BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
for
F5 Networks BIG-IP® Application Delivery
Controller (ADC-AP) version 11.5.1 HF10 (build
10.123.180)
from
F5 Networks, Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.2 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018 (*)
Network Device
F5 Networks BIG-IP® Application Delivery Controller (ADC-AP)
version 11.5.1 HF10 (build 10.123.180)
from F5 Networks, Inc.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 February 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 2 and ALC_FLR only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
5. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................25
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................26
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................26
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................29
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................30
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................31
C. Annexes..........................................................................................................................39
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components. The evaluation contained the SAR components above EAL
2 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2014,
for mutual recognition the EAL 2 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product F5 Networks BIG-IP® Application Delivery Controller (ADC-AP), version
11.5.1 HF10 (build 10.123.180) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0856-2017. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0856-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product F5 Networks BIG-IP® Application Delivery Controller (ADC-
AP), version 11.5.1 HF10 (build 10.123.180) was conducted by atsec information security
GmbH. The evaluation was initially completed on 26 October 2017 but a further delta
evaluation task was performed to include a hotfix. This task was completed 15 February
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018 Certification Report
2018. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: F5 Networks, Inc.
The product was developed by: F5 Networks, Inc.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 15 February
2018 is valid until 14 February 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product F5 Networks BIG-IP® Application Delivery Controller (ADC-AP), version
11.5.1 HF10 (build 10.123.180) has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
F5 Networks, Inc.
401 Elliott Ave West
Seattle, WA 98119
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called BIG-IP ADC-AP Version 11.5.1 HF10
(build10.123.180) (in the following named short as BIG-IP). The TOE provides the
functionality of a reverse proxy and application gateway as well as a VPN endpoint with
optional high availability failover. Its role based management functions can be accessed
via a GUI, command line interface or an API.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
Main Topic TOE Security Functionality / Addressed Issue
Device management Security Function Management
Authentication
Access Control
Auditing
Communications Security
Basic Traffic Management Reply Detection
Traffic Authentication
TLS offloading
VPN Traffic VPN Traffic
Cryptographic mechanisms Key Generation
Key Storage
Certificate validation
Cryptographic primitives in the TOE
Random Number Generation
Zeroization of Critical Security Parameters
Crypto Statement (used cryptograhic functions)
TSF Protection and Support
Functions
Failover of Redundant Systems
Self-tests
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Main Topic TOE Security Functionality / Addressed Issue
Update Verification
Denial-of-Service Mitigation
Protection of Sensitive Data
Residual Information Protection
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
F5 Networks BIG-IP® Application Delivery Controller (ADC-AP), version 11.5.1 HF10
(build 10.123.180)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW BIGIP-11.5.1.0.0.110.iso
SHA256:
bfca59ca1ec2606f24489dd52415bb8089f2f8b234bd82adb
bc878111ac35888
11.05.01 Download
2 SW Hotfix-BIGIP-11.5.1.10.123.180-HF10-ENG.iso
SHA256:
1f505f4edd31ff0394207c6640f8dc8ec0923c24234fc7e61e
21579ce4da573f
HF10 Download
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 DOC Documentation Supplement ISO
(CommonCriteriaDocumentation-11.5.1.iso), containing [9]
SHA256:
1f505f4edd31ff0394207c6640f8dc8ec0923c24234fc7e61e
21579ce4da573f
Note: Version 1.33 of [9] is the given version number of the
main guigance document 'Guidance Supplement:
AGD_PRE and AGD_OPE'. It is contained in the
documentation supplement iso image, which is labeled as
of version 11.5.1 like the TOE itself.
11.05.01 Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The appliance on which the TOE will run may be shipped pre-installed with any version of
the BIG-IP software. For the evaluated configuration, the user has to explicitly install and
verify the evaluated release according to the instructions given in [9].
The software is downloaded from https://downloads.f5.com. The ISO images of the TOE
as well as HF10 have to be downloaded individually and then need to be copied onto the
appliance either via SSH or via an upload from the GUI. BIG-IP will perform an integrity
check of the image. The TLS protected download page also provides the digital signatures
of the ISO images for verification. The guidance is downloaded from https://askF5.com
which resolves to https://support.f5.com and is provided as part of an ISO image. The
guidance also instructs the user on how to verify the signatures of the TOE and HF10 ISO-
images or checksums of the guidance ISO image.
