

# Certification Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014**

for

**NXP Secure Smart Card Controller  
P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC  
Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or  
MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire  
EV1**

from

**NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH**

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Bundesamt  
für Sicherheit in der  
Informationstechnik

# Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

## BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014

Smartcard Controller

**NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG  
including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE  
Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1**

from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH

PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,  
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007

Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 5 augmented by ALC\_DVS.2, ASE\_TSS.2 and  
AVA\_VAN.5



SOGIS  
Recognition Agreement



The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 24 October 2014

For the Federal Office for Information Security



Common Criteria  
Recognition Arrangement  
for components up to  
EAL 4

Bernd Kowalski  
Head of Department

L.S.



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## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

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<sup>1</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

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## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural Description (BSI 7138) [3]
- BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1<sup>5</sup> [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045.
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

### 2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

#### European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.

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<sup>2</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

### **International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)**

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on September 8, 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC\_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-2000, issued before September 8, 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on September 8, 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC\_FLR)) is defined until September 8, 2017.

As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV\_FSP.5, ADV\_INT.2, ADV\_TDS.4, ALC\_CMS.5, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_TAT.2, ASE\_TSS.2, ATE\_DPT.3 and AVA\_VAN.5, that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

## **3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification**

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.



The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 2 October 2014. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>6</sup> recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.

The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

## 4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

## 5 Publication

The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and

<sup>6</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

MIFARE DESFire EV1 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer<sup>7</sup> of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

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<sup>7</sup> NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH  
Stresemannallee 101  
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## **B Certification Results**

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

## 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IC hardware platform NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)yVG with IC Dedicated Software and documentation describing the Instruction Set and the usage.

The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of Boot-ROM Software controlling the boot process of the hardware platform and Firmware Operating System (FOS) which can be called by the Security IC Embedded Software. The Firmware Operating System provides an interface for programming of the internal EEPROM memory, which is mandatory for use by the Security IC Embedded Software when programming the EEPROM memory. Furthermore FOS provides an interface for the Post Delivery Configuration functionality. OS Emulation MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or OS Emulations MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 are included in the FOS and are therefore part of the TOE.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by ALC\_DVS.2, ASE\_TSS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SS.RNG	Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES	Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW_AES	AES coprocessor
SS.CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
SS.RECONFIG	Post Delivery Configuration
SS.MFP_AUTH	Authentication
SS.MFP_ENC	Encryption
SS.MFP_MAC	Message Authentication Code
SS.MFP_ACC_CTRL	Access Control
SS.DF_AUTH	Authentication
SS.DF_ENC	Encryption
SS.DF_MAC	Message Authentication Code
SS.DF_ACC_CTRL	Access Control
SS.DF_TRANS	Transaction mechanism

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SF.OPC	Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY	Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG	Logical Protection
SF.COMP	Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC	Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC	Special Function Register Access Control
SF.FFW	Firmware Firewall
SF.FIRMWARE	Firmware Support

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

**NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1**

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW	NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A) and NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVG	nameplate 9049A and nameplate 9049B	Wafer, module, inlay or package
2a	SW	Test ROM Software (Security IC Dedicated Test Software), Test-ROM on the chip acc. to 9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC	Version 0A.05, 2012-05-07	stored in ROM on the chip
2b	SW	Test ROM Software (Security IC Dedicated Test Software), Test-ROM on the chip acc. to 9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC and P60D080/052/040JVC	Version 0A.09, 2012-12-17	stored in ROM on the chip

