Bastille Enterprise Fusion Center
Version 3.6
Security Target
Document ID: UL15574582-ST
Version: 1.8
January 09, 2026
Prepared For:
Bastille Networks, Inc
499 Lake Ave,
Santa Cruz CA, 95062
Prepared By:
Dylan Lyman
UL Verification Services Inc.
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Notices:
©2022-2025 Bastille Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. All other brand names are trademarks,
registered trademarks, or service marks of their respective companies or organizations.
May be reproduced only in its original form.
ST Change Log
Version Date Author Changes
1.0 January 27,
2025
D. Lyman Initial release
1.1 June 11,
2025
D. Lyman Updates in response to NIAP validator comments
1.2 July 9, 2025 D. Lyman Updates in response to round 1 ATE evaluator
comments
1.3 July 28,
2025
D. Lyman Updates in response to round 1 of ASE evaluator
comments
1.4 October 2,
2025
D. Lyman Fixed typos and updated TDs
1.5 October 28,
2025
D. Lyman Updated SFR selections and list of packages
1.6 October 30,
2025
D. Lyman Minor updates
1.7 December
22, 2025
C. Sepulveda Minor updates
1.8 January 09,
2026
C. Sepulveda Minor updated for ECR
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Table of Contents
1. Security Target (ST) Introduction 6
1.1 Security Target Reference 6
1.2 Target of Evaluation Reference 6
1.3 Target of Evaluation Overview 6
1.3.1 TOE Product Type 6
1.3.2 TOE Usage 7
1.3.3 TOE Major Security Features Summary 7
1.3.4 TOE IT environment hardware/software/firmware requirements 8
1.4 Target of Evaluation Description 8
1.4.1 Physical Scope 8
1.4.2 Logical Scope 9
1.4.2.1 Cryptographic Support 9
1.4.2.2 User Data Protection 9
1.4.2.3 Identification and Authentication 9
1.4.2.4 Security Management 9
1.4.2.5 Privacy 9
1.4.2.6 Protection of the TSF 9
1.4.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels 9
1.5 Notation, formatting, and conventions 9
2. Conformance Claims 11
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claims 11
2.2 Conformance to Protection Profiles 11
2.3 Conformance to Security Packages 12
2.4 Conformance Claims Rationale 12
3. Security Problem Definition 13
3.1 Threats 13
3.2 Organizational Security Policies 13
3.3 Assumptions 13
4. Security Objectives 14
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 14
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 14
5. Extended Components Definition 16
6. Security Requirements 17
6.1 Security Function Requirements 17
6.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) 17
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6.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services 17
6.1.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services 17
6.1.1.3 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials 18
6.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP) 18
6.1.2.1 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources 18
6.1.2.2 FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications 18
6.1.2.3 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data 18
6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) 18
6.1.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation (Selection-based) 18
6.1.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication (Selection-based) 19
6.1.4 Security Management (FMT) 19
6.1.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration 19
6.1.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism 20
6.1.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 20
6.1.5 Privacy (FPR) 20
6.1.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent of Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information 20
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 20
6.1.6.1 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs 20
6.1.6.2 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities 20
6.1.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions 21
6.1.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries 21
6.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update 21
6.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) 21
6.1.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit 21
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements 22
7. TOE Summary Specification 23
7.1 Cryptographic Support 23
7.1.1 Cryptographic Key Generation 23
7.1.2 Random Bit Generation Services 23
7.1.3 Storage of Credentials (Selection-based) 23
7.1.4 Platform provided cryptographic services. 23
7.2 User Data Protection 24
7.2.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data 24
7.2.2 Network Connectivity 24
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7.3 Identification and Authentication 24
7.3.1 Digital certificates for TLS and HTTPS 24
7.4 Security Management 24
7.4.1 Secure by Default Configuration 24
7.4.2 Supported Configuration Mechanism 25
7.4.3 Management functions. 25
7.5 Privacy 25
7.5.1 User Consent of Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information 25
7.6 Protection of the TSF 25
7.6.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities 25
7.6.2 Use of Supported Services and APIs 26
7.6.3 Software Identification and Versions 26
7.6.4 Integrity for Installation and Update 26
7.6.5 Timely Security Updates 27
7.7 Trusted Path/Channels 27
7.7.1 Protection of Data in Transit 27
8. Terms and Definitions 31
9. References 33
Appendix A 34
Appendix B 42
Platform: 42
TOE: 42
Javascript libraries: 42
Python 3.11.3 with the following python libraries: 42
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1. Security Target (ST) Introduction
This Security Target (ST) is the statement of security needs for the specified Target of
Evaluation (TOE). The structure of this document is defined by CC v3.1r5 Part 1 Annex A.2,
“Mandatory contents of an ST”:
● Section 1 contains the ST Introduction, including the ST reference, Target of Evaluation
(TOE) reference, TOE overview, and TOE description.
● Section 2 contains conformance claims to the Common Criteria (CC) version, Protection
Profile (PP) and package claims, as well as rationale for these conformance claims.
● Section 3 contains the security problem definition, which includes threats, Organizational
Security Policies (OSP), and assumptions that must be countered, enforced, and upheld
by the TOE and its operational environment.
● Section 4 contains statements of security objectives for the TOE, and the TOE
operational environment as well as rationale for these security objectives.
● Section 5 contains definitions of any extended security requirements claimed in the ST.
● Section 6 contains the security function requirements (SFR), the security assurance
requirements (SAR), as well as the rationale for the claimed SFR and SAR.
● Section 7 contains the TOE summary specification, which includes the detailed
specification of the IT security functions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
The Security Target reference shall uniquely identify the Security Target.
ST Title: Bastille Enterprise Fusion Center Version 3.6 Security Target
ST Version Number: 1.8
ST Author(s): Dylan Lyman
ST Publication Date: January 09, 2026
Keywords Application Software
1.2 Target of Evaluation Reference
TOE Developer: Bastille Networks, Inc.
499 Lake Ave,
Santa Cruz CA, 95062
TOE Name: Bastille Enterprise Fusion Center
TOE Version: 3.6
1.3 Target of Evaluation Overview
1.3.1 TOE Product Type
The TOE is classified as Application Software running in a virtual appliance.
