Power Plus Communications AG • Dudenstrasse 6 • 68167 Mannheim • Deutschland • www.ppc-ag.de Security Target SMGW Version 2.1 page 2 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Version History 1 Ver- sion Datum Name Änderungen 1.7 19.10.2023 C. Miller Aktualisierung page 3 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Contents 2 Contents.............................................................................................................3 3 1 Introduction.................................................................................................6 4 1.1 ST reference........................................................................................................... 6 5 1.2 TOE reference ........................................................................................................ 6 6 1.3 Introduction............................................................................................................ 9 7 1.4 TOE Overview ...................................................................................................... 11 8 1.4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 11 9 1.4.2 Overview of the Gateway in a Smart Metering System ................................................ 12 10 1.4.3 TOE description................................................................................................................ 15 11 1.4.4 TOE Type definition ......................................................................................................... 16 12 1.4.5 TOE logical boundary ...................................................................................................... 19 13 1.4.6 The logical interfaces of the TOE ................................................................................... 27 14 1.4.7 The cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module ................................................ 28 15 TOE life-cycle ................................................................................................................................ 32 16 2 Conformance Claims................................................................................33 17 2.1 CC Conformance Claim....................................................................................... 33 18 2.2 PP Claim / Conformance Statement ................................................................... 33 19 2.3 Package Claim ..................................................................................................... 33 20 2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale ............................................................................ 33 21 3 Security Problem Definition.....................................................................34 22 3.1 External entities ................................................................................................... 34 23 3.2 Assets................................................................................................................... 34 24 3.3 Assumptions........................................................................................................ 38 25 3.4 Threats.................................................................................................................. 40 26 3.5 Organizational Security Policies......................................................................... 43 27 4 Security Objectives ..................................................................................45 28 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ......................................................................... 45 29 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment....................................... 50 30 4.3 Security Objective Rationale............................................................................... 52 31 4.3.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 52 32 4.3.2 Countering the threats..................................................................................................... 53 33 4.3.3 Coverage of organisational security policies ............................................................... 56 34 4.3.4 Coverage of assumptions ............................................................................................... 57 35 5 Extended Component definition .............................................................59 36 5.1 Communication concealing (FPR_CON) ............................................................ 59 37 5.2 Family behaviour ................................................................................................. 59 38 5.3 Component levelling............................................................................................ 59 39 5.4 Management......................................................................................................... 59 40 5.5 Audit ..................................................................................................................... 59 41 5.6 Communication concealing (FPR_CON.1) ......................................................... 59 42 6 Security Requirements.............................................................................61 43 6.1 Overview............................................................................................................... 61 44 page 4 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2 Class FAU: Security Audit................................................................................... 65 45 6.2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 65 46 6.2.2 Security Requirements for the System Log .................................................................. 67 47 6.2.3 Security Requirements for the Consumer Log ............................................................. 70 48 6.2.4 Security Requirements for the Calibration Log ............................................................ 73 49 6.2.5 Security Requirements that apply to all logs ................................................................ 78 50 6.3 Class FCO: Communication................................................................................ 80 51 6.3.1 Non-repudiation of origin (FCO_NRO)........................................................................... 80 52 6.4 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support .................................................................... 81 53 6.4.1 Cryptographic support for TLS....................................................................................... 81 54 6.4.2 Cryptographic support for CMS ..................................................................................... 82 55 6.4.3 Cryptographic support for Meter communication encryption .................................... 84 56 6.4.4 General Cryptographic support...................................................................................... 86 57 6.5 Class FDP: User Data Protection........................................................................ 89 58 6.5.1 Introduction to the Security Functional Policies .......................................................... 89 59 6.5.2 Gateway Access SFP....................................................................................................... 89 60 6.5.3 Firewall SFP...................................................................................................................... 91 61 6.5.4 Meter SFP.......................................................................................................................... 94 62 6.5.5 General Requirements on user data protection............................................................ 98 63 6.6 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ..................................................... 99 64 6.6.1 User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD) ............................................................................... 99 65 6.6.2 Authentication Failures (FIA_AFL) ............................................................................... 100 66 6.6.3 User Authentication (FIA_UAU) .................................................................................... 100 67 6.6.4 User identification (FIA_UID) ........................................................................................ 102 68 6.6.5 User-subject binding (FIA_USB)................................................................................... 103 69 6.7 Class FMT: Security Management .................................................................... 104 70 6.7.1 Management of the TSF................................................................................................. 104 71 6.7.2 Security management roles (FMT_SMR) ..................................................................... 111 72 6.7.3 Management of security attributes for Gateway access SFP.................................... 112 73 6.7.4 Management of security attributes for Firewall SFP .................................................. 113 74 6.7.5 Management of security attributes for Meter SFP ...................................................... 114 75 6.8 Class FPR: Privacy ............................................................................................ 115 76 6.8.1 Communication Concealing (FPR_CON) ..................................................................... 115 77 6.8.2 Pseudonymity (FPR_PSE)............................................................................................. 116 78 6.9 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ..................................................................... 117 79 6.9.1 Fail secure (FPT_FLS).................................................................................................... 117 80 6.9.2 Replay Detection (FPT_RPL)......................................................................................... 118 81 6.9.3 Time stamps (FPT_STM) ............................................................................................... 118 82 6.9.4 TSF self test (FPT_TST)................................................................................................. 118 83 6.9.5 TSF physical protection (FPT_PHP)............................................................................. 119 84 6.10 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels.................................................................... 119 85 6.10.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC)............................................................................ 119 86 page 5 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE............................................... 121 87 6.12 Security Requirements rationale ...................................................................... 123 88 6.12.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale............................................................... 123 89 6.12.2 Security Assurance Requirements rationale .............................................................. 136 90 7 TOE Summary Specification..................................................................137 91 7.1 SF.1: Authentication of Communication and Role Assignment for external 92 entities............................................................................................................................ 137 93 7.2 SF.2: Acceptance and Deposition of Meter Data, Encryption of Meter Data for 94 WAN transmission......................................................................................................... 144 95 7.3 SF.3: Administration, Configuration and SW Update...................................... 146 96 7.4 SF.4: Displaying Consumption Data................................................................. 148 97 7.5 SF.5: Audit and Logging.................................................................................... 149 98 7.6 SF.6: TOE Integrity Protection .......................................................................... 151 99 7.7 TSS Rationale..................................................................................................... 152 100 8 List of Tables...........................................................................................156 101 9 List of Figures .........................................................................................157 102 10 Appendix ..............................................................................................158 103 10.1 Mapping from English to German terms .......................................................... 158 104 10.2 Glossary ............................................................................................................. 160 105 11 Literature..............................................................................................165 106 107 page 6 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 1 Introduction 108 1.1ST reference 109 Title: Security Target, SMGW Version 2.1 110 Editors: Power Plus Communications AG 111 CC-Version: 3.1 Revision 5 112 Assurance Level: EAL 4+, augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 113 General Status: Final 114 Document Version: 1.7 115 Document Date: 19.10.2023 116 TOE: SMGW Version 2.1 117 Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V7-2023 118 This document contains the security target of the SMGW Version 2.1. 119 This security target claims conformance to the Smart Meter Gateway protection profile 120 [PP_GW]. 121 122 1.2TOE reference 123 The TOE described in this security target is the SMGW Version 2.1. 124 The following classifications of the product “Smart Meter Gateway” contain the TOE: 125 • BPL Smart Meter Gateway (BPL-SMGW), SMGW-B-2A-111-00 126 • ETH Smart Meter Gateway (ETH-SMGW), SMGW-E-2A-111-00 127 • LTE Smart Meter Gateway (LTE-SMGW), SMGW-J-2A-111-10, SMGW-J-2A- 128 111-30, SMGW-K-2A-111-10 or SMGW-K-2A-111-30 129 • G.hn Smart Meter Gateway (G.hn-SMGW), SMGW-N-2A-111-00 130 • LTE450 Smart Meter Gateway (LTE450-SMGW), SMGW-V-2A-111-20 131 The TOE comprises the following parts: 132 • hardware device of the hardware generation 2A according to Table 1, including 133 the TOE’s main circuit board, a carrier board, a power-supply unit and a radio 134 page 7 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland module for communication with wireless meter (included in the hardware device 135 “Smart Meter Gateway”) 136 • firmware including software application (loaded into the circuit board) 137 o “SMGW Software Version 2.2.0”, identified by the value 00861-34788 138 which comprises of two revision numbers of the underlying version control sys- 139 tem for the TOE, where the first part is for the operating system and the second 140 part is for the SMGW application 141 • manuals 142 o „Handbuch für Verbraucher, Smart Meter Gateway“ [AGD_Consumer], 143 identified by the SHA-256 hash value 144 e24e25671d2c16224e058247eb5fdfbb1cfdf8bd89de2ee318f99f1f9e776beb 145 o „Handbuch für Service-Techniker, Smart Meter Gateway“ [AGD_Techni- 146 ker], identified by the SHA-256 hash value 147 9966741b00848419339c729cc6bfff6f7bed2ef348e681e0cb04122ece3865d6 148 o „Handbuch für Hersteller von Smart-Meter Gateway-Administrations- 149 Software, Smart Meter Gateway“ [AGD_GWA], identified by the SHA- 150 256 hash value 151 43f69e9458e582262a7d2505209e8b0233a4729854c906d4d29200eb92d70f3 152 0 153 o „Logmeldungen, SMGW “ [SMGW_Logging] identified by the SHA-256 154 hash value 155 f3a935b6ae1713ccdaa02411b377377a8e4f7dfb092a181efe1a6c9a86f17a64 156 o „Auslieferungs- und Fertigungsprozeduren, Anhang Sichere Ausliefe- 157 rung“ [AGD_SEC], identified by the SHA-256 hash value 158 17e280428e1602759b7bfa7dbbfde2e8d65ad7d518a96f0ab41a7130a9f38205 159 The hardware device “Smart Meter Gateway” includes a secure module with the product 160 name “TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE” which 161 is not part of the TOE but has its own certification id “BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016”. More- 162 over, a hard-wired communication adapter is connected to the TOE via [USB] as shown 163 in Figure 3 which is not part of the TOE (but always an inseparable part of the delivered 164 entity). This communication adapter can be either a LTE communication adapter, a 165 LTE450 communication adapter, a BPL [IEEE 1901] communication adapter, a GPRS 166 communication adapter, a CDMA communication adapter, a powerWAN-Ethernet com- 167 munication adapter, a G.hn [ITU G.hn] communication adapter or an ethernet 168 page 8 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland communication adapter. There might be not every communication adapter available for 169 each Hardware Generation. 170 The following table shows the different “Smart Meter Gateway” product classifications 171 applied on the case of the product, while not all of them might be part of the TOE: 172 # Characteristic Value Description 1 Product family SMGW each classification of a type start with this value 2 - Delimiter 3 Communication Technology B Product Type „BPL Smart Meter Gateway“ C Product Type „CDMA Smart Meter Gateway“ E Product Type „ETH Smart Meter Gateway“ G Product Type „GPRS Smart Meter Gateway“ L Product Type „LTE Smart Meter Gateway“ J Product Type “LTE Smart Meter Gateway” K Product Type „LTE Smart Meter Gateway“ P Product Type „powerWAN-ETH Smart Meter Gateway“ N Product Type „G.hn Smart Meter Gateway“ V Product Type “LTE450 Smart Meter Gateway” 4 - Delimiter 5 Hardware gen- eration 1A Identification of hardware generation; version 1.0 of “SMGW Hardware” 1B Identification of hardware generation; version 1.0.1 of “SMGW Hardware” (with new power adapter) page 9 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland # Characteristic Value Description 2A Identification of hardware generation; version 2.0 of “SMGW Hardware” 6 - Delimiter 7 HAN Interface 1 Ethernet 8 CLS Interface 1 Ethernet 9 LMN Interface 1 Wireless and wired 10 - Delimiter 11 SIM card type 0 None 1 SIM card assembled at factory and SIM slot 2 SIM card assembled at factory only 3 SIM slot only 12 reserved 0 Table 1: Smart Meter Gateway product classifications 173 1.3Introduction 174 The increasing use of green energy and upcoming technologies around e-mobility lead 175 to an increasing demand for functions of a so called smart grid. A smart grid hereby 176 refers to a commodity 1 network that intelligently integrates the behaviour and actions of 177 all entities connected to it – suppliers of natural resources and energy, its consumers 178 and those that are both – in order to efficiently ensure a more sustainable, economic and 179 secure supply of a certain commodity (definition adopted from [CEN]). 180 1 Commodities can be electricity, gas, water or heat which is distributed from its generator to the consumer through a grid (network). page 10 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland In its vision such a smart grid would allow to invoke consumer devices to regulate the 181 load and availability of resources or energy in the grid, e.g. by using consumer devices 182 to store energy or by triggering the use of energy based upon the current load of the 183 grid2. Basic features of such a smart use of energy or resources are already reality. 184 Providers of electricity in Germany, for example, have to offer at least one tariff that has 185 the purpose to motivate the consumer to save energy. 186 In the past, the production of electricity followed the demand/consumption of the con- 187 sumers. Considering the strong increase in renewable energy and the production of en- 188 ergy as a side effect in heat generation today, the consumption/demand has to follow 189 the – often externally controlled – production of energy. Similar mechanisms can exist 190 for the gas network to control the feed of biogas or hydrogen based on information sub- 191 mitted by consumer devices. 192 An essential aspect for all considerations of a smart grid is the so called Smart Metering 193 System that meters the consumption or production of certain commodities at the con- 194 sumers’ side and allows sending the information about the consumption or production to 195 external entities, which is then the basis for e. g. billing the consumption or production. 196 This Security Target defines the security objectives, corresponding requirements and 197 their fulfilment for a Gateway which is the central communication component of such a 198 Smart Metering System (please refer to chapter 1.4.2 for a more detailed overview). 199 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) that is described in this document is an electronic unit 200 comprising hardware and software/firmware3 used for collection, storage and provision 201 of Meter Data4 from one or more Meters of one or multiple commodities. 202 The Gateway connects a Wide Area Network (WAN) with a Network of Devices of one 203 or more Smart Metering devices (Local Metrological Network, LMN) and the consumer 204 Home Area Network (HAN), which hosts Controllable Local Systems (CLS) and visuali- 205 zation devices. The security functionality of the TOE comprises 206 • protection of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity of data and 207 • information flow control 208 2 Please note that such a functionality requires a consent or a contract between the supplier and the consumer, alterna- tively a regulatory requirement. 3 For the rest of this document the term “firmware” will be used if the complete firmware ist meant. For the application in- cluding its services the term “software” will be used. 4 Please refer to chapter 3.2 for an exact definition of the term "Meter Data”. page 11 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland mainly to protect the privacy of consumers, to ensure a reliable billing process and to 209 protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale infrastructure of the 210 smart grid. The availability of the Gateway is not addressed by this ST. 211 212 1.4TOE Overview 213 1.4.1 Introduction 214 The TOE as defined in this Security Target is the Gateway in a Smart Metering System. 215 In the following subsections the overall Smart Metering System will be described first 216 and afterwards the Gateway itself. 217 There are various different vocabularies existing in the area of Smart Grid, Smart Meter- 218 ing and Home Automation. Furthermore, the Common Criteria maintain their own vo- 219 cabulary. The Protection Profile [PP_GW, chapter 1.3] provides an overview over the 220 most prominent terms used in this Security Target to avoid any bias which is not fully 221 repeated here. 222 page 12 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 1.4.2 Overview of the Gateway in a Smart Metering System 223 The following figure provides an overview of the TOE as part of a complete Smart Me- 224 tering System from a purely functional perspective as used in this ST.5 225 226 Figure 1: The TOE and its direct environment 227 228 As can be seen in Figure 1, a system for smart metering comprises different functional 229 units in the context of the descriptions in this ST: 230 • The Gateway (as defined in this ST) serves as the communication component 231 between the components in the local area network (LAN) of the consumer and 232 the outside world. It can be seen as a special kind of firewall dedicated to the 233 smart metering functionality. It also collects, processes and stores the records 234 5 It should be noted that this description purely contains aspects that are relevant to motivate and understand the function- alities of the Gateway as described in this ST. It does not aim to provide a universal description of a Smart Metering Sys- tem for all application cases. page 13 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland from Meter(s) and ensures that only authorised parties have access to them or 235 derivatives thereof. Before sending meter data6 the information will be en- 236 crypted and signed using the services of a Security Module. The Gateway fea- 237 tures a mandatory user interface, enabling authorised consumers to access the 238 data relevant to them. 239 • The Meter itself records the consumption or production of one or more com- 240 modities (e.g. electricity, gas, water, heat) and submits those records in defined 241 intervals to the Gateway. The Meter Data has to be signed and encrypted be- 242 fore transfer in order to ensure its confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. The 243 Meter is comparable to a classical meter7 and has comparable security require- 244 ments; it will be sealed as classical meters according to the regulations of the 245 calibration authority. The Meter further supports the encryption and integrity 246 protection of its connection to the Gateway8. 247 • The Gateway utilises the services of a Security Module (e.g. a smart card) as 248 a cryptographic service provider and as a secure storage for confidential assets. 249 The Security Module will be evaluated separately according to the requirements 250 in the corresponding Protection Profile (c.f. [SecModPP]). 251 Controllable Local Systems (CLS, as shown in Figure 2) may range from local power 252 generation plants, controllable loads such as air condition and intelligent household ap- 253 pliances (“white goods”) to applications in home automation. CLS may utilise the ser- 254 vices of the Gateway for communication services. However, CLS are not part of the 255 Smart Metering System. 256 The following figure introduces the external interfaces of the TOE and shows the cardi- 257 nality of the involved entities. Please note that the arrows of the interfaces within the 258 Smart Metering System as shown in Figure 2 indicate the flow of information. However, 259 it does not indicate that a communication flow can be initiated bi-directionally. Indeed, 260 6 Please note that readings and data which are not relevant for billing may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer. 7 In this context, a classical meter denotes a meter without a communication channel, i.e. whose values have to be read out locally. 8 It should be noted that this ST does not imply that the connection between the Gateways and external components (specifically meters and CLS) is cable based. It is also possible that the connections as shown in Figure 1 are realised deploying a wireless technology. However, the requirements on how the connections shall be secured apply regardless of the realisation. page 14 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland the following chapters of this ST will place dedicated requirements on the way an infor- 261 mation flow can be initiated9. 262 263 Figure 2: The logical interfaces of the TOE 264 The overview of the Smart Metering System as described before is based on a threat 265 model that has been developed for the Smart Metering System and has been motivated 266 by the following considerations: 267 • The Gateway is the central communication unit in the Smart Metering System. 268 It is the only unit directly connected to the WAN, to be the first line of defence 269 an attacker located in the WAN would have to conquer. 270 • The Gateway is the central component that collects, processes and stores Me- 271 ter Data. It therewith is the primary point for user interaction in the context of 272 the Smart Metering System. 273 9 Please note that the cardinality of the interface to the consumer is 0...n as it cannot be assumed that a consumer is interacting with the TOE at all. page 15 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • To conquer a Meter in the LMN or CLS in the HAN (that uses the TOE for com- 274 munication) a WAN attacker first would have to attack the Gateway success- 275 fully. All data transferred between LAN and WAN flows via the Gateway which 276 makes it an ideal unit for implementing significant parts of the system's overall 277 security functionality. 278 • Because a Gateway can be used to connect and protect multiple Meters (while 279 a Meter will always be connected to exactly one Gateway) and CLS with the 280 WAN, there might be more Meters and CLS in a Smart Metering System than 281 there are Gateways. 282 All these arguments motivated the approach to have a Gateway (using a Security Mod- 283 ule for cryptographic support), which is rich in security functionality, strong and evaluated 284 in depth, in contrast to a Meter which will only deploy a minimum of security functions. 285 The Security Module will be evaluated separately. 286 1.4.3 TOE description 287 The Smart Metering Gateway (in the following short: Gateway or TOE) may serve as the 288 communication unit between devices of private and commercial consumers and service 289 providers of a commodity industry (e.g. electricity, gas, water, etc.). It also collects, pro- 290 cesses and stores Meter Data and is responsible for the distribution of this data to ex- 291 ternal entities. 292 Typically, the Gateway will be placed in the household or premises of the consumer10 of 293 the commodity and enables access to local Meter(s) (i.e. the unit(s) used for measuring 294 the consumption or production of electric power, gas, water, heat etc.) and may enable 295 access to Controllable Local Systems (e.g. power generation plants, controllable loads 296 such as air condition and intelligent household appliances). 297 The TOE has a fail-safe design that specifically ensures that any malfunction can not 298 impact the delivery of a commodity, e.g. energy, gas or water11. 299 300 10 Please note that it is possible that the consumer of the commodity is not the owner of the premises where the Gateway will be placed. However, this description acknowledges that there is a certain level of control over the physical access to the Gateway. 11 Indeed, this Security Target assumes that the Gateway and the Meters have no possibility at all to impact the delivery of a commodity. Even an intentional stop of the delivery of a certain commodity is Not within the scope of this Security Target. It should, however, be noted that such a functionality may be realised by a CLS that utilises the services of the TOE for its communication. page 16 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The following figure provides an overview of the product with its TOE and non-TOE parts: 301 302 Figure 3: The product with its TOE and non-TOE parts 303 The TOE communicates over the interface IF_GW_SM with a security module and over 304 the interfaces USB_P, USB_N and Module Reset with one of the possible communica- 305 tion adapters according to chapter 1.2. The communication adapters, which are not part 306 of the TOE, transmit data from the USB interface to the WAN interface and vice versa. 307 1.4.4 TOE Type definition 308 At first, the TOE is a communication Gateway. It provides different external communica- 309 tion interfaces and enables the data communication between these interfaces and con- 310 nected IT systems. It further collects, processes and stores Meter Data and is responsi- 311 ble for the distribution of this data to external parties. 312 Typically, the Gateway will be placed in the household or premises of the consumer of 313 the commodity and enables access to local Meter(s) (i.e. the unit(s) used for measuring 314 the consumption or production of electric power, gas, water, heat etc.) and may enable 315 access to Controllable Local Systems (e.g. power generation plants, controllable loads 316 such as air condition and intelligent household appliances). Roles respectively External 317 Entities in the context of the TOE are introduced in chapter 3.1. 318 The TOE described in this ST is a product that has been developed by Power Plus Com- 319 munication AG. It is a communication product which complies with the requirements of 320 the Protection Profile “Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System” 321 page 17 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [PP_GW]. The TOE consists of hardware and software including the operating system. 322 The communication with more than one meter is possible. 323 The TOE is implemented as a separate physical module which can be integrated into 324 more complex modular systems. This means that the TOE can be understood as an 325 OEM module which provides all required physical interfaces and protocols on well de- 326 fined interfaces. Because of this, the module can be integrated into communication de- 327 vices and directly into meters. 328 The TOE-design includes the following components: 329 • The security relevant components compliant to the Protection Profile. 330 • Components with no security relevance (e.g. communication protocols and in- 331 terfaces). 332 The TOE evaluation does not include the evaluation of the Security Module. In fact, the 333 TOE relies on the security functionality of the Security Module but it must be security 334 evaluated in a separate security evaluation12. 335 The hardware platform of the TOE mainly consists of a suitable embedded CPU, volatile 336 and non-volatile memory and supporting circuits like Security Module and RTC. 337 The TOE contains mechanisms for the integrity protection for its firmware. 338 The TOE supports the following communication protocols: 339 • OBIS according to [IEC-62056-6-1] and [EN 13757-1], 340 • DLMS/COSEM according to [IEC-62056-6-2], 341 • SML according to [IEC-62056-5-3-8], 342 • unidirectional and bidirectional wireless M-Bus according to [EN 13757-3], 343 [EN 13757-4], and [IEC-62056-21]. 344 345 12 Please note that the Security Module is physically integrated into the Gateway even though it is not part of the TOE. page 18 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The TOE provides the following physical interfaces for communication 346 • Wireless M-Bus (LMN) according to [EN 13757-3], 347 • RS-485 (LMN) according to [EIA RS-485], 348 • Ethernet (HAN) according to [IEEE 802.3], and 349 • USB (WAN) according to [USB]. 350 The physical interface for the WAN communication is described in chapter 1.4.3. The 351 communication is protected according to [TR-03109]. 352 The communication into the HAN is also provided by the Ethernet interface. The proto- 353 cols HTTPS and TLS proxy are therefore supported. 