Australasian Information
Security Evaluation Program
Senetas CN Series Application Software
V3.0.1 & CM Management Application
Software v 7.6.1
Certification Report
2017/113
13 December 2017
Version 1.0
13 Dec 2017 Version 1.0 ii
Commonwealth of Australia 2017
Reproduction is authorised provided
that the report is copied in its entirety.
13 Dec 2017 Version 1.0 iii
Amendment Record
Version Date Description
0.1 08/12/2017 Internal version
1.0 13/12/2017 Final Release
13 Dec 2017 Version 1.0 iv
Executive Summary
The TOE is the Senetas CN Series Application Software v 3.0.1 & CM Management
Application Software v 7.6.1.
The CN series encryptors are high-speed, standards based multi-protocol encryptors
specifically designed to secure voice, data and video information transmitted over
Ethernet and Fibre Channel data networks at data rates up to 100 Gigabits per second.
It also provides access control facilities using access rules for each defined Ethernet or
Fibre Channel connection.
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Senetas CN Series
Application Software v 3.0.1 & CM Management Application Software v 7.6.1 to the
Common Criteria (CC) evaluation assurance level EAL2 augmented with
ALC_FLR.2. The report concludes that the product has met the target assurance level
of EAL2+ and that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common
Criteria and the requirements of the Australasian Information Security Evaluation
Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by DXC Australia and was
completed on 29 October 2017.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australasian Certification
Authority (ACA) recommends that authorised users:
o operate the CM Management Application from a secure location.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and
architecture of the TOE, and information regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For
this reason, it is recommended that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security
Target at (Ref [1]) and read this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to
purchase the product.
13 Dec 2017 Version 1.0 v
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................iv
2. Table of Contents.............................................................................................................................v
3. Chapter 1 – Introduction................................................................................................................1
1.1 Overview........................................................................................................................................1
1.2 Purpose..........................................................................................................................................1
1.3 Identification..................................................................................................................................1
4. Chapter 2 - Target of Evaluation...................................................................................................4
2.1 Overview........................................................................................................................................4
2.2 Description of the TOE..................................................................................................................4
2.3 Security Policy...............................................................................................................................4
2.4 TOE Architecture...........................................................................................................................4
2.5 Clarification of Scope....................................................................................................................6
2.5.1 Evaluated Functionality .........................................................................................................7
2.5.2 Non-evaluated Functionality and Services.............................................................................8
2.6 Usage.............................................................................................................................................8
2.6.1 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................................8
2.6.2 Delivery procedures ...............................................................................................................9
2.6.3 Determining the Evaluated Configuration ...........................................................................10
2.6.4 Documentation.....................................................................................................................10
2.6.5 Secure Usage........................................................................................................................10
5. Chapter 3 - Evaluation..................................................................................................................12
3.1 Overview......................................................................................................................................12
3.2 Evaluation Procedures ................................................................................................................12
3.3 Functional Testing.......................................................................................................................12
3.4 Penetration Testing......................................................................................................................12
6. Chapter 4 - Certification...............................................................................................................13
4.1 Certification Result......................................................................................................................13
4.2 Assurance level............................................................................................................................13
4.3 Recommendations........................................................................................................................13
7. Annex A - References and Abbreviations....................................................................................14
A.1 References ...................................................................................................................................14
A.2 Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................................15
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 1
Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to
identify the Target of Evaluation (TOE).
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
a) report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE,
Senetas CN Series Application Software v 3.0.1 & CM Management
Application Software v 7.6.1 against the requirements of the Common Criteria
(CC) evaluation assurance level EAL2+ and
b) provides a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any
interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target (Ref [1])
which provides a full description of the security requirements and specifications that
were used as the basis of the evaluation.
1.3 Identification
The TOE is the CN Series Encryptor Range Application Software running on the
hardware models identified in the table below & CM Management Application
Software.
