4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, California, 94054
Solaris 10 11/06
SecurityTarget
Author:
Document Number: S10_101
Date: September 11, 2007
Version: 1.3 FINAL
Abstract
This document is the Security Target for the EAL4+ Common Criteria v2.3
evaluation of Solaris10 11/06 developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
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SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.
©2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc. 4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, California 95054 U.S.A.
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TRADEMARKS
Sun, Sun Microsystems, the Sun logo, SunSoft, the SunSoft logo, Solaris, Trusted Solaris, SunOS, OpenWindows, DeskSet, ONC, ONC+,
NFS, NeWSprint, and Trusted NeWSprint are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and may be
protected as trademarks in other countries. UNIX is a registered trademark in the United States and other countries, exclusively licensed
through X/Open Company, Ltd. OPEN LOOK is a registered trademark of Novell, Inc. PostScript and Display PostScript are trademarks of
Adobe Systems, Inc. All other product, service, or company names mentioned herein are claimed as trademarks and trade names by their
respective companies.
All SPARC trademarks are trademarks or registered trademarks of SPARC International, Inc. in the United States and other countries.
SPARCcenter, SPARCcluster, SPARCompiler, SPARCdesign, SPARC811, SPARCengine, SPARCprinter, SPARCserver, SPARCstation,
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bearing SPARC trademarks are based upon an architecture developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
The OPEN LOOK®
and Sun™ Graphical User Interfaces were developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc. for its users and licensees. Sun
acknowledges the pioneering efforts of Xerox in researching and developing the concept of visual or graphical user interfaces for the computer
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INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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THIS PUBLICATION COULD INCLUDE TECHNICAL INACCURACIES OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS. CHANGES ARE
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OF THE PUBLICATION. SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. MAY MAKE IMPROVEMENTS AND/OR CHANGES IN THE PRODUCT(S)
AND/OR THE PROGRAMS(S) DESCRIBED IN THIS PUBLICATION AT ANY TIME.
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References
Standards & Criteria
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
CCMB-2005-08-002, August 2005
[CCP2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Requirements, Version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-002, August 2005
[CAPP] Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999
[RBAC] Role Based Access Control Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 30 July 1998
[ALC_FLR] Part 2: Evaluation Methodology Supplement: Flaw Remediation, Version
1.1, February 2002
[NIST1] Letter from R. Chandramouli, re: FIA_UAU.2 in RBAC PP, Computer
Security Division, NIST, dated 16 July 2001
[NIST2] Letter from R. Chandramouli, re: FPT_TST.1 in RBAC PP, Computer
Security Division, NIST, dated 16 July 2001
PublicRevisionHistory
Version Date Author Comments
0.1 23 May 2006 Jane Medefesser First Draft for Submission to CSE
0.2 18 Oct 2006 Jane Medefesser Updated per ASE OR 01
0.3 17 April 2007 Jane Medefesser Removed crypto framework, updated hardware, sync’d
formatting issues with TX ST per TX ASE OR 01
1.0 9 August 2007 Jane Medefesser Updated per ASE OR 02, removed proprietary comments
in preparation for publication
1.1 14 August 2007 Jane Medefesser Updated per MSU OR 01
1.2 29 August 2007 Jane Medefesser Updates to address observations raised by CSE
1.3 11 September 2001 Jane Medefesser Updated to address ADV_FSP OR 01
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Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL v
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 ST Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 ST Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 CC Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.4 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.5 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.6 Document Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 TOE Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Evaluated Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1 Target of Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2 File systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3 Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Summary of Security Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.1 DAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.2 Object Reuse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.3 Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.4 Roles and Profiles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.5 Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.6 Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.7 Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.8 Secure Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.9 TSF Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.10 Privileges and Authorizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 TOE Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.1 Threats countered by the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.2 Threats to be countered by measures within the TOE
environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Organizational Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.1 Physical Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.2 Personnel Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.3 Procedural Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.4 Connectivity Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.1 Protection Profile SFRs Tailored for This ST. . . . . . . 30
5.2 Additional SFRs for This ST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2.1 Security Management (FMT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2.3 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3 Strength of Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.5 Security Requirements for the IT Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.5.1 Sun Ultrasparc Workstations and Low End Servers . . 38
5.5.2 SunFire MidFrames and High End Servers . . . . . . . . 38
5.5.3 x86/x64 Workstations and Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6 TOE Summary Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1 IT Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.2 Object Reuse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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6.1.3 Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.1.4 Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1.5 Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.6 Enforcement Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1.7 Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1.8 Session Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1.9 Secure Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.2 Required Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.2.1 Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.3 Assurance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.1 Correlation of Threats, Policies, Assumptions and Objectives. 51
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.2.1 Complete Coverage - Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.2.2 Complete Coverage - Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.2.3 Complete Coverage - Environmental Assumptions . . 61
7.2.4 Complete Coverage - Personnel Assumptions. . . . . . 62
7.2.5 Complete Coverage - Procedural Assumptions . . . . . 63
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.3.1 Complete Coverage - Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.3.2 Requirements are Mutually Supportive and Internally
Consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.3.3 Justification for Choice of Assurance Requirements . 74
7.3.4 Strength of Function Claim is Consistent with Security
Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.4.1 IT Security Functions Satisfy Functional Requirements 75
7.4.2 Justification for Compliance of Assurance Measures 80
7.5 PP Claims and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.5.1 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.5.2 PP Tailoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.5.3 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
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7.5.4 PP Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8 Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A 1.1 Platform 1 Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A 1.2 Platform 2 Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A 1.3 Platform 3 Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
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Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target, 1.3. FINAL 1
Introduction 1
1.1 ST Identification
Title: Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target, v 1.3. FINAL
Keywords: Solaris 10 11/06, general-purpose operating system, POSIX, UNIX.
This document is the Security Target for the CC evaluation of the Solaris 10 11/06
operating system product, and is conformant to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation [CC].
1.2 ST Overview
This Security Target documents the security characteristics of the Solaris 10 11/06
operating system.
The Solaris Operating Environment is a computer operating system, based on the open-
source UNIX SunOS developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Solaris is a highly-configurable UNIX-based operating system. Originally developed to
meet the requirements of the C2 class of the U.S. Department of Defence
(DoD) Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), it now meets
specific equivalent Protection Profiles developed within the Common Criteria
Project. These broad requirements are described for the Common Criteria
scheme in [CAPP], the Controlled Access Protection Profile and in [RBAC], the
Role Based Access Control Protection Profile.
A Solaris 10 11/06 system consists of a number of workstations and/or servers linked
together to form a single distributed system. Users share the resources of multiple
workstations and/or servers connected together in a single, distributed Trusted
Computing Base (TCB).
This Solaris 10 11/06 ST, version 1.3. FINAL is based on the previous Solaris 10
3/05 Security Target with the appropriate changes and addition of new material.
1.3 CC Conformance
This ST is conformant with the following:
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• Controlled Access Protection Profile version 1.d [CAPP].
• Role Based Access Control Protection Profile version 1 [RBAC]
This ST is CC Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant, augmented by ALC_FLR.3, with
a claimed Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL4+ (see section 7.3.3).
1.4 Structure
The structure of this document is as defined by [CC] Part 1 Annex C.
• Section 2 is the TOE Description.
• Section 3 provides the statement of TOE security environment.
• Section 4 provides the statement of security objectives.
• Section 5 provides the statement of IT security requirements.
• Section 6 provides the TOE summary specification, which includes the detailed
specification of the IT Security Functions.
• Section 7 provides the rationale for the security objectives, security requirements,
TOE summary specification and PP claims against [CAPP] and [RBAC].
• Appendix A contains information about TOE supported hardware platforms
1.5 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning
specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless
stated otherwise.
Action: An action is an execution of a command or system call.
Administrative User: This term refers to an administrator of a Solaris 10 system.
Administrators are granted a rights profile and may also be granted roles.
Audit Class: This is the name given to the definition of a collective grouping of events
representing particular types of activity to be monitored; e.g. file read, network,
administrative, application, process, file attribute modify, etc.
Authentication data: This includes a user identifier, password and authorizations for
each user of the product.
CCATS: Commodity Classification Automated Tracking System. U.S. Bureau of Industry
and Security code number for products classified against the Commerce Control List.
CB: Certification Body, a part of CSE (Communications Security Establishment)
overseeing and monitoring evaluations in Canada.
CCS: Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. The CC program
run by the Government of Canada
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CDE: Common Desktop Environment. The legacy user desktop provided with the
Solaris Operating System. It is an integrated graphical user interface built on top of the
Motif toolkit (a graphical widget toolkit for building graphical user interfaces under the
X Window System on UNIX and other POSIX-compliant systems).
Common Components: These relate to components of the mid-frame family that share
the same or functionally similar hardware such as CPU, memory, Compact PCI Card,
SC, I/O assemblies, etc.
Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR): This is the process of dynamically reconfiguring
system boards, removing them or installing them onto a system while the Solaris
operating environment is running. DR software is part of the Solaris Operating
Environment and supports Multiple Domaining or Dynamic System Domains feature.
Dynamic System Domains: see Multiple Domain
FCS: First Customer Shipment.
JDS: Sun Java Desktop System. Sun's version of the opensource GNOME 2.0 Desktop
Operating Environment. GNOME is a Unix and Linux desktop suite and development
platform that provides a desktop for end-users, users. JDS is provided with Solaris 10 as
a selectable option (an alternative to the Solaris CDE – Common Desktop Environment).
High End Server platforms: For the purposes of this ST this means the Sunfire 12K,
15K, 20K and 25K servers.
IARR: Impact Analysis and Rationale Report, the document which shows platform
equivalency across the SunFire mid-frame range of servers.
Low-end/Entry-Level platforms: For the purposes of this ST this means the following
product models: Servers E3500, E4500, E420R, E450, E250 and E220R; Workstation;
Ultrasparcs 25, 30, 45, 60, 80 and 450; SunBlades 100, 150, 1000, 1500, 2000 and 2500;
Netra X1, 20, 120, 240, CT410, CT810 and CT820; SunFire B100s, V100, V120, V125,
V215, V245, V280R, V445, V480, V880, V880z, V210, V240, V250, V440; Netra 440
Server; UltraSparc 5 & 10; and the Ultra 3 Mobile. Entry level platforms also include
all of Sun’s Opteron- and Intel-based machines: the Sunfire v20z, v40z, x2100, x2100
M2, x2200 M2, x4100, x4100 M2, x4200, x4200 M2, x4500, x4600, x4600 M2 and
servers; the Dell Poweredge 6000 workstation; the Ultra 20 and Ultra 20 M2
workstations; and the Javastations W1100 and W2100.
Mid-frame/Mid-range platforms: For the purposes of this ST this means the E10K
Server; the Netra 1280; the Sunfire 1280, 3800, 4800, 4810, E5500, E6500, and 6800
servers; the SunFire V490, V890, 2900, 4900, 6900, T1000, T2000 Servers; and the
Netra T2000 Server and CP3060 Blade.
Multiple Domain (MD): This is a hardware configuration feature whereby a system
may be logically partitioned into one or more domains. Each domain is a self-
contained server of one or multiple system boards, contains CPU, memory, I/O, boot-
disk. network resources and runs a single instance of the Solaris Operating
Environment.
Object: In Solaris 10, objects belong to one of four categories: file system objects,
other kernel objects (such as processes, programs and interprocess communication),
window system objects and miscellaneous objects.
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Peripherals: This term should be taken to mean (optional) storage, communications or
printing devices that can be used with the TOE platforms.
Platform: Refers to servers, workstations or both when contextually appropriate.
PP: Protection Profile.
Product: The term product is used to define all hardware and software components that
comprise the distributed Solaris 10 system.
Public object: A type of object for which all subjects have read access, but only the
TCB has write access.
SB: Sun Blade, a name given to a family of workstation products.
SC: System Controller, the component in the mid-frame platforms that boots up the
ToE, and performs similar functions to that of an Open BootPROM
Security Attributes: As defined by functional requirement FIA_ATD.1, the term
‘security attributes’ includes the following as a minimum: user identifier; group
memberships; user authentication data.
Server: A computer/device which provides/manages information or services to
computers on a network.
SF: Security Function OR (alternatively) SunFire, a name given to a family of servers,
dependent upon context.
SFR: Security Functional Requirement
SMC: Sun Management Console, a secure system management GUI for SPARC
administration
SoF: Strength of Function
SPARC: The name given to the processor family that is incorporated into the platforms
identified in this ST.
SRN: Security Release Notes, see references.
Subject: There are two classes of subjects in Solaris 10:
• untrusted subject - this is a Solaris 10 process running on behalf of some user,
running outside of the TCB (for example, with no privileges).
• trusted subject - this is a Solaris 10 process running as part of the TCB. Examples
are service daemons and the processes implementing the windowing system.
System: Includes the hardware, software and firmware components of the Solaris 10
product which are connected/networked together and configured to form a usable
system.
System Controller: This is an embedded system consisting of the system controller
board and the system controller software (own processor, memory, etc.) which
provides communication pathways between the platform system components and
additionally performs functions replicating those of an ‘Open Boot PROM’.
Target of Evaluation (TOE): The TOE is defined as the Solaris 10 11/06 Operating
system, running and tested on the hardware and firmware specified in this ST. The
BootPROM firmware forms part of the TOE Environment (see section 5.4).
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Trusted Computing Base (TCB): A TCB is the totality of protection mechanisms within
a computer system (which may include a combination of hardware, firmware, and
software) that is responsible for enforcing a security policy
TSF: TOE Security Function.
TSP: TOE Security Policy.
User: Any individual/person who has a unique user identifier and who interacts with
the Solaris 10 product.
Workstation: A workstation is a computer intended for individual use that is more
capable, powerful and faster than a personal computer.
1.6 Document Layout
IT security functions are assigned a unique reference identifier of the form Name.1 to
enable ease of reference. For example, DAC.1, Audit.1.
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TOEDescription 2
2.1 Introduction
The TOE description aims to aid the understanding of the TOE’s security requirements
and provides a context for the evaluation. It defines the scope and boundaries
of the TOE, both physically and logically, and describes the environment into which
the TOE will fit.
For the purposes of this ST, the TOE is the Sun Microsytems Solaris 10 11/06
Operating System, referred to throughout this document as “Solaris 10” or “the TOE”.
2.2 Intended Use
Solaris 10 is a highly-configurable UNIX-based operating system which has
been developed to be compliant with the Controlled Access and Role Based
Protection Profiles. Originally developed to meet the requirements of the C2 class
of the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), it now meets specific equivalent Protection Profiles
developed within the Common Criteria Project.
The TOE consists of a number of workstations and/or servers linked together to form a
single distributed system. Users share the resources of multiple workstations and/or
servers connected together in a single, distributed Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
After successful login, the users have access to a general computing environment,
allowing the start-up of user applications, issuing user commands at shell level,
creating and accessing files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the
users and protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to the system
administrator role.
The TOE permits one or more processors and attached peripheral and storage devices
to be used by multiple users to perform a variety of functions requiring controlled
shared access to the data stored on the system. Such installations are typical of
personal, workgroup, or enterprise computing systems accessed by users local to, or
with otherwise protected access to, the computer systems.
The TOE provides facilities for on-line interaction with users. Networking is covered
only to the extent to which the TOE can be considered to be part of a centrally-
managed system that meets a common set of security requirements. It is assumed that
responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by the TOE can be delegated
to the TOE users (other than the management of TOE security critical parameters,
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which is performed by administrative users). All data is under the control of the
TOE. The data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate with each
controlled object a description of the access rights to that object.
All individual users of the TOE are assigned a unique user identifier; this unique
identifier type supports individual accountability. The TOE authenticates the claimed
identity of each user before allowing a user to perform any further actions. The TOE
enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place in accordance with
the access restrictions.
2.3 Evaluated Configurations
2.3.1 Target of Evaluation
This section defines the software that comprise the TOE and the Servers/Workstations
that the software runs on.
2.3.1.1 TOE Certification Platforms:
Note that the UltraSPARC IIi, IIIi and III Low-End platforms use an OpenBoot PROM.
SunFire MidFrame and High-End platforms make use of the System Controller
component to perform similar tasks to the OpenBOOT PROM. Both the OpenBoot
PROM and System Controller are outside of the scope of this evaluation. The
OpenBootPROM and System Controller are protected by a password commensurate
with the appropriate SoF requirement for the environment. The Administrator is
responsible for selecting passwords of appropriate strength to meet the ST
requirements.
Workstations and Servers:
The target of evaluation is a (distributed) operating system product running on:
• Platform 1: Entry Level workstations and servers utilizing an UltraSPARC II,
UltraSPARC IIe, UltraSPARC IIi, UltraSPARCIII, UltraSPARCIIIi, or UltraSPARC
T1 processor in a single or multiple configuration. Various configurations of these
platforms are possible and the evaluation scope includes all possible
combinations/permutations through the testing of CB appropriate configurations.
• Platform 2: The Netra 1280 and SunFire mid-frame and high-end family offering
Dynamic Reconfiguration and Multiple Domaining as defined in Section 1.5 and
utilizing an UltraSPARC III Cu (copper based) or UltraSPARC IV processor. Various
configurations of these platforms are possible and the evaluation scope includes all
possible combinations/permutations through the testing of CB appropriate
configurations. An [IARR], Impact Analysis and Rationale Report, will show
platform equivalency across the SunFire midframe family.
• Platform 3: AMD based processor systems: AMD Opteron 800, 1200, and 8000
series; AMD-64 100, 200, and 2000 series; AMD dual-core 1200 and 2000 series;
AMD Opteron 285; and, Intel Xeon.
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Please refer to Appendix A for tables illustrating the hardware configurations available
for use. Note that within each platform group, the processor speed associated with each
model is dependant upon what was or is offered by the vendor.
2.3.1.2 Software
The Target of Evaluation is based on the following system software:
• Solaris 10 11/06
• Solaris Management Console 2.1 (SMC)
The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM and on SUN’s website:
http://www.sun.com/software/security/securitycert.
