National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Pure Storage Inc.
FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11076-2021
Dated: January 13, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Department of Defense
ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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Acknowledgements
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell
John Butterworth
Jenn Dotson
Patrick Mallett
Lisa Mitchell
Clare Olin
The MITRE Corporation
Anne Gugel
Peter Kruus
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Devin Becker
Adam I. Borin
Gerrit Kruitbosch
UL, San Luis Obispo, CA
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................5
2 Identification................................................................................................6
3 Architectural Information.............................................................................7
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms.................................................................................................. 7
3.2 Physical Boundaries.......................................................................................................... 8
4 Security Policy..............................................................................................8
4.1 Audit................................................................................................................................. 8
4.2 Cryptographic Operations................................................................................................ 8
4.3 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................... 9
4.4 Security Management.................................................................................................... 10
4.5 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 10
4.6 TOE Access...................................................................................................................... 11
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels................................................................................................... 11
5 Assumptions...............................................................................................11
6 Clarification of Scope..................................................................................11
7 Documentation ..........................................................................................12
8 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................12
8.1 Developer Testing .......................................................................................................... 12
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .......................................................................... 12
9 Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................13
10 Results of the Evaluation............................................................................13
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)...................................................................... 13
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ....................................................................... 14
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) .......................................................... 14
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................................. 14
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)........................... 14
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN).................................................................... 15
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................................. 15
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11 Validator Comments/Recommendations....................................................15
12 Security Target ...........................................................................................15
13 Glossary .....................................................................................................16
14 Bibliography...............................................................................................16
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment by the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation team of the evaluation of the FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3 solution
provided by Pure Storage, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by UL Verification Services Inc., a Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) in San Luis Obispo, CA, United States of America, and was completed in
January 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by UL Verification Services, Inc. The
evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3
Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September 2018 (NDcPP21).
The TOE is the FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3. The TOE identified in this Validation
Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the
TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security
Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the FlashArray//X running
Purity//FA 5.3 Security Target, Version 3.2, January 7, 2021 and analysis performed by the
Validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories CCTLs using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with
National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States Common Criteria Evaluation Validation Scheme
Target of Evaluation FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version
2.1
Security Target FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3 Security Target, version
3.2, January 7, 2021
Evaluation Technical Report Common Criteria Evaluation Technical Report FlashArray//X
running Purity//FA 5.3, Version 1.2, January 11, 2021 (20-4177-
R-0015)
Common Criteria Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor/Developer Pure Storage, Inc.
Common Criteria Testing Lab UL Verification Services Inc.
CCEVS Validators Paul Bicknell, John Butterworth, Jenn Dotson, Anne Gugel,
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Peter Kruus, Patrick Mallett, Lisa Mitchell, Clare Olin
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
Pure Storage Inc's (Pure Storage) FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3 (the TOE) is an
enterprise Network Attached Storage solution that includes a Linux-based operating system,
SAN (Storage Area Network) protocols and interfaces (iSCSI, Fiber Channel, SAS), and custom
software to provide network storage with high performance, reliability, usability, and efficiency.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The TOE consists of the following FlashArray//X (R2 and R3 families) hardware models:
FlashArray//X R2 Family models and specifications:
X10 R2 X20 R2 X50 R2 X70 R2 X90 R2
CPU Intel® Xeon®
Silver 4108
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Silver 4114
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Silver 4116
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Gold 6130
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Gold 6152
Processor
Total Volatile
Memory
96GB 192GB 192GB 384GB 768GB
Management
Ports
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
FlashArray//X R3 Family models and specifications:
X10 R3 X20 R3 X50 R3 X70 R3 X90 R3
CPU Intel® Xeon®
Silver 4208
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Silver 4210R
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Silver 4214R
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Silver 6230
Processor
Intel® Xeon®
Silver 6252
Processor
Total Volatile
Memory
96GB 192GB 288GB 384GB 768GB
Management
Ports
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
2 x 1Gb
Management
Ports
1x Local
Console Port
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Software:
Each model of the TOE runs the Purity//FA 5.3 Operating System software.
3.2 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE model is made up of FlashArray//X hardware with Purity//FA 5.3 software
components. The TOE communicates with a remote syslog server and may be administered via
a web browser or SSH client in the environment or the local console. Evaluated protocols and
ciphersuites are detailed in the ST. The scope of the evaluation was limited to the
requirements in the ST – all other functionality was outside the scope of the evaluation.