Table 1 Identification Information
Description Version
Evaluation
Scheme
Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Senetas CN Series Encryptor Range & CM Management Application
Software
Hardware
Models
A4010B CN4010 1G ETHERNET (RJ45) UNIT
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 2
A4020B CN4020 1G ETHERNET (SFP) UNIT
A6010B CN6010 1G ETHERNET (SFP+RJ45) AC UNIT
A6011B CN6010 1G ETHERNET (SFP+RJ45) DC UNIT
A6012B
CN6010 1G ETHERNET (SFP+RJ45) AC/DC
UNIT
A6040B
CN6040 1G ETHERNET + 1/2/4G
Fibre Channel (SFP+RJ45) AC UNIT
A6041B
CN6040 1G ETHERNET + 1/2/4G
Fibre Channel (SFP+RJ45) DC UNIT
A6042B
CN6040 1G ETHERNET + 1/2/4G
Fibre Channel (SFP+RJ45) AC/DC UNIT
A6100B CN6100 10G ETHERNET (XFP) AC UNIT
A6101B CN6100 10G ETHERNET (XFP) DC UNIT
A6102B CN6100 10G ETHERNET (XFP) AC/DC UNIT
A6140B CN6140 1/10G ETHERNET (SFP+) AC UNIT
A6141B CN6140 1/10G ETHERNET (SFP+) DC UNIT
A6142B
CN6140 1/10G ETHERNET (SFP+)
AC/DC UNIT
A8003-10
CN8000 MULTI-SLOT 1/10G ETHERNET +
4/8G Fibre Channel (SFP+) AC UNIT
A9100B CN9100 100G ETHERNET (CFP4) UNIT
A9101B CN9100 100G ETHERNET (CFP4) DC UNIT
A9102B CN9100 100G ETHERNET (CFP4) AC/DC UNIT
A9120B CN9120 100G ETHERNET (QSFP28) UNIT
A9121B CN9120 100G ETHERNET (QSFP28) DC UNIT
A9122B
CN9120 100G ETHERNET (QSFP28)
AC/DC UNIT
Software
Version
CN Series Application Software 3.0.1 which applies to all CN units
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 3
CM Management Series Application Software 7.6.1
Security
Target
Security Target for Senetas CN-Series Encryptor-Range & Senetas
CM7 Management Application v2.3, 29 November 2017
Evaluation
Level
EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April
2017
Conformance Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant and augmented (EAL2 +
ALC_FLR.2).
Sponsor Senetas Security Ltd
312 Kings Way
South Melbourne Victoria 3205 Australia
Developer Senetas Security Ltd
312 Kings Way
South Melbourne Victoria 3205 Australia
Evaluation
Facility
DXC Australia
12 Brindabella Circuit
Brindabella Business Park ACT 2609 Australia
Table 1 provides identification details for the evaluation. For details of all components
included in the evaluated configuration refer to section 2.6.1 Evaluated Configuration.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 4
Chapter 2 - Target of Evaluation
2.1 Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including: a
description of functionality provided; its architectural components; the scope of
evaluation; security policies; and its secure usage.
2.2 Description of the TOE
The TOE comprises of the CN application software version 3.0.1 loaded onto the
applicable encryptor hardware model; and a single version of CM Management
software (7.6.1).
a) The CM7 management application is a Graphical User Interface (GUI)
software package that runs on Windows platforms. It can act as a Certification
Authority (CA) for signing X.509 certificates, or alternatively supports the use
of external CA PKI environments. It provides secure remote installation of
X.509 certificates into the Senetas encryptors using SNMPv3, and is also used
to securely manage the encryptors.
b) The CN series encryptors are high-speed, standards based multi-protocol
encryptors specifically designed to secure voice, data and video information
transmitted over Ethernet and Fibre Channel data networks at data rates up to
100 Gigabits per second. It also provides access control facilities using access
rules for each defined Ethernet or Fibre Channel connection.
2.3 Security Policy
The TOE Security Policy (TSP) is a set of rules that defines how the information
within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target (Ref [1]) contains no
explicit security policy statements.