2.3.2 File systems
The following filesystem types are supported:
• the standard Solaris UNIX filesystem, ufs, without the Trusted Solaris attributes;
• the standard remote filesystem access protocol, nfs (V2 and V3);
• the MS-DOS formatted filesystem pcfs;
• the High Sierra filesystem for CD-ROM drives, hsfs;
• the Network File System, Version 4 (NFS V4). This feature provides authentication,
integrity, and privacy as well as enabling servers to offer different security flavors
for different file systems via it's integration with the Kerberos authentication
protocol.
• the Solaris Zettabyte File System (Solaris ZFS). This feature provides enhanced file
system capabilities by automating common administrative tasks, protecting data
from corruption and providing an extremely high degree of scalability. Solaris ZFS
utilizes virtual storage pools to simplify expanding or contracting of file systems via
additional drives.
In addition to the above file systems a number of “internal” filesystems are supported:
The file descriptor file system, fd, allows programs to access their own file
descriptors through the file name space, such as /dev/stdin corresponding to
/dev/fd0.
• The names file system, namefs (or namfs) allows the arbitrary mounting of any file
descriptor on top of another file name.
• The doors file system, doorfs allows fast control transfer between processes on the
same machine.
• The process file system, procfs (/proc), provides access to the process image of each
process on the machine as if the process were a “file”. Process access decisions are
enforced by DAC attributes inferred from the underlying process' DAC attributes.
2.3.3 Configurations
The evaluated configurations are defined as follows.
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• When installing the product, the entire distribution should be selected;
• The evaluated version (or “package set”) must be selected at time of installation in
accordance with the description provided in the documentation and installed
accordingly.
• No additional SMC add-ons should be installed;
• Minimum physical memory and disk configurations provided for the
hardware in the tables in Appendix A are provided with the Solaris 10 11/06
documentation and may not be sufficient for all applications. For components which
must be installed separately from the Solaris Installation, please consult that
component's installation guide to determine requirements;
• The default setting for the Global Zone (Solaris Container) should be used. In
addition, when configuring non-global Zones, the non-global Zone root file system
models should be followed (sparse root Zone model and the whole root Zone
model);
• The evaluated configuration includes both the Common Desktop Environment
(CDE) windowing environment and Sun Java Desktop System (JDS) Operating
Environment. Users may select either of these during login via the “User
Preference” screen.
Application note: for the CC evaluated version of Solaris 10, the JDS/GNOME
accessibility features are not available.
• Solaris 10 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, (no additional security claims are
made for IPv6)
• Solaris 10 supports the use of DHCP, (no additional security claims are made for
DHCP);
• 64 bit architectures are included;
• Web Based Enterprise Management Services (WBEM) are included (no additional
security claims are made for WBEM);
• Network, Web Start, Jumpstart, Flash, DVD and CD installations are all supported;
• The standard Service Management Framework (SMF) profiles, generic.xml and
generic_limited_net.xml, must be used;
• The Solaris Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) using the default
configuration for identification and authentication. Alternately, the Kerberos
authentication protocol can be configured for TOE identification and authentication.
• If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the server/workstation
and afforded the same physical protection as the server/workstation.
The product comprises one or more of the listed servers and/or workstations
(and optional peripherals) running the above listed system software (a platform
running the above listed software is referred to as a “TOE platform” below).
If the product is configured with more than one TOE platform, they are linked
by Ethernet LANs, which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE platforms
which act as routers/gateways.
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If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured and managed
by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not conflicting with the
security policy of the TOE. All links from this network to untrusted networks (e.g. the
Internet) need to be protected by appropriate measures like carefully configured
firewall systems that prohibit attacks from the untrusted networks. Those protections
are not part of the TOE environment.
No other processors may be connected to the Ethernet network, except as noted below.
If the product is configured with more than one TOE platform, then the Sun Java System
Directory Server 5.2 version of the LDAP naming service must be used and the Sun
Java System Directory Server 5.2 version of the LDAP naming server(s) must be TOE
platforms.
Figure 2-1 Typical Evaluation Configuration
TOE workstation
TOE server
TOE workstation
(Ethernet)
(Ethernet)
TOE servers
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2.4 Summary of Security Features
The primary security features of the product are:
• Discretionary Access Control;
• Object Reuse;
• Identification and Authentication (Including PAM and Kerberos);
• Roles and Profiles (Including Service Management Framework);
• Security Management
• Auditing;
• Enforcement;
• Secure Communication;
• TSF Protection; and
• Privileges and Authorizations.
These primary security features are supported by kernel and process domain separation
and reference mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and cannot
be bypassed.
2.4.1 DAC
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) restricts access to objects, such as files,
based on Access Control Lists (ACLs) that include the standard UNIX permissions
for user, group and other users. Access control mechanisms also protect System V IPC
(interprocess communication) objects from unauthorized access.
The Solaris ACL model allows administrators to grant access rights, to a user or group,
specific rights that govern who can access a specific object, a group of properties, or an
individual property of an object.
2.4.2 Object Reuse
Object Reuse functionality ensures that memory and other storage and file system
objects are cleared of data (i.e. Contain no data) when they are re-allocated or re-used.
2.4.3 Identification and Authentication
Sun Solaris provides identification and authentication as a built-in feature using the
Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) based on usernames and passwords.
The PAM modules that are included in the default installation are included in the
evaluated configuration. The list of PAM modules includes:
pam_authtok_check.so.1
pam_authtok_get.so.1
pam_authtok_store.so.1
pam_dhkeys.so.1
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pam_dial_auth.so.1
pam_krb5.so.1
pam_passwd_auth.so.1
pam_rhosts_auth.so.1
pam_roles.so.1
pam_unix_account.so.1
pam_unix_auth.so.1
pam_unix_cred.so.1
pam_unix_session.so.1
In cooperation with the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) and the
Generic Security Service (GSS); Kerberos and PAM are the mechanisms available for
both distributed and non-distributed authentication. Note: LDAP is used with both
SASL and Kerberos.
Kerberos provides an integrated client/server architecture that offers strong user
authentication, as well as data integrity and privacy, for providing secure transactions
over networks. Discussion of Kerberos data integrity and privacy services are
discussed in Section "2.4.8 Secure Communications".
Solaris provides the mechanisms for password policy enforcement and the use of
containers and zones, profiles, and privileges to limit the use of superuser level
commands.
2.4.4 Roles and Profiles
Solaris 10 supports the concept of Roles, allowing administrative powers to be
broken into many discrete Roles. This removes the requirement of one superuser (root
or only one system-administrator) to administer the TOE. A Role consists of a set of
profiles. Profiles can be populated with the required authorizations appropriate to
the defined role, thus allowing the administrative functionality to be distributed and
hence diluted amongst the Roles, to reduce the impact of any misuse of a Role.
New to Solaris 10 is the Service Management Framework (SMF) which provides
RBAC authorization that is required to administrate services. SMF allows
administrators to install, configure and enable system applications and provides
dependency based service startup/recovery. SMF can be used to assign uid/gid/default
and limit privileges for services.
SMF also provides for distinction between services and applications that are
configured/enabled e.g. services can be fully configured but disabled or
enabled/disabled temporarily or permanently.
There are 2 types of SMF profiles:
• generic.xml: most services enabled (similar to Solaris 9;) and
• generic_limited_net.xml: fewer remotely available network services enabled, only
ssh available for remote login, most other services off.
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2.4.5 Security Management
The management of the security critical parameters of the TOE is performed
by administrative users. A set of commands that require root privileges are used
for system management. Security parameters are stored in specific files that are
protected by the access control mechanisms of the TOE against unauthorized
access by non-administrative users.
Solaris 10 introduces Solaris Zones (formerly N1 grid containers). Solaris Zones
provide an advanced resource management feature which ensures that applications can
be run in separate Zones, with logical isolation ensuring true encapsulation. Zones
provide multiple virtualized application environments from a single Solaris kernel to
provide (in addition to process containment) resource usage & security isolation but
blocks direct access to hardware (each Zone appears as a separate host from
“outside”).
The virtual server in the Zone hides the system details. The hardware on which the
Zone is running is not exposed to the applications or users. Solaris Zones allows for a
separate uid /gid namespace per Zone, and each Zone has their own root user and
separate file system space.
The upper limit for the number of zones on a system is 8192. The number of Zones
that can be effectively hosted on a single system is determined by the total resource
requirements of the application software running in all of the zones.
There are 2 standard types of Solaris Zones, Global and non-Global. A Global Zone
has a dual function as it is both the default Zone for the system and the Zone used for
system-wide administrative control. All processes run in the global Zone if no non-
Global Zones (referred to simply as “Zones”) are created by the global administrator.
The global Zone is the only Zone from which a non-global Zone can be configured,
installed, managed, or uninstalled. Only the global Zone is bootable from the system
hardware. Administration of the system infrastructure, such as physical devices,
routing tables, or dynamic reconfiguration (DR), is only possible in the global Zone.
Appropriately privileged processes running in the global Zone can access objects
associated with other zones.
A non-Global Zone provides isolation at almost any level of granularity required. A
Zone does not need a dedicated CPU, a physical device, or a portion of physical
memory. These resources can either be multiplexed across a number of Zones running
within a single domain or system, or allocated on a per-Zone basis using the resource
management features available in the operating system.
Each Zone can provide a customized set of services. To enforce basic process isolation,
a process can see or signal only those processes that exist in the same Zone. Basic
communication between Zones is accomplished by giving each Zone at least one
logical network interface. An application running in one Zone cannot observe the
network traffic of another Zone. This isolation is maintained even though the
respective streams of packets travel through the same physical interface.
Each Zone is given a portion of the file system hierarchy. Because each Zone is
confined to its subtree of the file system hierarchy, a workload running in a particular
Zone cannot access the on-disk data of another workload running in a different Zone.
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Files used by naming services reside within a Zone's own root file system view. Thus,
naming services in different zones are isolated from one other and the services can be
configured differently.
There are two types of non-global Zone root file system models: sparse and whole
root. The sparse root Zone model optimizes the sharing of objects. The whole root
Zone model provides the maximum configurability.
Zone Security Properties:
• Services can be isolated from each other;
• Potentially risky software can be quarantined;
• Processes in Zones can't send signals to other Zones (even if they have proc_session
or proc_owner);
• System memory cannot be shared between Zones;
• Untrusted parties can be isolated to contain potential damage by a breach; and
• Each Zone can only see those processes running within it (except Global Zone)
In addition, each "Global Zone" can:
• Observe all activities inside each Zone;
• Not be seen by software in a non global Zone (note: non-global Zones run with less
privileges, which will be a subset of the available privileges); and
• Change the contents or processes in each Zone (note: if proper privileges are
assigned).
2.4.6 Auditing
Solaris 10 can collect extensive auditing information about security related actions
taken or attempted by users, ensuring that users are accountable for their actions.
For each such action or event an audit record is generated containing: date and time of
the event, user, security attributes and success or failure. This audit trail can be
analyzed to identify attempts to compromise security and determine the extent of the
compromise.
2.4.7 Enforcement
The Solaris 10 security policy is enforced in a manner which ensures that
the organizational policies are upheld in the target environment i.e. the integrity of the
TSF is protected, kernel and process domain separation is enforced and bypass of
the security functions is prevented.
2.4.8 Secure Communication
In its evaluated configuration, Solaris 10 supports trusted communication channels for
TCP and IP layer connections between different physical TOEs through different
protocols/services.
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The Kerberos V5 network authentication protocol provides an integrated client/server
architecture that offers strong user authentication, as well as data integrity and privacy,
for providing secure transactions over networks. Authentication guarantees that the
identities of both the sender and recipient of a network transaction are true. Kerberos
can also verify the validity of data being passed back and forth (integrity) and encrypt
it during transmission (privacy/confidentiality).
Using Kerberos, a user can log on to other machines, execute commands, exchange
data, and transfer files securely. Additionally, Kerberos provides authorization
services, allowing administrators to restrict access to services and machines; moreover,
as a Kerberos user you can regulate other people's access to your account.
2.4.9 TSF Protection
While in operation, the kernel software and data are protected by the hardware memory
protection mechanisms. The memory and process management components of the
kernel ensure a user process cannot access kernel storage or storage belonging to other
processes.
Access to system services is controlled by the system, which requires that subjects
wanting to perform security-relevant tasks be authorized appropriately.
Non-kernel TSF software and data are protected by DAC and process isolation
mechanisms. In the evaluated configuration, the reserved user ID root owns the
directories and files that define the TSF configuration. In general, files and directories
containing internal TSF data (e.g., configuration files, batch job queues) are also
protected from reading by DAC permissions.
The TOE and the hardware and firmware components are required to be physically
protected from unauthorized access. The system kernel mediates all access to the
hardware mechanisms themselves, other than program visible CPU instruction
functions.
The TOE provides a tool that allows an administrative user to check the correct
operation of the underlying hardware. This tool performs tests to check the system
memory, the memory protection features of the underlying processor and the correct
separation between user and supervisor state.
2.4.10 Privileges and Authorizations
Privileges and Authorizations are two separate mechanisms that confer security rights
to processes and users respectively. Authorizations apply to users. In order for a user to
perform an action that would otherwise be prohibited by the Solaris 10 11/06 security
policy, the user must have an authorization.
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TOESecurityEnvironment 3
3.1 Introduction
The statement of TOE security environment describes the security aspects of the
environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and the manner in which it is
expected to be employed.
To this end, the statement of TOE security environment identifies the lists the
assumptions made on the operational environment (including physical and procedural
measures), the intended method of use of the product, defines the threats that the
product is designed to counter, and the organizational security policies with which the
product is designed to comply.
Throughout this section, items that have been included which satisfy the specific
requirements of the PP's are indicated with either [RBAC] or [CAPP] at the end of the
item entry, where applicable.
3.2 Threats
The assumed security threats are listed below.
The IT assets to be protected comprise the information stored, processed or
transmitted by the TOE. The term “information” is used here to refer to all data held
within a workstation/server, including data in transit between workstations/servers.
The TOE counters the general threat of unauthorized access to information, where
“access” includes disclosure, modification and destruction.
The threat agents can be categorized as either:
• unauthorized users of the TOE, i.e. individuals who have not been granted the right
to access the system; or
• authorized users of the TOE, i.e. individuals who have been granted the right to
access the system.
The threat agents are assumed to originate from a well managed user community in a
non-hostile working environment, and hence the product protects against threats of
inadvertent or casual attempts to breach the system security. The TOE is not intended
to be applicable to circumstances in which protection is required against determined
attempts by hostile and well funded attackers to breach system security.
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The threats listed below are grouped according to whether or not they are countered by
the TOE. Those that are not countered by the TOE are countered by environmental or
external mechanisms.
3.2.1 Threats countered by the TOE
[T.ACCESS_INFO] An authorized user of the TOE accesses information
without having permission from the person who owns, or is responsible for, the
information.In this context “access” is to be interpreted as observing information for
which the user has no “need to know”, even though that user may have sufficient
clearance to see the information. [RBAC]
[T.ACCESS_TOE] An unauthorized user of the TOE gains access to the system,
thereby gaining unauthorized access to information. An unauthorized user of the TOE
could gain access to the system by impersonating an authorized user, or by gaining
access to an unattended platform at which an authorized user is logged on. Failure to
detect the fact that an attack is taking place, or that many attempts have taken place
over a period of time, may result in the attack eventually succeeding, resulting in the
attacker gaining unauthorized access to information. [RBAC]
Note: T.ACCESS_TOE is meant to satisfy the T.ENTRY threat requirement from
[RBAC].
[T.MODIFY] Unauthorized modification or destruction of information by an
authorized user of the TOE.In this context “unauthorized” means not having the
explicit or implicit permission of the designated owner of the information.
[T.ADMIN_RIGHTS] Unauthorized use of facilities which require administration
rights by an authorized user of the TOE. Unauthorized use of such facilities by a user
who cannot be trusted not to misuse them (whether intentionally or accidentally) could
be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information.
[T.COMPROMISE] Data may be compromised in terms of confidentiality and
integrity if an unauthorized User intercepts a communication link between the TOE
and another trusted IT product (which may be another instantiation of the TOE) and
attempts to modify information in a way that can not be detected by the TOE or the
other trusted IT product.
3.2.2 Threats to be countered by measures within the TOE environment
The following threats apply in environments where specific threats to distributed
systems need to be countered.
[T.TRANSIT] Data transferred between platforms is disclosed to or modified by
unauthorized users or processes either directly or indirectly (e.g. through spoofing
of workstation/server identity).
[T.OPERATE] Compromise of the IT assets may occur because of improper
administration and operation of the TOE. Users or external threat agents may, through
accidental discovery or directed search, discover inadequacies in the security
administration of the TOE which permit them to gain logical access to and perform
operations on its resources in breach of any permissions they may have. Potential
attackers may seek to develop methods whereby the improperly administered security
functions of the TOE may be circumvented during normal operation.[RBAC]
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[T.ROLEDEV] The development and assignment of user roles may be done in a
manner that undermines security. In general, roles could be developed which have an
incorrect or improper combination of authorizations to perform operations on objects.
In addition, users could be assigned to roles that are incommensurate with their duties,
giving them either too much or too little scope of authorization. A particular concern
arises in that users could be assigned conflicting roles with respect to ‘separation of
duties’. An individual user could be authorized to perform multiple operations on data
objects that represent the parts of a transaction that should be separated among
different individuals. [RBAC]
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE complies with the following organizational security policies:
[P.AUTH] Only those users who have been authorized to access the information
within the system may access the system.[CAPP]
[P.DAC] The right to access specific data objects is determined on the basis of:
a. the owner of the object; and
b. the identity of the subject attempting the access; and
c. the implicit and explicit access rights to the object granted to the subject by the
object owner.
Note: P.DAC is meant to satisfy the P.ACCESS policy requirement from [RBAC].
[P.ACCOUNTABLE] The users of the system shall be held accountable for their
actions within the system.[CAPP]
[P.NEED_TO_KNOW] The system must limit the access to, modification of, and
destruction of the information in protected resources to those authorized users which
have a “need to know” for that information. [CAPP]
3.4 Assumptions
This section indicates the minimum physical and procedural measures required to
maintain security of the TOE.