354 355 Figure 4: The TOE’s protocol stack 356 The TOE provides the following functionality: 357 • Protected handling of Meter Data compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.1 and 358 1.4.6.2] 359 • Integrity and authenticity protection e. g. of Meter Data compliant to [PP_GW, 360 chapter 1.6.4.3] 361 • Protection of LAN devices against access from the WAN compliant to [PP_GW, 362 chapter 1.4.6.4] 363 • Wake-Up Service compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.5] 364 • Privacy protection compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.6] 365 • Management of Security Functions compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.7] 366 page 19 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • Cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module compliant to [PP_GW, chap- 367 ter 1.4.8] 368 1.4.5 TOE logical boundary 369 The logical boundary of the Gateway can be defined by its security features: 370 • Handling of Meter Data, collection and processing of Meter Data, submission 371 to authorised external entities (e.g. one of the service providers involved) where 372 necessary protected by a digital signature 373 • Protection of authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data temporarily or per- 374 sistently stored in the Gateway, transferred locally within the LAN and trans- 375 ferred in the WAN (between Gateway and authorised external entities) 376 • Firewalling of information flows to the WAN and information flow control among 377 Meters, Controllable Local Systems and the WAN 378 • A Wake-Up-Service that allows to contact the TOE from the WAN side 379 • Privacy preservation 380 • Management of Security Functionality 381 • Identification and Authentication of TOE users 382 The following sections introduce the security functionality of the TOE in more detail. 383 1.4.5.1 Handling of Meter Data13 384 The Gateway is responsible for handling Meter Data. It receives the Meter Data from the 385 Meter(s), processes it, stores it and submits it to external entities. 386 The TOE utilises Processing Profiles to determine which data shall be sent to which 387 component or external entity. A Processing Profile defines: 388 • how Meter Data must be processed, 389 • which processed Meter Data must be sent in which intervals, 390 • to which component or external entity, 391 • signed using which key material, 392 • encrypted using which key material, 393 • whether processed Meter Data shall be pseudonymised or not, and 394 • which pseudonym shall be used to send the data. 395 13 Please refer to chapter 3.2 for an exact definition of the various data types. page 20 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The Processing Profiles are not only the basis for the security features of the TOE; they 396 also contain functional aspects as they indicate to the Gateway how the Meter Data shall 397 be processed. More details on the Processing Profiles can be found in [TR-03109-1]. 398 The Gateway restricts access to (processed) Meter Data in the following ways: 399 • consumers must be identified and authenticated first before access to any data 400 may be granted, 401 • the Gateway accepts Meter Data from authorised Meters only, 402 • the Gateway sends processed Meter Data to correspondingly authorised exter- 403 nal entities only. 404 The Gateway accepts data (e.g. configuration data, firmware updates) from correspond- 405 ingly authorised Gateway Administrators or correspondingly authorised external entities 406 only. This restriction is a prerequisite for a secure operation and therewith for a secure 407 handling of Meter Data. Further, the Gateway maintains a calibration log with all relevant 408 events that could affect the calibration of the Gateway. 409 These functionalities: 410 • prevent that the Gateway accepts data from or sends data to unauthorised en- 411 tities, 412 • ensure that only the minimum amount of data leaves the scope of control of the 413 consumer, 414 • preserve the integrity of billing processes and as such serve in the interests of 415 the consumer as well as in the interests of the supplier. Both parties are inter- 416 ested in an billing process that ensures that the value of the consumed amount 417 of a certain commodity (and only the used amount) is transmitted, 418 • preserve the integrity of the system components and their configurations. 419 The TOE offers a local interface to the consumer (see also IF_GW_CON in Figure 2) 420 and allows the consumer to obtain information via this interface. This information com- 421 prises the billing-relevant data (to allow the consumer to verify an invoice) and infor- 422 mation about which Meter Data has been and will be sent to which external entity. The 423 TOE ensures that the communication to the consumer is protected by using TLS and 424 ensures that consumers only get access to their own data. Therefore, the TOE contains 425 a web server that delivers the content to the web browser after successful authentication 426 of the user. 427 page 21 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 1.4.5.2 Confidentiality protection 428 The TOE protects data from unauthorised disclosure 429 • while received from a Meter via the LMN, 430 • while received from the administrator via the WAN, 431 • while temporarily stored in the volatile memory of the Gateway, 432 • while transmitted to the corresponding external entity via the WAN or HAN. 433 Furthermore, all data, which no longer have to be stored in the Gateway, are securely 434 erased to prevent any form of access to residual data via external interfaces of the TOE. 435 These functionalities protect the privacy of the consumer and prevent that an unauthor- 436 ised party is able to disclose any of the data transferred in and from the Smart Metering 437 System (e.g. Meter Data, configuration settings). 438 The TOE utilises the services of its Security Module for aspects of this functionality. 439 1.4.5.3 Integrity and Authenticity protection 440 The Gateway provides the following authenticity and integrity protection: 441 • Verification of authenticity and integrity when receiving Meter Data from a Meter 442 via the LMN, to verify that the Meter Data have been sent from an authentic 443 Meter and have not been altered during transmission. The TOE utilises the ser- 444 vices of its Security Module for aspects of this functionality. 445 • Application of authenticity and integrity protection measures when sending pro- 446 cessed Meter Data to an external entity, to enable the external entity to verify 447 that the processed Meter Data have been sent from an authentic Gateway and 448 have not been changed during transmission. The TOE utilises the services of 449 its Security Module for aspects of this functionality. 450 • Verification of authenticity and integrity when receiving data from an external 451 entity (e.g. configuration settings or firmware updates) to verify that the data 452 have been sent from an authentic and authorised external entity and have not 453 been changed during transmission. The TOE utilises the services of its Security 454 Module for aspects of this functionality. 455 These functionalities 456 • prevent within the Smart Metering System that data may be sent by a non- 457 authentic component without the possibility that the data recipient can detect 458 this, 459 page 22 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • facilitate the integrity of billing processes and serve for the interests of the con- 460 sumer as well as for the interest of the supplier. Both parties are interested in 461 the transmission of correct processed Meter Data to be used for billing, 462 • protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale Smart Grid 463 infrastructure by preventing that data (e.g. Meter Data, configuration settings, 464 or firmware updates) from forged components (with the aim to cause damage 465 to the Smart Grid) will be accepted in the system. 466 1.4.5.4 Information flow control and firewall 467 The Gateway separates devices in the LAN of the consumer from the WAN and enforces 468 the following information flow control to control the communication between the networks 469 that the Gateway is attached to: 470 • only the Gateway may establish a connection to an external entity in the WAN14; 471 specifically connection establishment by an external entity in the WAN or a Me- 472 ter in the LMN to the WAN is not possible, 473 • the Gateway can establish connections to devices in the LMN or in the HAN, 474 • Meters in the LMN are only allowed to establish a connection to the Gateway, 475 • the Gateway shall offer a wake-up service that allows external entities in the 476 WAN to trigger a connection establishment by the Gateway, 477 • connections are allowed to pre-configured addresses only, 478 • only cryptographically-protected (i.e. encrypted, integrity protected and mutu- 479 ally authenticated) connections are possible.15 480 These functionalities 481 • prevent that the Gateway itself or the components behind the Gateway (i.e. 482 Meters or Controllable Local Systems) can be conquered by a WAN attacker 483 (as defined in section 3.4), that processed data are transmitted to the wrong 484 external entity, and that processed data are transmitted without being confi- 485 dentiality/authenticity/integrity-protected, 486 • protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale infrastruc- 487 ture in two ways: by preventing that conquered components will send forged 488 14 Please note that this does not affect the functionality for a CLS to establish a secure channel to a party in the WAN. Technically however, this channel is established by the TOE who acts as a proxy between the CLS and the WAN. 15 To establish an encrypted channel the TOE may use the required protocols such as DHCP or PPP. Beside the establishment of an encrypted channel no unprotected communication between the TOE and external entities located in the WAN or LAN is allowed. page 23 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Meter Data (with the aim to cause damage to the Smart Grid), and by preventing 489 that widely distributed Smart Metering Systems can be abused as a platform 490 for malicious software/firmware to attack other systems in the WAN (e.g. a WAN 491 attacker who would be able to install a botnet on components of the Smart Me- 492 tering System). 493 The communication flows that are enforced by the Gateway between parties in the HAN, 494 LMN and WAN are summarized in the following table16: 495 Table 2: Communication flows between devices in different networks 496 For communications within the different networks the following assumptions are defined: 497 1. Communications within the WAN are not restricted. However, the Gateway is 498 not involved in this communication, 499 2. No communications between devices in the LMN are assumed. Devices in the 500 LMN may only communicate to the Gateway and shall not be connected to any 501 other network, 502 3. Devices in the HAN may communicate with each other. However, the Gateway 503 is not involved in this communication. If devices in the HAN have a separate 504 16 Please note that this table only addresses the communication flow between devices in the various networks attached to the Gateway. It does not aim to provide an overview over the services that the Gateway itself offers to those devices nor an overview over the communication between devices in the same network. This information can be found in the paragraphs following the table. 17 The channel to the external entity in the WAN is established by the Gateway. Source(1st column) Destination (1st row) WAN LMN HAN WAN - (see following list) No connection establishment allowed No connection establishment allowed LMN No connection establishment allowed - (see following list) No connection establishment allowed HAN Connection establishment is allowed to trustworthy, pre-configured endpoints and via an encrypted channel only17 No connection establishment allowed - (see following list) page 24 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland connection to parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this connection is as- 505 sumed to be appropriately protected. It should be noted that for the case that a 506 TOE connects to more than one HAN communications between devices within 507 different HAN via the TOE are only allowed if explicitly configured by a Gateway 508 Administrator. 509 Finally, the Gateway itself offers the following services within the various networks: 510 • the Gateway accepts the submission of Meter Data from the LMN, 511 • the Gateway offers a wake-up service at the WAN side as described in chapter 512 1.4.6.5 of [PP_GW], 513 • the Gateway offers a user interface to the HAN that allows CLS or consumers 514 to connect to the Gateway in order to read relevant information. 515 1.4.5.5 Wake-Up-Service 516 In order to protect the Gateway and the devices in the LAN against threats from the WAN 517 side the Gateway implements a strict firewall policy and enforces that connections with 518 external entities in the WAN shall only be established by the Gateway itself (e.g. when 519 the Gateway delivers Meter Data or contacts the Gateway Administrator to check for 520 updates)18. 521 While this policy is the optimal policy from a security perspective, the Gateway 522 Administrator may want to facilitate applications in which an instant communication to 523 the Gateway is required. 524 In order to allow this kind of re-activeness of the Gateway, this ST allows the Gateway 525 to keep existing connections to external entities open (please refer to [TR-03109-3] for 526 more details) and to offer a so called wake-up service. 527 The Gateway is able to receive a wake-up message that is signed by the Gateway 528 Administrator. The following steps are taken: 529 1. The Gateway verifies the wake-up packet. This comprises 530 i. a check if the header identification is correct, 531 ii. the recipient is the Gateway, 532 iii. the wake-up packet has been sent/received within an acceptable period 533 of time in order to prevent replayed messages, 534 18 Please note that this does not affect the functionality for a CLS to establish a secure channel to a party in the WAN. Technically however, this channel is established by the TOE who acts as a proxy between the CLS and the WAN. page 25 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland iv. the wake-up message has not been received before, 535 2. If the wake-up message could not be verified as described in step #1, the 536 message will be dropped/ignored. No further operations will be initiated and no 537 feedback is provided. 538 3. If the message could be verified as described in step #1, the signature of the 539 wake-up message will be verified. The Gateway uses the services of its Security 540 Module for signature verification. 541 4. If the signature of the wake-up message cannot be verified as described in step 542 #3 the message will be dropped/ignored. No feedback is given to the sending 543 external entity and the wake-up sequence terminates. 544 5. If the signature of the wake-up message could be verified successfully , the 545 Gateway initiates a connection to a pre-configured external entity; however no 546 feedback is given to the sending external entity. 547 More details on the exact implementation of this mechanism can be found in [TR-03109- 548 1, „Wake-Up Service“]. 549 1.4.5.6 Privacy Preservation 550 The preservation of the privacy of the consumer is an essential aspect that is imple- 551 mented by the functionality of the TOE as required by this ST. 552 This contains two aspects: 553 The Processing Profiles that the TOE obeys facilitate an approach in which only a mini- 554 mum amount of data have to be submitted to external entities and therewith leave the 555 scope of control of the consumer. The mechanisms “encryption” and “pseudonymisation” 556 ensure that the data can only be read by the intended recipient and only contains an 557 association with the identity of the Meter if this is necessary. 558 On the other hand, the TOE provides the consumer with transparent information about 559 the information flows that happen with their data. In order to achieve this, the TOE im- 560 plements a consumer log that specifically contains the information about the information 561 flows which has been and will be authorised based on the previous and current Pro- 562 cessing Profiles. The access to this consumer log is only possible via a local interface 563 from the HAN and after authentication of the consumer. The TOE does only allow a 564 consumer access to the data in the consumer log that is related to their own consumption 565 or production. The following paragraphs provide more details on the information that is 566 included in this log: 567 page 26 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Monitoring of Data Transfers 568 The TOE keeps track of each data transmission in the consumer log and allows the 569 consumer to see details on which information have been and will be sent (based on the 570 previous and current settings) to which external entity. 571 Configuration Reporting 572 The TOE provides detailed and complete reporting in the consumer log of each security 573 and privacy-relevant configuration setting. Additional to device specific configuration set- 574 tings, the consumer log contains the parameters of each Processing Profile. The con- 575 sumer log contains the configured addresses for internal and external entities including 576 the CLS. 577 Audit Log and Monitoring 578 The TOE provides all audit data from the consumer log at the user interface 579 IF_GW_CON. Access to the consumer log is only possible after successful authentica- 580 tion and only to information that the consumer has permission to (i.e. that has been 581 recorded based on events belonging to the consumer). 582 1.4.5.7 Management of Security Functions 583 The Gateway provides authorised Gateway Administrators with functionality to manage 584 the behaviour of the security functions and to update the TOE. 585 Further, it is defined that only authorised Gateway Administrators may be able to use 586 the management functionality of the Gateway (while the Security Module is used for the 587 authentication of the Gateway Administrator) and that the management of the Gateway 588 shall only be possible from the WAN side interface. 589 System Status 590 The TOE provides information on the current status of the TOE in the system log. Spe- 591 cifically it shall indicate whether the TOE operates normally or any errors have been 592 detected that are of relevance for the administrator. 593 1.4.5.8 Identification and Authentication 594 To protect the TSF as well as User Data and TSF data from unauthorized modification 595 the TOE provides a mechanism that requires each user to be successfully identified and 596 authenticated before allowing any other actions on behalf of that user. This functionality 597 includes the identification and authentication of users who receive data from the 598 page 27 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Gateway as well as the identification and authentication of CLS located in HAN and 599 Meters located in LMN. 600 The Gateway provides different kinds of identification and authentication mechanisms 601 that depend on the user role and the used interfaces. Most of the mechanisms require 602 the usage of certificates. Only consumers are able to decide whether they use certifi- 603 cates or username and password for identification and authentication. 604 1.4.6 The logical interfaces of the TOE 605 The TOE offers its functionality as outlined before via a set of external interfaces. Figure 606 2 also indicates the cardinality of the interfaces. The following table provides an overview 607 of the mandatory external interfaces of the TOE and provides additional information: 608 19 Please note that this interface allows consumer (or consumer’s CLS) to connect to the gateway in order to read consumer specific information. 20 Please note that an implementation of this external interface is also required in the case that Meter and Gateway are implemented within one physical device in order to allow the extension of the system by another Meter. Interface Name Description IF_GW_CON Via this interface the Gateway provides the consumer19 with the possibility to review information that is relevant for billing or the privacy of the consumer. Specifically the access to the consumer log is only allowed via this interface. IF_GW_MTR Interface between the Meter and the Gateway. The Gateway receives Meter Data via this interface.20 IF_GW_SM The Gateway invokes the services of its Security Module via this interface. IF_GW_CLS CLS may use the communication services of the Gateway via this interface. The implementation of at least one interface for CLS is mandatory. IF_GW_WAN The Gateway submits information to authorised external entities via this interface. IF_GW_SRV Local interface via which the service technician has the possibility to review information that are relevant to maintain the Gateway. Specifically he has page 28 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 3: Mandatory TOE external interfaces 609 1.4.7 The cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module 610 Parts of the cryptographic functionality used in the upper mentioned functions is provided 611 by a Security Module. The Security Module provides strong cryptographic functionality, 612 random number generation, secure storage of secrets and supports the authentication 613 of the Gateway Administrator. The Security Module is a different IT product and not part 614 of the TOE as described in this ST. Nevertheless, it is physically embedded into the 615 Gateway and protected by the same level of physical protection. The requirements 616 applicable to the Security Module are specified in a separate PP (see [SecModPP]). 617 The following table provides a more detailed overview on how the cryptographic 618 functions are distributed between the TOE and its Security Module. 619 read access to the system log only via this interface. He has also the possibility to view non-TSF data via this interface. Aspect TOE Security Module Communicatio n with external entities • encryption • decryption • hashing • key derivation • MAC generation • MAC verification • secure storage of the TLS certificates Key negotiation: • support of the authentication of the external entity • secure storage of the private key • random number generation • digital signature verification and generation Communicatio nwith the consumer • encryption • decryption • hashing • key derivation • MAC generation • MAC verification • secure storage of the TLS certificates Key negotiation: • support of the authentication of the consumer • secure storage of the private key • digital signature verification and generation • random number generation page 29 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 4: Cryptographic support of the TOE and its Security Module 620 621 1.4.7.1 Content data encryption vs. an encrypted channel 622 The TOE utilises concepts of the encryption of data on the content level as well as the 623 establishment of a trusted channel to external entities. 624 As a general rule, all processed Meter Data that is prepared to be submitted to ex- 625 ternal entities is encrypted and integrity protected on a content level using CMS (ac- 626 cording to [TR-03109-1-I]). 627 Further, all communication with external entities is enforced to happen via encrypted, 628 integrity protected and mutually authenticated channels. 629 This concept of encryption on two layers facilitates use cases in which the external 630 party that the TOE communicates with is not the final recipient of the Meter Data. In 631 Communicatio n with the Meter • encryption • decryption • hashing • key derivation • MAC generation • MAC verification • secure storage of the TLS certificates Key negotiation (in case of TLS connection): • support of the authentication of the meter • secure storage of the private key • digital signature verification and generation • random number generation Signing data before submission to an external entity • hashing Signature creation • secure storage of the private key Content data encryption and integrity protection • encryption • decryption • MAC generation • key derivation • secure storage of the public Key Key negotiation: • secure storage of the private key • random number generation page 30 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland this way, it is for example possible that the Gateway Administrator receives Meter 632 Data that they forward to other parties. In such a case, the Gateway Administrator is 633 the endpoint of the trusted channel but cannot read the Meter Data. 634 Administration data that is transmitted between the Gateway Administrator and the TOE 635 is also encrypted and integrity protected using CMS. 636 The following figure introduces the communication process between the Meter, the TOE 637 and external entities (focussing on billing-relevant Meter Data). 638 The basic information flow for Meter Data is as follows and shown in Figure 5: 639 1. The Meter measures the consumption or production of a certain commodity. 640 2. The Meter Data is prepared for transmission: 641 a. The Meter Data is typically signed (typically using the services of an 642 integrated Security Module). 643 b. If the communication between the Meter and the Gateway is performed 644 bidirectional, the Meter Data is transmitted via an encrypted and mutually 645 authenticated channel to the Gateway. Please note that the submission of 646 this information may be triggered by the Meter or the Gateway. 647 or 648 c. If a unidirectional communication is performed between the Meter and the 649 Gateway, the Meter Data is encrypted using a symmetric algorithm 650 (according to [TR-03109-3]) and facilitating a defined data structure to ensure 651 the authenticity and confidentiality. 652 3. The authenticity and integrity of the Meter Data is verified by the Gateway. 653 4. If (and only if) authenticity and integrity have been verified successfully, the 654 Meter Data is further processed by the Gateway according to the rules in the 655 Processing Profile else the cryptographic information flow will be cancelled. 656 5. The processed Meter Data is encrypted and integrity protected using CMS 657 (according to [TR-03109-1-I]) for the final recipient of the data21. 658 6. The processed Meter Data is signed using the services of the Security Module. 659 7. The processed and signed Meter Data may be stored for a certain amount of 660 time. 661 21 Optionally the Meter Data can additionally be signed before any encryption is done. page 31 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 8. The processed Meter Data is finally submitted to an authorised external entity 662 in the WAN via an encrypted and mutually authenticated channel. 663 664 Figure 5: Cryptographic information flow for distributed Meters and Gateway 665 666 page 32 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland TOE life-cycle 667 The life-cycle of the TOE can be separated into the following phases: 668 1. Development 669 2. Production 670 3. Pre-personalization at the developer's premises (without Security Module) 671 4. Pre-personalization and integration of Security Module 672 5. Installation and start of operation 673 6. Personalization 674 7. Normal operation 675 A detailed description of the phases #1 to #4 and #6 to #7 is provided in [TR-03109-1- 676 VI], while phase #5 is described in the TOE manuals. 677 The TOE will be delivered after phase “Pre-personalization and integration of Security 678 Module”. The phase “Personalization” will be performed when the TOE is started for the 679 first time after phase “Installation and start of operation”. The TOE delivery process is 680 specified in [AGD_SEC]. 681 page 33 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 2 Conformance Claims 682 2.1CC Conformance Claim 683 • This ST has been developed using Version 3.1 Revision 5 of Common Criteria 684 [CC]. 685 • This ST is [CC] part 2 extended due to the use of FPR_CON.1. 686 • This ST claims conformance to [CC] part 3; no extended assurance compo- 687 nents have been defined. 688 689 2.2PP Claim / Conformance Statement 690 This Security Target claims strict conformance to Protection Profile [PP_GW]. 691 692 2.3Package Claim 693 This Security Target claims an assurance package EAL4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 694 and ALC_FLR.2 as defined in [CC] Part 3 for product certification. 695 696 2.4Conformance Claim Rationale 697 This Security Target claims strict conformance to only one PP [PP_GW]. 698 This Security Target is consistent to the TOE type according to [PP_GW] because the 699 TOE is a communication Gateway that provides different external communication inter- 700 faces and enables the data communication between these interfaces and connected IT 701 systems. It further collects processes, and stores Meter Data. 702 This Security Target is consistent to the security problem defined in [PP_GW]. 703 This Security Target is consistent to the security objectives stated in [PP_GW], no secu- 704 rity objective of the PP is removed, nor added to this Security Target. 705 This Security Target is consistent to the security requirements stated in [PP_GW], no 706 security requirement of the PP is removed, nor added to this Security Target. 707 708 page 34 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 3 Security Problem Definition 709 3.1External entities 710 The following external entities interact with the system consisting of Meter and Gateway. 711 Those roles have been defined for the use in this Security Target. It is possible that a 712 party implements more than one role in practice. 713 Role Description Consumer The authorised individual or organization that “owns” the Meter Data. In most cases, this will be tenants or house owners con- suming electricity, water, gas or further commodities. However, it is also possible that the consumer produces or stores energy (e.g. with their own solar plant). Gateway Admin- istrator Authority that installs, configures, monitors, and controls the Smart Meter Gateway. Service Techni- cian The authorised individual that is responsible for diagnostic pur- poses. Authorised Exter- nal Entity / User Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary. In the context of this ST, the term user or external entity serve as a hypernym for all entities mentioned be- fore. Table 5: Roles used in the Security Target 714 715 3.2Assets 716 The following tables introduces the relevant assets for this Security Target. The tables 717 focus on the assets that are relevant for the Gateway and does not claim to provide an 718 overview over all assets in the Smart Metering System or for other devices in the LMN. 719 The following Table 6 lists all assets typified as “user data”: 720 721 page 35 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Asset Description Need for Protection Meter Data Meter readings that allow calculation of the quantity of a commodity, e.g. electricity, gas, water or heat consumed over a period. Meter Data comprise Consumption or Production Data (billing-relevant) and grid status data (not billing-relevant). While billing-relevant data needs to have a relation to the Consumer, grid status data do not have to be directly related to a Consumer. • According to their specific need (see below) System log data Log data from the • system log. • Integrity • Confidentiality (only authorised SMGW administrators and Service technicians may read the log data) Consumer log data Log data from the • consumer log. • Integrity • Confidentiality (only authorised Consumers may read the log data) Calibration log data Log data from the • calibration log. • Integrity • Confidentiality (only authorised SMGW ad- ministrators may read the log data) Consumption Data Billing-relevant part of Meter Data. Please note that the term Consumption Data implicitly includes Production Data. • Integrity and authenticity (comparable to the classical meter and its security requirements) • Confidentiality (due to privacy concerns) page 36 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 6: Assets (User data) 722 Table 7 lists all assets typified as “TSF data”: 723 22 Please note that these readings and data of the Meter which are not relevant for billing may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer(s). Status Data Grid status data, subset of Meter Data that is not billing-relevant22. • Integrity and authenticity (comparable to the classical meter and its security requirements) • Confidentiality (due to privacy concerns) Supplementar y Data The Gateway may be used for communication purposes by devices in the LMN or HAN. It may be that the functionality of the Gateway that is used by such a device is limited to pure (but secure) communication services. Data that is transmitted via the Gateway but that does not belong to one of the aforementioned data types is named Supplementary Data. • According to their specific need Data The term Data is used as hypernym for Meter Data and Supplementary Data. • According to their specific need Gateway time Date and time of the real-time clock of the Gateway. Gateway Time is used in Meter Data records sent to external entities. • Integrity • Authenticity (when time is adjusted to an external reference time) Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Personally Identifiable Information refers to information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single individual. • Confidentiality page 37 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 7: Assets (TSF data) 724 725 Asset Description Need for Protection Meter config (secondary asset) Configuration data of the Meter to control its behaviour including the Meter identity. Configuration data is transmitted to the Meter via the Gateway. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality Gateway config (secondary asset) Configuration data of the Gateway to control its behaviour including the Gateway identity, the Processing Profiles and certificate/key material for authentication. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality CLS config (secondary asset) Configuration data of a CLS to control its behaviour. Configuration data is transmitted to the CLS via the Gateway. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality Firmware update (secondary asset) Firmware update that is downloaded by the TOE to update the firmware of the TOE. • Integrity and authenticity Ephemeral keys (secondary asset) Ephemeral cryptographic material used by the TOE for cryptographic operations. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality page 38 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 3.3Assumptions 726 In this threat model the following assumptions about the environment of the components 727 need to be taken into account in order to ensure a secure operation. 