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
3a	SW	Boot ROM Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated Support Software), Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to 9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC	Version 0A.05, 2012-05-07	stored in ROM on the chip
3b	SW	Boot ROM Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated Support Software), Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to 9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC and P60D080/052/040JVC	Version 0A.09, 2012-12-17	stored in ROM on the chip
4a	SW	Firmware Operating System FOS including MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 (part of the Security IC Dedicated Support Software), Firmware Operating System on the chip acc. to 9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC	Version 06.12 and 06.13, 2012-05-07	stored in ROM on the chip 2
4b	SW	Firmware Operating System FOS including MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated Support Software), Firmware Operating System on the chip acc. to 9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.hex, for major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC and P60D080/052/040JVC	Version 08.00, 2012- 12-17	stored in ROM on the chip
5	DOC	Product Data Sheet, SmartMX2 family P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification	Rev. 5.2, 2014-06-27	electronic form
6	DOC	Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family, Secure smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification	Rev. 3.1, 2012-02-02	electronic form
7	DOC	NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x040/052/080VC/VG, Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and Operation Manual	Rev. 1.1, 2014-06-26	electronic form
8	DOC	Wafer and delivery specification, SmartMX2 family P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, Product data sheet addendum, NXP Semiconductors	Rev. 3.3, 2014-05-21	electronic form
9	DOC	Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family, Post Delivery Configuration, NXP Semiconductors	Rev. 3.2, 2013-02-04	electronic form
10	DOC	Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family, Chip Health Mode, NXP Semiconductors	Rev. 3.0, 2012-05-11	electronic form
11	DOC	Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family, Firmware Interface Specification, Firmware, NXP Semiconductors	Rev. 4.1, 2014-06-25	electronic form
12	DOC	MIFARE Plus, Functionality of implementations on smart card controllers, NXP Semiconductors	Rev. 3.2, 2013-02-27	electronic form
13	DOC	NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, User Guidance Manual	Rev. 1.5, 2013-06-21	electronic form
14	DOC	NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE DESFire EV1 Guidance, Delivery and Operation, User Guidance Manual, NXP Semiconductors	Rev. 1.3, 2013-06-10	electronic form

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
15	DOC	MIFARE DESFire EV1, Functionality of implementations on smart card controllers, NXP Semiconductors	Rev. 2.0, 2013-02-06	electronic form

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The commercial type name is the identification used to order the TOE P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG in the respective major configuration and with the evaluated package type. In consequence this means that a full commercial product name that fits in the variable forms described in the Security Target [6,8] determines that the hardware platform is an evaluated product. In addition the hardware version can be identified by the crypted nameplate "9049A", respectively "9049B" for yVG on the surface of the hardware platform as described in chapters 4.2 and 3.9.3 of the Wafer and delivery specification. The nameplate is the same for all configurations. In addition each major configuration has a different device coding and type coding described in the Data Sheet.

### 3 Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and is implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing, malfunctions, physical manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of functionality.

Hence the TOE shall maintain

- the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories,
- the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access and
- the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE.

### 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

Name	Assumption Title
OE.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform
OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing
OE.Check-Init	Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded Software
OE.Check-OriginalityKey	Check of the Originality Key of the MIFARE Software
OE.Secure-Values	Generation of secure values
OE.Terminal-Support	Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers

Table 3: Objectives for the TOE-Environment

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.

## 5 Architectural Information

The TOE consists of the following 15 subsystems (7 hardware / 8 software):

Subsystem	Description
<b>Hardware</b>	
IC.LOGIC_BLK	The IC.LOGIC_BLK comprises the instance id_smx2_kernel except the contacts and the memory blocks. Furthermore, it is stated in the developer documentation that the hardware instantiation id_smx2_kernel instantiates and connects all digital IPs.
IC.RAM	This subsystem is in charge for the TOE's RAM memory operations. In comparison to the previous subsystem, the subsystem IC.RAM is not that complex, nevertheless several modules are associated to it.
IC.EEPROM	This subsystem is in charge for the TOE's EEPROM memory and its operations.
IC.ROM	This subsystem is in charge for the TOE's ROM memory and its operations.
IC.ANALOG	This subsystem consists of two major parts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a power conversion unit including a contactless part with voltage supply for contactless operation, clock recovery and demodulation of the contactless signal,</li> <li>• various sensors, a part of the random number generator, the internal oscillator and further circuitry to monitor the operating conditions and provide reference signals.</li> </ul>
IC.PADS	This subsystem contains the physical interfaces of the TOE which can be divided into ISO contacts and non-ISO contacts.
IC.COVER	This subsystem comprises only passive metal structures. It is not included in the design hierarchy because it is not part of the functional design of the device.
<b>Software</b>	
SW.Iso	The subsystem SW.Iso is part of SW.Framework and implements the IC Dedicated Support software interface to use the ISO 14443-3 and 14443-4 communication layers. The evaluator remarks that this subsystem serves merely to group a semantically similar group of modules and is to be interpreted as part of the subsystem IC.ROM. This is reasonable, as all firmware resides in the



