National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing Switches
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10772-2017
Dated: March 9, 2017
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin
Jerry Myers
Herb Ellis
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................5
2.1 Threats...............................................................................................................................5
2.2 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................................6
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................7
4 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................9
4.1 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................9
5 Security Policy.........................................................................................................................10
5.1 TOE Keyboard and Mouse .............................................................................................10
5.2 TOE External Interfaces .................................................................................................10
5.3 TOE Audio Subsystem ...................................................................................................10
5.4 TOE Video Subsystem (KVM devices only)..................................................................11
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management.............................................................11
5.6 TOE User Authentication ...............................................................................................11
5.7 TOE User Control and Monitoring.................................................................................11
5.8 TOE Tampering Protection.............................................................................................12
5.9 TOE Self-Testing and Security Audit.............................................................................12
6 Documentation.........................................................................................................................13
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................14
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing ..............................................................................14
7.2 Vulnerability analysis .....................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................19
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................20
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................21
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................22
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................23
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Setup of 4-Port KM TOE Installation ........................................................................... 16
Figure 2: Setup of 4-Port KVM TOE Installation ........................................................................ 17
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List of Tables
Table 1: IPGARD 2-Port Secure TOE Identification ..................................................................... 2
Table 2: IPGARD 4-Port Secure TOE Identification ..................................................................... 3
Table 3: IPGARD 8 and 16-Port Secure TOE Identification ......................................................... 3
Table 4: Evaluation Details............................................................................................................. 4
Table 5: TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................... 18
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1 Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent
for that end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their
environment. End-users should review the Security Target (ST), (which is where specific
security claims are made) as well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how those
security claims were evaluated, tested, and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the
evaluated configuration) to help in that determination. Prospective users should carefully read
the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the Validator Comments in Section
10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing Switches. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no
warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version
and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing Switches was performed by
Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in the United
States and was completed in March 2017. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the
requirements of the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), version 3.1, revision 4 and the assurance activities specified in the Protection Profile for
Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0. Leidos performed an analysis of the NIAP Technical
Decisions (https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). Leidos
determined Technical Decisions TD0083, TD0086, and TD0136 applied to this evaluation. The
evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing
Switches is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when installed, configured
and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfied all of the security
functional requirements stated in the ST. The information in this VR is largely derived from the
publically available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) and the associated proprietary test report
produced by the Leidos evaluation team.
IPGARD Secure Peripheral Sharing Switches provide a secure medium to share a single set of
peripheral components such as keyboard, video display and mouse/pointing devices among
multiple computers over USB, DVI, and Display Port for KVM Switches and keyboard,
mouse/pointing devices among multiple computers over USB for KM Switches. The TOE is a
hardware and firmware solution that consists of the following KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing
Switches:
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# Model
Name
P/N Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
1 SDVN-2S 1872-IPG-1001 2-Port SH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 111.111
2 SDVN-2S-P 1872-IPG-1002 2-Port SH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC, PP
3.0
111.111
3 SDVN-2D 1872-IPG-1003 2-Port DH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 111.111
4 SDVN-2D-P 1872-IPG-1004 2-Port DH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 121.212
5 SDPN-2S 1872-IPG-1005 2-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 121.212