728 A.ExternalPrivacy It is assumed that authorised and authenticated external 729 entities receiving any kind of privacy-relevant data or bill- 730 ing-relevant data and the applications that they operate are 731 trustworthy (in the context of the data that they receive) and 732 do not perform unauthorised analyses of this data with re- 733 spect to the corresponding Consumer(s). 734 A.TrustedAdmins It is assumed that the Gateway Administrator and the Ser- 735 vice Technician are trustworthy and well-trained. 736 A.PhysicalProtection It is assumed that the TOE is installed in a non-public en- 737 vironment within the premises of the Consumer which pro- 738 vides a basic level of physical protection. This protection 739 covers the TOE, the Meter(s) that the TOE communicates 740 with and the communication channel between the TOE and 741 its Security Module. 742 A.ProcessProfile The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data 743 are assumed to be trustworthy and correct. 744 A.Update It is assumed that firmware updates for the Gateway that 745 can be provided by an authorised external entity have un- 746 dergone a certification process according to this Security 747 Target before they are issued and can therefore be as- 748 sumed to be correctly implemented. It is further assumed 749 that the external entity that is authorised to provide the up- 750 date is trustworthy and will not introduce any malware into 751 a firmware update. 752 A.Network It is assumed that 753 • a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliabil- 754 ity and bandwidth for the individual situation is 755 available, 756 • one or more trustworthy sources for an update of 757 the system time are available in the WAN, 758 page 39 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • the Gateway is the only communication gateway for 759 Meters in the LMN23, 760 • if devices in the HAN have a separate connection 761 to parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this 762 connection is appropriately protected. 763 A.Keygen It is assumed that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) is 764 generated securely according to [TR-03109-3] and brought 765 into the Gateway in a secure way by the Gateway Admin- 766 istrator. 767 Application Note 1: This ST acknowledges that the Gateway cannot be com- 768 pletely protected against unauthorised physical access by 769 its environment. However, it is important for the overall se- 770 curity of the TOE that it is not installed within a public envi- 771 ronment. 772 The level of physical protection that is expected to be pro- 773 vided by the environment is the same level of protection 774 that is expected for classical meters that operate according 775 to the regulations of the national calibration authority [TR- 776 03109-1]. 777 Application Note 2: The Processing Profiles that are used for information flow 778 control as referred to by A.ProcessProfile are an essential 779 factor for the preservation of the privacy of the Consumer. 780 The Processing Profiles are used to determine which data 781 shall be sent to which entity at which frequency and how 782 data are processed, e.g. whether the data needs to be re- 783 lated to the Consumer (because it is used for billing pur- 784 poses) or whether the data shall be pseudonymised. 785 The Processing Profiles shall be visible for the Consumer 786 to allow a transparent communication. 787 23 Please note that this assumption holds on a logical level rather than on a physical one. It may be possible that the Meters in the LMN have a physical connection to other devices that would in theory also allow a communication. This is specifically true for wireless communication technologies. It is further possible that signals of Meters are amplified by other devices or other Meters on the physical level without violating this assumption. However, it is assumed that the Meters do only communicate with the TOE and that only the TOE is able to decrypt the data sent by the Meter. page 40 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland It is essential that Processing Profiles correctly define the 788 amount of information that must be sent to an external en- 789 tity. Exact regulations regarding the Processing Profiles 790 and the Gateway Administrator are beyond the scope of 791 this Security Target. 792 793 3.4Threats 794 The following sections identify the threats that are posed against the assets handled by 795 the Smart Meter System. Those threats are the result of a threat model that has been 796 developed for the whole Smart Metering System first and then has been focussed on 797 the threats against the Gateway. It should be noted that the threats in the following par- 798 agraphs consider two different kinds of attackers: 799 • Attackers having physical access to Meter, Gateway, a connection between 800 these components or local logical access to any of the interfaces (local at- 801 tacker), trying to disclose or alter assets while stored in the Gateway or while 802 transmitted between Meters in the LMN and the Gateway. Please note that the 803 following threat model assumes that the local attacker has less motivation than 804 the WAN attacker as a successful attack of a local attacker will always only 805 impact one Gateway. Please further note that the local attacker includes au- 806 thorised individuals like consumers. 807 • An attacker located in the WAN (WAN attacker) trying to compromise the con- 808 fidentiality and/or integrity of the processed Meter Data and or configuration 809 data transmitted via the WAN, or attacker trying to conquer a component of the 810 infrastructure (i.e. Meter, Gateway or Controllable Local System) via the WAN 811 to cause damage to a component itself or to the corresponding grid (e.g. by 812 sending forged Meter Data to an external entity). 813 The specific rationale for this situation is given by the expected benefit of a successful 814 attack. An attacker who has to have physical access to the TOE that they are attacking, 815 will only be able to compromise one TOE at a time. So the effect of a successful attack 816 will always be limited to the attacked TOE. A logical attack from the WAN side on the 817 other hand may have the potential to compromise a large amount of TOEs. 818 819 page 41 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland T.DataModificationLocal A local attacker may try to modify (i.e. alter, delete, insert, 820 replay or redirect) Meter Data when transmitted between 821 Meter and Gateway, Gateway and Consumer, or Gateway 822 and external entities. The objective of the attacker may be 823 to alter billing-relevant information or grid status infor- 824 mation. The attacker may perform the attack via any inter- 825 face (LMN, HAN, or WAN). 826 In order to achieve the modification, the attacker may also 827 try to modify secondary assets like the firmware or config- 828 uration parameters of the Gateway. 829 T.DataModificationWAN A WAN attacker may try to modify (i.e. alter, delete, insert, 830 replay or redirect) Meter Data, Gateway config data, Meter 831 config data, CLS config data or a firmware update when 832 transmitted between the Gateway and an external entity in 833 the WAN. 834 When trying to modify Meter Data, it is the objective of the 835 WAN attacker to modify billing-relevant information or grid 836 status data. 837 When trying to modify config data or a firmware update, the 838 WAN attacker tries to circumvent security mechanisms of 839 the TOE or tries to get control over the TOE or a device in 840 the LAN that is protected by the TOE. 841 T.TimeModification A local attacker or WAN attacker may try to alter the Gate- 842 way time. The motivation of the attacker could be e.g. to 843 change the relation between date/time and measured con- 844 sumption or production values in the Meter Data records 845 (e.g. to influence the balance of the next invoice). 846 T.DisclosureWAN A WAN attacker may try to violate the privacy of the Con- 847 sumer by disclosing Meter Data or configuration data (Me- 848 ter config, Gateway config or CLS config) or parts of it 849 when transmitted between Gateway and external entities 850 in the WAN. 851 page 42 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland T.DisclosureLocal A local attacker may try to violate the privacy of the Con- 852 sumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the 853 TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if 854 Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one 855 Gateway. 856 T.Infrastructure A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways, 857 Meters or CLS via the TOE, which enables the WAN at- 858 tacker to cause damage to Consumers or external entities 859 or the grids used for commodity distribution (e.g. by send- 860 ing wrong data to an external entity). 861 A WAN attacker may also try to conquer a CLS in the HAN 862 first in order to logically attack the TOE from the HAN side. 863 T.ResidualData By physical and/or logical means a local attacker or a WAN 864 attacker may try to read out data from the Gateway, which 865 travelled through the Gateway before and which are no 866 longer needed by the Gateway (i.e. Meter Data, Meter con- 867 fig, or CLS config). 868 T.ResidentData A WAN or local attacker may try to access (i.e. read, alter, 869 delete) information to which they don't have permission to 870 while the information is stored in the TOE. 871 While the WAN attacker only uses the logical interface of 872 the TOE that is provided into the WAN, the local attacker 873 may also physically access the TOE. 874 T.Privacy A WAN attacker may try to obtain more detailed infor- 875 mation from the Gateway than actually required to fulfil the 876 tasks defined by its role or the contract with the Consumer. 877 This includes scenarios in which an external entity that is 878 primarily authorised to obtain information from the TOE 879 tries to obtain more information than the information that 880 has been authorised as well as scenarios in which an at- 881 tacker who is not authorised at all tries to obtain infor- 882 mation. 883 884 page 43 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 3.5Organizational Security Policies 885 This section lists the organizational security policies (OSP) that the Gateway shall com- 886 ply with: 887 OSP.SM The TOE shall use the services of a certified Security Mod- 888 ule for 889 • verification of digital signatures, 890 • generation of digital signatures, 891 • key agreement, 892 • key transport, 893 • key storage, 894 • Random Number Generation, 895 The Security Module shall be certified according to 896 [SecModPP] and shall be used in accordance with its rele- 897 vant guidance documentation. 898 OSP.Log The TOE shall maintain a set of log files as defined in [TR- 899 03109-1] as follows: 900 1. A system log of relevant events in order to allow an 901 authorised Gateway Administrator to analyse the 902 status of the TOE. The TOE shall also analyse the 903 system log automatically for a cumulation of secu- 904 rity relevant events. 905 2. A consumer log that contains information about the 906 information flows that have been initiated to the 907 WAN and information about the Processing Profiles 908 causing this information flow as well as the billing- 909 relevant information. 910 3. A calibration log (as defined in chapter 6.2.1) that 911 provides the Gateway Administrator with a possibil- 912 ity to review calibration relevant events. 913 The TOE shall further limit access to the information in the 914 different log files as follows: 915 1. Access to the information in the system log shall 916 only be allowed for an authorised Gateway 917 page 44 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Administrator via the IF_GW_WAN interface of the 918 TOE and an authorised Service Technician via the 919 IF_GW_SRV interface of the TOE. 920 2. Access to the information in the calibration log shall 921 only be allowed for an authorised Gateway Admin- 922 istrator via the IF_GW_WAN interface of the TOE. 923 3. Access to the information in the consumer log shall 924 only be allowed for an authorised Consumer via the 925 IF_GW_CON interface of the TOE. The Consumer 926 shall only have access to their own information. 927 The system log may overwrite the oldest events in case 928 that the audit trail gets full. 929 For the consumer log the TOE shall ensure that a sufficient 930 amount of events is available (in order to allow a Consumer 931 to verify an invoice) but may overwrite older events in case 932 that the audit trail gets full. 933 For the calibration log, however, the TOE shall ensure the 934 availability of all events over the lifetime of the TOE. 935 page 45 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4 Security Objectives 936 4.1Security Objectives for the TOE 937 O.Firewall The TOE shall serve as the connection point for the con- 938 nected devices within the LAN to external entities within 939 the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to 940 protect the devices of the LMN and HAN (as long as they 941 use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the WAN 942 side. 943 The firewall: 944 • shall allow only connections established from HAN 945 or the TOE itself to the WAN (i.e. from devices in 946 the HAN to external entities in the WAN or from the 947 TOE itself to external entities in the WAN), 948 • shall provide a wake-up service on the WAN side 949 interface, 950 • shall not allow connections from the LMN to the 951 WAN, 952 • shall not allow any other services being offered on 953 the WAN side interface, 954 • shall not allow connections from the WAN to the 955 LAN or to the TOE itself, 956 • shall enforce communication flows by allowing traf- 957 fic from CLS in the HAN to the WAN only if confi- 958 dentiality-protected and integrity-protected and if 959 endpoints are authenticated. 960 O.SeparateIF The TOE shall have physically separated ports for the 961 LMN, the HAN and the WAN and shall automatically detect 962 during its self test whether connections (wired or wireless), 963 if any, are wrongly connected. 964 Application Note 3: O.SeparateIF refers to physical inter- 965 faces and must not be fulfilled by a pure logical separation 966 of one physical interface only. 967 page 46 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Conceal To protect the privacy of its Consumers, the TOE shall con- 968 ceal the communication with external entities in the WAN 969 in order to ensure that no privacy-relevant information may 970 be obtained by analysing the frequency, load, size or the 971 absence of external communication.24 972 O.Meter The TOE receives or polls information about the consump- 973 tion or production of different commodities from one or mul- 974 tiple Meters and is responsible for handling this Meter 975 Data. 976 This includes that: 977 • The TOE shall ensure that the communication to 978 the Meter(s) is established in an Gateway Adminis- 979 trator-definable interval or an interval as defined by 980 the Meter, 981 • the TOE shall enforce encryption and integrity pro- 982 tection for the communication with the Meter25, 983 • the TOE shall verify the integrity and authenticity of 984 the data received from a Meter before handling it 985 further, 986 • the TOE shall process the data according to the 987 definition in the corresponding Processing Profile, 988 • the TOE shall encrypt the processed Meter Data for 989 the final recipient, sign the data and 990 • deliver the encrypted data to authorised external 991 entities as defined in the corresponding Processing 992 Profiles facilitating an encrypted channel, 993 • the TOE shall store processed Meter Data if an ex- 994 ternal entity cannot be reached and re-try to send 995 24 It should be noted that this requirement only applies to communication flows in the WAN. 25 It is acknowledged that the implementation of a secure channel between the Meter and the Gateway is a security function of both units. The TOE as defined in this Security Target only has a limited possibility to secure this communication as both sides have to sign responsible for the quality of a cryptographic connection. However, it should be noted that the encryption of this channel only needs to protect against the Local Attacker possessing a basic attack potential and that the Meter utilises the services of its Security Module to negotiate the channel. page 47 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland the data until a configurable number of unsuccess- 996 ful retries has been reached, 997 • the TOE shall pseudonymize the data for parties 998 that do not need the relation between the pro- 999 cessed Meter Data and the identity of the Con- 1000 sumer. 1001 O.Crypt The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as fol- 1002 lows: 1003 • authentication, integrity protection and encryption 1004 of the communication and data to external entities 1005 in the WAN, 1006 • authentication, integrity protection and encryption 1007 of the communication to the Meter, 1008 • authentication, integrity protection and encryption 1009 of the communication to the Consumer, 1010 • replay detection for all communications with exter- 1011 nal entities, 1012 • encryption of the persistently stored TSF and user 1013 data of the TOE26. 1014 In addition, the TOE shall generate the required keys uti- 1015 lising the services of its Security Module27, ensure that the 1016 keys are only used for an acceptable amount of time and 1017 destroy ephemeral28 keys if no longer needed.29 1018 O.Time The TOE shall provide reliable time stamps and update 1019 its internal clock in regular intervals by retrieving reliable 1020 time information from a dedicated reliable source in the 1021 WAN. 1022 26 The encryption of the persistent memory shall support the protection of the TOE against local attacks. 27 Please refer to chapter 1.4.7 for an overview on how the cryptographic functions are distributed between the TOE and its Security Module. 28 This objective addresses the destruction of ephemeral keys only because all keys that need to be stored persistently are stored in the Security Module. 29 Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more detailed information about what kind of information this objective applies to. page 48 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Protect The TOE shall implement functionality to protect its secu- 1023 rity functions against malfunctions and tampering. 1024 Specifically, the TOE shall 1025 • encrypt its TSF and user data as long as it is not in 1026 use, 1027 • overwrite any information that is no longer needed 1028 to ensure that it is no longer available via the exter- 1029 nal interfaces of the TOE30, 1030 • monitor user data and the TOE firmware for integ- 1031 rity errors, 1032 • contain a test that detects whether the interfaces 1033 for WAN and LAN are separate, 1034 • have a fail-safe design that specifically ensures that 1035 no malfunction can impact the delivery of a com- 1036 modity (e.g. energy, gas, heat or water)31, 1037 • make any physical manipulation within the scope of 1038 the intended environment detectable for the Con- 1039 sumer and Gateway Administrator. 1040 O.Management The TOE shall only provide authorised Gateway Adminis- 1041 trators with functions for the management of the security 1042 features. 1043 The TOE shall ensure that any change in the behaviour of 1044 the security functions can only be achieved from the WAN 1045 side interface. Any management activity from a local inter- 1046 face may only be read only. 1047 Further, the TOE shall implement a secure mechanism to 1048 update the firmware of the TOE that ensures that only au- 1049 thorised entities are able to provide updates for the TOE 1050 30 Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more detailed information about what kind of information this objective applies to. 31 Indeed this Security Target acknowledges that the Gateway and the Meters have no possibility at all to impact the deliv- ery of a commodity. Even an intentional stop of the delivery of a certain commodity is not within the scope of this Security Target. It should however be noted that such a functionality may be realised by a CLS that utilises the services of the TOE for its communication. page 49 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland and that only authentic and integrity protected updates are 1051 applied. 1052 O.Log The TOE shall maintain a set of log files as defined in [TR- 1053 03109-1] as follows: 1054 1. A system log of relevant events in order to allow an 1055 authorised Gateway Administrator or an authorised 1056 Service Technician to analyse the status of the 1057 TOE. The TOE shall also analyse the system log 1058 automatically for a cumulation of security relevant 1059 events. 1060 2. A consumer log that contains information about the 1061 information flows that have been initiated to the 1062 WAN and information about the Processing Profiles 1063 causing this information flow as well as the billing- 1064 relevant information and information about the sys- 1065 tem status (including relevant error messages). 1066 3. A calibration log that provides the Gateway Admin- 1067 istrator with a possibility to review calibration rele- 1068 vant events. 1069 The TOE shall further limit access to the information in the 1070 different log files as follows: 1071 1. Access to the information in the system log shall 1072 only be allowed for an authorised Gateway Admin- 1073 istrator via IF_GW_WAN or for an authorised Ser- 1074 vice Technician via IF_GW_SRV. 1075 2. Access to the information in the consumer log shall 1076 only be allowed for an authorised Consumer via the 1077 IF_GW_CON interface of the TOE and via a se- 1078 cured (i.e. confidentiality and integrity protected) 1079 connection. The Consumer shall only have access 1080 to their own information. 1081 3. Read-only access to the information in the calibra- 1082 tion log shall only be allowed for an authorised 1083 page 50 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Gateway Administrator via the WAN interface of the 1084 TOE. 1085 The system log may overwrite the oldest events in case 1086 that the audit trail gets full. 1087 For the consumer log, the TOE shall ensure that a suffi- 1088 cient amount of events is available (in order to allow a Con- 1089 sumer to verify an invoice) but may overwrite older events 1090 in case that the audit trail gets full. 1091 For the calibration log however, the TOE shall ensure the 1092 availability of all events over the lifetime of the TOE. 1093 O.Access The TOE shall control the access of external entities in 1094 WAN, HAN or LMN to any information that is sent to, from 1095 or via the TOE via its external interfaces32. Access control 1096 shall depend on the destination interface that is used to 1097 send that information. 1098 1099 4.2Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 1100 OE.ExternalPrivacy Authorised and authenticated external entities receiving 1101 any kind of private or billing-relevant data shall be trustwor- 1102 thy and shall not perform unauthorised analyses of these 1103 data with respect to the corresponding consumer(s). 1104 OE.TrustedAdmins The Gateway Administrator and the Service Technician 1105 shall be trustworthy and well-trained. 1106 OE.PhysicalProtection The TOE shall be installed in a non-public environment 1107 within the premises of the Consumer that provides a basic 1108 level of physical protection. This protection shall cover the 1109 TOE, the Meters that the TOE communicates with and the 1110 communication channel between the TOE and its Security 1111 32 While in classical access control mechanisms the Gateway Administrator gets complete access, the TOE also maintains a set of information (specifically the consumer log) to which Gateway Administrators have restricted access. page 51 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Module. Only authorised individuals may physically access 1112 the TOE. 1113 OE.Profile The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data 1114 shall be obtained from a trustworthy and reliable source 1115 only. 1116 OE.SM The environment shall provide the services of a certified 1117 Security Module for 1118 • verification of digital signatures, 1119 • generation of digital signatures, 1120 • key agreement, 1121 • key transport, 1122 • key storage, 1123 • Random Number Generation. 1124 The Security Module used shall be certified according to 1125 [SecModPP] and shall be used in accordance with its rele- 1126 vant guidance documentation. 1127 OE.Update The firmware updates for the Gateway that can be pro- 1128 vided by an authorised external entity shall undergo a cer- 1129 tification process according to this Security Target before 1130 they are issued to show that the update is implemented 1131 correctly. The external entity that is authorised to provide 1132 the update shall be trustworthy and ensure that no mal- 1133 ware is introduced via a firmware update. 1134 OE.Network It shall be ensured that 1135 • a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliabil- 1136 ity and bandwidth for the individual situation is 1137 available, 1138 • one or more trustworthy sources for an update of 1139 the system time are available in the WAN, 1140 • the Gateway is the only communication gateway for 1141 Meters in the LMN, 1142 page 52 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • if devices in the HAN have a separate connection 1143 to parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this 1144 connection is appropriately protected. 1145 OE.Keygen It shall be ensured that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) 1146 is generated securely according to the [TR-03109-3]. It 1147 shall also be ensured that the keys are brought into the 1148 Gateway in a secure way by the Gateway Administrator. 1149 1150 4.3Security Objective Rationale 1151 4.3.1 Overview 1152 The following table gives an overview how the assumptions, threats, and organisational 1153 security policies are addressed by the security objectives. The text of the following sec- 1154 tions justifies this more in detail. 1155 O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Management O.Log O.Access OE.SM OE.ExternalPrivacy OE.TrustedAdmins OE.PhysicalProtec- tion OE.Profile OE.Update OE.Network OE.Keygen T.DataModification- Local X X X X X X T.DataModification- WAN X X X X X T.TimeModification X X X X X X T.DisclosureWAN X X X X X X T.DisclosureLocal X X X X X X T.Infrastructure X X X X X X X T.ResidualData X X X page 53 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 8: Rationale for Security Objectives 1156 1157 4.3.2 Countering the threats 1158 The following sections provide more detailed information on how the threats are coun- 1159 tered by the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment. 1160 1161 4.3.2.1 General objectives 1162 The security objectives O.Protect, O.Management and OE.TrustedAdmins contribute 1163 to counter each threat and contribute to each OSP. 1164 O.Management is indispensable as it defines the requirements around the management 1165 of the Security Functions. Without a secure management no TOE can be secure. Also 1166 OE.TrustedAdmins contributes to this aspect as it provides the requirements on the 1167 availability of a trustworthy Gateway Administrator and Service Technician. O.Protect is 1168 present to ensure that all security functions are working as specified. 1169 Those general objectives will not be addressed in detail in the following paragraphs. 1170 T.ResidentData X X X X X X X T.Privacy X X X X X X X X OSP.SM X X X X X OSP.Log X X X X X A.ExternalPrivacy X A.TrustedAdmins X A.PhysicalProtection X A.ProcessProfile X A.Update X A.Network X A.Keygen X page 54 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4.3.2.2 T.DataModificationLocal 1171 The threat T.DataModificationLocal is countered by a combination of the security ob- 1172 jectives O.Meter, O.Crypt, O.Log and OE.PhysicalProtection. 1173 O.Meter defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption of communication when receiv- 1174 ing Meter Data from the Meter. O.Crypt defines the required cryptographic functionality. 1175 The objectives together ensure that the communication between the Meter and the TOE 1176 cannot be modified or released. 1177 OE.PhysicalProtection is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited. 1178 4.3.2.3 T.DataModificationWAN 1179 The threat T.DataModificationWAN is countered by a combination of the security ob- 1180 jectives O.Firewall and O.Crypt. 1181 O.Firewall defines the connections for the devices within the LAN to external entities 1182 within the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to protect the devices of 1183 the LMN and HAN (as long as they use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the 1184 WAN side. O.Crypt defines the required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives to- 1185 gether ensure that the data transmitted between the TOE and the WAN cannot be mod- 1186 ified by a WAN attacker. 1187 4.3.2.4 T.TimeModification 1188 The threat T.TimeModification is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1189 O.Time, O.Crypt and OE.PhysicalProtection. 1190 O.Time defines that the TOE needs a reliable time stamp mechanism that is also up- 1191 dated from reliable sources regularly in the WAN. O.Crypt defines the required crypto- 1192 graphic functionality for the communication to external entities in the WAN. Therewith, 1193 O.Time and O.Crypt are the core objective to counter the threat T.TimeModification. 1194 OE.PhysicalProtection is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited. 1195 4.3.2.5 T.DisclosureWAN 1196 The threat T.DisclosureWAN is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1197 O.Firewall, O.Conceal and O.Crypt. 1198 O.Firewall defines the connections for the devices within the LAN to external entities 1199 within the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to protect the devices of 1200 the LMN and HAN (as long as they use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the 1201 WAN side. O.Crypt defines the required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives 1202 page 55 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland together ensure that the communication between the Meter and the TOE cannot be dis- 1203 closed. 1204 O.Conceal ensures that no information can be disclosed based on additional character- 1205 istics of the communication like frequency, load or the absence of a communication. 1206 4.3.2.6 T.DisclosureLocal 1207 The threat T.DisclosureLocal is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1208 O.Meter, O.Crypt and OE.PhysicalProtection. 1209 O.Meter defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption and integrity protection of com- 1210 munication when polling or receiving Meter Data from the Meter. O.Crypt defines the 1211 required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives together ensure that the communi- 1212 cation between the Meter and the TOE cannot be disclosed. 1213 OE.PhysicalProtection is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited. 1214 4.3.2.7 T.Infrastructure 1215 The threat T.Infrastructure is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1216 O.Firewall, O.SeparateIF, O.Meter and O.Crypt. 1217 O.Firewall is the core objective that counters this threat. It ensures that all communica- 1218 tion flows to the WAN are initiated by the TOE. The fact that the TOE does not offer any 1219 services to the WAN side and will not react to any requests (except the wake-up call) 1220 from the WAN is a significant aspect in countering this threat. Further the TOE will only 1221 communicate using encrypted channels to authenticated and trustworthy parties which 1222 mitigates the possibility that an attacker could try to hijack a communication. 1223 O.Meter defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption and integrity protection for the 1224 communication with the Meter. 1225 O.SeparateIF facilitates the disjunction of the WAN from the LMN. 1226 O.Crypt supports the mitigation of this threat by providing the required cryptographic 1227 primitives. 1228 4.3.2.8 T.ResidualData 1229 The threat T.ResidualData is mitigated by the security objective O.Protect as this se- 1230 curity objective defines that the TOE shall delete information as soon as it is no longer 1231 used. Assuming that a TOE follows this requirement, an attacker cannot read out any 1232 residual information as it does simply not exist. 1233 page 56 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4.3.2.9 T.ResidentData 1234 The threat T.ResidentData is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1235 O.Access, O.Firewall, O.Protect and O.Crypt. Further, the environment (OE.Physi- 1236 calProtection and OE.TrustedAdmins) contributes to this. 1237 O.Access defines that the TOE shall control the access of users to information via the 1238 external interfaces. 1239 The aspect of a local attacker with physical access to the TOE is covered by a combi- 1240 nation of O.Protect (defining the detection of physical manipulation) and O.Crypt (re- 1241 quiring the encryption of persistently stored TSF and user data of the TOE). In addition, 1242 the physical protection provided by the environment (OE.PhysicalProtection) and the 1243 Gateway Administrator (OE.TrustedAdmins) who could realise a physical manipulation 1244 contribute to counter this threat. 1245 The aspect of a WAN attacker is covered by O.Firewall as this objective ensures that 1246 an adequate level of protection is realised against attacks from the WAN side. 1247 4.3.2.10 T.Privacy 1248 The threat T.Privacy is primarily addressed by the security objectives O.Meter, O.Crypt 1249 and O.Firewall as these objective ensures that the TOE will only distribute Meter Data 1250 to external parties in the WAN as defined in the corresponding Processing Profiles and 1251 that the data will be protected for the transfer. OE.Profile is present to ensure that the 1252 Processing Profiles are obtained from a trustworthy and reliable source only. 1253 Finally, O.Conceal ensures that an attacker cannot obtain the relevant information for 1254 this threat by observing external characteristics of the information flow. 1255 4.3.3 Coverage of organisational security policies 1256 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objec- 1257 tives for the environment and the TOE cover the organizational security policies. 