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1.3.2 TOE Usage
The Bastille Enterprise Fusion Center analyzes observed wireless device data to detect devices,
their metadata, and their locations (the data collection component is not part of the evaluation).
The Fusion Center provides real time feeds of this enriched device data. This data enables users
to make security decisions by leveraging the real time wireless device inventory the Fusion Center
provides and site policies of the organization. Sites can include one or more floors of a building,
multiple buildings, or entire organization campuses.
The Fusion Center provides secure access to the data through the use of APIs available to users
via the TLS/HTTPS protected network connections. There are several web-based (single page)
applications that are built into the TOE and these are built exclusively with the aforementioned
APIs. Usage of these APIs is outside of scope of this evaluation. The TOE can optionally also
provide notifications to subscriber applications through the use of webhooks via secured
TLS/HTTPS protocol. Webhook subscribers are outside the scope of the evaluation (except for
the TOE’s configuration of webhook endpoints and the TOE’s protected transmission of
notifications to those endpoints).
Figure 1: TOE and TOE Environment
1.3.3 TOE Major Security Features Summary
TOE performs secure collection, processing and presentation of data collected on customer
location. Security of this functions is ensured by the following TOE security features, further
detailed in TOE Logical Scope section below:
● Cryptographic Support
● User Data Protection
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
● Privacy
● Protection of the TSF
● Trusted Path/Channel
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1.3.4 TOE IT environment hardware/software/firmware requirements
IT environment should contain the following hardware and services that are not considered parts
of the TOE, but required for correct functioning of the TOE:
Table 1: Non-TOE Software and Hardware
Component Purpose Specific Requirements.
Bastille Concentrator or other
compatible data source
Source of data for the TOE. Support of the TOE API
Network equipment Enabling TOE connection to
non-TOE entities listed in this
table over network.
None
Microsoft Windows Server 2019,
running Active Directory
Federation Service (MS ADFS)
Authentication that uses OAuth,
specifically, OIDC.
Microsoft Windows Server 2019
or 2022
NTP Server Synchronizes the clocks on
computers and networks across
the Internet.
Any NTPv4-compliant server
VMware ESXi Virtualization
Server (vCenter®, vSphere®)
Hosts Fusion Center virtual
appliance.
VMware ESXi 7 or higher
(Virtual Hardware Version 17 or
higher) running Intel® Xeon®
Gold 6242 CPU @ 2.80GHz.
Minimum virtual machine
resources:
− 32 GB RAM
− 100 GB disk (local to VM)
− 100 GB network mounted
partition (NFS/external to
VM)
Database Elasticsearch Cluster Storage for data, data at rest. Version 7.12 or higher
500 GB storage for index data
Data Queue Apache Kafka Ephemeral data buffer or queue. Version 2.7.0 or higher
20 GB storage or higher
Minimum retention: 2 days
The TOE is running on Ubuntu Linux LTS 18.04 and 22.04, running on VMware ESXI
Virtualization Server. Ubuntu Linux is not part of the TOE but is provided together with the TOE
as a virtual appliance. Ubuntu Pro ESM long term support (LTS) subscription is prepaid by
Bastille.
1.4 Target of Evaluation Description
1.4.1 Physical Scope
The TOE consists of the following modules and scripts: core Fusion Center Modules, NGINX
web server, Elastic Filebeat, Confluent Kafka Python client, libraries as described in Appendix
B.
The TOE is delivered to the customer in the form of a virtual appliance with all TOE parts
already pre-installed to the /opt/bastille folder in a virtual appliance virtual drive. The appliance is
provided through the developer support website, https://bastille.net/support/, and contacting
Bastille support, to receive the VM in the OVA file format. Appliance integrity is verified using a
digital signature of the file.
The TOE runs on an Ubuntu Linux LTS 18.04 or 22.04 virtual machine running on a VMware
ESXI virtualization server.
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The Guidance documentation that is part of the TOE is listed in Section 9 “References” within
Table 9: TOE Guidance.
Guidance documentation is delivered to the customer in the form of PDF documents through the
developer support website together with the appliance.
1.4.2 Logical Scope
The logical security features of the TOE are listed in Section 1.3.3 above and are further
described in the following subsections. A more detailed description of the implementation of
these security functions are provided in Section 7 “TOE Summary Specification”.
1.4.2.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE does not directly perform cryptographic services, but rather calls the platform-provided
crypto library, so cryptographic operations are out of the TOE logical scope.
1.4.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE protects confidential data using platform provided mechanisms and does not collect
sensitive information from the platform or users. The TOE restricts its access to platform
resources to network connections.
1.4.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE uses x509 certificates to verify the authenticity of the remote services when initiating
secure communications with them.
1.4.2.4 Security Management
The TOE provides security management functionality for users to perform initial configuration and
to configure external connections. Configuration is stored in a way recommended by the platform.
The TOE requires users to change the built-in OS credentials during initial configuration of the
TOE. TOE configures file permissions for its binaries to protect from modification by unprivileged
users.
1.4.2.5 Privacy
The TOE does not collect or transmit Personal Identifiable Information.
1.4.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE employs built-in anti-exploitation capabilities and uses only supported platform APIs and
a limited number of 3rd
party libraries. The TOE uses SemVer format to track TOE versions.
The TOE provides its current version number and capabilities to check for existing updates to the
TOE. The TOE is distributed with the OS as a Virtual Appliance, and updates are distributed as a
complete virtual appliance image.
1.4.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE performs encryption of transmitted sensitive data using platform provided functionality.
1.5 Notation, formatting, and conventions
The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are defined below; these
styles and clarifying information conventions were developed to aid the reader.
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Where necessary, the ST author has added application notes to provide the reader with
additional details to aid understanding; they are italicized and usually appear following the
element needing clarification.
The CC permits four SAR and SFR component operations (assignment, iteration, refinement,
and selection) to be performed. These operations defined in Common Criteria, Part 1; section
8.1, are:
● Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations;
● Assignment: allows the specification of parameters;
● Selection: allows the specification of one or more items from a list; and
● Refinement: allows the addition of details.
The notation conventions that refer to iterations, assignments, selections, and refinements
made in this Security Target are in reference to SARs and SFRs taken directly from CC Part 2
and Part 3 as well as from the Protection Profiles, modules, packages and extensions this ST
claims conformance to.
