STMicroelectronics
SA/SB33F1MD
Security Target -
Public Version
Common Criteria for IT security
evaluation
SMD_Sx33F1M_ST_10_001 Rev 01.00
June 2010
BLANK
June 2010 SMD_Sx33F1M_ST_10_001 Rev 01.00 3/57
SA/SB33F1MD
Security Target - Public Version
Common Criteria for IT security evaluation
1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target reference
1 Document identification: SA/SB33F1MD SECURITY TARGET - PUBLIC VERSION.
2 Version number: Rev 01.00, issued June 2010.
3 Registration: registered at ST Microelectronics under number
SMD_Sx33F1M_ST_10_001_V01.00.
1.2 Purpose
4 This document presents the Security Target - Public version (ST) of the SA33F1MD and
SB33F1MD, Security Integrated Circuits (IC), with Dedicated Software (DSW) and an
embedded cryptographic library, designed on the ST33 platform of STMicroelectronics.
5 This document is a sanitized version of the Security Target used for the evaluation. It is
classified as public information.
6 The precise reference of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and the security IC features are
given in Section 3: TOE description.
7 A glossary of terms and abbreviations used in this document is given in Appendix A:
Glossary
www.st.com
Contents SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version
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Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Security Target reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 TOE description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1 TOE overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 TOE life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 TOE environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.1 TOE Development Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.2 TOE production environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.3 TOE operational environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 Conformance claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1 Common Criteria conformance claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 PP Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.1 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.2 PP Refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.3 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.4 PP Claims rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5 Security problem definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1 Description of assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3 Organisational security policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.4 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6 Security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1 Security objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2 Security objectives for the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.3 Security objectives rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.3.1 TOE threat "Memory Access Violation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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6.3.2 Organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality"
27
6.3.3 Organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the Security IC
Embedded Software" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7 Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1.4 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1.5 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.6 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.7 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.8 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.9 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.10 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.11 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.12 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.13 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.14 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories] . . . . . . . 34
7.1.15 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.16 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories] . . . . 34
7.1.17 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Memories] . . . . 35
7.1.18 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Issuer] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.19 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Issuer] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.20 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader] . . 35
7.1.21 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.22 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1.23 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1.24 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader] . . . . . . . 36
7.1.25 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader] . . . . . . 36
7.2 TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.3.1 Refinement regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP) . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.3.2 Refinement regarding test coverage (ATE_COV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.4 Security Requirements rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
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7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8 TOE summary specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.4 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Issuer] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.5 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test] & [Issuer] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.6 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.7 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.8 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1), Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) & Subset information flow control
(FDP_IFC.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.9 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.10 Cryptographic operation: DES / 3DES operation (FCS_COP.1 [EDES]) . 46
8.11 Cryptographic operation: RSA operation (FCS_COP.1 [RSA]) . . . . . . . . 47
8.12 Cryptographic operation: AES operation (FCS_COP.1 [AES]) for SB33F1M
only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.13 Cryptographic operation: Elliptic Curves Cryptography operation
(FCS_COP.1 [ECC]) for SB33F1M only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.14 Cryptographic operation: SHA operation (FCS_COP.1 [SHA]) . . . . . . . . 47
8.15 Cryptographic key generation: Prime generation (FCS_CKM.1
[Prime_generation]) & Cryptographic key generation: Protected prime
generation (FCS_CKM.1 [Protected_prime_generation]) . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.16 Cryptographic key generation: RSA key generation (FCS_CKM.1
[RSA_key_generation]) & Cryptographic key generation: Protected RSA key
generation (FCS_CKM.1 [Protected_RSA_key_generation]) . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.17 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.18 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories] & Specification
of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.19 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories] & Security attribute
based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.20 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader] . . . 48
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8.21 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.22 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader] & Specification of
management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.23 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader] & Security attribute based
access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix A Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.1 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.2 Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10 Revision history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
List of tables SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version
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List of tables
Table 1. Products and versions of the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 3. Summary of security environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 4. Summary of security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 7. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table 8. FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table 9. TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table 10. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-0035 refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 11. Dependencies of security functional requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 12. List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Table 13. Document revision history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version List of figures
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List of figures
Figure 1. SA/SB33F1MD block diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 2. Security IC life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Context SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version
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2 Context
8 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) referred to in Section 3: TOE description, is evaluated under
the French IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme and is developed by the SMD
Division of STMicroelectronics (ST).
9 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) comprises the SA33F1MD and SB33F1MD.
10 The assurance level of the performed Common Criteria (CC) IT Security Evaluation is EAL 5
augmented.
11 The intent of this Security Target is to specify the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) applicable to the SA33F1MD and
SB33F1MD security ICs, and to summarise their chosen TSF services and assurance
measures.
12 This ST claims to be an instantiation of the "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" (PP)
registered and certified under the reference BSI-PP-0035 in the German IT Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme, with the following augmentations:
• Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG
• Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from AUG
• Additions specific to this Security Target.
The original text of this PP is typeset as indicated here, its augmentations from AUG as
indicated here, when they are reproduced in this document.
13 Extensions introduced in this ST to the SFRs of the Protection Profile (PP) are exclusively
drawn from the Common Criteria part 2 standard SFRs.
14 This ST makes various refinements to the above mentioned PP and AUG. They are all
properly identified in the text typeset as indicated here. The original text of the PP is
repeated as scarcely as possible in this document for reading convenience. All PP identifiers
have been however prefixed by their respective origin label: BSI for BSI-PP-0035, AUG1 for
Addition #1 of AUG and AUG4 for Addition #4 of AUG.
SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version TOE description
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3 TOE description
3.1 TOE overview
15 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) comprises two products: the SA33F1MD and SB33F1MD.
Both products share the same hardware design, and the same maskset. The different
derivates differ only on the associated cryptographic library, as detailed here below:
16 In this Security Target, the terms "TOE" or "Sx33F1M" or "SA/SB33F1MD" mean both
products.
17 The rest of this document applies to both products, except when a particular mention to one
of the products is added. For easier reading, the restrictions corresponding to a particular
product are typeset as indicated here.
18 The TOE comprises two possible versions of Neslib, a SA and a SB version.
19 The TOE is a serial access Smartcard IC designed for secure mobile applications, based on
the most recent generation of ARM® processors for embedded secure systems. Its
SecurCore® SC300™ 32-bit RISC core is built on the Cortex™ M3 core with additional
security features to help to protect against advanced forms of attacks.
20 The SA33F1MD and SB33F1MD offer 1280 KBytes high-density User Flash memory, an
internally generated clock, an MPU, an internal true random number generator (TRNG) and
accelerators dedicated to cryptographic algorithms.
21 Operations can be synchronized with an external clock or with an internally generated clock
issued by the Clock Generator module. The internal speed of the device is fully software
programmable. High performance can be reached by using high speed internal clock
frequency (up to 25 MHz). The CPU interfaces with the on-chip RAM, ROM and EEPROM
memories via a 32-bit internal bus.
22 This device includes the ARM® SecurCore® SC300™ memory protection unit (MPU),
which enables the user to define its own region organization with specific protection and
access permissions. The MPU can be used to enforce various protection models, ranging
from a basic code dump prevention model up to a full application confinement model.
23 The E-DES (Enhanced DES) module supports efficiently the Data Encryption Standard
(DES [2]) with built-in coutermeasures against side channel attacks. Additionally, an extra
feature allows fast implementation of CBC and CBC-MAC modes [10] [9].
24 The NESCRYPT (NExt Step CRYPTo-processor) is the latest generation of ST
cryptographic accelerator providing native modular arithmetic for both GF(p) and GF(2n
)
with a very high level of performance. NESCRYPT also includes dedicated instructions to
Table 1. Products and versions of the TOE
Product name
Product
version
Product identification
number (1)
Product and System
ROM version (2)
Crypto library
name
Crypto library
version (3)
SA33F1MD D 0000h 0007h Neslib SA 3.0 1300h
SB33F1MD D 0000h 0007h Neslib SB 3.0 1300h
1. See the Datasheet referenced in Section 9 .
2. See the System ROM User Manual referenced in Section 9.
3. See the Neslib User Manual referenced in Section 9 .
TOE description SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version
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accelerate SHA-1 and SHA-2 family hash functions. NESCRYPT allows efficient and secure
implementation of almost all known public key cryptosystems with a high level of
performance ([4], [8], [12], [18],[19], [20], [21]).
