BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
for
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server Version 15 SP7
from
SUSE LLC
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.56
BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 (*)
Operating System
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP7
from SUSE LLC
PP Conformance: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - Protection
Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version
4.3, 27 September 2022, CCEVS-VR-PP-0091,
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, 12 Februar 2019, NIAP,
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0,
13 May 2021, CCEVS-VR-PP-0075, NIAP
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1,
ALC_TSU_EXT.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
valid until: 23 February 2031
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 24 February 2026
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Fabian Hodouschek L.S. Sandro Amendola
Head of Certification Director-General Directorate General S
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................17
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................18
13. Definitions................................................................................................................18
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................21
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 22
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBI. 2025
, no. 301, p. 2
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 02 December
2025, Bundesgesetzblatt 2025, no. 301
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs – Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) – dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the extended component
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 which is not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
SOGIS MRA.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP7 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP7 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23
February 2026. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: SUSE LLC.
The product was developed by: SUSE LLC.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
evaluated guidance documentation, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment as specified in the following report and in the
Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the
product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor
should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity
program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis. Therefore the BSI reserves the right to revoke the certificate, especially if a
exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets to known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 24 February
2026 is valid until 23 February 2031. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP7 has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly in the listing found at the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-Gesamtlisten. Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
SUSE LLC
1221 S Valley Grove Way
#500, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
United States
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP7, a highly-
configurable Linux-based operating system that has been developed to provide a good
level of security as required in commercial environments.
The Security Target [5] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified General
Purpose Operating System Protection Profile [7] supplemented by functional packages for
SSH [8] and TLS [9].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6.3. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 3 and there
is one additional Extended Component defined in the Protection Profile. Thus the TOE is
CC Part 3 extended. The TOE meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection
Profile.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Audit The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down
functions, and all auditable events as specified by the
requirements.
Each audit record contains the date and time of the event, type
of event, subject identity (if applicable), and outcome (success
or failure) of the event.
Cryptographic support The TOE includes the OpenSSL version 3.1.4 cryptographic
libraries for performing userspace cryptographic operations. In
addition, the Linux kernel crypto API performs the cryptographic
operations performed by the kernel. In addition, the TOE uses
software noise sources for entropy generation. The TOE
implements TLS for secure communications with remote
servers.
The TOE implements SSH for allowing secure remote
administration.
User data protection The TOE implements access controls which can be configured
to prevent unprivileged users from accessing files and
directories owned by other users. The configuration of the
access control mechanism is left to the owner of the file system
object.
Identification and Authentication All users, including administrators, must be authenticated to the
TOE prior to carrying out any actions, including management
operations.
The TOE supports password-based authentication,
authentication based on SSH-keys, as well as X.509 certificate-
based authentication.
The TOE will lock out user accounts after a defined number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts to that user account has
been met.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Security Management The TOE can perform management functions. The administrator
has full access to carry-out all management functions offered by
the TOE.
The user is allowed a limited set of administrative operations for
his own user account.
Protection of the TSF The TOE implements the following protection of TSF data
functions.
● Access controls
● Address space layout randomization (ASLR) with 11 bits
(stack) and 28 bits (text segment start address) of entropy
● Stack buffer overflow protection
● Verification of integrity of the boot-chain
● Trusted software updates using digital signatures
TOE Access The TOE displays an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the OS prior to establishment of a user
session.
Trusted Path/Channel The TOE supports TLS v1.2 for trusted channel
communications. The TOE uses TLS to securely communicate
with the SUSE Customer Center. Applications may invoke the
TOE-provided TLS to securely communicate with remote
servers.
The TOE offers an SSH server which uses the SSHv2 protocol
allowing remote administration.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 1.5.2.