Iterations are indicated by an identifier or number in parenthesis following the requirement
number, e.g., FIA_X509_EXT.1.1(Server); the iterated requirement titles are similarly indicated,
e.g., FIA_X509_EXT.1(Server).
Assignments made by the ST author are identified with [bold text].
Selections are identified with [underlined text]. Selections within selections are identified with
[double underlined text].
Refinements that add text use bold and italicized text to identify the added text. Refinements
that performs a deletion, identify the deleted text with strikeout, bold, and italicized text.
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2. Conformance Claims
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claims
This Security Target and TOE are conformant to the Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5,
CC Part 2 extended [C2], and CC Part 3 extended [C3].
2.2 Conformance to Protection Profiles
This Security Target claims exact conformance to the Protection Profile for Application
Software, Version 1.4, dated 2021-10-07 [PP]. This Protection Profile will be referred to as PP
for convenience throughout this Security Target.
The TOE conforms with the following related NIAP Technical Decisions:
Table 2 Technical Decisions implemented
Technical Decision Details
0964 -Clarifications to FMT_MEC_EXT.1
Windows Test
Clarification of test activity, not
applicable to ST
0945 – Adding FIPS 186-5 in PP_APP_V1.4 SFR not included in ST
0931 – Clarification when CTR_DRBG is
Selected for FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2 in
PP_APP_V1.4
SFR not included in ST
0914 – Addition of PKG_TLS_V2.0 to
Conformance Claims
Package not supported by the TOE, not
applicable to ST
0865 – Consistency of Cryptographic Key Sizes SFR, FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
0844 – Addition of Assurance Package for Flaw
Remediation V1.0 Conformance Claim
PP modification, not applicable to ST
0823 – Update to Microsoft Windows Exploit
Protection link in FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
Additional test activity, not applicable to
ST
0822 – Correction to Windows Manifest File for
FDP_DEC_EXT.1
Additional test activity, not applicable to
ST
0815 – Addition of Conditional TSS Activity for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
Additional TSS evaluation activity,
considered for ST generation
0798 – Static Memory Mapping Exceptions Additional TSS evaluation activity,
considered for ST generation
0780 – FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification Modification to test activity, not
applicable to ST
0756 – Update for platform-provided full disk
encryption
Modification to test activity, not
applicable to ST
0747 – Configuration Storage Option for Android Platform is not Android
0743 – FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity SFR, FTP_DIT_EXT.1, was modified to
include assignment.
0736 – Number of elements for iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
SFR not included in the ST
0719 – ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4 PP modification, not applicable to ST
0717 – Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4 SFRs not included in the ST
0664 – Testing activity for FPT_TUD.2.2 SFR not included in the ST
0650 – Conformance claim sections updated to
allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
Not part of conformance claims
0628 – Addition of Container Image to Package
Format
SFR not included in the ST
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2.3 Conformance to Security Packages
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any security function requirements or
security assurance requirements packages, neither as package-conformant or package-
augmented.
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any PP modules.
2.4 Conformance Claims Rationale
This ST claims exact conformance and as such no conformance claims rationale is required.
The threats, OSPs, assumptions and security objectives are identical to the PP this ST is
conformant to.
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3. Security Problem Definition
3.1 Threats
This section defines the security threats for the TOE, characterized by a threat agent, an asset,
and an adverse action of that threat agent on that asset. These threats are taken directly from
the PP unchanged.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the application software or alter
communications between the application software and other endpoints in order to compromise
it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the
application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform on which the
application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the
form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS
An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the application.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the assumptions on the operational environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used. It includes information about the physical, personnel, and connectivity
aspects of the environment. The operational environment must be managed in accordance with
the provided Guidance. The following defines specific conditions that are assumed to exist in an
environment where the TOE is deployed. These assumptions are taken directly from the PP
unchanged.
A.PLATFORM
The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its
execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides
to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER
The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and
administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
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4. Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
O.INTEGRITY
Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages, and also
leverage execution environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever, shipped without
errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded software with integrity is critical to
enterprise network security. Processor manufacturers, compiler developers, execution
environment vendors, and operating system vendors have developed execution environment-
based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of
compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of these mechanisms by
using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the mechanism through
compiler or linker options.
O.QUALITY
To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and APIs provided by
the runtime environment rather than implementing their own versions of these services and
APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services and other complex operations such
as file and media parsing. Leveraging this platform behavior relies upon using only documented
and supported APIs.
O.MANAGEMENT
To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide consistent and
supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the
deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported
deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This
also includes providing control to the user regarding disclosure of any PII.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of physical control
of the storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This involves
encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to prevent unauthorized access to this
data. This also includes unnecessary network communications whose consequence may be the
loss of data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack
threats, conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data includes
cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific to the application that should not be
exposed outside of the application.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the TOE in correctly
providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.
OE.PLATFORM
The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes the
underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER
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The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software
within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and
administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
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5. Extended Components Definition
As stated in Section 2, this Security Target claims exact conformance to the referenced PP. As
such, the extended components definition is contained in the PP.
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6. Security Requirements
This section describes the security functional and assurance requirements for the TOE.
6.1 Security Function Requirements
This section describes the functional requirements for the TOE. Operations that were performed
in the PP are not signified in this section. Operations performed by the ST are denoted
according to the formatting conventions in Section 1.5.
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements
SFR Description
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent of Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
6.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM.1.1
The application shall [
● generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys].
6.1.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
● Use no DRBG functionality
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] for its cryptographic operations.
6.1.1.3 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
● invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [TLS server private
key]
] to non-volatile memory.
6.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.2.1 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [
● network connectivity
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [
● no sensitive information repositories
].
6.1.2.2 FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict network communication to [
● user-initiated communication for [updates availability check],
● respond to [connections from data source devices, users and custom applications
to TOE API],
● [application-initiated connections to CRL servers, Elasticsearch Database Server,
Apache Kafka server, Active Directory Server, event feed subscribers]
].
6.1.2.3 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
● protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1
] in non-volatile memory.
6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation (Selection-based)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
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The application shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to validate certificates in
accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates and
that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the
key usage field.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [CRL as
specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3].
