



Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0415-2007

for

**BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1
Version 2.1.2.1**

from

OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG

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Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0415-2007

Signature application component

BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1

Version 2.1.2.1

from: OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG

Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_VLA.4, AVA_MSU.3



Common Criteria
Arrangement
for components up
to EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using *the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3* extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 for conformance to the *Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)*.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 11. December 2007

The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security



SOGIS - MRA

Dr. Helmbrecht

L.S.

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Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

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A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG²
- BSI Certification Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)⁵
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
- Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 (AIS 34)

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

² Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998.

This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>

The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1, version 2.1.2.1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0367-2006.

The evaluation of the product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1, version 2.1.2.1 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁶ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the applicant and developer is: OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4 Validity of the certification result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

5 Publication

The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24 and D1 to D-2.

The product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1, version 2.1.2.1 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: [http:// www.bsi.bund.de](http://www.bsi.bund.de)). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁷ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁷ OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Zuger Str. 76 b
6341 Baar, Switzerland

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

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1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) is the software application BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1, version 2.1.2.1⁸.

BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 is an electronic signature application compliant to the German electronic signature law [11] and ordinance on electronic signatures [12]. The application itself is a set of executables and programming libraries.

The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 were developed for the use on the operating systems from Microsoft since Microsoft Windows 98 SE. In the IT-security environment a smart card terminal with secure pin entry mode as well as a smart card are required to run the required cryptographic operations in the process of electronic signature creation.

The product provides additional cryptographic functionality like data encryption based on symmetric encryption algorithms. These product capabilities are not part of the Common Criteria evaluation of this product.

The TOE itself is limited to the creation of hash values, using the SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD-160 algorithms and the RSA-Algorithm for signature validation. It is therefore able to check and ensure the integrity as well as the trustworthiness of signed data based on the components responsible for CRL-processing, OCSP-processing, timestamp processing and PDF processing.

The TOE can be used as a standalone application or can be integrated into third party products. For third party products the TOE includes an API (called BKK OPENLiMiT Job Interface⁹) that allows access to the following core functionality of the TOE:

- Computation of hash values implementing the algorithms mentioned above.
- Initiation of the creation of electronic signatures.
- Timestamp processing.
- Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for OCSP-processing in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Electronic signature verification.
- Integrity protection of the installed product.

⁸ Also named BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 in this report.

⁹ The guidance for this API is contained in the document [10]. The API itself is called "OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK" within [10].

Furthermore, the TOE provides a legal binding displaying unit (BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer) for the Text, TIFF and PDF format. The displaying unit of the TOE allows the examination of the files in order to ensure that the user is assured about the content to be signed or the content of the signed file.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified Protection Profile.

The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VLA.4, AVA_MSU.3.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.

The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functions:

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
SF.1	<p>Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature creation process using certificates, smart card terminals and secure signature creation devices.</p> <p>The user can optionally include OCSP-responses for the validation of certificates and add timestamps to a digital signature. Furthermore, the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 allow the creation of more than one signature without entering the PIN for every document¹⁰. This feature is only available for the BKK OPENLiMiT Job Interface and not for the graphical user interface included in the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1.</p>
SF.2	<p>Verification of hash values and electronic signatures using certificate revocation lists, OCSP responses (optional) and timestamps (optional)</p> <p>Apart from the extraction of the original and the comparison with the calculated hash value the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 verify the certificate chain using the chain model or RFC 3280.</p>
SF.3	<p>Program module manipulation detection</p> <p>The files and libraries constituting the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 are digitally signed. Each time the application starts a specific module is responsible for verifying these signatures mathematically.</p>
SF.4	<p>Unambiguous presentation of the data to be signed</p>

¹⁰ Though the software provides this functionality, the supported smart cards require entering the PIN for every document.