Using the guidance and the SHA256 checksums provided in this certification report, the
integrity of all images can be verified.
From the GUI, "System->Software Management: Image List" can be used to identify the
currently running version of the TOE. Alternatively, the command string "tmsh show sys
software status" can be used on the command line.
The output will be
'BIG-IP 11.5.1 10.123.180' and should be displayed as 'Active' and 'Complete'.
This corresponds to the major version 11, minor version 5, maintenance release 1, hotfix
10 and build 10.123.180.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The security policy enforced is
defined by the selected set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the
TOE. The TOE implements a role-based access control policy to control administrative
access to the system.
In addition, the TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional
classes: Security Audit, Cryptographic Support, User Data Protection, Identification and
Authentication, Access Control, Traffic Management, VPN and Security Management. All
of these functions are supported by TSF protection mechanisms including failover
functions. Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found
in Section 7 of the Security Target [6].
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Section 2.1 of [9] titled
"Preparing for BIG-IP Installation and Configuration" lists expectations on the customer
when preparing to use the TOE:
● Installed in a secure location
● No general purpose computing
● Trained administrators
● Trusted administrators
● Operational environment resources available and TOE attached to appropriate networks
● Keys and certificates used conform to the stated requirements
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an Application Delivery Controller (ADC) based on F5's Traffic Management
Operating System (TMOS).
The TOE includes the Local Traffic Manager (LTM) and Access Policy Manager (APM)
modules, providing network traffic management, and VPN gateway functionality.
BIG-IP runs on F5's TMOS (Linux: CentOS 5.4), either directly on appliance hardware or in
a Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) environment. vCMP is a hypervisor that allows
organizations to run multiple virtual Instances of the TOEs on the same hardware.
The relationships of TOE components in the evaluated configuration are shown in Figure 2
of the Security Target [6]. Virtual editions of the TOE running on third-party hypervisors are
excluded from the certified scope.
BIG-IP can be connected in a redundant configuration to an identical (redundant) BIG-IP
for failover purposes.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
Test Configuration
The test results provided by the developer were generated on the following systems:
B4300, B4300+VCMP, 10000, 10000+VCMP, 7000, 10200, 5200, 5000.
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The developer has performed his tests on the above listed hardware platforms. The
software was installed and configured as defined in the document "Guidance Supplement:
AGD_PRE and AGD_OPE" [9].
Test Approach
The developer did not perform all tests on all platforms. The tests where performed on the
platforms defined in the Security Target [6]. Only hardware-specific tests where executed
on the specific hardware i.e. on the 5000 and 7000 series although they use the same
chip-set. The vCMP platform was used for just two of the test runs as it does not have an
impact on the actual results. In general, the TOE does not have any hardware
dependencies apart from the Cavium chip for entropy, which was available on all tests.
The developer devised manual tests for testing specific functionality. Protocol compliance
testing was performed via standard tools TAHI for IPv6 compliance tests and IxANVL for
all other protocol compliance tests.
Test Results
The test results provided by the developer were generated on the hardware platforms
listed above. The developer uses the tool 'ap test manager' to track the tests and records
the verdict with the test runs.
All test results from all tested environments show that the expected test results are
identical to the actual test results.
The developer did not test all machines of all families mentioned in the Security Target [6]
but only once for each CPU and co-processor. Differences between the machines are
related to the provided hardware environment that has no impact on the security of the
TOE.
Test Coverage
The functional specification has identified the following different TSFI:
CLI: The command-line shell (tmsh) accessed via SSH.
Configuration Utility (GUI): The web GUI accessed via HTTPS/TLS.
iControl API: A SOAP based API.
Network Protocols: The network protocols supported for administrative tasks as well as
the protocols supported by the proxy functions.
The test mapping provided by the developer shows that the tests cover all individual TSFI
identified for the TOE. An extension to this mapping by the evaluator also shows that the
TSFI have been covered with the developer’s test suite.