25 As randomness is a key stone in many applications, the SA/SB33F1MD feature a highly
reliable True Random Number Generator (TRNG), compliant with P2 Class of AIS-31 [1]
and directly accessible through dedicated registers.
26 The SA33F1MD and SB33F1MD offer 3 communication channels to the external world: a
serial communication interface fully compatible with the ISO/IEC 7816-3 standard, a single-
wire protocol (SWP) interface for communication with a near-field communication (NFC)
router in SIM/NFC applications, and an optional and exclusive SPI Slave interface for
communication in non-SIM applications.
27 In a few words, the SA/SB33F1MD offer a unique combination of high performances and
very powerful features for high level security:
• Die integrity,
• Monitoring of environmental parameters,
• Protection mechanisms against faults,
• Hardware Security Enhanced DES accelerator,
• AIS-31 class P2 compliant True Random Number Generator,
• ISO 3309 CRC calculation block,
• Memory Protection Unit,
• NExt Step CRYPTography accelerator (NESCRYPT).
28 The TOE includes in the OST ROM a Dedicated Software which provides full test
capabilities (operating system for test, called "OST"), not accessible by the Security IC
Embedded Software (ES), after TOE delivery.
29 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Software which provides a
very reduced set of commands for final test (operating system for final test, called "FTOS"),
not intended for the Security IC Embedded Software (ES) usage, and not available in User
configuration.
30 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Support Software called
Secure Flash Loader, enabling to securely and efficiently download the Security IC
Embedded Software (ES) into the NVM. It also allows the evaluator to load software into the
TOE for test purpose. The Secure Flash Loader is not available in User configuration.
31 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Support Software, which
provides low-level functions (called Flash Drivers), enabling the Security IC Embedded
Software (ES) to modify and manage the NVM contents. The Flash Drivers are available all
through the product life-cycle.
32 The SA33F1M comprises a specific application in User NVM: this applicative Embedded
Software is a cryptographic library called Neslib SA. Neslib SA is a cutting edge
cryptographic library in terms of security and performance.
Neslib SA is embedded by the ES developper in his applicative code. The whole ES is not
part of the TOE, only Neslib SA is part of the TOE and is in the scope of this evaluation.
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Neslib SA provides the most commonly used operations in public key algorithms and
protocols:
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module, supporting secure modular
arithmetic with large integers, with specialized functions for Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Standard cryptographic algorithm (RSA [20]),
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides secure hash functions
(SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 [4]),
• prime number generation [6].
33 The SB23YTxx comprises a specific application in User NVM: this applicative Embedded
Software is a cryptographic library called Neslib SB. Neslib SB is a cutting edge
cryptographic library in terms of security and performance.
Neslib SB is embedded by the ES developper in his applicative code. The whole ES is not
part of the TOE, only Neslib SB is part of the TOE and is in the scope of this evaluation.
Neslib SB provides the most useful operations in public key algorithms and protocols:
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module, supporting secure modular
arithmetic with large integers, with specialized functions for Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Standard cryptographic algorithm (RSA [20]),
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides very efficient basic
functions to build up protocols using Elliptic Curves Cryptography on prime fields GF(p)
[18],
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides secure hash functions
(SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 [4]),
• a symmetric key cryptographic support module whose base algorithm is the Advanced
Encryption Standard cryptographic algorithm (AES [7]),
• prime number generation [6].
34 Figure 1 provides an overview of the SA/SB33F1MD.
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Figure 1. SA/SB33F1MD block diagram
3.2 TOE life cycle
35 This Security Target is fully conform to the claimed PP. In the following, just a summary and
some useful explanations are given. For complete details on the TOE life cycle, please refer
to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), section 1.2.3.
36 The composite product life cycle is decomposed into 7 phases. Each of these phases has
the very same boundaries as those defined in the claimed protection profile.
37 The life cycle phases are summarized in Table 2.
38 The limit of the evaluation corresponds to phases 2 and 3, including the delivery and
verification procedures of phase 1, and the TOE delivery to the IC packaging manufacturer ;
procedures corresponding to phases 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are outside the scope of this
evaluation.
39 The TOE Manufacturer, as defined in [BSI-PP-0035], is STMicroelectronics.
40 In the following, the term "Composite product manufacturing" is uniquely used to indicate
phases 1, 4, 5 and 6 all together.
This ST also uses the term "Composite product manufacturer" which includes all roles
responsible of the TOE during phases 1, 4, 5 and 6.
41 In the following, the term "TOE delivery" is uniquely used to indicate after phase 3 (or before
phase 4). The TOE is delivered after phase 3, in ISSUER or in USER configuration,
depending on the customer’s request.
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42 The following figure shows the possible organization of the life cycle, adapted to the TOE
which comprises programmable NVM. Thus, the Security IC Embedded Software may be
loaded onto the TOE in phase 3, 4, 5 or 6, depending on customer’s choice.
Figure 2. Security IC life cycle
Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases
Phase Name Description Responsible party
1
IC embedded software
development
security IC embedded software
development
specification of IC pre-personalization
requirements
IC embedded software
developer
2 IC development
IC design
IC dedicated software development
IC developer: ST
3 IC manufacturing
integration and photomask fabrication
IC production
IC testing
pre-personalisation
IC manufacturer: ST
4 IC packaging
security IC packaging (and testing)
pre-personalisation if necessary
IC packaging
manufacturer
5
Composite product
integration
composite product finishing process
composite product testing
Composite product
integrator
6 Personalisation
composite product personalisation
composite product testing
Personaliser
7 Operational usage
composite product usage by its issuers
and consumers
End-consumer
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3.3 TOE environment
43 Considering the TOE, three types of environments are defined:
• Development environment corresponding to phase 2,
• Production environment corresponding to phase 3,
• Operational environment, including phase 1 and from phase 4 to phase 7.
3.3.1 TOE Development Environment
44 To ensure security, the environment in which the development takes place is secured with
controllable accesses having traceability. Furthermore, all authorised personnel involved
fully understand the importance and the strict implementation of defined security
procedures.
45 The development begins with the TOE's specification. All parties in contact with sensitive
information are required to abide by Non-Disclosure Agreements.
46 Design and development of the IC then follows, together with the dedicated and engineering
software and tools development. The engineers use secure computer systems (preventing
unauthorised access) to make their developments, simulations, verifications and generation
of the TOE's databases. Sensitive documents, files and tools, databases on tapes, and
printed circuit layout information are stored in appropriate locked cupboards/safe. Of
paramount importance also is the disposal of unwanted data (complete electronic erasures)
and documents (e.g. shredding).
47 The development centres involved in the development of the TOE are the following: ST
ROUSSET and ST ANG MO KIO, for the design activities, ST ROUSSET, for the engineering
activities, ST ROUSSET and ST ZAVENTEM for the software development activities.
48 Reticules and photomasks are generated from the verified IC databases; the former are
used in the silicon Wafer-fab processing. As reticules and photomasks are generated off-
site, they are transported and worked on in a secure environment with accountability and
traceability of all (good and bad) products. During the transfer of sensitive data
electronically, procedures are established to ensure that the data arrive only at the
destination and are not accessible at intermediate stages (e.g. stored on a buffer server
where system administrators make backup copies).
49 The authorized sub-contractors involved in the TOE mask manufacturing can be DNP JAPAN
and DPE ITALY.
3.3.2 TOE production environment
50 As high volumes of product commonly go through such environments, adequate control
procedures are necessary to account for all product at all stages of production.
51 Production starts within the Wafer-fab; here the silicon wafers undergo the diffusion
processing. Computer tracking at wafer level throughout the process is commonplace. The
wafers are then taken into the test area. Testing of each TOE occurs to assure conformance
with the device specification. The wafers are then delivered for assembly onto the composite
products.
