National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Validation Report
Galleon Embedded Computing
Software Encryption Layer
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11654-2026
Dated: May 21, 2026
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Jaemond Reyes
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Matai Spivey
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 1
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ....................................................................................................... 4
3.1 TOE Description............................................................................................................. 4
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ............................................................................................... 4
3.3 TOE Architecture............................................................................................................ 5
3.4 Physical Boundaries........................................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 6
4.1 Cryptographic support .................................................................................................... 6
4.2 User data protection ........................................................................................................ 6
4.3 Security management...................................................................................................... 6
4.4 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ................................................................................... 7
5.1 Assumptions.................................................................................................................... 7
5.2 Clarification of scope...................................................................................................... 7
6 Documentation........................................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................................. 9
7.1 Developer Testing........................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ........................................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration ....................................................................................................... 10
9 Results of the Evaluation ...................................................................................................... 11
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)...................................................................... 11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)........................................................................ 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ........................................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)............................................... 12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ........................... 12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)................................................................... 12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................................... 13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .......................................................................... 14
11 Annexes............................................................................................................................. 15
12 Security Target.................................................................................................................. 16
13 Glossary ............................................................................................................................ 17
14 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 18
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
Validation team of the evaluation of Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer
solution provided by Galleon Embedded Computing AS. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
May 2026. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation
determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and
meets the assurance requirements of the:
• PP-Configuration for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition and Full Drive
Encryption – Encryption Engine, Version: 1.0 (CFG_CPP_FDE_AA-
CPP_FDE_EE_V1.0) which includes the following components:
o Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption –
Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
(CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E) and
o Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption
Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E).
The TOE is the Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer. The TOE identified in
this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CTL using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target
(ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Galleon Embedded
Computing Software Encryption Layer Security Target, Version 2.2, May 15, 2026, and analysis
performed by the Validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer
Protection Profile
PP-Configuration for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition and Full
Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine, Version: 1.0 (CFG_CPP_FDE_AA-
CPP_FDE_EE_V1.0) which includes the following components:
• Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption –
Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1,
2019 (CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E) and
• Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption –
Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
(CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E).
ST Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer Security Target,
Version 2.2, May 15, 2026
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Galleon Embedded Computing Software
Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, May 15, 2026
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
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Item Identifier
Sponsor Galleon Embedded Computing AS
Developer Galleon Embedded Computing AS
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Randy Heimann, Lisa Mitchell, Jaemond Reyes,
Lori Sarem
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The TOE is the Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer version 1.1 running on
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.5.
Galleon’s SW-layer FDE was evaluated against the FDE collaborative protection profiles, which
pertain to data at rest encryption. Network security is outside the scope of a Full Drive Encryption
(FDE) evaluation, and thus, only local administration was evaluated.
The TOE provides software FDE of removable drives and the software can be installed on Red
Hat Enterprise Linux on various Galleon computing platforms (including XSR, G1, G2, HPR, and
ARINC models). All of Galleon’s models use Intel 64-bit CPUs, and Galleon offers the G1 with
a single CPU model while offering the XSR with a range of CPUs to allow customers to tailor the
system to their needs. The table in Section 8 summarizes the CPU options available. Because the
Red Hat operating system provides a hardware abstraction layer, the TOE software executes
identically irrespective of the underlying CPU.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a software application that provides FDE of drives within the system in which the
software executes. The TOE has been evaluated on various computing environments including
Galleon’s XSR, HPR, G1, G2, and ARINC computing environments. These products/
environments can act in different capacities (Network Attached Storage [NAS], data recorder,
general server, etc.) and allow for encryption of the drives attached to the system (including a
Removable Data Module [RDM]). The XSR model supports encryption of one RDM (at a time),
up to 4 internal SSDs, and its internal, non-removable mSATA SSD. The G1 model also supports
encryption of one RDM (at a time) and up to 2 internal SSDs. TOE securely encrypts all user data
stored on the protected drives.
The TOE software is executed in a Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Release 9.5 operating system
running on the computing hardware, and the TOE provides software-based FDE of data drives
(both internal drives and the RDM).
The TOE supports encrypting data stored by software applications running in the RHEL operating
system. The RHEL operating system might include software to support protocols including CIFS
and NFS, might include the vendor’s data recording software, might even include customer-
provided software applications, or might include additional software running within KVM
virtualized guest. The RHEL administrator can enable, disable, or install additional (accessing the
system directly) desired protocols, software applications, and KVM guests to support their use-
case and application.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Details regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
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3.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a software FDE solution that can encrypt a RDM which contains a data drive
within as well as additional internal SSDs.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a
ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).
