Date of Issue: 2017/12/14
Copyright Canon Inc. 2017
1
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C356/C256 Series
2600 model
Security Target
Version 1.05
2017/12/14
Canon Inc.
Significant portions of this document were excerpted from IEEE Std 2600.1 and 2600.2,
-2009 - copyright IEEE 2009 and reproduced with permission from IEEE. , All rights
reserved. An use beyond what is permitted, please contact mailto:stds-ipr@ieee.org.
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified
security target written in Japanese.
Date of Issue: 2017/12/14
Copyright Canon Inc. 2017
2
Table of Contents
1 ST introduction.................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 ST reference..............................................................................................................................4
1.2 TOE reference...........................................................................................................................4
1.3 TOE overview...........................................................................................................................4
1.4 Terms and Abbreviations..........................................................................................................5
1.5 TOE description ........................................................................................................................7
1.6 Scope of the TOE......................................................................................................................9
1.6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE................................................................................................9
1.6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE ...............................................................................................10
1.7 Users of the TOE.....................................................................................................................11
1.8 Assets ......................................................................................................................................12
1.8.1 User Data.........................................................................................................................12
1.8.2 TSF Data..........................................................................................................................12
1.8.3 Functions .........................................................................................................................13
2 Conformance claims.......................................................................................................................... 14
2.1 CC Conformance claim...........................................................................................................14
2.2 PP claim, Package claim .........................................................................................................14
2.3 SFR Packages..........................................................................................................................14
2.3.1 SFR Packages reference ..................................................................................................14
2.3.2 SFR Package functions....................................................................................................15
2.3.3 SFR Package attributes....................................................................................................16
2.4 PP Conformance rationale.......................................................................................................16
3 Security Problem Definition.............................................................................................................. 19
3.1 Notational conventions............................................................................................................19
3.2 Threats agents .........................................................................................................................19
3.3 Threats to TOE Assets ............................................................................................................20
3.4 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE.........................................................................20
3.5 Assumptions............................................................................................................................21
4 Security Objectives ........................................................................................................................... 22
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.............................................................................................22
4.2 Security Objectives for the IT environment............................................................................22
4.3 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment.....................................................................22
4.4 Security Objectives rationale ..................................................................................................23
5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD).................................................................................. 27
5.1 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces......................................27
6 Security requirements........................................................................................................................ 29
6.1 Security functional requirements ............................................................................................29
6.1.1 User Authentication Function..........................................................................................29
6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function..................................................................................31
6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions ....................................................................................34
6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function ....................................................................................37
6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function...............................................................................................37
6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function......................................................................................37
6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function........................................................................................38
6.1.8 Self-Test Function ...........................................................................................................39
6.1.9 Audit Log Function .........................................................................................................40
6.1.10 Management Function.....................................................................................................42
6.2 Security assurance requirements.............................................................................................46
6.3 Security functional requirements rationale .............................................................................47
6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements.....................................................................47
6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements ........................................................................48
6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements.....................................................................49
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6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale..............................................................................51
7 TOE Summary specification ............................................................................................................. 52
7.1 User Authentication Function .................................................................................................52
7.2 Function Use Restriction Function..........................................................................................52
7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions............................................................................................53
7.3.1 Job Cancel .......................................................................................................................54
7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control.............................................................................................54
7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs ..................................................................................56
7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function............................................................................................56
7.5 HDD Data Erase Function ......................................................................................................57
7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function..............................................................................................57
7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function.....................................................................................57
7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function .....................................................................58
7.7 LAN Data Protection Function ...............................................................................................58
7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function........................................................................................58
7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function .....................................................................58
7.8 Self-Test Function...................................................................................................................59
7.9 Audit Log Function.................................................................................................................59
7.10 Management Functions...........................................................................................................60
7.10.1 User Management Function.............................................................................................60
7.10.2 Device Management Function.........................................................................................60
Trademark Notice
- Canon, the Canon logo, imageRUNNER, imageRUNNER ADVANCE, imagePRESS, MEAP, and the MEAP logo are
trademarks or registered trademarks of Canon Inc.
- Microsoft, Internet Explorer, and Active Directory are trademarks or registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the
U.S. and other countries.
- eDirectry is a trademark of Novell, Inc. in the U.S.
- All names of companies and products contained herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of the respective companies.
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1 ST introduction
1.1 ST reference
This section provides the Security Target (ST) identification information.
ST name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series 2600 model Security Target
Version: 1.05
Issued by: Canon Inc.
Date of Issue: 2017/12/14
1.2 TOE reference
This section provides the TOE identification information.
TOE name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series 2600 model
Version: 1.0
The TOE is comprised of the following software and hardware.
iR-ADV Security Kit-UI for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00
Super G3 FAX Board-AT (Standard equipment on F model)
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCEC356/C256 Series
Canon MFP Security Chip 2.11
*Japanese Name
iR-ADV Security Kit-U1 for IEEE 2600 Ver 1.00
Super G3 FAX Board-AT (Standard equipment on “F” model)
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series
Canon MFP Security Chip 2.11
1.3 TOE overview
The TOE is a digital multi-function peripheral (MFP) known as < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C356/C256 Series 2600 model >. This is a version of the standard model < Canon imageRUNNER
ADVANCE C356/C256 Series > which by installing/attaching the following 2 products and making the
proper settings, makes up the < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series 2600 model > or
TOE.
- iR-ADV Security Kit-UI for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria
- Fax Board (Standard equipment on “F” model)
< iR-ADV Security Kit-UI for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria > contains the < Canon imageRUNNER
ADVANCE C356/C256 Series > control software.
Fax board is a hardware to use fax function.
Canon MFP Security Chip 2.11 is embedded in <Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series>.
< Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series 2600 model > is capable of fully implementing
the Protection Profile (PP) for Multi-Function Peripherals indicated below, as well as the security
functions required by six out of seven SFR Packages defined in the PP, except for 2600.2-NVS, SFR
Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational Environment B. In addition, it
has HDD encryption function to encrypt all the data to be stored in the HDD.
Protection Profile
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- U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile – U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009)
SFR Packages
- 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions,
Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational
Environment B
1.4 Terms and Abbreviations
The following terms and abbreviations are used throughout this ST.
Table 1 —Terms and Abbreviations
Terms/Abbreviations Description
Multi-Function
Peripheral (MFP)
A machine which incorporates the functionality of multiple devices in one, such
as copier, fax, printer, and Universal Send, and contains a large capacity HDD to
facilitate such capabilities.
Control software Software that runs on the hardware of the device, and controls security functions.
Control panel One of the hardware elements of the MFP, consisting of a touch panel and
operation keys, which provide the interface for operation of the MFP.
Remote UI An interface that provides access to the MFP from a Web browser via the LAN,
to acquire operating status, perform job operations or BOX operations, and make
various settings.
HDD Hard disk drive mounted on the MFP, where control software and assets are
stored.
I-Fax Short for Internet Fax. Uses the Internet instead of telephone line to receive and
send faxes.
Image file Image data generated within the MFP, from operations such as scan, print, and
receive.
Temporary image file Image files generated during jobs such as Copy and Print, which are needed only
until the job completes.
Roles Used by access restriction functions to restrict the functions that each user can
use. One role is associated with each user. In addition to pre-defined default roles,
default roles may be modified to create custom roles. The default roles are:
Administrator, Power User, General User, and Limited User.
Auser assigned theAdministrator role is capable of using management operations
(administrative privileges).
Administrator User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges.
Equivalent to U.ADMINISTRATOR defined in the PP.
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Terms/Abbreviations Description
Job When a user uses the functions of the TOE to execute an operation on a document,
a Job is the intended document data combined with the user instructions for
processing those data.
The operations that can be performed on a document are: Scan, Print, Copy, Fax
TX, Save, and Delete. The processing phases for a Job issued by the user are:
generation, execution, and completion.
Document data User data processed within the MFP, consisting of image files and print setting.
Memory RX
(Reception)
Allows data received by fax/I-fax to be stored in the Memory RX Inbox for later
processing.