3.4.1 Physical Aspects
[A.PROTECT] The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy
enforcement will be physically protected from unauthorized modification by
potentially hostile outsiders.
It is assumed that all software and hardware, including network and peripheral cabling
is approved for the transmittal of the most sensitive data held by the system. Such
items are assumed to be physically protected against threats to the confidentiality and
integrity of the data transmitted. [RBAC] [CAPP]
[A.LOCATE] The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled
access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access. [RBAC] [CAPP]
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[A.ASSET] It is also assumed that the value of the stored assets merits moderately
intensive penetration or masquerading attacks. It is also assumed that physical controls
in place would alert the system authorities to the physical presence of attackers within
the controlled space. [RBAC]
3.4.2 Personnel Aspects
[A.ACCESS] Rights for users to gain access and perform operations on information
are based on their membership in one or more roles (and the profiles that accompany
these roles). These roles are granted to the users by the TOE Administrator. These
roles accurately reflect the users job function, responsibilities,
qualifications, and/or competencies within the enterprise. [RBAC]
[A.MANAGE] There will be one or more competent and trustworthy individuals
assigned to manage TOE security. These individuals will have sole responsibility for
the following functions: [CAPP]
a.Create and maintain roles;
b.Establish and maintain relationships among roles; and
c.Assignment and Revocation of users to roles.
In addition these individuals (as ‘owners of the entire corporate data’), along with
object owners will have the ability to assign and revoke object access rights to roles.
[RBAC]
[A.OWNER] A limited set of users is given the rights to “create new data objects” and
they become owners for those data objects. The organization is the owner of the rest of
the information under the control of TOE. [RBAC]
[A.NO_EVIL_ADM] The system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully
negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the
administrator documentation. [CAPP]
[A.COOP] Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least
some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a cooperating
manner in a benign environment. [CAPP]
3.4.3 Procedural Aspects
[A.USER] Each individual user is assumed to have a unique user ID.
[A.PASSWORD] Those responsible for the TOE must configure minimum
password length for normal users to be at least six but no more than eight characters.
3.4.4 Connectivity Aspects
[A.LDAP_DOMAINS] It is assumed that, if the product comprises more than
one platform, all platforms are administered from a central point within each
LDAP directory domain.
LDAP allows the creation of multiple administrative domains, thus
allowing administrators to control local resources and user accounts, yet making it
possible for users and resources to operate seamlessly over the entire organization.
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[A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS] All bridges and routers are assumed to correctly
pass data without modification.
[A.CONNECT] All connections to peripheral devices reside within the controlled
access facilities. RBAC only addresses security concerns related to the manipulation of
the TOE through its legitimate interfaces. Internal communication paths to interfaces
points such as terminals are assumed to be adequately protected. [RBAC] [CAPP]
[A.PEER] Any other systems with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be
under the same management control and operate under the same security policy
constraints. CAPP-conferment TOEs are applicable to networked or distributed
environments only if the entire network operates under the same constraints and
resides within a single management domain. There are no security requirements which
address the need to trust external systems or the communications links to such systems.
[CAPP]
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SecurityObjectives 4
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Throughout this section, items that have been included which satisfy the specific
requirements of the PP's are indicated with either [RBAC] or [CAPP] at the end of the
item entry, where applicable.
[O.AUTHORISATION] The TOE must ensure that only authorized users gain access
to the TOE and its resources. [CAPP]
[O.ENTRY] The TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or processes with no
rights to access it. [RBAC]
[O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS] The TOE must control access to resources based
on the identity of users. The TSF must allow authorized users to specify which
resources may be accessed by which users.
The TOE must provide its users with the means of controlling and limiting access to
the objects and resources they own or are responsible for, on the basis of individual
users or identified groups of users, and in accordance with the set of rules defined by
the P.DAC security policy. [CAPP]
[O.KNOWN] Legitimate users of the system must be identified before rights of access
can be granted. RBAC assumes that there is a finite community of known users who
will be granted rights of access and that system management has authority over that
user community. [RBAC]
[O.AUDITING] The TSF must record the security relevant actions of users of the
TOE. The TSF must present this information to authorized administrators. The TOE
must provide the means of recording security relevant events in sufficient detail to help
an administrator of the TOE detect attempted security violations or potential
misconfiguration of the TOE security features that would leave the IT assets open to
compromise. [CAPP]
[O.ACCOUNT] The TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their
security relevant actions. [RBAC]
[O.TRUSTPATH] The TSF must be designed and implemented in a manner that
allows for establishing a trusted channel or communication path between the TOE and
another trusted IT product that protects the user data transferred over this channel from
disclosure and undetected modification.
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[O.RESIDUAL_INFO] The TOE must ensure that any information contained in
a protected resource is not released when the resource is recycled. [CAPP]
[O.MANAGE] The TOE must allow administrators to effectively manage the TOE
and its security functions, and must ensure that only authorized administrators are able
to access such functionality. [CAPP] [RBAC]
Note: O.MANAGE is meant to satisfy the O.ADMIN objective from [RBAC].
[O.ENFORCEMENT] The TOE security policy is enforced in a manner which
ensures that the organizational policies are enforced in the target environment i.e. the
integrity of the TSF is protected. [CAPP]
[O.DUTY] The TOE must provide the capability of enforcing the separation of duties,
so that no single user is required to perform all administrative functions. [RBAC].
[O.HIERARCHICAL] The TOE must allow hierarchical definitions of profile rights.
The hierarchical definition of rights gives the ability to define profile rights in terms of
other profile rights. [RBAC].
[O.ROLE] The TOE must prevent users from gaining access to and performing
operations on its resources/objects unless they have been granted access by the
resource/object owner or they have been assigned to a role (by an authorized
administrator) which permits those operations. [RBAC]
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE Environment
[O.E_ADMIN] Those responsible for the TOE are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of managing the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
[O.E_ACCOUNTABLE] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that:
a.The product is configured such that only the approved group of users for which the
system was accredited may access the system.
b.Each individual user is assigned a unique user ID.
[O.E_AUDITDATA] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the
audit functionality is used and managed effectively. In particular:
a.Procedures must exist to ensure that the audit trail for the product (i.e., all
networked components containing an audit trail) is regularly analyzed and archived, to
allow retrospective inspection.
b.The auditing system must be configured such that the loss of audit
data is minimized upon:
-planned or unplanned shutdown; or
-lack of available audit storage (in particular administrators should ensure that the
AUDIT_CNT flag is correctly set as identified in the Administration documentation
supplied with the TOE, and that remote partitions are mounted with the appropriate
option [noac] so that audit information is not lost when the partition fills).
c.The auditing system is designed such that bad authentication data will not be stored
in the audit trail.
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d.The media on which audit data is stored must not be physically removable from the
platform by unauthorized users.
[O.E_CREDEN] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access
credentials, such as passwords or other authentication information, are protected by the
users in a manner which maintains IT security objectives. Those responsible for the
TOE must ensure that user authentication data is stored securely and not disclosed to
unauthorized individuals. In particular:
a.Procedures must be established to ensure that user passwords generated by an
administrator during user account creation or modification are distributed in a
secure manner, as appropriate for the clearance of the system.
b.The media on which authentication data is stored must not be physically removable
from the platform by unauthorized users.
c.Users must not disclose their passwords to other individuals. [CAPP]
[O.E_BOOT] Hardware and firmware within the IT environment shall ensure
that the correct copy of the Solaris 10 11/06 Operating system is “booted” during
system start-up.
Note: The above applies to both workstations and server. Administrators should
also take precautions to prevent booting from the floppy drive, CD device or
over the network where this is considered a threat.
[O.E_CONNECT] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no connections to
outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets. [RBAC]
[O.E_CONSISTENCY] Administrators of the TOE must establish and
implement procedures to ensure the consistency of the security-related data across all
distributed components that are networked to form a single system (e.g.
authentication data). In particular, if the product comprises more than one
platform, all such platforms are administered from a central point within each LDAP
domain.
[O.E_INSTALL] Those responsible for the TOE must establish and
implement procedures to ensure that the hardware, software and firmware
components that comprise the networked product are distributed, installed and
configured in a secure manner. [CAPP] [RBAC]
[O.E_INFO_PROTECT]Those responsible for the TOE must establish and
implement procedures to ensure that information is protected in an appropriate
manner. In particular:
a.DAC protections on security critical files (such as audit trails and
authentication databases) shall always be set up correctly.
b.All network and peripheral cabling must be approved for the transmittal of the most
sensitive data held by the system. Such physical links are assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted.
c.If a system console is used, it must be connected directly to the machine, and must be
afforded the same physical protections as the server or workstation. Access onto the
system console is protected by user identification and authentication
mechanisms. Access to the eeprom is protected by an eeprom password.
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d. For the MidFrame and E15K platforms, the system controller must be
connected directly to the server, and must be afforded the same physical
protections as the server. The system controller will not be accessible via a
network connection. Access onto the system controller is protected by an SC
password.
[O.E_MAINTENANCE] Administrators of the TOE must ensure that the
comprehensive diagnostics facilities provided by the product are invoked at
every scheduled preventative maintenance period.
[O.E_RECOVER] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures
and/or mechanisms are provided to assure that, after system failure or other
discontinuity, recovery without a protection (i.e., security) compromise is obtained.
[O.E_PHYSICAL] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the
TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might
compromise IT security objectives. [CAPP] [RBAC]
[O.E_SOFTWARE_IN] Those responsible for the TOE shall ensure that the system
shall be configured so that only an administrator can introduce new software into the
system.
[O.E_SERIAL_LOGIN] Those responsible for the TOE shall implement
procedures to ensure that users clear the screen before logging off where serial
login devices(e.g. VT100) are used.
The following security objective applies in environments where specific threats
to distributed systems need to be countered, as described in section 3. Typically
this objective is met by cryptographic protection of network connections.
[O.E_PROTECT] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures
and/or mechanisms exist to ensure that data transferred between platforms is
secured from disclosure, interruption or tampering.
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SecurityRequirements 5
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for the TOE are listed below in table 3 (classes, families,
components and elements), with cross-references to [CAPP] and [RBAC] where these are derived from ei-
ther PP.
The elements that are tailored for this security target are indicated by a * after the element's name in
the table. These tailored elements are detailed in sub-section 5.1 below, with the new material underlined.
SFRs in addition to those taken from the [CAPP] and [RBAC] PP's for this security target are indicated in Ta-
ble 5-1 with italics. These additional elements are conformant with Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version 2.3, CCIMB-2005-08-002, August
2005[CCP2], and are detailed in Section 5.2, below. The remaining SFRs in the table are to be used for this ST
exactly as they appear in [CAPP] and [RBAC].
Table 5-1 Security Functional Requirements
CLASS FAMILY COMPONENT ELEMENT
[CAPP]
PARAGRAPH
[RBAC]
PARAGRAPH
FAU FAU_GEN FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1.1
FAU_GEN.1.2
5.1.1.1
5.1.1.2
5.1.1
5.1.1
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2.1 5.1.2.1 5.1.1
FAU_SAR FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1.1
FAU_SAR.1.2
5.1.3.1
5.1.3.2
5.1.1
5.1.1
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.2.1 5.1.4.1 5.1.1
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.3.1* 5.1.5.1 5.1.1
FAU_SEL FAU_SEL.1 FAU_SEL.1.1* 5.1.6.1 5.1.1
FAU_STG FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1.1
FAU_STG.1.2
5.1.7.1
5.1.7.2
5.1.1
5.1.1
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.3.1* 5.1.8.1
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4.1* 5.1.9.1
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FDP FDP_ACC FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1.1* 5.2.1.1 5.1.2
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1.1*
FDP_ACF.1.2*
FDP_ACF.1.3*
FDP_ACF.1.4*
5.2.2.1
5.2.2.2
5.2.2.3
5.2.2.4
5.1.2
FDP_RIP FDP_RIP.2 FDP_RIP.2 5.2.3.1
FDP_RIP.2 FDP_RIP.2 5.2.4.1
FDP_UCT FDP_UCT.1 FDP_UCT.1.1 N/A N/A
FDP_UIT FDP_UIT.1 FDP_UIT.1.1
FDP_UIT.1.2
N/A N/A
FIA FIA_ATD FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1.1* 5.3.1.1 5.1.3
FIA_SOS FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.1.1 5.3.2.1
FIA_UAU FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1.1*
FIA_UAU.1.2
5.3.3.1
5.3.3.2
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU2.1 5.1.3
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.7.1 5.3.4.1
FIA_UID FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1.1*
FIA_UID.1.2
5.3.5.1
5.3.5.2
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.2.1 5.1.3
FIA_USB FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1.1* 5.3.6.1
5.3.6.2
5.3.6.3
5.1.3
Table 5-1 Security Functional Requirements
CLASS FAMILY COMPONENT ELEMENT
[CAPP]
PARAGRAPH
[RBAC]
PARAGRAPH
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FMT FMT_MSA FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1.1* 5.4.1.1 5.1.4
FMT_MSA.2 FMT_MSA.2.1 5.1.4
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3.1*
FMT_MSA.3.2*
5.4.2.1
5.4.2.2
5.1.4
5.1.4
FMT_MTD FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1.1 5.4.3
5.4.4
5.4.5
5.4.6
5.1.4
FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.3.1 5.1.4
FMT_REV FMT_REV.1 FMT_REV.1.1
FMT_REV.1.2*
FMT_REV.1.1
5.4.7.1
5.4.7.2
5.4.8.1
5.1.4
5.1.4
FMT_SMR FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1.1*
FMT_SMR.1.2
5.4.9.1
5.4.9.2
FMT_SMR.2 FMT_SMR.2.1*
FMT_SMR.2.2*
FMT_SMR.2.3*
5.1.4
5.1.4
5.1.4
FMT_SMF FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1.1
FPT FPT_AMT FPT_AMT.1 FPT_AMT.1.1* 5.5.1.1 5.1.5
FPT_FLS FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1.1 5.1.5
FPT_RCV FPT_RCV.1 FPT_RCV.1.1 5.1.5
FPT_RCV.4 FPT_RCV.4.1* 5.1.5
FPT_RVM FPT_RVM.1 FPT_RVM.1.1 5.5.2.1 5.1.5
FPT_SEP FPT_SEP.1 FPT_SEP.1.1
FPT_SEP.1.2
5.5.3.1
5.5.3.2
5.1.5
5.1.5
FPT_STM FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1.1 5.5.4.1 5.1.5
FPT_TST FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1.1
FPT_TST.1.2
FPT_TST.1.3
5.1.5
5.1.5
5.1.5
FTA FTA_LSA FTA_LSA.1 FTA_LSA.1.1 5.1.6
FTA_TSE FTA_TSE.1 FTA_TSE.1.1 5.1.6
FTA_SSL FTA_SSL.1 FTA_SSL.1.1
FTA_SSL.1.2
FTA_SSL.2 FTA_SSL.2.1
FTA_SSL.2.2
Table 5-1 Security Functional Requirements
CLASS FAMILY COMPONENT ELEMENT
[CAPP]
PARAGRAPH
[RBAC]
PARAGRAPH
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5.1.1 Protection Profile SFRs Tailored for This ST
This sections contains the elements that correspond to the [RBAC] and [CAPP]
Protection Profiles that are tailored for this security target (as indicated by a * after
the element's name in Table 5-1, above) with the new material underlined.
5.1.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
[CAPP] 5.1.5.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to perform searches of audit data
based on the following attributes: FAU_SAR.3.1
a. User identity;
b. type of audit event and audit class.
[CAPP] 5.1.6.1 The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from the set
of audited events based on the following attributes: FAU_SEL.1.1
a. User identity;
b. audit class.
[CAPP] 5.1.8.1 The TSF shall generate an alarm to the authorized administrator if the
audit trail exceeds or meets 100% occupancy. FAU_STG.3.1
Note: An alarm is generated once 100% of the allocated audit space is reached.
This disk space may be exceeded in certain circumstances e.g. by auditable actions taken
by authorized administrators.
[CAPP] 5.1.9.1 The TSF shall be able to prevent auditable events, except those taken by
the authorized administrator, if the audit trail is full. FAU_STG.4.1
5.1.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
[CAPP] 5.2.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy on
processes acting on the behalf of users, filesystem objects and all operations among
subjects and objects covered by the DAC policy. FDP_ACC.1.1
[CAPP] 5.2.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to
FTP FTP_ITC FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1.1
FTP_ITC.1.2
FTP_ITC.1.2
FTP_TRP FTP_TRP.1 FTP_TRP.1.1
FTP_TRP.1.2
FTP_TRP.1.3
Table 5-1 Security Functional Requirements
CLASS FAMILY COMPONENT ELEMENT
[CAPP]
PARAGRAPH
[RBAC]
PARAGRAPH
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objects based on the following: FDP_ACF.1.1
a. The user identity and group membership(s) associated with a subject; and
b. The access control attributes associated with an object: ACL, permission bits
[CAPP] 5.2.2.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: FDP_ACF.1.2
IF the object has an explicit ACL, THEN:
• access granted to the object's owner is based on the user::rwx permissions
• access granted to individuals specified in the ACL is based on the bitwise AND
• operation of the user:[specified]:rwx and mask:rwx permissions
• access granted to subjects who belong to the object's group is based on the bitwise
AND operation of the group::rwx and the mask:rwx entries
• access granted to subjects who belong to groups specified in the ACL is based on
the bitwise AND operation of the group:[specified]:rwx and mask:rwx permissions
• access granted to all other subjects is based on the object's other permissions
ELSE
• access granted to the object's owner is based on the object user rwx permissions
• access granted to subjects who belong to the object's group is based on the object
group rwx permissions
• access granted to all other subjects is based on the object other rwx permissions
[CAPP] 5.2.2.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rule: FDP_ACF.1.3
a. .If a subject has an effective override privilege, the TSF shall authorize access of
the subject to any given filesystem object, even if such access is disallowed by
FDP_ACF.1.2.