52 The authorized front-end plant involved in the manufacturing of the TOE is ST ROUSSET.
53 The authorized EWS plant involved in the testing of the TOE is ST ROUSSET.
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3.3.3 TOE operational environment
54 A TOE operational environment is the environment of phases 1, then 4 to 7.
55 At phases 1, 4, 5 and 6, the TOE operational environment is a controlled environment.
56 End-user environments (phase 7): composite products are used in a wide range of
applications to assure authorised conditional access. Examples of such are pay-TV, banking
cards, portable communication SIM cards, health cards, transportation cards, identity and
passport cards. The end-user environment therefore covers a wide range of very different
functions, thus making it difficult to avoid and monitor any abuse of the TOE.
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4 Conformance claims
4.1 Common Criteria conformance claims
57 The SA/SB33F1MD Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version
3.1.
58 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 (CCMB-2009-07-002) extended and CC Part 3
(CCMB-2009-07-003) conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are
those defined in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035).
59 The assurance level for the SA/SB33F1MD Security Target is EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
4.2 PP Claims
4.2.1 PP Reference
60 The SA/SB33F1MD Security Target claims strict conformance to the Security IC Platform
Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), as required by this Protection Profile.
4.2.2 PP Refinements
61 The main refinements operated on the BSI-PP-0035 are:
• Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG,
• Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from AUG,
• Specific additions for the Secure Flash Loader
• Refinement of assurance requirements.
62 All refinements are indicated with type setting text as indicated here, original text from the
BSI-PP-0035 being typeset as indicated here. Text originating in AUG is typeset as indicated
here.
4.2.3 PP Additions
63 The security environment additions relative to the PP are summarized in Table 3.
64 The additional security objectives relative to the PP are summarized in Table 4.
65 A simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is added.
66 The additional SFRs for the TOE relative to the PP are summarized in Table 6.
67 The additional SARs relative to the PP are summarized in Table 9.
4.2.4 PP Claims rationale
68 The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and
those of BSI-PP-0035, to which conformance is claimed, have been identified and justified
in Section 6 and in Section 7. They have been recalled in the previous section.
69 In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives,
and the security requirements are consistent with those of the BSI-PP-0035.
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70 The security problem definition presented in Section 5, clearly shows the additions to the
security problem statement of the PP.
71 The security objectives rationale presented in Section 6.3 clearly identifies modifications
and additions made to the rationale presented in the BSI-PP-0035.
72 Similarly, the security requirements rationale presented in Section 7.4 has been updated
with respect to the protection profile.
73 All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements
whose completeness, consistency and soundness have been argued in the rationale
sections of the present document.
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5 Security problem definition
74 This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended
to be used and addresses the description of the assets to be protected, the threats, the
organisational security policies and the assumptions.
75 Note that the origin of each security aspect is clearly identified in the prefix of its label.
76 Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the Security IC Platform
Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), section 3. Only those originating in AUG, and the one
introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the following sections.
77 A summary of all these security aspects and their respective conditions is provided in
Table 3.
5.1 Description of assets
78 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are:
• the User Data,
• the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation,
• the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
79 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security
concerns:
SC1 integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being
executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories),
SC2 confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being
processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories)
SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC
Embedded Software.
Application note:
The TOE providing a functionality for Security IC Embedded Software secure loading
into NVM, the ES is considered as User Data being stored in the TOE’s memories at
this step, and the above security concerns are extended accordingly.
80 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related to
security service:
SC4 deficiency of random numbers.
81 To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality. Therefore
critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes:
• logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration
data,
• Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and
characterisation related data, material for software development support, and
photomasks.
Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above
assets.
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82 The information and material produced and/or processed by ST in the TOE development
and production environment (Phases 2 to 3) can be grouped as follows:
• logical design data,
• physical design data,
• IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialisation Data and pre-
personalisation Data,
• specific development aids,
• test and characterisation related data,
• material for software development support, and
• photomasks and products in any form
as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by ST.
5.2 Threats
83 The threats are described in the BSI-PP-0035, section 3.2. Only those originating in AUG
are detailed in the following section.
Table 3. Summary of security environment
Label Title
TOE
threats
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
OSPs
BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality (Cipher Scheme
Support)
P.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software
Assumptions
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
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5.3 Organisational security policies
84 The TOE provides specific security functionality that can be used by the Security IC
Embedded Software. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not
derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment because it can only be decided in
the context of the Security IC application, against which threats the Security IC Embedded
Software will use the specific security functionality.
85 ST applies the Protection policy during TOE Development and Production (BSI.P.Process-
TOE) as specified below.
86 ST applies the Additional Specific Security Functionality policy (AUG1.P.Add-Functions) as
specified below.
87 A new Organisational Security Policy (OSP) is defined here below. This OSP is related to
the capability provided by the TOE to load Security IC Embedded Software into the NVM
after TOE delivery, in a controlled manner, during composite product manufacturing. The
use of this capability is optional, and depends on the customer’s production organization
BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation:
Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may cause security violations
by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include
code). Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific
application context and must be implemented by the Security IC
Embedded Software.
Clarification: This threat does not address the proper definition and
management of the security rules implemented by the Security IC
Embedded Software, this being a software design and correctness issue.
This threat addresses the reliability of the abstract machine targeted by the
software implementation. To avert the threat, the set of access rules
provided by this TOE should be undefeated if operated according to the
provided guidance. The threat is not realized if the Security IC Embedded
Software is designed or implemented to grant access to restricted
information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is granted under
unexpected conditions or if the execution machinery does not effectively
control a controlled access.
Here the attacker is expected to (i) take advantage of flaws in the design
and/or the implementation of the TOE memory access rules (refer to
BSI.T.Abuse-Func but for functions available after TOE delivery), (ii)
introduce flaws by forcing operational conditions (refer to
BSI.T.Malfunction) and/or by physical manipulation (refer to BSI.T.Phys-
Manipulation). This attacker is expected to have a high level potential of
attack.
BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production:
An accurate identification is established for the TOE. This requires that
each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.
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5.4 Assumptions
88 The assumptions are described in the BSI-PP-0035, section 3.4.
AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
Security IC Embedded Software:
– Data Encryption Standard (DES),
– Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
– Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), for SB33F1M only,
– Elliptic Curves Cryptography on GF(p), for SB33F1M only,
– Secure Hashing (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512),
– Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
– Prime Number Generation.
Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function in the
context of smart card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software
may need to use triple DES to achieve a suitable strength.
P.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software:
The TOE shall provide the capability to import the Security IC Embedded
Software into the NVM, in a controlled manner, either before TOE delivery,
under ST authority, either after TOE delivery, under the composite product
manufacturer authority.
This capability is not available in User configuration.
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
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6 Security objectives
89 The security objectives of the TOE cover principally the following aspects:
• integrity and confidentiality of assets,
• protection of the TOE and associated documentation during development and
production phases,
• provide random numbers,
• provide cryptographic support and access control functionality.
90 A summary of all security objectives is provided in Table 4. Note that the origin of each
objective is clearly identified in the prefix of its label.
91 Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the protection profile. Only
those originating in AUG, and the one introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the
following sections.
6.1 Security objectives for the TOE
Table 4. Summary of security objectives
Label Title
TOE
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification
BSI.O.RND Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
AUG4.O.Mem-Access Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control
O.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software
Environments
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
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6.2 Security objectives for the environment
92 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment
(phase 1):
93 Security Objectives for the operational Environment (phase 4 up to 6):
6.3 Security objectives rationale
94 The main line of this rationale is that the inclusion of all the security objectives of the BSI-
PP-0035 protection profile, together with those in AUG, guarantees that all the security
BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification
BSI.O.RND Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality to
the Security IC Embedded Software:
– Data Encryption Standard (DES),
– Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
– Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), for SB33F1M only,
– Elliptic Curves Cryptography on GF(p), for SB33F1M only,
– Secure Hashing (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512),
– Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
– Prime Number Generation.
AUG4.O.Mem-Access Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control:
The TOE must provide the Security IC Embedded Software with the
capability to define dynamic memory segmentation and
protection. The TOE must then enforce the defined access rules
so that access of software to memory areas is controlled as required,
for example, in a multi-application environment.
O.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software:
The TOE must provide the capability to load the Security IC
Embedded Software into the NVM, either before TOE delivery, under
ST authority, either after TOE delivery, under the composite product
manufacturer authority. The TOE must restrict the access to these
features. The TOE must provide control means to check the integrity
of the loaded user data.