Box Collective name for Mail Boxes, Fax Inboxes, and the Memory RX Inbox
wherein data from operations such as scan, print, and received faxes are stored in
the MFP.
*Use of Fax Inboxes is not included in this TOE.
Mail Box Whether a general user feeds data to the MFP directly, or specifies a document
for printing from a PC, data can be stored here to be printed later.
Memory RX Inbox When memory reception is set, documents received by fax/I-fax are stored in the
Memory RX Inbox. Stored documents can be printed or sent later.
Mail server Server that facilitates I-fax transmission or email transmission of document data
in the MFP.
User authentication
server
Server that maintains user information such as user ID and password, for user
authentication over the network.
Firewall Device or system designed to protect the internal LAN against threats from the
Internet.
Time server Server that uses the Network Time Protocol to provide the accurate time over the
Internet.
[Print] A button on the control panel that activates the Hold Print function.
[Copy] A button on the control panel that activates the Copy function.
[Fax] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax function.
[Scan] Indicates the [Scan and Store] and [Scan and Send] buttons on the control panel,
that allow the user to scan paper documents to be stored as files, or scanned
documents to be sent to some location such as to an email address or a shared
folder in a PC, respectively.
[Fax/I-Fax Inbox] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax/I-Fax Inbox function.
There are two types of Fax/I-Fax Inbox: the Memory RX Inbox and Confidential
Fax Inbox. Both inboxes can be used to store files received by Fax and I-Fax.
[Access Stored Files] A button on the control panel that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail
Box/Inbox.
Remote UI
[Access Received/
Stored Files]
A button on the remote UI that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail
Box/Inbox.
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1.5 TOE description
The TOE is a MFP that offers Copy, Print, Universal Send, Fax, I-Fax RX, and Mail Box capabilities. The
TOE, which conforms to “U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile – U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009))” is designed to operate in an
environment such as the one shown below (as excerpted from “U.S. GovernmentApproved Protection Profile
– U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009)”
clause “1.1 Scope”).
This standard is for a Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in a commercial information processing
environment in which a moderate level of document security, network security, and security assurance are
required. Typically, the day-to-day proprietary and nonproprietary information needed to operate an
enterprise will be handled by this environment. This environment will be known as “Operational
Environment B.”
Figure 1 shows the environment for which the TOE or < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256
Series 2600 model > has been designed, with options included. Since not all of these features may be
required, the actual operational environment is expected to differ than what is shown here.
Figure 1 The assumed operational environment of the MFP
< Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series >
PC
HDD
LAN
Firewall
Mail server
Mail Box
Memory
RX
Inbox
Send via I-Fax/E-Mail
Receive I-Fax
Hardcopy
document
Hardcopy
document
Web browser
Internet
MFP
User authentication
server
User authentication
Authentication result
Time server
PC
Fax RX
Fax TX
PSTN
File server for audit log
(SMB server)
In Figure 1, the MFP is connected by an internal LAN, to all of the other major components, namely the Mail
Server, User Authentication Server, File Server for Audit Log (SMB Server)1
, PC, and Firewall. Furthermore,
the internal LAN is protected by Firewall from threats from the Internet. To send (via I-Fax or email) a
previously scanned document or when receiving a document by I-Fax for example, the MFP connects to the
1
This evaluation was performed using Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition as the file server for audit log.
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Mail Server. By using a PC with a Web browser2
, functions such as printing, storing, or I-Fax can also be
executed remotely. However, in order to print from a PC, the appropriate printer driver needs to be installed
in the PC. Alternatively, a USB cable could be used to connect the PC directly, and print or store document
data from the PC. In this case, some configuration is required initially, in order to protect against data being
taken out of the MFP and stored in a PC or USB device.
The TOE also obtains accurate time from the Time server for time synchronization, and supports user
authentication through the External Authentication Server. In addition, it is possible to output audit logs to
file server for audit log at regular intervals. The TOE also has HDD encryption function to encrypt all the
data to be stored in the internal HDD.
The functions available to the MFP in such an environment are listed below:
- Copy function
Produces duplicates of the hardcopy document by scanning and printing.
- Print function
Produces a hardcopy document from its electronic form (contained in the MFP or sent from a
PC).
- I-Fax RX (receive) function
Uses the Internet to receive faxes. Data received by I-fax is not printed immediately; rather it is
stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent
or deleted later.
- Fax RX (receive) function
Uses a fax line to receive faxes. Data received by fax is not printed immediately; rather it is stored
in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent or
deleted later.
- Fax TX (send) function
Scanned document data or electronic documents stored in Memory RX Inbox can be retrieved
for transmission by fax.
- Universal Send function
Scanned document data or electronic documents stored in Memory RX Inbox can be transmitted
by email or I-fax, or sent to a shared folder on a PC, in TIFF or PDF file format.
- Mail Box function
Refers to the storage of image files into a Mail Box or in Memory RX Inbox, or to functions that
utilize the Mail Box/inbox functionality.
- Image files Stored in Mail Box
Scanned document data or electronic data specified for storage from a PC, are stored in a Mail
Box.
- Functions that utilize Mail Box functionality
The following functions can be executed on data stored in a Mail Box.
– Edit (document data/print setting)
– Print
– Delete
2
This evaluation was performed using Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 as the Web browser.
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1.6 Scope of the TOE
The TOE conforms to “U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile – U.S. Government Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009)” and is designed to meet the requirements
specified therein, as described below.
The physical and logical scopes of the TOE are described below.
1.6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a MFP consisting of hardware and software components. The physical scope of the TOE is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Hardware and software components of the TOE
Control Software
(TOE Software)
Fax board
(Standard equipment
on “F model”)
(TOE: Hardware)
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C356/C256 Series
MFP Main Unit
(TOE: Hardware)
In Figure 2, “Control Software” refers to the < iR-ADV Security Kit-UI for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria>.
Note also that the “MFP Main Unit” together with the < iR-ADV Security Kit-UI for IEEE 2600 Common
Criteria > make up the MFP main unit.
The TOE or < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series 2600 model > consists of the MFP
main unit combined with the fax board.
< Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series >, or the hardware making up the TOE, refers to
the following product lineup.
Table 2 —Line of Products
Products
iR-ADV C356/C356i/C356F/C356iF
iR-ADV C256/C256i/C256iF
*Only C356F is sold in Japan.
The fax board comprising the TOE is identified as the fax board to comprise the TOE by procuring Super G3
FAX Board-AT1 and combining with the MFP.
The documentation for the TOE are listed below.
(English Name)
- iR-ADV Security Kit-U1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Administrator Guide
[FT6-1926 (000)]
- Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-U1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification [FT6-
1925 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series 2600 model User's Guide CD （USE Version）
[FT6-1927 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356/C256 Series 2600 model User's Guide CD （APE Version）
[FT6-1928 (000)]
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(Japanese Name)
- iR-ADV Security Kit-U1 for IEEE 2600 Administrator Guide [FT6-1923 (000)]
- Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-U1 for IEEE 2600 [FT6-1922 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C356 Series 2600 model User's Guide CD [FT6-1924 (000)]
1.6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is illustrated in Figure 3 (excluding: User, User Authentication Server, Mail
Server, File Server for Audit Log, PC, and Time Server). In the table, the security functions of the TOE are
shown in blue.
Figure 3 Functional configuration of the TOE
LAN Data Protection Function
HDD
UI Func
User
User Auth Server
LAN Data Protection
User Auth Function
Mail Server
LAN Data Protection
Email Function
PC
LAN Data Protection
Web Browser
DocData
DocData
AuthInfo
Hardcopy
document
Time Server
Time Function
TimeInfo
Output Func
Input Func
Print
Scan Send
Copy Mailbox/Inbox
Function Use Restriction
Job Output Restriction
User Authentication HDD Data Erase
HDD Data Encryption
Management Function
Self-Test Audit Log
LAN Data Protection
Flow of data
Operate/
Display
Hardcopy
document
Forward Received Jobs
Receive
TOE
PC
DocData
USB connection
FAX
DocData
Phone line
File Server for Audit Log
File Management Function
LAN Data Protection
AuditLogInfo
In addition to the capabilities described in Section 1.5, the TOE embodies the following basic functionality.