1258 4.3.3.1 OSP.SM 1259 The Organizational Security Policy OSP.SM that mandates that the TOE utilises the ser- 1260 vices of a certified Security Module is directly addressed by the security objectives 1261 OE.SM and O.Crypt. The objective OE.SM addresses the functions that the Security 1262 Module shall be utilised for as defined in OSP.SM and also requires a certified Security 1263 Module. O.Crypt defines the cryptographic functionalities for the TOE itself. In this 1264 page 57 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland context, it has to be ensured that the Security Module is operated in accordance with its 1265 guidance documentation. 1266 4.3.3.2 OSP.Log 1267 The Organizational Security Policy OSP.Log that mandates that the TOE maintains an 1268 audit log is directly addressed by the security objective for the TOE O.Log. 1269 O.Access contributes to the implementation of the OSP as it defines that also Gateway 1270 Administrators are not allowed to read/modify all data. This is of specific importance to 1271 ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the log data as is required by the OSP.Log. 1272 4.3.4 Coverage of assumptions 1273 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objec- 1274 tives for the environment cover the assumptions. 1275 4.3.4.1 A.ExternalPrivacy 1276 The assumption A.ExternalPrivacy is directly and completely covered by the security 1277 objective OE.ExternalPrivacy. The assumption and the objective for the environment 1278 are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1279 4.3.4.2 A.TrustedAdmins 1280 The assumption A.TrustedAdmins is directly and completely covered by the security 1281 objective OE.TrustedAdmins. The assumption and the objective for the environment 1282 are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1283 4.3.4.3 A.PhysicalProtection 1284 The assumption A.PhysicalProtection is directly and completely covered by the secu- 1285 rity objective OE.PhysicalProtection. The assumption and the objective for the envi- 1286 ronment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1287 4.3.4.4 A.ProcessProfile 1288 The assumption A.ProcessProfile is directly and completely covered by the security 1289 objective OE.Profile. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted 1290 in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1291 4.3.4.5 A.Update 1292 The assumption A.Update is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1293 OE.Update. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1294 that the correspondence is obvious. 1295 page 58 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4.3.4.6 A.Network 1296 The assumption A.Network is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1297 OE.Network. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1298 that the correspondence is obvious. 1299 4.3.4.7 A.Keygen 1300 The assumption A.Keygen is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1301 OE.Keygen. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1302 that the correspondence is obvious. 1303 1304 page 59 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 5 Extended Component definition 1305 5.1Communication concealing (FPR_CON) 1306 The additional family Communication concealing (FPR_CON) of the Class FPR (Pri- 1307 vacy) is defined here to describe the specific IT security functional requirements of the 1308 TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of 1309 the Consumer that may be obtained by an attacker by observing the encrypted commu- 1310 nication of the TOE with remote entities. 1311 1312 5.2Family behaviour 1313 This family defines requirements to mitigate attacks against communication channels in 1314 which an attacker tries to obtain privacy relevant information based on characteristics of 1315 an encrypted communication channel. Examples include but are not limited to an analy- 1316 sis of the frequency of communication or the transmitted workload. 1317 1318 5.3Component levelling 1319 FPR_CON: Communication concealing ------------1 1320 1321 5.4Management 1322 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: 1323 a. Definition of the interval in FPR_CON.1.2 if definable within the operational 1324 phase of the TOE. 1325 1326 5.5Audit 1327 There are no auditable events foreseen. 1328 1329 5.6Communication concealing (FPR_CON.1) 1330 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1331 Dependencies: No dependencies. 1332 page 60 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FPR_CON.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information 1333 flow policy] in order to ensure that no personally iden- 1334 tifiable information (PII) can be obtained by an analysis 1335 of [assignment: characteristics of the information flow 1336 that need to be concealed]. 1337 FPR_CON.1.2 The TSF shall connect to [assignment: list of external 1338 entities] in intervals as follows [selection: weekly, 1339 daily, hourly, [assignment: other interval]] to conceal 1340 the data flow. 1341 page 61 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6 Security Requirements 1342 6.1Overview 1343 This chapter describes the security functional and the assurance requirements which 1344 have to be fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components 1345 from part 2 of [CC] and the assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assur- 1346 ance Level 4 from part 3 of [CC]. 1347 The following notations are used: 1348 • Refinement operation (denoted by bold text): is used to add details to a re- 1349 quirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. In case that a word has 1350 been deleted from the original text this refinement is indicated by crossed out 1351 bold text. 1352 • Selection operation (denoted by underlined text): is used to select one or more 1353 options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement. 1354 • Assignment operation (denoted by italicised text): is used to assign a specific 1355 value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. 1356 • Iteration operation: are identified with a suffix in the name of the SFR (e.g. 1357 FDP_IFC.2/FW). 1358 It should be noted that the requirements in the following chapters are not necessarily be 1359 ordered alphabetically. Where useful the requirements have been grouped. 1360 The following table summarises all TOE security functional requirements of this ST: 1361 Class FAU: Security Audit FAU_ARP.1/SYS Security alarms for system log FAU_GEN.1/SYS Audit data generation for system log FAU_SAA.1/SYS Potential violation analysis for system log FAU_SAR.1/SYS Audit review for system log FAU_STG.4/SYS Prevention of audit data loss for the system log FAU_GEN.1/CON Audit data generation for consumer log page 62 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FAU_SAR.1/CON Audit review for consumer log FAU_STG.4/CON Prevention of audit data loss for the consumer log FAU_GEN.1/CAL Audit data generation for calibration log FAU_SAR.1/CAL Audit review for calibration log FAU_STG.4/CAL Prevention of audit data loss for the calibration log FAU_GEN.2 User identity association FAU_STG.2 Guarantees of audit data availability Class FCO: Communication FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin Class FCS: Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/TLS Cryptographic key generation for TLS FCS_COP.1/TLS Cryptographic operation for TLS FCS_CKM.1/CMS Cryptographic key generation for CMS FCS_COP.1/CMS Cryptographic operation for CMS FCS_CKM.1/MTR Cryptographic key generation for Meter communication encryption FCS_COP.1/MTR Cryptographic operation for Meter communication encryption FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/HASH Cryptographic operation for Signatures FCS_COP.1/MEM Cryptographic operation for TSF and user data encryption page 63 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Class FDP: User Data Protection FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_IFC.2/FW Complete information flow control for firewall FDP_IFF.1/FW Simple security attributes for Firewall FDP_IFC.2/MTR Complete information flow control for Meter information flow FDP_IFF.1/MTR Simple security attributes for Meter information FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action Class FIA: Identification and Authentication FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding Class FMT: Security Management FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles page 64 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_MSA.1/AC Management of security attributes for Gateway access policy FMT_MSA.3/AC Static attribute initialisation for Gateway access policy FMT_MSA.1/FW Management of security attributes for Firewall policy FMT_MSA.3/FW Static attribute initialisation for Firewall policy FMT_MSA.1/MTR Management of security attributes for Meter policy FMT_MSA.3/MTR Static attribute initialisation for Meter policy Class FPR: Privacy FPR_CON.1 Communication Concealing FPR_PSE.1 Pseudonymity Class FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_TST.1 TSF testing FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack Class FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_ITC.1/WAN Inter-TSF trusted channel for WAN FTP_ITC.1/MTR Inter-TSF trusted channel for Meter FTP_ITC.1/USR Inter-TSF trusted channel for User Table 9: List of Security Functional Requirements 1362 page 65 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2Class FAU: Security Audit 1363 6.2.1 Introduction 1364 The TOE compliant to this Security Target shall implement three different audit logs as 1365 defined in OSP.Log and O.Log. The following table provides an overview over the three 1366 audit logs before the following chapters introduce the SFRs related to those audit logs. 1367 System-Log Consumer-Log Calibration-Log Purpose • Inform the Gateway Administrator about security relevant events • Log all events as defined by Common Criteria [CC] for the used SFR • Log all system relevant events on specific functionality • Automated alarms in case of a cumulation of certain events • Inform the Service Technician about the status of the Gateway • Inform the Consumer about all information flows to the WAN • Inform the Consumer about the Processing Profiles • Inform the Consumer about other metering data (not billing-relevant) • Inform the Consumer about all billing-relevant data needed to verify an invoice • Track changes that are relevant for the calibration of the TOE relevant data needed to verify an invoice Data • As defined by CC part 2 • Augmented by specific events for the security functions • Information about all information flows to the WAN • Information about the current and the previous Processing Profiles • Non-billing-relevant Meter Data • Information about the system status (including relevant errors) • Calibration relevant data only page 66 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 10: Overview over audit processes 1368 • Billing-relevant data needed to verify an invoice Access • Access by authorised Gateway Administrator and via IF_GW_WAN only • Events may only be deleted by an authorised Gateway Administrator via IF_GW_WAN • Read access by authorised Service Technician via IF_GW_SRV only • Read access by authorised Consumer and via IF_GW_CON only to the data related to the current consumer • Read access by authorised Gateway Administrator and via IF_GW_WAN only Deletion • Ring buffer. • The availability of data has to be ensured for a sufficient amount of time • Overwriting old events is possible if the memory is full. • Ring buffer. • The availability of data has to be ensured for a sufficient amount of time. • Overwriting old events is possible if the memory is full • Retention period is set by authorised Gateway Administrator on request by consumer, data older than this are deleted. • The availability of data has to be ensured over the lifetime of the TOE. page 67 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.2 Security Requirements for the System Log 1369 6.2.2.1 Security audit automatic response (FAU_ARP) 1370 6.2.2.1.1 FAU_ARP.1/SYS: Security Alarms for system log 1371 FAU_ARP.1.1/SYS The TSF shall take inform an authorised Gateway 1372 Administrator and create a log entry in the system log 33 1373 upon detection of a potential security violation. 1374 Hierarchical to: No other components 1375 Dependencies: FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis 1376 1377 6.2.2.2 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1378 6.2.2.2.1 FAU_GEN.1/SYS: Audit data generation for system log 1379 FAU_GEN.1.1/SYS The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the 1380 following auditable events: 1381 a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; 1382 b) All auditable events for the basic34 level of audit; and 1383 c) other non privacy relevant auditable events: none35. 1384 FAU_GEN.1.2/SYS The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the 1385 following information: 1386 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity 1387 (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the 1388 event; and 1389 b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event 1390 definitions of the functional components included in the 1391 PP/ST36, other audit relevant information: none 37. 1392 33 [assignment: list of actions] 34 [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] 35 [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] 36 [refinement: PP/ST] 37 [assignment: other audit relevant information] page 68 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: No other components 1393 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 1394 6.2.2.3 Security audit analysis (FAU_SAA) 1395 6.2.2.3.1 FAU_SAA.1/SYS: Potential violation analysis for system 1396 log 1397 FAU_SAA.1.1./SYS The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring 1398 the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a 1399 potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs. 1400 FAU_SAA.1.2/SYS The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring 1401 audited events: 1402 a) Accumulation or combination of 1403 • Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions 1404 • all auditable events for the basic level of audit 1405 • all types of failures in the TSF as listed in 1406 FPT_FLS.1 38 1407 known to indicate a potential security violation. 1408 b) any other rules: none 39. 1409 Hierarchical to: No other components 1410 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1411 6.2.2.4 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 1412 6.2.2.4.1 FAU_SAR.1/SYS: Audit Review for system log 1413 FAU_SAR.1.1/SYS The TSF shall provide only authorised Gateway 1414 Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface and 1415 authorised Service Technicians via the IF_GW_SRV 1416 38 [assignment: subset of defined auditable events] 39 [assignment: any other rules] page 69 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland interface 40 with the capability to read all information 41 1417 from the system audit records 42. 1418 FAU_SAR.1.2/SYS The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner 1419 suitable for the user to interpret the information. 1420 Hierarchical to: No other components 1421 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1422 6.2.2.5 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1423 6.2.2.5.1 FAU_STG.4/SYS: Prevention of audit data loss for 1424 systemlog 1425 FAU_STG.4.1/SYS The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records 43 1426 and other actions to be taken in case of audit storage 1427 failure: none 44 if the system audit trail 45 is full. 1428 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 1429 Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1430 Application Note 4: The size of the audit trail that is available before the oldest 1431 events get overwritten is configurable for the Gateway 1432 Administrator. 1433 40 [assignment: authorised users] 41 [assignment: list of audit information] 42 [refinement: audit records] 43 [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] 44 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] 45 [refinement: audit trail] page 70 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.3 Security Requirements for the Consumer Log 1434 6.2.3.1 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1435 6.2.3.1.1 FAU_GEN.1/CON: Audit data generation for consumer log 1436 FAU_GEN.1.1/CON The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the 1437 following auditable events: 1438 a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; 1439 b) All auditable events for the not specified46 level of audit; 1440 and 1441 c) all audit events as listed in Table 11 and additional 1442 events: none 47. 1443 FAU_GEN.1.2/CON The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the 1444 following information: 1445 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity 1446 (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the 1447 event; and 1448 b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event 1449 definitions of the functional components included in the 1450 PP/ST48, additional information as listed in Table 11 and 1451 additional events: none 49. 1452 Hierarchical to: No other components 1453 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 1454 1455 46 [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] 47 [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] 48 [refinement: PP/ST] 49 [assignment: other audit relevant information] page 71 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 11: Events for consumer log 1456 1457 6.2.3.2 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 1458 6.2.3.2.1 FAU_SAR.1/CON: Audit Review for consumer log 1459 FAU_SAR.1.1/CON The TSF shall provide only authorised Consumer via the 1460 IF_GW_CON interface 50 with the capability to read all 1461 50 [assignment: authorised users] Event Additional Information Any change to a Processing Profile The new and the old Processing Profile Any submission of Meter Data to an external entity The Processing Profile that lead to the submission The submitted values Any submission of Meter Data that is not billing- relevant - Billing-relevant data - Any administrative action performed - Relevant system status information including relevant errors - page 72 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland information that are related to them 51 from the consumer 1462 audit records 52. 1463 FAU_SAR.1.2/CON The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner 1464 suitable for the user to interpret the information. 1465 Hierarchical to: No other components 1466 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1467 Application Note 5: FAU_SAR.1.2/CON shall ensure that the Consumer is 1468 able to interpret the information that is provided to him in a 1469 way that allows him to verify the invoice. 1470 6.2.3.3 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1471 6.2.3.3.1 FAU_STG.4/CON: Prevention of audit data loss for the 1472 consumer log 1473 FAU_STG.4.1/CON The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and 1474 interrupt metrological operation in case that the oldest 1475 audit record must still be kept for billing verification 53 if the 1476 consumer audit trail is full. 1477 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 1478 Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1479 Application Note 6: The size of the audit trail that is available before the oldest 1480 events get overwritten is configurable for the Gateway 1481 Administrator. 1482 51 [assignment: list of audit information] 52 [refinement: audit records] 53 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] page 73 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.4 Security Requirements for the Calibration Log 1483 6.2.4.1 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1484 6.2.4.1.1 FAU_GEN.1/CAL: Audit data generation for calibration log 1485 FAU_GEN.1.1/CAL The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the 1486 following auditable events: 1487 a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; 1488 b) All auditable events for the not specified 54 level of audit; 1489 and 1490 c) all calibration-relevant information according to Table 1491 1255. 1492 FAU_GEN.1.2/CAL The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the 1493 following information: 1494 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity 1495 (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the 1496 event; and 1497 b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event 1498 definitions of the functional components included in the 1499 PP/ST 56, other audit relevant information: none 57. 1500 Hierarchical to: No other components 1501 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 1502 Application Note 7: The calibration log serves to fulfil national requirements in 1503 the context of the calibration of the TOE. 1504 1505 54 [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] 55 [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] 56 [refinement: PP/ST] 57 [assignment: other audit relevant information] page 74 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Event / Parameter Content Commissioning Commissioning of the SMGW MUST be logged in calibration log. Event of self-test Initiation of self-test MUST be logged in calibration log. New meter Connection and registration of a new meter MUST be logged in calibration log. Meter removal Removal of a meter from SMGW MUST be logged in calibration log. Change of tarification profiles Every change (incl. parameter change) of a tarification profile according to [TR-03109-1, 4.4], provided the parameter is relevant for calibration regulations (see below) as well as new storage or removal of tarification profiles MUST be logged in calibration log. Parameter relevant for calibration regulations are: • Device-ID of a meter - Unique identifier of the meter, which send the input values for a TAF • OBIS value of the measured variable of the meter - Unique value for the measured variable of the meter for the used TAF • Metering point name - Unique name of the metering point • Billing period - Period in which a billing should be done • Consumer ID • Validity period - Period for which the TAF is booked • Definition of tariff stages - Defines different tariff stages and associated OBIS values. Here it will be defined which tariff stage is valid at the time of rule set activation • Tariff switching time - Defines to the split second the switching of tariff stages. The time points can be defined as periodic values • Register period - Time distance of two consecutive measured value acquisitions for meter readings page 75 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Change of meter profiles Every change (incl. parameter change) of a meter profile according to [TR-03109-1, 4.4], provided the parameter is relevant for calibration regulations (see below) as well as new storage or removal of meter profiles MUST be logged in calibration log. Parameter relevant for legal metrology are: • Device-ID - Unique identifier of the meter according to DIN 43863-5 • Key material - Public key for inner signature (dependent on the used meter in LMN) • Register period - Interval during receipt of meter values • Displaying interval (‘Anzeigeintervall’) - Interval during which the actual meter value (only during display) must be updated in case of bidirectional communication between meter and SMGW • Balancing (‘Saldierend’) - Determines if the meter is balancing (‘saldierend’) and meter values can grow and fall • OBIS values - OBIS values according to IEC-62056-6-1 resp. EN 13757-1 • Converter factor (‘Wandlerfaktor’) - Value is 1 in case of directly connected meter. In usage of converter counter (‘Wandlerzähler’) the value may be different. Software update Every update of the code which touches calibration regulations (serialized COSEM-objects, rules) MUST be logged in calibration log. Firmware update Every firmware update (incl. operating system update if applicable) MUST be logged in calibration log. Error messages of a meter All FATAL messages of a connected meter MUST be logged in calibration log according to 0 - no error 1 - Warning, no action to be done according to calibration authority, meter value valid page 76 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 2 - Temporal error, send meter value will be marked as invalid, the value in meter field (‘Messwertfeld’) could be used according to the rules of [VDE4400] resp. [G865] as replacement value (‘Ersatzwert’) in backend. 3 - Temporal error, send meter value is invalid; the value in the meter field (‘Messwertfeld’) cannot be used as replacement value in backend. 4 - Fatal error (meter defect), actual send value is invalid and all future values will be invalid. including the device-ID. Error messages of a SMGW All self-test and calibration regulations relevant errors MUST be logged in calibration log. Table 12: Content of calibration log 1506 1507 page 77 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.4.2 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 1508 6.2.4.2.1 FAU_SAR.1/CAL: Audit Review for the calibration log 1509 FAU_SAR.1.1/CAL The TSF shall provide only authorised Gateway 1510 Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface 58 with the 1511 capability to read all information 59 from the calibration 1512 audit records 60. 1513 FAU_SAR.1.2/CAL The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner 1514 suitable for the user to interpret the information. 1515 Hierarchical to: No other components 1516 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1517 6.2.4.3 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1518 6.2.4.3.1 FAU_STG.4/CAL: Prevention of audit data loss for 1519 calibration log 1520 FAU_STG.4.1/CAL The TSF shall ignore audited events 61 and stop the 1521 operation of the TOE and inform a Gateway 1522 Administrator 62 if the calibration audit trail 63 is full. 1523 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 1524 Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1525 Application Note 8: As outlined in the introduction it has to be ensured that the 1526 events of the calibration log are available over the lifetime 1527 of the TOE. 1528 58 [assignment: authorised users] 59 [assignment: list of audit information] 60 [refinement: audit records] 61 [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] 62 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] 63 [refinement: audit trail] page 78 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.5 Security Requirements that apply to all logs 1529 6.2.5.1 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1530 6.2.5.1.1 FAU_GEN.2: User identity association 1531 FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, 1532 the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event 1533 with the identity of the user that caused the event. 1534 Hierarchical to: No other components 1535 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1536 FIA_UID.1 1537 Application Note 9: Please note that FAU_GEN.2 applies to all audit logs, the 1538 system log, the calibration log, and the consumer log. 1539 page 79 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.5.2 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1540 6.2.5.2.1 FAU_STG.2: Guarantees of audit data availability 1541 FAU_STG.2.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the all 1542 audit trails 64 from unauthorised deletion. 1543 FAU_STG.2.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent 65 unauthorised 1544 modifications to the stored audit records in the all audit 1545 trails 66. 1546 FAU_STG.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that all 67 stored audit records will be 1547 maintained when the following conditions occur: audit 1548 storage exhaustion or failure 68. 1549 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1550 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1551 Application Note 10: Please note that FAU_STG.2 applies to all audit logs, the 1552 system log, the calibration log, and the consumer log. 1553 64 [refinement: audit trail] 65 [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] 66 [refinement: audit trail] 67 [assignment: metric for saving audit records] 68 [selection: audit storage exhaustion, failure, attack] page 80 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.3Class FCO: Communication 1554 6.3.1 Non-repudiation of origin (FCO_NRO) 1555 6.3.1.1 FCO_NRO.2: Enforced proof of origin 1556 FCO_NRO.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin 1557 for transmitted Meter Data 69 at all times. 1558 FCO_NRO.2.2 The TSF shall be able to relate the key material used for 1559 signature 70, 71 of the originator of the information, and the 1560 signature 72 of the information to which the evidence 1561 applies. 1562 FCO_NRO.2.3 The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of 1563 origin of information to recipient, Consumer 73 given 1564 limitations of the digital signature according to TR-03109- 1565 1 74. 1566 Hierarchical to: FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin 1567 Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 1568 Application Note 11: FCO_NRO.2 requires that the TOE calculates a signature 1569 over Meter Data that is submitted to external entities. 1570 Therefore, the TOE has to create a hash value over the 1571 Data To Be Signed (DTBS) as defined in 1572 FCS_COP.1/HASH. The creation of the actual signature 1573 however is performed by the Security Module. 1574 69 [assignment: list of information types] 70 [assignment: list of attributes] 71 The key material here also represents the identity of the Gateway. 72 [assignment: list of information fields] 73 [selection: originator, recipient, [assignment: list of third parties]] 74 [assignment: limitations on the evidence of origin] page 81 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.4Class FCS: Cryptographic Support 1575 6.4.1 Cryptographic support for TLS 1576 6.4.1.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1577 6.4.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/TLS: Cryptographic key generation for TLS 1578 FCS_CKM.1.1/TLS The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance 1579 with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm 1580 TLS-PRF with SHA-256 or SHA-384 75 and specified 1581 cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 256 bit or 384 bit 76 that 1582 meet the following: [RFC 5246] in combination with 1583 [FIPS Pub. 180-4] and [RFC 2104] 77. 1584 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1585 Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or 1586 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by 1587 FCS_COP .1/TLS 1588 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1589 Application Note 12: The Security Module is used for the generation of random 1590 numbers and for all cryptographic operations with the pri- 1591 vate key of a TLS certificate. 1592 Application Note 13: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1593 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1594 6.4.1.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1595 6.4.1.2.1 FCS_COP.1/TLS: Cryptographic operation for TLS 1596 FCS_COP.1.1/TLS The TSF shall perform TLS encryption, decryption, and 1597 integrity protection 78 in accordance with a specified 1598 cryptographic algorithm TLS cipher suites 1599 75 [assignment: key generation algorithm] 76 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 77 [assignment: list of standards] 78 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] page 82 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 1600 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, 1601 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 1602 and 1603 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 1604 79 using elliptic curves BrainpoolP256r1, BrainpoolP384r1, 1605 BrainpoolP512r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), NIST P-256, 1606 and NIST P-384 (according to [RFC 5114]) and 1607 cryptographic key sizes 128 bit or 256 bit 80 that meet the 1608 following: [RFC 2104], [RFC 5114], [RFC 5246], 1609 [RFC 5289], [RFC 5639], [NIST 800-38A], and [NIST 800- 1610 38D] 81. 1611 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1612 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1613 or 1614 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1615 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1616 FCS_CKM.1/TLS 1617 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1618 Application Note 14: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1619 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1620 6.4.2 Cryptographic support for CMS 1621 6.4.2.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1622 6.4.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/CMS: Cryptographic key generation for CMS 1623 FCS_CKM.1.1/CMS The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance 1624 with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm 1625 ECKA-EG 82 and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 1626 79 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 80 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 81 [assignment: list of standards] 82 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] page 83 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland bit 83 that meet the following: [X9.63] in combination with 1627 [RFC 3565] 84. 1628 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1629 Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or 1630 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by 1631 FCS_COP.1/CMS 1632 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1633 Application Note 15: The TOE utilises the services of its Security Module for the 1634 generation of random numbers and for all cryptographic 1635 operations with the private asymmetric key of a CMS cer- 1636 tificate. 1637 Application Note 16: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1638 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1639 6.4.2.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1640 6.4.2.2.1 FCS_COP.1/CMS: Cryptographic operation for CMS 1641 FCS_COP.1.1/CMS The TSF shall perform 1642 symmetric encryption, decryption and integrity protection 1643 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 1644 AES-CBC-CMAC or AES-GCM 85 and cryptographic key 1645 sizes 128 bit 86 that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197], 1646 83 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 84 [assignment: list of standards] 85 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 86 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] page 84 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [NIST 800-38D], [RFC 4493], [RFC 5084], and [RFC 5652] 1647 in combination with [NIST 800-38A] 87. 