6 SDPN-2S-P 1872-IPG-1006 2-Port SH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 121.212
7 SDPN-2D 1872-IPG-1007 2-Port DH Secure DP KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 121.212
8 SDPN-2D-P 1872-IPG-1008 2-Port DH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 121.212
9 SDHN-2S-P 1872-IPG-1009 2-Port SH Secure Pro DP to HDMI KVM w/audio and
CAC, PP 3.0
131.313
10 SDHN-2D-P 1872-IPG-1010 2-Port DH Secure Pro DP to HDMI KVM w/audio and
CAC, PP 3.0
131.313
Table 1: IPGARD 2-Port Secure TOE Identification
# Model
Name
P/N Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
1 SDVN-4S 1872-IPG-1011 4-Port SH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 242.414
2 SDVN-4S-P 1872-IPG-1012 4-Port SH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC, PP
3.0
242.414
3 SDVN-4D 1872-IPG-1013 4-Port DH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 242.414
4 SDVN-4D-P 1872-IPG-1014 4-Port DH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC, PP
3.0
242.414
5 SDPN-4S 1872-IPG-1015 4-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 252.515
6 SDPN-4S-P 1872-IPG-1016 4-Port SH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 252.515
7 SDPN-4D 1872-IPG-1017 4-Port DH Secure DP KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 252.515
8 SDPN-4D-P 1872-IPG-1018 4-Port DH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 252.515
9 SDHN-4S-P 1872-IPG-1019 4-Port SH Secure Pro DP to HDMI KVM w/audio and
CAC, PP 3.0
262.616
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10 SDHN-4D-P 1872-IPG-1020 4-Port DH Secure Pro DP to HDMI KVM w/audio and
CAC, PP 3.0
262.616
11 SDVN-4Q-P 1872-IPG-1021 4-Port QH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC, PP
3.0
242.414
12 SDPN-4Q-P 1872-IPG-1022 4-Port QH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 252.515
13 SDHN-4Q-P 1872-IPG-1023 4-Port QH Secure Pro DP to HDMI KVM w/audio and
CAC, PP 3.0
262.616
14 SKMN-4S 1872-IPG-1030 4-Port Secure KM w/audio, PP 3.0 202.410
15 SKMN-4S-P 1872-IPG-1031 4-Port Secure Pro KM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 202.410
Table 2: IPGARD 4-Port Secure TOE Identification
# Model
Name
P/N Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
1 SDVN-8S 1872-IPG-1024 8-Port SH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 373.717
2 SDVN-8S-P 1872-IPG-1025 8-Port SH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/ audio and CAC, PP
3.0
373.717
3 SDVN-8D 1872-IPG-1026 8-Port DH Secure DVI-I KVM w/ audio, PP 3.0 373.717
4 SDVN-8D-P 1872-IPG-1027 8-Port DH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/ audio and CAC, PP
3.0
373.717
5 SKMN-8S 1872-IPG-1032 8-Port Secure KM w/ audio, PP 3.0 303.710
6 SKMN-8S-P 1872-IPG-1033 8-Port Secure Pro KM w/ audio and CAC, PP 3.0 303.710
7 SDVN-16S 1872-IPG-1028 16-Port SH Secure DVI-I KVM w/ audio, PP 3.0 484.818
8 SDVN-16S-P 1872-IPG-1029 16-Port SH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/ audio and CAC, PP
3.0
484.818
Table 3: IPGARD 8 and 16-Port Secure TOE Identification
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation
evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the
evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the
evaluation results showed that all assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been
completed successfully and that the product satisfied all of the security functional and assurance
requirements as stated in the ST.
Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The products, when configured as specified in the guidance documentation, satisfy all of the
security functional requirements stated in the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch Security
Target.
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Item Identifier
Evaluated Product IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing Switches
identified in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3
Sponsor & Developer Albert Cohen
IPGARD, Inc.
3455 W. Craig Road, Suite C
North Las Vegas, NV 89032
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date March 2017
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
PP Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral
Sharing Switches by any agency of the U.S. Government and no
warranty of the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing
Switches is either expressed or implied.
Evaluation Personnel Gregory Beaver
Cody Cummins
Gary Grainger
Kevin Steiner
Validation Personnel Jerry Myers, Lead Validator
Daniel Faigin, Senior Validator
Herb Ellis, Validator
Table 4: Evaluation Details
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List
(PCL).
The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Name Description
ST Title IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch Security Target
ST Version 3.14
Publication Date February 17, 2017
Vendor and ST
Author
IPGARD, Inc.
TOE Reference IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing Switches identified in Table 1, Table 2,
and Table 3
TOE Software
Version
IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing Switches identified in Table 1, Table 2,
and Table 3
Keywords KVM Switch, KM Switch, Peripheral Sharing Switch
2.1 Threats
The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are intended
to counter:
 A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
the PSS or its connected peripherals.
 A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
bit-by-bit signaling.
 A PSS may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected computer. More specifically, a PSS may
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leak user keyboard entries to a PSS-connected computer other than the selected computer
in real-time or at a later time.
 A threat in which the user is connected to a computer other than the one to which they
intended to be connected.
 The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSS peripheral port may
allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS
or its connected computers.
 The use of an authorized peripheral device with the PSS may still cause unauthorized
data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS or its connected
computers. Such threats are possible due to known or unknown device vulnerabilities or
due to additional functions within the authorized peripheral device.
 Microphone connected to the TOE used for audio eavesdropping or to transfer data
across an air-gap through audio signaling.
 Audio output device used by an attacker as a low-gain microphone for audio
eavesdropping. This threat is an abuse of the computer and TOE audio output path to
reverse the analog data flow from the headphones to the computer. The computer then
amplifies and filters the weak signal, and then digitizes and streams it to another location.