Subsystem	Description
	TOE's ROM.
SW.Framework	The subsystem SW.Framework is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software. It operates in the firmware mode of M.CPU and is located in IC.ROM protected by M.MMU, i.e. access from Security IC Embedded Software to the external interface of the SW.Framework can only be done via an FVEC call. The evaluator remarks that this subsystem serves merely to group a semantically similar group of modules and is to be interpreted as part of the subsystem IC.ROM. This is reasonable, as all firmware resides in the TOE's ROM.
SW.CommonHal	The SW.CommonHal is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software and implements the interface to use the hardware blocks M.CRC, M.CIU, M.EEIF_CTRL, M.SBC-IF, M.RNG-DIG, M.TIMER, M.COPY-MACHINE and M.CPU. The evaluator remarks that this subsystem serves merely to group a semantically similar group of modules and is to be interpreted as part of the subsystem IC.ROM. This is reasonable, as all firmware resides in the TOE's ROM.
SW.MfpCore	This subsystem implements the core MIFARE Plus functionality and provides the interface to the different MIFARE Plus security levels.
SW.MfpOs	This subsystem provides a well-structured implementation of the MIFARE Plus basic operations needed by SW.MfpCore.
SW.MfpHal	This subsystem implements a hardware abstraction layer for MIFARE Plus related HW and provides the low-level functions to SW.MfpCore and SW.MfpOs.
SW.MdfCore	This subsystem provides the core functionality for MIFARE DESFire EV1 emulation mode.
SW.MdfHal	This subsystem is part of MIFARE DESFire EV1 and supports the implementation of the DESFire relevant Hardware Abstraction Layer.

Table 4: TOE subsystems

## 6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

## 7 IT Product Testing

The developer's testing effort can be summarised in the following aspects.

TOE test configuration and Developer's testing approach:

- The tests are performed with the TOE in different test environments and configurations depending on the test classes and groups.
- All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
- Test categories/classes were

- Production testing on wafers using test functions implemented in the IC Dedicated Software.
- Simulation tests (design verification) which are performed to verify functionality, which is not visible at the accessible interfaces of the TOE including automated regression testing and manual simulation tests.
- Characterization tests to verify the electrical properties of the device, which are specified with regard to limiting values, thresholds and timings of several electrical parameters like voltages, currents, frequencies, capacitors, resistances and latches.
- Verification tests which are performed on single samples of the device to verify specific security functionality, which is not testable for each device during production test or within the scope of characterization testing. Such tests include standard tests of the Random Number Generator, AES coprocessor and Triple-DES coprocessor.
- Test of configurations
- Functional verification and validation (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1) including firmware tests, MIFARE Plus Acceptance/Regression Tests, MIFARE Plus Backwards Compatibility Tests, Anti-Tearing Test,
- System Stability Verification (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1) including Robot Arm test and Multiple PICC Test,
- Performance Verification (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1) of each individual command and of standard transactions,
- External test (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1), consisting of a “Test plan for MIFARE® Compatibility for Certification of Terminals and Qualification of Contactless Readers”.