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the
Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing
purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority
(RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension
is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
6.1.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication (Selection-based)
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication
for [HTTPS, TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the
application shall [not accept the certificate].
6.1.4 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured
with default credentials or no credentials.
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FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application
binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
6.1.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
● invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting
configuration options.]
6.1.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
● set up connections to external webhook subscribers
].
6.1.5 Privacy (FPR)
6.1.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent of Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
● not transmit PII over a network
] .
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.6.1 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
6.1.6.2 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no
exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [
● not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions]
] .
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
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FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files
unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
6.1.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [[Semantic Versioning (“SemVer”) version format ]]
6.1.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
The application shall be packaged with only [3rd party libraries as listed in Appendix B].
6.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the application
software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [with the platform OS]
6.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
6.1.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.11
The application shall [
● invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted sensitive data with
[HTTPS, TLS] for [external API communication and database access].
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
1
TD0743 has been applied.
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6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE satisfies Security Assurance requirements as required by the [PP]. The TOE claims
conformance to:
Table 4: Security Assurance Requirements
SAR Description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
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7. TOE Summary Specification
This section provides evaluators and potential consumers of the TOE with a high-level description
of each SFR, thereby enabling them to gain a general understanding of how the TOE is
implemented. These descriptions are intentionally not overly detailed, thereby disclosing no
proprietary information. These sections refer to SFRs defined in Section 6.1.
The TOE consists of the following Security Functions:
● Cryptographic Support
● User Data Protection
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
● Privacy
● Protection of the TSF
● Trusted Path/Channels
7.1 Cryptographic Support
7.1.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
The TOE does not directly generate asymmetric keys. Asymmetric keys used in a HTTPS/TLS
connection as server certificates are generated outside of the TOE by the administrator and are
imported to the TOE during the initial configuration process. Asymmetric keys that are used as
part of the TLS handshake process are generated without TOE control by the underlaying
platform cryptographic module that implements TLS encryption and decryption, as described in
Section 7.7 below.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
7.1.2 Random Bit Generation Services
The TOE does not directly use a DRBG to support TSF. A DRBG is called by the underlying
platform cryptographic module that implements TLS encryption and decryption, as described in
Section 7.1.4 below.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
7.1.3 Storage of Credentials (Selection-based)
The TOE uses a Linux Keyring to securely store the TLS server private key. The TOE does not
store other credentials in non-volatile memory. To authenticate external users, the TOE relies on
JSON Web Tokens authorized by Active Directory Services and does not verify credentials based
on locally stored values or keys. To verify JWT validity the TOE will establish a connection to the
ADFS service, as described in section 7.7 below. Verification of credentials is out of the scope of
the evaluation. Signature verification of the JWT token is performed by platform-provided
OpenSSL crypto library.
FCS_STO_EXT.1
7.1.4 Platform provided cryptographic services.
The TOE relies on the platform-provided OpenSSL module to perform trusted channel encryption
and other required cryptographic operations as required by the TOE.
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7.2 User Data Protection
7.2.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
The TOE does not store sensitive data other than TLS Server private keys in non-volatile memory.
This is covered by FCS_STO_EXT.1.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1
7.2.2 Network Connectivity
The TOE uses the network to perform its primary functionality – receiving, processing, storing,
and presenting of data.
The TOE accepts incoming network communications on port 443 using TLS protocol for:
● API or Web Interface Users
● Data collection from Concentrator (or other compatible data source devices)
The TOE establishes outgoing network connections to:
● MS AFDS Service for access token verification
● ElasticSearch database to store data
● Kafka cluster to queue messages for processing
● External applications using webhooks
● Developer portal to perform version check
● Kafka to send performance logs
● CRL server for revocation checking
FDP_NET_EXT.1
7.3 Identification and Authentication
7.3.1 Digital certificates for TLS and HTTPS
The TOE uses x509 certificates to verify the authenticity of remote servers that it connects to. The
TOE uses the platform-provided OpenSSL module to perform the certificate validation checks in
accordance with RFC 5280. Validation is performed for every certificate in the certificate trust
chain up to the root certificate that is stored in the platform-managed root store. The TOE will
reject a certificate without key usage or an incorrect key usage field. A revocation check for
certificates is performed using CRLs as per RFC 5280 Section 6.3. If revocation status is
impossible to verify, the certificate is considered invalid.
TOE uses only one certificate chain configured by the administrator. Section 6 of administrative
guidance [G1] describes how to upload those certificates to the trust store during TOE
configuration.
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2
7.4 Security Management
7.4.1 Secure by Default Configuration
The TOE uses no credentials. The Application cannot be used until initial configuration has
been performed. The customer is expected to follow the user guidance to perform initial
configuration and secure the underlying OS.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1
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7.4.2 Supported Configuration Mechanism
The TOE stores the following settings on the platform:
• List of domain names of external non-TOE entities the TOE will need to perform a
network connection when functioning as listed in FDP_NET_EXT.1:
o NTP server FQDN or IP
o ADFS server FQDN or IP
o ADFS web application id value
o Kafka Server FQDN or IP
• Domain names the TOE will be using to accept incoming connections
• x509 certificates and private key for use with TLS connections, defined in
FTP_DIT_EXT.1
o X.509 certificate chain / certificates are stored in /var/lib/bastille/etc/certs/
o TLS server private key stored in the Linux keyring (persists across reboots)
These settings are created at initial deployment and are not modified during normal operation.
These configuration files are stored in /var/lib/bastille/ and /etc/opt/bastille/.
Settings for connection to external webhooks subscribers are stored by the TOE in the
Elasticsearch database.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1
7.4.3 Management functions.
When the TOE is installed and initial configuration is performed, connection details for external IT
entities are provided, together with hostnames for the services the TOE will be providing and TLS
certificates that these services will be using. Those settings can be changed only when the TOE
is re-initialized. During normal TOE operation, an authorized user can only enable and configure
connection details for external webhooks subscribers using the web-interface provided by the
TOE.
FMT_SMF.1
7.5 Privacy
7.5.1 User Consent of Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
The TOE does not request or collect Personally Identifiable Information from the users.