- UI Functionality
Enables the user to operate the TOE from the control panel, and the TOE to display information on
the control panel.
- Output Functionality
Enables the TOE to output hardcopy documents.
- Input Functionality
Enables the TOE to input hardcopy documents.
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The TOE embodies the following security functions.
- User Authentication Function
Performs authentication on the user, to prevent any unauthorized access to the TOE.
Two types of user authentication are supported: Internal Authentication wherein authentication
takes place internally within the TOE, and External Authentication which uses an external user
authentication server. External authentication uses Kerberos3
or LDAP4
authentication.
- Function Use Restriction Function
Uses role management to restrict the functions that each authenticated user can use.
- Job Output Restriction Function
This function restricts access to print, cancel, and other job operations, to the user that executed
the job.
- Forward Received Jobs Function
This function restricts the machine from forwarding received data directly to the LAN. It is
provided as a countermeasure against threats arising from misuse of the fax line.
- HDD Data Erase Function
Function for erasing unnecessary data from the hard disk by overwriting the data, in order to
prevent unauthorized use of previously generated image data.
- HDD Data Encryption Function
Because the HDD could potentially be removed for unauthorized access to its contents, the HDD
Data Encryption Chip embedded in the MFP encrypts all the data to be stored in the HDD.
- LAN Data Protection Function
To protect LAN data from IP packet sniffing, IP packets are encrypted using IPSec.
- Self-Test Function
When the machine starts, this function checks to see that the primary security functions are running
properly.
- Audit Log Function
Allows auditing of user operations by generating logs which are stored in the HDD. Stored audit
logs are protected and can be viewed. It is also possible to store audit logs to File Server for Audit
Log.
The date/time recorded on the audit log is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information
is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is
obtained from the Time Server.
- Management Function
Consists of user management functions such as user registration and role management, and device
management functions which enable proper operation of various security functions, which can only be
specified by Administrators.
1.7 Users of the TOE
The TOE has two types of users (U.USER): U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR
3 This evaluation was performed using Active Directory Domain Services as the authentication server software for Kerberos
authentication.
4
This evaluation was performed using eDirectory 8.8 SP8 as the authentication server software for LDAP authentication.
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Table 3 —Users
Designation Definition
U.USER Any authorized User.
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions
of the TOE.
U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion
or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy (TSP).
Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to
override portions of the TSP.
1.8 Assets
There are three types of assets: User Data, TSF Data, and Functions.
1.8.1 User Data
User Data are created by the user, and have no effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of
User Data: D.DOC and D.FUNC.
Table 4 — User Data
Designation Definition
D.DOC User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user's document. This
includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or
residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original document
and printed hardcopy output.
D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by
the TOE.
1.8.2 TSF Data
TSF Data are data that have an effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of TSF Data:
D.PROT and D.CONF.
Table 5 — TSF Data
Designation Definition
D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator
nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but
for which disclosure is acceptable.
D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is
neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational
security of the TOE.
A list of the TSF Data used in this TOE is given in Table 6.
Table 6 — List of TSF Data
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Type TSF Data Description Stored in
D.PROT User name User identification information used by the user
identification and authentication function.
HDD
Role Used by access restriction functions to restrict the
functions that each user can use.
HDD
Lockout policy
settings
Settings for the lockout function, such as the number of
attempts before lockout and the lockout time.
HDD
Password policy
settings
Policy for the password for user authentication, such as
minimum password length, allowed characters, and
combination of character types.
HDD
Auto Reset Time
setting
Settings for session timeout in the control panel. HDD
Date/Time setting Specifies the date and time that is set. RTC
HDD Data Erase
setting
Settings for the HDD Data Erase function, including the
settings to enable or disable the HDD Data Erase
function.
HDD
IPSec settings Settings for the LAN Data Protection function,
including the settings to enable or disable the LAN Data
Protection function.
HDD
D.CONF Password Password used to authenticate the user in the User
Identification and Authentication function.
HDD
Audit logs Logs generated by the Audit Log function. HDD
Box PIN PIN used for access control to the Mail Box or the
Memory RX Inbox where the data is stored, for Job
Output Restriction functions.
HDD
1.8.3 Functions
Refer to the functions listed in Table 7.
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2 Conformance claims
2.1 CC Conformance claim
This ST conforms to the following Common Criteria (CC).
- Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Release 4
- Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant
- Assurance level: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
2.2 PP claim, Package claim
This ST conforms to the following Protection Profile (PP).
- Title: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile – U.S. Government Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009)
- Version: 1.0
This ST is package-conformant to and package-augmented by the following SFR packages:
- 2600.2-PRT conformant
- 2600.2-SCN conformant
- 2600.2-CPY conformant
- 2600.2-FAX conformant
- 2600.2-DSR conformant
- 2600.2-SMI augmented
2.3 SFR Packages
2.3.1 SFR Packages reference
Title: 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as printers, paper-based fax machines, and
MFPs) that perform a printing function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document
output.
Title: 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as scanners, paper-based fax machines, and
MFPs) that perform a scanning function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document
output.
Title: 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B
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Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This Protection Profile shall be used for HCD products (such as copiers and MFPs) that perform a copy
function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output.
Title: 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as fax machines and MFPs) that perform a
scanning function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based document facsimile (fax)
transmission, and a printing function in which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted
to physical document output.
Title: 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions,
Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as MFPs) that perform a document storage and
retrieval feature in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs.
Title: 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational
Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products that transmit or receive User Data or TSF Data over a
communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple
users, such as wired network media and most radio frequency wireless media. This package applies for TOEs
that provide a trusted channel function allowing for secure and authenticated communication with other IT
systems. If such protection is supplied only by the TOE environment, then this package cannot be claimed.
2.3.2 SFR Package functions
Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in HCD products. The
functions that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection Profile,
are listed in Table 7.
Table 7 —SFR Package functions
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Designation Definition
F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document
output
F.SCN Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document
output
F.CPY Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document
output
F.FAX Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based
document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in which a telephone-based document
facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output
F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one job
and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs
F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data over
a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously
accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio-frequency wireless
media
2.3.3 SFR Package attributes
When a function is performing processing, storage, or transmission of data, the identity of the function is
associated with that particular data as a security attribute. This attribute in the TOE model makes it possible
to distinguish differences in Security Functional Requirements that depend on the function being performed.
The attributes that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection
Profile, are listed in Table 8.
Table 8 —SFR Package attributes
Designation Definition
+PRT Indicates data that are associated with a print job.
+SCN Indicates data that are associated with a scan job.
+CPY Indicates data that are associated with a copy job.
+FAXIN Indicates data that are associated with an inbound (received) fax job.
+FAXOUT Indicates data that are associated with an outbound (sent) fax job.
+DSR Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval job.
+SMI Indicates data that are transmitted or received over a shared-medium interface.
2.4 PP Conformance rationale
In addition to the primary functionality of the MFP (Copy, Print, Scan, and Fax), the TOE implements the
document storage function, HDD encryption function, and the LAN data encryption function. As such, it is
appropriate to conform to all of the SFR Packages defined in the PP(Chapter 2.2 PP claim, Package claim).
The PP to which this ST claims to conform includes contents that conform to IEEE Standard Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600™-2008, Operational Environment B and defined in
CCEVS Policy Letter #20.
In the following, the ST is compared against the PP containing the aforementioned six SFR Packages.
In terms of the Security Problem Definition, the ST is equivalent to the PP except for the addition of one
other OSP:
P.STORAGE.CRYPT
This OSP is a restriction on the TOE, rather than a restriction on the operational environment.
As such:
- All TOEs that would meet the Security Problem Definition in the ST also meet the Security Problem
Definition in the PP.
- All operational environments that would meet the Security Problem Definition in the PP would also
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meet the Security Problem Definition in the ST.
In terms of Objectives, the ST is equivalent to the PP except for the addition of one other objective:
O.STORAGE.CRYPTED
FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h) are added to address this objective. These are more restrictive than PP
in terms of the behavior of the TOE. Therefore, this objective is a restriction on the TOE.
