National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11125-2021
Dated: May 28, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Farid Ahmed
Joyce Baidoo
Anne Gugel
John Hopkins University APL
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
The Aerospace Corporation
.
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kenji Yoshino
Danielle F Canoles
Kevin Zhang
Thibaut Marconnet
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 8
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 9
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 17
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................17
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................17
8.3 TOE Testing Timeframe and Location.......................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 18
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................18
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................18
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................18
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................19
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................19
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................19
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................20
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 21
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 22
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 23
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 24
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 25
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT)
product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific
security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were
tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should
carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in
Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the FireEye CM Series Appliances Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by
any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR
applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the
ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in May 2021. The information in this report is largely
derived from the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by
Acumen Security as summarized in the Assurance Activity Report for FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0.
The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3
Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in the collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP] and all applicable NIAP technical decisions for the
technology. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation
technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on these findings, the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profiles
containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of CEM work units specific to the
technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation
contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.
The target of evaluation is the FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 and the associated TOE guidance
documentation.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP]
Security Target FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 Common Criteria Security Target, Version
1.2.
Evaluation
Technical Report
Assurance Activity Report for FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor FireEye, Inc.
Developer FireEye, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security, LLC
CCEVS Validators Farid Ahmed
Joyce Baidoo
Anne Gugel
Patrick Mallett
Jerome Myers
Table 1 – Identification
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The TOE is comprised of seven models of the FireEye CM Series Appliances as shown below.
CM4500 CM7500 CM9400
Network Interface
Ports
2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT
Management Ports 2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT
Storage 4x 4TB disk / 8TB virtual disk
RAID 10
4x 4TB disk / 8TB virtual disk
RAID 10
4 * 800GB SATA SSD / 1.6TB RAID
10
Enclosure 1 Rack Unit 2 Rack Units 2 Rack Units
Processor Intel Xeon E3-1240 v6 (Kaby
Lake)
Intel Xeon E5-2620 v4
(Broadwell)
AMD Opteron 6380 (Piledriver)
TOE Type Stand-alone physical network
device
Stand-alone physical network
device
Stand-alone physical network
device
Table 2 – CM Series Appliances (1)
CM9500
Network Interface
Ports
2x 1GigE BaseT
Management Ports 2x 1GigE BaseT
Storage 8x 4TB disk / 16TB virtual
disk RAID 10
Enclosure 2 Rack Units
Processor Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4
(Broadwell)
TOE Type Stand-alone physical network
device
Table 3 – CM Series Appliances (2)
CM1500V CM2500V CM7500V
Network Interface
Ports
2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces
Management Ports 2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces
CPU Cores 2 4 16
Memory 16 GB 32 GB 128 GB
Storage 256 GB disk 512 GB disk 1200 GB disk
Processor Intel Xeon E5-4620 v4
(Broadwell)
Intel Xeon E5-4620 v4
(Broadwell)
Intel Xeon E5-4620 v4 (Broadwell)
Environment VMware vSphere ESXi 6.7 VMware vSphere ESXi 6.7 VMware vSphere ESXi 6.7
TOE Type Stand-alone virtual network
device
Stand-alone virtual network
device
Stand-alone virtual network device
Table 4 – CM Series Appliances (3)
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that is comprised of the security appliance models
described above. The TOE guidance documentation that is considered to be part of the TOE is the
FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 Common Criteria Guidance Addendum document and is
downloadable from the FireEye website.
The network on which the TOE resides is considered part of the environment. The software is pre-
installed and is comprised of only the software versions identified above. In addition, software updates
are downloadable from the FireEye website. A login ID and password is required to download the
software update.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features, as identified below.
• Protected Communications. The TOE protects the integrity and confidentiality of
communications as follows:
o TLS connectivity with the following entities:
▪ Audit Server
▪ Management Web Browser
o SSH connectivity with the following entities:
▪ Management SSH Client
• Secure Administration. The TOE enables secure local and remote management of its security
functions, including:
o Local console CLI administration
o Remote CLI administration via SSHv2
o Remote GUI administration via HTTPS/TLS
o Administrator authentication using a local database
o Timed user lockout after multiple failed authentication attempts
o Password complexity enforcement
o Role Based Access Control - the TOE supports several types of administrative user roles.
Collectively these sub-roles comprise the “Security Administrator”
o Configurable banners to be displayed at login
o Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity
o Protection of secret keys and passwords
• Trusted Update. The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of software updates through
digital signatures and requires administrative intervention prior to the software updates being
installed.