FPR_ANO_EXT.1
7.6 Protection of the TSF
7.6.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
The TOE consists of Python scripts and several compiled binaries and libraries. Binary code has
been compiled using compilation flags to ensure exploit prevention capabilities:
Table 5: TOE module compilation flags
TOE Modules Compilation flags
NGINX
C language compilation flags: -g -O2 -fdebug-prefix-
map=/<<PKGBUILDDIR>>=. -fstack-protector-strong -Wformat
-Werror=format-security -g -O2 -fdebug-prefix-
map=/<<PKGBUILDDIR>>=.
-fstack-protector-strong -Wformat -Werror=format-security -fPIC -Wdate-
time
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-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
FileBeat
GO language compilation flags: -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O3 -fstack-
protector-all CGO_ENABLED:1
-buildmode=pie -ldflags -s -linkmode=external -X
Confluent
C++ compilation flags: -g -O2 -fPIC -Wall -Wsign-compare -Wfloat-equal
-Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align
In the table above “-fPIC” and “buildmode=pie” ensure binaries are compiled with ASLR support.
The underlying platform (Ubuntu 18.04 or 22.04) is able to perform ASLR when running TOE
binaries. Python scripts are not susceptible to buffer overflow attacks.
The TOE does not interfere with the AppArmor security feature of the Linux platform.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1
7.6.2 Use of Supported Services and APIs
The TOE uses only documented APIs provided by the platform. The list is provided in Appendix
A.
FPT_API_EXT.1
7.6.3 Software Identification and Versions
The TOE uses Semantic Versioning (“SemVer”) versioning methodology to track TOE versions
Major.Minor.Patch (e.g. 2.1.0). (For more on SemVer see https://semver.org/)
FPT_IDV_EXT.1
7.6.4 Integrity for Installation and Update
The TOE is distributed to customers from a secure developer portal or via a tracked courier
delivery service. The Developer publishes the public key on a developer support website
https://www.bastille.net/support.
Delivery package also contains a detached digital signature in the .sig file. Customers are required
to verify integrity of the package using this detached signature and developers public key obtained
from developer support website prior to installation of the package.
The delivery package is a virtual appliance image (.OVA), which contains Ubuntu Linux 18.04 or
22.04 operating system with the TOE pre-installed. Customers can import this OVA image to their
VMware ESXi server, run it, and perform initial TOE configuration without installing any additional
packages.
The Developer can issue an update to the TOE to address discovered flaws and vulnerabilities.
This update will be similarly provided to customers as a packaged OVA virtual appliance image,
with Platform OS and the updated TOE pre-installed. The TOE is not updated by applying patches
or installing packages. In order to update the TOE, customers decommission the virtual appliance
with the previous version of the TOE, then import and initialize the new version of the appliance
obtained from the Developer as described above.
Users can query the current version of the TOE using the TOE web interface. Users can check
for existing updates to the TOE using the TOE web interface (this functionality requires an internet
connection).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
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7.6.5 Timely Security Updates
The TOE developer has implemented internal processes for receiving reports of security flaws,
tracking product vulnerabilities, and distributing software updates to customers in a timely
manner.
Customers can submit support issues, including discovered security vulnerabilities via email to
support@bastille.io. Sensitive information should be encrypted using the PGP key published on
the developer support website.
Any implementation flaws are expected to be addressed within 90 days of reporting. Issues that
necessitate a fix to the TOE will result in a release of an updated version of the TOE, as there is
no process of applying targeted patches or updates. The updated version will be released as a
new software distribution package (virtual appliance). Customers are notified of security related
fixes via email or can check for existing updates using the functionality built into the TOE. When
a security fix affects security properties or the configuration, updated guidance documentation will
be issued. Issues in the third-party libraries comprising the OVA image will be resolved in the
same manner.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1
7.7 Trusted Path/Channels
7.7.1 Protection of Data in Transit
The TOE supports various network activities as described in Section 7.2.2 above. The network
connections transmit sensitive and non-sensitive data as enumerated in the following table:
Table 6: TOE communication channels
Direction Description Data classification Protection TOE Module
Incoming API Users/Web Interface Sensitive Platform TLS/HTTPS NGINX
Incoming Data Collection Sensitive Platform TLS/HTTPS NGINX
Outgoing MS AFDS connection Sensitive Platform TLS/HTTPS Fusion Center
Outgoing ElasticSearch DB Sensitive Platform TLS/HTTPS Fusion Center
Outgoing Kafka message queue Sensitive Platform TLS Confluent
Outgoing External Applications Sensitive Platform TLS/HTTPS Fusion Center
Outgoing Developer Portal Sensitive Platform TLS/HTTPS Fusion Center
Outgoing FileBeat logs Non-Sensitive Platform TLS FileBeat
Outgoing CRL check Non-Sensitive No Fusion Center
TOE does not transmit user credentials over the network.
The TOE uses the platform-provided OpenSSL library to perform encryption of sensitive
communications with other IT products or users.
For incoming connections, NGINX module accepts incoming network connection to the TOE.
When this connection is being established, NGINX calls the platform-provided OpenSSL library
to perform HTTPS/TLS channel establishment and ongoing decryption/encryption of transmitted
data. The TOE uses the documented platform library API calls to obtain an established TLS
channel, using a TOE-provided x509 certificate, private key, TOE-prescribed TLS version and
ciphersuites. The platform library is expected to perform all necessary low-level cryptographic
operations (including calls to the DRBG for key generation and establishment) transparently for
the TOE. The API the TOE uses to communicate with the platform-provided OpenSSL library are
provided in Table 7 below. The TOE does not request or verify client certificates for incoming
connections.