As such:
- All TOEs that would meet the Security Objectives for the TOE in the ST also meet the Security
Objectives for the TOE in the PP.
- All operational environments that would meet the Security Objectives for the operational environment
in the PP would also meet the Security Objectives for the operational environment in the ST.
In terms of the functional requirements, the ST compared with the PP contains all functional requirements of
the PP including the six SFR Packages, as well as additional functional requirements, as shown in Table 9.
“-” indicated in the columns “PP Package” and “PP functional requirement” means not applicable.
Table 9 — Functional requirements specified in the PP and the ST
PP_Package PP functional requirement ST functional requirement
Common FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
Common FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2
Common FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
Common FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.2
Common FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
Common FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4
Common FDP_ACC.1(a) FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)
Common FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)
Common FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACF.1(delete-job)
Common FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.1(exec-job)
Common FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1
Common FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1
Common FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
Common FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
Common FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1
Common FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)
Common FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job)
Common FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1(exec-job)
Common FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job)
Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(a)) FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt)
Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(b)) FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt)
Common FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
Common FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
Common FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1
Common FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1
Common FTA_SSL.3 FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)
PRT FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
PRT FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
SCN FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
SCN FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
CPY FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
CPY FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
FAX FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
FAX FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
DSR FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
DSR FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
SMI FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
SMI FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1
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PP_Package PP functional requirement ST functional requirement
SMI FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1
Common - FIA_AFL.1
Common - FIA_SOS.1
Common - FIA_UAU.7
- - FCS_COP.1(h)
- - FCS_CKM.1(h)
SMI - FCS_CKM.1 (n)
SMI - FCS_COP.1(n)
SMI - FCS_CKM.2
Note the following:
For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for a Delete of +FAXIN D.DOC, and Delete of +FAXIN D.FUNC
is specified as U.NORMAL.
For FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, withAccess Control
rule for U.NORMAL specified as “Denied”.
For FDP_ACC.1 in the PP, the Subject for a Read of +FAXIN D.DOC is specified as U.NORMAL.
For FDP_ACC.1(in-job) in the ST, the Subject for a Read is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, with Access
Control rule for U.NORMAL specified as “Denied”.
The ST functional requirements as mentioned above, are restrictive in the scope of Subjects allowed to Delete
or Read, and restrains U.NORMAL from having access to any Object. As such, the ST functional
requirements specify greater restrictions than the corresponding PP functional requirements.
For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for a Modify of +FAXIN D.FUNC is specified as U.NORMAL.
For FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.User, with Access Control rule specified
as “Denied”.
The ST functional requirement as mentioned above, does not allow use of the function to any Subject. As
such, the ST functional requirement specifies greater restriction than the corresponding PP functional
requirement.
Consequently, the SFRs of the ST are equivalent or more restrictive than SFRs of the PP.
As such:
‐All TOEs that would meet the SFRs in the ST would also meet the SFRs in the PP.
In terms of the Security Assurance Requirements, the ST and PP are equivalent.
As such, this ST compared with the PP, specifies equal or greater restrictions on the TOE, and at most equal
restrictions on the operational environment of the TOE.
Therefore, this ST claims demonstrable conformance to the PP.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Notational conventions
a) Defined terms in full form are set in title case (for example, “Document Storage and Retrieval”).
b) Defined terms in abbreviated form are set in all caps (for example, “DSR”).
c) In tables that describe Security Objectives rationale, a checkmark (“”) placed at the intersection of a
row and column indicates that the threat identified in that row is wholly or partially mitigated by the
objective in that column.
d) In tables that describe completeness of security requirements, a bold typeface letter “P” placed at the
intersection of a row and column indicates that the requirement identified in that row performs a
principal fulfillment of the objective indicated in that column. A letter “S” in such an intersection
indicates that it performs a supporting fulfillment.
e) In tables that describe the sufficiency of security requirements, a bold typeface requirement name and
purpose indicates that the requirement performs a principal fulfillment of the objective in the same row.
Requirement names and purposes set in normal typeface indicate that those requirements perform
supporting fulfillments.
f) In specifications of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs):
1) Bold typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been completed or refined in this
Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an
Extended Component Definition.
2) Italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that must be completed by the ST Author in a
conforming Security Target.
3) Bold italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially completed or
refined in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria
Part 2 or an Extended Component Definition, but which also must be completed by the ST
Author in a conforming Security Target.
g) The following prefixes in Table 10 are used to indicate different entity types:
Table 10— Notational prefix conventions
Prefix Type of entity
U. User
D. Data
F. Function
T. Threat
P. Policy
A. Assumption
O. Objective
OE. Environmental objective
+ Security attribute
3.2 Threats agents
This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents:
a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE
b) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which they are
not authorized.
c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which they
are not authorized.
d) Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to unanticipated
threats.
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The threats and policies defined in this Protection Profile address the threats posed by these threat agents.
3.3 Threats to TOE Assets
This section describes threats to assets described in clause 1.8.
Table 11—Threats to User Data for the TOE
Threat Affected asset Description
T.DOC.DIS D.DOC User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.DOC.ALT D.DOC User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.FUNC.ALT D.FUNC User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
Table 12—Threats to TSF Data for the TOE
Threat Affected asset Description
T.PROT.ALT D.PROT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.CONF.DIS D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.CONF.ALT D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
3.4 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the TOE. OSPs are used to
provide a basis for Security Objectives that are commonly desired by TOE Owners in this operational
environment but for which it is not practical to universally define the assets being protected or the threats to
those assets.
Table 13—Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
Name Definition
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be
authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures
will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records that
provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be
created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or
alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE,
operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT
environment
P.STORAGE.CRYPT*) The data to be stored in the HDD of the TOE must be encrypted
*) Customers that have a policy to have HDD encryption function in MFP are assumed.
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3.5 Assumptions
The Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements defined in subsequent sections of this Protection
Profile are based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this section are satisfied.
Table 14—Assumptions
Assumption Definition
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance
and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance
with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the Security Objectives that must be satisfied by the TOE.
Table 15— Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Definition
O.DOC.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
O.DOC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.PROT.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.CONF.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users,
and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with
security policies before allowing them to use the TOE.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in
accordance with security policies.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in
the TSF.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-
relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration.
O.STORAGE.CRYPTED The TOE shall encrypt data when writing data to the HDD.
4.2 Security Objectives for the IT environment
This section describes the Security Objectives for the IT environment.
Table 16— Security Objectives for the IT environment
Objective Definition
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT
product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are
protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the
TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure
that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential
security violations, and only by authorized persons
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged
access to TOE external interfaces.
4.3 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment
This section describes the Security Objectives for non-IT environments.
Table 17— Security Objectives for the non-IT environment
Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides
protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.
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Objective Definition
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use
the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their
organization.
OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security
policies and procedures of their organization, and have the training and
competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the
security policies and procedures of their organization, have the training,
competence, and time to follow the manufacturer's guidance and
documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not
use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate
intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity.
4.4 Security Objectives rationale
This section demonstrates that at least one of the Security Objectives of the TOE mitigates individual threat
and facilitates organizational security policies and assumptions, and that such Security Objectives counter
the threats, are enforced, and support assumptions. .