2.4 TOE Architecture
The TOE consists of the following major subsystems:
Management Console Subsystem
The management console subsystem provides a Graphical User Interface (GUI) for
remote management of encryptors. It utilises encrypted SNMPv3 communications
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 5
over either an out-of-band management interface or in-band via the local and network
interfaces.
Management Subsystem
The management subsystem provides the following functionality:
a) Creation and maintenance of the audit log
b) Audit trail analysis and review
c) Creation and maintenance of user files
d) Identification and authentication of users
e) Remote management using SNMPv3
f) Local management using the RS232 console port
g) Creation and maintenance of the Connection Identifier Table
h) Random number generation for keys
i) A real time clock
j) 3-way messaging function
k) Multicast/VLAN operations
l) Running of self tests during start-up and
m) Automatic destruction of keys and user passwords if either of the interface
cards is removed.
Local and Network Interface Subsystems
Both the network and local interface subsystems convert the physical signal received
from the network and translate it to a suitable logical format for the frame/cell /bit
stream /packet to be processed by the encryptor.
Software Crypto subsystem
The software crypto subsystem provides cryptographic support services to the
management. The subsystem is built using the open source OpenSSL libraries, and
provides such functionality as session key establishment, certification generation,
authentication and provision of SNMP authentication and privacy services.
FPGA Crypto Subsystem
The CN encryptors use a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to conduct
encryption and decryption of protected traffic between encryptors. The cryptographic
functions are performed at very high speed as the process occurs in hardware.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 6
Figure 1 Encryption data flow diagram
2.5 Clarification of Scope
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target
(Ref [1]) and includes the following:
a) Audit - The TOE is able to generate auditable data for security relevant events
b) Certificate Management - certificates will be maintained for the use by the
product
c) Protected Data Exchange - the confidentiality of packets sent over the
untrusted network will be maintained
d) Identification and Authentication - of administrative users who are responsible
for the configuration and monitoring of the TOE
e) Key Management - will be used in implementing security functions
f) Information Flow Control - controlling the flow of received Ethernet frames
from external host
g) Role-Based Access Control - restriction of users to different configuration
interfaces based on the role they are assigned
h) Secure Remote Management - remote administration by CM Management
i) Self-Protection - the TOE will protect against unauthorised access to the
physical security of the TOE.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 7
2.5.1 Evaluated Functionality
The TOE provides the following evaluated security functionality:
a) Audit
The TOE generates system events associated with the operations that occur in the
encryptors. The results are stored in non-volatile memory and accessible to
administrators either remotely using CM Management Application (SNMPv3) or
via the console.
b) Certificate Management.
The TOE generates and installs X.509 Certificates into the encryptors. Signed
X.509 certificates are used by the TOE to establish trusted communication
channel between itself and other encryptors. Both encryptors must have a valid
X.509 certificate, which has been signed by a Certificate Authority which is either
an encryptor itself or a third party Certificate Authority (CA), to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information.
c) Data exchange
The TOE performs hardware or software based 128 or 256 bit AES encryption in
Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB), Counter mode, or Galois Counter Mode on the
internet frame payload or hardware based 256 bit AES encryption in CFB mode
on the fibre channel payload and a user configurable portion of the header.
d) Identification
The TOE enforces identification and authentication prior to allowing an
authorised administrator the ability to view or modify any TOE security attributes.
e) Key Management
The TOE manages all the necessary keys and mechanisms to support the
cryptographic operations including public and private keys for the TOE.
f) Information Flow Control
The TOE determines the action to take on any given cell, frame or bit stream by
examining the list of entries in the Connection Identifier (CI) Table. The possible
actions the TOE can apply to the traffic flows matching CI entries are encrypt
/decrypt, discard or bypass.
g) Role Based Access
The TOE can assign and control differing privilege levels to administrative users
of the TOE, thereby controlling the attributes which each administrator can view,
modify or delete. The TOE maintains the roles of administrator, supervisor and
user.
h) Secure Remote Management
The TOE can encrypt SNMPv3 management data packets using 128-bit AES. The
remote management session is initiated by the user via CM Management
Application software on their workstation.
i) Self protection
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 8
The TOE will erase all key material and user passwords if the case is tampered.