The TOE Security Problem Definition has been taken from the Protection Profile [7] and is
defined in terms of Threats and Assumptions. This is outlined in the Security Target [5],
chapter 3.1 resp. 3.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, Version 15 SP7
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW
(ISO)
SLE-15-SP7-Full-x86_64-GM-Media1.iso
SHA256: cd9430420726219f9c73aa7a389b430
57e1d9c610d279b7f71d3687c06d8e66c
SLES 15 SP7 download
2 SW
(ISO)
SLE-15-SP7-Full-aarch64-GM-Media1.iso
SHA256: 9a136f0bff5473e82ec1ebe34e8fbac1b
dc0cdfd128b3219b4e2ab2df6654d44)
SLES 15 SP7 download
3 SW
(ISO)
SLE-15-SP7-Full-s390x-GM-Media1.iso
SHA256: 052b4627a811afd39d9ae27da572736
4760b9ea6159fc0848d0600b4419d1f23
SLES 15 SP7 download
4 DOC Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide
for SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 15 SP7
SHA256: 72b494f5426edac14607229e138aa27
8cfbb446641337caec9a1c2b41fa530fe
SLES 15 SP7,
Document
version 1.0
download
5 rpm openssh 9.6p1-150600.
6.34.1
download and
verification by the TOE
6 rpm openssh-client 9.6p1-150600.
6.34.1
download and
verification by the TOE
7 rpm openssh-common 9.6p1-150600.
6.34.1
download and
verification by the TOE
8 rpm openssh-helpers 9.6p1-150600.
6.34.1
download and
verification by the TOE
9 rpm openssh-server 9.6p1-150600.
6.34.1
download and
verification by the TOE
10 rpm kernel-default 6.4.0-150700.
53.22.1
download and
verification by the TOE
11 rpm audit-audispd-plugin 3.0.6-150400.
4.16.1
download and
verification by the TOE
12 rpm yast2-online-update 4.7.0-150700.1.1 download and
verification by the TOE
13 rpm yast2-online-update-configuration 4.7.0-150700.1.1 download and
verification by the TOE
14 rpm firewalld 2.0.1-
150600.3.5.1
download and
verification by the TOE
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE is via electronic download only in the form of ISO images and
additional rpm packages. The packages that make up the TOE are digitally signed using
OpenPGP/GnuPG. The key of the developer is contained on the installation ISO, as
described in the Evaluated Configuration Guide [11].
The developer provides and operates the download site and provides checksums for the
downloaded images that enable the user to verify the integrity of the download.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Security audit, Cryptographic
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
support, User data protection, Identification and authentication, Security Management,
Protection of the TSF, TOE Access and Trusted Path/Channels.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware. (OE.PLATFORM)
● The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are
provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of
access should have a separate account dedicated for that use. (OE.PROPER_USER)
● The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
(OE.PROPER_ADMIN)
Details can be found in the Security Target [5], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES) is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking Linux
based operating system. It provides a platform for a variety of applications.
The SLES evaluation covers a potentially distributed network of systems running the
evaluated versions and configurations of SLES as well as other peer systems operating
within the same management domain. The hardware platforms selected for the evaluation
consist of machines, which are available when the evaluation has completed and to
remain available for a substantial period of time afterwards.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consist of functions of SLES that run in kernel mode
plus a set of trusted processes. These are the functions that enforce the security policy as
defined in this Security Target. Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used
by an administrative user need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be part of this
TSF. The hardware, the BIOS firmware and potentially other firmware layers between the
hardware and the TOE are considered to be part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, including applications allowing access
of the TOE via cryptographically protected communication channels, such as SSH and
TLS.
System administration tools include the standard command line tools. A graphical user
interface for system administration or any other operation is not included in the evaluated
configuration.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are used as
unprivileged tools to access public system services. For example a network server using a
port above 1024 may be used as a normal application running without root privileges on
top of the TOE. The additional documentation specific for the evaluated configuration
provides guidance how to set up such applications on the TOE in a secure way.
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The evaluator performed all the tests defined in the Protection Profile (PP) [7] and
Functional Packages (FPs) [8][9], which makes it around 100 tests. For the test
requirements on cryptographic primitives and RNG, the ACVP tests were performed on all
applicable cryptographic algorithms.
Test approach
The evaluator followed the test requirements from the PP and FPs and constructed the
tests. He used the evaluator test plan as an entry point, which explains the test
configuration, and links the test requirements (including the complete text specification
from the PP and FPs), to the actual test procedure.