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
	<p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 present the data to be signed unambiguously to the user. To accomplish this, a parser determines whether the format of the data to be signed complies to the Adobe PDF-, the TIFF-standard or is a text file. The data is checked for active content, unknown tags and elements or control characters that cannot be displayed. If any irregularities are detected, the user is informed with appropriate error messages or warnings.</p>
SF.5	<p>Protection against hash value manipulation</p> <p>Before the electronic signature is initiated, the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 compute the hash value of the data to be signed. After the electronic signature creation process the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 verify the electronic signature using the public key of the given signer certificate. If the original hash value and the hash value encoded in the electronic signature are not identical, the signature is discarded.</p>
SF.6	<p>Assurance of the TOE's integrity</p> <p>For the integrity check the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 comprise a JAVA-applet that is provided online. When assessing this applet it calculates the hash value of each file belonging to the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 and compares it to the values that were initially calculated by the manufacturer. If any value does not match, an error message is displayed.</p>
SF.7	<p>Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 is able to process OCSP-responses. First the mathematical correctness of the signature of the OCSP-response is checked. If the OCSP-response is used for the validation of a certificate, the complete chain for the signing certificate of the OCSP-response is verified.</p>
SF.8	<p>Application of timestamps</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 apply timestamps to files if the timestamp is electronically signed and the certificate belonging to the signature of the timestamp is already available. Otherwise the timestamp is not imported.</p>
SF.9	<p>Validation of timestamps</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 validate the electronic signature of a timestamp mathematically. Furthermore, the certificate underlying the electronic signature of the timestamp is validated according to the chain model or RFC 3280. A prerequisite for this security function is that the signing certificate of the timestamp is already available.</p>

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
SF.10	Management of Security Functions depending on licenses The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 support different licenses. E.g. for the verification of electronic signatures no special license key must be purchased, whereas the creation of embedded PDF-signatures requires the availability of the most comprehensive license.

Table 1: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.

The claimed TOE’s strength of functions ‘high (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 8.5 is confirmed. The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSI Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of assumptions, threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.

This certification covers the configuration of the TOE as mentioned in the Security Target and in the Evaluation Technical Report [7].

The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1, version 2.1.2.1

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Date	Form of Delivery
1.	SW	BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1, version 2.1.2.1 delivered as <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, version 2.0.2.1 with patch BKKCCSignSec.exe (2.060.856 bytes) • or as complete setup. 	2.1.2.1	13.11.2006	File
2.	SW	Integrity Tool SiqCfg.jar	see Table 7	13.11.2006	File
3.	DOC	BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 – User Guidance (German)	2.0.2.1	23.03.2006	chm-File
4.	DOC	OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.0 Documentation ¹¹	0.9	23.03.2006	PDF-File
5.	SW (Header file)	siqSDK.h	see Table 7	17.03.2005	File
6.	SW (Library file)	siqSDK.lib	see Table 7	20.03.2005	File

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE deliverables No. 1 to No. 3 are delivered to customers who purchase the TOE as a standalone application.

The TOE deliverables No. 4 - 6 are intended for developers who want to integrate the API provided by the TOE into their own application.

To identify the Header and Library Files of the API and the BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool the SHA-1 values of these files are listed in the next table.

No.	File	SHA-1-value
1.	siqSDK.h	d574186d11a0d591f8516b78b035d13609365187
2.	siqSDK.lib	0d7029d0afd70838bcbb9e6e5093f46f19db2d38
3.	SiqCfg.jar	91782f0e903912dca93fae35deb18a909d1d0c9e

Table 7: Hash Values of TOE deliverables

The end customer can acquire the TOE through different sales channels:

¹¹ This document contains the guidance for the BKK OPENLiMiT Job Interface.

- The customer buys a CD-ROM that contains the complete setup directly from OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG or resellers.
- Resellers or the OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG make the software available on their webpages. The download process must comply with the following guidelines:
 - The webpage where the software is offered must be secured by means of https. The fingerprint of the certificate must be published separately on the website of the corresponding company.
 - The website must explicitly instruct the user to execute the integrity tool first before using the TOE.
- The user already owns the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, version 2.0.2.1 and installs the patch update. To download the patch, the user must execute the Java-Applet contained on the webpage www.openlimit.com/integritytool. This applet automatically directs the user to the webpage where the user can download the correct patch for his product.