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4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and
block-based encryption including symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic
hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions
are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization
vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic
functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and
key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE performs full drive encryption on all partitions on the drive (so that no plaintext exists)
and does so without user intervention.
4.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services to manage the full drive encryption
using a command line interface.
4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements several features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security features. It protects key and key material and includes functions to perform self-tests and
software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt.
If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not transition into an operational mode.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, can be found in the following
document:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
That information has not been reproduced here. CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E as described for this TOE in the ST. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionalities need to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made in accordance with the assurance activities specified in
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and performed by the Evaluation team.
• This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this document, and
not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide identified in Section 6, additional customer documentation
for the specific models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should
not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication, and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE
were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following document was available with the TOE for evaluation:
• SW Encryption Layer Certifiable Encryption, Version 1.1.2, May 13, 2026
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online, was
not included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Galleon Embedded
Computing Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, May 15, 2026 (DTR), as summarized in the
evaluation Assurance Activity Report for Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption
Layer, Version 0.2, May 15, 2026 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E including the tests
associated with optional requirements. The AAR in sections 1.1 and 3.4.1 lists the tested devices,
provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The following table summarizes the CPU options available (bold denotes the models used during
evaluation testing, while italics denotes equivalent models).
Model Processor
XSR Intel Xeon E3-1505Lv6 (Kaby Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon E-2276ME (Coffee Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon W-11865MRE (Tiger Lake)
HPR Intel Xeon D-1732TE (Ice Lake)
G1 Intel Atom C2758 (Rangeley)
G2 Intel Atom C3708 (Deverton)
ARINC Intel Atom x6211E (Elkhart Lake)
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units
received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Galleon Embedded
Computing Software Encryption Layer TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained
in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Galleon Embedded Computing Software
Encryption Layer products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST and
Guidance documents. Additionally, the Evaluation team performed the assurance activities
specified in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E related to the examination of
the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS).
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely
administer the TOE. The guidance was assessed during the design and testing phases of the
evaluation to ensure it was complete.
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The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the TOE
was appropriately labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE identification in the
evaluation evidence and that the TOE references used are consistent.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
DTR prepared by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for
vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities was conducted on May 14, 2026, and did not
uncover any residual vulnerability.
The Evaluation team searched the following databases:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search),
• MITRE CVE Database ((https://www.cve.org/)
• CVE details https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php),
• Known Vulnerability Exploit Catalog (https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-
vulnerabilities-catalog
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
The Evaluation team performed the search using the following search terms: "Disk encryption",
"Drive encryption", "Key destruction", "Key sanitization", "Password caching", "Key caching",
"Galleon", "G1", "XSR", "Intel Xeon E3-1505Lv6 ", "Intel Xeon E-2276ME ", "Intel Xeon W-
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11865MRE ", "Intel Xeon D-1732TE ", "Intel Atom C2758 ", "Intel C3708 ", "Atom x6211E ",
"Opal management software", "SED management software", "LUKS", "Linux Unified Key
Setup", "Kernel cryptography", "Openssl 3.2", "Libgcrypt", "RHEL 9.5", "Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 9.5", "OPAL".
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and performed
the Evaluation Activities in CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and their Supporting
Documents, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the configuration instructions in the Guidance document defined in Section 6. No
other versions of the TOE software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
The Validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is
scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the ST and only that
functionality was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed
separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
The Validation team strongly recommends that all TOE hardware in the operational environment
is kept up to date with patches as they are released. In addition, Per NIAP/CCEVS Publication #6,
user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security patches is encouraged between
completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance Date; with such updates properly
installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in its evaluated configuration
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11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer
Security Target, Version 2.2, May 15, 2026.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019.
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019.
[6] Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer Security Target, Version 2.2,
May 15, 2026 (ST). [includes public and proprietary versions]
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer,
Version 0.2, May 15, 2026 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer,
Version 0.2, May 15, 2026 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption
Layer, Version 0.2, May 15, 2026 (ETR).
[10] SW Encryption Layer Certifiable Encryption, Version 1.1.2, May 13, 2026 (AGD).