 An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the
control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code embedded in the TOE’s
volatile or non-volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows between
connected devices.
 A malicious human agent could physically tamper with or modify the TOE to allow
unauthorized information flows between connected devices.
 A malicious human agent could replace the TOE during shipping, storage, or use with an
alternate device that does not enforce the TOE security policies.
 Detectable failure of a PSS may cause an unauthorized information flow, weakening of
PSS security functions, or unintended switching.
2.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Switch.
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3 Architectural Information
IPGARD Secure Peripheral Sharing Switches (PSS) provides a secure medium to share a single
set of peripheral components such as keyboard, video display and mouse/pointing devices among
multiple computers over USB, DVI, and Display Port for KVM Switches and keyboard,
mouse/pointing devices among multiple computers over USB for KM Switches.
IPGARD Secure PSS product utilizes multiple isolated microcontrollers to emulate the
connected peripherals in order to prevent a multitude of threats. The TOE is also equipped with
numerous uni-directional data flow forcing devices to guarantee isolation of connected computer
data channels.
IPGARD Secure KVM port models:
 2-Port
 4-Port
 8-Port
 16-Port
IPGARD Secure KVM video outputs (displays):
 Single head
 Dual-head
 Quad-head
IPGARD Secure KM port models:
 4-Port
 8-Port
IPGARD Secure PSS is compatible with standard personal/portable computers, servers or thin-
clients. Connected computers running operating systems such as Windows or Linux and have
ports for the following:
 USB keyboard (KVM and KM)
 USB mouse (KVM and KM)
 DVI and Display Port 1.2 Video Input (KVM)
 DVI, HDMI 1.4 and Display Port 1.2 Video Output (KVM)
 Audio Input (KVM and KM)
 Audio Output (KVM and KM)
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 USB Common Access Card (CAC) or Smart-Card reader (KVM and KM)
Computers of varying sensitivities are connected to a single TOE that is intended to restrict
peripherals connection to one computer at a time. Data leakage is prevented across the TOE to
avoid severe compromise of the user's information.
The TOE operational environment included standard computers, monitors, USB mouse, and
CAC reader.
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4 Assumptions
The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:
 It is assumed that the computers and peripheral devices connected to the TOE are not
TEMPEST approved.
 It is assumed that the computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special
analog data collection cards or peripherals such as: Analog to digital interface, high
performance audio interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and analog video
capture function.
 Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is
assumed to be provided by the environment.
 TOE Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
 Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
4.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific hardware products, and firmware versions
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related
functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the ST, were not covered
by this evaluation.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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5 Security Policy
The TOE implements the User Data Protection and Data Isolation security function policies of
the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch as specified in the ST.
Secure KVM/KM allows an individual user to utilize a single set of peripherals to operate in an
environment with several isolated computers. KVM switches keyboard, mouse, display, audio,
and USB/CAC (on -P models) from one isolated computer to another. KM switches keyboard,
mouse, audio, and USB user authentication devices (only in -P models) from one isolated
computer to another. Consequently, TOE security policy consists of data isolation policies along
with supporting audit, authentication, management and self-protection policies.
5.1 TOE Keyboard and Mouse
The keyboard and mouse processor is programmed in firmware only to accept basic keyboard
and mouse USB devices. Wireless keyboard and mouse are not allowed by the TOE. Only USB
host peripheral devices are allowed by TOE keyboard and mouse host emulators. A secure
peripheral switch (multiplexer) is used to assure the selection of just one tied keyboard and
mouse serial data stream during TOE operation. The secure multiplexor has a third position,
isolation, which is activated when the TOE has been tampered with or self-test has failed to
disable the keyboard and mouse stream.
5.2 TOE External Interfaces
The TOE only supports AC/DC power, USB keyboard and mouse, KVM Video (DVI in/DVI
out, DP 1.2 in/DP 1.2 out, DP 1.2 in/HDMI 1.4 out or VGA in/VGA out via adapter), analog
audio output, user authentication devices, and other assigned/authorized USB devices. Docking
protocols are not supported by the TOE. Analog microphone or audio line inputs are not
supported by the TOE. Uni-directional audio diodes are placed in parallel on both right and left
stereo channels to ensure uni-directional data flow from the connected computer to the user
peripheral device. Audio data from the connected peripheral devices to the connected computer
is blocked by the audio data diodes.