The evaluator tests are partly manual tests, and partly automated.
Test configuration
The evaluator verified the correctly set up test systems according to the documentation in
the Evaluated Configuration Guide and the test plan.
The evaluator tested on hardware setup defined in the Security Target [5]. See also
Chapter 8 for details.
All tests were performed on all hardware platforms.
The evaluator executed tests on the TOE, most notably kernel version 6.4.0-
150700.53.22.1 for Intel, AMD, z16 , and ARM.
Test Depth
Two types of tests were performed - independent testing as defined by the PP and FPs as
well as CAVS algorithm testing:
Independent Testing
The tests mainly comprised of tests that test the external interfaces, but there were also
tests that target TOE security behavior that is normally hidden from the outside:
● stack protection: a tool has been used that analyses the binary file meta data to
determine whether stack protection is enforced
● binary modifications: for integrity/boot tests the kernel or program packages where
modified
● adapted TLS and SSH servers/clients: modified versions of TLS/SSH peers were used
to force protocol misbehavior as mandated by the PP and FPs
Algorithm Testing
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
Multiple algorithm testing is required to be performed by the PP and the FPs. The ACVP
parser tool was used to trigger the cryptographic interfaces with the given test vectors for
validation.
Results
The TOE platforms showed no deviation from the expected results have been
encountered.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations:
The installation of the TOE must be carried out as described in Evaluated Configuration
Guide (ECG) [11], which describes the actual installation steps as well as additional
configuration steps that need to be carried out when the TOE is installed.
The ECG [11], in section 1.3.1 and the ST [5], in section 1.5.1 also define a number of
hardware platforms:
● x86 64bit Intel Cascade Lake processors on Delta D20x-M1-PC-32-8-96GB-1TB-2x1G
● x86 64bit AMD EPYC 3rd Generation processors on Gigabyte R181-Z90
● ARM 64 bit ARMv8.2-A processors on Gigabyte R181-T90
● IBM Z System z16 with TOE executing within an LPAR
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used guidance specific for the technology of the
product as present in the Protection Profile [5] and the Functional Packages [8][9].
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The extended assurance component as defined in the Protection Profile and the Security
Target was followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components claimed in the Security Target [5], chapter 6.3 and defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems,
Version 4.3, 27 September 2022, CCEVS-VR-PP-0091, NIAP
[7]
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version
1.1, 01 March 2019, NIAP [8]
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13
May 2021, CCEVS-VR-PP-0075, NIAP [9]
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
Technical Decisions listed in Chapter 2.1 in the Security Target
[6]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1,
ALC_TSU_EXT.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
a security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The tables in annex B of part D of this report give an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outline its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 120 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ACVP Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FP Functional Package
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
ISO ISO 9660 filesystem image
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RPM RPM package manager
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SLES SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
SW Software
TLS Transport Level Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile – A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal – Expressed in natural language.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Subject – An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licensing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026, SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP7
Security Target, Version 1.0, Date 23 February 2026, Document Title, Developer
Name
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, Final Evaluation Technical Report, Version 5, Date 23
February 2026, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27
September 2022, CCEVS-VR-PP-0091, NIAP
[8] Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, CCEVS-VR-
PP-0075, NIAP
[9] Functional Package for Transport layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019,
NIAP
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Master Configuration List, as of 2026-02-23
(confidential document)
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
Guide for SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 15 SP7 (NIAP) – GPOS, Version 1.0, 23
February 2026, SUSE LLC
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 120
Bits
Comments
1 Authentication RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1.5 using SHA-2
(rsa-sha2-256 or
rsa-sha2-512)
[RFC8017], PKCS#1
v2.2 sec. 8.2(RSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS) for host
authentication
[RFC4252] sec. 7
(SSH-AUTH) for
user authentication
[RFC8332] for rsa-
sha2-256/512
3072, 4096 Yes Pubkeys are
exchanged trust-
worthily out of
band, e.g.
checking finger-
prints.
Authenticity is
not part of the
TOE.