1648 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1649 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1650 or 1651 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1652 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1653 FCS_CKM.1/CMS 1654 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1655 Application Note 17: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1656 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1657 6.4.3 Cryptographic support for Meter communication encryption 1658 6.4.3.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1659 6.4.3.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/MTR: Cryptographic key generation for Meter 1660 communication (symmetric encryption) 1661 FCS_CKM.1.1/MTR The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance 1662 with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm 1663 AES-CMAC 88 and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 1664 bit 89 that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197], and 1665 [RFC 4493] 90. 1666 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1667 Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or 1668 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by 1669 FCS_COP.1/MTR 1670 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1671 87 [assignment: list of standards] 88 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] 89 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 90 [assignment: list of standards] page 85 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Application Note 18: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1672 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1673 6.4.3.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1674 6.4.3.2.1 FCS_COP.1/MTR: Cryptographic operation for Meter 1675 communication encryption 1676 FCS_COP.1.1/MTR The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption, decryption, 1677 integrity protection 91 in accordance with a specified 1678 cryptographic algorithm AES-CBC-CMAC 92 and 1679 cryptographic key sizes 128 bit 93 that meet the following: 1680 [FIPS Pub. 197] and [RFC 4493] in combination with 1681 [ISO 10116] 94. 1682 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1683 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1684 or 1685 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1686 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1687 FCS_CKM.1/MTR 1688 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1689 Application Note 19: The ST allows different scenarios of key generation for 1690 Meter communication encryption. Those are: 1691 1. If a TLS encryption is being used, the key 1692 generation/negotiation is as defined by 1693 FCS_CKM.1/TLS. 1694 2. If AES encryption is being used, the key has been 1695 brought into the Gateway via a management 1696 function during the pairing process for the Meter 1697 91 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 92 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 93 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 94 [assignment: list of standards] page 86 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland (see FMT_SMF.1) as defined by 1698 FCS_COP.1/MTR. 1699 Application Note 20: If the connection between the Meter and TOE is 1700 unidirectional, the communication between the Meter and 1701 the TOE is secured by the use of a symmetric AES 1702 encryption. If a bidirectional connection between the Meter 1703 and the TOE is established, the communication is secured 1704 by a TLS channel as described in chapter 6.4.1. As the 1705 TOE shall be interoperable with all kind of Meters, both 1706 kinds of encryption are implemented. 1707 Application Note 21: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1708 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1709 6.4.4 General Cryptographic support 1710 6.4.4.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1711 6.4.4.1.1 FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic key destruction 1712 FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance 1713 with a specified cryptographic key destruction method 1714 Zeroisation 95 that meets the following: none 96. 1715 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1716 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1717 or 1718 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1719 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1720 FCS_CKM.1/TLS and 1721 FCS_CKM.1/CMS and FCS_CKM.1/MTR 1722 Application Note 22: Please note that as against the requirement FDP_RIP.2, 1723 the mechanisms implementing the requirement from 1724 FCS_CKM.4 shall be suitable to avoid attackers with 1725 95 [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] 96 [assignment: list of standards] page 87 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland physical access to the TOE from accessing the keys after 1726 they are no longer used. 1727 6.4.4.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1728 6.4.4.2.1 FCS_COP.1/HASH: Cryptographic operation, hashing for 1729 signatures 1730 FCS_COP.1.1/HASH The TSF shall perform hashing for signature creation and 1731 verification 97 in accordance with a specified cryptographic 1732 algorithm SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 98 and 1733 cryptographic key sizes none 99 that meet the following: 1734 [FIPS Pub. 180-4]100. 1735 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1736 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1737 or 1738 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1739 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation 101] 1740 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1741 Application Note 23: The TOE is only responsible for hashing of data in the 1742 context of digital signatures. The actual signature 1743 operation and the handling (i.e. protection) of the 1744 cryptographic keys in this context is performed by the 1745 Security Module. 1746 Application Note 24: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1747 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1748 97 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 98 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 99 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 100 [assignment: list of standards] 101 The justification for the missing dependency FCS_CKM.1 can be found in chapter 6.12.1.3. page 88 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.4.4.2.2 FCS_COP.1/MEM: Cryptographic operation, encryption of 1749 TSF and user data 1750 FCS_COP.1.1/MEM The TSF shall perform TSF and user data encryption and 1751 decryption 102 in accordance with a specified cryptographic 1752 algorithm AES-XTS 103 and cryptographic key sizes 128 1753 bit 104 that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197] and 1754 [NIST 800-38E] 105. 1755 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1756 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1757 or 1758 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1759 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], not fulfilled s. 1760 Application Note 25 1761 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1762 Application Note 25: Please note that for the key generation process an external 1763 security module is used during TOE production. 1764 Application Note 26: The TOE encrypts its local TSF and user data while it is 1765 not in use (i.e. while stored in a persistent memory). 1766 It shall be noted that this kind of encryption cannot provide 1767 an absolute protection against physical manipulation and 1768 does not aim to. It however contributes to the security 1769 concept that considers the protection that is provided by 1770 the environment. 1771 102 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 103 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 104 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 105 [assignment: list of standards] page 89 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.5Class FDP: User Data Protection 1772 6.5.1 Introduction to the Security Functional Policies 1773 The security functional requirements that are used in the following chapters implicitly 1774 define a set of Security Functional Policies (SFP). These policies are introduced in the 1775 following paragraphs in more detail to facilitate the understanding of the SFRs: 1776 • The Gateway access SFP is an access control policy to control the access to 1777 objects under the control of the TOE. The details of this access control policy 1778 highly depend on the concrete application of the TOE. The access control policy 1779 is described in more detail in [TR-03109-1]. 1780 • The Firewall SFP implements an information flow policy to fulfil the objective 1781 O.Firewall. All requirements around the communication control that the TOE 1782 poses on communications between the different networks are defined in this 1783 policy. 1784 • The Meter SFP implements an information flow policy to fulfil the objective 1785 O.Meter. It defines all requirements concerning how the TOE shall handle Meter 1786 Data. 1787 6.5.2 Gateway Access SFP 1788 6.5.2.1 Access control policy (FDP_ACC) 1789 6.5.2.1.1 FDP_ACC.2: Complete access control 1790 FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 106 on 1791 subjects: external entities in WAN, HAN and LMN 1792 objects: any information that is sent to, from or via 1793 the TOE and any information that is stored in the 1794 TOE 107 and all operations among subjects and 1795 objects covered by the SFP. 1796 FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any 1797 subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by 1798 the TSF are covered by an access control SFP. 1799 106 [assignment: access control SFP] 107 [assignment: list of subjects and objects] page 90 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 1800 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 1801 6.5.2.1.2 FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based access control 1802 FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 108 to 1803 objects based on the following: 1804 subjects: external entities on the WAN, HAN or 1805 LMN side 1806 objects: any information that is sent to, from or via 1807 the TOE 1808 attributes: destination interface 109. 1809 FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if 1810 an operation among controlled subjects and controlled 1811 objects is allowed: 1812 • an authorised Consumer is only allowed to have 1813 read access to his own User Data via the interface 1814 IF_GW_CON, 1815 • an authorised Service Technician is only allowed to 1816 have read access to the system log via the interface 1817 IF_GW_SRV, the Service Technician must not be 1818 allowed to read, modify or delete any other TSF 1819 data, 1820 • an authorised Gateway Administrator is allowed to 1821 interact with the TOE only via IF_GW_WAN, 1822 • only authorised Gateway Administrators are 1823 allowed to establish a wake-up call, 1824 • additional rules governing access among controlled 1825 subjects and controlled objects using controlled 1826 108 [assignment: access control SFP] 109 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes] page 91 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland operations on controlled objects or none: 1827 none 110. 111 1828 FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to 1829 objects based on the following additional rules: none 112. 1830 FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects 1831 based on the following additional rules: 1832 • the Gateway Administrator is not allowed to read 1833 consumption data or the Consumer Log, 1834 • nobody must be allowed to read the symmetric 1835 keys used for encryption 113. 1836 Hierarchical to: No other components 1837 Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 1838 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 1839 6.5.3 Firewall SFP 1840 6.5.3.1 Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC) 1841 6.5.3.1.1 FDP_IFC.2/FW: Complete information flow control for 1842 firewall 1843 FDP_IFC.2.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 114 on the TOE, 1844 external entities on the WAN side, external entities on the 1845 LAN side and all information flowing between them 115 and 1846 all operations that cause that information to flow to and 1847 from subjects covered by the SFP. 1848 110 [assignment: additional rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects or none] 111 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects] 112 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] 113 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] 114 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 115 [assignment: list of subjects and information] page 92 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FDP_IFC.2.2/FW The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any 1849 information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in 1850 the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP. 1851 Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1852 Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes 1853 6.5.3.2 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF) 1854 6.5.3.2.1 FDP_IFF.1/FW: Simple security attributes for Firewall 1855 FDP_IFF.1.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 116 based on the 1856 following types of subject and information security 1857 attributes: 1858 subjects: The TOE and external entities on the 1859 WAN, HAN or LMN side 1860 information: any information that is sent to, from or 1861 via the TOE 1862 attributes: destination_interface (TOE, LMN, HAN 1863 or WAN), source_interface (TOE, LMN, HAN or 1864 WAN), destination_authenticated, 1865 source_authenticated 117. 1866 FDP_IFF.1.2/FW The TSF shall permit an information flow between a 1867 controlled subject and controlled information via a 1868 controlled operation if the following rules hold: 1869 (if source_interface=HAN or 1870 source_interface=TOE) and 1871 destination_interface=WAN and 1872 destination_authenticated = true 1873 Connection establishment is allowed 1874 1875 116 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 117 [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes] page 93 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland if source_interface=LMN and 1876 destination_interface= TOE and 1877 source_authenticated = true 1878 Connection establishment is allowed 1879 1880 if source_interface=TOE and 1881 destination_interface= LMN and 1882 destination_authenticated = true 1883 Connection establishment is allowed 1884 1885 if source_interface=HAN and 1886 destination_interface= TOE and 1887 source_authenticated = true 1888 Connection establishment is allowed 1889 1890 if source_interface=TOE and 1891 destination_interface= HAN and 1892 destination_authenticated = true 1893 Connection establishment is allowed 1894 else 1895 Connection establishment is denied 118. 1896 FDP_IFF.1.3/FW The TSF shall enforce the establishment of a connection 1897 to a configured external entity in the WAN after having 1898 received a wake-up message on the WAN interface 119. 1899 118 [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes] 119 [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules] page 94 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FDP_IFF.1.4/FW The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow 1900 based on the following rules: none 120. 1901 FDP_IFF.1.5/FW The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on 1902 the following rules: none 121. 1903 Hierarchical to: No other components 1904 Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1905 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 1906 Application Note 27: It should be noted that the FDP_IFF.1.1/FW facilitates 1907 different interfaces of the origin and the destination of an 1908 information flow implicitly requires the TOE to implement 1909 physically separate ports for WAN, LMN and HAN. 1910 6.5.4 Meter SFP 1911 6.5.4.1 Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC) 1912 6.5.4.1.1 FDP_IFC.2/MTR: Complete information flow control for 1913 Meter information flow 1914 FDP_IFC.2.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 122 on the TOE, 1915 attached Meters, authorized External Entities in the WAN 1916 and all information flowing between them 123 and all 1917 operations that cause that information to flow to and from 1918 subjects covered by the SFP. 1919 FDP_IFC.2.2/MTR The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any 1920 information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in 1921 the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP. 1922 Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1923 Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes 1924 120 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows] 121 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows] 122 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 123 [assignment: list of subjects and information] page 95 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.5.4.2 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF) 1925 6.5.4.2.1 FDP_IFF.1/MTR: Simple security attributes for Meter 1926 information 1927 FDP_IFF.1.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 124 based on the 1928 following types of subject and information security 1929 attributes: 1930 • subjects: TOE, external entities in WAN, Meters 1931 located in LMN 1932 • information: any information that is sent via the 1933 TOE 1934 • attributes: destination interface, source interface 1935 (LMN or WAN), Processing Profile 125. 1936 FDP_IFF.1.2/MTR The TSF shall permit an information flow between a 1937 controlled subject and controlled information via a 1938 controlled operation if the following rules hold: 1939 • an information flow shall only be initiated if allowed 1940 by a corresponding Processing Profile 126. 1941 FDP_IFF.1.3/MTR The TSF shall enforce the following rules: 1942 • Data received from Meters shall be processed as 1943 defined in the corresponding Processing Profiles, 1944 • Results of processing of Meter Data shall be 1945 submitted to external entities as defined in the 1946 Processing Profiles, 1947 • The internal system time shall be synchronised as 1948 follows: 1949 124 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 125 [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes] 126 [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes] page 96 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland o The TOE shall compare the system time to a 1950 reliable external time source every 24 1951 hours 127. 1952 o If the deviation between the local time and the 1953 remote time is acceptable 128 , the local system 1954 time shall be updated according to the remote 1955 time. 1956 o If the deviation is not acceptable the TOE 1957 shall ensure that any following Meter Data is 1958 not used, stop operation 129 and 1959 inform a Gateway Administrator 130. 1960 FDP_IFF.1.4/MTR The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow 1961 based on the following rules: none 131. 1962 FDP_IFF.1.5/MTR The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on 1963 the following rules: The TOE shall deny any acceptance of 1964 information by external entities in the LMN unless the 1965 authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the Meter Data 1966 could be verified 132. 1967 Hierarchical to: No other components 1968 Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1969 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 1970 Application Note 28: FDP_IFF.1.3 defines that the TOE shall update the local 1971 system time regularly with reliable external time sources if 1972 the deviation is acceptable. In the context of this 1973 functionality two aspects should be mentioned: 1974 127 [assignment: synchronization interval between 1 minute and 24 hours] 128 Please refer to the following application note for a detailed definition of “acceptable”. 129 Please note that this refers to the complete functional operation of the TOE and not only to the update of local time. However, an administrative access shall still be possible. 130 [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules] 131 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows] 132 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows] page 97 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Reliability of external source 1975 There are several ways to achieve the reliability of the 1976 external source. On the one hand, there may be a source 1977 in the WAN that has an acceptable reliability on its own 1978 (e.g. because it is operated by a very trustworthy 1979 organisation (an official legal time issued by the calibration 1980 authority would be a good example for such a source133)). 1981 On the other hand a developer may choose to maintain 1982 multiple external sources that all have a certain level of 1983 reliability but no absolute reliability. When using such 1984 sources the TOE shall contact more than one source and 1985 harmonize the results in order to ensure that no attack 1986 happened. 1987 Acceptable deviation 1988 For the question whether a deviation between the time 1989 source(s) in the WAN and the local system time is still 1990 acceptable, normative or legislative regulations shall be 1991 considered. If no regulation exists, a maximum deviation of 1992 3% of the measuring period is allowed to be in 1993 conformance with [PP_GW]. It should be noted that 1994 depending on the kind of application a more accurate 1995 system time is needed. For doing so, the intervall for the 1996 comparison of the system time to a reliable external time 1997 source is configurable. But this aspect is not within the 1998 scope of this Security Target. 1999 Please further note that – depending on the exactness of 2000 the local clock – it may be required to synchronize the time 2001 more often than every 24 hours. 2002 Application Note 29: In FDP_IFF.1.5/MTR the TOE is required to verify the 2003 authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the Meter Data 2004 133 By the time that this ST is developed however, this time source is not yet available. page 98 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland received from the Meter. The TOE has two options to do 2005 so: 2006 1. To implement a channel between the Meter and the 2007 TOE using the functionality as described in 2008 FCS_COP.1/TLS. 2009 2. To accept, decrypt and verify data that has been 2010 encrypted by the Meter as required in 2011 FCS_COP.1/MTR if a wireless connection to the 2012 meters is established. 2013 The latter possibility can be used only if a wireless 2014 connection between the Meter and the TOE is established. 2015 6.5.5 General Requirements on user data protection 2016 6.5.5.1 Residual information protection (FDP_RIP) 2017 6.5.5.1.1 FDP_RIP.2: Full residual information protection 2018 FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information 2019 content of a resource is made unavailable upon the 2020 deallocation of the resource from 134 all objects. 2021 Hierarchical to: FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection 2022 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2023 Application Note 30: Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more 2024 detailed information about what kind of information this 2025 requirement applies to. 2026 Please further note that this SFR has been used in order 2027 to ensure that information that is no longer used is made 2028 unavailable from a logical perspective. Specifically, it has 2029 to be ensured that this information is no longer available 2030 via an external interface (even if an access control or 2031 information flow policy would fail). However, this does not 2032 necessarily mean that the information is overwritten in a 2033 134 [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] page 99 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland way that makes it impossible for an attacker to get access 2034 to is assuming a physical access to the memory of the 2035 TOE. 2036 6.5.5.2 Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI) 2037 6.5.5.2.1 FDP_SDI.2: Stored data integrity monitoring and action 2038 FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers 2039 controlled by the TSF for integrity errors 135 on all objects, 2040 based on the following attributes: cryptographical check 2041 sum 136. 2042 FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall 2043 create a system log entry137. 2044 Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring 2045 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2046 6.6Class FIA: Identification and Authentication 2047 6.6.1 User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD) 2048 6.6.1.1 FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition 2049 FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security 2050 attributes belonging to individual users: 2051 • User Identity 2052 • Status of Identity (Authenticated or not) 2053 • Connecting network (WAN, HAN or LMN) 2054 • Role membership 2055 • none 138. 2056 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2057 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2058 135 [assignment: integrity errors] 136 [assignment: user data attributes] 137 [assignment: action to be taken] 138 [assignment: list of security attributes] page 100 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.6.2 Authentication Failures (FIA_AFL) 2059 6.6.2.1 FIA_AFL.1: Authentication failure handling 2060 FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 5 139 unsuccessful 2061 authentication attempts occur related to authentication 2062 attempts at IF_GW_CON 140. 2063 FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication 2064 attempts has been met 141, the TSF shall block 2065 IF_GW_CON for 5 minutes 142. 2066 Hierarchical to: No other components 2067 Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication 2068 6.6.3 User Authentication (FIA_UAU) 2069 6.6.3.1 FIA_UAU.2: User authentication before any action 2070 FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully 2071 authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated 2072 actions on behalf of that user. 2073 Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 2074 Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 2075 Application Note 31: Please refer to [TR-03109-1] for a more detailed overview 2076 on the authentication of TOE users. 2077 6.6.3.2 FIA_UAU.5: Multiple authentication mechanisms 2078 FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide 2079 • authentication via certificates at the IF_GW_MTR 2080 interface 2081 • TLS-authentication via certificates at the 2082 IF_GW_WAN interface 2083 139 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] 140 [assignment: list of authentication events] 141 [selection: met, surpassed] 142 [assignment: list of actions] page 101 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • TLS-authentication via HAN-certificates at the 2084 IF_GW_CON interface 2085 • authentication via password at the IF_GW_CON 2086 interface 2087 • TLS-authentication via HAN-certificates at the 2088 IF_GW_SRV interface 2089 • authentication at the IF_GW_CLS interface 2090 • verification via a commands' signature 143 2091 to support user authentication. 2092 FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity 2093 according to the 2094 • meters shall be authenticated via certificates at the 2095 IF_GW_MTR interface only 2096 • Gateway Administrators shall be authenticated via 2097 TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_WAN interface only 2098 • Consumers shall be authenticated via TLS- 2099 certificates or via password at the IF_GW_CON 2100 interface only 2101 • Service Technicians shall be authenticated via 2102 TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_SRV interface only 2103 • CLS shall be authenticated at the IF_GW_CLS only 2104 • each command of an Gateway Administrator shall 2105 be authenticated by verification of the commands' 2106 signature, 2107 • other external entities shall be authenticated via 2108 TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_WAN interface 2109 only 144. 2110 143 [assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms] 144 [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication] page 102 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: No other components. 2111 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2112 Application Note 32: Please refer to [TR-03109-1] for a more detailed overview 2113 on the authentication of TOE users. 2114 6.6.3.3 FIA_UAU.6: Re-authenticating 2115 FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate an external entity 145 under 2116 the conditions 2117 • TLS channel to the WAN shall be disconnected 2118 after 48 hours, 2119 • TLS channel to the LMN shall be disconnected after 2120 5 MB of transmitted information, 2121 • other local users shall be re-authenticated after at 2122 least 10 minutes146 of inactivity 147. 2123 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2124 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2125 Application Note 33: This requirement on re-authentication for external entities 2126 in the WAN and LMN is addressed by disconnecting the 2127 TLS channel even though a re-authentication is - strictly 2128 speaking - only achieved if the TLS channel is build up 2129 again. 2130 6.6.4 User identification (FIA_UID) 2131 6.6.4.1 FIA_UID.2: User identification before any action 2132 FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully 2133 identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions 2134 on behalf of that user. 2135 Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 2136 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2137 145 [refinement: the user] 146 [refinement: after at least 10 minutes]. This value is configurable by the authorised Gateway Administrator. 147 [assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required] page 103 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.6.5 User-subject binding (FIA_USB) 2138 6.6.5.1 FIA_USB.1: User-subject binding 2139 FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security 2140 attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: 2141 attributes as defined in FIA_ATD.1 148. 2142 FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial 2143 association of user security attributes with subjects acting 2144 on the behalf of users: 2145 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘connecting 2146 network’ is set to the corresponding physical 2147 interface of the TOE (HAN, WAN, or LMN). 2148 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘role 2149 membership’ is set to the user role claimed on basis 2150 of the credentials used for authentication at the 2151 connecting network as defined in FIA_UAU.5.2. For 2152 role membership ‘Gateway Administrators’, 2153 additionally the remote network endpoint 149used 2154 and configured in the TSF data must be identical. 2155 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘user 2156 identity’ is set to the identification attribute of the 2157 credentials used by the subject. The security 2158 attribute ‘user identity’ is set to the subject key ID of 2159 the certificate in case of a certificate-based 2160 authentication, the meter-ID for wired Meters and 2161 the user name owner in case of a password-based 2162 authentication at interface IF_GW_CON. 2163 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘status of 2164 identity’ is set to the authentication status of the 2165 claimed identity. If the authentication is successful 2166 on basis of the used credentials, the status of 2167 148 [assignment: list of user security attributes] 149 The remote network endpoint can be either the remote IP address or the remote host name. page 104 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland identity is ‘authenticated’, otherwise it is 2168 ‘not authenticated’ 150. 2169 FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing 2170 changes to the user security attributes associated with 2171 subjects acting on the behalf of users: 2172 • security attribute ‘connecting network’ is not 2173 changeable. 2174 • security attribute ‘role membership’ is not 2175 changeable. 2176 • security attribute ‘user identity’ is not changeable. 2177 • security attribute ‘status of identity’ is not 2178 changeable151. 2179 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2180 Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition 2181 6.7Class FMT: Security Management 2182 6.7.1 Management of the TSF 2183 6.7.1.1 Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF) 2184 6.7.1.1.1 FMT_MOF.1: Management of security functions 2185 behaviour 2186 FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behaviour 2187 of 152 the functions for management as defined in 2188 150 [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes] 151 [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes] 152 [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] page 105 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_SMF.1 153 to roles and criteria as defined in Table 2189 13 154. 2190 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2191 Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2192 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2193 Table 13: Restrictions on Management Functions 2194 153 [assignment: list of functions] 154 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 155 The TOE displays the version number of the TOE and the current time of the TOE also to the authorized service techni- cian via the interface IF_GW_SRV because the service technician must be able to determine if the current time of the TOE is correct or if the version number of the TOE is correct. 