National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Progress LoadMaster, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11691-2026
Dated: July 8, 2026
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
NIAP
Matt Downey
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Farid Ahmed
Russ Fink
Alex Lee
Robert Wojcik
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Rupal Gupta
Theo Ajibade
Akshay Jain
Intertek Acumen Security
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 7
3.1 TOE Overview ................................................................................................................................................7
3.2 TOE Description.............................................................................................................................................7
3.3 Physical Boundaries .......................................................................................................................................7
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 9
4.1 Security Audit .................................................................................................................................................9
4.2 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................9
4.3 Identification and Authentication .................................................................................................................9
4.4 Security Management ....................................................................................................................................9
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................9
4.6 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................10
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................10
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions & Threats................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................11
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 12
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 13
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................13
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................13
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 14
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................14
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 15
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................15
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................15
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................15
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................16
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................16
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................16
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 18
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 19
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 20
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 21
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14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 22
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Progress Loadmaster Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in June 2026. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the list
of the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e [CPP_ND_V3.0E].
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions
justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories
called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
PPs containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Progress LoadMaster
Protection Profile Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06
December 2023 [CPP_ND_V3.0E]
Security Target Progress LoadMaster Security Target, Version 1.7
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Progress LoadMaster, Version 0.6
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Progress Software Corporation
Developer Progress Software Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL)
Intertek Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Matt Downey, Farid Ahmed, Russ Fink, Alex Lee, Robert Wojcik
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3 Architectural Information
3.1 TOE Overview
The TOE is the Progress Software Corporation’s Progress LoadMaster X25-NG, LoadMaster
X40-NG, ECS CM H2 NG, ECS CM H3 NG and Virtual LoadMaster running on LoadMaster
OS 7.2.54.18. The LoadMaster simplifies the management of networked resources, and
optimizes and accelerates user access to diverse servers, content, and transaction-based systems.
The TOE is comprised of hardware and software and represents a complete network device
providing load balancing functionality.
3.2 TOE Description
Progress LoadMaster is a load balancer and application delivery controller (ADC) appliance. It is
designed to increase the availability, scalability, and security of applications and data centers.
The TOE suits all sizes of organizations with integrated hardware acceleration and support for up
to 35 million concurrent connections. The TOE is a network device.
Figure 1 – Representative TOE Deployment
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE boundary consists of one of the appliances listed below. The LoadMaster X25-NG,
LoadMaster X40-NG, ECS CM H2 NG and ECS CM H3 NG are physical devices while the
Virtual LoadMaster is a virtual machine which runs on ESXi. The virtual TOE is conformant
with Case 1 as described in the NDcPP:
Table 2- TOE Physical Boundary Components
Model
LoadMaster X25-
NG
LoadMaster X40-
NG
ECS CM H2
NG
ECS CM H3
NG
Virtual LoadMaster
Processor Intel Xeon Silver
4316 (Ice Lake)
Intel Xeon Silver
4316 (Ice Lake)
Intel Xeon
Silver 4316
(Ice Lake)
Intel Xeon
Silver 4316
(Ice Lake)
Intel Xeon Gold 5222 (Cascade
Lake)
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Model
LoadMaster X25-
NG
LoadMaster X40-
NG
ECS CM H2
NG
ECS CM H3
NG
Virtual LoadMaster
RAM 64 GB RAM
(evaluated)
64 GB RAM
(evaluated)
128 GB RAM 128 GB RAM 4GB (evaluated)
Network 2 1Gb Ethernet
8 10Gb Ethernet
Fiber
2 1Gb Ethernet
8 10Gb Ethernet
Fiber
2 1Gb
Ethernet
8 10Gb
Ethernet
Fiber
4 25Gb
Ethernet
Fiber
4 100Gb
Ethernet
Fiber
2 1Gb
Ethernet
8 10Gb
Ethernet
Fiber
4 25Gb
Ethernet
Fiber
4 100Gb
Ethernet
Fiber
2 10Gb virtual NIC (evaluated)
Platform LoadMaster OS
7.2.54.18
LoadMaster OS
7.2.54.18
LoadMaster
OS 7.2.54.18
LoadMaster
OS 7.2.54.18
LoadMaster OS 7.2.54.18 on
ESXi v7.0 U3
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the Collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, hereafter referred to as NDcPP v3.0e or NDcPP.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. The audit events are associated
with the administrator or processes. The audit records are transmitted over TLS to an external
audit server.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides the following cryptographic services described below.