Table 18—Completeness of Security Objectives
Threats, Policies, and Assumptions
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.STORAGE.CRYPTED
OE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED
OE.USER.TRAINED
T.DOC.DIS    
T.DOC.ALT    
T.FUNC.ALT    
T.PROT.ALT    
T.CONF.DIS    
T.CONF.ALT 
  
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION 

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION     
P.AUDIT.LOGGING 



P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT   
P.STORAGE.CRYPT   
A.ACCESS.MANAGED  
A.ADMIN.TRAINING   
A.ADMIN.TRUST 
A.USER.TRAINING 
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Table 19—Sufficiency of Security Objectives
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Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be
disclosed to unauthorized
persons
O.DOC.NO_DIS protects D.DOC from
unauthorized disclosure
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.DOC.NO_ALT protects D.DOC from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.FUNC.NO_ALT protects D.FUNC from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.PROT.NO_ALT protects D.PROT from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be
disclosed to unauthorized
persons
O.CONF.NO_DIS protects D.CONF from
unauthorized disclosure
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.CONF.NO_ALT protects D.CONF from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
P.USER.AUTHORIZ
ATION
Users will be authorized to use
the TOE
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization to use the TOE
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
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P.SOFTWARE.VERIF
ICATION
Procedures will exist to self-
verify executable code in the
TSF
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED provides procedures
to self-verify executable code in the TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING An audit trail of TOE use and
security-relevant events will be
created, maintained, protected,
and reviewed.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and maintains a log
of TOE use and security-relevant events, and
prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED protects
exported audit records from unauthorized access,
deletion and modifications
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to
provide appropriate access to exported audit
records
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that
audit logs are appropriately reviewed
P.INTERFACE.MAN
AGEMENT
Operation of external interfaces
will be controlled by the TOE
and its IT environment .
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED manages the
operation of external interfaces in accordance
with security policies
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED establishes a
protected environment for TOE external
interfaces
P.STORAGE.CRYPT Data to be stored in the HDD
will be encrypted.
O.STORAGE.CRYPTED encrypts data when
writing data to the HDD.
A.ACCESS.MANAG
ED
The TOE environment provides
protection from unmanaged
access to the physical
components and data interfaces
of the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED establishes a
protected physical environment for the TOE
A.ADMIN.TRAININ
G
TOE Users are aware of and
trained to follow security
policies and procedures
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide
appropriate Administrator training.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their
privileged access rights for
malicious purposes.
OE.ADMIN.TRUST establishes responsibility of
the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship
with Administrators.
A.USER.TRAINING Administrators are aware of and
trained to follow security
policies and procedures
OE.USER.TRAINED establishes responsibility
of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate User
training.
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5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD)
Protection Profile defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Revision 2, Part 2. These
extended components are defined in the Protection Profile but are used in SFR Packages, and therefore, are
employed only in TOEs whose STs conform to those SFR Packages.
5.1 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external
interface to another external interface.
Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this
information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide the
capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are connected
to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external
interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP
has been defined to specify this kind of functionality.
Component leveling:
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces provides for the functionality to require TSF
controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on another
external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance
by an authorized administrative role.
Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities
b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role
c) Revocation of such an allowance
Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Rationale:
Quite often, a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external interface
before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples are firewall
systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be transferred.
Direct forwarding of such data (i.e., without processing the data first) between different external interfaces is
therefore a function that – if allowed at all – can only be allowed by an authorized role.
It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the property
to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that
is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component.
The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of User Data flow in its FDP class. However, in this
Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both User Data and TSF Data flow using
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces 1
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administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this
purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy for
refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this
functionality.
This extended component protects both User Data and TSF Data, and it could therefore be placed in either the
FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most
appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this
lead the authors to define a new family with just one member.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list of external
interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of
external interfaces].
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6 Security requirements
6.1 Security functional requirements
This section describes the Security functional requirements for the TOE.
The text in brackets following the component identifier or element name denotes iteration operations.
6.1.1 User Authentication Function
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator
configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive
integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
- an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to 10
[assignment: list of authentication events]
- Login attempts from the control panel or remote UIs.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met,
surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
- met
[assignment: list of actions]
- Lockout
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
[assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attributes]
- User name, role
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-
controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
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[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions
of the TOE]
- Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU .7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is
in progress.
[assignment: list of feedback]
- *
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-
controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions
of the TOE]
- Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf
of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
- User name, role
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes
with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of
attributes].
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[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
- None
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes with
the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
- None
FTA_SSL.3(lui) TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1(lui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user
inactivity].
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]
- User inactivity at the control panel lasting for the specified period of time.
FTA_SSL.3(rui)TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1(rui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user
inactivity].
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]
- User inactivity at the remote UI lasting for 15 minutes.
6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP, [assignment:
access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:
change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes
[assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
- None
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
- query, modify, delete, create
[assignment: list of security attributes]
- Role
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[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control Policy, [assignment:
access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of:
restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that
are used to enforce the SFP.
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- None
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
- Restrictive
[refinement]
- TOE Function Access Control Policy  TOE Function Access Control SFP
FMT_MSA.3.2(exec-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- Nobody
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP on users as
subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as operations.
FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following: users and [assignment: list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s)
used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP].
[assignment: list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE
Function Access Control SFP]
- objects controlled under the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20, and for
each, the indicated security attributes in Table 20.
FDP_ACF.1.2(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
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controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [selection: the user is explicitly authorized
by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is
automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: list of functions], [assignment:
other conditions]].
[selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user
that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions
[assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]]
- [assignment: other conditions]
[assignment: other conditions]
- rules specified in the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20 governing access
among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations
on controlled objects
FDP_ACF.1.3(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: other
rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects
to objects]
- None
FDP_ACF.1.4(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects]
- None
Table 20—TOE Function Access Control SFP
Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Attribute Access control rule
[Print] +PRT
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER Role
For the attribute of the Object, the
role associated with the Subject,
must be authorized to perform the
Operation.
[Copy]
+CPY
+DSR
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER Role
For the attribute of the Object, the
role associated with the Subject,
must be authorized to perform the
Operation.
[Scan]
+SCN
+DSR
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER Role
For the attribute of the Object, the
role associated with the Subject,
must be authorized to perform the
Operation.
[Fax] +FAXOUT
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER Role
For the attribute of the Object, the
role associated with the Subject,
must be authorized to perform the
Operation.
[Fax/I-Fax Inbox] +FAXIN
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER Role
For the attribute of the Object, the
role associated with the Subject,
must be authorized to perform the
Operation.
[Access Stored
Files]
+DSR
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER Role
For the attribute of the Object, the
role associated with the Subject,
must be authorized to perform the
Operation.
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Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Attribute Access control rule
Remote UI
[Access Received/
Stored Files]
+DSR
+FAXIN
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER Role
If the role associated with the
Subject is Administrator, the
Operation is permitted.
6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions
6.1.3.1 Delete Job
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22,
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security
attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
- In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
- Refer to “Operation” in Table 21.
[assignment: list of security attributes]
- Refer to “Security Attributes” in Table 21.
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
- Refer to “Role” in Table 21.
Table 21—Management of security attributes
Security Attributes Operation Role
User name delete, create, query U.ADMINISTRATOR
Box PINs modify, create U.ADMINISTRATOR
PIN of own Mail Box modify U.NORMAL
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22,
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose
one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
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[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- Common Access Control SFP in Table 22
- In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
- restrictive
FMT_MSA.3.2(delete-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- Nobody
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 on the list
of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the
Common Access Control SFP in Table 22.
FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 to objects
based on the following: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the
Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, and for each, the indicated security attributes
in Table 22.
FDP_ACF.1.2(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the Common Access
Control SFP in Table 22 governing access among controlled users as subjects and
controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.
FDP_ACF.1.3(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly
authorise access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects]
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete any D.DOC/D.FUNC.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to modify any +CPY, +SCN, +DSR,
+FAXOUT D.FUNC.
FDP_ACF.1.4(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to
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objects]
- None
Table 22—Common Access Control SFP
Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Access control rule
D.DOC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY,
+FAXOUT,
+DSR
Delete U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own
documents
D.DOC +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL Denied
D.FUNC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY,
+FAXOUT
+DSR
Modify;
Delete
U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own
function data
D.FUNC +FAXIN Modify U.USER Denied
D.FUNC +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL Denied
6.1.3.2 In The Job
FDP_ACC.1(in-job) Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 on the list
of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the In The Job
Access Control SFP in Table 23.
FDP_ACF.1(in-job) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 to objects
based on the following: the list of subjects and objects controlled under the In The Job
Access Control SFP in Table 23, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 23.
FDP_ACF.1.2(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the In The Job Access
Control SFP in Table 23 governing access among Users and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects.