(no certificates
are used)
2 Authentication ECDSA signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-{384, 512} on
nistp-{, 384, 521}
(ecdsa-sha2-
nistp384,ecdsa-
sha2-nistp521)
[ANSIX9.62]
(ECDSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
NIST curves
[FIPS186-5]
identifiers analogous
to [RFC5903] sec 5
[RFC5656]
secp{384,521}r1
[SEC2]
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS) for host
authentication
[RFC4252], sec. 7
(SSH-AUTH) for
user authentication
384, 521 Yes
3 Key
agreement
DH with diffie-
hellman-group16-
sha512, diffie-
hellman-group18-
sha512 (for RSA)
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS) supported
by [RFC4419] and
[RFC8268] (DH-
Group Exchange)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA)
4096, 8192
(prime
modulus)
Yes
4 Key
agreement
ECDH with
P-384/521 (ecdh-
sha2-nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-nistp521)
[RFC4253] (SSH-
TRANS)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA)
supported by
384, 521 Yes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 120
Bits
Comments
[RFC5656] (ECC in
SSH)
P-384/521 NIST
curves [SP800-186]
5 Confidentiality AES in GCM mode
aes256-gcm-
@openssh.com
[FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC5647] (SSH-2
using AES with GCM
mode)
256 Yes
6 Integrity and
Authenticity
HMAC-SHA-2-
(hmac-sha2-256,
hmac-sha2-512) and
GCM (AEAD_AES_-
256_GCM)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4251] /
[RFC4253] (SSH
HMAC support),
[RFC6668],
[RFC5647]
(GCM for SSH)
256, 512 Yes
7 Key
generation for
host and user
keys
RSA key generation
with key size: 3072,
4096 bits
[FIPS 186-5],
B.3.1 and C.1 for
Miller Rabin primality
tests.
3072, 4096 Yes
8 Key
generation for
host and user
keys
ECDSA key
generation based on
NIST curves:
P-384 and P-521
[FIPS 186-5],A.2 384, 521 Yes
9 Key
generation for
diffie-hellman
key
agreement
Modular
exponentiation DH
key exchange with
key size:
3072, 4096
[SP800-56A-Rev3]
sec. 5.6.1.1.4
4096, 8192
(prime
modulus)
Yes
10 Key
generation for
diffie-hellman
key exchange
ECDH key
generation based on
the NIST curves:
P-384 and P-521
[SP800-56A-Rev3],
sec. 5.6.1.2.2
384, 521 Yes
11 Trusted
channel
FTP_ITC_EXT.1,
[ST] sec. 7.2.8.1 for
SSH v2
Cf. all lines above See above Yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality for SSH
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 120
Bits
Comments
1 Key derivation
with
authentication
(access
control,
protection /
recovery
mode)
Password based key
derivation using
PBKDF2 with PRF
HMAC using
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[SP800-132]
[RFC2898]
(PBKDF2)
[FIPS198-1]
(HMAC),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Guessing
prob. 2-20
Salt 32
byte
(LUKS_SA
LTSIZE)
iteration
count 2000
ms
Yes
2 Confidentiality
(bulk data &
key access /
key wrapping)
AES in XTS mode
IV-handling
mechanism:
XTS-plain64
XTS-benbi
[FIPS197]
[SP800-38E] (XTS)
2*256 Yes
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality for dm-crypt
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 120
Bits
Comments
1 Confidentiality Cipher: AES
Modes: CBC, GCM
CBC: [RFC5246],
[SP800-38A]
GCM: [RFC5288],
[SP800-38D]
256 Yes
2 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
AES GMAC used by
GCM
[RFC5246]
[RFC5288]
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[FIPS198-1] (HMAC)
[SP800-38D] (GCM /
GMAC)
256, 384,
512
Yes
3 IV / Key
derivation
PRF
SHA-2 with hash
type chosen by TLS
cipher suite
[RFC5246]
[FIPS180-4]
[FIPS198-1]
256 Yes
4 Peer
authentication
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1.5 using SHA-2
[RFC5246]
[FIPS186-5]
[FIPS180-4]
[RFC8017] (PKCS#1
v2.2) Sec. 8 (RSA)
3072, 4096 Yes
5 Peer RSA signature [RFC8446] 3072, 4096 Yes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 120
Bits
Comments
authentication generation and
verification
RSASSA-PSS using
SHA-2
[FIPS186-5]
[FIPS180-4]
[RFC8017]
(PKCS#1 v2.2)
Sec. 8 (RSA)
6 Peer
authentication
ECDSA with
signature generation
and verification
using SHA-2 with
NIST P-384, P-521
[RFC5289]
Sec1-v2 (ECDSA)
([SEC2])
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
384, 521 Yes
7 Key
generation for
authentication
ECDSA using NIST
P-384, P-521
[FIPS186-5] A.2 256, 384 Yes
8 Key
generation for
authentication
RSA with 3072,
4096 bits
[FIPS186-5] B.3.1
and C.1 for Miller
primality tests
3072, 4096 Yes
9 Key
generation for
DH / ECDH
FFC key-pair
generation using
PQG parameter set
[SP800-56A-Rev3]
section 5.6.1.1.4
3072, 4096 Yes
10 Key
generation for
DH / ECDH
ECC key-pair
generation with
NIST P-384, P-521
[SP800-56A-Rev3]
section 5.6.1.2.2
384, 521 Yes
11 Trusted
channel
FTP_ITC_EXT.1, ST
[5] sec. 7.2.8.1 for
TLS v1.2
Cf. all lines for TLS
above
See above Yes
12 Random
number
generator
CTR DRBG with
AES- 256, with DF,
without PR