After installing the product the user is compelled to execute the integrity tool that the OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG offers on the website

www.openlimit.com/integritytool.

This applet checks whether the TOE is correctly installed on the computer of the user and displays the versions of the different files composing the TOE. Thus, the user can easily recognize whether he installed the correct version of the software.

The OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG is responsible for the provision of the TOE deliverables No. 4 – No. 6. They are handed over to end customers (i.e. application developers) either online or by a delivery service on CD-ROM as a compressed zip-archive that is signed with a qualified certificate and can be identified by means of the following information:

Subject: Armin Lunkeit
 Issuer: S-TRUST Qualified Signature CA 2005-001:PN
 Valid From: 11th of October 2005
 Valid Until: 31 of December 2009
 Serial Number: 0x6A 41 76 EC AB 31 41 3B DC B3 87 A0 2A 62 E6 BF
 SHA-1 Fingerprint: 49 DA 34 B5 BF C2 8A 41 38 1D 52 2C 6E C6 24 BD C3 0E 08 38

The receiver of the archive must verify this qualified electronic signature to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the software.

3 Security Policy

The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1, version 2.1.2.1 is a signature application component compliant to the German signature law and ordinance on electronic signatures and thus enforces the following security policies:

- The TOE clearly indicates the creation of a qualified electronic signature and enables the user to unambiguously identify the data to be signed.
- The TOE ensures that the identification data are not disclosed and are stored only on the relevant secure signature creation device. The application enforces the rule that a signature is provided only at the initiation of the authorized signing person.
- The TOE shows to which data the signature refers, whether the signed data is unchanged and to which signature-code owner the signature is to be assigned.
- The TOE presents the contents of the qualified certificate on which the signature is based, the appropriate qualified attribute certificates and the results of the subsequent check of certificates.
- If data to be signed or data already signed is displayed by the TOE certain rules for the treatment of nonreadable signs are enforced.
- For the verification of a qualified electronic signature the TOE reliably verifies the correctness of a signature and displays this fact appropriately.
- Using the TOE it can be clearly determined whether the verified qualified certificates were present in the relevant register of certificates at the given time and were not revoked.
- The TOE ensures, that security-relevant changes in the technical components are apparent to the user.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

4.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target [6] and some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-environment. The following topics are of relevance:

- Usage of the supported operating system, smart card readers and smart cards as specified in the objective OE.Platform.
- Trustworthiness of users and administrators as mentioned in OE.Personnel.
- Protection of the computer where the TOE is installed on against network based attacks as indicated in OE.Network.
- Restriction of the physical access to the computer where the TOE is installed on to authorized users and administrators only. The TOE must not

be accessed through existing network connections. See OE.Access for more details.

- Computation of electronic signatures from a given hash value in the environment.

Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.

4.2 Clarification of scope

The TOE cannot assure the correctness of the following functions:

- Private Key material. The secure signature creation device must assure the correctness and integrity of the private key material.
- Assurance of the operating system integrity. The TOE does not contain any capabilities for ensuring the integrity of the operating system and its environment. The user must assure that sufficient actions are undertaken to avoid that the operating system may be compromised.
- Strength and security of cryptographic operations. The TOE uses libraries for hash value creation and the RSA algorithm for signature validation. Therefore the TOE can only assure the compliance to given standardization documentation and test vectors but must not make any statement about the strength of the cryptographic operations.

The capability characteristics of the TOE are limited to the computation of hash values and the usage of secure signature creation devices for electronic signature creation and the usage of the RSA algorithm for signature verification. Manipulations on the IT-security environment cannot be recognized or even prevented by the TOE.

Applications that use the TOE via the evaluated API are **not** in the focus of this evaluation.

4.2.1 Restrictions and Exceptions

There are some combinations between operating system and smart card readers that do not work together. These are listed below.