Amount of developer testing performed:

- The tests are performed on security mechanisms and on subsystem and module level.
- As demonstrated by ATE\_COV.2 the developer has tested all security mechanisms and TSFIs.
- As demonstrated by ATE\_DPT.3 the developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design and against the security architecture description.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

The P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG can be delivered in different major configurations. All of the following major configurations are covered by this evaluation: P60D080yVC(Z/A)/yVG, P60D052yVC(Z/A)/yVG and P60D040yVC(Z/A)/yVG, see the Security Target [6,8] for details..

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

### CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
- Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
- Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation

(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).

To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ALC\_DVS.2, ASE\_TSS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on life cycle and laser fault injection penetration testing.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 5 augmented by ALC\_DVS.2, ASE\_TSS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

## Results of cryptographic assessment

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (<https://www.bsi.bund.de>).

Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column '*Security Level above 100 Bits*' of the following table with '*no*' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context).

Purpose	Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
Authentication (MFP)	AES in CBC mode	[FIPS-197] (AES), [SP 800-38A] (CBC)	K  = 128	yes
Authentication (DF)	AES in CBC mode	[FIPS-197] (AES), [SP 800-38A] (CBC)	K  = 128	yes
	Three-key TDES in CBC mode	[FIPS-46-3] (DES), [SP 800-38A] (CBC)	K  = 168	yes
Key Agreement (MFP)	FTP_TRP.1[MFP]	--	--	no
Key Agreement (DF)	FTP_TRP.1[DF]	--	--	no
Confidentiality (MFP)	AES in CBC mode	[FIPS-197] (AES), [SP 800-38A] (CBC)	K  = 128	yes
Confidentiality (DF)	AES in CBC mode	[FIPS-197] (AES), [SP 800-38A] (CBC)	K  = 128	yes
Integrity (MFP)	AES in CMAC mode	[FIPS-197] (AES), [SP800-38B] (CMAC)	K  = 128	yes
Integrity (DF)	AES in CMAC mode	[FIPS-197] (AES), [SP800-38B] (CMAC)	K  = 128	yes
Trusted Channel (MFP)	Mifare Plus MF1PLUSx0	--	--	no
Trusted Channel (DF)	Desfire EV1	--	--	no
Cryptographic Primitives	Two-key TDES	[FIPS-46-3] (DES)	K  = 112	no
	Three-key TDES	[FIPS-46-3] (DES)	K  = 168	yes
	AES	[FIPS-197] (AES)	K  = 128, 192, 256	yes

Table 5: Cryptographic TOE Security Functionalities

## 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.

For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.

In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].

In addition, the following aspect needs to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

The implementation of the encryption/decryption operation of the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 may expose some bits of the XOR difference between pairs of plaintext using the principles of a watermark attack.

## 11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).

## 12 Definitions

### Acronyms

<b>AES</b>	Advanced Encryption Standard
<b>AIS</b>	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
<b>BSI</b>	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
<b>BSIG</b>	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
<b>CBC</b>	Cipher Block Chaining
<b>CCRA</b>	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

<b>CEM</b>	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
<b>CMAC</b>	Cipher-based MAC
<b>DES</b>	Data Encryption Standard
<b>DF</b>	Desfire
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>EEPROM</b>	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
<b>ETR</b>	Evaluation Technical Report
<b>FIPS</b>	Federal Information Processing Standard
<b>FOS</b>	Firmware Operating System
<b>FVEC</b>	Firmware Vector
<b>ISO</b>	International Organization for Standardization
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>ITSEC</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
<b>ITSEF</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
<b>MFP</b>	Mifare Plus
<b>PCD</b>	Proximity Coupling Device
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>RAM</b>	Random Access Memory
<b>ROM</b>	Read Only Memory
<b>SAR</b>	Security Assurance Requirement
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TDES</b>	Triple-DES
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functionality

## Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

**Collaborative Protection Profile** - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Package** - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

**Protection Profile** - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

**Security Target** - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Subject** - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