[CAPP] 5.2.2.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on no
additional rules. FDP_ACF.1.4
5.1.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
User Attribute Definition
[CAPP] 5.3.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: FIA_ATD.1.1
a. User Identifier;
b. Group Memberships;
c. Authentication Data;
d. Security-relevant Roles; and
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e. login shell.
User Authentication
[CAPP] 5.3.3.1 The TSF shall allow the following TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is authenticated FIA_UAU.1.1
a. select language;
b. select desktop or console login;
c. select remote host for login;
d. help for login function.
User Identification
[CAPP] 5.3.5.1 The TSF shall allow the following TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.1
a. select language;
b. select desktop or console login;
c. select remote host for login;
d. help for login function.
User Subject Binding
[CAPP] 5.3.6.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: FIA_USB.1.1
a. The audit user identity;
b. The effective user identity;
c. The effective group identities;
d. The real user identity and real group identities.
[CAPP] 5.3.6.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of a user: FIA_USB.1.1
a. Upon successful identification and authentication, the real and effective and
audit user identities shall be those specified via the User Identifier attribute
held by the TSF for the user.
b. Upon successful identification and authentication, the real and effective group
identities shall be those specified via the Group Memberships attributes held by the
TSF for the user.
[CAPP] 5.3.6.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the
user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of a user:
FIA_USB.1.1
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a. The effective user identity associated with a subject can be changed to
another user's identity via a command, provided that the effective user carried
override privilege or successful authentication as the new user identity has been
achieved;
b. When executing a file which has the set UID permission bit set, the effective user
identity associated with the subject shall be changed to that of the owner of the file;
c. When executing a file which has the set GID permission bit set, the effective group
identity associated with the subject shall be changed to that of the group attribute of
the file.
Application Note: The DAC policy is enforced based on the effective UID as described
above. All auditable events are recorded with the audit ID, which contains the identity of
the user at identification time. In this manner, all auditable events can be traced
back to the person initially identified to the TOE and are not associated to
another person who may at some time identify them self as the alternate identity.
5.1.1.4 Security Management (FMT)
[CAPP] 5.4.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to
restrict the ability to modify the access control attributes associated with a named
object to the subject that owns the object and a subject with an effective override
privilege.FMT_MSA.1.1
[RBAC] 5.1.4The TSF shall enforce the RBAC SFP to provide restrictive default
values for object security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.FMT_MSA.3.1
[CAPP] 5.4.2.2 The TSF shall allow the authorized administrators and users
authorized by the Discretionary Access Control Policy to modify object security
attributes to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created. FMT_MSA.3.2
Revocation
[CAPP] 5.4.7.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke security attributes
associated with objects within the TSC to users authorized to modify the security
attributes by the Discretionary Access Control policy. FMT_REV.1.1
[CAPP] 5.4.7.2 The TSF shall enforce the rules: FMT_REV.1.2
a. The access rights associated with an object shall be enforced when an access check
is made; and
b. Administrative users shall be able to revoke security-relevant authorizations
by completely deleting user security attributes, or by modifying the user identity,
user name, primary group, secondary group and login shell, or by setting a
new password. Such revocation is to take effect when the user next authenticates to
the system.
Application Note: The DAC policy may include immediate revocation (e.g., Multics
immediately revokes access to segments) or delayed revocation (e.g., most UNIX
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systems do not revoke access to already opened files). The DAC access rights are
considered to have been revoked when all subsequent access control decisions by the TSF
use the new access control information. It is not required that every operation on an object
make an explicit access control decision as long as a previous access control decision was
made to permit that operation. It is sufficient that the developer clearly documents in
guidance documentation how revocation is enforced.
Rationale: This component supports the O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS objective
by providing that specified access control attributes are enforced at some fixed
point in time.
5.1.1.5 Security Management Roles
The TSF shall maintain the roles:
a. Set of RBAC administrative roles;
b. users authorized by the Discretionary Access Control Policy to modify object
security attributes;
c. users authorized to modify their own authentication data;
d. [CAPP] 5.4.9.1 Roles for the Object Owners.FMT_SMR.1.1
e. [RBAC] 5.1.4 Restrictions on Roles for the Object owner and administrator
FMT_SMR.2.1
[RBAC] 5.1.4 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.FMT_SMR.2.2
The TSF shall ensure that the following conditions are satisfied:
a. Object owners can modify security attributes for only the objects that they own;
b. [RBAC] 5.1.4 The set of RBAC administrative roles can modify security attributes
for all objects under the control of the TOE.FMT_SMR.2.3
5.1.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
[CAPP] 5.5.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests at the request of an
authorized administrator to demonstrate the correct operation of the security
assumptions provided by the abstract machine that underlies the TSF. FPT_AMT.1.1
5.1.1.7 Trusted Recovery
[RBAC] 5.1.5 After a failure or service discontinuity, the TSF shall enter a
maintenance mode where the ability to return the TOE to a secure state is provided.
FPT_RCV.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that the following SFs and failure scenarios have the property
that the SF either completes successfully, or the indicated failure scenarios recovers to
a consistent and secure state:
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a. The SF checks whether a specified privilege is assigned to any role but the database
containing the privilege data is not on-line or the particular data table is
inaccessible;
b. [RBAC] 5.1.5 The SF checks whether a specified role has been assigned to a
particular user but the database containing the role membership information is not
on-line or the particular data table is inaccessible. FPT_RCV.4.1
5.1.1.8 Specification of Management Functions
[CEM-2] Note below: The TSF shall be capable of allowing the administrative user to
perform the following management functions: FMT_SMF.1
a. Object security attributes management
b. Management of user accounts and roles (create, delete, modify)
c. Authentication data management
d. Management of security settings
e. Audit administration
NOTE: This security functional requirement has been added as a result of AIS 32, Final
Interpretation 065. The security functional requirement was added because a
dependency from FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MTD.1 to this new component has been
defined in ASI 32, Final Interpretation 065.
5.1.1.9 TOE Access
[CEM-2] 501 The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an administrator-defined
time interval of user activity by;
• clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
• disabling any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than unlocking
the session. FTA_SSL.1.1
The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session: the
user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA_SSL.1.2
[CEM-2] 501 The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user’s own interactive
session by;
• clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
• disabling any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than unlocking
the session. FTA_SSL.2.1
The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session: the
user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA_SSL.2.2
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5.2 Additional SFRs for This ST
This section contains the SFR elements (as indicated in italics in Table 5-1, above)
included in this ST that are in addition to the requirements defined by either the
[CAPP] or [RBAC] PP's.
5.2.1 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.1.1 Specification of Management Functions
[CCP2] Note below: The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions: FMT_SMF.1.1
a. Object security attributes management
b. Management of user accounts and roles (create, delete, modify)
c. Authentication data management d. Management of security settings
d. Audit administration
Note: See application note at beginning of Section 5, above.
5.2.1.2 TOE Access (FTA)
Session Locking
[CCP2] The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an administrator-defined time
interval of user activity by;
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
b. disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking
the session. FTA_SSL.1.1
The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session:
a. the user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA_SSL.1.2
[CCP2] The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user's own interactive session
by;
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
b. disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking
the session. FTA_SSL.2.1
The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session:
a. the user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA_SSL.2.2
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5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.2.2.1 Inter-TSF User Data Confidentiality Transfer Protection
[CCP2] The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to
transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
FDP_UCT.1.1
5.2.2.2 Inter-TSF User Data Integrity Transfer Protection
[CCP2] The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification and insertion
errors. FDP_UIT.1.1
[CCP2] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification
or insertion has occurred. FDP_UIT.1.2
5.2.3 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.2.3.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
[CCP2] The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.1
[CCP2] The TSF shall permit the TSF or the remote trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.2
[CCP2] The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for, nfs (standard
remote filesystem access protocol), ftp (file transfer protocol), rcp (remote copy), rdist
(remote file distribution), rlogin (remote login), rsh (remote shell), and telnet.
5.2.3.2 Trusted Path
[CCP2] The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote users
that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
modification or disclosure. FTP_TRP.1.1
[CCP2] The TSF shall permit local and remote users to initiate communication via the
trusted path. FTP_TRP.1.2
[CCP2] The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial user authentication;
user identification; changing of roles; changing of current group; changing of password
and changing of session level. FTP_TRP.1.3
5.3 Strength of Function
The claimed minimum strength of function is SOF-medium.
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5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The target evaluation assurance level for the product is EAL4+ [CC]. Assurance is
augmented by ALC_FLR.3 Systematic Flaw Remediation.
5.5 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
The IT environment is required to meet the objectives described in Section 4.2. All but
one of these objectives is met by procedural measures, however O.E_BOOT is met by
either the OpenBoot PROM or the System Controller. Refinements to the CC Part 2
functional component are identified by emboldened text. The functionality provided by
this firmware/SC is specified as follows:
5.5.1 Sun Ultrasparc Workstations and Low End Servers
The platforms with OpenBoot PROM shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior
of the boot strapping process to users who know the valid PROM
password.FMT_MOF.1.1:1
Application Note: In fully secure and command-secure modes, the valid (booting)
password is required in order to configure the PROM operating modes, passwords or
boot parameters as required by the [SRN].
5.5.2 SunFire MidFrames and High End Servers
The System Controller on the SunFire MidFrame High End servers shall restrict
the ability to modify the behavior of the boot strapping process to users who know the
valid SC password.FMT_MOF.1.1:2
Application Note: A valid (booting) password is required in order to configure the SC
operating modes, passwords or boot parameters as required by the [SRN].
5.5.3 x86/x64 Workstations and Servers
The x86/x64 Workstations and Server platforms shall restrict the ability to modify
the behavior of the boot strapping process to users who know the valid PROM
password.FMT_MOF.1.1:2
Application Note: A valid (booting) password is required in order to configure the
operating modes, passwords or boot parameters as required by the [SRN].
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TOESummarySpecification 6
6.1 IT Security Functions
The ITSFs to which the claimed Strength of Function (SoF) rating applies are as
follows:
• IA.1
• IA.11
6.1.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Policy
The security-related software shall define and control access between named users and
named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the data processing system. All named
users and named objects shall be uniquely identifiable over all the platforms in the
system.
Within Solaris, DAC is applied in two different ways depending on the type of object.
This ST therefore defines two object types:
• Objects that have permissions that can be changed by the owner;
• Objects that have permissions that are fixed or implicit given a process context.
The enforcement mechanisms for the former type of object shall allow users to specify
and control sharing of those objects, initially generated by the user, by named users
(group control is optional) using the specific designations of read, write,
execute/search.
The discretionary access control mechanism shall, either by explicit user action or by
default, provide that objects are protected from unauthorized access.
These access controls shall be capable of including or excluding access down to the
level of a single user.
Access permission to these objects by users not already possessing access permission
shall only be assigned by an authority responsible and authorized to grant access.
Subjects have a number of IDs associated with them:-
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• effective user ID, real user ID, saved user ID;
• effective group ID, real group ID, saved group ID, supplemental groups; and
• audit user ID.
The Solaris 10 discretionary access controls use the effective user ID and effective
group ID for policing a subject’s access rights over objects that have fixed or implicit
permissions to within a process context.
Self/Group/Public/ACL Permissions
The product shall implement a discretionary access control mechanism that controls
the access of subjects to named owner controlled objects. The discretionary access
control mechanism shall associate with each object, an owner identification, a group
identification, a set of access permissions and/or an access control list (ACL).
DAC.1 Subject to DAC.8, the access permissions on a filesystem object can be
modified only by a subject that owns the object.
DAC.2 No subject may change the owner or group of an owner controlled object
unless it is the owner of the object or has the following privilege effective:
• priv_file_chown - Allows a process to change a file’s owner user ID. Also
allows a process to change a file’s group ID to one other
than the process’ effective group ID or one of the process’
supplemental group IDs.
DAC.3 Subject to DAC.1, a subject may assign any combination of the following
access modes to an owner controlled object:-
• read, write, execute/search
to:-
• the owner of the object (self);
• any member of the owning group (group); and
• any user other than the owner or a member of the owning group
(other).
DAC.4 Subject to DAC.1, an Access Control List (ACL) can be created for a ufs or nfs
filesystem object to specify a set of allowable access modes (as per DAC.3) for
individually named users or groups. If an ACL entry for a user or group contains no
access modes, the specified user or group is specifically excluded from accessing the
object. Users not listed anywhere in an ACL (either through explicit user ACL entries
or through any applicable group ACL entries) shall have their access to the object
determined by the “Other” ACL entry.
Note that the scope of the above Security Function is limited to regular files held on
ufs and nfs filesystems. This includes hard links but excludes device special files, pipes
and symbolic links. However, the regular files referenced by symbolic links can still be
controlled by ACLs.
DAC.6 Whenever a subject requests access to an owner controlled object, the
access permissions for that object shall be checked to determine whether the user who
owns the subject can access the object in the requested mode. Where an ACL is
defined for an object, it shall be used instead of the object's permission bits.
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DAC.7 When a subject creates a filesystem object, the user ID of the subject
is assigned to the object, and the user's umask restricts the initial access permissions of
the object. The TOE default is that a user's umask is set to prevent any user other than
the owner having write access to the object.
DAC.8 Subjects may only override discretionary access control if they have one or
more of the following privileges effective;
• priv_file_dac_execute
• priv_file_dac_read
• priv_file_dac_search
• priv_file_dac_write
• priv_file_owner
• priv_file_setid
• priv_ipc_dac_read
• priv_ipc_dac_write
• priv_ipc_owner
DAC.9 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to
transmit objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
DAC.10 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification and insertion
errors.
6.1.2 Object Reuse
OR.1 When an object is initially assigned, allocated or reallocated to a subject from
the system’s pool of unused objects, the security-related software shall assure that the
object contains no data for which the subject is not authorized.
OR.2 When memory objects are allocated for use by a subject at run-time, the memory
shall contain no data from a previous subject.
Any portion of a file object that has not been previously written to shall either:
• not be readable by any subject; or
• shall be cleared before it can be read.
OR.3 The TOE shall revoke all access rights held by a subject to the information
contained within a storage object, before reuse by other subjects.
6.1.3 Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
IA.1 The product shall require users to identify and successfully authenticate
themselves, using a user name and a password, before performing any other actions.
IA.2 Upon successful identification and authentication, the real and audit user ID and
the real group ID of the user’s subjects shall be those specified by the authentication
data.
Password Protection
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The authentication data shall not contain a clear text version of each user’s password,
but rather a one-way encrypted value based on the user’s password. When a user enters
his password, it is used to construct an encrypted value and is compared against the
encrypted value in the authentication data.
IA.9 On entry, passwords shall not be displayed in cleartext.
IA.10 User passwords are always stored in encrypted form.
Note: This SF does not apply to BOOTPROM or System Controller passwords (which
are not user passwords, and are beyond the scope of this ST).
IA.11 The authentication data shall be protected so that it cannot be written other than
as follows:
• by administrative users who may
• create, delete user identities,
• modify the name, primary group, secondary group, login shell;
• set passwords if required; and
• by a user supplying a new password.
Note: In respect of [CAPP_5.4.7.2] requirements; The administrator can use the
Administration tools to revoke access rights, security relevant authorizations and
forcibly log off users if required.
6.1.4 Audit
Audit Events
Audit.1 The use of the identification and authentication mechanisms is auditable. The
following information is recorded for each event audited:-
• date;
• time;
• user identity - audit ID and effective user ID (if successful);
• security attributes of the user (if successful)
• identification of the server/workstation or terminal used; and
• success or failure of the event.
Audit.2 Attempts to access to objects are auditable. The following information is
recorded for each event audited:-
• date;
• time;
• user identity - audit ID and effective user ID;
• name of the object;
• type of access attempted; and
• success or failure of the attempt.
Audit.3 The creation of an object is auditable. The following information is recorded
for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• user identity - audit ID and effective user ID;
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• name of the object.
Audit.4 The creation of a subject to run on behalf of a user is auditable. The following
information is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• user identity - audit ID and effective user ID;
• success or failure of the attempt;
Audit.5 The creation, deletion, disabling or enabling of user accounts is auditable. The
following information is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• identity of the user implementing the change - audit ID and effective user ID;
• name of the user account being modified; and
• type of action.
Audit.6 Attempts to assign or modify security attributes are auditable. The following
information is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• identity of the user implementing the change - audit ID and effective user ID;
• name of the user account or object being modified;
• type of attribute; and
• success or failure of the attempt.
Audit.7 The use of DAC override privileges are auditable. The following information
is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• user identity - audit ID and effective user ID;
• name of the object involved (if any); and
• the privilege or role granted.
Audit.8 Security relevant events affecting the operation of the auditing functions are
auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• user identity (if relevant) - audit ID and effective user ID; and
• type of event.
• the privilege or role granted
Audit.9 The allocation or re-allocation of any reconfigurable hardware component on
a platform via the dynamic reconfiguration capability is auditable. The following
information is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• user identity - audit ID and effective user ID;
• name of the hardware component; and
• type of action.
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• Note that this Security Function applies to the SunFire MidFrame and E15K
platforms configured in multi-domain mode. If an attempt is made to execute the
command which supports the dynamic reconfiguration feature, all other platforms
and the SunFire MidFrames and E15K platforms configured in single-domain mode
will generate audit records indicating that the command is not applicable to the
machine.
Audit.10 The creation or deletion of a logical device for storage media is auditable.
The following information is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• user identity (if relevant) - audit ID and effective user ID;
• name of the object and device; and
• type of action.
Audit.11 Start-up and shutdown of the system is auditable. The following information
is recorded for each event audited:
• date;
• time;
• user identity (mandatory for shutdown only) - audit ID and effective user ID; and
• type of event.
Audit.12 The date and time information recorded in audit records shall be reliable.
Protection of Audit Information
Audit.14 Audit data shall be protected so that access to it is limited to administrative
users.
Audit.15 Password data (in clear or encrypted form) is never recorded in the audit log.
Selective Audit Data Collection/Reduction
Audit.16 Only administrative users may define classes of audit event.