Operating System	Not supported smart card reader
Windows NT	Cherry G83-6744 LU, Cherry ST 2000, Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB, Kobil KAAN Advanced, Reiner SCT Cyber Jack pinpad v2.0, Reiner SCT cyberJack Version 3.0, Omnikey Cardman 3621, Omnikey Cardman 3821
Windows 2003	Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Windows XP 64 Bit Edition	Cherry G83-6700 LQ, Cherry G83-6744 LU, Cherry ST 2000, Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB, Kobil Systems KAAN SecOVID Plus, Kobil Standard Plus, Kobil KAAN Advanced, SCM Microsystems SPRx32/ChipDrive pinpad, Reiner SCT Cyber Jack e-com v2.0, Reiner SCT Cyber Jack pinpad v2.0, Omnikey Cardman 8630

Table 4: Operating systems and not supported smart card readers

The following combinations between smart card reader and smart cards could not be tested successfully:

Smart Card Reader	Smart Card
Cherry G83-6700 LQ	ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
	ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
	ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
	Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
Cherry G83-6744 LU	Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
Cherry ST 2000	ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
	ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
	ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
	Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
Kobil B1 Pro USB	Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
Kobil Systems KAAN SecOVID Plus	Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
Kobil Standard Plus	Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
Kobil KAAN Advanced	Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
	Signature card DTRUST Card_MS version 1.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
	Signature card DTRUST Card_MS version 1.0

Smart Card Reader	Smart Card
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0	Signature card DTRUST Card_MS version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0	Signature card DTRUST Card_MS version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Omnikey Cardman 3621	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Omnikey Cardman 3821	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Omnikey Cardman 8630	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1

Table 5: Incompatibility of smart cards and smart card readers

These combinations of operating systems and smart card readers or smart card readers and smart cards are not included in the evaluation and therefore not in the scope of this certificate.

5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a signature application component compliant to the German electronic signature law and ordinance on electronic signatures. The application itself is a set of executables and programming libraries. This means that the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 may be used as a single application but also may be integrated into third party products. The TOE comprises three different parts:

- the BKK OPENLiMiT Security Environment Manager
- the BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer
- the BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool

The first two parts represent the main components of the TOE whereas the BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool is a separate application implemented as a Java-Applet. The BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool is used to allow the user to check the integrity of the installed product.

The figure below provides an overview of the main components and their interfaces as described in the High-Level Design. For the sake of clarity the Integrity Tool is not depicted in this figure.




Figure 1: Decomposition of the main components of the TOE

In Figure 1 the lined boxes represent the subsystems of the main components of the TOE whereas the arrows indicate interfaces between subsystems. Dashed boxes refer to external subsystems that are part of the IT environment of the TOE.

The BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer is a software component for displaying signed data or data to be signed according to the signature law §17 paragraph 2. The BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer is able to display TIFF documents following the Adobe TIFF specification, PDF documents that follow the PDF 1.6 document format as well as documents that contain ASCII characters. If the user decides to sign the document that is currently displayed with the BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer, he can start the process of electronic signature creation using the BKK OPENLiMiT

Viewer as an indirect interface to that functionality provided by the BKK OPENLiMiT Security Environment Manager.

The BKK OPENLiMiT Security Environment Manager provides the following functionality that may be accessed in parts or completely through the use of the BKK OPENLiMiT Job Interface:

- Computation of hash values using the SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD-160 algorithms.
- Initiation of the creation of electronic signatures using a smart card and a secure pin entry device (smart card reader).
- Timestamp processing during the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for OCSP processing during the electronic signature creation.
- Electronic signature verification including OCSP and CRL processing as well as timestamp processing. The use of attribute certificates is supported.
- API's for applications/product parts that want to use the provided functionality.
- Ensuring the integrity and correctness of the BKK OPENLiMiT base components installed on the user's computer.
- Providing graphical interfaces in the process of signature creation, verification and product configuration.