• Security Audit. The TOE keeps local and remote audit records of security relevant events. The
TOE internally maintains the date and time which can be set manually or using authenticated
NTP.
• Self-Test. The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to ensure the correct operation and
enforcement of its security functions.
• Cryptographic Operations. The TOE provides cryptographic support for the services described in
Table 6 (table refenced from the ST). The related CAVP validation details are provided in Table 7
(table refenced from the ST).
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security
requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
ID Assumption
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result,
the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect
the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows
unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or
otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to
the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as
general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide
a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to
networking functionality).
In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one
vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being
where components of the distributed TOE run inside more than one
virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There are no other guest VMs on
the physical platform providing non-Network Device functionality.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is
traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is
not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices
(e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be
trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization.
This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack
malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is
not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security
of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline
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ID Assumption
verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA
certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted
CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated
by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network
Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to
act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes not
interfering with the correct operation of the device. The Network Device
is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious VS
Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security
of the device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to
known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATON For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to
provide sufficient isolation between software running in VMs on the
same physical platform. Furthermore, it is assumed that the VS
adequately protects itself from software running inside VMs on the
same physical platform.
A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to
support ND functionality implemented in VMs.
Table 5 – Assumptions
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5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of
expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
ID Threat
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the
Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as
an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to
an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its
entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-
middle attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices.
Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious
actions that compromise the security functionality of the
device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or
perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly
chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust
the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing
them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with
minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do
not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols to protect the
critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly
designed protocols or poor key management to successfully
perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc.
Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and
integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could
lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use
weak methods to authenticate the endpoints, e.g. a shared
password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The
consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the
attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another
device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the
network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The
result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could
be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the
Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update
of the software or firmware which undermines the security
functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates
validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the
update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify
the security functionality of the Network Device without
Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker
finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product)
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to compromise the device and the Administrator would have
no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data
enabling continued access to the Network Device and its
critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing
existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying
existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device
credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may
allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with
other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or
compromised security functionality and might therefore
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical
network traffic or security functionality of the device.
Table 6 – Threats
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP].
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as
one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PP and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities that may be included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 Common Criteria Guidance Addendum [AGD]
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following hardware and software when configured in
accordance with the documentation specified in section 6. The TOE is comprised of seven models of the
FireEye CM Series Appliances as shown below.
CM4500 CM7500 CM9400
Network Interface
Ports
2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT
Management Ports 2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT 2x 1GigE BaseT
Storage 4x 4TB disk / 8TB virtual disk
RAID 10
4x 4TB disk / 8TB virtual disk
RAID 10
4 * 800GB SATA SSD / 1.6TB RAID
10
Enclosure 1 Rack Unit 2 Rack Units 2 Rack Units
Processor Intel Xeon E3-1240 v6 (Kaby
Lake)
Intel Xeon E5-2620 v4
(Broadwell)
AMD Opteron 6380 (Piledriver)
TOE Type Stand-alone physical network
device
Stand-alone physical network
device
Stand-alone physical network
device
Table 7 – CM Series Appliances (1)
CM9500
Network Interface
Ports
2x 1GigE BaseT
Management Ports 2x 1GigE BaseT
Storage 8x 4TB disk / 16TB virtual
disk RAID 10
Enclosure 2 Rack Units
Processor Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4
(Broadwell)
TOE Type Stand-alone physical network
device
Table 8 – CM Series Appliances (2)
CM1500V CM2500V CM7500V
Network Interface
Ports
2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces
Management Ports 2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces 2x 1GigE interfaces
CPU Cores 2 4 16
Memory 16 GB 32 GB 128 GB
Storage 256 GB disk 512 GB disk 1200 GB disk
Processor Intel Xeon E5-4620 v4
(Broadwell)
Intel Xeon E5-4620 v4
(Broadwell)
Intel Xeon E5-4620 v4 (Broadwell)
Environment VMware vSphere ESXi 6.7 VMware vSphere ESXi 6.7 VMware vSphere ESXi 6.7
TOE Type Stand-alone virtual network
device
Stand-alone virtual network
device
Stand-alone virtual network device
Table 9 – CM Series Appliances (3)
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that is comprised of the security appliance models
described above. The TOE guidance documentation that is considered to be part of the TOE is the
FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 Common Criteria Guidance Addendum document and is
downloadable from the FireEye website.