4 Security Policy
This section contains the security functions within the logical boundaries of the TOE. The
following Security Functions are supported by the TOE:
 Audit
 Cryptographic Operations
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
4.1 Audit
 The TOE will audit all events and information defined in Table 3: Auditable Events in the
Security Target.
 The TOE will also include the identity of the user that caused the event (if applicable),
date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome of the event.
 The TOE protects storage of audit information from unauthorized deletion.
 The TOE prevents unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records.
 The TOE can transmit audit data to an external IT entity using the Syslog over TLS
protocol.
4.2 Cryptographic Operations
The TSF performs the following cryptographic operations:
 SSH for remote CLI administrative management of the TOE:
o Protocol versions: SSHv2 (Conforming to RFCs 4251-4254, 5656, and 6668)
o Public-Key Algorithms: SSH-RSA, 2048-bit RSA keys
o Data Encryption:
 AES-CBC-128, 128-bit, AES symmetric key
 AES-CBC-256, 256-bit AES symmetric key
 AES128-CTR, 128-bit AES symmetric key
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 AES256-CTR, 256-bit AES symmetric key
 aes128-gcm@openssh.com, 128-bit AES symmetric key
 aes256-gcm@openssh.com, 256-bit AES symmetric key
o Data Integrity: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, “Implicit”
o Key Exchange: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-
nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 HTTPS for remote administrative management of the TOE:
o Protocol versions supporting: HTTPS/TLSv1.2 (Conforming to RFCs 2818 & 5246)
o Supporting the following TLS Ciphersuites:
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
The TSF zeroizes all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs once they are no
longer required.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
 The TSF supports passwords consisting of alphanumeric and special characters.
 The TSF allows the security administrator to configure the minimum password length
from 1 character to 100 characters.
 The TSF prevents offending Administrator accounts (FIA_AFL.1.1) from successfully
establishing remote session using any authentication method that involves a password
until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed.
 The TSF allows local administrators to re-enable user accounts locked by the FIA_AFL.1
functionality.
 The TSF requires all administrative users to authenticate before allowing the user to
perform any actions other than:
o Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
o Respond to ICMP Echo Request;
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o Respond to ARP requests with ARP replies;
o Make DNS Requests;
o Respond to HTTP Get Requests on TCP port 80 with a HTTP 301 ‘Moved
Permanently’ Status; Code redirecting to TCP port 443; and
o Respond to TLS Client_Hello messages with TLS Server_Hello messages on TCP
port 443.
4.4 Security Management
 TSF data includes the following:
o All audit records generated to meet the auditing requirements of the Protection
Profile;
o All user credentials (symmetric keys, private keys, keying material,
username/password); and
o TSF Configuration data.
 The TSF includes four administrative roles within the Authorized Administrator role:
o Internal Administrator,
o Array Administrator,
o Storage Administrator; and
o Read-Only Administrator.
 All roles are considered authorized administrators for the remainder of this document.
 The device ships with three hard-coded users but allows for additional users to be
created.
 The TOE provides management over HTTPS (remote), SSH (remote), and a local console.
 The TOE authenticates administrative users using a username/password combination or
a username/SSH_RSA key combination.
 The TSF does not allow access to any administrative functions prior to successful
authentication.
 The TOE also has the capability of being updated and verifying updates via published
hash verification.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
 The TSF protects TSF data from disclosure when the data is transmitted between
administrators and the TOE, and between the TOE and trusted IT entities.
 The TSF prevents the reading of secret and private keys.
 The TOE provides reliable time stamps for itself.
 The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during the initial start-up (upon power on) to
demonstrate the correction operation of the TSF.
 The TOE provides a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a
published hash mechanism to verify the candidate update package prior to installing the
update.
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4.6 TOE Access
 The TOE, for local interactive sessions, terminates the user’s session after an Authorized
Administrator-specified period of session inactivity (applies to the local console).
 The TOE terminates a remote interactive session after an Authorized Administrator-
configurable period of session inactivity (applies to SSH remote console and HTTPS
remote web GUI console).
 The TOE allows Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own
interactive session.