5.3 TOE Audio Subsystem
Electrical isolation of the audio subsystem from all other TOE interfaces prevents data leakages
to and from the audio paths. The use of microphones or audio line input devices are prohibited.
All TOE devices support analog audio out switching and all TOE devices will prevent
microphone devices. These microphones are stopped through the use of unidirectional audio
diodes on both left and right stereo channels (forces data flow from only the computer to the
connected audio device) and the analog output amplifier which enforces unidirectional audio
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data flow. The TOE audio subsystem does not delay, store, or convert audio data flows. This
prevents any audio overflow during switching between isolated audio channels.
5.4 TOE Video Subsystem (KVM devices only)
Each connected computer has its own TOE isolated channel with its own Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) emulator and video input port. Data flows from the input video
source through its respective EDID emulator and out of the monitor display port. Each video
input interface is isolated from one another using different EDID ICs, power planes, ground
planes, and electronic components in each independent channel. The TOE supports DVI/ DP 1.2
video input, and DVI/HDMI 1.4 video output (depending on the TOE model).
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management
Each TOE is equipped with Administration and Security Management Tool that can be initiated
by running an executable file on a computer with keyboard connected to the same computer via
the TOE. The tool requires administrator or a user to be successfully identified and authenticated
by name and password in order to gain access to any supported feature.
5.6 TOE User Authentication
The TOE is shipped with default Device Filtration for the CAC port. The filter is set at default to
allow only standard smart-card reader, PIV/CAC USB 1.1/2.0 token or biometric reader. All
devices must be bus powered only (no external power source allowed). The TOE default settings
accept standard smart-card reader, PIV/CAC USB 1.1/2.0 token or biometric reader. Only an
Identified and authorized administrator can register other USB devices.
5.7 TOE User Control and Monitoring
All user monitoring and control of the TOE is performed through the TOE front panel LED
illuminated push-buttons. These buttons are tied to the TOE system controller functionality. All
push-buttons for selecting computer channels are internally illuminated via LEDs. The current
selected channel is indicated by the illumination of the current channel push-button LED (the
other channel LEDs remain off). During operation, all front panel LED indications cannot be
turned off or dimmed by the user in any way including after Restore Factory Default (reset).
All features of the TOE front panel are tested during power up self-testing. From power up until
the termination of the TOE self-test, no channel is selected.
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5.8 TOE Tampering Protection
In order to mitigate potential tampering and replacement, the TOE is devised to ensure that any
replacement may be detected, any physical modification is evident, and any logical modification
may be prevented. The TOE is designed so that access to the TOE firmware, software, or its
memory via its accessible ports is prevented. The TOE is designed to prevent any physical or
logical access its internal memory. There is a mechanical switch on the inside of the TOE that
triggers the anti-tampering state when the enclosure is manually opened. Once the anti-
tampering state is triggered, the TOE is permanently disabled.
5.9 TOE Self-Testing and Security Audit
The TOE has a self-testing function that executes immediately after power is supplied including
Restore Factory Default (reset) and power reset, before normal operation access is granted to the
user. Self-Test function includes the following activities:
 Basic integrity test of the TOE hardware (no front panel push buttons are jammed).
 Basic integrity test of the TOE firmware.
 Integrity test of the anti-tampering system and control function.
 Test the data traffic isolation between ports.
The TOE has a non-volatile memory event log which records all abnormal security events that
occur within TOE operation. This log can be accessed by the identified and authorized
administrator and dumped into a .txt file using a connected computer and a program.
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6 Documentation
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the
TOE is as follows:
 IPGard Secure KVM Administration and Security Management Tool Guide (KVM and
KM) Document ID: DOC-IPG-2009, Version: 2.0, Release Date: January 24th, 2017
 Advanced 2/4-Port DP To HDMI Secure KVM Switch User Manual, Document ID:
DOC-IPG-2005, Revision: 1.10, Release Date: December 13th, 2016
 Advanced 2/4-Port DP Secure KVM Switch User Manual, Document ID: DOC-IPG-
2008, Revision: 1.10 Release Date: December 13th, 2016
 Advanced 2/4-Port DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Manual, Document ID: DOC-IPG-
2004, Revision: 1.10 Release Date: December 13th, 2016
 Advanced 8/16-Port DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Manual, Document ID: DOC-IPG-
2006, Revision: 1.10 Release Date: November 13th, 2016
 Advanced 4/8 - Port Secure KM Switch User Manual, Document ID: DOC-IPG-2007,
Revision: 1.11 Release Date: February 17th, 2017
The above documents are considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. The documentation is
delivered with the product and is also available by download from:
http://ipgard.com/documentation/.