156 This criterion applies to all management functions. The following entries in this table only augment this restriction further. Function Limitation Display the version number of the TOE Display the current time The management functions must only be accessible for an authorised Consumer and only via the interface IF_GW_CON. An authorized Service Technician is also able to access the version numer of the TOE and the current time of the TOE via interface IF_GW_SRV 155. All other management functions as defined in FMT_SMF.1 The management functions must only be accessible for an authorised Gateway Administrator and only via the interface IF_GW_WAN 156. Firmware Update The firmware update must only be possible after the authenticity of the firmware update has been verified (using the services of the Security Module and the trust anchor of the Gateway developer) and if the version number of the new firmware is higher to the version of the installed firmware. Deletion or modification of events from the Calibration Log A deletion or modification of events from the calibration log must not be possible. page 106 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.7.1.2 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF) 2195 6.7.1.2.1 FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions 2196 FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following 2197 management functions: list of management functions as 2198 defined in Table 14 and Table 15 and additional 2199 functionalities: none 157. 2200 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2201 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2202 157 [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF] 158 The TOE does not have the indicated management ability since there exist no standard method calls for the Gateway Administrator to enforce such management ability. 159 As the rules for audit review are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. SFR Management functionality FAU_ARP.1/SYS • The management (addition, removal, or modification) of actions 158 FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/CON FAU_GEN.1/CAL - FAU_SAA.1/SYS • Maintenance of the rules by (adding, modifying, deletion) of rules from the set of rules 158 FAU_SAR.1/SYS FAU_SAR.1/CON FAU_SAR.1/CAL - 159 FAU_STG.4/SYS FAU_STG.4/CON • Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure 158 • Size configuration of the audit trail that is available before the oldest events get overwritten 158 page 107 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 160 As the actions that shall be performed if the audit trail is full are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. FAU_STG.4/CAL - 160 FAU_GEN.2 - FAU_STG.2 • Maintenance of the parameters that control the audit storage capability for the consumer log and the system log 158 FCO_NRO.2 • The management of changes to information types, fields, 158 originator attributes and recipients of evidence FCS_CKM.1/TLS - FCS_COP.1/TLS • Management of key material including key material stored in the Security Module FCS_CKM.1/CMS - FCS_COP.1/CMS • Management of key material including key material stored in the Security Module FCS_CKM.1/MTR - FCS_COP.1/MTR • Management of key material stored in the Security Module and key material brought into the gateway during the pairing process FCS_CKM.4 - FCS_COP.1/HASH - FCS_COP.1/MEM • Management of key material FDP_ACC.2 - FDP_ACF.1 - FDP_IFC.2/FW - page 108 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 161 In the assignment it is not indicated that the authorized Gateway Administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users. 162 As the rules for re-authentication are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. FDP_IFF.1/FW • Managing the attributes used to make explicit access based decisions • Add authorised units for communication (pairing) • Management of endpoint to be contacted after successful wake-up call • Management of CLS systems FDP_IFC.2/MTR - FDP_IFF.1/MTR • Managing the attributes (including Processing Profiles) used to make explicit access based decisions FDP_RIP.2 - FDP_SDI.2 • The actions to be taken upon the detection of an integrity error shall be configurable. 158 FIA_ATD.1 • If so indicated in the assignment, the authorised Gateway Administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users161. FIA_AFL.1 • Management of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication attempts 158 • Management of actions to be taken in the event of an authentication failure 158 FIA_UAU.2 • Management of the authentication data by an Gateway Administrator FIA_UAU.5 - 162 FIA_UAU.6 • Management of re-authentication time page 109 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 163 As the role that can interact with the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply. 164 As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 165 As the role that can read, modify, delete or add the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply. 166 As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 167 As the role that can read, modify, delete or add the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply. FIA_UID.2 • The management of the user identities FIA_USB.1 • An authorised Gateway Administrator can define default subject security attributes, if so indicated in the assignment of FIA_ATD.1. 158 • An authorised Gateway Administrator can change subject security attributes, if so indicated in the assignment of FIA_ATD.1. 158 FMT_MOF.1 • Managing the group of roles that can interact with the functions in the TSF FMT_SMF.1 - FMT_SMR.1 • Managing the group of users that are part of a role FMT_MSA.1/AC • Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values 163 158 FMT_MSA.3/AC - 164 FMT_MSA.1/FW • Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values 165 158 FMT_MSA.3/FW - 166 FMT_MSA.1/MTR • Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values 167 158 page 110 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 14: SFR related Management Functionalities 2203 168 As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 169 As the rules for TSF testing are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 170 As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply. 171 As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply. 172 As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply. FMT_MSA.3/MTR - 168 FPR_CON.1 • Definition of the interval in FPR_CON.1.2 if definable within the operational phase of the TOE 158 FPR_PSE.1 - FPT_FLS.1 - FPT_RPL.1 - FPT_STM.1 • Management a time source FPT_TST.1 - 169 FPT_PHP.1 • Management of the user or role that determines whether physical tampering has occurred 158 FTP_ITC.1/WAN - 170 FTP_ITC.1/MTR - 171 FTP_ITC.1/USR - 172 page 111 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 2204 Table 15: Gateway specific Management Functionalities 2205 6.7.2 Security management roles (FMT_SMR) 2206 6.7.2.1 FMT_SMR.1: Security roles 2207 FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles authorised Consumer, 2208 authorised Gateway Administrator, authorised Service 2209 Technician, the authorised identified roles: authorised 2210 external entity, CLS, and Meter 174. 2211 FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. 2212 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2213 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2214 173 Resetting the TOE will be necessary when the TOE stopped operation due to a critical deviation between local and remote time (see FDP_IFF.1.3/MTR)or when the calibration log is full. 174 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] Gateway specific Management functionality Pairing of a Meter Performing a firmware update Displaying the current version number of the TOE Displaying the current time Management of certificates of external entities in the WAN for communication Resetting of the TOE 173 page 112 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.7.3 Management of security attributes for Gateway access SFP 2215 6.7.3.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA) 2216 6.7.3.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/AC: Management of security attributes for 2217 Gateway access SFP 2218 FMT_MSA.1.1/AC The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 175 to 2219 restrict the ability to query, modify, delete, other 2220 operations: none 176 the security attributes all relevant 2221 security attributes 177 to authorised Gateway 2222 Administrators 178. 2223 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2224 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 2225 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by 2226 FDP_ACC.2 2227 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2228 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2229 6.7.3.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/AC: Static attribute initialisation for Gateway 2230 access SFP 2231 FMT_MSA.3.1/AC The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 179 to 2232 provide restrictive 180 default values for security attributes 2233 that are used to enforce the SFP. 2234 FMT_MSA.3.2/AC The TSF shall allow the no role 181 to specify alternative 2235 initial values to override the default values when an object 2236 or information is created. 2237 175 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 176 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 177 [assignment: list of security attributes] 178 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 179 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 180 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] 181 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] page 113 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: No other components. 2238 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 2239 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2240 6.7.4 Management of security attributes for Firewall SFP 2241 6.7.4.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA) 2242 6.7.4.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/FW: Management of security attributes for 2243 firewall policy 2244 FMT_MSA.1.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 182 to restrict the 2245 ability to query, modify, delete, other operations: none 183 2246 the security attributes all relevant security attributes 184 to 2247 authorised Gateway Administrators 185. 2248 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2249 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 2250 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by 2251 FDP_IFC.2/FW 2252 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2253 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2254 6.7.4.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/FW: Static attribute initialisation for Firewall 2255 policy 2256 FMT_MSA.3.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 186 to provide 2257 restrictive 187 default values for security attributes that are 2258 used to enforce the SFP. 2259 182 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 183 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 184 [assignment: list of security attributes] 185 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 186 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 187 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] page 114 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_MSA.3.2/FW The TSF shall allow the no role 188 to specify alternative 2260 initial values to override the default values when an object 2261 or information is created. 2262 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2263 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 2264 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2265 Application Note 34: The definition of restrictive default rules for the firewall 2266 information flow policy refers to the rules as defined in 2267 FDP_IFF.1.2/FW and FDP_IFF.1.5/FW. Those rules apply 2268 to all information flows and must not be overwritable by 2269 anybody. 2270 6.7.5 Management of security attributes for Meter SFP 2271 6.7.5.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA) 2272 6.7.5.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/MTR: Management of security attributes for 2273 Meter policy 2274 FMT_MSA.1.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 189 to restrict the 2275 ability to change_default, query, modify, delete, other 2276 operations: none 190 the security attributes all relevant 2277 security attributes 191 to authorised Gateway 2278 Administrators 192. 2279 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2280 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 2281 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by 2282 FDP_IFC.2/FW 2283 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2284 188 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 189 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 190 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 191 [assignment: list of security attributes] 192 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] page 115 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2285 6.7.5.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/MTR: Static attribute initialisation for Meter 2286 policy 2287 FMT_MSA.3.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 193 to provide 2288 restrictive 194 default values for security attributes that are 2289 used to enforce the SFP. 2290 FMT_MSA.3.2/MTR The TSF shall allow the no role 195 to specify alternative 2291 initial values to override the default values when an object 2292 or information is created. 2293 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2294 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 2295 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2296 2297 6.8Class FPR: Privacy 2298 6.8.1 Communication Concealing (FPR_CON) 2299 6.8.1.1 FPR_CON.1: Communication Concealing 2300 FPR_CON.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 196 in order to 2301 ensure that no personally identifiable information (PII) can 2302 be obtained by an analysis of frequency, load, size or the 2303 absence of external communication 197. 2304 FPR_CON.1.2 The TSF shall connect to the Gateway Administrator, 2305 authorized External Entity in the WAN 198 in intervals as 2306 193 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 194 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] 195 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 196 [assignment: information flow policy] 197 [assignment: characteristics of the information flow that need to be concealed] 198 [assignment: list of external entities] page 116 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland follows daily, other interval: none 199 to conceal the data 2307 flow200. 2308 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2309 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2310 6.8.2 Pseudonymity (FPR_PSE) 2311 6.8.2.1 FPR_PSE.1 Pseudonymity 2312 FPR_PSE.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that external entities in the WAN 201 2313 are unable to determine the real user name bound to 2314 information neither relevant for billing nor for a secure 2315 operation of the Grid sent to parties in the WAN 202. 2316 FPR_PSE.1.2 The TSF shall be able to provide aliases as defined by the 2317 Processing Profiles 203 of the real user name for the 2318 Meter and Gateway identity 204 to external entities in the 2319 WAN 205. 2320 FPR_PSE.1.3 The TSF shall determine an alias for a user 206 and verify 2321 that it conforms to the alias given by the Gateway 2322 Administrator in the Processing Profile207. 2323 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2324 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2325 Application Note 35: When the TOE submits information about the consumption 2326 or production of a certain commodity that is not relevant for 2327 the billing process nor for a secure operation of the Grid, 2328 there is no need that this information is sent with a direct 2329 199 [selection: weekly, daily, hourly, [assignment: other interval]] 200 The TOE uses a randomized value of about ±50 percent per delivery. 201 [assignment: set of users and/or subjects] 202 [assignment: list of subjects and/or operations and/or objects] 203 [assignment: number of aliases] 204 [refinement: of the real user name] 205 [assignment: list of subjects] 206 [selection, choose one of: determine an alias for a user, accept the alias from the user] 207 [assignment: alias metric] page 117 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland link to the identity of the consumer. In those cases, the 2330 TOE shall replace the identity of the Consumer by a 2331 pseudonymous identifier. Please note that the identity of 2332 the Consumer may not be their name but could also be a 2333 number (e.g. consumer ID) used for billing purposes. 2334 A Gateway may use more than one pseudonymous 2335 identifier. 2336 A complete anonymisation would be beneficial in terms of 2337 the privacy of the consumer. However, a complete 2338 anonymous set of information would not allow the external 2339 entity to ensure that the data comes from a trustworthy 2340 source. 2341 Please note that an information flow shall only be initiated 2342 if allowed by a corresponding Processing Profile. 2343 2344 6.9Class FPT: Protection of the TSF 2345 6.9.1 Fail secure (FPT_FLS) 2346 6.9.1.1 FPT_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state 2347 FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following 2348 types of failures occur: 2349 • the deviation between local system time of the TOE 2350 and the reliable external time source is too large, 2351 • TOE hardware / firmware integrity violation or 2352 • TOE software application integrity violation 208. 2353 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2354 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2355 Application Note 36: The local clock shall be as exact as required by normative 2356 or legislative regulations. If no regulation exists, a 2357 208 [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF] page 118 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland maximum deviation of 3% of the measuring period is 2358 allowed to be in conformance with [PP_GW]. 2359 6.9.2 Replay Detection (FPT_RPL) 2360 6.9.2.1 FPT_RPL.1: Replay detection 2361 FPT_RPL.1.1 The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: all 2362 external entities 209. 2363 FPT_RPL.1.2 The TSF shall perform ignore replayed data 210 when 2364 replay is detected. 2365 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2366 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2367 6.9.3 Time stamps (FPT_STM) 2368 6.9.3.1 FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps 2369 FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. 2370 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2371 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2372 2373 6.9.4 TSF self test (FPT_TST) 2374 6.9.4.1 FPT_TST.1: TSF testing 2375 FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial startup, 2376 at the request of a user and periodically during normal 2377 operation 211 to demonstrate the correct operation of the 2378 TSF 212. 2379 209 [assignment: list of identified entities] 210 [assignment: list of specific actions] 211 [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] 212 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF] page 119 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability 2380 to verify the integrity of TSF data 213. 2381 FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability 2382 to verify the integrity of TSF 214. 2383 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2384 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2385 6.9.5 TSF physical protection (FPT_PHP) 2386 6.9.5.1 FPT_PHP.1: Passive detection of physical attack 2387 FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical 2388 tampering that might compromise the TSF. 2389 FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether 2390 physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF 2391 elements has occurred. 2392 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2393 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2394 2395 6.10 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels 2396 6.10.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC) 2397 6.10.1.1 FTP_ITC.1/WAN: Inter-TSF trusted channel for WAN 2398 FTP_ITC.1.1/WAN The TSF shall provide a communication channel between 2399 itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct 2400 from other communication channels and provides assured 2401 identification of its end points and protection of the channel 2402 data from modification or disclosure. 2403 213 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data] 214 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF] page 120 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FTP_ITC.1.2/WAN The TSF shall permit the TSF 215 to initiate communication 2404 via the trusted channel. 2405 FTP_ITC.1.3/WAN The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted 2406 channel for all communications to external entities in the 2407 WAN 216. 2408 Hierarchical to: No other components 2409 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2410 6.10.1.2 FTP_ITC.1/MTR: Inter-TSF trusted channel for Meter 2411 FTP_ITC.1.1/MTR The TSF shall provide a communication channel between 2412 itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct 2413 from other communication channels and provides assured 2414 identification of its end points and protection of the channel 2415 data from modification or disclosure. 2416 FTP_ITC.1.2/MTR The TSF shall permit the Meter and the TOE 217 to initiate 2417 communication via the trusted channel. 2418 FTP_ITC.1.3/MTR The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted 2419 channel for any communication between a Meter and the 2420 TOE 218. 2421 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2422 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2423 Application Note 37: The corresponding cryptographic primitives are defined by 2424 FCS_COP.1/MTR. 2425 6.10.1.3 FTP_ITC.1/USR: Inter-TSF trusted channel for User 2426 FTP_ITC.1.1/USR The TSF shall provide a communication channel between 2427 itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct 2428 from other communication channels and provides assured 2429 215 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] 216 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required] 217 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] 218 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required] page 121 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland identification of its end points and protection of the channel 2430 data from modification or disclosure. 2431 FTP_ITC.1.2/USR The TSF shall permit the Consumer, the Service 2432 Technician 219 to initiate communication via the trusted 2433 channel. 2434 FTP_ITC.1.3/USR The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted 2435 channel for any communication between a Consumer and 2436 the TOE and the Service Technician and the TOE 220. 2437 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2438 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2439 2440 6.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE 2441 The minimum Evaluation Assurance Level for this Security Target is EAL 4 augmented 2442 by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2. The following table lists the assurance components 2443 which are therefore applicable to this ST. 2444 Assurance Class Assurance Component Development ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.4 ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.3 Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1 Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 219 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] 220 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required] page 122 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Assurance Class Assurance Component ALC_CMS.4 ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DVS.1 ALC_LCD.1 ALC_TAT.1 ALC_FLR.2 Security Target Evaluation ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1 ASE_INT.1 ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_REQ.2 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_TSS.1 Tests ATE_COV.2 ATE_DPT.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2 Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.5 Table 16: Assurance Requirements 2445 page 123 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12 Security Requirements rationale 2446 6.12.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale 2447 6.12.1.1 Fulfilment of the Security Objectives 2448 This chapter proves that the set of security requirements (TOE) is suited to fulfil the 2449 security objectives described in chapter 4 and that each SFR can be traced back to the 2450 security objectives. At least one security objective exists for each security requirement. 2451 O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FAU_ARP.1/SYS X FAU_GEN.1/SYS X FAU_SAA.1/SYS X FAU_SAR.1/SYS X FAU_STG.4/SYS X FAU_GEN.1/CON X FAU_SAR.1/CON X FAU_STG.4/CON X FAU_GEN.1/CAL X FAU_SAR.1/CAL X FAU_STG.4/CAL X FAU_GEN.2 X FAU_STG.2 X FCO_NRO.2 X page 124 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FCS_CKM.1/TLS X FCS_COP.1/TLS X FCS_CKM.1/CMS X FCS_COP.1/CMS X FCS_CKM.1/MTR X FCS_COP.1/MTR X FCS_CKM.4 X FCS_COP.1/HASH X FCS_COP.1/MEM X X FDP_ACC.2 X FDP_ACF.1 X FDP_IFC.2/FW X X FDP_IFF.1/FW X X FDP_IFC.2/MTR X X FDP_IFF.1/MTR X X FDP_RIP.2 X FDP_SDI.2 X FIA_ATD.1 X page 125 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FIA_AFL.1 X FIA_UAU.2 X FIA_UAU.5 X FIA_UAU.6 X FIA_UID.2 X FIA_USB.1 X FMT_MOF.1 X FMT_SMF.1 X FMT_SMR.1 X FMT_MSA.1/AC X FMT_MSA.3/AC X FMT_MSA.1/FW X FMT_MSA.3/FW X FMT_MSA.1/MTR X FMT_MSA.3/MTR X FPR_CON.1 X FPR_PSE.1 X FPT_FLS.1 X page 126 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FPT_RPL.1 X FPT_STM.1 X X FPT_TST.1 X X FPT_PHP.1 X FTP_ITC.1/WAN X FTP_ITC.1/MTR X FTP_ITC.1/USR X Table 17: Fulfilment of Security Objectives 2452 The following paragraphs contain more details on this mapping. 2453 6.12.1.1.1 O.Firewall 2454 O.Firewall is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2455 • FDP_IFC.2/FW defines that the TOE shall implement an information flow policy 2456 for its firewall functionality. 2457 • FDP_IFF.1/FW defines the concrete rules for the firewall information flow policy. 2458 • FTP_ITC.1/WAN defines the policy around the trusted channel to parties in the 2459 WAN. 2460 6.12.1.1.2 O.SeparateIF 2461 O.SeparateIF is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2462 • FDP_IFC.2/FW and FDP_IFF.1/FW implicitly require the TOE to implement 2463 physically separate ports for WAN and LMN. 2464 • FPT_TST.1 implements a self test that also detects whether the ports for WAN 2465 and LAN have been interchanged. 2466 page 127 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12.1.1.3 O.Conceal 2467 O.Conceal is completely met by FPR_CON.1 as directly follows. 2468 6.12.1.1.4 O.Meter 2469 O.Meter is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2470 • FDP_IFC.2/MTR and FDP_IFF.1/MTR define an information flow policy to 2471 introduce how the Gateway shall handle Meter Data. 2472 • FCO_NRO.2 ensure that all Meter Data will be signed by the Gateway (invoking 2473 the services of its Security Module) before being submitted to external entities. 2474 • FPR_PSE.1 defines requirements around the pseudonymization of Meter 2475 identities for Status data. 2476 • FTP_ITC.1/MTR defines the requirements around the Trusted Channel that 2477 shall be implemented by the Gateway in order to protect information submitted 2478 via the Gateway and external entities in the WAN or the Gateway and a 2479 distributed Meter. 2480 2481 page 128 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12.1.1.5 O.Crypt 2482 O.Crypt is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2483 • FCS_CKM.4 defines the requirements around the secure deletion of ephemeral 2484 cryptographic keys. 2485 • FCS_CKM.1/TLS defines the requirements on key negotiation for the TLS 2486 protocol. 2487 • FCS_CKM.1/CMS defines the requirements on key generation for symmetric 2488 encryption within CMS. 2489 • FCS_COP.1/TLS defines the requirements around the encryption and 2490 decryption capabilities of the Gateway for communications with external parties 2491 and to Meters. 2492 • FCS_COP.1/CMS defines the requirements around the encryption and 2493 decryption of content and administration data. 2494 • FCS_CKM.1/MTR defines the requirements on key negotiation for meter com- 2495 munication encryption. 2496 • FCS_COP.1/MTR defines the cryptographic primitives for meter 2497 communication encryption. 2498 • FCS_COP.1/HASH defines the requirements on hashing that are needed in the 2499 context of digital signatures (which are created and verified by the Security 2500 Module). 2501 • FCS_COP.1/MEM defines the requirements around the encryption of TSF data. 2502 • FPT_RPL.1 ensures that a replay attack for communications with external 2503 entities is detected. 2504 6.12.1.1.6 O.Time 2505 O.Time is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2506 • FDP_IFC.2/MTR and FDP_IFF.1/MTR define the required update functionality 2507 for the local time as part of the information flow control policy for handling Meter 2508 Data. 2509 • FPT_STM.1 defines that the TOE shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. 2510 2511 page 129 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12.1.1.7 O.Protect 2512 O.Protect is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2513 • FCS_COP.1/MEM defines that the TOE shall encrypt its TSF and user data as 2514 long as it is not in use. 2515 • FDP_RIP.2 defines that the TOE shall make information unavailable as soon 2516 as it is no longer needed. 2517 • FDP_SDI.2 defines requirements around the integrity protection for stored data. 2518 • FPT_FLS.1 defines requirements that the TOE falls back to a safe state for 2519 specific error cases. 2520 • FPT_TST.1 defines the self testing functionality to detect whether the interfaces 2521 for WAN and LAN are separate. 2522 • FPT_PHP.1 defines the exact requirements around the physical protection that 2523 the TOE has to provide. 2524 6.12.1.1.8 O.Management 2525 O.Management is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2526 • FIA_ATD.1 defines the attributes for users. 2527 • FIA_AFL.1 defines the requirements if the authentication of users fails multiple 2528 times. 2529 • FIA_UAU.2 defines requirements around the authentication of users. 2530 • FIA_UID.2 defines requirements around the identification of users. 2531 • FIA_USB.1 defines that the TOE must be able to associate users with subjects 2532 acting on behalf of them. 2533 • FMT_MOF.1 defines requirements around the limitations for management of 2534 security functions. 2535 • FMT_MSA.1/AC defines requirements around the limitations for management 2536 of attributes used for the Gateway access SFP. 2537 • FMT_MSA.1/FW defines requirements around the limitations for management 2538 of attributes used for the Firewall SFP. 2539 • FMT_MSA.1/MTR defines requirements around the limitations for management 2540 of attributes used for the Meter SFP. 2541 • FMT_MSA.3/AC defines the default values for the Gateway access SFP. 2542 • FMT_MSA.3/FW defines the default values for the Firewall SFP. 2543 • FMT_MSA.3/MTR defines the default values for the Meter SFP. 2544 page 130 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • FMT_SMF.1 defines the management functionalities that the TOE must offer. 2545 • FMT_SMR.1 defines the role concept for the TOE. 2546 6.12.1.1.9 O.Log 2547 O.Log defines that the TOE shall implement three different audit processes that are 2548 covered by the Security Functional Requirements as follows: 2549 System Log 2550 The implementation of the system log itself is covered by the use of FAU_GEN.1/SYS. 2551 FAU_ARP.1/SYS and FAU_SAA.1/SYS allow to define a set of criteria for automated 2552 analysis of the audit and a corresponding response. FAU_SAR.1/SYS defines the 2553 requirements around the audit review functions and that access to them shall be limited 2554 to authorised Gateway Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface and to authorised 2555 Service Technicians via the IF_GW_SRV interface. Finally, FAU_STG.4/SYS defines 2556 the requirements on what should happen if the audit log is full. 2557 Consumer Log 2558 The implementation of the consumer log itself is covered by the use of 2559 FAU_GEN.1/CON. FAU_STG.4/CON defines the requirements on what should happen 2560 if the audit log is full. FAU_SAR.1/CON defines the requirements around the audit review 2561 functions for the consumer log and that access to them shall be limited to authorised 2562 Consumer via the IF_GW_CON interface. FTP_ITC.1/USR defines the requirements on 2563 the protection of the communication of the Consumer with the TOE. 2564 Calibration Log 2565 The implementation of the calibration log itself is covered by the use of 2566 FAU_GEN.1/CAL. FAU_STG.4/CAL defines the requirements on what should happen 2567 if the audit log is full. FAU_SAR.1/CAL defines the requirements around the audit review 2568 functions for the calibration log and that access to them shall be limited to authorised 2569 Gateway Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface. 2570 FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.2 and FPT_STM.1 apply to all three audit processes. 2571 6.12.1.1.10 O.Access 2572 FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 define the access control policy as required to address 2573 O.Access. FIA_UAU.5 ensures that entities that would like to communicate with the TOE 2574 are authenticated before any action whereby FIA_UAU.6 ensures that external entities 2575 page 131 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland in the WAN are re-authenticated after the session key has been used for a certain 2576 amount of time. 2577 6.12.1.2 Fulfilment of the dependencies 2578 The following table summarises all TOE functional requirements dependencies of this 2579 ST and demonstrates that they are fulfilled. 2580 SFR Dependencies Fulfilled by FAU_ARP.1/SYS FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis FAU_SAA.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/SYS FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 FAU_SAA.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_SAR.