The TOE also runs self tests on start-up to verify the underlying functionality of
the device is correct.
2.5.2 Non-evaluated Functionality and Services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been
evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully
consider their requirements for using functions and services outside of the evaluated
configuration; Australian Government users should refer to Australian Government
Information Security Manual (ISM) (Ref [2]) for policy relating to using an evaluated
product in an un-evaluated configuration. New Zealand Government users should
refer to the New Zealand ISM (Ref [3]).
2.6 Usage
2.6.1 Evaluated Configuration
This section describes the configurations of the TOE that were included within scope
of the evaluation. The assurance gained via evaluation applies specifically to the TOE
in this defined evaluated configuration. Australian Government users should refer to
the ISM (Ref [2]) to ensure that configuration meet the minimum Australian
Government policy requirements. New Zealand Government users should refer to the
New Zealand ISM (Ref [3]).
The TOE consists of the CN application Software version 3.0.1 loaded on the
Encryptor Hardware Module and a single version of the CM management Software
version 7.6.1.
The hardware models in scope for this evaluation are as follows. Ethernet and Fibre
channel models have been identified as appropriate.
Table 2 TOE Components (CN)
ID Description
A4010B CN4010 1G ETHERNET (RJ45) UNIT
A4020B CN4020 1G ETHERNET (SFP) UNIT
A6010B CN6010 1G ETHERNET (SFP+RJ45) AC UNIT
A6011B CN6010 1G ETHERNET (SFP+RJ45) DC UNIT
A6012B CN6010 1G ETHERNET (SFP+RJ45) AC/DC UNIT
A6040B CN6040 1G ETHERNET + 1/2/4G Fibre Channel (SFP+RJ45) AC UNIT
A6041B CN6040 1G ETHERNET + 1/2/4G Fibre Channel (SFP+RJ45) DC UNIT
A6042B CN6040 1G ETHERNET + 1/2/4G Fibre Channel (SFP+RJ45) AC/DC UNIT
A6100B CN6100 10G ETHERNET (XFP) AC UNIT
A6101B CN6100 10G ETHERNET (XFP) DC UNIT
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 9
A6102B CN6100 10G ETHERNET (XFP) AC/DC UNIT
A6140B CN6140 1/10G ETHERNET (SFP+) AC UNIT
A6141B CN6140 1/10G ETHERNET (SFP+) DC UNIT
A6142B CN6140 1/10G ETHERNET (SFP+) AC/DC UNIT
A8003-10 CN8000 MULTI-SLOT 1/10G ETHERNET + 4/8G Fibre Channel (SFP+) AC UNIT
A9100B CN9100 100G ETHERNET (CFP4) AC UNIT
A9101B CN9100 100G ETHERNET (CFP4) DC UNIT
A9102B CN9100 100G ETHERNET (CFP4) AC/DC UNIT
A9120B CN9120 100G ETHERNET (QSFP28) AC UNIT
A9121B CN9120 100G ETHERNET (QSFP28) DC UNIT
A9122B CN9120 100G ETHERNET (QSFP28) AC/DC UNIT
2.6.2 Delivery procedures
Hardware
Shipment of units from Senetas to the user is via commercial courier company who
will pick up from Senetas and deliver it directly to the customer.
After placing an order, Senetas will issue the Order Acknowledgement Form listing
the assigned user order number, the model numbers, serial numbers and expected date
of delivery. When items are received, the customer must ensure that the serial number
on the outside of the packaging, the serial number attached to the encryptor itself and
the number listed on the acknowledgement match.
The customer must also verify that the tamper proof seal on the outside of the unit is
intact. If the seal is broken then the integrity of the encryptor cannot be assured and
Senetas should be informed immediately.