This capability is not available in User configuration.
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
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environment aspects identified in Section 5 are addressed by the security objectives stated
in this chapter.
95 Thus, it is necessary to show that:
• security environment aspects from AUG, and from this ST, are addressed by security
objectives stated in this chapter,
• security objectives from AUG, and from this ST, are suitable (i.e. they address security
environment aspects),
• security objectives from AUG, and from this ST, are consistent with the other security
objectives stated in this chapter (i.e. no contradictions).
96 The selected augmentations from AUG introduce the following security environment
aspects:
• TOE threat "Memory Access Violation, (AUG4.T.Mem-Access)",
• organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality, (AUG1.P.Add-
Functions)".
97 The augmentation made in this ST introduces the following security environment aspects:
• organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded
Software, (P.Controlled-ES-Loading)".
98 As required by CC Part 1 (CCMB-2009-07-001), no assumption nor objective for the
environment has been added to those of the BSI-PP-0035 Protection Profile to which strict
conformance is claimed.
99 The justification of the additional policies and the additional threat provided in the next
subsections shows that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the protection
profile BSI-PP-0035 for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.
Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies
Assumption, Threat or Organisational
Security Policy
Security Objective Notes
BSI.A.Plat-Appl BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Phase 1
BSI.A.Resp-Appl BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1
BSI.P.Process-TOE BSI.O.Identification Phase 2-3
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 4-6
P.Controlled-ES-Loading O.Controlled-ES-Loading Phase 4-6
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent BSI.O.Leak-Inherent
BSI.T.Phys-Probing BSI.O.Phys-Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction BSI.O.Malfunction
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced BSI.O.Leak-Forced
BSI.T.Abuse-Func BSI.O.Abuse-Func
BSI.T.RND BSI.O.RND
AUG1.P.Add-Functions AUG1.O.Add-Functions
AUG4.T.Mem-Access AUG4.O.Mem-Access
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6.3.1 TOE threat "Memory Access Violation"
100 The justification related to the threat “Memory Access Violation, (AUG4.T.Mem-Access)” is
as follows:
101 According to AUG4.O.Mem-Access the TOE must enforce the dynamic memory
segmentation and protection so that access of software to memory areas is controlled.
Any restrictions are to be defined by the Security IC Embedded Software. Thereby security
violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which may include
code) can be prevented (refer to AUG4.T.Mem-Access). The threat AUG4.T.Mem-Access is
therefore removed if the objective is met.
102 The added objective for the TOE AUG4.O.Mem-Access does not introduce any contradiction
in the security objectives for the TOE.
6.3.2 Organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security
Functionality"
103 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security
Functionality, (AUG1.P.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
104 Since AUG1.O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific
security functionality as required by AUG1.P.Add-Functions, and in the very same
conditions, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective.
105 Nevertheless the security objectives BSI.O.Leak-Inherent, BSI.O.Phys-Probing, ,
BSI.O.Malfunction, BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation and BSI.O.Leak-Forced define how to
implement the specific security functionality required by AUG1.P.Add-Functions. (Note that
these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way
as expected from AUG1.P.Add-Functions.) Especially BSI.O.Leak-Inherent and BSI.O.Leak-
Forced refer to the protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) in general. User
Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by AUG1.P.Add-
Functions.
106 The added objective for the TOE AUG1.O.Add-Functions does not introduce any
contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE.
6.3.3 Organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the Security IC
Embedded Software"
107 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the
Security IC Embedded Software, (P.Controlled-ES-Loading)” is as follows:
108 Since O.Controlled-ES-Loading requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific
security functionality as required by P.Controlled-ES-Loading, and in the very same
conditions, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective.
109 The added objective for the TOE O.Controlled-ES-Loading does not introduce any
contradiction in the security objectives.
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7 Security requirements
110 This chapter on security requirements contains a section on security functional
requirements (SFRs) for the TOE (Section 7.1), a section on security assurance
requirements (SARs) for the TOE (Section 7.2), a section on the refinements of these SARs
(Section 7.3) as required by the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profile. This chapter includes a
section with the security requirements rationale (Section 7.4).
7.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE
111 Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) from the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profile (PP)
are drawn from CCMB-2009-07-002, except the following SFRs, that are extensions to
CCMB-2009-07-002:
• FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers,
• FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability,
• FAU_SAS Audit data storage.
The reader can find their certified definitions in the text of the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection
Profile.
112 All extensions to the SFRs of the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profiles (PPs) are exclusively
drawn from CCMB-2009-07-002.
113 All iterations, assignments, selections, or refinements on SFRs have been performed
according to section C.4 of CCMB-2009-07-001. They are easily identified in the following
text as they appear as indicated here. Note that in order to improve readability, iterations
are sometimes expressed within tables.
114 In order to ease the definition and the understanding of these security functional
requirements, a simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is given in the
following section.
115 The selected security functional requirements for the TOE, their respective origin and type
are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Malfunction BSI-PP-0035
CCMB-2009-07-002
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation
of secure state
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FMT_LIM.1 [Test] Limited capabilities Abuse of TEST
functionality
BSI-PP-0035
Extended
FMT_LIM.2 [Test] Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1
[Issuer]
Limited capabilities
Abuse of ISSUER
functionality
Security Target
Operated
FMT_LIM.2
[Issuer]
Limited availability
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage Lack of TOE identification
BSI-PP-0035
Operated
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical
attack
Physical manipulation &
probing
BSI-PP-0035
CCMB-2009-07-002
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer
protection
Leakage
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow
control
FCS_RNG.1
Random number
generation
Weak cryptographic
quality of random
numbers
BSI-PP-0035
Operated
Extended
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Cipher scheme support
AUG #1
Operated
CCMB-2009-07-002
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation
Security Target
Operated
FDP_ACC.2
[Memories]
Complete access control
Memory access violation
Security Target
Operated
FDP_ACF.1
[Memories]
Security attribute based
access control
AUG #4
Operated
FMT_MSA.3
[Memories]
Static attribute
initialisation
Correct operation
FMT_MSA.1
[Memories]
Management of security
attribute
FMT_SMF.1
[Memories]
Specification of
management functions
Security Target
Operated
Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued)
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
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7.1.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
116 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following failures
occur: exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the
requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).
7.1.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
117 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: exposure
to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement
Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.
118 Refinement:
The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the
“circumstances” defined above.
Regarding application note 15 of BSI-PP-0035, the TOE provides information on the
operating conditions monitored during Security IC Embedded Software execution and after
a warm reset. No audit requirement is however selected in this Security Target.
7.1.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test]
119 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].
7.1.4 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test]
120 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].
121 SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test]
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no
FDP_ITC.1
[Loader]
Import of user data
without security attributes
User data loading access
violation
Security Target
Operated
CCMB-2009-07-002
FDP_ACC.1
[Loader]
Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1
[Loader]
Security attribute based
access control
FMT_MSA.3
[Loader]
Static attribute
initialisation
Correct operation
FMT_MSA.1
[Loader]
Management of security
attribute
FMT_SMF.1
[Loader]
Specification of
management functions
Abuse of ISSUER
functionality
Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued)
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
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substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
attacks.
7.1.5 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)
122 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to store
the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the
Security IC Embedded Software in the NVM.
7.1.6 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
123 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing, to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
124 Refinement:
The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional
requirements are enforced. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i)assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii)countermeasures are provided at any time.
7.1.7 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
125 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to prevent the disclosure of user data
when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
7.1.8 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
126 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure when it is transmitted between separate
parts of the TOE.
127 Refinement:
The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic
co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.
This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User
Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same Data Processing Policy
defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.
7.1.9 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
128 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on all confidential data when they are
processed or transferred by the TSF or by the Security IC Embedded Software.
129 SFP_2: Data Processing Policy
User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Security IC
Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an external interface. The
protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes
controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.
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7.1.10 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)
130 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements a total failure
test of the random source.
131 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet P2 class of BSI-AIS31.