 Before establishing an administrative user session, the TOE can display an Authorized
Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the TOE.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
 The TOE uses TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and all
authorized IT entities that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
 The TOE permits the TSF, or the authorized IT entities, to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
 The TOE permits remote administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.
The TOE provides an HTTPS protected trusted path, as well as an SSH protected trusted
path to administer the TOE.
 The TOE requires the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication and
all remote administration actions.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September 2018
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP21 should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
This evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the NDcPP21 as
described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as
part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed
separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
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 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made in accordance with the assurance activities specified in
the NDcPP21 and performed by the evaluation team.
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the NDcPP21 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security
related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following guidance documents are provided in PDF format via download from the Pure
Storage support web portal. Only the documents in bold were utilized for meeting the CC
guidance requirements and only they should be trusted for the purpose of installing,
administering, or using the product in its evaluated configuration. Any other documents should
not be trusted for those purposes.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the Developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report FlashArray//X running
Purity//FA 5.3, V1.2, January 11, 2021 (AAR) and the FlashArray//X running Purity 5.3 Test
Report, V1.4, 1/7/21 (DTR). The DTR shows the test configuration, provides the tested
platforms, and lists the test tools.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of Developer testing was provided or required.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team performed the independent testing activities to confirm the TOE operates
to the TOE security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming
Document Revision Date
Guidance Documentation Pure Storage
FlashArray//XR2 and //XR3 Appliances Running
Purity 5.3
4.2.5 January 2021
FlashArray User Guide 5.3.0 August 22, 2019
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conformance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.1,
September 24, 2018. The Evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance
Activities specified in the Supporting Document for the NDcPP21. The Test Plan described how
each test activity was to be performed. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the
Test Plan and documented the results in a proprietary DTR noted in Section 8. The results of the
testing are summarized in the publicly available AAR for this evaluation.
The hardware/software was provided in the same form that customers of the vendor would
receive the product in. The evaluator installed and configured the TOE in accordance with the
vendor provided guidance documentation and performed the testing procedures as described
in the DTR.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the models as defined in Section 3.1 of this Validation
Report.
Configuration was performed in accordance with the documentation provided in Section 7.
Instructions include configuration of remote syslog destination and transmission parameters.
NTP functionality is unevaluated and Security Administrative users are instructed to disable NTP
functionality in the evaluated configuration.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against the
criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation methodology used by the Evaluation Team to conduct
the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the AAR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit and ensured the ST contained a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3 that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the Evaluation team was justified.
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10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit, assessed the design documentation, and
found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The
design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST and Guidance
documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the
NDcPP21 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the Evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit and ensured the adequacy of the user
guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the Evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer
the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation
to ensure they were complete.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity
(ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP21 and recorded the results in the DTR,
summarized in the AAR.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is provided in
the AAR and ETR prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search
for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual
vulnerability. The evaluator vulnerability research is current as of January 6, 2021.
The search for publicly known vulnerabilities was performed against the sources and on the
search-terms required in the NDcPP21 Supporting Document as well as the terms derived from
the information that was available to the evaluators (vendor documentation, information
gleaned from working with the products CLI, and information gleaned from automated packet
analysis). In addition to the search terms required as per the Supporting Document, the
following search terms were utilized: flash array, OpenSSH, OpenSSL, Pure Storage Flash Array
//X R2 and //X R3, purestorage, pure storage, flasharray, purity, X R2, X R3, Lldpd, Nginx, Net-
snmp, Syslog-ng, and Ubuntu.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The Validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documentation referenced in
Section 7 of this Validation Report. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later
were evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, should be
assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
As noted earlier in this report, NTP functionality is unevaluated; Security Administrators are
instructed to disable NTP functionality in the evaluated configuration.
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3 Security Target,
Version 3.2, January 7, 2021.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the
CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction
and general model, dated April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001.
[2] Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
methodology, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004.
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.1, September 24, 2018
[6] FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3 Security Target, Version 3.2, January 7, 2021
Pure Storage Validation Report Version 1.0
FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3 January 13, 2021
17
[7] Assurance Activity Report FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3, V1.2, January 11, 2021
[8] Common Criteria Evaluation Technical Report FlashArray//X running Purity//FA 5.3,
Version 1.2, January 11, 2021
[9] FlashArray//X running Purity 5.3 Test Report, V1.4, 1/7/21