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_STG.4/SYS FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1/CON FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 FAU_SAR.1/CON FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/CON FAU_STG.4/CON FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1/CAL FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 FAU_SAR.1/CAL FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/CAL FAU_STG.4/CAL FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/CON FIA_UID.2 FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/CON FAU_GEN.1/CAL page 132 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FCO_NRO.2 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2 FCS_CKM.1/TLS [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/TLS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/TLS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1/TLS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1/CMS [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/CMS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/CMS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1/CMS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1/MTR [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/MTR FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/MTR [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1/TLS FCS_CKM.4 page 133 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 221 The key will be generated by secure production environment and not the TOE itself. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.1/TLS FCS_CKM.1/CMS FCS_CKM.1/MTR FCS_COP.1/HASH [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction Please refer to chapter 6.12.1.3 for missing dependency FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/MEM [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction not fulfilled 221 FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACC.2 FMT_MSA.3/AC FDP_IFC.2/FW FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes FDP_IFF.1/FW page 134 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FDP_IFF.1/FW FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_IFC.2/FW FMT_MSA.3/FW FDP_IFC.2/MTR FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes FDP_IFF.1/MTR FDP_IFF.1/MTR FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_IFC.2/MTR FMT_MSA.3/MTR FDP_RIP.2 - - FDP_SDI.2 - - FIA_ATD.1 - - FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2 FIA_UAU.5 - - FIA_UAU.6 - - FIA_UID.2 - - FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FIA_ATD.1 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 - - FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2 FMT_MSA.1/AC [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FDP_ACC.2 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 page 135 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MSA.3/AC FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.1/AC FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1/FW [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FDP_IFC.2/WAN FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.3/FW FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.1/FW FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1/MTR [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FDP_IFC.2/MTR FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.3/MTR FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.1/MTR FMT_SMR.1 FPR_CON.1 - - FPR_PSE.1 - - FPT_FLS.1 - - FPT_RPL.1 - - FPT_STM.1 - - FPT_TST.1 - - page 136 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 18: SFR Dependencies 2581 6.12.1.3 Justification for missing dependencies 2582 Dependency FCS_CKM.1 for FCS_COP.1/MEM ist not fulfilled. For the key generation 2583 process an external security module (“D-HSM”) is used so that the key is imported from 2584 an HSM during TOE production. 2585 The hash algorithm as defined in FCS_COP.1/HASH does not need any key material. 2586 As such the dependency to an import or generation of key material is omitted for this 2587 SFR. 2588 6.12.2 Security Assurance Requirements rationale 2589 The decision on the assurance level has been mainly driven by the assumed attack 2590 potential. As outlined in the previous chapters of this Security Target it is assumed that 2591 – at least from the WAN side – a high attack potential is posed against the security 2592 functions of the TOE. This leads to the use of AVA_VAN.5 (Resistance against high 2593 attack potential). 2594 In order to keep evaluations according to this Security Target commercially feasible EAL 2595 4 has been chosen as assurance level as this is the lowest level that provides the 2596 prerequisites for the use of AVA_VAN.5. 2597 Eventually, the augmentation by ALC_FLR.2 has been chosen to emphasize the 2598 importance of a structured process for flaw remediation at the developer’s side, 2599 specifically for such a new technology. 2600 6.12.2.1 Dependencies of assurance components 2601 The dependencies of the assurance requirements taken from EAL 4 are fulfilled 2602 automatically. The augmentation by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 does not introduce 2603 additional assurance components that are not contained in EAL 4. 2604 FPT_PHP.1 - - FTP_ITC.1/WAN - - FTP_ITC.1/MTR - - FTP_ITC.1/USR - - page 137 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 7 TOE Summary Specification 2605 The following paragraph provides a TOE summary specification describing how the TOE 2606 meets each SFR. 2607 2608 7.1SF.1: Authentication of Communication and Role Assignment 2609 for external entities 2610 The TOE contains a software module that authenticates all communication channels 2611 with WAN, HAN and LMN networks. The authentication is based on the TLS 1.2 protocol 2612 compliant to [RFC 5246]. According to [TR-03109], this TLS authentication mechanism 2613 is used for all TLS secured communications channels with external entities. The TOE 2614 does always implement the bidirectional authentication as required by [TR-03109-1] with 2615 one exception: if the Consumer requests a password-based authentication from the 2616 GWA according to [TR-03109-1], and the GWA activates this authentication method for 2617 this Consumer, the TOE uses a unidirectional TLS authentication. Thus, although the 2618 client has not sent a valid certificate, the TOE continues the TLS authentication process 2619 with the password authentication process for this client (see [RFC 5246, chap. 7.4.6.]). 2620 The password policy to be fulfilled hereby is that the password must be at least 10 char- 2621 acters long containing at least one character of each of the following character groups: 2622 capital letters, small letters, digits, and special characters (!"§$%&/()=?+*~#',;.:-_). Fur- 2623 ther characters could also be used. 2624 [TR-03109-1] requires the TOE to use elliptical curves conforming to [RFC 5289] 2625 whereas the following cipher suites are supported: 2626 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 2627 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, 2628 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and 2629 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. 2630 The following elliptical curves are supported by the TOE 2631 • BrainpoolP256r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), 2632 • BrainpoolP384r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), 2633 • BrainpoolP512r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), 2634 • NIST P-256 (according to [RFC 5114]), and 2635 • NIST P-384 (according to [RFC 5114]). 2636 page 138 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Alongside, the TOE supports the case of unidirectional communication with wireless me- 2637 ter (via the wM-Bus protocol), where the external entity is authenticated via AES with 2638 CMAC authentication. In this case, the AES algorithm is operating in CBC mode with 2639 128-bit symmetric keys. The authentication is successful in case that the CMAC has 2640 been successfully verified by the use of a cryptographic key Kmac. The cryptographic key 2641 for CMAC authentication (Kmac) is derived from the meter individual key MK conformant 2642 to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.2]. The meter individual key MK (brought into the TOE by the 2643 GWA) is selected by the TOE through the MAC-protected but unencrypted meter-id sub- 2644 mitted by the meter. 2645 The generation of the cryptographic key material for TLS secured communication chan- 2646 nels utilizes a Security Module. This Security Module is compliant to [TR-03109-2] and 2647 evaluated according to [SecModPP]. 2648 The destruction of cryptographic key material used by the TOE is performed through 2649 “zeroisation”. The TOE stores all ephemeral keys used for TLS secured communication 2650 or other cryptographic operations in the RAM only. For instance, whenever a TLS se- 2651 cured communication is terminated, the TOE wipes the RAM area used for the crypto- 2652 graphic key material with 0-bytes directly after finishing the usage of that material. 2653 The TOE receives the authentication certificate of the external entity during the hand- 2654 shake phase of the TLS protocol. For the establishment of the TLS secured communi- 2655 cation channel, the TOE verifies the correctness of the signed data transmitted during 2656 the TLS protocol handshake phase. While importing an authentication certificate the 2657 TOE verifies the certificate chain of the certificate for all certificates of the SM-PKI ac- 2658 cording to [TR-03109-4]. Note, that the certificate used for the TLS-based authentication 2659 of wired meters is self-signed and not part of the SM-PKI. Additionally, the TOE checks 2660 whether the certificate is configured by the Gateway Administrator for the used interface, 2661 and whether the remote IP address used and configured in the TSF data are identical 2662 (FIA_USB.1). The TOE does not check the certificate’s revocation status. In order to 2663 authenticate the external entity, the key material of the TOE’s communication partner 2664 must be known and trusted. 2665 The following communication types are known to the TOE 222: 2666 a) WAN communication via IF_GW_WAN 2667 222 Please note that the TOE additionally offers the interface IF_GW_SM to the certified Security Module built into the TOE. page 139 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland b) LMN communication via IF_GW_MTR (wireless or wired Meter) 2668 c) HAN communication via IF_GW_CON, IF_GW_CLS or IF_GW_SRV 2669 Except the communication with wireless meters at IF_GW_MTR, all communication 2670 types are TLS-based. In order to accept a TLS communication connection as being au- 2671 thenticated, the following conditions must be fulfilled: 2672 a) The TLS channel must have been established successfully with the required 2673 cryptographic mechanisms. 2674 b) The certificate of the external entity must be known and trusted through config- 2675 uration by the Gateway Administrator, and associated with the according com- 2676 munication type223. 2677 For the successfully authenticated external entity, the TOE performs an internal assign- 2678 ment of the communication type based on the certificate received at the external inter- 2679 face if applicable. The user identity is associated with the name of the certificate owner 2680 in case of a certificate-based authentication or with the user name in case of a password- 2681 based authentication at interface IF_GW_CON. 2682 For the LMN communication of the TOE with wireless (a.k.a. wM-Bus-based) meters, 2683 the external entity is authenticated by the use of the AES-CMAC algorithm and the me- 2684 ter-ID for wired Meters is used for association to the user identity (FIA_USB.1). This 2685 communication is only allowed for meters not supporting TLS-based communication 2686 scenarios. 2687 FCS_CKM.1/TLS is fulfilled by the TOE through the implementation of the pseudoran- 2688 dom function of the TLS protocol compliant to [RFC 5246] while the Security Module is 2689 used by the TOE for the generation of the cryptographic key material. The use of TLS 2690 according to [RFC 5246] and the use of the postulated cipher suites according to 2691 [RFC 5639] fulfill the requirement FCS_COP.1/TLS. The requirements 2692 FCS_CKM.1/MTR and FCS_COP.1/MTR are fulfilled by the use of AES-CMAC-secured 2693 communication for wireless meters. The requirement FCS_CKM.4 is fulfilled by the de- 2694 scribed method of “zeroisation” when destroying cryptographic key material. The imple- 2695 mentation of the described mechanisms (especially the use of TLS and AES-CBC with 2696 CMAC) fulfills the requirements FTP_ITC.1/WAN, FTP_ITC.1/MTR, and 2697 223 Of course, this does not apply if password-based authentication is configured at IF_GW_CON. page 140 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FTP_ITC.1/USR. FPT_RPL.1 is fulfilled by the use of the TLS protocol respectively the 2698 integration of transmission counters according to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.3]. 2699 A successfully established connection will be automatically disconnected by the TOE if 2700 a TLS channel to the WAN is established more than 48 hours, if a TLS channel to the 2701 LMN has transmitted more than 5 MB of information or if a channel to a local user is 2702 inactive for a time configurable by the authorised Gateway Administrator of up to 10 2703 minutes, and a new connection establishment will require a new full authentication pro- 2704 cedure (FIA_UAU.6). In any case – whether the connection has been successfully es- 2705 tablished or not – all associated resources related with the connection or connection 2706 attempt are freed. The implementation of this requirement is done by means of the TOE’s 2707 operation system monitoring and limiting the resources of each process. This means 2708 that with each connection (or connection attempt) an internal session is created that is 2709 associated with resources monitored and limited by the TOE. All resources are freed 2710 even before finishing a session if the respective resource is no longer needed so that no 2711 previous information content of a resource is made available. Especially, the associated 2712 cryptographic key material is wiped as soon it is no longer needed. As such, the TOE 2713 ensures that during the phase of connection termination the internal session is also ter- 2714 minated and by this, all internal data (associated cryptographic key material and volatile 2715 data) is wiped by the zeroisation procedure described. Allocated physical resources are 2716 also freed. In case non-volatile data is no longer needed, the associated resources data 2717 are freed, too. The TOE doesn’t reuse any objects after deallocation of the resource 2718 (FDP_RIP.2). 2719 If the external entity can be successfully authenticated on basis of the received certificate 2720 (or the password in case of a consumer using password authentication) and the ac- 2721 claimed identity could be approved for the used external interface, the TOE associates 2722 the user identity, the authentication status and the connecting network to the role ac- 2723 cording to the internal role model (FIA_ATD.1). In order to implement this, the TOE uti- 2724 lizes an internal data model which supplies the allowed communication network and 2725 other restricting properties linked with the submitted security attribute on the basis of the 2726 submitted authentication data providing the multiple mechanisms for authentication of 2727 any user's claimed identity according to the necessary rules according to [TR-03109-1] 2728 (FIA_UAU.5). 2729 In case of wireless meter communication (via the wM-Bus protocol), the security attribute 2730 of the Meter is the meter-id authenticated by the CMAC, where the meter-id is the identity 2731 providing criterion that is used by the TOE. The identity of the Meter is associated to the 2732 page 141 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland successfully authenticated external entity by the TOE and linked to the respective role 2733 according to Table 5 and its active session. In this case, the identity providing criterion 2734 is also the meter-id. 2735 The TOE enforces an explicit and complete security policy protecting the data flow for 2736 all external entities (FDP_IFC.2/FW, FDP_IFF.1/FW, FDP_IFC.2/MTR, 2737 FDP_IFF.1/MTR). The security policy defines the accessibility of data for each external 2738 entity and additionally the permitted actions for these data. Moreover, the external enti- 2739 ties do also underlie restrictions for the operations which can be executed with the TOE 2740 (FDP_ACF.1). In case that it is not possible to authenticate an external entity success- 2741 fully (e.g. caused by unknown authentication credentials), no other action is allowed on 2742 behalf of this user and the concerning connection is terminated (FIA_UAU.2). Any com- 2743 munication is only possible after successful authentication and identification of the ex- 2744 ternal entity (FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1). 2745 The reception of the wake-up service data package is a special case that requests the 2746 TOE to establish a TLS authenticated and protected connection to the Gateway Admin- 2747 istrator. The TOE validates the data package due to its compliance to the structure de- 2748 scribed in [TR-03109-1] and verifies the ECDSA signature with the public key of the 2749 Gateway Administrator’s certificate which must be known and trusted to the TOE. The 2750 TOE does n ot perform a revocation check or any validity check compliant to the shell 2751 model. The TOE verifies the electronic signature successfully when the certificate is 2752 known, trusted and associated to the Gateway Administrator. The TOE establishes the 2753 connection to the Gateway Administrator when the package has been validated due to 2754 its structural conformity, the signature has been verified and the integrated timestamp 2755 fulfills the requirements of [TR-03109-1]. Receiving the data package and the successful 2756 validation of the wake-up package does not mean that the Gateway Administrator has 2757 successfully been authenticated. 2758 If the Gateway Administrator could be successfully authenticated based on the certificate 2759 submitted during the TLS handshake phase, the role will be assigned by the TOE ac- 2760 cording to now approved identity based on the internal role model and the TLS channel 2761 will be established. 2762 WAN roles 2763 The TOE assigns the following roles in the WAN communication (FMT_SMR.1): 2764 • authorised Gateway Administrator, 2765 • authorised External Entity. 2766 page 142 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The role assignment is based on the X.509 certificate used by the external entity during 2767 TLS connection establishment. The TOE has explicit knowledge of the Gateway Admin- 2768 istrator’s certificate and the assignment of the role “Gateway Administrator” requires the 2769 successful authentication of the WAN connection. 2770 The assignment of the role “Authorized External Entity” requires the X.509 certificate 2771 that is used during the TLS handshake to be part of an internal trust list that is under 2772 control of the TOE. 2773 The role “Authorized External Entity” can be assigned to more than one external entity. 2774 HAN roles 2775 The TOE differentiates and assigns the following roles in the HAN communication 2776 (FMT_SMR.1): 2777 • authorised Consumer 2778 • authorised Service Technician 2779 The role assignment is based on the X.509 certificate used by the external entity for 2780 TLS-secured communication channels or on password-based authentication at interface 2781 IF_GW_CON if configured (FIA_USB.1). 2782 The assignment of roles in the HAN communication requires the successful identification 2783 of the external entity as a result of a successful authentication based on the certificate 2784 used for the HAN connection. The certificates used to authenticate the “Consumer” or 2785 the “Service Technician” are explicitly known to the TOE through configuration by the 2786 Gateway Administrator. 2787 Multi-client capability in the HAN 2788 The HAN communication might use more than one, parallel and independent authenti- 2789 cated communication channels. The TOE ensures that the certificates that are used for 2790 the authentication are different from each other. 2791 The role “Consumer” can be assigned to multiple, parallel sessions. The TOE ensures 2792 that these parallel sessions are logically distinct from each other by the use of different 2793 authentication information. This ensures that only the Meter Data associated with the 2794 authorized user are provided and Meter Data of other users are not accessible. 2795 LMN roles 2796 One of the following authentication mechanisms is used for Meters: 2797 page 143 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland a) authentication by the use of TLS according to [RFC 5246] for wired Meters 2798 a) authentication by the use of AES with CMAC authentication according to 2799 [RFC 3394] for wireless Meters. 2800 The TOE explicitly knows the identification credentials needed for authentication (X.509 2801 certificate when using TLS; meter-id in conjunction with CMAC and known Kmac when 2802 using AES) through configuration by the Gateway Administrator. If the Meter could be 2803 successfully authenticated and the claimed identity could thus be proved, the according 2804 role “Authorised External Entity” is assigned by the TOE for this Meter at IF_GW_MTR 2805 based on the internal role model. 2806 LMN multi-client capabilities 2807 The LMN communication can be run via parallel, logically distinct and separately au- 2808 thenticated communication channels. The TOE ensures that the authentication creden- 2809 tials of each separate channel are different. 2810 The TOE’s internal policy for access to data and objects under control of the TOE is 2811 closely linked with the identity of the external entity at IF_GW_MTR according to the 2812 TOE-internal role model. Based on the successfully verified authentication data, a per- 2813 mission catalogue with security attributes is internally assigned, which defines the al- 2814 lowed actions and access permissions within a communication channel. 2815 The encapsulation of the TOE processes run by this user is realized through the mech- 2816 anisms offered by the TOE´s operating system and very restrictive user rights for each 2817 process. Each role is assigned to a separate, limited user account in the TOE´s operating 2818 system. For all of these accounts, it is only allowed to read, write or execute the files 2819 absolutely necessary for implementing the program logic. For each identity interacting 2820 with the TOE, a separate operating system process is started. Especially, the databases 2821 used by the TOE and the logging service are adequately separated for enforcement of 2822 the necessary security domain separation (FDP_ACF.1). The allowed actions and ac- 2823 cess permissions and associated objects are assigned to the successfully approved 2824 identity of the user based on the used authentication credentials and the resulting asso- 2825 ciated role. The current session is unambiguously associated with this user. No interac- 2826 tion (e.g. access to Meter Data) is possible without an appropriate permission catalogue 2827 (FDP_ACC.2). The freeing of the role assignment and associated resources are ensured 2828 through the monitoring of the current session. 2829 page 144 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 7.2SF.2: Acceptance and Deposition of Meter Data, Encryption of 2830 Meter Data for WAN transmission 2831 The TOE receives Meter Data from an LMN communication channel and deposits these 2832 Meter Data with the associated data for tariffing in a database especially assigned to this 2833 individual Meter residing in an encrypted file system (FCS_COP.1/MEM). The time in- 2834 terval for receiving or retrieving Meter Data can be configured individually per meter 2835 through a successfully authenticated Gateway Administrator and are initialized by the 2836 TOE during the setup procedure with pre-defined values. 2837 The Meter Data are cryptographically protected and their integrity is verified by the TOE 2838 before the tariffing and deposition is performed. In case of a TLS secured communica- 2839 tion, the integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted data is protected by the TLS pro- 2840 tocol according to [RFC 5246]. In case of a unidirectional communication at 2841 IF_GW_MTR/wireless, the integrity is verified by the verification of the CMAC check sum 2842 whereas the protection of the confidentiality is given by the use of AES in CBC mode 2843 with 128 bit key length in combination with the CMAC authentication (FCS_CKM.1/MTR, 2844 FCS_COP.1/MTR). The AES encryption key has been brought into the TOE via a man- 2845 agement function during the pairing process for the Meter. In the TOE’s internal data 2846 model, the used cryptographic keys Kmac and Kenc are associated with the meter-id due 2847 to the fact of the unidirectional communication. The TOE contains a packet monitor for 2848 Meter Data to avoid replay attacks based on the re-sending of Meter Data packages. In 2849 case of recognized data packets which have already been received and processed by 2850 the TOE, these data packets are blocked by the packet monitor (FPT_RPL.1). 2851 Concerning the service layers, the TOE detects replay attacks that can occur during 2852 authentication processes against the TOE or for example receiving data from one of the 2853 involved communication networks. This is for instance achieved through the correct in- 2854 terpretation of the strictly increasing ordering numbers for messages from the meters (in 2855 case that a TLS-secured communication channel is not used), through the enforcement 2856 of an appropriate time slot of execution for successfully authenticated wake-up calls, and 2857 of course through the use of the internal means of the TLS protocol according to 2858 [RFC 5246] (FPT_RPL.1). 2859 The deposition of Meter Data is performed in a way that these Meter Data are associated 2860 with a permission profile. This means that all of the operations and actions that can be 2861 taken with these data as described afterwards (e.g. sending via WAN to an Authenti- 2862 cated External Entity) depend on the permissions which are associated with the 2863 page 145 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Meter Data. For metrological purposes, the Meter Data’s security attribute - if applicable 2864 - will be persisted associated with its corresponding Meter Data by the TOE. All user 2865 associated data stored by the TOE are protected by an AES-128-CMAC value. Before 2866 accessing these data, the TOE verifies the CMAC value that has been applied to the 2867 user data and detects integrity errors on any data and especially on user associated 2868 Meter Data in a reliable manner (FDP_SDI.2). 2869 Closely linked with the deposition of the Meter Data is the assignment of an unambigu- 2870 ous and reliable timestamp on these data. The reliability grounds on the regular use of 2871 an external time source offering a sufficient exactness (FPT_STM.1) which is used to 2872 synchronize the operating system of the TOE. A maximum deviation of 3% of the meas- 2873 uring period is allowed to be in conformance with [PP_GW]. The data set (Meter Data 2874 and tariff data) is associated with the timestamp in an inseparably manner because each 2875 Meter Data entry in the database includes the corresponding time stamp and the data- 2876 base is cryptographically protected through the encrypted file system. For details about 2877 database encryption please see page 150). 2878 For transmission of consumption data (tariffed Meter Data) or status data into the WAN, 2879 the TOE ensures that the data are encrypted and digitally signed (FCO_NRO.2, 2880 FCS_CKM.1/CMS, FCS_COP.1/CMS, FCS_COP.1/HASH, FCS_COP.1/MEM). In case 2881 of a successful transmission of consumption data into the WAN, beside the transmitted 2882 data the data’s signature applied by the TOE is logged in the Consumer-Log for the 2883 respective Consumer at IF_GW_CON thus providing the possibility not only for the re- 2884 cipient to verify the evidence of origin for the transmitted data but to the Consumer at 2885 IF_GW_CON, too (FCO_NRO.2). The encryption is performed with the hybrid encryption 2886 as specified in [TR-03109-1-I] in combination with [TR-03116-3]. The public key of the 2887 external entity, the data have to be encrypted for, is known by the TOE through the 2888 authentication data configured by the Gateway Administrator and its assigned identity. 2889 This public key is assumed by the TOE to be valid because the TOE does not verify the 2890 revocation status of certificates. The public key used for the encryption of the derived 2891 symmetric key used for transmission of consumption data is different from the public key 2892 in the TLS certificate of the external entity used for the TLS secured communication 2893 channel. The derivation of the hybrid key used for transmission of consumption data is 2894 done according to [TR-03116-3, chapter 8]. 2895 The TOE does also foresee the case that the data is encrypted for an external entity that 2896 is not directly assigned to the external entity holding the active communication channel. 2897 The electronic signature is created through the utilization of the Security Module whereas 2898 page 146 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland the TOE is responsible for the computation of the hash value for the data to be signed. 2899 Therefore, the TOE utilizes the SHA-256 or SHA-384 hash algorithm. The SHA-512 hash 2900 algorithm is available in the TOE but not yet used (FCS_COP.1/HASH). The data to be 2901 sent to the external entity are prepared on basis of the tariffed meter data. The data to 2902 be transmitted are removed through deallocation of the resources after the (successful 2903 or unsuccessful) transmission attempt so that afterwards no previous information will be 2904 available (FDP_RIP.2). The created temporary session keys which have been used for 2905 encryption of the data are also deleted by the already described zeroisation mechanism 2906 as soon they are no longer needed (FCS_CKM.4). 2907 The time interval for transmission of the data is set for a daily transmission, and can be 2908 additionally configured by the Gateway Administrator. The TOE sends randomly gener- 2909 ated messages into the WAN, so that through this the analysis of frequency, load, size 2910 or the absence of external communication is concealed (FPR_CON.1). Data that are not 2911 relevant for accounting are aliased for transmission so that no personally identifiable 2912 information (PII) can be obtained by an analysis of not billing-relevant information sent 2913 to parties in the WAN. Therefore, the TOE utilizes the alias as defined by the Gateway 2914 Administrator in the Processing Profile for the Meter identity to external parties in the 2915 WAN. Thereby, the TOE determines the alias for a user and verifies that it conforms to 2916 the alias given in the Processing Profile (FPR_PSE.1). 2917 2918 7.3SF.3: Administration, Configuration and SW Update 2919 The TOE includes functionality that allows its administration and configuration as well as 2920 updating the TOE’s complete firmware (“firmware updates”) or only the software appli- 2921 cation including the service layer (“software updates”). This functionality is only provided 2922 for the authenticated Gateway Administrator (FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/AC, 2923 FMT_MSA.1/FW, FMT_MSA.1/MTR). 2924 The following operations can be performed by the successfully authenticated Gateway 2925 Administrator: 2926 a) Definition and deployment of Processing Profiles including user administration, 2927 rights management and setting configuration parameters of the TOE 2928 b) Deployment of tariff information 2929 c) Deployment and installation of software/firmware updates 2930 page 147 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland A complete overview of the possible management functions is given in Table 14 and 2931 Table 15 (FMT_SMF.1). Beside the possibility for a successfully authenticated Service 2932 Technician to view the system log via interface IF_GW_SRV, administrative or configu- 2933 ration measures on the TOE can only be taken by the successfully authenticated Gate- 2934 way Administrator. 2935 In order to perform these measures, the TOE has to establish a TLS secured channel 2936 to the Gateway Administrator and must authenticate the Gateway Administrator suc- 2937 cessfully. There are two possibilities: 2938 a) The TOE independently contacts the Gateway Administrator at a certain time 2939 specified in advance by the Gateway Administrator. 2940 b) Through a message sent to the wake-up service, the TOE is requested to con- 2941 tact the Gateway Administrator. 2942 In the second case, the wake-up data packet is received by the TOE from the WAN and 2943 checked by the TOE for structural correctness according to [TR-03109-1]. Afterwards, 2944 the TOE verifies the correctness of the electronic signature applied to the wake-up mes- 2945 sage data packet using the certificate of the Gateway Administrator stored in the TSF 2946 data. Afterwards, a TLS connection to the Gateway Administrator is established by the 2947 TOE and the above mentioned operations can be performed. 2948 Software/firmware updates always have to be signed by the TOE manufacturer. 2949 Software/firmware updates can be of different content: 2950 a) The whole boot image of the TOE is changed. 2951 b) Only individual components of the TOE are changed. These components can 2952 be the boot loader plus the static kernel or the SMGW application. 2953 The update packet is realized in form of an archive file enveloped into a CMS signature 2954 container according to [RFC 5652]. The electronic signature of the update packet is cre- 2955 ated using signature keys from the TOE manufacturer. The verification of this signature 2956 is performed by the TOE using the TOE's Security Module using the trust anchor of the 2957 TOE manufacturer. If the signature of the transferred data could not be successfully 2958 verified by the TOE or if the version number of the new firmware is not higher than the 2959 version number of the installed firmware, the received data is rejected by the TOE and 2960 not used for further processing. Any administrator action is entered in the System Log of 2961 the TOE. Additionally, an authorised Consumer can interact with the TOE via the 2962 page 148 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland interface IF_GW_CON to get the version number and the current time displayed 2963 (FMT_MOF.1). 2964 The signature of the update packet is immediately verified after receipt. After successful 2965 verification of the update packet the update process is immediately performed. In each 2966 case, the Gateway Administrator gets notified by the TOE and an entry in the TOE´s 2967 system log will be written. 