Test Depth
In addition to the mapping to the functional specification, the developer provided a
mapping of test cases to subsystems of the high-level design. This mapping shows that all
subsystems and the internal interfaces are covered by test cases. To show evidence that
the internal interfaces have been called, the developer provided the description of the
internal interfaces as part of the design.
Conclusion
The evaluator has verified that developer testing was performed on hardware conformant
to the Security Target [6].
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The evaluator was able to follow and fully understand the developer testing approach by
using the information provided by the developer.
The evaluator analysed the developer testing coverage and the depth of the testing by
reviewing all test cases. The evaluator found the testing of the TSF to be extensive and
covering the TSFI as identified in the functional specification as well as the subsystem
internal interfaces identified in the design documentation.
The evaluator reviewed the test results provided by the developer and found them to be
consistent with the expected test results according to the test plan.
7.2. Evaluator Testing Effort
Test Configuration
The evaluator verified the test systems according to the documentation in the 'Evaluated
Configuration Guide [9]' and the test plan.
Evaluator Tests Performed
In addition to running a random sample of the developer tests, the evaluator devised tests
for a subset of the TOE.
The evaluator has chosen these tests for the following reasons:
● The test cases examine some of the security functions of the TOE in more detail than
the developer-supplied test cases.
● The test cases cover security aspects not included in the developer testing
The evaluator created several test cases for testing a few functional aspects where the
developer test cases were not considered by the evaluator to be broad enough. During the
evaluator's review of the test cases provided by the developer, the evaluator gained
confidence in the developer testing effort and the depth of test coverage in the developer
supplied test cases. The analysis has shown a very wide coverage of the TSF, therefore
the evaluator devised only a small number of test cases.
Summary of Evaluator Test Results
The tests were performed remotely at the developer's data center via VPN as well as on-
site. Only one test configuration was used as the SFRs are not dependent on the
hardware platform.
SSH was used for console access and HTTPS connections for the GUI and iControl. The
TOE was installed on the test machine by the evaluator according to the instructions in [9]
and verified by the evaluator. The configuration triggered by the ccmode script8
ensured
the evaluation-compliant system configuration. After running the automated configuration,
no further system configuration was performed and only the specifics for the test cases
were set up. The test systems were therefore configured according to the Security Target
[6] and the instructions in [9]. The developer provided manual test cases. The evaluator
verified the configuration against [9] before conducting the independent tests. The test
results were analysed for completeness and failures.
All the test results conformed to the expected test results from the test plan.
8
The ccmode command is the first step in configuring the BIG-IP to be compliant with specific Common
Criteria requirements. It performs functions such as setting the required password policy, the allowed
ciphersuites for SSL, logging options, etc.
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In addition to repeating a subset of developer tests, the evaluator decided to run some
additional test cases on the provided test systems:
● Verification of the firewall via nmap scans.
● SSLv3 and SSLv2 handshake attempts to verify that they are not supported.
● TLS with disallowed ciphers to verify that they are not supported (no downgrade).
● Code analysis of the iControl python test scripts.
Finally, a test suite related to specifics of the TOE's cryptographic functions was devised
and run. All tests passed successfully.
7.3. Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator took the following approach to derive penetration tests for the TOE:
The evaluator decided to not generate simple penetration tests, but instead to perform a
source code analysis for some of the identified potential vulnerabilities.
The evaluator has performed his analysis on the TOE source code that was available via
the developer's source browsing tool as well as via shell access to a complete source tree.
The analysis addressed the following security functions because they were considered to
be the most important parts of the code where the TOE's security policy was enforced, and
where the evaluator could assess whether the enforcement could be bypassed or not:
● Network interfaces: General TSF protection.
● User data handling interfaces: General TSF protection.
● Privilege escalation for administrative roles: Separation of roles.
● Issues reported from CPPCheck: General source code analysis.
No residual vulnerabilities for the TOE were identified.