7.1.11 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
132 Depending on the product in Table 7, the TSF shall perform the operations in Table 7 in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm in Table 7 and cryptographic key sizes
of Table 7 that meet the standards in Table 7.
Table 7. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations)
Product Iteration label
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
Sx33F1M
(TOE)
EDES
encryption
decryption
- in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) mode
- in Electronic Code Book
(ECB) mode
MAC computation in CBC-
MAC
Data Encryption
Standard (DES)
56 bits
FIPS PUB 46-3
ISO/IEC 9797-1
ISO/IEC 10116
Triple Data
Encryption
Standard (3DES)
168 bits
Sx33F1M
(TOE)
RSA
RSA public key operation)
RSA private key operation
without the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
RSA private key operation
with the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
Rivest, Shamir &
Adleman’s
up to 4096 bits PKCS #1 V2.1
SB33F1M
AES
encryption (cipher)
decryption (inverse cipher)
key expansion
randomize
Advanced
Encryption
Standard
128, 192 and
256 bits
FIPS PUB 197
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7.1.12 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
133 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm, in Table 8, and specified cryptographic key sizes of Table 8 that meet
the following standards in Table 8.
SB33F1M
ECC
private scalar multiplication
prepare Jacobian
public scalar multiplication
point validity check
convert Jacobian to affine
coordinates
general point addition
point expansion
point compression
Elliptic Curves
Cryptography on
GF(p)
up to 640 bits
IEEE 1363-2000,
chapter 7
IEEE 1363a-2004
Sx33F1M
(TOE)
SHA
SHA-1
SHA-224
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Protected SHA-1
Secure Hash
Algorithm
assignment
pointless
because
algorithm has
no key
FIPS PUB 180-1
FIPS PUB 180-2
ISO/IEC 10118-
3:1998
Table 7. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations) (continued)
Product Iteration label
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
Table 8. FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation)
Iteration label
[assignment: cryptographic
key generation algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic key
sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
Prime generation
prime generation and RSA
prime generation algorithm
up to 2048 bits
FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS PUB 186
Protected prime
generation
prime generation and RSA
prime generation algorithm,
protected against side
channel attacks
up to 2048 bits
FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS PUB 186
RSA key generation
RSA key pair generation
algorithm
up to 4096 bits
FIPS PUB 140-2
ISO/IEC 9796-2
PKCS #1 V2.1
Protected RSA key
generation
RSA key pair generation
algorithm, protected against
side channel attacks
up to 4096 bits
FIPS PUB 140-2
ISO/IEC 9796-2
PKCS #1 V2.1
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7.1.13 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]
134 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to provide minimally
protective(a)
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
135 The TSF shall allow none to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Application note:
The security attributes are the set of access rights currently defined. They are dynamically
attached to the subjects and objects locations, i.e. each logical address.
7.1.14 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories]
136 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to restrict the ability
to modify the security attributes current set of access rights to software running in
privileged mode.
7.1.15 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories]
137 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy on all subjects
(software), all objects (data including code stored in memories) and all operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
138 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any
object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
7.1.16 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories]
139 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to objects based on
the following: software mode, the object location, the operation to be performed, and
the current set of access rights.
140 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: the operation is allowed if and only if the
software mode, the object location and the operation matches an entry in the current
set of access rights.
141 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
142 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: in Issuer or User configuration, any access (read, write, execute) to the OST
ROM is denied, and in User configuration, any write access to the ST NVM is denied.
Note: It should be noted that this level of policy detail is not needed at the application level. The
composite Security Target writer should describe the ES access control and information flow
control policies instead. Within the ES High Level Design description, the chosen setting of
IC security attributes would be shown to implement the described policies relying on the IC
SFP presented here.
143 The following SFP Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement
"Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)":
a. See the Datasheet referenced in Section 9 for actual values.
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144 SFP_3: Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy
145 The TSF must control read, write, execute accesses of software to data, based on the
software mode and on the current set of access rights.
7.1.17 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Memories]
146 The TSF will be able to perform the following management functions: modification of the
current set of access rights security attributes by software running in privileged
mode, supporting the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy.
7.1.18 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Issuer]
147 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Issuer].
7.1.19 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Issuer]
148 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Issuer].
149 SFP_4: Limited capability and availability Policy [Issuer]
150 Deploying Loading or Final Test Artifacts after TOE Delivery to final user (phase 7 / USER
configuration) does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, stored software to be reconstructed or altered, and no substantial
information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
7.1.20 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]
151 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from ouside of the TOE.
152 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the User data when imported
from outside of the TOE.
153 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the
SFP from outside of the TOE:
• the integrity of the loaded user data is checked at the end of each loading
session,
• the loaded user data is received encrypted, internally decrypted, then stored into
the NVM.
7.1.21 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]
154 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
155 The TSF shall allow none to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
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7.1.22 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]
156 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to modify
the security attributes password to the Standard Loader.
7.1.23 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader]
157 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy on the execution of the
Standard Loader instructions and/or the Advanced Loader instructions.
7.1.24 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]
158 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy to objects based on the
following: an external process may execute the Standard Loader instructions and/or
the Advanced Loader instructions, depending on the presentation of valid
passwords.
159 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: the Standard Loader instructions and/or
Advanced Loader instructions can be executed only if valid passwords have been
presented.
160 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
161 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none.
162 The following SFP Loading Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement "Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)":
163 SFP_5: Loading Access Control Policy
164 According to the value of the presented password, the TSF grants execution of the
instructions of the Standard Loader, Advanced Loader or none.
7.1.25 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader]
165 The TSF will be able to perform the following management functions: modification of the
Standard Loader behaviour, by the Advanced Loader, under the Loading Access
Control Policy.
7.2 TOE security assurance requirements
166 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken
from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following
components:
• ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
167 Regarding application note 21 of BSI-PP-0035, the continuously increasing maturity level of
evaluations of Security ICs justifies the selection of a higher-level assurance package.
168 The set of security assurance requirements (SARs) is presented in Table 9, indicating the
origin of the requirement.
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7.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements
169 As BSI-PP-0035 defines refinements for selected SARs, these refinements are also claimed
in this Security Target.
170 The main customizing is that the IC Dedicated Software is an operational part of the TOE
after delivery, although it is not available to the user.
171 Regarding application note 22 of BSI-PP-0035, the refinements for all the assurance
families have been reviewed for the hierarchically higher-level assurance components
selected in this Security Target.
172 The text of the impacted refinements of BSI-PP-0035 is reproduced in the next sections.
173 For reader’s ease, an impact summary is provided in Table 10.
Table 9. TOE security assurance requirements
Label Title Origin
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ADV_FSP.5
Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
EAL5
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ADV_INT.2 Well-stuctured internals EAL5
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design EAL5
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage EAL5
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures BSI-PP-0035
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards EAL5
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design EAL5
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis BSI-PP-0035
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7.3.1 Refinement regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP)
174 Although the IC Dedicated Test Software is a part of the TOE, the test functions of the IC
Dedicated Test Software are not described in the Functional Specification because the IC
Dedicated Test Software is considered as a test tool delivered with the TOE but not
providing security functions for the operational phase of the TOE. The IC Dedicated
Software provides security functionalities as soon as the TOE becomes operational
(boot software). These are properly identified in the delivered documentation.
175 The Functional Specification refers to datasheet to trace security features that do not
provide any external interface but that contribute to fulfil the SFRs e.g. like physical
protection. Thereby they are part of the complete instantiation of the SFRs.
176 The Functional Specification refers to design specifications to detail the mechanisms
against physical attacks described in a more general way only, but detailed enough to be
able to support Test Coverage Analysis also for those mechanisms where inspection of the
layout is of relevance or tests beside the TSFI may be needed.
177 The Functional Specification refers to data sheet to specify operating conditions of the
TOE. These conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power
supply, and the temperature.
178 All functions and mechanisms which control access to the functions provided by the IC
Dedicated Test Software (refer to the security functional requirement (FMT_LIM.2)) are part
of the Functional Specification. Details will be given in the document for ADV_ARC, refer to
Section 6.2.1.5. In addition, all these functions and mechanisms are subsequently be
refined according to all relevant requirements of the Common Criteria assurance class ADV
because these functions and mechanisms are active after TOE Delivery and need to be part
of the assurance aspects Tests (class ATE) and Vulnerability Assessment (class AVA).