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through
electronic downloads should not be relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
The Security Target used is:
 IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch Security Target, Document ID: DOC-IPG-2001,
Revision: 3.14, Release Date: February 17, 2017
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7 Independent Testing
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information
contained in the following proprietary documents:
 IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch Security Common Criteria Test Report and
Procedures, Version 1.1, March 6, 2017
A non-proprietary summary of the test configuration, test tools, and tests performed may be
found in:
 Assurance Activities Report For IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switches, Version 1.1, March
6, 2017
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE
security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0.
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0. The Test Plan described how each
test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team
executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report
listed above.
Independent testing took place at the IPGARD facility in North Hollywood, California from
December 5, 2016 to December 9, 2016. In addition, a supplemental test was performed
remotely on March 6, 2017 in accordance with Labgram #078.
Prior to testing, the evaluation team performed an onsite evaluation per NIAP Labgram
#078/Valgram #098: CCTL Evaluation Test Requirements. The vendor site controlled access to
the test facility. Only the employees who were involved in testing were allowed in the testing
facility. The testing was performed on an isolated network to prevent tampering. All test
equipment was verified to be functioning properly before being used as part of testing.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed
and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test
Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the
testing requirements for Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0 were
fulfilled.
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7.2 Vulnerability analysis
A search of public domain sources for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE did not reveal any
known vulnerabilities.
The evaluator conducted penetration testing, based on the potential vulnerabilities identified in
the general KM/KVM switch technologies. The testing did not exploit any vulnerability.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing
Switches identified in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3
The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be
configured in accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6. The figures below
identify the evaluated configuration for the four port switches. The same configuration is
applied to the 2, 4, 8, and 16 port models.
IPGARD Secure KVM port models:
 2-Port
 4-Port
 8-Port
 16-Port
IPGARD Secure KM port models:
 4-Port
 8-Port
Figure 1: Setup of 4-Port KM TOE Installation
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Figure 2: Setup of 4-Port KVM TOE Installation
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in Protection Profile
for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0, in conjunction with version 3.1, revision 4 of the CC
and the CEM. A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts
assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed PPs, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is
controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following
table.
Table 5: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Component ID Assurance Component Name
ADV_FSP.1 Basic function specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – sample
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
NIAP established a Peripheral Sharing Switch Technical Rapid Response Team (PSS-TRRT) to
address questions and concerns related to evaluations claiming conformance to Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch. A Technical Decision is an issue resolution statement
that clarifies or interprets protection profile requirements and assurance activities. PSS-TRRT
has formally posted three Technical Decisions related to Protection Profile for Peripheral
Sharing Switch, namely TD0083, TD0086, and TD0136. (See https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm.) All three PSS-TRRT Technical Decisions
applied to the IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Peripheral Sharing Switch evaluation.
In addition to the items mentioned above some additional product administration and usability
features are worth considering:
 An administrator mode is supported in the product, but its usability and features are
limited. The administrator should make sure they enable multiple users and change
default passwords.
 An audit feature is supported, but is of a limited nature given the product.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Name Description
ST Title IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch Security Target
ST Version 3.14
Publication Date February 17, 2017
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13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
Acronym Full Definition KVM or KM Related
CAC Common Access Card KVM/KM
CCTL Common Criteria Test Lab KVM/KM
DP Display Port KVM
DVI Digital Visual Interface KVM
HD High Definition KVM
HDMI High Definition Multimedia Interface KVM
KM Keyboard, Mouse KVM/KM
KVM Keyboard, Video and Mouse KVM/KM
LED Light-Emitting Diode KVM/KM
MCU Microcontroller Unit KVM/KM
MCCS Monitor Control Command Set KVM
PC Personal Computer KVM/KM
PIN Personal Identification Number KVM/KM
PSS Peripheral Sharing Switch KVM/KM
USB Universal Serial Bus KVM/KM
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
5. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme - Guidance to CCEVS Approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 2.0, 8 Sep 2008.
6. IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch Security Target, Document ID: DOC-IPG-2001,
Revision: 3.14, Release Date: February 17, 2017
7. Evaluation Technical Report for IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch, Version 1.0,
January 24, 2017
8. IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switch Security Common Criteria Test Report and
Procedures, Version 1.1, March 6, 2017
9. Assurance Activities Report For IPGARD Secure KVM/KM Switches, Version 1.1,
March 6, 2017