In addition, some of the testing conducted as part of the evaluators independent testing
can be considered penetration testing. It is shown in the chapter on the evaluator testing
above.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the evaluated configuration which consists of BIG-IP ADC-AP
Version 11.5.1 HF10 (build10.123.180).
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE:
● Appliance mode is licensed. This results, amongst other effects, in root access to the
underlying system being disabled, and Always-On Management not being able to
access the host.
● A physical network port is dedicated on each device for the exchange of management
traffic with the mirrored device (configuration synchronization, failover monitoring).
● Dynamic routing is excluded from the evaluated configuration.
The following interfaces are disabled:
● Shells other than tmsh (e.g. bash and other user-serviceable shells).
● Management of the TOE via SNMP.
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● Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display.
● Remote (i.e., SSH) access to the Lights-Out / Always-On Management capabilities of the
system.
● Serial port console.
The evaluated configuration is limited to the physical and logical boundaries as mentioned
in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.5.5, especially is it limited to the listed Hardware
configurations.
Virtual editions of the TOE running on third-party hypervisors are excluded from the
certified scope.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0856-2017, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the licensed functionality and
the inclusion of a hotfix as compared to the TOE of BSI-DSZ-CC-0856-2017. The base
evaluation included the Advanced Firewall Manager module, whereas the current
evaluation does not include this firewall functionality, but instead the Access Policy
Manager module for VPN and web gateway functionality. The TOE for this evaluation is
therefore a different instantiation of the same BIG-IP base product, with only the availability
of the above named functionality being different. No other changes have been made to the
TOE.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA signature verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using SHA-1
FIPSPUB186-39
(RSA)
referring to RFC3447
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPSPUB180-310
(SHA)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072,
4096
no Algorithms
used
depending on
the signature
algorithm /
hash
algorithm
used for
signing the
certificates
and the
accepted
signature
algorithms /
hash
algorithms by
the peers.
Server
certificates
required and
client
certificates
optional.
Verification of
certificate
signatures
provided for
authentication
of peers.
The
certificates
are not
generated by
the TOE11
2 RSA signature verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using SHA-256, SHA-384
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072
4096
yes
3 ECDSA signature
generation and verification
using SHA-1
FIPSPUB186-3 (ECDSA),
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA),
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
no
4 ECDSA signature
generation and verification
using SHA-256, SHA-384
FIPSPUB186-3 (ECDSA),
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA)
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
yes
9
Note, that FIPSPUB186-3 is obsoleted by FIPSPUB186-4.
10
Note, that FIPSPUB180-3 is obsoleted by FIPSPUB180-4.
11
Please note that the TOE in general can handle signature algorithms with smaller key sizes than those
listed above and using weak hash functions (e.g. MD5). However, the administrator is advised not to import
certificates with such signatures. The same holds true for signing algorithms and respective hash functions
as contained in the certificate itself.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
(imported into
the TOE).
5 Authentication
Client
Depending on
client's
certificate if any
(subject public
key info and key
usage).
RSA signature generation
(client) and verification
(server).
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_512
)
using SHA-1
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072,
4096
no Certificates
with signing
capability.
Client cert
type:
rsa_sign.
CertificateVeri
fy: Client
provides
signature
over the
whole
handshake
message
Only for
TLSv1.1.
6 RSA signature generation
(client) and verification
(server).
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using SHA-256, SHA-384
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072
4096
yes
7 RSA signature generation
(client) and verification
(server).
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using MD5 / SHA-1
combination
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
RFC4346 (TLSv1.1)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072
4096
no
8 ECDSA signature
generation and verification
using SHA-1
FIPSPUB186-3 (ECDSA),
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA),
RFC4492 (ECC for TLS)
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
no Client cert
Type:
ecdsa_sign.
The public
key of the
certificate
MUST use a
curve and
point format
supported by
the server.
9 ECDSA signature
generation and verification
using SHA-256, SHA-384
FIPSPUB186-3 (ECDSA),
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA),
RFC4492 (ECC for TLS)
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
yes
10 Authentication
Server (static)13
Generating and verifying the
PRF contained in the
“Finished message”.
(TLS_RSA, TLS_ECDH)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
RFC4346 (TLSv1.1)
Please refer
to PRF within
key derivation
below.