Therefore, all necessary information is provided to allow tests and vulnerability assessment.
179 Since the selected higher-level assurance component requires a security functional
specification presented in a “semi-formal style" (ADV_FSP.5.2C) the changes affect the style
Table 10. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-0035 refinements
Assurance
Family
BSI-PP-0035
Level
ST
Level
Impact on refinement
ADO_DEL 1 1 None
ALC_DVS 2 2 None
ALC_CMS 4 5 None, refinement is still valid
ALC_CMC 4 4 None
ADV_ARC 1 1 None
ADV_FSP 4 5
Presentation style changes, IC Dedicated Software is
included
ADV_IMP 1 1 None
ATE_COV 2 2 IC Dedicated Software is included
AGD_OPE 1 1 None
AGD_PRE 1 1 None
AVA_VAN 5 5 None
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of description, the BSI-PP-0035 refinements can be applied with changes covering the IC
Dedicated Test Software and are valid for ADV_FSP.5.
7.3.2 Refinement regarding test coverage (ATE_COV)
180 The TOE is tested under different operating conditions within the specified ranges. These
conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power supply, and the
temperature. This means that “Fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” is proven for the complete TSF.
The tests must also cover functions which may be affected by “ageing” (such as EEPROM
writing).
181 The existence and effectiveness of measures against physical attacks (as specified by the
functional requirement FPT_PHP.3) cannot be tested in a straightforward way. Instead
STMicroelectronics provides evidence that the TOE actually has the particular physical
characteristics (especially layout design principles). This is done by checking the layout
(implementation or actual) in an appropriate way. The required evidence pertains to the
existence of mechanisms against physical attacks (unless being obvious).
182 The IC Dedicated Test Software is seen as a “test tool” being delivered as part of the TOE.
However, the Test Features do not provide security functionality. Therefore, Test Features
need not to be covered by the Test Coverage Analysis but all functions and mechanisms
which limit the capability of the functions (cf. FMT_LIM.1) and control access to the
functions (cf. FMT_LIM.2) provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software must be part of the
Test Coverage Analysis. The IC Dedicated Software provides security functionalities as
soon as the TOE becomes operational (boot software). These are part of the Test
Coverage Analysis.
7.4 Security Requirements rationale
7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
183 Just as for the security objectives rationale of Section 6.3, the main line of this rationale is
that the inclusion of all the security requirements of the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile,
together with those in AUG, and with those introduced in this Security Target, guarantees
that all the security objectives identified in Section 6 are suitably addressed by the security
requirements stated in this chapter, and that the latter together form an internally consistent
whole.
184 As origins of security objectives have been carefully kept in their labelling, and origins of
security requirements have been carefully identified in Table 6 and Table 9, it can be verified
that the justifications provided by the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile and AUG can just be
carried forward to their union.
185 From Table 4, it is straightforward to identify two additional security objectives for the TOE
(AUG1.O.Add-Functions and AUG4.O.Mem-Access) tracing back to AUG, and one
additional objective (O.Controlled-ES-Loading) introduced in this Security Target. This
rationale must show that security requirements suitably address these three.
186 Furthermore, a more careful observation of the requirements listed in Table 6 and Table 9
shows that:
• there are additional security requirements introduced by this Security Target
(FCS_CKM.1, FMT_LIM.1 [Issuer], FMT_LIM.2 [Issuer], FDP_ITC.1 [Loader],
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader], FDP_ACF.1 [Loader], FMT_MSA.3 [Loader], FMT_MSA.1
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[Loader], FMT_SMF.1 [Loader], and FMT_SMF.1 [Memories], and various assurance
requirements of EAL5),
• there are security requirements introduced from AUG (FCS_COP.1, FDP_ACC.2
[Memories], FDP_ACF.1 [Memories], FMT_MSA.3 [Memories] and FMT_MSA.1
[Memories]).
187 Though it remains to show that:
• security objectives from this Security Target and from AUG are addressed by security
requirements stated in this chapter,
• additional security requirements from this Security Target and from AUG are mutually
supportive with the security requirements from the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile, and
they do not introduce internal contradictions,
• all dependencies are still satisfied.
188 The justification that the additional security objectives are suitably addressed, that the
additional security requirements are mutually supportive and that, together with those
already in BSI-PP-0035, they form an internally consistent whole, is provided in the next
subsections.
7.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed
Security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control
(AUG4.O.Mem-Access)”
189 The justification related to the security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access
Control (AUG4.O.Mem-Access)” is as follows:
190 The security functional requirements "Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories]"
and "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories]", with the related
Security Function Policy (SFP) “Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require
to implement a Dynamic area based memory access control as demanded by
AUG4.O.Mem-Access. Therefore, FDP_ACC.2 [Memories] and FDP_ACF.1 [Memories]
with their SFP are suitable to meet the security objective.
191 The security functional requirement "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]"
requires that the TOE provides default values for security attributes. The ability to update the
security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s) as further detailed in the security
functional requirement "Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories]".
These management functions ensure that the required access control can be realised using
the functions provided by the TOE.
Security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (AUG1.O.Add-
Functions)”
192 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality
(AUG1.O.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
193 The security functional requirements “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” and
"Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)" exactly require those functions to be
implemented that are demanded by AUG1.O.Add-Functions. Therefore, FCS_COP.1 is
suitable to meet the security objective, together with FCS_CKM.1.
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Security objective “Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software
(O.Controlled-ES-Loading)”
194 The justification related to the security objective “Controlled loading of the Security IC
Embedded Software (O.Controlled-ES-Loading)” is as follows:
195 The security functional requirements "Import of user data without security attributes
(FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]", "Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader]" and "Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]", with the related Security Function
Policy (SFP) “Loading Access Control Policy” exactly require to implement a controlled
loading of the Security IC Embedded Software as demanded by O.Controlled-ES-Loading.
Therefore, FDP_ITC.1 [Loader], FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] and FDP_ACF.1 [Loader] with their
SFP are suitable to meet the security objective.
196 The security functional requirement "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]"
requires that the TOE provides default values for security attributes. The ability to update the
security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s) as further detailed in the security
functional requirement "Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]". The
security functional requirement "Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
[Loader]" provides additional controlled facility for adapting the loader behaviour to the
user’s needs. These management functions ensure that the required access control,
associated to the loading feature, can be realised using the functions provided by the TOE.
7.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent
"Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) & key generation (FCS_CKM.1)"
197 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Additional Specific Security Functionality (AUG1.O.Add-Functions)” above.
"Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3 [Memories]),
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1 [Memories]),
Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2 [Memories]),
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1 [Memories])"
198 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control (AUG4.O.Mem-Access)” above.
"Import of user data without security attribute (FDP_ITC.1 [Loader]),
Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3 [Loader]),
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1 [Loader]),
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]),
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1 [Loader]),
Specification of management function (FMT_SMF.1 [Loader])"
199 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software (O.Controlled-ES-Loading)”
above.
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7.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
200 All dependencies of Security Functional Requirements have been fulfilled in this Security
Target except :
• those justified in the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile security requirements rationale,
• those justifed in AUG security requirements rationale (except on FMT_MSA.2, see
discussion below),
• the dependency of FCS_COP.1 and FCS_CKM.1 on FCS_CKM.4 (see discussion
below).
• the dependency of FMT_MSA.1 [Loader] and FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] on FMT_SMR.1
(see discussion below).
201 Details are provided in Table 11 below.
Table 11. Dependencies of security functional requirements
Label Dependencies
Fulfilled by security
requirements in this
Security Target
Dependency already
in BSI-PP-0035 or
in AUG
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_FLS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.1 [Test] FMT_LIM.2 [Test] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.2 [Test] FMT_LIM.1 [Test] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.1
[Issuer]
FMT_LIM.2 [Issuer] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.2
[Issuer]
FMT_LIM.1 [Issuer] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FAU_SAS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_PHP.3 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FDP_ITT.1
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_ITT.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 No, see BSI-PP-0035 Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FCS_RNG.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FCS_COP.1
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
Yes, by FDP_ITC.1 and
FCS_CKM.1, see discussion
below
Yes, AUG #1
FCS_CKM.4 No, see discussion below
FCS_CKM.1
[FDP_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
Yes, by FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4 No, see discussion below
FDP_ACC.2
[Memories]
FDP_ACF.1
[Memories]
Yes No, CCMB-2009-07-002
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202 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)" on "Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)" or "Import of
user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2)" or "Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)". In this particular TOE, both "Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)"
and "Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]" may be used for
the purpose of creating cryptographic keys, but also, the ES has all possibilities to
implement its own creation function, in conformance with its security policy.