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Table 7: NGINX API Calls for channel encryption
API Description
BIO_free https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/BIO_free.html
BIO_new_file https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/BIO_new_file.html
CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.html
EVP_DigestFinal_ex https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_DigestFinal_ex.html
EVP_DigestInit_ex https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_DigestInit_ex.html
EVP_DigestUpdate https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_DigestUpdate.html
EVP_MD_CTX_free https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_MD_CTX_free.html
EVP_MD_CTX_new https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_MD_CTX_new.html
EVP_sha1 https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_sha1.html
OPENSSL_init_ssl https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/OPENSSL_init_ssl.html
OPENSSL_sk_num
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/605856d72cbd4720ad9ccb20c8fd5afbee
2ad1a4/crypto/stack/stack.c#L379
PEM_read_bio_X509 https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/PEM_read_bio_X509.html
PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX.html
SSL_CIPHER_description https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CIPHER_description.html
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl.html
SSL_CTX_clear_options https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_clear_options.html
SSL_CTX_ctrl https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_ctrl.html
SSL_CTX_free https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_free.html
SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list.html
SSL_CTX_get_ex_data https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_get_ex_data.html
SSL_CTX_get_options https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_get_options.html
SSL_CTX_get_verify_callbac
k
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback.htm
l
SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth.html
SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.html
SSL_CTX_new https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_new.html
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_c
b
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.htm
l
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.html
SSL_CTX_set_default_passw
d_cb
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb
.html
SSL_CTX_set_ex_data https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ex_data.html
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.html
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_a
dvertised_cb
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advert
ised_cb.html
SSL_CTX_set_options https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.html
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_co
ntext
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context
.html
SSL_CTX_set_timeout https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.html
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth.html
SSL_CTX_use_certificate https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.html
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_fil
e
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file.ht
ml
SSL_do_handshake https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_do_handshake.html
SSL_free https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_free.html
SSL_get_current_cipher https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_current_cipher.html
SSL_get_error https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_error.html
SSL_get_ex_data https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_ex_data.html
SSL_get_rbio https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_rbio.html
SSL_get_servername https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_servername.html
SSL_get_shutdown https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_shutdown.html
SSL_get_wbio https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_wbio.html
SSL_in_init https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_in_init.html
SSL_is_server https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_is_server.html
SSL_new https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_new.html
SSL_read https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_read.html
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SSL_select_next_proto https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_select_next_proto.html
SSL_session_reused https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_session_reused.html
SSL_set_accept_state https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_accept_state.html
SSL_set_ex_data https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_ex_data.html
SSL_set_fd https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_fd.html
SSL_set_options https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_options.html
SSL_set_quiet_shutdown https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_quiet_shutdown.html
SSL_set_shutdown https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_shutdown.html
SSL_set_SSL_CTX
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/6d4313f03eddd39ca8d06a5e1d20fc1adc
b207c5/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L4235
SSL_set_verify https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_verify.html
SSL_set_verify_depth https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_verify_depth.html
SSL_shutdown https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_shutdown.html
SSL_write https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_write.html
TLS_method https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/TLS_method.html
X509_digest https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_digest.html
X509_free https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_free.html
X509_get_ex_data https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_get_ex_data.html
X509_set_ex_data https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_set_ex_data.html
When the TOE is establishing outgoing connections to a non-TOE entity, the TOE is using
standard Python ssl module (https://docs.python.org/3/library/ssl.html?highlight=ssl#module-ssl)
to establish a TLS connection. The Python library then places a call to the platform-provided
OpenSSL library to establish an encrypted connection socket. All low-level cryptographic
operations (including calls to the DRBG) are performed by that module transparently for the TOE.
When establishing outgoing TLS connections, the TOE will not present x.509 certificates to non-
TOE entities. The server’s certificate validation is being performed by the platform-provided
OpenSSL according to the certificate validation requirements as described above.
When the TOE performs a connection to the Kafka server it is using Kafka Confluent client that
calls an API for the platform-provided OpenSSL library to establish an encrypted connection to
the Kafka service with the provided parameters. All required low-level cryptographic operations
(including calls to the DRBG) are performed by that module transparently for the TOE.
Table 8: Confluent Kafka API Calls for channel encryption
API Description
SSL_CTX_new https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_new.html
SSL_CTX_set_options TLS version is defined
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list Ciphersuites to be used are defined.
SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list EC Curves to be used are defined
SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list Signature algorithms are defined.
SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations CA certificates location is defined.
SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths CA certificates location is defined.
X509_STORE_set_flags CRL check is requested to be performed by platform.
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file Provide Certificate file and key files for the connection.
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file Provide Certificate file and key files for the connection.
d2i_PKCS12_fp https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/d2i_PKCS12_fp.html
PKCS12_parse https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/PKCS12_parse.html
SSL_CTX_use_certificate
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_use_certific
ate.html
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_use_Private
Key_file.html
SSL_CTX_set_mode
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.h
tml
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SSL_write https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_write.html
SSL_read https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_read.html
SSL_do_handshake
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_do_handshake.ht
ml
SSL_get_peer_certificate
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_peer_certifica
te.html
SSL_get_verify_result
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_get_verify_result.
