MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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Dossier: 2015-31
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Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
REF: 2015-31-INF-1653 v2
Target: Público
Date: 23.10.2017
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2015-31 KONA2 ePassport EAC
Applicant: 109-81-53365 KONA I Co., Ltd.
References:
[EXT-2852] Certification request of KONA2 ePassport EAC
[EXT-3078] Evaluation Technical Report of KONA2 ePassport EAC.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration)
version 01 revision 03 patch 00, as requested in [EXT-2852] dated 04/11/2015, and
evaluated by the laboratory Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation
Technical Report [EXT-3078] received on 13/06/2016.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS......................................................... 5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................ 6
IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................................... 7
SECURITY POLICIES ............................................................................................... 7
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.......................................... 8
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS............................................... 9
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY............................................ 10
ARCHITECTURE..................................................................................................... 12
DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 12
PRODUCT TESTING............................................................................................... 13
PENETRATION TESTING.................................................................................... 13
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ............................................................................ 14
EVALUATION RESULTS ........................................................................................ 15
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ........... 15
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 15
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................. 15
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................... 16
SECURITY TARGET ............................................................................................... 18
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch
00.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control and Extended Access
Control according to the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-01] and BSI TR-03110 [TR-03],
respectively. It provides the security level of EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5. The TOE type of the current security target is "the contactless
integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip)
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the
Extended Access Control", compatible with the expected TOE type described in the
[PP-EAC].
Developer/manufacturer: KONA I Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: KONA I Co., Ltd.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF:Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control version 1.10, 25th
March 2009. BSI-CC-PP-0056.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2.
Evaluation end date: 13/06/2016.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 augmented with
augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5
(Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict.
Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL5 +
AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the
CEM v3.1 R4.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03
patch 00, a positive resolution is proposed.
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TOE SUMMARY
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control, the Active
Authentication and the Extended Access Control according to ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[ICAO-01] and BSI TR-03110 [TR-03], respectively.
The TOE comprises of:
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards,
S3FT9MG rev 0)
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (KONA2 D2320N ePassport V01.03.00),
 the associated guidance documentation.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature
created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the
security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD,
Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the
‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-01]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data
Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE
environment.
The TOE covered by this Certification Report addresses the protection of the logical
MRTD
(i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and
(ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism. The TOE
also addresses the Chip Authentication described in [TR-03] as an alternative
to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO-01] which is out of the scope of
this certificate.
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall
be implemented by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by this
Certification Report as there are known weaknesses in the quality (i.e. entropy) of
the BAC keys generated by the environment. Due to the fact that [PP-BAC] does
only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control
Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3) the MRTD has to be evaluated and certified
separately.
The TOE is conformant with the Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0056, Common
Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Extended Access Control, version 1.10 [PP-EAC].
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SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL5 and the evidences required by the additional components ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.
Assurance Class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional
specification with additional error information
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the
TSF
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation
standards
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
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SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R4:
Class Components
FAU: Security Audit FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation –
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction –
MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash
for Key Derivation
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation –
Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation –MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation –
Signature verification by MRTD
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
- Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the
TOE
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating
of Terminal by the TOE
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FDP: User Data
Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Basic security attribute based access
control
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data -
Writing of Initialization Data and Prepersonalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data –
Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
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– Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current
Date
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF
data – Country Verifying Certification Authority
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data –
Current date
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF
data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data –
Chip Authentication Private Key
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
– Key Read
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FPT: Protection of the
Security
Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure
state
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
IDENTIFICATION
Product: KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03
patch 00
Security Target: SP-06-02 KONA2 D2320N ePassport EAC Security Target version
1 revision 7.2016-05-21.
Protection Profile: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control version 1.10, 25th
March 2009. BSI-CC-PP-0056.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01
revision 03 patch 00 shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment
of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it
establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following
aspects.
Policy 01: P.BAC-PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control
Protection Profile
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This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in [PP-EAC] (paragraph
77).
Policy 02: P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference
data
This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in in [PP-EAC]
(paragraph 78).
Policy 03: P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in [PP-EAC] (paragraph
79).
Policy 04: P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by
issuing State or Organization only
This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in in [PP-EAC]
(paragraph 80).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Assumption 01: A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on step 4
to 6
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 60).
Assumption 02: A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to
6
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 61).
Assumption 03: A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 62).
Assumption 04: A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global
interoperability
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This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 63).
Assumption 05: A.Signature_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 64).
