REF: 2015-31-INF-1653 v2

Target: Público

Date: 23.10.2017

Created by: CERT10

Revised by: CALIDAD

Approved by: TECNICO

CERTIFICATION REPORT

File: 2015-31 KONA2 ePassport EAC

Applicant: 109-81-53365 KONA I Co., Ltd.

References:

[EXT-2852] Certification request of KONA2 ePassport EAC

[EXT-3078] Evaluation Technical Report of KONA2 ePassport EAC.

The product documentation referenced in the above documents.

Certification report of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00, as requested in [EXT-2852] dated 04/11/2015, and evaluated by the laboratory Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-3078] received on 13/06/2016.

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ENAC
CERTIFICACIÓN
Nº 45/C-PR110

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control and Extended Access Control according to the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-01] and BSI TR-03110 [TR-03], respectively. It provides the security level of EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The TOE type of the current security target is "the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Extended Access Control", compatible with the expected TOE type described in the [PP-EAC].

Developer/manufacturer: KONA I Co., Ltd.

Sponsor: KONA I Co., Ltd.

Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).

ITSEF:Applus Laboratories.

Protection Profile: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control version 1.10, 25th March 2009. BSI-CC-PP-0056.

Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2.

Evaluation end date: 13/06/2016.

All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 augmented with augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis) have been assigned a "PASS" verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the "PASS" VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.

Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00, a positive resolution is proposed.

TOE SUMMARY

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control, the Active Authentication and the Extended Access Control according to 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-01] and BSI TR-03110 [TR-03], respectively.

The TOE comprises of:
- the circuitry of the MRTD's chip (16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, S3FT9MG rev 0)
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (KONA2 D2320N ePassport V01.03.00),
- the associated guidance documentation.

The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD's chip.

The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD's chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-01]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.

The TOE covered by this Certification Report addresses the protection of the logical MRTD

(i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and
(ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism. The TOE also addresses the Chip Authentication described in [TR-03] as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO-01] which is out of the scope of this certificate.

The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall be implemented by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by this Certification Report as there are known weaknesses in the quality (i.e. entropy) of the BAC keys generated by the environment. Due to the fact that [PP-BAC] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3) the MRTD has to be evaluated and certified separately.

The TOE is conformant with the Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0056, Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control, version 1.10 [PP-EAC].

SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL5 and the evidences required by the additional components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
	ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
	ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	**AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis**

SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R4:

Class	Components
FAU: Security Audit	FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS: Cryptographic Support	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Keys by the TOE
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD
	FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation
	FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
	FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation –MAC
	FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
	FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA: Identification and Authentication	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
	FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
	FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
	FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
	FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FDP: User Data Protection	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
	FDP_ACF.1 Basic security attribute based access control
	FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
	FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FMT: Security Management	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
	FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data - Writing of Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data
	FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data

	– Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current Date
	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifying Certification Authority
	FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
	FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
	FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
	FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
	FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FPT: Protection of the Security Functions	FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
	FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
	FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
	FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

IDENTIFICATION

Product: KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00

Security Target: SP-06-02 KONA2 D2320N ePassport EAC Security Target version 1 revision 7.2016-05-21.

Protection Profile: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control version 1.10, 25th March 2009. BSI-CC-PP-0056.

Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2.

SECURITY POLICIES

The use of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00 shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.

The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following aspects.

Policy 01: P.BAC-PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile

This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in [PP-EAC] (paragraph 77).

Policy 02: P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data

This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in in [PP-EAC] (paragraph 78).

Policy 03: P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD's chip

This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in [PP-EAC] (paragraph 79).

Policy 04: P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only

This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in in [PP-EAC] (paragraph 80).

ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.

In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.

Assumption 01: A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6

This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 60).

Assumption 02: A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6

This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 61).

Assumption 03: A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD's chip

This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 62).

Assumption 04: A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability

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This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 63).

Assumption 05: A.Signature_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication

This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 64).

Assumption 06: A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems

This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 65).

CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS

The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) vversion 01 revision 03 patch 00, although the agents implementing attacks have a high attack potential of EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.

For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.

The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.

Threat 01: T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data

This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 68).

Threat 02: T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD's chip

This threat is included in the ST and it is described the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 69).

Threat 03: T.Counterfeit MRTD's chip

This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 70).

Threat 04: T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality

This threat is included in the ST and it is described the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 72).

Threat 05: T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD's chip

This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 73).

Threat 06: T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering

This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 74).

Threat 07: T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress

This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 75).

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY

The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the objectives of the defined security problem.

The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are categorized below.

Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

Environment objective 01: OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 98).

Environment objective 02: OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 99).

Environment objective 03: OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 100).

Environment objective 04: OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 101).

Environment objective 05: OE.Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD Authentication Key

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 102).

Environment objective 06: OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 103).

Environment objective 07: OE.BAC_PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 104)

Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment

Environment objective 08: OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 106)

Environment objective 09: OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 107).

Environment objective 10: OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 108).

### Environment objective 11: OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems

This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the MRTD, "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control PP (paragraph 110).

The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and organizational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in the associated security target.

ARCHITECTURE

The TOE is a composition of IC hardware and embedded software that controls the IC.

The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.

DOCUMENTS

The TOE includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available together to the users of the evaluated version.

- KONA2 D2320N ePassport Operational Guidance, version 01.01 [GU]. This guide is delivered to the card holder (Card holder or receiving State).

- KONA2 D2320N ePassport Preparative Guidance, version 01.07 [GP]. This guide is delivered to the personalization agent (Issuing State).

- KONA2 D2320N ePassport Administrator Guidance, version 01.03 [GA]. This guide is only used by KONA I internally

- KONA2 D2320N ePassport Delivery Procedure 01.02 [DEL]. This guide is used by all the entities to deliver the TOE between them

PRODUCT TESTING

The evaluation has been performed according to the Composite Evaluation Scheme as defined in the guides [JILCOMP] and [JILADVARC] in order to assess that the combination of the TOE with the underlying platform did not lead to any exploitable vulnerability.

This evaluation has then taken into account the evaluation results and security recommendations for the platform which is part of the evaluated composite TOE, and was already certified with certificate ANSSI-CC-2015/66.

The developer has executed test for all the declared security functions. All the tests have been performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.

During the evaluation process, each test unit has been executed to check that the declared security functionality has been identified and also to check that the kind of test is appropriate to the function that is intended to test.

All the tests have been developed using a testing scenario appropriate to the established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.

To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluation team has applied a sampling strategy and has concluded that the information is complete and coherent enough to reproduce tests and identify the functionality tested. Moreover, the evaluation team has planned and executed additional tests independently of those executed by the developer. The latter tests covered the TOE EAC functionalities. The underlying RNG has been also tested.

The obtained results have been checked to be conformant to the expected results and in cases where a deviation relative to the expected results has been detected, the evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product.

PENETRATION TESTING

Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment, the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests according to JIL supporting documents [JILAAPS] and [JILADVARC]. Within these activities all aspects of the security architecture which were not covered by functional testing have been considered.

The implementations of the requirements of the provided platform's ETR for Composition and guidance, as well as of the security mechanisms of the TOE in general have been verified by the evaluation team. An appropriate test set was devised to cover these potential vulnerabilities.

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential **High** has been

successful in the TOE's operational environment as defined in the security target when all measures required by the developer are applied.

EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The TOE is defined by its name and version number KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00.

The TOE is composed of:

- the circuitry of the MRTD's chip (16-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, S3FT9MG rev 0)

- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software,

- the IC Embedded Software (KONA2 D2320N ePassport V01.03.00),

- the associated guidance documentation.

The version of the software may be retrieved by following the procedure in section 6. Secure acceptance procedure [GP].

To identify the TOE is necessary for the personalization agent to execute the GET DATA command (APDU==00ca004600) and check the returned 10 Bytes against the following table (described in Table 54 TOE identification of [GP]):

Response Data	Length	Value
Card Information	10	'44' '32' '01' '40' '4E' '31' '01' '00' '03' '00'
Card Serial Number	8	'xx' 'xx' 'xx' 'xx' 'xx' 'xx' 'xx' 'xx'

The identification of the Card information data is identified as follows:

- *44: (ASCII) meaning 'D' related to ODA and I/F where ODA=DDA , IF=DI*

- *32: (ASCII) '2' related to IC vendor (Samsung)*

- *01 40: (hex-decimal) '320' meaning 320 KB of IC memory*

- *4E : (ASCII) 'N' meaning native platform*

- *31 : (ASCII) '1' meaning the first revision of the IC (S3FT9MG rev 0)*

- *01 00 03 : meaning TOE version 01.03*

- *00 : meaning update (patch) version 00 (no patch has been done)*

Regarding the Card Serial Number, as this data depends on the particular card delivered, it is not necessary to check this information.

EVALUATION RESULTS

The product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) vversion 01 revision 03 patch 00 has been evaluated against the Security Target SP-06-02 KONA2 D2320N ePassport EAC Security Target version 1 revision 7.2016-05-21.