The network on which the TOE resides is considered part of the environment. The software is pre-
installed and is comprised of only the software versions identified above. In addition, software updates
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are downloadable from the FireEye website. A login ID and password is required to download the
software update.
The TOE evaluated configuration consists of one of the CM series appliances listed above. The TOE has
been evaluated to work with the following devices in the IT environment. Some components are
required to operate the TOE, while other components may be included at the discretion of the
administrator.
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Virtual Hardware Yes (for
CM1500V,
CM2500V,
and
CM7500V)
Virtual hardware provided by VMware vSphere ESXi 6.7 and Intel Xeon
E5-4620 v4 (Broadwell).
Management Workstation
with Web Browser/SSH
Client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a Web
Browser and a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator
to support TOE administration through HTTPS and SSH protected
channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used. Any web
browser that supports TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2 may be used.
Syslog server No The syslog audit server is used for remote storage of audit records that
have been generated by and transmitted from the TOE. The syslog
server must support communications using TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.
NTP Server No NTP server supporting SHA-1 integrity verification.
Table 10 – IT Environment Components
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example of a typical TOE deployment.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Evaluation Test Report for the FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0, which is not
publicly available. Section 4.1 of the Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation and
ran the tests specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP].
The Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly
available, and is not duplicated here. Multiple test beds were constructed to exercise Application
Software capabilities and claimed security functionality. The following tooling was used as part of the
test activities:
• Openssl 1.1.1d
• Rsyslog 8.2004.0
• OpenSSH 8.1p1
• Tcpdump v4.9.3
• Wireshark v3.2.1
• acumen-sshs v1.1
• acumen-tlss v2.4
• acumen-tlsc v1.2
• acumen-tlsc v2.1
• acumen-tlsc v3.6
• ntpd v4.2.8p14
• acumen-tlsc-v2.2e
• Wireshark 2.4.6
• XCA v2.1.2
• Google Chrome Version 89
8.3 TOE Testing Timeframe and Location
• The TOE specific testing was conducted during the timeframe of March 2020 through May 2021.
• The TOE specific testing was conducted at Acumen Security CCTL located at Rockville, MD.
18
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and as summarized in the Assurance Activity Report for FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0. The
reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev
5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the FireEye CM Series Appliances to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the NDcPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the FireEye CM Series Appliances that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP].
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding
how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the
operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance
in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed
the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information contained
in the operational guidance documents.
19
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified. Additionally, the team verified that both the
TOE and its supporting documentation consistently reference the same version and use the same
nomenclature. The evaluation team also verified that the vendor website identified the TOE version
accurately.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP and recorded
the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities
Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in
the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
On 20 May 2021, the evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed
vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE. The following sources of
public vulnerability information were searched:
• NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
• US-CERT: https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/search/
• SecurITeam Exploit Search: https://securiteam.com/
• Zero Day Initiative: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/published/
• Offensive Security Exploit Database: https://www.exploit-db.com/
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database: https://www.rapid7.com/db/?type=nexpose
The search terms used included:
• openssl-1.0.1e-60.el7.1.fe
• OpenSSH 6.4
• curl-7.61.1-2.el7.centos.fe
• openldap-2.4.40-8.el7.fe
• httpd-2.4.41-6.1.fe
20
• login 2.11
• ssmtp 2.60
• postfix-2.11.0-1.el7.fe
• ntp-4.2.6p5-25.el7.1.fe
• stunnel-5.35-1.el7.fe
• rsyslog-7.4.7-12.el7.fe
• pam_ldap-183
• nss_ldap-253-42.el5_7.4
• pam-1.1.8-12.el7_1.1
• xmlsec1-1.2.20-7.el7_4
• net-snmp-libs-5.7.2-24.el7
• Intel Xeon E3-1240 v6 (Kaby Lake)
• Intel Xeon E5-2620 v4 (Broadwell)
• Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4 (Broadwell)
• AMD Opteron 6380 (Piledriver)
• FireEye CM
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in
the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0
Common Criteria Guidance Addendum [AGD] document. No versions of the TOE and software,
either earlier or later were evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped
exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other
functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need
to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Please see the FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 Common Criteria Security Target [ST].
24
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP]
6. FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 Common Criteria Security Target, Version 1.2 [ST]
7. Assurance Activity Report for FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0, Version 1.2, May 2021 [AAR]
8. FireEye CM Series Appliances v9.0 Common Criteria Guidance Addendum, Version 1.1[AGD]