html
SSL_shutdown https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_shutdown.html
SSL_new https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_new.html
SSL_set_fd https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_fd.html
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_tlsext_host_n
ame.html
SSL_connect https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_connect.html
The TOE instructs the underlying platform to establish connections using TLS 1.2 protocol and
the following ciphersuites:
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 and RFC
8422
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
FTP_DIT_EXT.1
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8. Terms and Definitions
Table 9: TOE Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviations/
Acronyms
Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ADFS Active Directory Federation Service
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CN Common Names
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DHE Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DNS Domain Name System
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IP Internet Protocol
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MIME Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
NFC Near Field Communication
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID Object Identifier
OIDC OpenID Connect
OS Operating System
PDF Portable Document Format
PE Portable Executable
PID Process Identifier
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
IT Information Technology
RBG Random Bit Generator
RFC Request for Comment
RNG Random Number Generator
SAN Subject Alternative Name
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
SSH Secure Shell
SWID Software Identification
TLS Transport Layer Security
UI User Interface
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator
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Table 10: CC Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviations/
Acronyms
Description
CC Common Criteria
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of IT
Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
TSS TOE Summary Specification
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9. References
Table 11: TOE Guidance
Referenc
e
Description Versio
n
Date
[G1] Bastille Enterprise Fusion Center Administrative Guidance
for Common Criteria
3.6 2025
Table 12: Common Criteria v3.1 References
Reference Description Version Date
[C1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model CCMB-2017-04-
001
V3.1 R5 April 2017
[C2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
Part 2: Security functional components CCMB-2017-04-
002
V3.1 R5 April 2017
[C3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
Part 3: Security assurance components CCMB-2017-04-
003
V3.1 R5 April 2017
[C4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
Evaluation Methodology CCMB-2017-04-004
V3.1 R5 April 2017
[C5] CC and CEM addenda - Exact Conformance, Selection-
Based SFRs, Optional SFRs CCDB-2017-05-xxx
V0.5 May 2017
Table 13: Supporting Documentation
Reference Description Version Date
[PP] Protection Profile for Application Software 1.4 2021-10-07
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Appendix A
Table 14: Platform API Usage
Library API call
Expat XML_ErrorString
Expat XML_ExpatVersionInfo
Expat XML_ExpatVersion
Expat XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate
Expat XML_FreeContentModel
Expat XML_GetBase
Expat XML_GetBuffer
Expat XML_GetCurrentByteIndex
Expat XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber
Expat XML_GetCurrentLineNumber
Expat XML_GetErrorCode
Expat XML_GetFeatureList
Expat XML_GetInputContext
Expat XML_GetSpecifiedAttributeCount
Expat XML_ParseBuffer
Expat XML_ParserCreate_MM
Expat XML_ParserFree
Expat XML_Parse
Expat XML_SetAttlistDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetBase
Expat XML_SetCharacterDataHandler
Expat XML_SetCommentHandler
Expat XML_SetDefaultHandlerExpand
Expat XML_SetDefaultHandler
Expat XML_SetElementDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetElementHandler
Expat XML_SetEncoding
Expat XML_SetEndCdataSectionHandler
Expat XML_SetEndDoctypeDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetEndElementHandler
Expat XML_SetEndNamespaceDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetEntityDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetExternalEntityRefHandler
Expat XML_SetHashSalt
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Expat XML_SetNamespaceDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetNotationDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetNotStandaloneHandler
Expat XML_SetParamEntityParsing
Expat XML_SetProcessingInstructionHandler
Expat XML_SetReturnNSTriplet
Expat XML_SetSkippedEntityHandler
Expat XML_SetStartCdataSectionHandler
Expat XML_SetStartDoctypeDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetStartElementHandler
Expat XML_SetStartNamespaceDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetUnknownEncodingHandler
Expat XML_SetUnparsedEntityDeclHandler
Expat XML_SetUserData
Expat XML_SetXmlDeclHandler
Expat XML_StopParser
Expat XML_UseForeignDTD
OpenSSL ASN1_d2i_bio
OpenSSL ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print
OpenSSL ASN1_TIME_print
OpenSSL BIO_ctrl
OpenSSL BIO_free
OpenSSL BIO_int_ctrl
OpenSSL BIO_new_file
OpenSSL BIO_new
OpenSSL BIO_read
OpenSSL BIO_s_mem
OpenSSL BIO_write
OpenSSL CRYPTO_free
OpenSSL CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index
OpenSSL CRYPTO_malloc
OpenSSL d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE
OpenSSL d2i_SSL_SESSION
OpenSSL DH_free
OpenSSL ENGINE_by_id
OpenSSL ENGINE_free
OpenSSL ENGINE_load_private_key
OpenSSL ENGINE_set_default
OpenSSL ERR_clear_error
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OpenSSL ERR_error_string_n
OpenSSL ERR_get_error
OpenSSL ERR_peek_error_line_data
OpenSSL ERR_peek_error
OpenSSL ERR_peek_last_error
OpenSSL EVP_aes_128_cbc
OpenSSL EVP_aes_256_cbc
OpenSSL EVP_CIPHER_iv_length
OpenSSL EVP_DecryptInit_ex
OpenSSL EVP_DigestFinal_ex
OpenSSL EVP_DigestInit_ex
OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate
OpenSSL EVP_EncryptInit_ex
OpenSSL EVP_MD_CTX_free
OpenSSL EVP_MD_CTX_new
OpenSSL EVP_PKEY_free
OpenSSL EVP_sha1
OpenSSL EVP_sha256
OpenSSL HMAC_Init_ex
OpenSSL i2a_ASN1_INTEGER
OpenSSL i2d_OCSP_REQUEST
OpenSSL i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE
OpenSSL i2d_SSL_SESSION
OpenSSL OBJ_nid2sn
OpenSSL OCSP_BASICRESP_free
OpenSSL OCSP_basic_verify
OpenSSL OCSP_CERTID_free
OpenSSL OCSP_cert_to_id
OpenSSL OCSP_check_validity
OpenSSL OCSP_request_add0_id
OpenSSL OCSP_REQUEST_free
OpenSSL OCSP_REQUEST_new
OpenSSL OCSP_resp_find_status
OpenSSL OCSP_RESPONSE_free
OpenSSL OCSP_response_get1_basic
OpenSSL OCSP_RESPONSE_new
OpenSSL OCSP_response_status
OpenSSL OPENSSL_init_ssl
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OpenSSL OPENSSL_sk_num
OpenSSL OPENSSL_sk_value
OpenSSL OpenSSL_version