FDP_ACF.1.3(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly
authorise access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects]
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to read any +FAXIN/+DSR D.Doc
FDP_ACF.1.4(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
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[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects]
- None
Table 23—In The Job Access Control SFP
Object Attribute(s) Operation Subject Access control rule
D.DOC +PRT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents
D.DOC +SCN Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents
D.DOC +CPY Read U.USER Denied
D.DOC +FAXIN Read U.NORMAL Denied
D.DOC +FAXOUT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents
D.DOC +DSR Read U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own documents
6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on any external Interface from
being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to any Shared-medium Interface.
6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable
upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the
following objects: D.DOC, [assignment: list of objects].
[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
- deallocation of the resource from
[assignment: list of objects]
- None
6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function
6.1.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function
FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(h) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
- Encryption of data written to the HDD
- Decryption of data read out from the HDD
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
- AES
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 256 bit
[assignment: list of standards]
- FIPS PUB 197
6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function
6.1.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function
FCS_COP.1(n) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(n) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
- Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN
- Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
- Refer to “Cryptographic Algorithm” in Table 24.
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- Refer to “Cryptographic Key Sizes” in Table 24.
[assignment: list of standards]
- Refer to “List of Standards” in Table 24.
Table 24— IPSec cryptographic algorithm, key sizes and standards
cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes list of standards
AES-CBC 256 bit FIPS PUB 197
AES-GCM 256 bit SP800-38D
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FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification
of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication of D.DOC,
D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medium Interface.
6.1.8 Self-Test Function
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during
normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions
under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection:
[assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the
authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
- during initial start-up
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
- Cryptographic algorithms used with the LAN Data Protection Function (AES)
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection:
[assignment: parts of TSF], TSF Data].
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF Data]
- [assignment: parts of TSF]
[assignment: parts of TSF]
- Audit log
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code.
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6.1.9 Audit Log Function
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]
level of audit; and
c) All Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for the
Relevant SFR in Table 25; [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]
- not specified
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
- None
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 25: (1)
information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all Additional
Information (if any is required); [assignment: other audit relevant information].
[assignment: other audit relevant information]
- None
Table 25—Audit data requirements
Auditable event Relevant SFR Audit level Additional
information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.1 Basic None required
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the
identification mechanism
FIA_UID.1 Basic Attempted user
identity, if available
Use of the management functions FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required
Modifications to the group of users that are
part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required
Termination of an interactive session by the
session locking mechanism5
FTA_SSL.3 Minimum None required
Failure of the trusted channel functions FTP_ITC.1 Minimum None required
5
See “Section 14.1 IEEE Std 2600.1 Errata” in the PP Guide.
In IEEE Std 2600.1, this is indicated as “Locking of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism” but note that
this is a transcription error.
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FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read [assignment:
list of audit information] from the audit records.
[assignment: authorised users]
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
[assignment: list of audit information]
- Refer to the audit logs listed in Table 25.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
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FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorised modifications
to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
[selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]
- prevent
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except
those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit
records”] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit
trail is full.
[selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken
by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”]
- “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
- None
6.1.10 Management Function
6.1.10.1 User Management Function
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a defined quality
metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
- Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length
- Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters
- Use at least one uppercase character (A to Z)
- Use at least one lowercase character (a to z)
- Use at least one number (0-9)
- Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><)
- Allowed characters
- All characters other than control characters
FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Management of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (user-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify,
delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF Data associated with
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a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL] to
[selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to
whom such TSF Data are associated]].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
- Refer to “Operation” in Table 26.
[assignment: list of TSF Data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with
documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL]
- Refer to “TSF Data” in Table 26.
[selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to
whom such TSF Data are associated]]
- Refer to “Role” in Table 26.
Table 26— User information management
TSF Data Role Operation
User name U.ADMINISTRATOR delete, create, query
Role U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create, query
Passwords U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create
Own password U.NORMAL modify
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL, [selection: Nobody,
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]].
[selection: Nobody, [assignment: the authorised identified roles]]
- Nobody
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the role “Nobody” to which no
user shall be associated.
6.1.10.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function
FCS_CKM.1(h) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(h) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
- Random number generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using Hash_DRBG
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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- 256 bit
[assignment: list of standards]
- Not Specified
FCS_CKM.1(n) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(n) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
- Random number generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using Hash_DRBG
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 256 bit
[assignment: list of standards]
- Not Specified
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
distribution method [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method] that meets the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key distribution method]
- DH (Diffie Hellman) and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman)
[assignment: list of standards]
- SP800-56A
6.1.10.3 Device Management Function
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Management of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1(device-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify,
delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [selection,
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choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: the authorized
identified roles except U.NORMAL]]].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
- Refer to “Operation” in Table 27.
[assignment: list of TSF data]
- Refer to “TSF Data” in Table 27.
[selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: the
authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]]
- Refer to “Role” in Table 27.
Table 27— Device management function
TSF Data Role Operation
Date/Time settings U.ADMINISTRATOR modify
HDD Data Erase settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
IPSec settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Auto Reset settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Lockout policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Password policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Audit log U.ADMINISTRATOR query, delete
Audit log auto-export settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: list
of management functions to be provided by the TSF].
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
- Refer to “Management Function” in Table 28.
Table 28—The management of security requirements
Management Function Operation
Date/Time settings modify
HDD Data Erase settings query, modify
IPSec settings query, modify
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Management Function Operation
Auto Reset settings query, modify
Lockout policy settings query, modify
Password policy settings query, modify
Audit log query, delete
Audit log auto-export settings query, modify
Username delete, create, query
Role modify, delete, create, query
Password modify, delete, create
Box PIN modify, create
Own password modify
PIN of own Mail Box modify
6.2 Security assurance requirements
Table 29 lists the Security Assurance Requirements for 2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices,
Operational Environment B, and related SFR Packages, EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
Table 29— IEEE 2600.2 Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures (augmentation of EAL2)
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
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6.3 Security functional requirements rationale
6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements
Table 30 provides a mapping of TOE Security Objectives and security functional requirements. This shows
how each of the security functional requirements corresponds to at least one TOE Security Objective.
Bold typeface items provide principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide
supporting (S) fulfillment.
Table 30—The completeness of security requirements
SFRs
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.STORAGE.CRYPTED
FIA_AFL.1 S
FIA_ATD.1 S
FIA_UAU.1 P P
FIA_UAU.7 S
FIA_UID.1 S S S S S S P P S
FIA_USB.1 P
FTA_SSL.3(lui) P P
FTA_SSL.3(rui) P P
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) S
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) S
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) P
FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) S
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) S S S
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) S S S
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) P P P
FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) S S S
FDP_ACC.1(in-job) P
FDP_ACF.1(in-job) S
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 P
FDP_RIP.1 P
FCS_COP.1(h) S S P
FCS_COP.1(n) S S S S S S
FTP_ITC.1 P P P P P P
FCS_CKM.1(h) S S P
FCS_CKM.1(n) S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.2 S S S S S S
FPT_TST.1 P
FAU_GEN.1 P
FAU_GEN.2 P
FAU_SAR.1 P
FAU_SAR.2 P
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SFRs
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.STORAGE.CRYPTED
FAU_STG.1 P
FAU_STG.4 P
FPT_STM.1 S
FIA_SOS.1 S
FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) P P P
FMT_SMR.1 S S S S S S S
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) P P P
FMT_SMF.1 S S S S S S
6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements
This section provides the rationale on how the security functional requirements are sufficient to satisfy the
Security Objectives.
O.DOC.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures user document data is protected from unauthorized
disclosure. O.DOC.NO_DIS is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are
assigned for access control.
The identified users are allowed to cancel only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete-
job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job).
The identified users are allowed to access only his/her own document data in print job, according to
FDP_ACC.1(in-job)/FDP_ACF.1(in-job), and Nobody is allowed to access any document data in other job
types.
Furthermore, by FDP_RIP.1, complete deletion of residual information of user document data created as a result
of job processing is ensured. By FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are
protected from unauthorized disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User
Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1,
management functions related to these actions, are provided.
O.DOC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user document data from unauthorized
alteration. O.DOC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are
assigned for access control.