6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is provided to the customer as part of the product. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7 IT Product Testing

The following tests belong to this re-evaluation:

- new tests to check the changed behaviour of the security function SF. 2 (verification of hash values and electronic signatures, see chapter 1),
- new tests to check the correct delivery of the product with the patch update,
- tests of the former evaluation that were repeated to ensure the compatibility of the changes with the unchanged parts of the program and
- tests of the former evaluation that remain valid.

Thus the TOE was tested in accordance with the Security Target [6].

All prerequisites mentioned in the assumptions on the operating environment concerning the installation of modules of the operating systems (e.g. the correct version of the Internet Explorer) or firewalls and virus scanners were fulfilled for the computers of the testbed. Consequently, the TOE was tested with the following configuration:

Smart cards:

- OPENLiMiT card
- TeleSec E4 NetKey Card
- TeleSec PKS Card v2.0 and v3.0
- Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v1.0
- Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v2.0
- Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.0
- Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.1
- Signature card D-TRUST Card_MS version 1.0
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.0
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.10
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.20
- STARCOS SPK 2.3 v7.0 with digital signature application StarCert v2.2
- STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (limited signature generation configuration)
- STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (unlimited signature generation configuration)
- Siemens CardOS M4.3 B
- ACOS EMV-A03 based smart card from A-Trust
- ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
- S-TRUST signature card release 3 (SPK 2.3 based)

Smart card terminals

- Cherry ST 2000
- Cherry G83-6700 LQ
- Cherry G83-6744 LU
- Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB

- Kobil Systems KAAN SecOVID Plus
- Kobil Standard Plus
- Kobil KAAN Advanced
- SCM Microsystems SPR x32
- Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
- Omnikey Cardman 3821
- Omnikey Cardman 8630
- Omnikey Cardman 3621

Operating systems

- Windows 98 SE
- Windows ME
- Windows NT 4 SP 6
- Windows 2000 SP 2
- Windows 2003
- Windows XP Home
- Windows XP Professional
- Windows XP Tablet PC Edition
- Windows XP 64 Bit Edition

7.2 Developer tests

Compared to the functionality that was evaluated and certified in the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0367-2005 the TOE changed on a small scale. As the changes of the TOE did not affect parts that depend on the operating system, all new and repeated tests were conducted on a test computer with the Windows 2000 operating system.

The test description demonstrates that the developer performed his testing on an adequate level for the evaluation assurance level EAL 4 augmented. According to the verdict of the evaluator mentioned in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7], the test efforts of the developer demonstrate that the security functionalities defined in the ST [6] have been implemented as required.

7.3 Evaluator tests

In context of the evaluation the ITSEF repeated some of the developer tests and performed independent tests in addition. The following testing approach was chosen:

Evaluator tests and independent tests were identified based on the developer tests already available. The developer tests have been compared with the Security Target and the corresponding design documentation in order to determine the fields of further investigation. According to EAL4, testing is performed down to a depth of subsystem interfaces. The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected. The depth of testing is adequate for the evaluation assurance level chosen (EAL4+).

The TOE successfully passed independent testing. The penetration tests performed by the evaluators confirmed that under the given assumptions no vulnerabilities can be exploited.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 was evaluated in the configuration as described in the Evaluation Technical Report [7] and summarized in chapter 2 of this report.

The TOE allows only one mode of operation though several different functionalities are bound to purchasing a corresponding license. Depending on the license, the user may use only parts of the functionality evaluated and certified. In any case, the evaluation and the certificate cover all functionalities that the purchase of the most comprehensive license provides.

9 Results of the Evaluation

9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up to EAL 4 and extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 [4] (AIS 34).

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the class ASE
- All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0367-2006, re-use of

specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was to check the changed behaviour of the security function SF.2 – verification of time stamps and electronic signatures – and to ensure a correct installation of the patch update.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- for the functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_VLA.4, AVA_MSU.3

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:

- hash functions:
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RIPEMD-160
- signature algorithms:
RSA with bitlength between 1024 and 2048 bits

This holds for the following security functions:

- SF.1 (Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature creation),
- SF.2 (Verification of hash values and electronic signatures),
- SF.3 (Program module manipulation detection),
- SF.5 (Protection against hash value manipulation),
- SF.6 (Assurance of the TOE's integrity),
- SF.7 (Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation),
- SF.8 (Application of timestamps),
- SF.9 (Validation of timestamps),
- SF.10 (Management of Security Functions depending on licenses).