OpenSSL PEM_read_bio_DHparams
OpenSSL PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX
OpenSSL PEM_read_bio_X509
OpenSSL PEM_write_bio_X509
OpenSSL SSL_CIPHER_description
OpenSSL SSL_CIPHER_find
OpenSSL SSL_CIPHER_get_name
OpenSSL SSL_ctrl
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_clear_options
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_ctrl
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_free
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_cert_store
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_ex_data
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_options
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_timeout
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_new
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_remove_session
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_ex_data
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_info_callback
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_options
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OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_timeout
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_set_verify
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_use_certificate
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file
OpenSSL SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey
OpenSSL SSL_do_handshake
OpenSSL SSL_free
OpenSSL SSL_get0_alpn_selected
OpenSSL SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
OpenSSL SSL_get1_session
OpenSSL SSL_get_certificate
OpenSSL SSL_get_current_cipher
OpenSSL SSL_get_error
OpenSSL SSL_get_ex_data
OpenSSL SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx
OpenSSL SSL_get_peer_certificate
OpenSSL SSL_get_rbio
OpenSSL SSL_get_servername
OpenSSL SSL_get_session
OpenSSL SSL_get_shutdown
OpenSSL SSL_get_verify_result
OpenSSL SSL_get_version
OpenSSL SSL_get_wbio
OpenSSL SSL_in_init
OpenSSL SSL_is_server
OpenSSL SSL_load_client_CA_file
OpenSSL SSL_new
OpenSSL SSL_read
OpenSSL SSL_select_next_proto
OpenSSL SSL_SESSION_free
OpenSSL SSL_SESSION_get_id
OpenSSL SSL_session_reused
OpenSSL SSL_set_accept_state
OpenSSL SSL_set_connect_state
OpenSSL SSL_set_ex_data
OpenSSL SSL_set_fd
OpenSSL SSL_set_options
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OpenSSL SSL_set_quiet_shutdown
OpenSSL SSL_set_session
OpenSSL SSL_set_shutdown
OpenSSL SSL_set_SSL_CTX
OpenSSL SSL_set_verify_depth
OpenSSL SSL_set_verify
OpenSSL SSL_shutdown
OpenSSL SSL_write
OpenSSL TLS_method
OpenSSL X509_check_host
OpenSSL X509_check_issued
OpenSSL X509_digest
OpenSSL X509_free
OpenSSL X509_get0_notAfter
OpenSSL X509_get0_notBefore
OpenSSL X509_get_ex_data
OpenSSL X509_get_issuer_name
OpenSSL X509_get_serialNumber
OpenSSL X509_get_subject_name
OpenSSL X509_LOOKUP_ctrl
OpenSSL X509_LOOKUP_file
OpenSSL X509_NAME_digest
OpenSSL X509_NAME_oneline
OpenSSL X509_NAME_print_ex
OpenSSL X509_set_ex_data
OpenSSL X509_STORE_add_lookup
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_free
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_get_error
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_init
OpenSSL X509_STORE_CTX_new
OpenSSL X509_STORE_set_flags
OpenSSL X509_up_ref
OpenSSL X509_verify_cert_error_string
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PCRE pcre_compile
PCRE pcre_config
PCRE pcre_exec
PCRE pcre_free_study
PCRE pcre_fullinfo
PCRE pcre_study
Zlib adler32
Zlib crc32
Zlib deflateCopy
Zlib deflateEnd
Zlib deflateInit2_
Zlib deflateInit_
Zlib deflateSetDictionary
Zlib deflate
Zlib inflateEnd
Zlib inflateInit2_
Zlib inflateReset
Zlib inflateSetDictionary
Zlib inflate
Zlib zlibVersion
Zlib inflateCopy
Linux Sys chmod
Linux Sys close
Linux Sys epoll_ctl
Linux Sys epoll_pwait
Linux Sys epoll_wait
Linux Sys exit
Linux Sys flistxattr
Linux Sys fstat
Linux Sys ftime
Linux Sys futex
Linux Sys getdents64
Linux Sys getegid32
Linux Sys getuid
Linux Sys llistxattr
Linux Sys madvise1
Linux Sys mkdir
Linux Sys nanosleep
Linux Sys newfstatat
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Linux Sys open
Linux Sys openat
Linux Sys pivot_root
Linux Sys profil
Linux Sys read
Linux Sys readlinkat
Linux Sys remap_file_pages
Linux Sys restart_syscall
Linux Sys rt_sigreturn
Linux Sys sigsuspend
Linux Sys write
Linux Sys getrandom
Python language is being used as per the official language specification published at
https://docs.python.org/3.11/.
Listed libraries are part of Ubuntu 18.04 platform:
• Expat version 2.2.5-3ubuntu0.9
• Openssl version 1.1.1-1ubuntu2.fips.2.1~18.04.15.2
• Zlib version 1:1.2.11.dfsg-0ubuntu2.2
• PCRE3 version 2:8.39-9ubuntu0.1
Listed libraries are part of Ubuntu 22.04 platform:
• Expat version 2.4.7-1ubuntu0.6
• Openssl version 3.0.2-0ubuntu1.12+Fips1
• Zlib version 1:1.2.11.dfsg-2ubuntu9.2
• PCRE3 version 2:8.39-13ubuntu0.22.04.1
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Appendix B
This Appendix describes 3rd
-party libraries that the TOE is packaged with.
Platform:
The TOE is delivered to the customer with the OS (TOE platform), which is the Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
or 22.04 LTS distribution.
TOE:
The following third party tools and libraries are included in the TOE:
NGINX, Elastic FileBeat, Confluent Kafka Python Client.
Javascript libraries:
@appbaseio/reactivesearch, @appbaseio/reactivesearch, aws4, axios, change-case, chart.js,
classnames, date-fns, dateformat, @date-io/date-fns, @date-io/moment, dom-to-image-more
downloadjs, elastic-builder, @elastic/datemath, elasticsearch, emotion, history, js-file-download,
jsonexport, leaflet, leaflet-draw, lodash, lodash.clonedeep, lodash.drop, lodash.get,
lodash.groupby, lodash.isequal, lodash.uniq, @material-ui/core, @material-ui/icons @material-
ui/lab @material-ui/pickers, @material-ui/pickers, mobx-react, moment, multidict, ngeohash,
numeral, object-hash, papaparse, pluralize, printable-characters, qs, ra-core, rc-slider, react,
react-admin, react-chartjs-2, react-color, react-dom, react-emotion, react-final-form, react-icons,
react-json-view react-leaflet, react-leaflet-control, react-leaflet-draw, react-leaflet-heatmap-layer,
@react-pdf/layout @react-pdf/renderer, react-redux, react-resize-detector, react-router, react-
router-dom, react, router-dom, react-select, react-select, react-sizeme, react-spinkit, react-
spinners-kit, react-to-print, react-use, react-use, react-vis, react-vis, js-timeline, shorted, uppy,
@uppy/react, url-search-params, vis
Python 3.11.3 with the following python libraries:
Aiofiles, aiohttp, aiokafka, backoff, cachetools, charset normalizer, cffi, greenlit, scipy, sql
alchemy, shortuuid, skops, starlette, streamz, torch, tornado, ujson, uvicorn, uvloop, redis,
requests, scikit-learn, shapely, psutil, pydantic, pydash, PyJWT, pyOpenSSL, pypager, PyYAML,
optuna, polars-lts-cpu, ntplib, cmd2, configclasses, configclasses confluent-kafka, cryptography,
dictdiffer, querystring-parser, MarkupSafe, lightning, validators, fastapi, fastavro, frozenlist,
httptools jinja2, numpy, websockets, yarl