12
Implicitly EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method is required based on block type 1 (PS= FF).
13
Static keys / parameter contained in the certificate. Server Certificate must contain the RSA key or the
ECDH parameters pub key. Key usage encipherment (RSA) and key exchange for (ECDH params). By
successfully decoding the premaster secret (RSA) or computing / agree upon the premaster secret ECDH
shared secret) and producing a correct “Finished message” with the master secret derived from the
premaster secret as key, the server demonstrates that it knows the private key corresponding to the
certificate. For TLS >= 1.1 it is only historical to list the key authentication key within the cipher since cert
signing is not any longer bound to the key contained in the cipher provided for key authentication.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
11 Authentication
Server
(ephemeral)
RSA signature generation
and verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using SHA-1
(TLS_ECDHE_RSA)
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072 4096
no ServerKeyEx
change: RSA
signature
over the
ephemeral
12 RSA signature generation
and verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using SHA-256, SHA-384
(TLS_ECDHE_RSA)
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072
4096
yes
13 RSA signature generation
(client) and verification
(server).
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using MD5 / SHA-1
combination
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1
RFC4346 (TLSv1.1)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072
4096
no For TLSv1.1
14 ECDSA signature
generation and verification
using SHA-1
(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA)
ANSI X9.62 (ECDSA),
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA),
RFC4492 (ECC for TLS)
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
no See above
however with
ECDSA as
signature
algorithm.
15 ECDSA signature
generation and verification
using SHA-256, SHA-384
(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA)
ANSI X9.62 (ECDSA),
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA),
RFC4492 (ECC for TLS),
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
yes
16 Key
establishment:
Key transport
RSA encryption (client) and
decryption (server)
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_514
)
(TLS_RSA)
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
SP800-56B (IFC key
establishment)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072
4096
yes Server
certificate is
used for key
exchange.
Encrypted
exchange of
pre-master
secret
generated at
client side.
Server
authentication
(#14).
14
Implicitly EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method is required based on block type 2 (PS= random data).
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No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
17 Key
establishment:
Key agreement
Ephemeral
ECDHE RFC4492 (ECC for TLS)
TR-03111 (ECC) SP800-
56-A (ECC DH)
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
yes Unauthenticat
ed ephemeral
ECDH key /
parameters
provided by
the server in
the
ServerKeyEx
change.
This is the
only curve
that is hard
coded in the
TOE.
18 Static ECDH RFC4492 (ECC for TLS)
TR-03111 (ECC)
SP800-56-A (ECC DH)
secp256r1
NIST P-
256
yes The ECDH-
parameters
contained in
the certificate
(static). Since
NIST P-256 is
the only curve
hard coded in
the TOE –
only
certificates
with ECDH
parameters
based on
NIST P-256
will work.
Server
authentication
(#14)
19 Key derivation PRF: HMAC with SHA-256,
384
(default: prf_sha256 for
TLSv1.2, also prf_sha384
possible)
FIPSPUB198-1 (HMAC)
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
variable yes Symmetric
keys and
MAC keys for
record layer.
Pre-master
secret / (DH /
ECDH shared
secret) is
converted into
the master
secret, the
keys of the
record layer
are generated
by expanding
the master
secret using
the security
parameters of
the
handshake
protocol.
20 PRF: HMAC with MD5 and
SHA-1 in combination
(default: prf for TLSv1.1)
FIPSPUB198-1 (HMAC)
RFC1321, RFC6151
(MD5)
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA)
RFC4346 (TLSv1. 1)
variable no
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No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
21 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC with SHA-1 or SHA-
256 or SHA-384 (SHA),
(SHA256),
(SHA384)
FIPSPUB198-1 (HMAC)
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA)
160 (SHA-
1)
256 (SHA-
256)
384 (SHA-
384)
yes Message
authentication
code
(record layer)
22 Trusted
Channel
FTP_ITC.1 [6], sec. 6.1.
10.1 for HTTPS, syslog
Cf. all lines above See above no15
Confidentiality
is provided by
AES-CBC
with key size
256 bits using
non-TSF
(AES-NI).