The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete-
job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job).
By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN
are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these
actions, are provided.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user function data from unauthorized
alteration. O.FUNC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are
assigned for access control.
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The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete-
job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job).
By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN
are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these
actions, are provided.
O.PROT.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF protected data from unauthorized
alteration. O.PROT.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1,
roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1.
By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN
are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from
unauthorized disclosure. O.CONF.NO_DIS is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1,
roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1.
Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are protected from
unauthorized disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF
Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from
unauthorized alteration. O.CONF.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1,
roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1.
By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN
are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the security objective that ensures user identification and authentication.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED is addressed by the following:
Users authenticated by the identification and authentication mechanism specified by FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_AFL.1, with user sessions managed by FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, and
FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), are granted use of the function, as determined by access control specified by
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)/FDP_ACF.1(exec-job).
Furthermore, authorized user information are managed by FIA_SOS.1, FMT_MSA.1(exec-job),
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), and FMT_SMR.1.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the security objective that ensures control of operations of the I/O interfaces
in accordance with security policy. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is addressed by the following:
By FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), the user interface is managed.
By FPT_FDI_EXP.1, restricted forwarding of data to the LAN is specified.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is addressed by providing the self-test procedures specified by FPT_TST.1.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED is addressed by providing the Audit Log function as specified by FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2,
FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, and FAU_STG.4. FIA_UID.1 and FPT_STM.1 provide the means for
user information and timestamps generated on audit logs.
O. STORAGE.CRYPTED is addressed by the encryption/decryption function as specified by FCS_COP.1(h)
and cryptographic key management function as specified by FCS_CKM.1(h).
6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements
This section provides the justification for any dependencies not met.
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Table 31—The dependencies of security requirements
Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
required by CC
Dependencies satisfied
by ST
Reason for not meeting dependencies
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FTA_SSL.3(lui) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FTA_SSL.3(rui) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job)
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job)
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job)
FMT_SMR.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(exec-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACF.1(exec-job)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job)
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)
FMT_SMR.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACF.1(delete-job)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies. No dependencies.
N/A (no dependencies)
FCS_COP.1(h)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1(h)]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(h)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any method
for their destruction.
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies. No dependencies.
N/A (no dependencies)
FCS_COP.1(n)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1(n)]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(n)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any method
for their destruction.
FCS_CKM.1(h)
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(h)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
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Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
required by CC
Dependencies satisfied
by ST
Reason for not meeting dependencies
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any method
for their destruction.
FCS_CKM.1(n)
[FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(n)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any method
for their destruction.
FCS_CKM.2
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1(n)]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(n)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any method
for their destruction.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale
This Protection Profile has been developed for Hardcopy Devices to be used in commercial information
processing environments that require a moderate level of document security, network security, and security
assurance. The TOE will be exposed to only a low level of risk because it is assumed that the TOE will be
located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides almost constant protection from unauthorized
and unmanaged access to the TOE and its data interfaces. Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile
storage without disassembling the TOE except for removable nonvolatile storage devices, where protection
of User and TSF Data are provided when such devices are removed from the TOE environment. Agents have
limited or no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change and the TOE self-verifies its
executable code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 is
appropriate.
EAL 2 is augmented with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw reporting procedures. ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions
and procedures for the reporting and remediation of identified security flaws are in place, and their inclusion
is expected by the consumers of this TOE.
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7 TOE Summary specification
This section describes the TOE summary specifications.
7.1 User Authentication Function
- Supported functional requirements: FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB.1, FIA_AFL.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)
When the control panel or a remote UI is used to operate the MFP, before permitting such operations, the
TOE requires user authentication in order to identify and authenticate valid users. However, the submission
of print jobs, fax jobs, and I-fax jobs is always permitted. [FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1]
Two methods of user authentication are supported:
- External Authentication
Authentication is based on user information registered in the authentication server. This may be
an Active Directory server that uses Kerberos authentication, or LDAP server that uses LDAP
authentication.
- Internal Authentication
Authentication is based on user information registered in the device.
For user authentication, the TOE prompts input of the user name, password, and the login destination. User
authentication succeeds only if the user name and password match the ones at the specified destination. For
security, note that the password is masked by asterisks in the text field. [FIA_UAU.7]
The TOE issues an Access Control Token (ACT) to each user successfully authenticated.
The ACT is an object that contains the user's name and role, as well as the access permissions to the
application functions that are specified for each user role. [FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1]
The TOE provides a lockout function in order to minimize invalid login attempts. [FIA_AFL.1]
- This function locks out any user that fails to login successfully within the maximum number of
failed authentication attempts. A value from 1 to 10 can be specified as the number of attempts
before lockout (Initial value: 3).
- Any user that is locked out will not be able to login until the lockout time passes. A value from
1 to 60 minutes can be specified as the lockout time (Initial value: 3 minutes).
The TOE terminates an interactive session when there is no user activity at the control panel or remote UI
lasting for a specified period of time. [FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)]
- At the control panel, session timeout occurs after a specified period of user inactivity. A value
from 10 seconds to 9 minutes can be specified (Initial value: 2 minutes).
- At a remote UI, session timeout occurs after 15 minutes of user inactivity.
7.2 Function Use Restriction Function
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(exec-job), FDP_ACF.1(exec-job),
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), FMT_SMF.1
For each UI, the TOE provides Function Use Restriction, which controls access based on the contents of the
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ACT issued to authenticated users. Any queries, modifications, deletions, and additions to the role contained
in the ACT, are performed by U.ADMINISTRATORs only. For Function Use Restriction, the attribute of the
Object is the functions itself, and is therefore fixed.
When the control panel is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions
depending on the settings in “Application Restrictions”, which are based on the role contained in the ACT.
When a remote UI is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions based on
attribute values associated with the role in the ACT.
Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are allowed use of all functions.
Table 32— Function Use Restriction Policy
UI Object Condition Operation
Control panel Pointer to [Print] The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Print] function.
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Copy] The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Copy] function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Scan and
Send]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Scan and Send]
function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Fax] The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Scan and Send]
function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Fax/I-Fax
Inbox]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Access Stored
Files] function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Access
Stored Files]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Access Stored
Files] function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Scan and
Store]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Scan and Store]
function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Remote UI Pointer to [Access
Received/Stored Files]
The role associated with U.USER is
anything other than Administrator.
Cannot be executed.
7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions
For Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs, the TOE provides the following security functions. Job Output
Restriction restricts access to submitted jobs, to the user that executed the job.
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7.3.1 Job Cancel
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job),
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMF.1
TOE can delete Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs according to following. The user name of these jobs is
initialized by username of the user that executed the job.
- U.NORMAL is authorized to delete his/her own job.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete all jobs.
With the cancellation of the job, the attribute value to be attached to the job is deleted.
7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job),
FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-
job), FMT_SMF.1
TOE provides the following access control functions for documents in each jobs. User name of these jobs is
initialized by username of the user that executed the job.
Copy, Scan, Fax TX Jobs
- Nobody is authorized to read documents in any copy jobs.
- Nobody is authorized to read documents in any scan, and Fax TX jobs, except in case of 7.3.3
Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs.
Temporarily Stored Print Jobs
If a print job is submitted, the job is temporarily stored in the machine without being output. Additionally, it
uses the user name associated with the print job to determine its owner, in order to realize access restriction
as described below.
For temporarily stored jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name
matches the user name associated with the desired job.
- Print
- Change priority for printing
- Delete
For all the print jobs to which print is instructed, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following:
- Delete
Received Fax Jobs
For documents received by fax/I-fax, the TOE provides the Memory RX Inbox where these jobs may be
stored as files, to be output at a later time. Since these are stored in the Memory RX Inbox, access control to
this inbox, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned to
the Memory RX Inbox, to prevent unauthorized access by a user.
Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are authorized to initialize, set, modify, or delete the PIN on the Memory RX
Inbox, which means only U.ADMINISTRATORs are allowed access to the stored document data. The TOE
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realizes access restriction, by determining the U.ADMINISTRATOR that enters the correct PIN to be the
owner of the stored document data, preventing any U.NORMAL from executing print or send operations on
the document data.