Assumption 06: A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 65).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product KONA2 D2320N
ePassport (EAC configuration) vversion 01 revision 03 patch 00, although the agents
implementing attacks have a high attack potential of EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 +
ALC_DVS.2 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security
policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
Threat 01: T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric
reference data
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 68).
Threat 02: T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
This threat is included in the ST and it is described the MRTD, “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 69).
Threat 03: T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 70).
Threat 04: T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
This threat is included in the ST and it is described the MRTD, “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 72).
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Threat 05: T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from
MRTD’s chip
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 73).
Threat 06: T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 74).
Threat 07: T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 75).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of
the TOE environment.
Environment objective 01: OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the
MRTD Manufacturing
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 98).
Environment objective 02: OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the
MRTD delivery
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 99).
Environment objective 03: OE.Personalization Personalization of
logical MRTD
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 100).
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Environment objective 04: OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 101).
Environment objective 05: OE.Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD
Authentication Key
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 102).
Environment objective 06: OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization
for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 103).
Environment objective 07: OE.BAC_PP Fulfillment of the Basic
Access Control Protection Profile
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 104)
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives
of the TOE environment
Environment objective 08: OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the
MRTD passport book
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 106)
Environment objective 09: OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by
Passive Authentication
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 107).
Environment objective 10: OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of
data from the logical MRTD
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 108).
Environment objective 11: OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of
Extended Inspection Systems
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in
the MRTD, “ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 110).
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The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and
organizational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in
the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is a composition of IC hardware and embedded software that controls the
IC.
The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and
application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet
(holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless
these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
DOCUMENTS
The TOE includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
 KONA2 D2320N ePassport Operational Guidance, version 01.01 [GU]. This
guide is delivered to the card holder (Card holder or receiving State).
 KONA2 D2320N ePassport Preparative Guidance, version 01.07 [GP]. This
guide is delivered to the personalization agent (Issuing State).
 KONA2 D2320N ePassport Administrator Guidance, version 01.03 [GA]. This
guide is only used by KONA I internally
 KONA2 D2320N ePassport Delivery Procedure 01.02 [DEL]. This guide is
used by all the entities to deliver the TOE between them
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PRODUCT TESTING
The evaluation has been performed according to the Composite Evaluation Scheme
as defined in the guides [JILCOMP] and [JILADVARC] in order to assess that the
combination of the TOE with the underlying platform did not lead to any exploitable
vulnerability.
This evaluation has then taken into account the evaluation results and security
recommendations for the platform which is part of the evaluated composite TOE, and
was already certified with certificate ANSSI-CC-2015/66.
The developer has executed test for all the declared security functions. All the tests
have been performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process, each test unit has been executed to check that the
declared security functionality has been identified and also to check that the kind of
test is appropriate to the function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using a testing scenario appropriate to the
established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the
obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluation team has applied a
sampling strategy and has concluded that the information is complete and coherent
enough to reproduce tests and identify the functionality tested. Moreover, the
evaluation team has planned and executed additional tests independently of those
executed by the developer. The latter tests covered the TOE EAC functionalities.
The underlying RNG has been also tested.
The obtained results have been checked to be conformant to the expected results
and in cases where a deviation relative to the expected results has been detected,
the evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither represents any security
problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment, the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests
according to JIL supporting documents [JILAAPS] and [JILADVARC]. Within these
activities all aspects of the security architecture which were not covered by functional
testing have been considered.
The implementations of the requirements of the provided platform’s ETR for
Composition and guidance, as well as of the security mechanisms of the TOE in
general have been verified by the evaluation team. An appropriate test set was
devised to cover these potential vulnerabilities.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High has been
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successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target
when all measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined by its name and version number KONA2 D2320N ePassport
(EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00.
The TOE is composed of:
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards,
S3FT9MG rev 0)
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (KONA2 D2320N ePassport V01.03.00),
 the associated guidance documentation.
The version of the software may be retrieved by following the procedure in section 6.
Secure acceptance procedure [GP].
To identify the TOE is necessary for the personalization agent to execute the GET
DATA command (APDU==00ca004600) and check the returned 10 Bytes against the
following table (described in Table 54 TOE identification of [GP]):
Response Data Length Value
Card Information 10 ‘44’ ‘32’ ‘01’ ‘40’ ‘4E’ ‘31’ ‘01’ ‘00’ ‘03’ ‘00’
Card Serial Number 8 ‘xx’ ‘xx’ ‘xx’ ‘xx’ ‘xx’ ‘xx’ ‘xx’ ‘xx’
The identification of the Card information data is identified as follows:
 44: (ASCII) meaning ‘D’ related to ODA and I/F where ODA=DDA , IF=DI
 32: (ASCII) ‘2’ related to IC vendor (Samsung)
 01 40: (hex-decimal) ‘320’ meaning 320 KB of IC memory
 4E : (ASCII) ‘N’ meaning native platform
 31 : (ASCII) ‘1’ meaning the first revision of the IC (S3FT9MG rev 0)
 01 00 03 : meaning TOE version 01.03
 00 : meaning update (patch) version 00 (no patch has been done)
Regarding the Card Serial Number, as this data depends on the particular card
delivered, it is not necessary to check this information.