FDP_ACF.1
[Memories]
FDP_ACC.1
[Memories]
Yes, by FDP_ACC.2
[Memories]
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_MSA.3
[Memories]
Yes
FMT_MSA.3
[Memories]
FMT_MSA.1
[Memories]
Yes
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMR.1
[Memories]
No, see AUG #4
FMT_MSA.1
[Memories]
[FDP_ACC.1
[Memories] or
FDP_IFC.1]
Yes, by FDP_ACC.2
[Memories] and FDP_IFC.1
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMF.1
[Memories]
Yes No, CCMB-2009-07-002
FMT_SMR.1
[Memories]
No, see AUG #4 Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMF.1
[Memories]
None No dependency No, CCMB-2009-07-002
FMT_ITC.1
[Loader]
[FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]
or FDP_IFC.1]
Yes
No, CCMB-2009-07-002
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] Yes
FDP_ACC.1
[Loader]
FDP_ACF.1 [Loader] Yes No, CCMB-2009-07-002
FDP_ACF.1
[Loader]
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] Yes
No, CCMB-2009-07-002
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] Yes
FMT_MSA.3
[Loader]
FMT_MSA.1 [Loader] Yes
No, CCMB-2009-07-002
FMT_SMR.1 [Loader] No, see discussion below
FMT_MSA.1
[Loader]
[FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]
or FDP_IFC.1]
Yes
No, CCMB-2009-07-002
FDP_SMF.1 [Loader] Yes
FDP_SMR.1 [Loader] No, see discussion below
FDP_SMF.1
[Loader]
None No dependency No, CCMB-2009-07-002
Table 11. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued)
Label Dependencies
Fulfilled by security
requirements in this
Security Target
Dependency already
in BSI-PP-0035 or
in AUG
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203 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)" and "Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)" on "Cryptographic key
destruction (FCS_CKM.4)". In this particular TOE, there is no specific function for the
destruction of the keys. The ES has all possibilities to implement its own destruction
function, in conformance with its security policy. Therefore, FCS_CKM.4 is not defined in
this ST.
204 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Management of security
attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]" and "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]"
on "Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) [Loader]". This dependency is considered to be satisfied,
because the access control defined for the loader is not role-based but enforced for each
subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a Security Functional
Requirement "FMT_SMR.1".
7.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements
Security assurance requirements added to reach EAL5 (Table 9)
205 Regarding application note 21 of BSI-PP-0035, this Security Target chooses EAL5 because
developers and users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned
development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.
206 EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal
design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, and improved
mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered
during development.
207 The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that
they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen
for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the
corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add
additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal
consistency is still guaranteed.
208 Note that detailed and updated refinements for assurance requirements are given in
Section 7.3.
Dependencies of assurance requirements
209 Dependencies of security assurance requirements are fulfilled by the EAL5 package
selection.
210 Augmentation to this package are identified in paragraph 166 and do not introduce
dependencies not already satisfied by the EAL5 package.
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8 TOE summary specification
211 This section demonstrates how the TOE meets each Security Functional Requirement,
which will be further detailed in the ADV_FSP documents.
212 The complete TOE summary specification has been presented and evaluated in the
ST/SA/SB33F1M Security Target.
213 For confidentiality reasons, the TOE summary specification is not fully reproduced here.
8.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
214 The TSF provides limited fault tolerance, by managing a certain number of faults or errors
that may happen, related to memory contents, CPU, random number generation and
cryptographic operations, thus preventing risk of malfunction.
8.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
215 The TSF provides preservation of secure state by detecting and managing the following
events, resulting in an immediate reset:
• Die integrity violation detection,
• Errors on memories,
• Glitches,
• High voltage supply,
• CPU errors,
• MPU errors,
• External clock incorrect frequency,
• etc..
216 In addition, the ES can generate a software reset.
8.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test]
217 The TSF ensures that only very limited test capabilities are available in USER configuration,
in accordance with SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].
8.4 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Issuer]
218 The TSF ensures that the Secure Flash Loader and the final test capabilities are unavailable
in USER configuration, in accordance with SFP_4: Limited capability and availability Policy
[Issuer].
8.5 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test] & [Issuer]
219 The TOE is either in TEST, ISSUER or USER configuration.
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220 The only authorised TOE configuration modifications are:
• TEST to ISSUER configuration,
• TEST to USER configuration,
• ISSUER to USER configuration.
221 The TSF ensures the switching and the control of TOE configuration.
222 The TSF reduces the available features depending on the TOE configuration.
8.6 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)
223 In Issuer configuration, the TOE provides commands to store data and/or pre-
personalisation data and/or supplements of the ES in the NVM. These commands are only
available to authorized processes, and only until phase 6.
8.7 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
224 The TSF ensures resistance to physical tampering, thanks to the following features:
• The TOE implements counter-measures that reduce the exploitability of physical
probing.
• The TOE is physically protected by an active shield that commands an automatic
reaction on die integrity violation detection.
8.8 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1), Basic internal
TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) & Subset
information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
225 The TSF prevents the disclosure of internal and user data thanks to:
• Memories scrambling and encryption,
• Bus encryption,
• Mechanisms for operation execution concealment,
• etc..
8.9 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)
226 The TSF provides 8-bit true random numbers that can be qualified with the test metrics
required by the BSI-AIS31 standard for a P2 class device.
8.10 Cryptographic operation: DES / 3DES operation (FCS_COP.1
[EDES])
227 The TOE provides an EDES accelerator that has the capability to perform DES and Triple
DES encryption and decryption conformant to FIPS PUB 46-3.
SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version TOE summary specification
SMD_Sx33F1M_ST_10_001 47/57
228 The EDES accelerator offers a Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode conformant to ISO/IEC
10116, and a Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode
conformant to ISO/IEC 9797-1.
8.11 Cryptographic operation: RSA operation (FCS_COP.1 [RSA])
229 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the RSA public key cryptographic operation for
modulus sizes up to 4096 bits, conformant to PKCS #1 V2.1.
230 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the RSA private key cryptographic operation with
or without CRT for modulus sizes up to 4096 bits, conformant to PKCS #1 V2.1.
8.12 Cryptographic operation: AES operation (FCS_COP.1 [AES])
for SB33F1M only
231 The cryptographic library Neslib SB provides the standard AES cryptographic operations for
key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, conformant to FIPS PUB 197 with intrinsic counter-
measures against timing attacks (TA), fault attacks (FA), SPA, and DPA.
8.13 Cryptographic operation: Elliptic Curves Cryptography
operation (FCS_COP.1 [ECC]) for SB33F1M only
232 The cryptographic library Neslib SB provides to the ES developer the following efficient
basic functions for Elliptic Curves Cryptography over prime fields, all conformant to IEEE
1363-2000 and IEEE 1363a-2004, including:
• private scalar multiplication,
• preparation of Elliptic Curve computations in affine coordinates,
• public scalar multiplication,
• point validity check.
8.14 Cryptographic operation: SHA operation (FCS_COP.1 [SHA])
233 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512 secure hash functions conformant to FIPS PUB 180-1, FIPS PUB 180-2, ISO/IEC
10118-3:1998.
234 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the SHA-1 secure hash function conformant to
FIPS PUB 180-1, FIPS PUB 180-2, ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998, and offering resistance against
side channel and fault attacks.
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8.15 Cryptographic key generation: Prime generation
(FCS_CKM.1 [Prime_generation]) & Cryptographic key
generation: Protected prime generation (FCS_CKM.1
[Protected_prime_generation])
235 The cryptographic library Neslib provides prime numbers generation for key sizes up to
2048 bits conformant to FIPS PUB 140-2 and FIPS PUB 186, and offering resistance
against side channel and fault attacks.