Table 3 – Cryptographic Services
Service Use
TLS Client Secure connection to remote syslog servers.
TLS Client Secure connection to remote LDAP server.
TLS/HTTPS Server Secures connections with remote administrators.
Verification of Updates Digital signature verification prior to installing an update.
Each of these cryptographic algorithms have been validated for conformance to the requirements
specified in their respective standards, as identified below.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports a password-based authentication mechanism which automatically locks users
after a pre-configured number of failed attempts. The TOE also validates X.509 certificates in
support of TLS.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides management capabilities via Console and a Web-based GUI, accessed over
HTTPS. Management functions allow the administrators to configure the system, install updates,
and manage users.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE prevents the reading of plaintext passwords and keys. The TOE provides a reliable
timestamp for its own use. The reliable timestamp can be set by a security administrator or
authenticated NTP. To protect the integrity of its security functions, the TOE implements a suite
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of self-tests at startup and halts or disables affected functionality if a self-test fails. The TOE
ensures that updates to the TOE are authenticated by verifying a digital signature prior to
installing any update.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE monitors local and remote administrative sessions for inactivity and either locks or
terminates the session when a threshold time period is reached. An advisory notice is displayed
at the start of each session.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE initiates a TLS trusted channel with a syslog server and LDAP authentication server
(as configured).
The TOE is a TLS/HTTPS server that allows remote administrators to establish a trusted path
with the TOE.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions & Threats
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions and threats, can be found in the
following documents:
• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E]
That information has not been reproduced here and CPP_ND_V3.0E should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_ND_V3.0E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included
in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness. A list of excluded functionalities have been documented in Sec 7.2.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the [CPP_ND_V3.0E].
• This evaluation covers only the specific hardware and software models and versions
identified in this document, and not any other models or earlier or later versions released
or in process.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for,
nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities
to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one
that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was exclusively limited to the
functionality specified in the claimed PP. Any additional security related functional
capabilities included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Progress Loadmaster Security Target, Version 1.7
• Progress LoadMaster OS 7.2.54.18 Common Criteria Conformance Guide Version 0.5
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product or that is available online was
not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The following environmental components are required to operate the TOE in the evaluated
configuration:
• Management Workstation providing local console access to the TOE and a browser to
connect to the Web User Interface (WUI) over TLSv1.2.
• Syslog server that receives audit logs from the TOE over TLSv1.2.
• ESXi v7.0 U3 acting as the hypervisor for Virtual LoadMaster.
• Authentication server supporting LDAP over TLSv1.2.
• NTP server supporting SHA-1 integrity verification with NTPv4.
• OCSP server that receives ocsp requests from TOE over HTTP.
• CA Server that provides signed certificates over HTTP.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
• SSH
• Management API
• IPv6
• RADIUS Server
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in ETR for Progress LoadMaster, which is not publicly available.
The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the [CPP_ND_V3.0E]. The Independent Testing
activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 Rev. (5) and CEM version 3.1 Rev. (5). The evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the
conformance claims made in the Progress LoadMaster Security Target, of Part 2 extended, and Part
3 conformant. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the
claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Progress LoadMaster that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the
[CPP_ND_V3.0E].
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the ST's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the [CPP_ND_V3.0E] related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
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securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the [CPP_ND_V3.0E] related to the examination of the
information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the TOE is
labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE identification in the evaluation evidence.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the [CPP_ND_V3.0E] and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the [CPP_ND_V3.0E], and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the [CPP_ND_V3.0E], and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the
17
[CPP_ND_V3.0E], and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documentation referenced in
Section 6 of this Validation Report. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration
guide from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated. Any additional
customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online was not included
in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST. This evaluation covers only the specific hardware and software models and
versions identified in this document, and not any other models or earlier or later versions
released or in process. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment,
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Progress LoadMaster Security Target, Version 1.7
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Assurance Activity Report for Progress LoadMaster, Version 0.5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
6. Evaluation Technical Report for Progress LoadMaster, Version 0.6, June 2026.
7. Progress LoadMaster OS 7.2.54.18 Common Criteria Conformance Guide Version 0.5.
8. Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, [CPP_ND_V3.0E].
9. Progress LoadMaster Security Target, Version 1.7.
10. Assurance Activity Report for Progress Loadmaster, version 0.5, June 2026