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EVALUATION RESULTS
The product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) vversion 01 revision 03
patch 00 has been evaluated against the Security Target SP-06-02 KONA2 D2320N
ePassport EAC Security Target version 1 revision 7.2016-05-21.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5
+ ALC_DVS.2 have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory
Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all
the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 +
ALC_DVS.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product:
1. The TOE includes the patching mechanism during development in order to
update the TOE after possible issues found during this development stage.
However, the patching mechanism is not available once the personalization
has been finished by setting the card into OPERATION state or the card has
reached TERMINATION state. Moreover, this patching is done with a key that
is different from the personalization one and is specially protected.
The evaluator assessed that the MRTD data is secure when the issuer uses
the SET LIFE CYCLE command to set the card into OPERATION state once
the MRTD personalization is finished.
Due to this, the laboratory recommends to the customer to be especially strict
following the preparative procedure guidance and operational guidance until
the OPERATION state is reached.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03
patch 00, a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
AA Active Authentication
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CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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BAC Basic Access Control
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EIS Extended Inspection System
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GIS General Inspection System
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
OC Organismo de Certificación
OSP Organizational security policy
PA Passive Authentication
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security functional requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version
3.1 R4, September 2012.
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CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version
3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version
3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[PP-EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control,
version 1.10. BSI-CC-PP-0056. March 2009. Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[PP-BAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access Control,
version 1.10. BSI-PP-0055. March 2009. Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[ICAO-01] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1
– Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006,
International Civil Aviation Organization.
[ICAO-03] Internal Civil Aviation Organization. Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Part 3, Vol 1 - Specifications for Electronically
Enabled MRTDs with Biometric Identification Capability,
version 3, edition 2008, International Civil Aviation
Organization.
[ICAO-10] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Doc 9303 Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of
Biometrics and Other Data in the Contacless Intedrated Circuit
(IC), 7th Edition, 2015
[TR-03] Technical Guideline TR-03110. Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –
Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI).
[CCCOMP] Common Criteria.
Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar
devices, Evaluation methodology
[INT10] Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
Certificación de productos, Versión 0.6
[PO-005] Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
Certificación de productos, Versión 24, 12-12-2015
[PO-008] Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
Certificación de smartcards, Versión 8, 11-11-2014
[AMCA] Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
Attack Methods using Side Channels or Perturbations,
Technical Guide, Versión 5
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CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
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[AMSCP] Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
Attack Methods using Side Channels or Perturbations,
Technical Guide, Versión 4
[JILAAPS] Joint Interpretation Library.
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, version 2.9. Jan.
2013.
[JILCOMP] Joint Interpretation Library.
Composite Product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices, version 1.2. Jan. 2012
[JIL-MSSR] Joint Interpretation Library.
Minimum site security requirements. Version 1.1
[JILADVARC] Joint Interpretation Library.
Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for Smart
Cards and similar devices. Version 2.0, January 2012
[ISO-14443] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification Cards – Contactless integrated
circuit(s) cards – Proximity cards. 2nd ed. 2008-06-15
[ISO-7816-4] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 Identification cards – Integrated circuits
cards –Part 4: organization, security and commands for
interchange. 2nd ed. 2005-01-15
[CCDB-2006-
04-004]
ST sanitising for publication. CCMC. Apr. 2006.
[GU] KONA2 D2320N ePassport Operational Guidance V01.01
(2016.05.06)
[GP] KONA2 D2320N ePassport Preparative Procedure Guidance
V01.07, (2016.05.18)
[GA] KONA2 D2320N ePassport Administrator Guidance, V01.03,
(2016.05.21)
[DEL] KONA2 D2320N ePassport Delivery Procedure V01.02
(2016.05.18)
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
stored and protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified
as:
- SP-06-02 KONA2 D2320N ePassport EAC Security Target version 1 revision
7.2016-05-21.
The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also
been reviewed for the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it
is published along with this certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA
websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
- SP-06-22 KONA2 D2320N ePassport EAC Security Target version 1 revision
2. 2016-05-21.