[SP800-90A-Rev1] n/a n/a
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality for TLS
References for tables 3 to 5:
ANSIX9.62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry:
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
Date 2005-11-16
Location https://standards.globalspec.com/std/1955141/ANSI%20X9.62
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Date 2015-08-04
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180-4/upd1/final
FIPS186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2023-02-03
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Date 2023-05-09
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/197/final
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026 Certification Report
FIPS198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Date 2008-07-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/198-1/final
RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Author(s) H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti
Date 1997-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
RFC2898 PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0
Author(s) B. Kaliski
Date 2000-09-01
RFC4251 The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt
RFC4252 The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4252.txt
RFC4253 The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4253.txt
RFC4419 Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) M. Friedl, N. Provos, W. Simpson
Date 2006-03-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4419.txt
RFC5246 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Author(s) T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
Author(s) J. Salowey, A. Choudhury, D. McGrew
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
RFC5289 TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and
AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5289.txt
RFC5647 AES Galois Counter Mode for the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) K. Igoe, J. Solinas
Date 2009-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5647.txt
RFC5656 Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
Author(s) D. Stebila, J. Green
Date 2009-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5656.txt
RFC5903 Elliptic Curve Groups modulo a Prime (ECP Groups) for IKE and IKEv2
Author(s) D. Fu, J. Solinas
Date 2010-06-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5903.txt
RFC6668 SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) D. Bider, M. Baushke
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1230-2026
Date 2012-07-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6668.txt
RFC8017 PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2
Author(s) B. Kaliski, J. Jonsson, A. Rusch
Date 2016-11-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8017.txt
RFC8268 More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)
Author(s) M. Baushke
Date 2017-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8268.txt
RFC8332 Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
Author(s) D. Bider
Date 2018-03-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8332.txt
RFC84468
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
Author(s) E. Rescorla
Date 2018-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8446.txt
SEC2 Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
Date 2000
Location http://www.secg.org
SP800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation:
Part 1: Storage Applications
Date 2010-12-22
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/132/final
SP800-186 Recommendations for Discrete Logarithm-based Cryptography:
Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
Date 2023-02-03
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/186/final
SP800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods and Technique
Date 2001-12-01
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/a/final
SP800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
Date 2007-11-28
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/d/final
SP800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
the XTSAES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices
Date 2010-01-18
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/e/final
SP800-56A-Rev3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
Date 2018-04-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/56/a/r3/final
SP800-90A-Rev1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators
Date 2015-06-24
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/90/a/r1/final
8
RFC 8446 for TLS 1.3 also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations
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Note: End of report
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