Software
A software upgrade notice will be sent to the user before shipping any software
upgrades. It will list the user name, software maintenance agreement number,
software identification number, software version number, a random shipment
identification number and expected date of delivery.
A Shipment Identification Number label is attached to software media and it is sealed
in an envelope and a tamper proof seal attached across the seal of the envelope before
shipping any software upgrades.
The customer must verify the information in the Shipment Identification label
matches the Software Upgrade Notice upon delivery. The customer must also verify
that the tamper proof seal is intact. If the seal is broken or the information does not
match, Senetas should be informed immediately.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 10
2.6.3 Determining the Evaluated Configuration
To ensure the hardware received is the evaluated product the customer must check the
models received against the list of TOE hardware models defined in the Security
Target (Ref [1]). In addition to verifying model numbers for hardware components,
the software versions must also be verified by the recipient. Software versions can be
checked using the ‘version’ command over the encryptors CLI.
2.6.4 Documentation
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in
order to ensure secure usage. The following documentation are delivered to the
customer along with the TOE:
a) Senetas CN6010 Encryptor User guide Release 07, March 2017
b) Senetas CN Series Encryptors Product Manual, Release 07, March 2017
2.6.5 Secure Usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational
environment. These assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives
of the TOE are met. The intended application of the TOE is to provide a secure
tunnel(s) between trusted networks.
The following physical, personnel and connectivity assumptions about the operating
environment and intended use of the TOE apply.
a) A.CM
The management console, CM is assumed to be located within control access
facilities, which will aid in prevent unauthorised users from attempting to
compromise the security functions of the TOE.
It is assumed that the CM will be installed on a computer with the following
minimum system configuration:
• Windows NT 4.0 /2000s/XP or higher
• 166 MHz or higher speed processor
• 64 MB of memory
• Hard disk drive with a minimum of 5MB of available application space
• CD drive for installation
• SVGA or better display resolution
• Mouse or other pointing device
• Network adapter card and
• TCP/IP connectivity
b) A.Locate
It is assumed that the encryptor is located in a secure area at the boundary of the
site to be protected. It is required to be in a secure area to ensure that the unit is
not physically bypassed.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 11
c) A.Admin
It is assumed that one or more administrators, together with other supervisors or
operators, who are assigned as authorised users, are competent to manage the TOE
and can be trusted not to deliberately abuse their privileges so as to undermine
security.
d) A.Audit
It is assumed that appropriate audit logs are maintained and regularly examined.
Without capturing security relevant events or performing regular examination of
audit logs, a compromise of security may go undetected.
e) A.PrivateKey
Where CM is configured as the Certificate Authority (CA), it is assumed that a
password used to protect the private key of the CM remote management station is
restricted to Administrators.
f) A.Install
It is assumed that the encryptor is installed on the boundary of the protected and
unprotected network. The encryptor needs to be installed on the boundary to
ensure confidentiality of transmitted information.
In addition, the following organisational security policies must be in place:
a) P.Crypto
All encryption services including confidentiality, authentication, key generation,
Must conform to standards specified in ISM and FIPs PUB 140-2.
b) P.Inflow
Traffic flow is controlled on the basis of the information in the Ethernet frame or
Fibre Channel frame and the action specified in the Connection Identifier Table.
Any Ethernet frame or Fibre Channel for which there is no CI entry is discarded
by default. By default all Ethernet and Fibre frames are discarded.
This policy ensure that the correct protective action of bypass, discard or encrypt
is applies to any given Ethernet Frame or Fibre Channel Frame received by the
TOE.
c) P.Roles
Administration of the TOE is controlled through the definition of roles, which
assign different privilege levels to different types of authorised users
(administrators, supervisors and operators). The P.Roles policy ensures the
administration of the TOE is performed in accordance with the concept of least
privilege.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 12
Chapter 3 - Evaluation
3.1 Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the
evaluation, the testing conducted as part of the evaluation and the certification result.
3.2 Evaluation Procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are
contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Revision 5 (Refs [4], [5] and [6]).