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality (TLS)
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Authentication RSA signature generation
& verification
RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5
using SHA-1
(ssh-rsa)
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA-1)
RFC4253
(SSH-TRANS) for host
authentication
RFC4252, sec 7
(SSH-USERAUTH) for
user authentication
method: “publickey”
Modulus
length:
1024
no Pubkeys are
exchanged
trustworthy out
of band.
Authenticity is
not part of the
TOE.
(no certificates
used, server
lists are in
general
possible at the
client side –
however client
is not part of
the TOE ).
15
Security properties of TLS are diminished by incomplete verification of the verify_data field in the Finished
message, see section 10.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
2 UserID & password RFC4252, sec.
(SSH-USERAUTH)
method; “password”
Guess
success
prob.
yes [6] FIA_AFL.1:
Recommendat
ion as of [9]
not to change
the default
setting where
the blocking
after 3
attempts is
configured.
Min 15
characters.
No FIA_SOS
claimed.
3 Key
establishment:
Key agreement
DH with
DH group14-sha1
RFC4253
(SSH-TRANS) supported
by
RFC3526 (DH
groups IKE)
FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA-1)
plength=
2048
yes Hard coded in
the TOE code.
4 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC-SHA-1 FIPSPUB180-3 (SHA),
RFC2104 (HMAC),
RFC4251 / RFC4253
(SSH general / detailed
HMAC support),
RFC4253 (SSH detailed
HMAC support)
|k|=160 yes Binary packet
protocol:
message
authentication
5 Key generation RSA key generation FIPSPUB186-3, B.3.3 and
C.3 for
Miller Rabin primality tests.
n/a n/a FCS_CKM.1
Host key
generation
using
FCS_RBG_E
XT.1
6 Trusted path FTP_TRP.1, [6] section
6.1.10.2 for SSH
yes/no16
Confidentiality
is provided by
AES-CBC with
key size 256
bits using non-
TSF (AES-NI).
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality (SSH)
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
16
Depending on the sec. level of the used mechanisms above.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Please note that upon detecting a block cipher CBC padding error, the record decryption
aborts with a masked error (the same error code as for a MAC error) without
unconditionally computing a MAC as countermeasure against information leakage. In
addition, the padding check itself is not implemented in constant time. Consequently, no
constant time unpadding and no constant time MAC verification is implemented in the
TOE. Thus, the TOE is vulnerable to all variants of CBC padding attacks based on timing
side channels. This vulnerability was registered as CVE-2013-0169 with a CVSS base
score of 2.6 LOW.
Please also note that the TOE does not verify every byte in the Finished Message
(Finished.verify_data) of a TLS handshake as required by the TLS protocol. Specifically,
only the first and the last four bytes of the 12 Byte Finished.verify_data message are
checked, while the middle four bytes are being ignored. Incomplete validation of the Finish
Message increases the probability not to detect modifications of the handshake.
These vulnerabilities, however, are not considered to be exploitable by an attacker at the
Enhanced Basic attack potential for EAL4.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● MD2: The TOE includes code that potentially allows the TOE to successfully validate
certificates signed with the md2WithRSAEncryption algorithm. MD2 is no longer
considered a valid and secure hash algorithm. It is thus required to hook into the TOE's
processing of certificates and reject certificates with the undesired algorithm using so
called iRules. See [9], section 2.3.8.3 for more information.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
ADC Application Delivery Controller
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APM Access Policy Manager
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018 Certification Report
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HF Hot Fix
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LTM Local Traffic Manager
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE17
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018, Version 1.6, 2018-02-12, BIG-IP 11.5.1 HF
10 (build 10.123.180) ADC-AP Security Target, F5 Networks, Inc.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 7, 2018-02-15, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, 2017-09-26, CI list for documentation in Perforce
(confidential document)
[9] Documentation Supplement ISO (CommonCriteriaDocumentation-11.5.1.iso),
containing 'Guidance Supplement: AGD_PRE and AGD_OPE', Version 1.33, 2017-
07-05
17
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0975-2018
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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C. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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