, addressed in the previous section.
b. Password policy, which has basic parameters and advanced parameters. Basic
parameters include the following items: Min. Length of common user password,
Min. Length of super user password, Max. Length of password, Max. Period for
password repetition (months), Password validity period (days), Minimum validity
period of the password (days), Number of days warning given before password
expiry, The Password Cannot Be Similar to History Passwords. Advanced
parameters include the following items: Min. Different characters between new and
old passwords, Min. Letter, Min. Lowercase, Min. Numbers. Account policy, which
has an upper threshold for legal login times and the excessive login attempts cause
account locking. Super user admin is not allowed to be locked. All the users should
meet the account policy defined in the TOE.
The TOE restricts the ability to manage the certificates, private keys, and symmetric keys to
SMManagers and users with sufficient user permissions.
(FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1)
7.1.9 Cryptographic Functions
Cryptographic functions are required by security features as dependencies. The following
cryptographic algorithms are supported:
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1. The TOE supports symmetric encryption and decryption using the AES256-GCM
algorithm to protect sensitive data. (FCS_COP.1.1/SYM).
2. The TOE shall release the cryptographic key memory by overwriting the byte or char
array with 0 if the key is no longer used (FCS_CKM.6.1/SYM, FCS_CKM.6.1/SIG,
FCS_CKM.6.2).
3. The TOE supports a three-layer key management structure of root key, master key and
working key. The root key is generated by PBKDF2 (HMAC-SHA2) algorithm from
root key materials. The master key is generated with a 64-byte random number obtained
from the TOE's deterministic random number, the master key is encrypted and protected
by the root key. The working key is generated by PBKDF2 (HMACSHA2) algorithm
from master key materials, the working key is encrypted and protected by the master key,
the working key is used to provide confidential and complete protection for sensitive
data saved in a local PC or data transferred through insecure channels. Both the two keys
can be updated manually (FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2), (FCS_RBG.1 and FCS_RBG.2
provides the random number required by FCS_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2).
4. The TOE supports hashing of data using PBKDF2 (SHA256) algorithm according to
[RFC8018] for password hashing. The iteration number is at least 10,000 times. The salt
used in PBKDF2 is a 16-byte random number obtained from the TOE's deterministic
random number generator (FCS_COP.1.1/PBKDF2).
5. The TOE supports issuing certificates and can generate RSA, ECDSA key pairs
according to the key generation algorithm described in (FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA and
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA), (FCS_RBG.1 and FCS_RBG.2 provides the random number
required by FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA). Then, perform the
corresponding digital signature operation according to the digital signature algorithm
described in (FCS_COP.1.1/RSASSA and FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA) to generate the
certificate.
6. The TOE supports backup the symmetric encryption key.(FCS_CKM.3)
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8 Abbreviations, Terminology and
References
8.1 Abbreviations
8.2 Terminology
8.3 References
8.1 Abbreviations
Abbreviations Full Spelling
AAA Authentication Authorization Accounting
ACL Access Control List
AOC Agile Open Container
BSS Business Support System
CA Certificate Authority
CAS Central Authentication Service
CC Common Criteria
CHR Call History Record
CMP Certificate Management Protocol
CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture
CSP Cloud Service Provider
E-UTRAN Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
eNodeB E-UTRAN NodeB
EPC Evolved Packet Core
FTP File Transfer Protocol
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Abbreviations Full Spelling
FTPs FTP over SSL
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
IMS Information Management System
IdP Identity Provider
LTE Long term evolution
MAE MBB Automation Engine
MBB Mobile broadband
MML Man-Machine Language
MR Measurement Report
NE Network Element
NGN Next Generation Network
NMS Network Management System
NTP Network Time Protocol
NBI Northbound Interface
OM Operation and Maintenance
OSS Operations Support System
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RAN Radio Access Network
RAT Radio Access Technology
REST Representational State Transfer
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SFTP SSH File Transfer Protocol
SIG LTE-cell-level signaling tracing messages of the medium
depth for signaling correction
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SNMPv3 SNMP version 3
SSH Secure Shell
SSHv2 SSH version 2
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Abbreviations Full Spelling
SSL Security Socket Layer
SSO Single Sign-on
ST Security Target
STP Signaling Transfer Point
SBI Southbound Interface
SOP Standard Operation Procedure
SDN Software-defined Networking
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SP Service Provider
TCP Transfer Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSF TOE Security Functions
PP Protection Profile
UGW User Gateway
USN User Sequence Number
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
WebNIC Web Based Network Information Collection
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
WRAN Wireless Regional Area Network
E2E End to End
VM Virtual Machine
8.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to
this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
Terminology Explanation
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Terminology Explanation
Administrator An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been assigned
specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This ST may use
the term administrator occasionally in an informal context, and not in
order to refer to a specific role definition. From the TOE's point of
view, an administrator is simply a user who is authorized to perform
certain administrative actions on the TOE and the objects managed by
the TOE.
Operator See User.
User A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE.
Access Network In telecommunications, an access network is a network that connects
subscribers to telecommunication service providers over public
ground. It can be considered the route between the subscriber's home
and the ISP itself. The access network is composed of the carrier's
station and the end user.
OM data Data user for system operation and maintenance.
Access Domain MAE provides the MAE-Access subsystem to connect to NEs to
implement basic NE O&M, monitoring, and data openness.
Deploy Domain MAE provides the MAE-Deployment subsystem including
configuration solutions.
EVA Domain MAE provides the MAE-Evaluation subsystem to implement
network-level monitoring, network assessment topic, and network
service provisioning assessment.
OPT Domain MAE provides the MAE-Optimization subsystem to implement
network self-optimization.
TSP Domain This module provides network modeling data and generates enhanced
functions such as geographic location and scenario identification based
on the CHR/MR.
This module provides an analysis and computing framework, supports
codeless computing extension and plug-in computing extension based
on the provided data model, and allows services to complete
network-level and service-level analysis and computing.
TSF Domain This module collects signaling data (CHR/MR) based on software,
opens data to northbound systems and value-added domain systems,
and allows service tools to obtain data.
This module also provides the capabilities of NE-level data association
analysis and processing in the northbound open scenario.
8.3 References
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022, revision 1,
November 2022 — Part 1: Introduction and general model
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Target V2.2 8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References
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Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022, revision 1,
November 2022 — Part 3: Security assurance components
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM:2022, revision
1, November 2022 — Evaluation methodology