Audit.17 Only administrative users shall be able to define the default system audit-
mask that defines which audit classes are recorded by default.
Audit.18 Only administrative users shall be able to define a per-user audit-mask that
defines which audit classes are recorded for that user. For a given user, the system
shall audit those classes that are in the default system audit mask or the per-user audit
mask.
Audit.19 Audit reduction software shall be available to allow administrative users to
selectively retrieve audit data based on, at a minimum, the identity of users, the type of
audit event, and the audit class.
Audit Data Storage
Audit.20 Each server/workstation of the (distributed) product may store audit data
locally or on another server/workstation of the product that can act as an audit server.
Audit.21 If another server/workstation of the product is being used as an audit server,
and this audit server becomes unavailable, the (local) server/workstation shall either:
• automatically switch over to storing audit data locally,
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or
• suspend operation until the audit server is again available,
or
• suspend operation until an alternative server/workstation of the product takes over
as an audit server;
or
• if no server/workstation is able to store audit data then no further auditable events
shall occur (i.e., all auditable actions will be suspended).
Audit.22 Facilities are available to allow administrative users to archive and maintain
the audit logs. Only such users may use these facilities to archive and maintain the
audit logs.
Audit.23 The system shall notify an administrator of audit trail saturation.
6.1.5 Administration
Profiles
Solaris 10 provides the ability for an administrator to define profiles and assign
profiles to users. Profiles are a powerful mechanism that allow administrators to define
the commands and CDE actions that users are allowed to perform, together with the
authorizations that the user has. This mechanism provides fine-grain control over user-
capabilities and allows the system to rigorously implement the principle of least
privilege.
Admin.1 Only administrators may assign a user profile to a user. The profile shall
include:
• A list of desktop actions that the user is allowed to perform, and for each action:
• The privilege that the action shall be performed with;
• The real and effective user ID and the real and effective group ID that the action
shall be performed with.
• A list of commands that the user is allowed to perform, and for each command:
• The privileges that the command shall be executed with;
• The real and effective user ID and the real and effective group ID that the
command shall be executed with.
• A list of authorizations that shall be granted to the users assigned this profile.
Admin.2 Users may perform only those desktop actions as specified in their profiles,
and when executed they are executed with the security attributes as specified by
Admin.1.
Admin.3 Users who are configured to use the profile shell may execute only those
commands as specified in their profiles, and when executed they are executed with the
security attributes as specified by Admin.1.
Roles
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Roles are configurable with Solaris 10, allowing the system to be configured so that
the principle of least-privilege can be optimally implemented for each installation and
application
The following rules apply to the configuration of roles:
Admin.4 Only an authorized user can define and assign roles to users.
Admin.5 The TSF shall restrict the scope of a session based on the role assigned to the
user.
6.1.6 Enforcement Functions
ENF.1The TOE shall validate all actions between subjects and objects that require
policy enforcement, before allowing the action to succeed.
ENF.2 The TOE shall maintain a domain ‘kernel space’ for its own trusted execution.
This shall be kept separate from untrusted subjects which operate in a separate domain
‘user space’.
ENF.3 The TOE shall allow an administrator to perform a self test to ensure that the
underlying TSF is enforcing process separation.
ENF.4 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for user passwords.
6.1.7 Failure
FAIL.1 After a failure or system discontinuity, the TSF shall enter a maintenance
mode where the ability to return the TOE to a secure state is provided.
FAIL.2 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when failures occur in the databases
containing user privileges information or the functions related to user roles and
privileges.
6.1.8 Session Locking
SL.1 The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an administrator-defined time
interval of user activity by clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current
contents unreadable and disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices
other than unlocking the session.
SL.2 The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking an interactive session the user must
be successfully re-authenticated.
SL.3 The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user's own interactive session
by clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable and
disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the
session.
SL.4 The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking a user's interactive session, the user
must be successfully re-authenticated.
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6.1.9 Secure Communication
The TOE provides the ability to protect communication by cryptographic mechanism
against disclosure and undetected unauthorized modification.
SC.7 Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and a remote
trusted IT product must be logically distinct from other communications channels.
SC.8 The TSF must provide assured identification of the end points and protection of
the channel data from modification or disclosure for communication channels provided
by the TSF between itself and a remote trusted IT product.
SC.9 Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and remote or local
users are kept logically distinct from other communications channels through the use
of encryption services that use specific session keys for each user/session.
SC.10 The TSF uses Kerberos authentication to provide assured identification of the
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure for
communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and remote or local users
for telnet, rcp, ftp, rsh commands.
6.2 Required Security Mechanisms
6.2.1 Identification and Authentication
The TOE uses a username and password mechanism to provide authentication of users.
The construction of passwords is sufficient to meet the requirements of a strength of
function of Medium. This mechanism supports the IT SFs IA.1 and IA.11.
Passwords are encrypted using a proprietary one way hashing algorithm, however the
assessment of algorithmic strength does not form part of the evaluation.
6.3 Assurance Measures
Assurance measures will be adopted to address each of the EAL4+ assurance
requirements, as summarized in Table B.1 in [CC, Part 3] and as summarized below.
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Table 6-1: How Assurance Requirements Will Be Met
Assurance components Assurance Measure
ACM_AUT.1
Partial CM automation
Information on the automated CM tools will be
provided in the Software Development Framework
document.
ACM_CAP.4
Generation support and
acceptance procedures
Configuration Management procedures will be
provided for Solaris 10.
ACM_SCP.2
Problem tracking CM coverage
As for ACM_CAP.4.
ADO_DEL.2
Detection of modification
Delivery procedures will be provided for Solaris
10.
ADO_IGS.1
Installation, generation, and
start-up procedures
Installation, generation and start-up procedures will
be provided for Solaris 10.
ADV_FSP.2
Fully defined external interfaces
The Solaris 10 MAN pages, which are relevant to
the implementation of the security functions, will
be provided to the evaluation and assessed against
this assurance requirement.
ADV_HLD.2
Security enforcing high-level
design
High-level Design will be provided for Solaris 10.
ADV_IMP.1
Subset of the implementation of
the TSF
The source code for Solaris 10 will be provided to
the evaluation.
ADV_LLD.1
Descriptive low-level design
Low-level Design will be provided for Solaris 10.
ADV_RCR.1
Informal correspondence
demonstration
This correspondence information will be contained
in the functional specification and design
documents. The functional specification will map
SFs to MAN pages. The HLD will map ITSFs to the
HLD, and the LLD will map ITSFs and source code
modules to the LLD basic components.
ADV_SPM.1
Informal TOE security policy
model
A separate Informal Security Policy Model (ISPM)
will be provided to the evaluation.
AGD_ADM.1
Administrator guidance
The Solaris 10 operational documentation relevant
to an administrator will be provided.
AGD_USR.1
User guidance
The Solaris 10 operational documentation relevant
to an end user will be provided.
ALC_DVS.1
Identification of security
measures
Development security documentation will be
provided for Solaris 10.
ALC_FLR.3
Life Cycle Support
Flaw remediation procedures are in place for
Solaris, documents and other evidence will be
provided.
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ALC_LCD.1
Developer defined life-cycle
model
The Life Cycle definition for Solaris 10 11/06 is
documented in the Software Development
Framework document.
ALC_TAT.1
Well-defined development tools
The tools used in the development of Solaris 10
11/06 are the same as for Solaris 10 3/05.
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of coverage
The analysis of test coverage for Solaris 10 11/06
will be presented to the evaluation in a form similar
to that provided to the Solaris 10 03/05 evaluation.
The existing coverage is against both High and Low
level designs and should therefore be to a sufficient
depth.
ATE_DPT.1
Testing: high-level design
The analysis of test depth for Solaris 10 11/06 will
be presented to the evaluation in a form similar to
that provided to the Solaris 10 03/05 evaluation.
The existing coverage is against both High and Low
level designs and should therefore be to a sufficient
depth.
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
The test documentation for Solaris 10 11/06
provided to the evaluation will be in a format
similar to that provided to the Solaris 10 03/05
evaluation. The tests will be run on a range of
platforms as specified in section 2.3.1.1
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing - sample
Access will be provided to the TOE in its evaluated
configuration on an appropriate set of platforms,
together with all resources needed to repeat the
developer’s tests.
AVA_MSU.2
Validation of analysis
The Misuse Analysis previously submitted for the
EAL4 evaluation of Solaris 10 03/05 will be
updated for Solaris 10 11/06.
AVA_SOF.1
Strength of TOE security
function evaluation
The Strength of Function analysis, previously
submitted for the EAL4 evaluation of Solaris 10
03/05, will be updated for Solaris 10 11/06.
AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability
analysis
The Developer Vulnerability Analysis, previously
submitted for the EAL4 evaluation of Solaris 10
03/05, will be updated for Solaris 10 11/06 and
submitted to fulfill this requirement. In addition,
evidence of Sun’s continuing search for
vulnerabilities and the resolution of them in the
Solaris product, will be provided.
Assurance components Assurance Measure
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Rationale 7
This chapter presents the evidence used in the ST evaluation. This evidence supports
the claims that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements, that a
conformant TOE would provide an effective set if IT security countermeasures within
the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the
requirements. The rationale also demonstrates that any PP conformance claims are
valid.
7.1 Correlation of Threats, Policies, Assumptions and Objectives.
The correlation between threats, organizational policies, assumptions and objectives is
detailed in the following sections, and is summarized below
Table 7-1 Mapping of Objectives to Threats and Organizational Polices
Objective Threat and Policies
O.AUTHORISATION T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY,
T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
P.AUTH, P.ACCOUNTABLE
O.ENTRY T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS T.ACCESS_INFO, T.MODIFY, P.DAC, P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.KNOWN T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY,
T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.AUDITING T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY,
P.ACCOUNTABLE, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.ACCOUNT T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY,
T.ADMIN_RIGHTS, P.ACCOUNTABLE
O.TRUSTPATH T.COMPROMISE, P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.RESIDUAL-INFO T.ACCESS_INFO, P.DAC, P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.MANAGE T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY,
T.ADMIN_RIGHTS, P.AUTH, P.DAC, P.ACCOUNTABLE,
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
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O.ENFORCEMENT T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY,
T.ADMIN_RIGHTS, P.AUTH, P.DAC, P.ACCOUNTABLE,
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.DUTY T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.HIERARCHIAL T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.ROLE T.ACCESS_INFO, T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
Table 7-2 Mapping of Threats to Objectives
Threat Objective
T.ACCESS_INFO O.AUTHORIZATION, O.ENTRY,
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS,
O.KNOWN, O.ROLE, O.AUDITING,
O.ACCOUNT, O.RESIDUAL_INFO,
O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT
T.ACCESS_TOE O.AUTHORIZATION, O.ENTRY, O.KNOWN,
O.AUDITING, O.ACCOUNT, O.MANAGE,
O.ENFORCEMENT
T.MODIFY O.AUTHORIZATION, O.DISCRETIONRY_ACCESS,
O.KNOWN, O.ROLE, O.AUDITING, O.ACCOUNT,
O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT, O.DUTY
T.ADMIN_RIGHTS O.AUTHORIZATION, O.KNOWN, O.ROLE,
O.ACCOUNT, O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT,
O.DUTY, O.HIERARCHICAL
T.COMPROMISE O.TRUSTPATH
T.TRANSIT O.E_INSTALL, O.E_INFO_PROTECT, O.E_PROTECT
T.OPERATE O.E_ADMIN, O.E_ACCOUNTABLE, O.E_CREDEN,
O.E_CONNECT, O.E_CONSISTENCY, O.E_PHYSICAL,
T.ROLEDEV O.E_ACCOUNTABLE, O.E_CONNECT,
O.E_CONSISTENCY, O.E_CREDEN
Table 7-1 Mapping of Objectives to Threats and Organizational Polices
Objective Threat and Policies
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Table 7-3 Mapping of Policies to Objectives
Policy Objective
P.AUTH O.AUTHORIZATION, O.MANAGE,
O.ENFORCEMENT
P.DAC O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS,
O.RESIDUAL_INFO, O.ENFORCEMENT, O.MANAGE
P.ACCOUNTABLE O.AUDITING, O.AUTHORIZATION,
O.MANAGE, O.ACCOUNT, O.ENFORCEMENT,
P.NEED_TO_KNOW O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS, O.RESIDUAL_INFO,
O.ENFORCEMENT, O.MANAGE
O.TRUSTPATH
Table 7-4 Mapping of Objectives for the Environment to Threats,
Assumptions and Policies
Objective Threats and Assumptions
O.E_ADMIN T.OPERATE
A.MANAGE, A.PASSWORD
O.E_ACCOUNTABLE T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV
A.USER, A.MANAGE
O.E_AUDITDATA A.MANAGE
O.E_CREDEN T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV
A.USER, A.MANAGE, A.COOP
O.E_BOOT A.MANAGE
O.E_CONNECT T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV, A.PROTECT, A.ASSET,
A.MANAGE
O.E_CONSISTENCY T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV,
A.LDAP_DOMAINS, A.MANAGE
O.E_INSTALL T.TRANSIT, A.PASSWORD,
A.MANAGE, A.PEER
O.E_INFO_PROTECT T.TRANSIT
A.PROTECT, A.ASSET,
A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS, A.MANAGE
O.E_MAINTENANCE A.MANAGE
O.E_RECOVER A.MANAGE
O.E_PHYSICAL T.OPERATE
A.LOCATE, A.MANAGE, A.CONNECT
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The OSPs are derived from the [CAPP] and [RBAC] and are included to indicate how
the OSPs relate to the TOE security objectives and the primary non-IT security
objectives. The OSPs are generally more abstract than the threats and so the correlation
between similar threats and OSPs to objectives is not necessarily the same.
The environmental objectives O.E_ADMIN, O.E_BOOT, O.E_INSTALL and
O.E_CONSISTENCY are general objectives which help counter all the threats (with
the exception of T.TRANSIT in some cases) as follows:
-[O.E_ADMIN] Those responsible for administering the TOE must be competent
and trustworthy in order to manage the security functions effectively.
Effective management is necessary in order that the threats are not
inadvertently or deliberately realized;
-[O.E_BOOT] and [O.E_INSTALL] ensure that the correct copy of the
operating system is installed and subsequently booted in a secure manner, and is
hence relevant to help counter all the threats;
-[O.E_CONSISTENCY] is required to ensure that data is set up and
maintained in a consistent manner across all platforms in the distributed system.
Erroneous or duplicate entries in the authentication information may allow any
of the threats to be realized.
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section demonstrates that the security objectives stated in Section 4 above are
traceable to all of the aspects identified in the TOE security environment and are
suitable to cover them.
7.2.1 Complete Coverage - Threats
This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the threats by both
the IT and Non-IT security objectives.
[T.ACCESS_INFO] An authorized user of the TOE accesses information
without having permission from the person who owns, or is responsible for, the
information.
O.E_SOFTWARE_IN A.MANAGE
O.E_SERIAL_LOGIN A.MANAGE,
A.CONNECT
O.E_PROTECT T.TRANSIT,
A.PROTECT, A.ASSET, A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS
A.MANAGE, A.CONNECT
Table 7-4 Mapping of Objectives for the Environment to Threats,
Assumptions and Policies
Objective Threats and Assumptions
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Security objectives O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS and O.ROLE counter this
threat directly by ensuring the means are provided by which users can securely
implement compartmentalization of information in order to counter this threat.
O.RESIDUAL_INFO helps counter the threat by ensuring that once an object
has passed outside the control of DAC, that residual information contained in it is
not passed to other users.
Security objectives O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN support
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS and O.ROLE in countering this threat by ensuring
that an authorized user cannot impersonate another authorized user, thereby
undermining the intent of O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS.
O.AUDITING helps counter this threat by ensuring that repeated [unsuccessful]
attempts to access information to which the user is not granted permission, can
be detected, thereby allowing the administrator to take action before the attack is
successful. O.ACCOUNT states that the TOE must ensure that all users can be held
accountable for their security relevant actions.
O.ENTRY which states that the TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or
processes with no rights to access it.
O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT counter this threat by ensuring:
-privileged actions are controlled; and
-the access controls cannot be bypassed.
Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:
a.O.E_ADMIN - to administer the controls over access to information;
b.O.E_BOOT - to ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative
operating system;
c.O.E_CREDEN is required to protect the information which would otherwise enable
attackers to gain access to the TOE;
d.O.E_.PROTECT - to ensure that data transmitted over network cabling is
appropriately protected;
e.O.E_RECOVER - to ensure that information cannot be accessed by
terminating the operation of a server/workstation (whether intentional or not); and
f.O.E_SERIAL_LOGIN - to ensure that information is not seen by users who
do not have a need to know when serial devices are being used.
g.O.E_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that
those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack
which might compromise IT security objectives.
[T.ACCESS_TOE] An unauthorized user of the TOE gains access to the
system, thereby gaining unauthorized access to information.
O.AUTHORISATION ensures that all users identify themselves to the system, and that
their claimed identity is authenticated before being granted access to the system. This
therefore prevents unauthorized users gaining access to the system. O.KNOWN also
states that legitimate users of the system must be identified before rights of access can
be granted.
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O.AUDITING provides support in the form of auditing attempts to access the
TOE. The auditing of unsuccessful attempts to login help to detect and hence counter
the threat of repeated attacks on the access functions. O.ACCOUNT states that the
TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant
actions.
O.ENTRY which states that the TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or
processes with no rights to access it.
O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:
-the database of authorized users is properly managed and maintained;
-the authorization functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed;
-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to login.
Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:
a.O.E_ADMIN - to ensure that the introduction of new user identities is a
restricted operation and performed only by the users responsible.
b.O.E_ACCOUNTABLE - to ensure that unauthorized users are not provided
with accounts enabling them to access the TOE;
c.O.E_CREDEN - which ensures that bad passwords, which might be used to
determine valid passwords, are not stored in the audit trail, and hence not known to
any users. It also ensures that valid authentication data is not disclosed to
unauthorized individuals;
d.O.E_CONSISTENCY - which ensures that access is granted to individuals on a basis
consistent across all platforms. This avoids possible duplication of authentication
data.
e.O.E_BOOT – to ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative
operating system
f.O.E_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no
connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.
g.O.E_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that
those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack
which might compromise IT security object
[T.MODIFY] Unauthorized modification or destruction of information by an
authorized user of the TOE.