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur [14] the algorithms are suitable for the creation and verification of qualified electronic signatures. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [14] and summarized in chapter 10.

10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE

The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.

As outlined in chapter 1 of this report and in the Security Target the TOE uses the hash functions SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD-160. For the verification of digital signatures the TOE uses the RSA-Algorithm with bitlengths between 1024-2048 bits. According to the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur, these algorithms are considered to be suitable for the application of qualified electronic signatures with respect to the German Signature Law (SigG) and ordinance on electronic signatures.

The following table describes the validity period of hash functions according to the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur [14].

Hash function	Valid until end of
SHA-1	2009
RIPEMD-160	2010
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2012

Table 6: Validity period of hash functions

As the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.1 implement certain cryptographic algorithms for the verification of electronic signatures, the following table summarizes the validity period of these algorithms as published by the Bundesnetzagentur.

Algorithm with bitlength	Valid until end of
RSA 1024	2007
RSA 1280	2008
RSA 1536	2009
RSA 1728	2010
RSA 1976	2012

Table 7: Validity period of cryptographic algorithms

A bitlength of 2048 Bits is recommended for an acceptable long term security level.

Detailed information about suitable algorithms for the application of qualified electronic signatures can be obtained from the website of the Bundesnetzagentur (see www.bundesnetzagentur.de).

11 Security Target

12 Definitions

12.1 Acronyms

API	Application Programming Interface
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CT	Card Terminal
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IT	Information Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
PC/SC	Personal Computer/Smart Card
PP	Protection Profile
SDK	Software development kit
SF	Security Function
SFP	Security Function Policy
SOF	Strength of Function
SSCD	Secure Signature Creation Device
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy

12.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

13 Bibliography

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Legal regulations

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- [12] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur (Signaturverordnung - SigV), 2001-11-16, BGBl. volume 2001 part I p. 876
- [13] Maßnahmenkatalog für technische Komponenten nach dem Signaturgesetz, Stand 15. July 1998, publisher RegTP

- [14] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), published 12 April 2007, in the Bundesanzeiger No. 69, p. 3759 and available for download on the web-pages of the Bundesnetzagentur (www.bundesnetzagentur.de)

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C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

Conformance results (chapter 7.4)

„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

- **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.

plus one of the following:

- **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
- **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

- **PP Conformant** - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.“

CC Part 3:

Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)

“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.”

“Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	TOE description (APE_DES)
	Security environment (APE_ENV)
	PP introduction (APE_INT)
	Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
	IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)

Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”

Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)

“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE evaluation.”

“Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	TOE description (ASE_DES)
	Security environment (ASE_ENV)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT)
	Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
	PP claims (ASE_PPC)
	IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)

Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”

Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)

“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 1.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management	CM automation (ACM_AUT)
	CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
	CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation	Delivery (ADO_DEL)
	Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development	Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
	High-level design (ADV_HLD)
	Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
	TSF internals (ADV_INT)
	Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
	Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
	Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents	Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
	User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support	Development security (ALC_DVS)
	Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
	Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
	Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests	Coverage (ATE_COV)
	Depth (ATE_DPT)
	Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
	Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
	Misuse (AVA_MSU)
	Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
	Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)

Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)

“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Evaluation Assurance Level Components by						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Configuration management	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2
	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3
Delivery and operation	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3
	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Development	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3
	ADV_INT					1	2	3
	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3
Guidance documents	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle support	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_CCA					1	2	2
	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3
	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4

Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary"

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)

“Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)

“Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 11.5)

“Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 11.6)

“Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 11.7)

“Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 11.8)

“Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)**“Objectives**

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“

Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)**“Objectives**

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)**"Objectives**

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

"Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”

“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”

D Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target [6] is provided within a separate document.

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