2968 All parameters that can be changed by the Gateway Administrator are preset with re- 2969 strictive values by the TOE. No role can specify alternative initial values to override these 2970 restrictive default values (FMT_MSA.3/AC, FMT_MSA.3/FW, FMT_MSA.3/MTR). 2971 This mechanism is supported by the TOE-internal resource monitor that internally mon- 2972 itors existing connections, assigned roles and operations allowed at a specific time. 2973 2974 7.4SF.4: Displaying Consumption Data 2975 The TOE offers the possibility of displaying consumption data to authenticated Consum- 2976 ers at interface IF_GW_CON. Therefore, the TOE contains a web server that implements 2977 TLS-based communication with mutual authentication (FTP_ITC.1/USR). If the Con- 2978 sumer requests a password-based authentication from the GWA according to [TR- 2979 03109-1] and the GWA activates this authentication method for this Consumer, the TOE 2980 uses TLS authentication with server-side authentication and HTTP digest access au- 2981 thentication according to [RFC 7616]. In both cases, the requirement FCO_NRO.2 is 2982 fulfilled through the use of TLS-based communication and through encryption and digital 2983 signature of the (tariffed) Meter Data to be displayed using FCS_COP.1/HASH. 2984 To additionally display consumption data, a connection at interface IF_GW_CON must 2985 be established and the role “(authorised) Consumer” is assigned to the user with his 2986 used display unit by the TOE. Different Consumer can use different display units. The 2987 amount of allowed connection attempts at IF_GW_CON is set to 5. In case the amount 2988 of allowed connection attempts is reached, the TOE blocks IF_GW_CON (FIA_AFL.1). 2989 The display unit has to technically support the applied authentication mechanism and 2990 the HTTP protocol version 1.1 according to [RFC 2616] as communication protocol. Data 2991 is provided as HTML data stream and transferred to the display unit. In this case, further 2992 processing of the transmitted data stream is carried out by the display unit. 2993 According to [TR-03109-1], the TOE exclusively transfers Consumer specific consump- 2994 tion data to the display unit. The Consumer can be identified in a clear and unambiguous 2995 page 149 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland manner due to the applied authentication mechanism. Moreover, the TOE ensures that 2996 exclusively the data actually assigned to the Consumer is provided at the display unit 2997 via IF_GW_CON (FIA_USB.1). 2998 2999 7.5SF.5: Audit and Logging 3000 The TOE generates audit data for all actions assigned in the System-Log 3001 (FAU_GEN.1/SYS), the Consumer-Log (FAU_GEN.1/CON), and the Calibration-Log 3002 (FAU_GEN.1/CAL) as well. On the one hand, this applies to the values measured by 3003 the Meter (Consumer-Log) and on the other hand to system data (System-Log) used by 3004 the Gateway Administrator of the TOE in order to check the TOE’s current functional 3005 status. In addition, metrological entries are created in the Calibration-Log. The TOE thus 3006 distinguishes between the following log classes: 3007 a) System-Log 3008 b) Consumer-Log 3009 c) Calibration-Log 3010 The TOE audits and logs all security functions that are used. Thereby, the TOE compo- 3011 nent accomplishing this security audit functionality includes the necessary rules moni- 3012 toring these audited events and through this indicating a potential violation of the en- 3013 forcement of the TOE security functionality (e. g. in case of an integrity violation, replay 3014 attack or an authentication failure). If such a security breach is detected, it is shown as 3015 such in the log entry (FAU_SAA.1/SYS). 3016 The System-Log can only be read by the authorized Gateway Administrator via interface 3017 IF_GW_WAN or by an authorized Service Technician via interface IF_GW_SRV 3018 (FAU_SAR.1/SYS). Potential security breaches are separately indicated and identified 3019 as such in the System-Log and the GWA gets informed about this potential security 3020 breach (FAU_ARP.1/SYS, FDP_SDI.2). Data of the Consumer-Log can exclusively be 3021 viewed by authenticated Consumers via interface IF_GW_CON designed to display con- 3022 sumption data (FAU_SAR.1/CON). The data included in the Calibration-Log can only be 3023 read by the authenticated Gateway Administrator via interface IF_GW_WAN 3024 (FAU_SAR.1/CAL). 3025 If possible, each log entry is assigned to an identity that is known to the TOE. For audit 3026 events resulting from actions of identified users resp. roles, the TOE associates the 3027 page 150 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland generated log information to the identified users while generating the audit information 3028 (FAU_GEN.2). 3029 Generated audit and log data are stored in a cryptographically secured storage. For this 3030 purpose, a file-based SQL database system is used securing its’ data using an AES- 3031 XTS-128 encrypted file system (AES in XTS mode with 128-bit keys) according to 3032 [FIPS Pub. 197] and [NIST 800-38E]. This is achieved by using device-specific AES 3033 keys so that the secure environment can only be accessed with the associated symmet- 3034 ric key available. Using an appropriately limited access of this symmetric, the TOE im- 3035 plements the necessary rules so that it can be ensured that unauthorised modification 3036 or deletion is prohibited (FAU_STG.2). 3037 Audit and log data are stored in separate locations: One location is used to store Con- 3038 sumer-specific log data (Consumer-Log) whereas device status data and metrological 3039 data are stored in a separate location: status data are stored in the System-Log and 3040 metrological data are stored in the Calibration-Log. Each of these logs is located in phys- 3041 ically separate databases secured by different cryptographic keys. In case of several 3042 external meters, a separate database is created for each Meter to store the respective 3043 consumption and log data (FAU_GEN.2). 3044 If the audit trail of the System-Log or the Consumer-Log is full (so that no further data 3045 can be added), the oldest entries in the audit trail are overwritten (FAU_STG.2, 3046 FAU_STG.4/SYS, FAU_STG.4/CON). If the Consumer-Log‘s oldest audit record must 3047 be kept because the period of billing verification (of usually 15 months) has not beeen 3048 reached, the TOE’s metrological activity is paused until the oldest audit record gets 3049 deletable. Thereafter, the TOE’s metrological activity is started again through an internal 3050 timer. Moreover, the mechanism for storing log entries is designed in a way that these 3051 entries are cryptographically protected against unauthorized deletion. This is especially 3052 achieved by assigning cryptographic keys to each of the individual databases for the 3053 System-Log, Consumer-Log and Calibration-Log. 3054 If the Calibration-Log cannot store any further data, the operation of the TOE is stopped 3055 through the termination of its metering services and the TOE informs the Gateway Ad- 3056 ministrator by creating an entry in the System-Log, so that additional measures can be 3057 taken by the Gateway Administrator. Calibration-Log entries are never overwritten by 3058 the TOE (FAU_STG.2, FAU_STG.4/CAL, FMT_MOF.1). 3059 The TOE anonymizes the data in a way that no conclusions about a specific person or 3060 user can be drawn from the log or recorded not billing relevant data. Stored consumption 3061 page 151 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland data are exclusively intended for accounting with the energy supplier. The data stored 3062 in the System-Log are used for analysis purposes concerning necessary technical anal- 3063 yses and possible security-related information. 3064 7.6SF.6: TOE Integrity Protection 3065 The TOE makes physical tampering detectable through the TOE's sealed packaging of 3066 the device. So if an attacker opens the case, this can be physically noticed, e. g. by the 3067 Service Technician (FPT_PHP.1). 3068 The TOE provides a secure boot mechanism. Beginning from the AES-128-encrypted 3069 bootloader protected by a digital signature applied by the TOE manufacturer, each sub- 3070 sequent step during the boot process is based on the previous step establishing a con- 3071 tinuous forward-concatenation of cryptographical verification procedures. Thus, it is en- 3072 sured that each part of the firmware, that means the operating system, the service layers 3073 and the software application in general, is tested by the TOE during initial startup. 3074 Thereby, a test of the TSF data being part of the software application is included. During 3075 this complete self-test, it is checked that the electronic system of the physical device, 3076 and all firmware components of the TOE are in authentic condition. This complete self- 3077 test can also be run at the request of the successfully authenticated Gateway Adminis- 3078 trator via interface IF_GW_WAN or at the request of the successfully authenticated Ser- 3079 vice Technician via interface IF_GW_SRV. At the request of the successfully authenti- 3080 cated Consumer via interface IF_GW_CON, the TOE will only test the integrity of the 3081 Smart Metering software application including the service layers (without the operating 3082 system) and the completeness of the TSF data stored in the TOE’s database. Addition- 3083 ally, the TOE itself runs a complete self-test periodically at least once a month during 3084 normal operation. The integrity of TSF data stored in the TOE’s database is always 3085 tested during read access of that part of TSF data (FPT_TST.1). FPT_RPL.1 is fulfilled 3086 by the use of the TLS protocol respectively the integration of transmission counters ac- 3087 cording to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.3], and through the enforcement of an appropriate time 3088 slot of execution for successfully authenticated wake-up calls. 3089 If an integrity violation of the TOE’s hardware or firmware is detected or if the deviation 3090 between local system time of the TOE and the reliable external time source is too large, 3091 further use of the TOE for the purpose of gathering Meter Data is not possible. Also in 3092 this case, the TOE signals the incorrect status via a suitable signal output on the case 3093 page 152 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland of the device, and the further use of the TOE for the purpose of gathering Meter Data is 3094 not allowed (FPT_FLS.1). 3095 Basically, if an integrity violation is detected, the TOE will create an entry in the System 3096 Log to document this status for the authorised Gateway Administrator on interface 3097 IF_GW_WAN resp. for the authorised Service Technician on interface IF_GW_SRV, and 3098 will inform the Gateway Administrator on this incident (FAU_ARP.1/SYS, 3099 FAU_GEN.1/SYS, FAU_SAR.1/SYS, FPT_TST.1). 3100 7.7TSS Rationale 3101 The following table shows the correspondence analysis for the described TOE security 3102 functionalities and the security functional requirements. 3103 SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FAU_ARP.1/SYS X (X) FAU_GEN.1/SYS X (X) FAU_SAA.1/SYS X FAU_SAR.1/SYS X (X) FAU_STG.4/SYS X FAU_GEN.1/CON X FAU_SAR.1/CON X FAU_STG.4/CON X FAU_GEN.1/CAL X FAU_SAR.1/CAL X FAU_STG.4/CAL X FAU_GEN.2 X page 153 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FAU_STG.2 X FCO_NRO.2 X X FCS_CKM.1/TLS X FCS_COP.1/TLS X FCS_CKM.1/CMS X FCS_COP.1/CMS X FCS_CKM.1/MTR X X FCS_COP.1/MTR X X FCS_CKM.4 X X FCS_COP.1/HASH X FCS_COP.1/MEM X FDP_ACC.2 X FDP_ACF.1 X FDP_IFC.2/FW X FDP_IFF.1/FW X FDP_IFC.2/MTR X FDP_IFF.1/MTR X FDP_RIP.2 X X FDP_SDI.2 X X page 154 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FIA_ATD.1 X FIA_AFL.1 X FIA_UAU.2 X FIA_UAU.5 X FIA_UAU.6 X FIA_UID.2 X FIA_USB.1 X X FMT_MOF.1 X X FMT_SMF.1 X FMT_SMR.1 X FMT_MSA.1/AC X FMT_MSA.3/AC X FMT_MSA.1/FW X FMT_MSA.3/FW X FMT_MSA.1/MTR X FMT_MSA.3/MTR X FPR_CON.1 X FPR_PSE.1 X FPT_FLS.1 X page 155 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FPT_RPL.1 X X x FPT_STM.1 X FPT_TST.1 X FPT_PHP.1 X FTP_ITC.1/WAN X FTP_ITC.1/MTR X FTP_ITC.1/USR X X Table 19: Rationale for the SFR and the TOE Security Functionalities 224 3104 224 Please note that SFRs marked with “(X)” only have supporting effect on the fulfilment of the TSF. page 156 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 8 List of Tables 3105 TABLE 1: SMART METER GATEWAY PRODUCT CLASSIFICATIONS................................................. 9 3106 TABLE 2: COMMUNICATION FLOWS BETWEEN DEVICES IN DIFFERENT NETWORKS ............... 23 3107 TABLE 3: MANDATORY TOE EXTERNAL INTERFACES..................................................................... 28 3108 TABLE 4: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT OF THE TOE AND ITS SECURITY MODULE .................... 29 3109 TABLE 5: ROLES USED IN THE SECURITY TARGET ......................................................................... 34 3110 TABLE 6: ASSETS (USER DATA).......................................................................................................... 36 3111 TABLE 7: ASSETS (TSF DATA) ............................................................................................................. 37 3112 TABLE 8: RATIONALE FOR SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........................................................................ 53 3113 TABLE 9: LIST OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................... 64 3114 TABLE 10: OVERVIEW OVER AUDIT PROCESSES ............................................................................ 66 3115 TABLE 11: EVENTS FOR CONSUMER LOG ........................................................................................ 71 3116 TABLE 12: CONTENT OF CALIBRATION LOG..................................................................................... 76 3117 TABLE 13: RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS.......................................................... 105 3118 TABLE 14: SFR RELATED MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONALITIES ....................................................... 110 3119 TABLE 15: GATEWAY SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONALITIES ............................................ 111 3120 TABLE 16: ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................ 122 3121 TABLE 17: FULFILMENT OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..................................................................... 126 3122 TABLE 18: SFR DEPENDENCIES ....................................................................................................... 136 3123 TABLE 19: RATIONALE FOR THE SFR AND THE TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITIES ................ 155 3124 3125 page 157 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 9 List of Figures 3126 FIGURE 1: THE TOE AND ITS DIRECT ENVIRONMENT..................................................................... 12 3127 FIGURE 2: THE LOGICAL INTERFACES OF THE TOE ....................................................................... 14 3128 FIGURE 3: THE PRODUCT WITH ITS TOE AND NON-TOE PARTS ................................................... 16 3129 FIGURE 4: THE TOE’S PROTOCOL STACK......................................................................................... 18 3130 FIGURE 5: CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FLOW FOR DISTRIBUTED METERS AND GATEWAY 3131 ........................................................................................................................................................ 31 3132 3133 page 158 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 10 Appendix 3134 10.1 Mapping from English to German terms 3135 English term German term billing-relevant abrechnungsrelevant CLS, Controllable Local System dezentral steuerbare Verbraucher- oder Erzeugersysteme Consumer Anschlussnutzer; Letztverbraucher (im verbrauchenden Sinne); u.U. auch Einspeiser Consumption Data Verbrauchsdaten Gateway Kommunikationseinheit Grid Netz (für Strom/Gas/Wasser) Grid Status Data Zustandsdaten des Versorgungsnetzes LAN, Local Area Network Lokales Kommunikationsnetz LMN, Local Metrological Network Lokales Messeinrichtungsnetz Meter Messeinrichtung (Teil eines Messsystems) Processing Profiles Konfigurationsprofile Security Module Sicherheitsmodul (z.B. eine Smart Card) Service Provider Diensteanbieter Smart Meter, Smart Metering System 225 Intelligente, in ein Kommunikationsnetz eingebundene, elektronische Messeinrichtung (Messsystem) TOE EVG (Evaluierungsgegenstand) 225 Please note that the terms “Smart Meter” and “Smart Metering System” are used synonymously within this document. page 159 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland WAN, Wide Area Network Weitverkehrsnetz (für Kommunikation) 3136 page 160 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 10.2 Glossary 3137 Term Description Authenticity property that an entity is what it claims to be (according to [SD_6]) Block Tariff Tariff in which the charge is based on a series of different energy/volume rates applied to successive usage blocks of given size and supplied during a specified period. (according to [CEN]) BPL Broadband Over Power Lines, a method of power line communica- tion CA Certification Authority, an entity that issues digital certificates. CLS config CDMA Code Division Multiple Access CLS config (secondary asset) See chapter 3.2 CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax Confidentiality the property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes (according to [SD_6]) Consumer End user of electricity, gas, water or heat (according to [CEN]). See chapter 3.1 DCP Data Co-Processor; security hardware of the CPU DLMS Device Language Message Specification DTBS Data To Be Signed EAL Evaluation Assurance Level page 161 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description Energy Service Provider Organisation offering energy related services to the Consumer (ac- cording to [CEN]) ETH Ethernet external entity See chapter 3.1 firmware update See chapter 3.2 Gateway Administrator (GWA) See chapter 3.1 Gateway config (secondary asset) See chapter 3.2 Gateway time See chapter 3.2 G.hn Gigabit Home Networks GPRS General Packet Radio Service, a packet oriented mobile data ser- vice Home Area Network (HAN) In-house data communication network which interconnects domestic equipment and can be used for energy management purposes (adopted according to [CEN]). Integrity property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorised and undetected manner (according to [SD_6]) IT-System Computersystem Local Area Network (LAN) Data communication network, connecting a limited number of com- munication devices (Meters and other devices) and covering a mod- erately sized geographical area within the premises of the consumer. In the context of this ST, the term LAN is used as a hypernym for HAN and LMN (according to [CEN], adopted). page 162 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description Local attacker See chapter 3.4 LTE Long Term Evolution mobile broadband communication standard Meter config (secondary asset) See chapter 3.2 Local Metrological Network (LMN) In-house data communication network which interconnects metrological equipment. Meter Data See chapter 3.2 Meter Data Aggregator (MDA) Entity which offers services to aggregate metering data by grid supply point on a contractual basis. NOTE: The contract is with a supplier. The aggregate is of all that supplier's consumers connected to that particular grid supply point. The aggregate may include both metered data and data estimated by reference to standard load profiles (adopted from [CEN]) Meter Data Collector (MDC) Entity which offers services on a contractual basis to collect metering data related to a supply and provide it in an agreed format to a data aggregator (that can also be the DNO). NOTE: The contract is with a supplier or a pool. The collection may be carried out by manual or automatic means. ([CEN]) Meter Data Management System (MDMS) System for validating, storing, processing and analysing large quantities of Meter Data. ([CEN]) Metrological Area Network In-house data communication network which interconnects metrological equipment (i.e. Meters) OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer OMS Open Metering System page 163 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description OCOTP On-Chip One-time-programmable Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Personally Identifiable Information refers to information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single individual. RJ45 registered jack #45; a standardized physical network interface RMII Reduced Media Independent Interface RTC Real Time Clock Service Technician Human entity being responsible for diagnostic purposes. Smart Metering System The Smart Metering System consists of a Smart Meter Gateway and connected to one or more meters. In addition, CLS (i.e. generation plants) may be connected with the gateway for dedicated communi- cation purposes. SML Smart Message Language Tariff Price structure (normally comprising a set of one or more rates of charge) applied to the consumption or production of a product or service provided to a Consumer (according to [CEN]). TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol TLS Transport Layer Security protocol according to [RFC 5246] TOE Target of Evaluation - set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance TSF TOE security functionality UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter page 164 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description WAN attacker See chapter 3.4 WLAN Wireless Local Area Network page 165 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 11 Literature 3138 [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 3139 Evaluation – 3140 Part 1: Introduction and general model, April 2017, ver- 3141 sion 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, 3142 https://www.commoncriteriapor- 3143 tal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf 3144 Part 2: Security functional requirements, April 2017, ver- 3145 sion 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, 3146 https://www.commoncriteriapor- 3147 tal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R5.pdf 3148 Part 3: Security assurance requirements, April 2017, ver- 3149 sion 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, 3150 https://www.commoncriteriapor- 3151 tal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf 3152 [CEN] SMART METERS CO-ORDINATION GROUP (SM-CG) 3153 Item 5. M/441 first phase deliverable – Communication – 3154 Annex: Glossary (SMCG/Sec0022/DC) 3155 [PP_GW] Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering 3156 System (Smart Meter Gateway PP), Schutzprofil für die 3157 Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems 3158 für Stoff- und Energiemengen, SMGW-PP, v.1.3, Bundes- 3159 amt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 31.03.2014 3160 [SecModPP] Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Me- 3161 ter Gateway (Security Module PP), Schutzprofil für das 3162 Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelli- 3163 genten Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen, 3164 SecMod-PP, Version 1.0.2, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 3165 der Informationstechnik, 18.10.2013 3166 [SD_6] ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 N7446, Standing Document 6 3167 (SD6): Glossary of IT Security Terminology 2009-04-29, 3168 available at 3169 page 166 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland http://www.teletrust.de/uploads/me- 3170 dia/ISOIEC_JTC1_SC27_IT_Security_Glossary_Tele- 3171 TrusT_Documentation.pdf 3172 [TR-02102] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102, Kryptographische 3173 Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Bundes- 3174 amt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 3175 2022-01 3176 [TR-03109] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109, Version 1.1, Bun- 3177 desamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 3178 22.09.2021 3179 [TR-03109-1] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1, Anforderungen an 3180 die Interoperabilität der Kommunikationseinheit eines 3181 Messsystems, Version 1.1, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 3182 der Informationstechnik, 17.09.2021 3183 [TR-03109-1-I] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1 Anlage I, CMS- 3184 Datenformat für die Inhaltsdatenverschlüsselung und - 3185 signatur, Version 1.0.9, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 3186 Informationstechnik, 18.03.2013 3187 [TR-03109-1-VI] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1 Anlage VI, Be- 3188 triebsprozesse, Version 1.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 3189 der Informationstechnik, 18.03.2013 3190 [TR-03109-2] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-2, Smart Meter Ga- 3191 teway – Anforderungen an die Funktionalität und In- 3192 teroperabilität des Sicherheitsmoduls, Version 1.1, Bun- 3193 desamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 3194 15.12.2014 3195 [TR-03109-3] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-3, Kryptographische 3196 Vorgaben für die Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsys- 3197 temen, Version 1.1, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Infor- 3198 mationstechnik, 17.04.2014 3199 [TR-03109-4] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-4, Smart Metering 3200 PKI - Public Key Infrastruktur für Smart Meter Gateways, 3201 page 167 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Version 1.2.1, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informati- 3202 onstechnik, 09.08.2017 3203 [TR-03109-6] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-6, Smart Meter Ga- 3204 teway Administration, Version 1.0, Bundesamt für Sicher- 3205 heit in der Informationstechnik, 26.11.2015 3206 [TR-03111] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03111, Elliptic Curve Cryp- 3207 tography (ECC), Version 2.1, 01.06.2018 3208 [TR-03116-3] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-3, Kryptographische 3209 Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 3 - Intel- 3210 ligente Messsysteme, Stand 2023, Bundesamt für Sicher- 3211 heit in der Informationstechnik, 06.12.2022 3212 [AGD_Consumer] Handbuch für Verbraucher, Smart Meter Gateway, Ver- 3213 sion 4.11, 02.06.2023, Power Plus Communications AG 3214 [AGD_Techniker] Handbuch für Service-Techniker, Smart Meter Gateway, 3215 Version 5.6, 05.07.2023, Power Plus Communications 3216 AG 3217 [AGD_GWA] Handbuch für Hersteller von Smart-Meter Gateway-Admi- 3218 nistrations-Software, Smart Meter Gateway, Version 4.13, 3219 01.09.2023, Power Plus Communications AG 3220 [AGD_SEC] Auslieferungs- und Fertigungsprozeduren, Anhang Si- 3221 chere Auslieferung, Version 1.4, 12.05.2021, Power Plus 3222 Communications AG 3223 [SMGW_Logging] Logmeldungen, SMGW Version 1.3 & 2.1 & 2.1.1, Version 3224 3.4, 11.05.2023, Power Plus Communications AG 3225 [FIPS Pub. 140-2] NIST, FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for crypto- 3226 graphic modules, 2019 3227 [FIPS Pub. 180-4] NIST, FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, 2015 3228 [FIPS Pub. 197] NIST, FIPS 197, Advances Encryption Standard (AES), 3229 2001 3230 [IEEE 1901] IEEE Std 1901-2010, IEEE Standard for Broadband over 3231 Power Line Networks: Medium Access Control and Physi- 3232 cal Layer Specifications, 2010 3233 page 168 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [IEEE 802.3] IEEE Std 802.3-2008, IEEE Standard for Information 3234 technology, Telecommunications and information ex- 3235 change between systems, Local and metropolitan area 3236 networks, Specific requirements, 2008 3237 [ISO 10116] ISO/IEC 10116:2006, Information technology -- Security 3238 techniques -- Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher, 3239 2006 3240 [NIST 800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for 3241 Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Tech- 3242 niques, December 2001, http://nvl- 3243 pubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublica- 3244 tion800-38a.pdf 3245 [NIST 800-38D] NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Recommendation for 3246 Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode 3247 (GCM) and GMAC, M. Dworkin, November 2007, 3248 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP- 3249 800-38D.pdf 3250 [NIST 800-38E] NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Recommendation for 3251 Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode 3252 for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, M. Dworkin, Janu- 3253 ary, 2010, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800- 3254 38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf 3255 [RFC 2104] RFC 2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authenti- 3256 cation, M. Bellare, R. Canetti und H. Krawczyk, February 3257 1997, http://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt 3258 [RFC 2616] RFC 2616, Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1, R. 3259 Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, P. Masinter, P. 3260 Leach, T. Berners-Lee, June 1999, http://rfc-edi- 3261 tor.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt 3262 [RFC 7616] RFC 7616, HTTP Digest Access Authentication, R. 3263 Shekh-Yusef, D. Ahrens, S. Bremer, September 2015, 3264 http://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7616.txt 3265 page 169 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [RFC 3394] RFC 3394, Schaad, J. and R. Housley, Advanced En- 3266 cryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm, September 3267 2002, http://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt 3268 [RFC 3565] RFC 3565, J. Schaad, Use of the Advanced Encryption 3269 Standard (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic 3270 Message Syntax (CMS), July 2003, http://rfc-edi- 3271 tor.org/rfc/rfc3565.txt 3272 [RFC 4493] IETF RFC 4493, The AES-CMAC Algorithm, J. H. Song, J. 3273 Lee, T. Iwata, June 2006, http://www.rfc-edi- 3274 tor.org/rfc/rfc4493.txt 3275 [RFC 5083] RFC 5083, R. Housley, Cryptographic Message Syntax 3276 (CMS) 3277 Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type, November 3278 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5083.txt 3279 [RFC 5084] RFC 5084, R. Housley, Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM 3280 Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message 3281 Syntax (CMS), November 2007, 3282 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5084.txt 3283 [RFC 5114] RFC 5114, Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with 3284 IETF Standards, M. Lepinski, S. Kent, January 2008, 3285 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5114.txt 3286 [RFC 5246] RFC 5246, T. Dierks, E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer 3287 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, August 2008, 3288 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt 3289 [RFC 5289] RFC 5289, TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA- 3290 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM), E. 3291 Rescorla, RTFM, Inc., August 2008, 3292 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5289.txt 3293 [RFC 5639] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool 3294 Standard Curves and Curve Generation, M. Lochter, BSI, 3295 J. Merkle, secunet Security Networks, March 2010, 3296 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt 3297 page 170 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [RFC 5652] RFC 5652, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), R. 3298 Housley, Vigil Security, September 2009, 3299 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5652.txt 3300 [EIA RS-485] EIA Standard RS-485, Electrical Characteristics of Gener- 3301 ators and Receivers for Use in Balanced Multipoint Sys- 3302 tems, ANSI/TIA/EIA-485-A-98, 1983/R2003 3303 [EN 13757-1] M-Bus DIN EN 13757-1: Kommunikationssysteme für 3304 Zähler und deren Fernablesung Teil 1: Datenaustausch 3305 [EN 13757-3] M-Bus DIN EN 13757-3, Kommunikationssysteme für 3306 Zähler und deren Fernablesung Teil 3: Spezielle Anwen- 3307 dungsschicht 3308 [EN 13757-4] M-Bus DIN EN 13757-4, Kommunikationssysteme für 3309 Zähler und deren Fernablesung Teil 4: Zählerauslesung 3310 über Funk, Fernablesung von Zählern im SRD-Band von 3311 868 MHz bis 870 MHz 3312 [IEC-62056-5-3-8] Electricity metering – Data exchange for meter reading, 3313 tariff and load control – Part 5-3-8: Smart Message Lan- 3314 guage SML, 2012 3315 [IEC-62056-6-1] IEC-62056-6-1, Datenkommunikation der elektrischen 3316 Energiemessung, Teil 6-1: OBIS Object Identification Sys- 3317 tem, 2017, International Electrotechnical Commission 3318 [IEC-62056-6-2] IEC-62056-6-2, Datenkommunikation der elektrischen 3319 Energiemessung - DLMS/COSEM, Teil 6-2: COSEM Inter- 3320 face classes, 2017, International Electrotechnical Commis- 3321 sion 3322 [IEC-62056-21] IEC-62056-21, Direct local data exchange - Mode C, 2011, 3323 International Electrotechnical Commission 3324 [LUKS] LUKS On-Disk Format Specification Version 1.2.1, Clem- 3325 ens Fruhwirth, October 16th, 2011 3326 [PACE] The PACE-AA Protocol for Machine Readable Travel Doc- 3327 uments, and its Security, Jens Bender, Ozgur Dagdelen, 3328 page 171 of 172 © 2023 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Marc Fischlin and Dennis Kügler, http://fc12.ifca.ai/pre- 3329 proceedings/paper_49.pdf 3330 [X9.63] ANSI X9.63, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 3331 Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Us- 3332 ing Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011 3333 [G865] DVGW-Arbeitsblatt G865 Gasabrechnung, 11/2008 3334 [VDE4400] VDE-AR-N 4400:2011-09, Messwesen Strom, VDE-An- 3335 wendungsregel, 01.09.2011 3336 [DIN 43863-5] DIN: Herstellerübergreifende Identifikationsnummer für 3337 Messeinrichtungen, 2012 3338 [USB] Universal Serial Bus Specification, Revision 2.0, April 27, 3339 2000, USB Communications CLASS Specification for 3340 Ethernet Devices, http://www.usb.org/develop- 3341 ers/docs/usb20_docs/#usb20spec 3342 [ITU G.hn] G.996x Unified high-speed wireline-based home network- 3343 ing transceivers, 2018 3344 Power Plus Communications AG • Dudenstrasse 6 • 68167 Mannheim • Deutschland • www.ppc-ag.de #pwib#pigjnpiz5jnjnpo Power Plus Communications AG Dudenstraße 6, 68167 Mannheim Tel. 00 49 621 40165 100 | Fax. 00 49 621 40165 111 info@ppc-ag.de | www.ppc-ag.de