The methodology used is described in the Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5 (CEM) (Ref [7]).
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the
Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP) (Refs [8]).
Additionally; the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of
Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security (Ref
[9]) were also upheld.
3.3 Functional Testing
To gain confidence that the developers testing was sufficient to ensure the correct
operation of the TOE, the evaluators analysed the evidence of the developer’s testing
effort. This analysis included examining: test coverage; test plans and procedures; and
expected and actual results. The evaluators drew upon this evidence to perform a
sample of the developer tests in order to verify that the test results were consistent
with those recorded by the developers.
3.4 Penetration Testing
A vulnerability analysis of the TOE was conducted in order to identify any obvious
vulnerability in the product and to show that the vulnerabilities were not exploitable in
the intended environment of the TOE.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 13
Chapter 4 - Certification
4.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as witnessed by the certifiers
and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [10]), the Australasian Certification
Authority certifies the evaluation of CN Series Encryptor Range & Senetas CM
Management Application Software performed by the Australasian Information
Security Evaluation Facility DXC Australia. DXC has found that CN Series Encryptor
Range & CM Management Application Software upholds the claims made in the
Security Target (Ref [1]) and has met the requirements of the Common Criteria (CC)
evaluation assurance level EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2.
Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
4.2 Assurance level
EAL2 provides assurance by a full security target and an analysis of the SFRs in that
ST, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and a basic
description of the architecture of the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.
The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer
testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of
the developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional
specification, TOE design, security architecture description and guidance evidence
provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack
potential.
EAL2 also provides assurance through use of a configuration management system and
evidence of secure delivery procedures.
This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL1 by requiring
developer testing, a vulnerability analysis (in addition to the search of the public
domain), and independent testing based upon more detailed TOE specifications.
4.3 Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for
Australian and New Zealand Government users. For further guidance, Australian
Government users should refer to ISM (Ref [2]) and New Zealand Government users
should consult the NZISM (Ref [3]).
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment
are fulfilled and the guidance documentation is followed (Ref [11]), the ACA also
recommends that users and administrators:
o operates the CM Management Application from a secure location.
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 14
Annex A - References and Abbreviations
A.1 References
1. ST – Security Target for Senetas CN Series Encryptor Range & Senetas CM
Management Application, version 2.3, 29 November 2017
2. 2017 Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM), Australian
Signals Directorate, (available at www.asd.gov.au)
3. NZ Information Security Manual (NZISM), available at
https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/publications/the-nz-information-security-manual/
4. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
5. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
6. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
7. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation methodology, April 2017 Version 3.1, Revision 5
8. AISEP Policy Manual, Release: 30 August 2011, Version 4.0
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, 2 July 2014
10. Evaluation Technical Report: Senetas CN Range Encryptors and CM7
Management Evaluation Technical Report Reference CSC-EFC-T0087-ETR
Version 1.0, 12 December 2017
11. User Guidance:
• Senetas CN6010 Encryptor User guide Release 07, March 2017
• Senetas CN Series Encryptors Product Manual, Release 07, March 2017
13 December 2017 Version 1.0 15
A.2 Abbreviations
AAA Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting
AISEF Australasian Information Security Evaluation Facility
AISEP Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
CA Certification Authority
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CFB Cipher Feedback (Mode)
CLI Command Line Interface
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standard Publication
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
Gbps Gigabits per second
GCSB Government Communications Security Bureau
IP Internet Protocol
MAC Media Access Control
Mbps Megabits per second
NTP Network Time Protocol
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request for Comment
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman - Public Key Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SNMPv3 Simple Network Management Protocol Version 3
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TACACS+ Terminal Access Control Access Control Server
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
X.509 Digital Certificate Standard
CI Connection Identifier (representing established security association)
Tunnel Equivalent to CI
KEK Key used to encrypt DEK
DEK Key used to encrypt defined segments of user data traffic
CM7 Senetas PC based remote Management Application
+ Augmented