The security objective O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS provides the means to ensure
that users can protect the integrity of the information they own or are responsible for.
Security objective O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN support
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS in countering this threat by ensuring that an
authorized user cannot impersonate another authorized user, thereby undermining
the intent of O.DISRETIONARY_ACCESS. O.MANAGE ensures that the
administrative users can control access to the information.
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O.AUDITING helps counter this threat by ensuring that repeated [unsuccessful]
attempts to modify information to which the user is not granted permission, can
be detected, thereby allowing the administrator to take action before the attack is
successful. O.ACCOUNT states that the TOE must ensure that all users can be held
accountable for their security relevant actions.
O.ENFORCEMENT supports this threat by ensuring the access control functions
are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.
Role based access to the information is covered by the objectives O.DUTY and
O.ROLE which ensure that only those users are assigned roles and only those uses that
have been assigned the correct role can access the information.
Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:
a.O.E_INFO_PROTECT and O.E_PROTECT - ensures that information
transmitted over the network is not accessible to other authorized users of the
TOE and hence the data cannot be modified or destroyed;
b.O.E_ADMIN ensures that the default access permissions are set appropriately so that
access is granted, by default, to a restricted set of users.
c.O.E_BOOT - to ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative
operating system
d.O.E_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that
those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack
which might compromise IT security objectives.
[T.ADMIN_RIGHTS] Unauthorized use of facilities which require
administration rights by an authorized user of the TOE.
Administration of the TOE has been divided into user roles. The objective for
this functionality is divided between O.DUTY, O.HIERACHICAL and O.ROLE,
which ensures that roles are properly defined.
O.DUTY provides the capabilityof enforcing separation of files and
O.HIERARCHIAL allows for the hierarchal definition of these roles. O.ROLE ensures
that a user cannot access or perform operations on its resources or objects unless they
have been assigned the appropriate role.
O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN ensures that only authorized users can
access the TOE, and provides for identification of users to determine the
administration right assigned to the user.
O.AUDITING discourages the unauthorized use of administrator facilities by ensuring
that any such breach of security policy can be detected. O.ACCOUNT states that the
TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant
actions.
O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:
-the database of authorized administrators is properly managed and maintained;
-the administration functions are always checked when invoked and cannot be
bypassed;
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-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to use the
administration functions by non-administrative users.
Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:
O.E_CREDEN ensures user’s authentication data is kept secure. This prevents an
authorized user impersonating an administrator to gain unauthorized access
to administrator facilities.
O.E_CONSISTENCY ensures that a single set of administration rights exist
across the TOE, thereby avoiding errors caused by duplication or erroneous entries in
the authorization data.
O.E_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no
connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.
O.E_BOOT - o ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative
operating system
O.E_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that users are uniquely identified and the use of
privileged facilities can be controlled amongst the user community.
O.E_SOFTWARE_INSTALL ensures that only administrators can introduce software
into the TOE and hence counters the threat of malicious software being
introduced. The introduction of some software e.g. Compilers, may provide
enhanced facilities to an attacker which could be used to mount a successful attack
on the TOE and hence make unauthorized use of administration facilities.
O.E_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that
those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack
which might compromise IT security objectives.
[T.COMPROMISE] Data may be compromised in terms of confidentiality and
integrity if an unauthorized User intercepts a communication link between the TOE
and another trusted IT product (which may be another instantiation of the TOE) and
attempts to modify information in a way that can not be detected by the TOE or the
other trusted IT product.
This threat is countered by the O.TRUSTPATH objective which states that the TSF
must be designed and implemented in a manner that allows for establishing a trusted
channel or communication path between the TOE and another trusted IT product that
protects the user data transferred over this channel from disclosure and undetected
modification.
[T.TRANSIT] Data transferred between platforms is disclosed or modified
to unauthorized users or processes either directly or indirectly (e.g. through
spoofing of server/workstation identity).
Administrators must ensure that data transferred between platforms i.e. along network
cabling, is suitably protected against physical or other (e.g. tempest) attacks
which may result in the disclose, modification or delay of information transmitted
between platforms. Environmental objective O.E_PROTECT ensures this is
achieved. Because such issues need to be considered at installation time,
environmental objectives O.E_INSTALL and O.E_INFO_PROTECT are also
applicable.
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[T.OPERATE] Compromise of IT assets may occur because of improper
administration and operation of the TOE.
This threat is countered by O.ENTRY which states that the TOE must prevent logical
entry to it by persons or processes with no rights to access it.
O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:
-the database of authorized administrators is properly managed and maintained;
-the administration functions are always checked when invoked and cannot be
bypassed;
-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to use the
administration functions by non-administrative users.
Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:
O.E_CREDEN ensures user’s authentication data is kept secure. This prevents an
authorized user impersonating an administrator to gain unauthorized access
to administrator facilities.
O.E_CONSISTENCY ensures that a single set of administration rights exist
across the TOE, thereby avoiding errors caused by duplication or erroneous entries in
the authorization data.
O.E_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no
connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.
O.E_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that users are uniquely identified and the use of
privileged facilities can be controlled amongst the user community.
O.E_ADMIN which states that those responsible for administering the TOE must
be competent and trustworthy in order to manage the security functions
effectively. Effective management is necessary in order that the threats are
not inadvertently or deliberately realized;
O.E_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that
those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack
which might compromise IT security objectives.
[T.ROLEDEV] The development and assignment of user roles may be done in a
manner that undermines security.
Administration of the TOE has been divided into user roles. The objective for
this functionality is divided between O.DUTY, O.HIERACHICAL and O.ROLE,
which ensures that roles are properly defined.
O.DUTY provides the capabilityof enforcing separation of files and
O.HIERARCHIAL allows for the hierarchal definition of these roles. O.ROLE ensures
that a user cannot access or perform operations on its resources or objects unless they
have been assigned the appropriate role.
O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN ensures that only authorized users can
access the TOE, and provides for identification of users to determine the
administration right assigned to the user.
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O.AUDITING discourages the unauthorized use of administrator facilities by ensuring
that any such breach of security policy can be detected. O.ACCOUNT states that the
TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant
actions.
O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:
-the database of authorized administrators is properly managed and maintained;
-the administration functions are always checked when invoked and cannot be
bypassed;
-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to use the
administration functions by non-administrative users.
Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:
O.E_CREDEN ensures user’s authentication data is kept secure. This prevents an
authorized user impersonating an administrator to gain unauthorized access
to administrator facilities.
O.E_CONSISTENCY ensures that a single set of administration rights exist
across the TOE, thereby avoiding errors caused by duplication or erroneous entries in
the authorization data.
O.E_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no
connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.
O.E_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that users are uniquely identified and the use of
privileged facilities can be controlled amongst the user community
7.2.2 Complete Coverage - Policy
This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the Organizational Security
Policy by the IT security objectives.
[P.AUTH] Only those users who have been authorized to access the information
within the system may access the system.
This policy is implemented through the objective O.AUTHORISATION which ensures
that only authorized users are allowed access to the system. O.MANAGE
and O.ENFORCEMENT support this policy by ensuring that the set of authorized
users is effectively managed and that the authorization functions are always invoked
and cannot be bypassed.
The environmental objective O.E_CREDEN supports this policy by ensuring that
authorization data is constructed in a manner commensurate with the protection
required for the information on the TOE and that passwords are not disclosed since
doing so would compromise the policy.
[P.DAC] The right to access specific data objects is determined on the basis of:
a.the owner of the object; and
b.the identity of the subject attempting the access; and
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c.the implicit and explicit access rights to the object granted to the subject by
the object owner.
P.DAC is implemented through the objective O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
which provides the means of controlling access between objects and subjects on the
attributes defined by the policy, and is supported by O.RESIDUAL_INFO objective
which ensures that information will not given to users which do not have a need to
know, when resources are reused. O.ENFORCEMENT supports this policy by ensuring
that the access control functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.
O.MANAGE supports this policy by requiring authorized administrator be able to
manage the functions.
[P.ACCOUNTABLE] The users of the system shall be held accountable for
their actions within the system.
Accountability is implemented primarily through the objective O.AUDITING
which ensures user's security relevant events can be recorded so as to be able
to hold users accountable for their actions. O.ACCOUNT ensures that all users can
be held accountable for their security relevant actions. An unauthorized user can not
be held accountable for their actions and O.AUTHORISATION therefore supports
this policy by ensuring that only authorized users are allowed access.
O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this policy by ensuring that an
effective set of actions are audited in order to detect attempted breaches of the
security policy and that the auditing functions are always invoked and cannot be
bypassed.
Environmental objectives O.E_ADMIN, O.E_ACCOUNTABLE and
O.E_AUDITDATA ensure that the administrator manages the auditing security
functions effectively.
[P.NEED_TO_KNOW] The system must limit the access to, modification of, and
destruction of the information in protected resources to those authorized users which
have a “need to know” for that information.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW is implemented primarily through the objective
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS which provides the means of controlling access
between objects and subjects on the attributes defined by the policy, and is supported
by O.RESIDUAL_INFO objective which ensures that information will not given
to users which do not have a need to know, when resources are reused.
O.ENFORCEMENT supports this policy by ensuring that the access control functions
are always invoked and cannot be bypassed. O.MANAGE supports this policy
by requiring authorized administrator be able to manage the functions. O.TRUSTPATH
supports this policy by requiring that the TSF be designed and implemented in a
manner that allows for establishing a trusted channel or communication path between
the TOE and another trusted IT product.
7.2.3 Complete Coverage - Environmental Assumptions
This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the environmental
assumptions by security objectives.
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[A.PROTECT] It is assumed that all network and peripheral cabling is approved for
the transmittal of the most sensitive data held by the system. Such physical
links are assumed to be adequately protected against threats to the confidentiality and
integrity of the data transmitted.
The environmental objective O.E_PROTECT ensures that network cabling is
suitably protected against threats of modification, tampering or interruption of
the data transmitted via this medium. O.E_INFO_PROTECT ensures that, where
the cabling is carrying classified information, that the infrastructure has been
approved. O.E_CONNECT ensures that no connections to outside systems or users
undermine the security of IT assets.
[A.LOCATE] It is assumed that the processing resources of the TOE will be located
within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
The environmental objective O.E_PHYSICAL states that those responsible for the
TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected
from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.
[A.ASSET] It is assumed that the value of the stored assets merits moderately
intensive penetration or masquerading attacks.
The environmental objective O.E_PROTECT ensures that network cabling is
suitably protected against threats of modification, tampering or interruption of
the data transmitted via this medium. O.E_INFO_PROTECT ensures that, where
the cabling is carrying classified information, that the infrastructure has been
approved. O.E_CONNECT ensures that no connections to outside systems or users
undermine the security of IT assets.
7.2.4 Complete Coverage - Personnel Assumptions
[A.ACESS] It is assumed that rights for users to gain access and perform operations
on information are based on their membership in one or more roles. These roles are
granted to the users by the TOE administrator. These roles adequately reflect the users
job function, responsibilities, qualifications, and/or competencies within the enterprise.
The environmental objective O.E_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that only approved groups
of users for which the product was accredited may access the system and that each
user is assigned a unique user ID.
[A.MANAGE] There will be one or more competent and trustworthy individuals
assigned to manage TOE security. These individuals will have sole responsibility for
the following functions:
a. create and maintain roles;
b.establish and maintain relationships among roles
c.Assignment and revocation of users to roles
In addition, these individuals, as owners of the entire corporate data, along with object
owners, will have the ability to assign and revoke object access rights to roles.
The assumption A.MANAGE is covered by all environmental objectives, specifically
O.E_ADMIN, O.E_ACCOUNTABLE, O.E_AUDITDATA, O.E_CREDEN,
O.E_BOOT, O.E_CONNECT, O.E_CONSISTENCY, O.E_INSTALL,
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O.E_INFO_PROTECT, O.E_MAINTENANCE, O.E_RECOVER, O.E_PHYSICAL,
O.E_SOFTWARE_IN, O.E_SERIAL_LOGIN and O.E_PROTECT. All of these
objectives require that those responsible for the TOE are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of managing the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
[A.OWNER] Assumes a limited set of users is given the rights to “create new data
objects” and they become owners for those data objects. The organization is the owner
of the rest of information under the control of the TOE.
[A.NO_EVIL_ADM] Assumes that system administrative personnel are not careless,
willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by
the administrator documentation.
This assumption is covered by the environmental objective O.E_ADMIN which states
that those responsible for the TOE are competent and trustworthy individuals, capable
of managing the TOE and the security of the information it contains. It is also covered
by O.E_INSTALL which requires procedures for secure distribution, installation and
configuration of systems.
[A.COOP] Assumes that authorized users possess the necessary authorization to
access at least some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in
a cooperating manner in a benign environment.
This assumption is met by the environmental objective O.E_CREDEN which requires
the safe storage of authentication data and ensures that users will not disclose their
passwords
7.2.5 Complete Coverage - Procedural Assumptions
[A.USER] Each individual user must have a unique user ID.
This is primarily met by O.E_ACCOUNTABLE which states that each individual user
is assigned a unique user ID. This is supported by O.E_ADMIN and
O.E_CREDEN which ensure that those responsible for the TOE are competent and
that the user IDs are not disclosed to unauthorized individuals.
[A.PASSWORD] It is assumed that the length of password for normal users will be at
least six but no more than eight characters.
This is primarily met by O.E_INSTALL which states that 'Those responsible for the
TOE must establish and implement procedures to ensure that the software
components are configured in a secure manner'. It is also supported by
O.E_ADMIN which ensures that the administrator is competent enough to ensure
this setting within the TOE remains set.
[A.LDAP_DOMAINS] It is assumed that, if the product comprises more than
one platform, all platforms are administered from a central point within each
LDAP domain.
LDAP is installed and configured at installation time, and therefore
objective O.E_CONSISTENCY ensures this assumption is upheld.
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[A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS] All bridges and routers are assumed to correctly
pass data without modification.
As for A.Protect, this assumption is met by O.E_PROTECT and
O.E_INFO_PROTECT; bridges and routers are part of the cabling infrastructure.
[A.CONNECT] It is assumed that all connections to peripheral devices reside within
controlled access facilities. Internal communication paths to interface points such as
terminals are assumed to be adequately protected.
This assumption is met by the following environmental objectives:
O.E_SERIAL_LOGIN which ensures the protection of attached serial login devices.
O.E_PROTECT which ensures that data transferred between servers and workstations
is protected
O.E_PHYSICAL which ensures that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy
are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.
[A.PEER] It is assumed that any other systems with which the TOE communicates are
assumed to be under the same management control and operate under the same
security policy constraints.
The assumption A.PEER is met by the environmental objective O.E_INSTALL which
states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE hardware, software
and firmware components that comprise the networked product are distributed,
installed and configured in a secure manner.
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale
This section demonstrates that the set of security requirements is suitable to meet and
is traceable to the set of security objectives.
7.3.1 Complete Coverage - Objectives
This section demonstrates that the functional components selected for the TOE provide
complete coverage of the defined security objectives. The mapping of components to
security objectives is depicted in the following table.
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Table 7-5 Security Objectives to Functional Component Mapping
Policy Objective
O.AUTHORISATION User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD.1)
Strength of Authentication Data (FIA_SOS.1)
Authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
User Authentication Before Any Action (FIA_UAU.2)
Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
User Identification Before Any Action (FIA_UID.2)
User Identification (FIA_UID.1)
TSF Initiated Screen Locking (FTA_SSL.1)
User initiated locking (FTA_SSL.2)
Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
O.ENTRY Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)
Management of Authentication Data (FMT_MTD.1)
Revocation of User and/or Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1)
Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1)
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS Discretionary Access Control Policy (FDP_ACC.1)
Discretionary Access Control Functions (FDP_ACF.1)
User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD.1)
User-subject Binding (FIA_USB.1)
Management of Object Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
Secure Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
Revocation of Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1)
O.KNOWN Authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
User Authentication Before Any Action (FIA_UAU.2)
User Identification (FIA_UID.1)
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O.AUDITING Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)
User Identity Generation (FAU_GEN.2)
Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1)
Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2)
Selectable Audit Review (FAU_SAR.3)
Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1)
Guarantees of Audit Data Availability (FAU_STG.1)
Action in case of Possible Audit Loss (FAU_STG.3)
Prevention of Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG.4)
User Subject Binding (FIA_USB.1)
Management of the Audit Trail (FMT_MTD.1)
Management of the Audited Events (FMT_MTD.1)
Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1)
O.ACCOUNT Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)
User Identity Generation (FAU_GEN.2)
User Subject Binding (FIA_USB.1)
Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2)
Selectable Audit Review (FAU_SAR.3)
Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1)
Guarantees of Audit Data Availability (FAU_STG.1)
Prevention of Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG.4)
Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)
Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1)
Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1)
O.TRUSTPATH Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1)
Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
Data Exchange Integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
O.RESIDUAL_INFO Subject Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2)
Table 7-5 Security Objectives to Functional Component Mapping
Policy Objective
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O.MANAGE Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1)
Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2)
Selectable Audit review (FAU_SAR.3)
Selectable Audit (FAU_SEL.1)
Action in case of Possible Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG.3)
Prevention of Audit Data loss (FAU_STG.4)
Management of Audit Trail (FMT_MTD.1)
Management of Audit Events (FMT_MTD.1)
Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)
Management of Authentication Data (FMT_MTD.1)
Revocation of User Attributes (FMT_REV.1)
Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1)
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
Management of Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
Secure Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
Secure TSF Data (FMT_MTD.3)
Failure with Preservation of State (FPT_FLS.1)
Manual Recovery (FPT_RCV.1)
Function Recovery (FPT_RCV.4)
O.ENFORCEMENT Abstract Machine Testing (FPT_AMT.1)
Reference Mediation (FPT_RVM.1)
Domain Separation (FPT_SEP.1)
TSF Self test (FPT_TST.1)
Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
O.DUTY Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)
O.HIERACHICAL Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)
Table 7-5 Security Objectives to Functional Component Mapping
Policy Objective
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O.AUTHORISATION
The TSF must ensure that only authorized users gain access to the TOE and
its resources.
