KECS-CR-23-12
Echelon V3.5
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1218-2023
2023. 3. 17.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2023.03.17. -
Certification report for Echelon V3.5
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Echelon V3.5 of UbimInfo
Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................8
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information .................................................................................. 11
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................12
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................12
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................13
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................13
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................14
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................15
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................15
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................16
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................16
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................17
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL1+ evaluation of Echelon V3.5(“TOE” hereinafter) with reference to
the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)
[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The TOE is database encryption software to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information by encrypting the database.
The TOE consists of management tool, manager, and agent. The management tool is
an administrator access tool that provides the ability for administrators (security
manager) to perform security management and encryption key management
(encryption key generation/destruction/inquiry function), and to view audit history.
The manager installed on the Echelon management server performs core functions
such as security management, encryption key management, audit history management,
and notification services. The agent installed on the database server encrypts and
decrypts user data according to the security policy sent from the manager. The TOE
includes cryptographic module (MPowerCrypto V2.5) validated under the Korea
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on March 17, 2023. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST)
[6].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Data
Encryption V1.1 [7]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3. The ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the
SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE, which is the plug-in type as
defined in the PP[7].
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[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
Management
tool
CPU Intel Core i3 @ 3.40GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD 1 GB or higher space for installation of TOE
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 Mbps x 1 Port or more
OS Windows 10 Pro(64bit)
Required S/W Eclipse RCP 4.19.0
JRE 11.0.16
Manager CPU Intel Core i3 @ 3.40GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD 1 GB or higher space for installation of TOE
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 Mbps x 1 Port or more
OS Ubuntu 18.04.6 (64bit) (Kernel:4.15.0-204)
Required S/W PostgreSQL 14.7
MPowerPlus 1.3.1
JRE 11.0.16
Agent CPU Intel Core i3 @ 3.40GHz or higher
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RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD 1GB or higher space for installation of TOE
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 Mbps x 1 Port or more
OS Oracle linux 8.7 (64bit) (Kernel:4.18.0-425)
Required S/W Oracle 19.3.0.0.0
MPowerPlus 1.3.1
JRE 11.0.16
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE Echelon V3.5
Version V3.5
Detail version 3.5.0.0.3
TOE
Components
Management tool Echelon V3.5-AdministratorV1.04
- Echelon V3.5@AdministratorV1.04.msi
Manager Echelon V3.5-ManagerV1.04
- Echelon V3.5@ManagerV1.04.jar
Agent Echelon V3.5-AgentV1.04
- Echelon V3.5@AgentV1.04.jar
Guidance
Document
- Echelon V3.5-PRE.1-r1.1.pdf
- Echelon V3.5-OPE.1-r1.1.pdf
- Echelon V3.5-OPE.2-r1.0.pdf
[Table 2] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(October 31, 2022)[3]
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(May 17, 2021)[4]
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1,
KECS-PP-0820a-2017, 11 December 2019
Developer UbimInfo Co., Ltd.
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Sponsor UbimInfo Co., Ltd.
Evaluation
Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
March 17, 2023
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [6] for the TOE claims strict conformance to Korean National Protection Profile
for Database Encryption V1.1 [7], and complies security policies defined in the PP [7]
by security requirements. The TOE provides security features defined in the PP [7] as
follows:
 Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events
including the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation and
self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption and hash, and cryptographic key management such as
key generation/distribution/destruction using cryptographic module
(MPowerCrypto V2.5) validated under the KCMVP.
 User data protection: The TOE provides encryption and decryption for the user
data in a column of a database.
 Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators(Security Manager) based on ID/PW. The TOE also mutually
authenticates TOE components when they communicate each other.
 Security management: Security management of the TOE is restricted to only
the authorized administrator who can access the management interface
provided by TOE.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides secure communications between
TOE components to protect the transmitted data. The TOE encrypts the stored
TSF data to protect them from unauthorized exposure and modification. The
TOE performs self-tests on the TOE components, which includes the self-test
on the validated cryptographic module.
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 TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators’ sessions based on
access IP addresses. The TOE terminates the sessions after predefined time
interval of inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no explicit Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the Low
Assurance ST. The followings are procedural method supported from operational
environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.
 The place where the TOE components are installed and operated shall be
equipped with access control and protection facilities so that only authorized
administrator can access.
 The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have
appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill
the duties in accordance with administrator guidances.
 The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification
and authentication function in the operational environment of the business
system shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied
in accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
 The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically check a spare space
of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit
data backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent
audit data loss.
 The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security
of the operating system by performing the reinforcement on the latest
vulnerabilities of the operating system in which the TOE is installed and
operated.
 The TOE shall accurately record security-related events using the reliable
timestamp provided by the TOE operating environment.
 Since the DBMS interacting with the TOE stores the audit records, it must be
protected from unauthorized deletion and modification of the stored audit
records.
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5. Architectural Information
The physical scope of TOE is Management tool, Manager, and Agent, and those are
inside CD. The major security policy of the TOE and logical scope of the TOE are
shown in [Figure 1] and chapter 3. For the detailed description, refer to the ST [6].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
Echelon V3.5-PRE.1-r1.1.pdf V1.1 Jan. 8, 2023
Echelon V3.5-OPE.1-r1.1.pdf V1.1 Feb. 8, 2023
Echelon V3.5-OPE.2-r1.0.pdf V1.0 Dec. 3, 2022
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
 Test no.: Identifier of each test case
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
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The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and
tools as the developer’s test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The
evaluator has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent
with the actual results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based
upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for
potential vulnerabilities. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration,
depth, and results are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: Echelon V3.5(version 3.5.0.0.3)
- Echelon V3.5-AdministratorV1.04
- Echelon V3.5-ManagerV1.04
- Echelon V3.5-AgentV1.04
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6,
[Table 4] were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
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CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are
internally consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes
the TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in
device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
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Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
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9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
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 The administrator should install and operate the TOE and DBMS in a
physically secure environment accessible only by the authorized administrator,
and should not allow remote management from the outside.
 Developers who link the encryption function to DBMS should ensure that the
security functions of the TOE are applied safely in accordance with the
requirements of the manual.
 When operating the product, the administrator's password should be changed
periodically.
 It is necessary to maintain the reliability and safety of the operating system by
performing reinforcement work on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating
system installed and operated by the TOE.
 The authorized administrator shall periodically check the free space of the
audit data storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records and perform
the backup of the audit records so that the audit records are not deleted.
 After installing the product, the administrator must register the administrator's
e-mail address on the product so that warning mail can be sent normally in the
event of a potential security violation, and ensure that the e-mail address is
correctly registered and functional.
 The policy manager should manage the PC so that only the authorized policy
manager can access the system to prevent modification and deletion of the
audit log from unauthorized users.
11. Security Target
The Echelon V3.5 Security Target V1.2, February 1, 2023 [6] is included in this report
by reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
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SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Decryption The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
Encryption The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext
using the cryptographic key
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (24 August 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)
[5] TTA-CCE-21-010 Echelon V3.5 Evaluation Technical Report V1.3, March 17,
2023
[6] Echelon V3.5 Security Target V1.2, February 1, 2023
[7] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1 (KECS-PP-
0820a-2017, 11 December 2019)