All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 have been assigned a "PASS" verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the "**PASS**" **VERDICT** to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.

COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM

Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product:

1. The TOE includes the patching mechanism during development in order to update the TOE after possible issues found during this development stage. However, the patching mechanism is not available once the personalization has been finished by setting the card into OPERATION state or the card has reached TERMINATION state. Moreover, this patching is done with a key that is different from the personalization one and is specially protected.
The evaluator assessed that the MRTD data is secure when the issuer uses the SET LIFE CYCLE command to set the card into OPERATION state once the MRTD personalization is finished.
Due to this, the laboratory recommends to the customer to be especially strict following the preparative procedure guidance and operational guidance until the OPERATION state is reached.

CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the product KONA2 D2320N ePassport (EAC configuration) version 01 revision 03 patch 00, a positive resolution is proposed.

GLOSSARY

AA   Active Authentication

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BAC	Basic Access Control
BIS	Basic Inspection System
CC	Common Criteria
CCN	Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI	Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAC	Extended Access Control
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EF	Elementary File
EIS	Extended Inspection System
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
GIS	General Inspection System
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IT	Information Technology
MRTD	Machine Readable Travel Document
OC	Organismo de Certificación
OSP	Organizational security policy
PA	Passive Authentication
PP	Protection Profile
RNG	Random Number Generator
SAR	Security assurance requirements
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security functional requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target Of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:

[CC_P1]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.

[CC_P2]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
               Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version
               3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CC_P3]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
               Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version
               3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CEM]   Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
               Evaluation: Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.

[PP-EAC]   Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
               Document with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control,
               version 1.10. BSI-CC-PP-0056. March 2009. Bundesamt für
               Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[PP-BAC]   Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
               Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access Control,
               version 1.10. BSI-PP-0055. March 2009. Bundesamt für
               Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[ICAO-01]   ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1
               – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006,
               International Civil Aviation Organization.

[ICAO-03]   Internal Civil Aviation Organization. Machine Readable Travel
               Documents, Part 3, Vol 1 - Specifications for Electronically
               Enabled MRTDs with Biometric Identification Capability,
               version 3, edition 2008, International Civil Aviation
               Organization.
[ICAO-10]   International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
               Doc 9303 Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of
               Biometrics and Other Data in the Contacless Intedrated Circuit
               (IC), 7th Edition, 2015
[TR-03]   Technical Guideline TR-03110. Advanced Security
               Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –
               Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, Bundesamt für
               Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI).
[CCCOMP]   Common Criteria.
               Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar
               devices, Evaluation methodology
[INT10]   Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
               Certificación de productos, Versión 0.6
[PO-005]   Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
               Certificación de productos, Versión 24, 12-12-2015
[PO-008]   Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
               Certificación de smartcards, Versión 8, 11-11-2014
[AMCA]   Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional.
               Attack Methods using Side Channels or Perturbations,
               Technical Guide, Versión 5

[AMSCP]	Organismo de Certificación. Centro Criptológico Nacional. Attack Methods using Side Channels or Perturbations, Technical Guide, Versión 4
[JILAAPS]	Joint Interpretation Library. Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, version 2.9. Jan. 2013.
[JILCOMP]	Joint Interpretation Library. Composite Product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, version 1.2. Jan. 2012
[JIL-MSSR]	Joint Interpretation Library. Minimum site security requirements. Version 1.1
[JILADVARC]	Joint Interpretation Library. Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for Smart Cards and similar devices. Version 2.0, January 2012
[ISO-14443]	ISO/IEC 14443 Identification Cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards – Proximity cards. 2nd ed. 2008-06-15
[ISO-7816-4]	ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 Identification cards – Integrated circuits cards –Part 4: organization, security and commands for interchange. 2nd ed. 2005-01-15
[CCDB-2006-04-004]	ST sanitising for publication. CCMC. Apr. 2006.
[GU]	KONA2 D2320N ePassport Operational Guidance V01.01 (2016.05.06)
[GP]	KONA2 D2320N ePassport Preparative Procedure Guidance V01.07, (2016.05.18)
[GA]	KONA2 D2320N ePassport Administrator Guidance, V01.03, (2016.05.21)
[DEL]	KONA2 D2320N ePassport Delivery Procedure V01.02 (2016.05.18)

SECURITY TARGET

Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is stored and protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:

- SP-06-02 KONA2 D2320N ePassport EAC Security Target version 1 revision 7.2016-05-21.

The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also been reviewed for the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it is published along with this certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA websites. The ST Lite identifier is:

- SP-06-22 KONA2 D2320N ePassport EAC Security Target version 1 revision 2. 2016-05-21.