Users authorized to access the TOE are defined using an identification
and authentication process [FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2]. To ensure
authorized access to the TOE, authentication data is protected [FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_UAU.7, FMT_MTD.1 and FTP_TRP.1]. The strength of the authentication
mechanism must be sufficient to ensure unauthorized users cannot pose as authorized
users with reasonable time, effort and other constraints [FIA_SOS.1]. Lock screen can
be initiated to ensure that only authorized uses can gain access [FTA_SSL.1 and
FTA_SSL.2].
O.ENTRY
The TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or processes with no rights to
access it.
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create, modify and initialize the user security
attributes, other than authentication data, to authorized administrators (FMT_MTD.1).
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create, modify and initialize the authentication data
to authorized administrators or users authorized to modify their own authentication
data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke user or object
attributes within the TSC to authorized administrators (FMT_REV.1). The TSF shall
maintain all roles and be able to associate users with roles (FMT_SMR.1).
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
The TSF must provide its users with the means of controlling and limiting access to
the objects and resources they own or are responsible for, on the basis of individual
users or identified groups of users, and in accordance with the set of rules
defined by the P.DAC security policy.
O.ROLE RBAC Policy (FDP_ACC.1)
RBAC Functions (FDP_ACF.1)
Management of Object Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)
Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)
Limitation on the Scope of Selectable Attributes (FTA_LSA.1)
TOE Session Establishment (FTA_TSE.1)
O.E_BOOT Management of the Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF.1)
Table 7-5 Security Objectives to Functional Component Mapping
Policy Objective
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Discretionary access control must have a defined scope of control [FDP_ACC.1]. The
rules of the DAC policy must be defined [FDP_ACF.1]. The security attributes
of objects used to enforce the DAC policy must be defined [FDP_ACF.1]. The
security attributes of subjects used to enforce the DAC policy must be defined
[FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1]. Authorized users must be able to control who has
access to objects[FMT_MSA.1], that only secure values are set for security
attributes [FMT_MSA.2] and be able to revoke that access [FMT_REV.1]. Protection
of named objects must be continuous, starting from object creation [FMT_MSA.3].
O.KNOWN
Legitimate users of the system must be identified before rights of access can be
granted.
The TSF shall allow TSF mediated actions on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated (FIA_UAU.1). The TSF shall require each user to be
successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on the
behalf of the user (FIA_UAU.1). The TSF shall allow TSF mediated actions on behalf
of the user to be performed before the user is identified (FIA_UID.1). The TSF shall
require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on the behalf of the user (FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.2).
O.AUDITING
The TOE must provide the means of recording any security relevant events, so as to (a)
assist an administrator in the detection of potential attacks or misconfiguration of the
TOE security features that would leave the TOE susceptible to attack; and (b)
hold users accountable for any actions they perform that are relevant to security.
Security-relevant actions must be defined, auditable [FAU_GEN.1], and capable
of being associated with individual users [FAU_GEN.2 and FIA_USB.1]. The audit
trail must be protected so that only authorized users may access it [FAU_SAR.2]. The
TSF must provide the capability to audit the actions of an individual user
[FAU_SAR.3, FAU_SEL.1 and FIA_USB.1]. The audit trail must be complete
[FAU_STG.1 and FAU_STG.4]. The time stamp associated must be reliable
[FPT_STM.1]. An authorized administrator must be able to review
[FAU_SAR.1] and manage[FAU_STG.3.1 and FMT_MTD.1] the audit trail.
O.ACCOUNT
The TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant
actions.
Security-relevant actions must be defined, auditable [FAU_GEN.1], and capable
of being associated with individual users [FAU_GEN.2 and FIA_USB.1]. The audit
trail must be protected so that only authorized users may access it [FAU_SAR.2]. The
TSF must provide the capability to audit the actions of an individual user
[FAU_SAR.3, FAU_SEL.1 and FIA_USB.1]. The audit trail must be complete
[FAU_STG.1 and FAU_STG.4]. The time stamp associated must be reliable
[FPT_STM.1]. An authorized administrator must be able to review
[FAU_SAR.1] and manage[FAU_SAR.3.1 and FMT_MTD.1] the audit trail.
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O.TRUSTPATH
The TSF must be designed and implemented in a manner that allows for establishing
a trusted channel or communication path between the TOE and another trusted IT
product that protects the user data transferred over this channel from disclosure and
undetected modification.
The TSF must be able to establish (a) an Inter-TSF trusted channel between itself and
another trusted IT product and/r (b) a communication path between itself and remote or
local users or that is logically distinct from other communication paths [FTP_ITC.1]
[FTP_TRP.1] protecting the user data transferred from disclosure [FDP_UCT.1] and
undetected modification [FDP_UIT.1].
O.RESIDUAL_INFO
The TSF must ensure that any information contained in a protected resource is
not released when the resource is recycled.
Residual information associated with defined objects in the TOE must be purged prior
to the reuse of the object containing the residual information [FDP_RIP.2].
O.MANAGE
The TSF must allow administrators to effectively manage the TOE and its
security functions, and must ensure that only authorized administrators are able to
access such functionality.
Aspects that need to be managed must be defined [FMT_SMF.1]. The TSF
must provide for an authorized administrator to manage the TOE [FMT_SMR.1].
The administrator mustbe ableto administer user accounts[FMT_MTD.1 and
FMT_REV.1]. The administrator must be able to review manage the audit
trail [FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_SEL.1, FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4,
FMT_MTD.1]. Only secure values must be accepted for RBAC-related attributes
and TSF data [FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MTD.3] The administrator must be able to ensure
that only authorized users are able to control who has access to objects
[FMT_MSA.1], and that only secure values are set for security attributes
[FMT_MSA.2]
The TSF shall provide a secure state following failure and allow manual and function
recovery [FPT_FLS.1, FPT_RCV.1, FPT_RCV.4].
O.ENFORCEMENT
The TOE security policy is enforced in a manner which ensures that the organizational
policies are enforced in the target environment i.e. the integrity of the TSF is protected.
The TSF must make and enforce the decisions of the TSP [FPT_RVM.1]. It
must be protected from interference that would prevent it from performing
its functions [FPT_SEP.1]. Additionally, the TOE must provide the capability to
demonstrate correct operation of the TSF's underlying abstract machine
[FMT_AMT.1]. The correctness of this objective is further met through the assurance
requirements defined in the PP.
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TOE
[FPT_TST.1]. The integrity of the TOE is enforced via the trusted path [FTP_TRP.1]
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O.DUTY
The TOE must provide the capability of enforcing separation of duties, so that
no single user is required to perform all administrative functions.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles [FMT_SMR.2].
O.HIERARCHICAL
The TOE must allow hierarchical definitions of roles. Hierarchical definition of
roles means that they are constructed hierarchically using rights profiles.
The TSF shall ensure that the set of administrative roles can modify security attributes
for all objects under the control of the TOE [FMT_SMR.2].
O.ROLE
The TOE must prevent users from gaining access to and performing operations on its
resources and objects unless they have been granted access by the resource or objects
owner or have been assigned a role which permits those operations.
The TSF shall enforce an RBAC policy [FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1]. User
and object security attributes required to enforce the RBAC policy must be
securely managed [FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3]. The TSF shall
be able to associate users with roles [FMT_SMR.2]. The TSF shall deny and restrict
the scope of a session [FTA_LSA.1 and FTA_TSE.1].
O.E_BOOT
The IT environment is required to meet the objectives described in Section 4.2. All but
one of these objectives is met by procedural measures, however O.E_BOOT is met by
either the OpenBoot PROM or the System Controller.
The platforms with OpenBoot PROM shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior
of the boot strapping process to users who know the valid PROM password.
[FMT_MOF.1.1]. The System Controller on the SunFire MidFrame High End servers
shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the boot strapping process to users
who know the valid SC password.[FMT_MOF.1.1]. The x86/x64 Workstations and
Server platforms shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the boot strapping
process to users who know the valid PROM password. [FMT_MOF.1.1].
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Table 7-6 Dependencies between Functional Components
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_AMT.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_TST.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1
FMT_MSA.2
FAU_GEN.1 3
FAU_GEN.2 3 3
FAU_SAR.1 3
FAU_SAR.2 3
FAU_SAR.3 3
FAU_SEL.1 3 3
FAU_STG.1 3
FAU_STG.3 3
FAU_STG.4 3
FDP_ACC.1 3
FDP_ACF.1 3
FDP_RIP.2
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_SOS.1
FIA_UAU.2 3
FIA_UAU.7 3
FIA_UID.2
FIA_USB.1 3
FMT_MSA.1 3
FMT_MSA.2 3 3 3
FMT_MSA.3 3 3
FMT_MTD.1 3 3
FMT_MTD.3 3
FMT_REV.1 3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 3
FMT_SMR.2 3
FPT_AMT.1
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7.3.2 Requirements are Mutually Supportive and Internally Consistent
The above table, Table 7-6, identifies the dependencies of all functional components
included in the ST. Required dependencies are indicated by the use if the checkmark:
3
All dependencies between functional components are satisfied within this ST, with the
following exceptions.
• Dependencies on FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 are satisfied, respectively, by the
inclusion of FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 which are hierarchic to these components.
ALC_FLR.3 introduces no additional dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_RCV.1
FPT_RCV.4
FPT_RVM.1
FPT_SEP.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_TST.1 3
FTA_LSA.1
FTA_SSL.1 3
FTA_SSL.2 3
FTA_TSE.1
FDP_UCT.1 3 3 3
FDP_UIT.1 3 3 3
FMT_SMF.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1
Table 7-6 Dependencies between Functional Components
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_AMT.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_TST.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1
FMT_MSA.2
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7.3.3 Justification for Choice of Assurance Requirements
This ST claims an assurance rating of EAL4+. The ST has been based largely on
[CAPP] and [RBAC] which specific security requirements for a product which is to be
used in a non-hostile environment with a moderate risk to the assets. In such
environments, an assurance level of EAL3 is recommended as stated in [CAPP].
This ST also contains the assurance requirements from the CC EAL4 assurance
package augmented with ALC_FLR.3. The CC allows assurance packages to be
augmented, which allows the addition of assurance components from the CC not
already included in the EAL. Augmentation was chosen to provide the added assurance
that is provided by defining flaw remediation procedures and correcting security flaws.
This ST is based on solid rigorous commercial software development practices and has
been developed for a generalized environment for a TOE that is generally available
and does not need modification to meet the security needs specified in the ST.
The EAL chosen is based on the statement of the security environment and objectives
defined in this ST. The sufficiency of the EAL chosen is justified based on the
enhancements made to [CAPP] and [RBAC] which are detailed in Section 5.1. and the
flaw remediation procedures defined in supplement ALC_FLR.3.
[CAPP] requires an EAL3 assurance rating. EAL4+ is a super-set of those
requirements.
[RBAC] requires EAL2 assurance augmented with ADV_SPM.1.1 EAL4+ is a super-
set of these requirements.
7.3.4 Strength of Function Claim is Consistent with Security Objectives
The claimed strength of function rating is SOF-medium. This exceeds the [RBAC]
requirement of SOF-basic and is consistent with [CAPP] which states that a ‘one off’
probability of guessing the password shall be 1,000,000. This is specified in SFR
FIA_SOS.1 which is in turn consistent with the security objectives described in section
7.3.
7.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
This section demonstrates that the TOE security functions and assurance measures are
suitable to meet the TOE security requirements.
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7.4.1 IT Security Functions Satisfy Functional Requirements
This section demonstrates that the combination of the specified TOE IT security
functions work together so as to satisfy the TOE security functional requirements. The
table below shows the TOE security functions which together satisfy each security
functional requirement. They are grouped under the relevant TOE security objective.
Table 7-7 SFR - IT SF Mapping
Security Functional Requirement
TOE Security Function(s)
Rational to support the SFR
Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1.1) Audit.1 to Audit.11, Audit.15a
Auditing procedures provide a record of auditable events.
Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1.2) Audit.1,2,3,4,5,6,8,11,21
Event records include date and time of the event, subject identity and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event.
User Identity Generation (FAU_GEN.2.1) Audit.1 to Audit.11
Auditing procedures identify each auditable event with the identity of the
user that caused the event.
Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1.1) Audit.19
Authorized administrators of the TOE have the capability to read all audit
record information.
Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1.2) Audit.19
Audit records are suitable for user interpretation.
Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2.1) Audit.14
Audit data is protected so that access is limited to administrative users.
Selectable Audit Review (FAU_SAR.3.1) Audit.19
Administrative users are able to selectively retrieve audit data based on,
at a minimum, the identity of users, the type of audit event, and the
audit class.
Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1.1) Audit.17, Audit.18
Administrative users are able to define the default system audit-mask
that defines which audit classes are recorded by default. Only
administrative users are able to define a per-user audit-mask that
defines which audit classes are recorded for that user. For a given user,
the system shall audit those classes that are in the default system audit
mask or the per-user audit mask.
Protected Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG.1.1) Audit.14
Audit data is protected against unauthorized deletion because access to
it is limited to administrative users.
Protected Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG.1.2) Audit.14
Audit data is protected against modification.
Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
(FAU_STG.3.1)
Audit.23
The system shall notify an administrator of audit trail saturation.
Prevention of Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG.4.1) Audit.20, Audit.21
In the event of an audit storage failure the system will prevent auditable
events, except those taken by the administrator.
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Discretionary Access Control Policy
(FDP_ACC.1.1)
DAC.6, Admin.2, Admin.3
The access permissions on an owner controlled object can be modified
only by a subject that owns the object or by a user with override file
access permissions.
Discretionary Access Control Functions
(FDP_ACF.1.1)
DAC.3, DAC.4
Solaris file permissions ensure that no subject can change the owner or
group of an owner controlled object unless it has override file access
permissions, or optionally is the owner of the object
Discretionary Access Control Functions
(FDP_ACF.1.2)
DAC.6
Solaris file permissions ensure that whenever a subject requests access
to an owner controlled object, the access permissions for that object
shall be checked to determine whether the user who owns the subject
can access the object in the requested mode.
Discretionary Access Control Functions
(FDP_ACF.1.3)
DAC.8, Admin.2, Admin.3
Solaris file permissions ensure that a subject cannot override
discretionary access control unless they have override file access
permissions
Discretionary Access Control Functions
(FDP_ACF.1.4)
DAC.3, DAC.4, DAC.6.
Whenever a subject requests access to an owner controlled object, the
access permissions for that object will be checked to determine whether
the user who owns the subject can access the object in the requested
mode. Where an ACL is defined for an object, it will be used instead of
the object’s permission bits. Unix file permissions ensure that the
changes to the object are allowable unless overridden by ACL.
Object Residual Information Protection
(FDP_RIP.2.1)
OR.1, OR.2, OR.3
Solaris ensures that any previous content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects.
Subject Residual Information Protection OR.1, OR.2, OR.3
Solaris ensures that any previous content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all subjects.
Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)
DAC.9
The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to
transmit objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure
Data Exchange Integrity (FDP_UIT.1.1) DAC.10
The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification
and insertion errors
Data Exchange Integrity (FDP_UIT.1.2) DAC.10
The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification
and insertion errors
User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD.1.1) IA.1, IA.11
Solaris assures that users are assigned unique individual security
attributes that are enforced throughout each session.
Table 7-7 SFR - IT SF Mapping
Security Functional Requirement
TOE Security Function(s)
Rational to support the SFR
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Strength of Authentication Data (FIA_SOS.1.1) IA.1, IA.11b
Solaris mechanisms exists which enforces standards of password
management.
Authentication (FIA_UAU.1.1) IA.1
User must authenticate identity at the beginning of each user session.
Authentication (FIA_UAU.1.2) IA.1
No user actions are allowed until authentication has completed
successfully.
User Authentication (FIA_UAU.2) IA.1
No user actions are allowed until authentication has completed successful
Protected Authentication Feedback
(FIA_UAU.7.1)
IA.9
Passwords are not displayed upon entry.
Identification (FIA_UID.1.1) IA.1
Solaris makes an allowance for actions to be taken on behalf of the user
prior to identification.
Identification (FIA_UID.1.2) IA.1
Solaris requires each user be successfully identified before allowing any
other actions on the behalf of that user.
Identification (FIA_UID.2) IA.1
Solaris requires each user be successfully identified before allowing any
other actions on the behalf of that user.
User-Subject Binding (FIA_USB.1.1) IA.2
Audit ID data assigned to a user upon entry does not change as the user
switches user ID’s and roles.
Management of Object Security Attributes
(FMT_MSA.1.1)
DAC.1, DAC.2
Discretionary Access Control rules ensure restricted ability to modify the
access control attributes associated with a named object.
Secure Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.2.1) ENF.4
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for user
passwords.
Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3.1) DAC.7
When a subject creates a filesystem object, the user ID of the subject is
assigned to the object, and the user’s umask restricts the initial access
permissions of the object.
Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3.2) DAC.7
The TOE default is that a user’s umask is set to prevent any user other
than the owner having write access to the object.
Management of the Audit Trail (FMT_MTD.1.1) Audit.14
Access to audit trail is limited to the administrator and therefore protected
from unauthorized observation or modification.
Table 7-7 SFR - IT SF Mapping
Security Functional Requirement
TOE Security Function(s)
Rational to support the SFR
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78 Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL
Management of Audited Events (FMT_MTD.1.1) Audit.16, 17, 18
Only the administrative user may initialize or change auditable events.
Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1.1) IA.11, Admin.1
Only the administrator can initialize user accounts and assign user profiles
Management of Authentication Data
(FMT_MTD.1.1)
IA.10
Only the administrator can change user authentication data.
Management of Authentication Data
(FMT_MTD.1.1)
IA.11
A user may change their own password.