If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without
entering any PIN.
- Print
- Send
- Delete
If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering
the correct PIN.
- Print
- Send
- Delete
Document Data Stored in Mail Box
For Copy or Scan jobs, the TOE provides Mail Boxes where these jobs may be stored as document data, to
be printed or sent at a later time. Since these are stored in Mail Boxes, access control to Mail Boxes, is
equivalent to access control to the stored document data.
A seven digit PIN can be assigned to a Mail Box, to help prevent unauthorized access by a user.
No PIN is required when storing document data in a Mail Box. The TOE realizes access restriction, by
determining the U.USER that enters the correct PIN, to be the owner of the stored document data.
For document data stored in a Mail Box, the following operations are made available to U.NORMAL only
by entering the correct PIN.
- Print
- Change print settings
- Preview
- Delete
If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without
entering any PIN.
- Print
- Change print settings
- Preview
- Delete
If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering
the correct PIN.
- Print
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- Change print settings
- Preview
- Delete
[Box PIN]
For the PIN set on Mail Boxes/Memory RX Inbox, only U.ADMINISTRATORs assigned the Administrator
role are allowed to set, change any PIN. Note however, that U.NORMALs are allowed to change the PIN for
the Mail Box they use.
7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(in-job),
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job)
There are two types of Send Jobs: Fax TX job and Scan job.And there are Delayed Send function and Preview
function as Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs function to store jobs temporarily.
Delayed Send
When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with transmission time specified, it is first stored temporarily, until
sending at the specified time.
For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.NORMALs, only if the
user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job.
- Change destination
For all temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following:
- Change destination
Preview
When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with Preview setting, it is first stored temporarily and previewed, later
it is send.
For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's
name matches the user name associated with the desired job.
- Preview
- Delete Pages
- Cancel Jobs
7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function
- Supported functional requirements: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The design of the TOE prevents received data from being forwarded directly to a server or computer. This
function enables the user to restrict forwarding of received jobs to the LAN.
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7.5 HDD Data Erase Function
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_RIP.1
By overwriting with random data, the TOE permanently erases document data (including temporary image
files) in the HDD, to ensure that no trace of the document data remains on the HDD.
The user can choose one of the following erasure methods:
- Overwrite using the DoD standard
- Overwrite with random data three times
- Overwrite once with random data
- Overwrite once with null data
The timing in which data are erased is specified below.
- Image files temporarily stored in the HDD as a result of job processing is completely erased during
or after processing of the job.
- Document data are completely erased from the HDD, immediately after being deleted from Mail
Box/Memory RX Inbox.
- Residual information that remained unerased due to a sudden power shutdown, are completely
erased from the HDD upon startup of the TOE.
7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function
The security functions provided by the “HDD Data Encryption Chip” on the controller board of the TOE are
described below.
The encryption/decryption function provides confidentiality protection for User Data and TSF Data stored in
the HDD.
7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(h)
To protect the confidentiality and integrity of User Data and TSF Data stored in the HDD, the TOE performs
the following cryptographic operations to encrypt all data stored in the HDD.
- Encryption of data written to the HDD.
- Decryption of data read out from the HDD.
The cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size are specified below:
- AES algorithm (FIPS PUB 197)
- 256 bit key length
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7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(h)
The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the HDD data
encryption function.
- Uses a random number generation algorithm according to NIST SP800-90A Hash_DRBG(SHA-
256)
- Generates a cryptographic key with 256 bit key length
The cryptographic key is managed as follows.
- Upon startup, the TOE reads the seed information stored in FlashROM and generates a
cryptographic key.
- After generating the cryptographic key, the TOE stores the key in RAM.
No method is available for acquiring the seed from the encryption chip. Note also, that because the
cryptographic key is stored in volatile RAM memory, it disappears when power is shut off.
7.7 LAN Data Protection Function
LAN Data Protection Function encrypts/decrypts all IP packets that are used in communication with an IT
device.
7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1
To ensure confidentiality and integrity of User Data and TSF Data communicated to and from an IT device,
the TOE uses IPSec to encrypt/decrypt all IP packets.
- Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN
- Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN
The following cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key sizes are used.
- See Table 24
7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(n), FCS_CKM.2
The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the IP packet
encryption function.
- Uses a random number generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using HMAC_DRBG(SHA-256)
- Generates a cryptographic key with 256 bit key length
The following method is used by the TOE, to transmit the cryptographic key used by the IP Packet Encryption
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Function, to the other party
- ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) and DH (Diffie Hellman) according to SP800-56A
7.8 Self-Test Function
- Supported functional requirements: FPT_TST.1
At startup, the TOE performs the following self-test.
- Checks whether cryptographic algorithms are running properly (AES)
- Checks the integrity of the audit log
- Checks the integrity of the executable code of the cryptographic algorithm
7.9 Audit Log Function
- Supported functional requirements: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), FMT_SMF.1
The TOE generates logs for the following events.
- Startup
- Shutdown
- Job completion
- User authentication success/failure
- Logout
- Use of device management functions
- Use of user management functions
- Changes to the date/time setting
- IPSec connection failures
The items that are recorded on each log, are listed below. The date/time is provided by the TOE. The TOE's
date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate
time is obtained from the Time Server.
- Date/Time, User Name, Event Type, Outcome (Success/Failed)
Other log events may have additional items as described below.
- Job type (job completion)
- Name of the user that failed authentication (authentication failure)
Export of audit logs can be performed from a remote UI, in order to read out log records, although use of this
function is restricted to U.ADMINISTRATORs only. Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed
to export audit logs when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI. Also, a function to export audit log
automatically to the file server for audit log is provided. In order to use this function, U.ADMINISTRATOR
needs to enable the function by setting destination and the time to send.
When accessing the TOE from a remote UI, another capability restricted to U.ADMINISTRATORs only is
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the deletion of log records from the [Deleting Collected Logs] menu. Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR
are not allowed access to this capability when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI, thus preventing
unauthorized alterations from occurring.
A maximum of 40,000 audit records can be maintained. Once this becomes full, the oldest audit record is
overwritten with the newest.
7.10 Management Functions
7.10.1 User Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FIA_SOS.1 , FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) ,
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
In the TOE, only U.ADMINISTRATORs assigned theAdministrator role can set, change, or delete user, role,
and access restriction information and box PINs. General users or U.NORMAL, can only change their own
passwords and the PIN for the Mail Box they use.
[Setting/Changing/Deleting User, Role, and Access Restriction Information]
New users are registered by setting the user name and password, and assigning a role to the user. Registered
user information can be modified by changing the password, or the assigned role, or the user's registration
can be deleted altogether. User specified passwords are checked to see that they are consistent with the
password policy.
Four roles exist, which are called “Base Roles”: Administrator, Power User, General User, and Limited User.
To create a new “Custom Role” different than these, any one of four base roles is used as a template for the
new role, which can then be registered.
The Administrator role is a role whose base role is “Administrator”, and has administrative privileges.
The access restriction information that determines whether use of certain functions is permitted or denied, is
specified by the “Application Restrictions” setting, which depends on what role is assigned. Although the
initial value for “Application Restrictions” is fixed for base roles, the initial value of “Application
Restrictions” can be changed for custom roles.
[Types of Users]
There are two types of users: U.ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges.
- U.NORMAL
General user assigned a role other than Administrator role.
7.10.2 Device Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), FMT_SMF.1
To provide for the effective enforcement of security functions, the TOE allows only U.ADMINISTRATORs
to set the device management settings in Table 27.
The following settings are also provided.
[Password Policy Settings]
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To encourage the use of strong passwords, the following password policy may be set.
- Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length
- Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters
- Use at least one uppercase characters (A to Z)
- Use at least one lowercase characters (a to z)
- Use at least one number (0-9)
- Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><)
- Allowed characters:
All characters other than control characters
[Lockout Policy Settings]
The number of attempts before lockout and the lockout time can be set.
- Number of attempts before lockout
Select a value from 1 to 10 (Initial value: 3)
- Lockout time
Select a value from 1 to 60 minutes (Initial value: 3 minutes)
END