8.16 Cryptographic key generation: RSA key generation
(FCS_CKM.1 [RSA_key_generation]) & Cryptographic key
generation: Protected RSA key generation (FCS_CKM.1
[Protected_RSA_key_generation])
236 The cryptographic library Neslib provides standard RSA public and private key computation
for key sizes upto 4096 bits conformant to FIPS PUB 140-2, ISO/IEC 9796-2 and PKCS #1
V2.1, and offering resistance against side channel and fault attacks.
8.17 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]
237 The TOE enforces a default memory protection policy when none other is programmed by
the ES.
8.18 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories]
& Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
[Memories]
238 The TOE provides a dynamic Memory Protection Unit (MPU), that can be configured by the
ES.
8.19 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories] &
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
[Memories]
239 The TOE enforces the dynamic memory protection policy for data access and code access
thanks to a dynamic Memory Protection Unit (MPU), programmed by the ES. Overriding the
MPU set of access rights, the TOE enforces additional protections on specific parts of the
memories.
8.20 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
[Loader]
240 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware provides the capability of securely loading
user data into the NVM (Secure Flash Loader). The ciphered data is automatically
SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version TOE summary specification
SMD_Sx33F1M_ST_10_001 49/57
decrypted, before installation in the NVM.
The integrity of the loaded data is systematically checked, and the integrity of the NVM can
also be checked by the ES.
8.21 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]
241 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware provides restrictive default values for the Flash
Loader security attributes.
8.22 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader] &
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
[Loader]
242 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware provides the capability to change part of the
Flash Loader security attributes, only once in the product lifecycle.
8.23 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader] & Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]
243 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware grants access to the Flash Loader functions,
only after presentation of the required valid passwords.
References SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version
50/57 SMD_Sx33F1M_ST_10_001
9 References
244 Protection Profile references
245 Sx33F1M Security Target reference
246 Target of Evaluation referenced documents
247 For security reasons, all these documents are classified and their applicable revisions are
referenced in the ST/SA/SB33F1M Documentation Report.
248 Standards references
Component description Reference Revision
Security IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035 1.0
Component description Reference
ST/SA/SB33F1M Security Target SMD_SB33F1M_ST_09_001
Component description Reference
ST/SA/SB33F1M Documentation Report SMD_ST33F1M_DR_09_001
Ref Identifier Description
[1] BSI-AIS31
A proposal for Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for
true (physical) random number generators,
W. Killmann & W. Schindler
BSI, Version 3.1, 25-09-2001
[2] FIPS PUB 46-3
FIPS PUB 46-3, Data encryption standard (DES), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999
[3] FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1999
[4] FIPS PUB 180-1
FIPS PUB 180-1 Secure Hash Standard, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce,1995
[5] FIPS PUB 180-2
FIPS PUB 180-2 Secure Hash Standard with Change Notice 1 dated
February 25,2004, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
U.S.A., 2004
[6] FIPS PUB 186
FIPS PUB 186 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, U.S.A., 1994
[7] FIPS PUB 197
FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National
Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce,
November 2001
[8] ISO/IEC 9796-2
ISO/IEC 9796, Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signature scheme giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer
factorization based mechanisms, ISO, 2002
SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version References
SMD_Sx33F1M_ST_10_001 51/57
[9] ISO/IEC 9797-1
ISO/IEC 9797, Information technology - Security techniques -
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a
block cipher, ISO, 1999
[10] ISO/IEC 10116
ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology - Security techniques - Modes
of operation of an n-bit block cipher algorithm, ISO, 1997
[11]
ISO/IEC 10118-
3:1998
ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998, Information technology - Security techniques -
Hash functions - Part 3: Dedicated hash functions
[12] ISO/IEC 14888
ISO/IEC 14888, Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signatures with appendix - Part 1: General (1998), Part 2: Identity-
based mechanisms (1999), Part 3: Certificate based mechanisms
(2006), ISO
[13] CCMB-2009-07-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
1: Introduction and general model, July 2009, version 3.1 Revision 3
[14] CCMB-2009-07-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
2: Security functional components, July 2009, version 3.1 Revision 3
[15] CCMB-2009-07-003
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
3: Security assurance components, July 2009, version 3.1 Revision 3
[16] AUG
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations,
Atmel, Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies, Philips Semiconductors,
Version 1.0, March 2002.
[17] MIT/LCS/TR-212
On digital signatures and public key cryptosystems,
Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Technical report MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for computer
sciences, January 1979
[18] IEEE 1363-2000
IEEE 1363-2000, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography,
IEEE, 2000
[19] IEEE 1363a-2004
IEEE 1363a-2004, Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography - Amendment 1:Additional techniques, IEEE, 2004
[20] PKCS #1 V2.1
PKCS #1 V2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June
2002
[21] MOV 97
Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone,
Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997
Ref Identifier Description
Glossary SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version
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Appendix A Glossary
A.1 Terms
Authorised user
A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Composite product
Security IC product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the
Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation.
End-consumer
User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
Integrated Circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
IC Dedicated Software
IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and
developed by ST. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test
Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or
to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software which is used to test the TOE before TOE
Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development.
IC manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and pre-
personalization.
IC packaging manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and testing.
Initialisation data
Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep
track of the Security IC’s production and further life-cycle phases are considered as
belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for
TOE identification (identification data)
Object
An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects
perform operations.
Packaged IC
Security IC embedded in a physical package such as micromodules, DIPs, SOICs or
TQFPs.
Pre-personalization data
Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance
used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.
Secret
SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version Glossary
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Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to
enforce a specific SFP.
Security IC
Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data, and the
package.
Security IC Embedded SoftWare (ES)
Software embedded in the Security IC and not developed by the IC designer. The
Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the
Security IC in Phase 3.
Security IC embedded software (ES) developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the security IC embedded software
development and the specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, if any.
Security attribute
Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the
enforcement of the TSP.
Sensitive information
Any information identified as a security relevant element of the TOE such as:
– the application data of the TOE (such as IC pre-personalization requirements, IC
and system specific data),
– the security IC embedded software,
– the IC dedicated software,
– the IC specification, design, development tools and technology.
Smartcard
A card according to ISO 7816 requirements which has a non volatile memory and a
processing unit embedded within it.
Subject
An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Test features
All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Software and/or
hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as
part of the TOE.
TOE Delivery
The period when the TOE is delivered which is after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) in
this Security target.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
User
Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the
TOE.
User data
All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context.
User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.
Glossary SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version
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A.2 Abbreviations
Table 12. List of abbreviations
Term Meaning
AIS Application notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (BSI)
ALU Arithmetical and Logical Unit.
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
CBC Cipher Block Chaining.
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code.
CC Common Criteria Version 3.1.
CPU Central Processing Unit.
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check.
DCSSI Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information
DES Data Encryption Standard.
DIP Dual-In-Line Package.
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level.
ECB Electronic Code Book.
EDES Enhanced DES.
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.
ES Security IC Embedded SoftWare.
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard.
I/O Input / Output.
IC Integrated Circuit.
ISO International Standards Organisation.
IT Information Technology.
MPU Memory Protection Unit.
NESCRYPT Next Step Cryptography Accelerator.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NVM Non Volatile Memory.
OSP Organisational Security Policy.
OST Operating System for Test.
PP Protection Profile.
PUB Publication Series.
RAM Random Access Memory.
RF Radio Frequency.
RF UART Radio Frequency Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter.
ROM Read Only Memory.
SA/SB33F1MD Security Target - Public Version Glossary
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RSA Rivest, Shamir & Adleman.
SAR Security Assurance Requirement.
SFP Security Function Policy.
SFR Security Functional Requirement.
SOIC Small Outline IC.
ST Context dependent : STMicroelectronics or Security Target.
TOE Target of Evaluation.
TQFP Thin Quad Flat Package.
TRNG True Random Number Generator.
TSC TSF Scope of Control.
TSF TOE Security Functionality.
TSFI TSF Interface.
TSP TOE Security Policy.
TSS TOE Summary Specification.
Table 12. List of abbreviations (continued)
Term Meaning
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10 Revision history
Table 13. Document revision history
Date Revision Changes
04-May-2010 01.00 Initial release.
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