Management of Authentication Data
(FMT_MTD.3)
ENF.4
The TSF ensures that only secure values are accepted for user passwords
Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1.1)
IA.1, IA.11, DAC.1, DAC.8
TSF allows for the administrator to manage the system security attributes
Revocation of User Attributes (FMT_REV.1.1) IA.11, DAC.1, DAC.2, Admin.1
Only the administrator can remove or delete user accounts
Revocation of Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1.2) IA.11
Once a user has been removed from the system there is no way to
authenticate.
Revocation of Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1.2) DAC.6
Solaris file permissions ensure that only authorized users are able to
revoke object attributes.
Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1.1) DAC.1, DAC.2, IA.11, Admin.1
Solaris assigns a unique id to each user which enables the assignment of
management roles. Only the administrator can assign roles to a user.
Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1.2) DAC.2, DAC.8, IA.11, Audit.14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, Admin.1
Solaris supports this requirement through the use of uid assignment and
audit tracking
Restriction on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2.1) Admin.1, Admin.4, Admin.5
The TSF shall maintain the list of roles.
Restriction on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2.2) Admin.1, Admin.4, Admin.5
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Restriction on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2.3) Admin.4, Admin.5
Defined ability of users and administrators to modify security attributes
and objects.
Abstract Machine Testing (FPT_AMT.1.1) ENF.3
SUN provides a suite of Abstract machine tests for TOE users
Failure with Preservation of Secure State
(FPT_FLS.1)
Fail.2
The TSF maintains the ability to preserve RBAC database information
when the system experiences a failure
Table 7-7 SFR - IT SF Mapping
Security Functional Requirement
TOE Security Function(s)
Rational to support the SFR
SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC
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Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL 79
Manual Recovery (FPT_RCV.1) Fail.1
The TSF will enter maintenance mode following a system failure, allowing
the administrator to bring the system to a secure state before resuming
operation.
Functional Recovery (FPT_RCV.4) Fail.2
The TSF maintains the ability to preserve RBAC database information
when the system experiences a failure
Reference Mediation (FPT_RVM.1.1) ENF.1
Solaris validates all actions between subjects and objects before allowing
the action to succeed
Domain Separation (FPT_SEP.1.1) ENF.2
Solaris maintains a secure domain within the system kernel for trusted
execution and the storage of trusted objects. This are is separate from
untrusted activities within the TOE.
Domain Separation (FPT_SEP.1.2) ENF.2
Solaris maintains a secure domain within the system kernel for trusted
execution and the storage of trusted objects. This are is separate from
untrusted activities within the TOE
Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1.1) Audit.12
Solaris provides a reliable time stamp through it’s audit mechanism.
TSF Self Test (FPT_TST.1) ENF.3
The TOE shall allow an administrator to perform a self test to ensure
that the underlying TSF is enforcing process separation
TSF-Limitation on scope of selectable attributes
(FTA_LSA.1.1)
Admin.5
The TSF shall restrict the scope of a session based on the role assigned
to the user.
TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL.1.1) SL.1
The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an administrator-defined
time interval of user activity by clearing or overwriting display devices,
making the current contents unreadable and disabling any activity of the
user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session.
TSF-initiated Session Unlocking (FTA_SSL.1.2) SL.2
The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking an interactive session the
user must be successfully re-authenticated.
User Initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL.2.1) SL.3
The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user's own interactive
session by clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current
contents unreadable and disabling any activity of the user's data
access/display devices other than unlocking the session.
User Initiated Session Unlocking (FTA_SSL.2.2) SL.4
The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking a user's interactive session,
the user must be successfully re-authenticated.
Table 7-7 SFR - IT SF Mapping
Security Functional Requirement
TOE Security Function(s)
Rational to support the SFR
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80 Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL
7.4.2 Justification for Compliance of Assurance Measures
Section 6.3 shows that all assurance requirements are met by an appropriate assurance
measure.
The Security Functional Requirements outlined in section 7.4.1 are all met within the
design of the Solaris Operating Environment. Tests have been developed and will be
conducted which confirm that all of the TOE security functional requirements are met.
7.5 PP Claims and Rationale
7.5.1 PP Reference
The TOE meets all of the requirements of the Controlled Access Protection Profile,
which is defined in [CAPP] and the Role Based Access Control Protection Profile
which is defined in [RBAC].
7.5.2 PP Tailoring
The security functional requirements for the TOE are as defined in [CAPP] and
[RBAC] with refinements as necessary and appropriate for a ST. These refinements are
detailed in section 5.1.1.
TOE Session Establishment (FTA_TSE.1) IA.1
The product shall require users to identify and successfully
authenticate themselves, using a user name and a password, before
performing any other actions
Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1) SC.7, SC.8
Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and a remote
trusted IT product must be logically distinct from other communications
channels and must provide assured identification of the end points and
protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1) SC.9, SC10
Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and remote
or local users must be logically distinct from other communications
channels and must provide assured identification of the end points and
protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
a. FAU_GEN.1.1 implicitly includes the requirement not to store password information in the audit trail as
required by IT SF Audit.15.
b. Supplying a new password is stated in ITSF IA.11, and it is the process through which a user enters a
new password that enforces the construction of the password and hence the probability of guessing the cor-
rect password.
Table 7-7 SFR - IT SF Mapping
Security Functional Requirement
TOE Security Function(s)
Rational to support the SFR
SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC
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Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL 81
7.5.3 PP Additions
There are a total of seven (7) additional security functional requirements for the TOE
beyond those defined in [RBAC] and [CAPP], as follows: FDP_UCT.1; FDP_UIT.1;
FMT_SMF.1; FTA_SSL.1; FTA_SSL.2; FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1. These additional
requirements are detailed in section 5.2.
There is one additional security requirement for the IT environment which is detailed
in section 5.4. This relates to the requirements placed on the SC or OpenBoot
PROM in support of protecting the server/workstation in the environment.
There are no additional TOE security objectives to those contained in [CAPP]
and [RBAC]. The security objectives for the TOE environment in this ST may be
regarded as additional to those contained in [CAPP] and [RBAC], although they are
deemed to be broadly equivalent, and refined due to the specific environment assumed
for the Solaris 10 product.
7.5.4 PP Rationale
The objectives used in this ST are derived from [CAPP] and [RBAC]. The differences
are minor and result from refinements appropriate to a Security Target where a
specific product and the assumed environment are being described. The SFRs used in
this ST are derived from [CAPP] and [RBAC], and have been refined as required for
inclusion in a ST.
The rationale presented in this document describing why the SFRs are
appropriate to meet the security objectives has been taken from [CAPP] and [RBAC]
also. Because of the similarities between the objectives and SFRs contained in this ST
and in [CAPP] and [RBAC], the justification provided in [CAPP] and [RBAC]
is also appropriate for this ST.
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82 Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL
SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC
Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL 83
AppendixA
A 1.1 Platform 1 Configurations
Platform Specification
Server
E3500
Server
E4500
Server
E5500
Server
E6500
Server
E10K
Server
E450
Server
E420R
Server
E250
Server
E220R
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1-8 1-14 1-14 1-30 4-64 1-4 1-4 1-2 1-2
Processor UltraSPARC II UltraSPARC II with onboard e-cache
Clock speeds 167; 250, 336, 400, 464, 500 or 650 MHz 250, 300, 400, 450 or 480 Mhz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 2 SBus 3 SBus 3 SBus
2 SBus
2 PCI
4 SBus
6 PCI
10 PCI 4 PCI 4 PCI 4 PCI
Maximum Memory 2 GB 2 GB 2 GB 56 GB 64 GB 4 GB 4 GB 2 GB 2 GB
Max Storage n/a 144 GB 144 GB
72.8
GB
2 TB 730 GB
72.8
GB
216 GB
72.8
GB
Platform Specification
Ultrasparc
30
Ultrasparc
60
Ultrasparc
80
Ultrasparc
450
SunFire
V1001
Sunblade
100
Netra X1
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1 1-2 1-4 1-4 1 1 1
Processor UltraSPARC-IIe
Clock speeds 250, 300, 450 or 500 MHz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 4 PCI 4 PCI 4 PCI 10 PCI 2 USB 2 PCI 2 USB
Maximum Memory 2 GB 2 GB 4 GB 4 GB 2 GB 2 GB 2 GB
Max Storage 18 GB 72 GB 72 GB 730 GB 40 GB 30GB 80 GB
SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC
84 Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL
A.1.1 Platform 1 Configurations - Continued
Platform Specification
SunBlade
1000
SunBlade
2000
Netra
20
SunFire
V280R
SunFire
V480
SunFire
V880
SunFire
V880z
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 2 or 4 2 - 8 1-6
Processor UltraSPARC III Cu 8MHz Cache
Clock speeds 600Mhz, 750Mhz, 900MHz, 1015MHz, 1050MHz & 1200MHz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 4 PCI 4 PCI 4 PCI 4 PCI 6 PCI 9 PCI 9 PCI
Maximum Memory 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 32 GB 64 GB 48 GB
Max Storage 146 Gb 146 GB 146 GB 146 GB 3 TB 3 TB 73 TB
Platform Specification
SunFire
V210
SunFire
V240
Netra
240
SunFire
V250
SunFire
V440
Netra 440
Server
SunBlade
1500
SunBlade
2500
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1 1-2
Processor UltraSPARC IIIi 8MHz Cache
Clock speeds 900MHz, 1015MHz, 1050MHz, 1200MHz & 1.503 GHz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)
1 PCI 3 PCI
2 PCI
1 SCSI
6 PCI 6 PCI 6 PCI 4 PCI 6 PCI
Maximum Memory 4 GB 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 16 GB 16 GB 8 GB 16 GB
Max Storage 146 GB 292 GB 292 GB 292 GB 292 GB 292 GB 120 GB 146 GB
Platform Specification
SunFire
V125
SunFire
V215
SunFire
V245
SunFire
V445
Ultra 25
Workstation
Ultra 45
Workstation
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1 1-2 1-2 1-4 1 1-2
Processor UltraSparc IIIi Processor, 1MB Level 2 Cache
Clock speeds 1.0, 1.34, 1.6 GHz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 1 PCI 2 PCI 4 PCI 8 PCI 6 PCI 6
Maximum Memory 8 GB 16 GB 16 GB 32 GB 8 GB 16 GB
Max Storage 146 GB 146 GB 292 GB 2.9 TB 1 TB 1 TB
SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC
Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL 85
A.1.1 Platform 1 Configurations - Continued
1. SunFire V100 was available with the Sparc IIe and IIi processors
Platform Specification
Netra
CT810
Netra CT820 Ultra Sparc 5
Ultra Sparc
10
Ultra 3
Mobile
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1 (single processor only)
Processor UltraSparc IIi 512Kb L2 on-die cache
Clock speeds 270, 300, 333, 360, 440, 550, or 650 Mhz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 6 PCI 18 cPSB 3 PCI 4PCI 0
Maximum Memory 4 GB 2 GB 512 MB 1 GB 2 GB
Max Storage 144 GB 80 GB 20 GB 40 GB 80 GB
Platform Specification
Sun
Blade
150
Sun Fire
B100s
SunFire
V1001
Sun
Fire V120
Netra
120
Netra
CT410
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1 (single processor only)
Processor UltraSparc IIi 512Kb L2 on-die cache
Clock speeds 270, 300, 333, 360, 440, 550, or 650 Mhz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 3 PCI 0 0 1 PCI 1 PCI 2 PCI
Maximum Memory 2 GB 2 GB 2 GB 4 GB 4 GB 4 GB
Max Storage 40 GB 40 GB 80 GB 108 GB 72 GB 72 GB
Platform Specification
Sun Fire T1000
Server
Sun Fire T2000
Server
Netra T2000
Server
Netra CP3060
Blade
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 1 1 1 1
Processor UltraSPARC T1 Chip Multithreaded (CMT)
Clock speeds 1.2 GHz is 8 core, 1.0 GHz are 4, 6 or 8-core
3 MB unified level 2 cache with ECC
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 1 PCI 5 PCI 5 PCI 8 PCIe
Maximum Memory 32 GB 64 GB 32 GB 64 GB
Max Storage 160 GB 292 GB 146 GB 292 GB
SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC
86 Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL
A 1.2 Platform 2 Configurations
Platform Specification
Netra
1280
SunFire
V1280
Sun Fire
3800
Sun Fire
4800
Sun Fire
4810
Sun Fire
6800
SunFire
12K
SunFire
15K
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 4-12 4-12 2-8 2-12 2-24 4-52 16-106
Processor UltraSPARC III Cu
Clock speeds 900 Mhz 900MHz, 1050MHz & 1200MHz
System Board (CPU) Slots N/A N/A 2 3 6 9 18
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 6 PCI 6 PCI 12 cPCI 16 PCI or 8 cPCI 32 PCI or 16 cPCI 36 PCI 72 PCI
I/O Channel Bandwidth 24 GB per second per PCI/cPCI assembly
Maximum Memory per
domain
96GB 96GB 64 GB 96 GB 192 GB 288 GB 576 GB
Max Storage (all SunFire
data center servers sup-
port external storage)
17.5 TB 17.5 TB 35 TB 77 TB 120 TB 250 TB
Sustained System Band-
width
9.6 GB/sec
21.6
GB/sec
43.2
GB/sec
Platform Specification
SunFire
V490
SunFire
V890
SunFire
2900
SunFire
4900
SunFire
6900
SunFire
E20K
SunFire
E25K
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment
CPUs 2-4 1-8 4, 8 or 12 4-12 2-24 4-36 8-72
Processor UltraSPARC III Cu
Clock speeds
UltraSPARC IV: 1050MHz,
1200MHz or 1350 MHz
SPARC V9
UltraSPARC[tm] III Cu: 900MHz, 1050MHz or 1200MHz
UltraSPARC IV: 1050MHz, 1200MHz or 1350MHz
superscalar SPARC V9, ECC protected
System Board (CPU) Slots 3 3 3 3 6 9 18
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 6 PCI
9 PCI, 2
USB
6 PCI 16 PCI 32 PCI 32 PCI 72 PCI
I/O Channel Bandwidth N/A 31.2 GB/sec aggregate bandwidth
150 MHz Sun[tm] Fire-
plane redundant 18X18
interconnect
Maximum Memory per
domain
32 GB 64 GB 96 GB 96 GB 192 GB 288 GB 576 GB
Max Storage (all SunFire
data center servers support
external storage)
292 GB 1.72 TB 146 GB 146 GB 146 GB 120 TB 250 TB
Sustained System Bandwidth N/A 9.6 GB/sec 21.6 GB/sec
43.2
GB/sec
SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC
Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL 87
A 1.3 Platform 3 Configurations
Platform Specification
SunFire
V20z
SunFire
V40z
Sun Java
Workstation
W1100
Sun Java
Workstation
W2100
Dell Precision 650
Workstation
Operating Environment Solaris 10 11/06 x86 Operating Environment
CPUs 1-2 2-4 1 2 1-2
Processor
AMD-64
200 Series
AMD
Opteron 800
AMD-64 100
AMD-64
200 Series
Intel(r) Xeon(tm)
Clock speeds
1.6GHz,
1.8GHz
2.2GHz
2.4GHz,
2.6GHz
1.8GHz,
2.2GHz,
2.4GHz,
2.6GHz
1.44Ghz,1.46Ghz,
1.48Ghz, 1.50Ghz
2.44Ghz,
2.46Ghz,
2.48Ghz, 2.50Ghz
1.8Ghz,
2.6Ghz
3.0Ghz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 2 PCI 7 PCI 5 PCI, 1 AGP 5 PCI, 1 AGP N/A
Maximum Memory 16 GB 32 GB 8 GB 16 GB 6 GB
Max Storage (all SunFire data
center servers support exter-
nal storage)
73 GB 1.8 TB 80 GB 146 GB N/A
Platform Specification
SunFire
x2100
SunFire
x2100 M2
SunFire
x2200 M2
SunFire
x4100 / 4100 M2
SunFire
x4200 / x4200 M2
Operating Environment Solaris 10 x86 Operating Environment
CPUs 1 1 1-2 1-2 1-2
Processor
AMD-64
100 Series
AMD dual
core model
1200
AMD dual
core 2000
series
AMD-64
200 / 2000 Series
AMD-64
200 / 2000 Series
Clock speeds
2.0, 2.4, 2.6,
2.8, 3.0 Ghz
1.8, 2.2, 2.6
GHz
1.8, 2.2, 2.6,
2.8 GHz
2.0GHz, 2.2GHz,
2.4GHz, 2.6GHz,
2.8GHz
2.0GHz, 2.2GHz,
2.4GHz, 2.6GHz,
2.8GHz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 1 PCIe 1 PCIe 2 PCIe 2 PCI 5 PCI
Maximum Memory 8 GB 8 GB 32 GB 32 GB 32 GB
Max Storage (all SunFire data
center servers support external
storage)
1 TB 1 TB 1 TB 1 TB 500 GB
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88 Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target 1.3 FINAL
A.1.3 Platform 3 Configurations - Continued
Platform Specification
SunFire
x4500
SunFire
x4600
SunFire
x4600 M2
Ultra 20
Wkstn
Ultra 20
M2 Wkstn
Ultra 40
Wkstn
Ultra 40
M2 Wkstn
Operating Environment Solaris 10 x86 Operating Environment
CPUs 1-2 4 or 8 4 or 8 1 1 1-2
Processor
AMD
Opteron,
Model 285
AMD
Opteron
800 Series
AMD
Opteron
8000 Series
AMD-64
100
Series
AMD
Opteron
1200
Series
Clock speeds
2.6 GHz
(95Watt)
2.6, 2.8
GHz
2.6, 2.8
GHz
1.8, 2.2
and
2.6GHz
1.8, 2.2,
2.6, and
2.8GHz
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI) 2 PCI 6 PCIe, 2 PCIx 6 PCI
Maximum Memory 16 GB 64 GB 128 GB 8 GB 32 Gb
Max Storage (all SunFire data
center servers support external
storage)
24 TB 2 TB 2TB 500 GB 1 TB