National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
LG Electronics Inc.
20 Yoido-dong, Youngdungpogu, Seoul 152-721, Korea
LG Electronics Inc. G4
Smartphone
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10626-2015
Dated: July 1, 2015
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerry Myers
Ken Stutterheim
Aerospace Corporation
Sheldon Durrant
Stelios Melachrinoudis
MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Khai Van
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 4
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 6
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) .............................................................. 9
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 9
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 10
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of LG G4 Smartphone solution provided by LG
Electronics Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in June 2015. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the LG G4 Smartphone with a Qualcomm Snapdragon
808 (MSM8992) processor.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The Gossamer Security Solutions evaluation team concluded that the TOE met Common
Criteria requirements for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the LG Electronics Inc.
G4 Smartphone (MDFPP11) Security Target and analysis performed by the evaluation
team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
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evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: LG Electronics Inc. G4 Smartphone with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 808
(MSM8992) processor
Protection Profile
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 1.1, 12 February
2014
ST: LG Electronics Inc. G4 Smartphone (MDFPP11) Security Target, Version 1.4,
May 27, 2015
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for LG Electronics Inc. G4 Smartphone (MDFPP11),
Version 0.2, July 1, 2015
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor LG Electronics Inc.
Developer LG Electronics Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Jerry Myers, The Aerospace Corporation
Ken Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
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Item Identifier
Sheldon Durrant, The MITRE Corporation
Stelios Melachrinoudis, The MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile device used to support enterprises and individual users alike. Based
upon Android 5.1 and improved by LG, the TOE provides wireless connectivity and an
execution environment for mobile applications
The TOE provides a rich Application Programming Interface (API) to mobile applications
and allows users installing an application to either approve or reject an application based
upon the API access that the application requires.
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
affords special protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
Moreover, the TOE provides users the ability to AES encrypt data and files stored on an
SD Card inserted into the device.
Finally, the TOE interacts with a Mobile Device Management solution to allow enterprise
control of the configuration and operation of the device so as to ensure adherence to
enterprise-wide policies.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for the LG G4 Smartphone contains 32GB of internal Flash
storage, 3GB of memory, and a Qualcomm Snapdragon 808 (MSM8992) processor and
comes in the following different carrier versions.
Product Carrier Security Software
Version
OS version Build number
LG G4 H810 AT&T MDF v1.1 Release 5 Android 5.1 LMY47D
LG G4 VS986 Verizon MDF v1.1 Release 5 Android 5.1 LMY47D
LG G4 LS991 Sprint MDF v1.1 Release 5 Android 5.1 LMY47D
LG G4 H811 T-Mobile MDF v1.1 Release 5 Android 5.1 LMY47D
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NOTE: Carrier specific versions of the evaluated product are released based upon that
carrier’s own schedule, so some carriers may not have released the evaluated version of the
TOE by the time this report is published. Therefore, consumers should ensure that they
have the evaluated version of the product software.
3.2 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure (without the rear
access cover present, so that one can access and replace the device’s battery, SIM, and SD
Card).
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic modules with FIPS certified algorithms for a wide range
of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment,
symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash
message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation,
key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key
and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to
implement security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and also to encrypt Data-At-Rest
(including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the
TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications
running on the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including
protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user
and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data
remains protected.
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4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e.,
Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even
when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password.
Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and
the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures
occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using
upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 14
characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are
restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management (MDM)
solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-
enrolled, it will remove Enterprise applications, remove MDM policies, and disable CC
mode.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the
reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as
cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own
timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the
potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification
by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to
protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the
TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of
the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while
ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the
TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their
installation as all applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).
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4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user, or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator-specified (using an
MDM) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after
reboot. The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 1.1, 12 February 2014
(MDFPP). That information has not been reproduced here; the MDFPP should be consulted
if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated
configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the
assurance activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile
and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified
in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit,
vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed
in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily
exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication
and resources.
6 Documentation
The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the LG G4
Smartphone:
 LG Electronics Inc. G4 Administrator Guidance, version 0.3, June 1, 2015
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Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied
upon when using the products as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
The detailed tests performed by the developer and the Evaluation Team were provided in
proprietary format to the validation team in the Detailed Test Report for LG G4
Smartphone (MDFPP11), Version 0.2, June 1, 2015. The non-proprietary version of the
testing evidence is included in the Assurance Activity Report for LG G4 Smartphone
(MDFPP11) Version 0.2, July 1, 2015.
The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.
Figure 1 Developer Test Setup
Windows Ubuntu
Linux
LG G4
USB Connection
Network – Putty
Connections
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7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the LG Electronics Inc. G4
Administrator Guidance, version 0.3, June 1, 2015 document and ran the tests specified in
the MDFPP.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the LG G4 Smartphone devices.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in LG Electronics Inc. G4 Administrator Guidance, version 0.3, June 1, 2015.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
EAL1 work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
Figure 2 Evaluator Test Setup
Linux
RADIU
S
Backtrack
Wireshark
Linux
Windows
Network – Putty
Connection
USB Connection
USB Connection
LG G4
LG G4
Evaluator Sniffing Configuration
Evaluator Direct Connect
Configuration
Access Point
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CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Product
Name TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL
1).
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the LG G4 Smartphone product that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team
assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the
TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the
evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran
the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team
performed a public search for vulnerabilities. The search identified some general Android
vulnerabilities which were addressed by the vendor prior to the completion of the
evaluation.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluated configuration requires that software updates to the TOE be restricted to
FOTA. The evaluators were unable to directly exercise this mechanism since it would have
involved placing invalid updates on the live public servers that are currently in use by
present customers. Hence, the evaluators had to take the products out of the evaluated
configuration to test the update features.
It should be noted that if a suitable Mobile Device Management tool for enterprise level
configuration and control of the deployed devices is not available, the vendor provides a
standalone application that can be used to place the devices into CC mode individually.
The evaluated product covers core functionality that is common to several carriers. Each
carrier adapts the product for its infrastructure in a manner that does not impact the
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evaluated functionality. The carrier specific versions of the evaluated product are released
based upon that carrier’s own schedule, so some carriers may not have released the
evaluated version of the TOE by the time this report is published. Consumers should
ensure that they have the evaluated version of the product software as it includes the
vulnerability fixes as identified by the evaluation. The evaluated product version is:
Security Software Version MDF v1.1, Release 4; Build number: LMY47D
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the evaluated
configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn
about their effectiveness.
Shortly before the evaluation completed a new denial of service vulnerability was
identified that applied to this and most other Android mobile devices with comparable
functionality. The vendor will be addressing the issue as soon as Google pushes out a
patch to the Android community. Users should follow their local polices for updates
utilizing the trusted update feature of the evaluated product to apply patches.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as LG Electronics Inc. G4 Smartphone (MDFPP11)
Security Target, Version 1.4, May 27, 2015.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
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complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 1.1, 12 February 2014.
[5] Assurance Activity Report for LG G4 Smartphone (MDFPP11) Version 0.2, July 1,
2015
[6] LG Electronics Inc. G4 Smartphone (MDFPP11) Security Target, Version 1.4, May
27, 2015