**Target of Evaluation** - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

**TOE Security Functionality** - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

## 13 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012  
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012  
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
- [3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products, protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE<sup>8</sup>.
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014, Version 2.0, 21 August 2014, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG Security Target, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
- [7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
- [8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014, Version 2.0, 21 August 2014, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG Security Target Lite, NXP Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
- [9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 17 October 2014, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
- [10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, Version 3, 17 October 2014, ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
- [11] Configuration lists for the TOE:

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<sup>8</sup>specifically

- AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
- AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
- AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
- AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results



- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG, Configuration List, Version 01.50, 23 July 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG, Customer specific Appendix of the Configuration List, Version 01.40, 01 July 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG, Appendix of the Configuration List for composite evaluation, Version 01.40, 05 August 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040MVC(Z/A)/MVG, Firmware Configuration List, Version 1.0, 01 July 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040JVC(Z/A)/JVG, Firmware Configuration List, Version 1.1, 01 July 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document)

[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE:

- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x040/052/080 VC/VG, Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and Operation Manual, Version 1.1, 26 June 2014, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE DESFire EV1 Guidance, Delivery and Operation, User Guidance Manual, Version 1.3, 10 June 2013, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document) and
- NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, User Guidance Manual, Version 1.5, 21 June 2013, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document)

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## C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

### Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
  - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
  - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
  - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
  - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

**Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation** (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

**Class ASE: Security Target evaluation** (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

## Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation
	AGD: Guidance documents
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
	ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Assurance class decomposition

**Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)**

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

**Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)**

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE’s assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one

component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

### **Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)**

#### “Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

### **Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)**

#### “Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

### **Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)**

#### “Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

#### **Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed** (chapter 8.6)

##### “Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

#### **Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested** (chapter 8.7)

##### “Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

#### **Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested** (chapter 8.8)

##### “Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

#### **Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested** (chapter 8.9)

##### “Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”



Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASR_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

**Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment** (chapter 16)

“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”

**Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VAN)** (chapter 16.1)

## “Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

## **D Annexes**

### **List of annexes of this certification report**

- Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
- Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

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## Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014

### Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC(Z/A)/yVG including IC Dedicated Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 October 2014, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC\_CMC.4, ALC\_CMS.5, ALC\_DEL.1, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_LCD.1 and ALC\_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

Site and address	Function
NXP Semiconductors Hamburg Business Unit Identification (BU ID) Stresemannallee 101 22569 Hamburg Germany	Development, Delivery and customer support
NXP Semiconductors Leuven, Leuven, Belgium	Development
NXP Semiconductors India Private Limited, Bangalore, India	Development
TSMC, Fab 2 and 5 No. 121 Park Ave. III Hsinchu Science Park Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.	Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 7 No. 6, Creation Rd. II Hsinchu Science Park Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.	Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 6 and Fab 14 No. 1, Nan-Ke North Rd. Tainan Science Park Tainan, Taiwan 741, R.O.C.	Mask and wafer production
Chipbond Technology Corporation No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V Science Based Industrial Park Hsin-Chu City Taiwan, R.O.C.	Bumping
NXP Semiconductors GmbH Hamburg Test Center Europe - Hamburg (TCE- H) Stresemannallee 101 22569 Hamburg Germany	Test Center and configuration of the Fabkey
Assembly Plant Bangkok 303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd. Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand	Test Center, Delivery and Module assembly
Assembly Plant Kaohsiung NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd #10, Jing 5th Road, N.E.P.Z, Kaohsiung	Module assembly and test center

Site and address	Function
81170 Taiwan, R.O.C	
SMARTRAC Technology Ltd. Bangkok Street: 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang- Pa-In 13160 Ayutthaya Thailand	Inlay assembly
SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY GERMANY GmbH Gewerbeparkstr. 10 51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath Germany	Inlay assembly
HID Global Teoranta Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh Balle na hAbhann Co. Galway Ireland	Inlay assembly
NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria Business Unit Identification (BU ID) Mikron-Weg 1 8108 Gratkorn Austria	Document control
NedCard B.V. Bijsterhuizen 25-29 6604 LM Wijchen The Netherlands	Module assembly
The site of this SST is NXP Nijmegen, located at the campus: NXP Semiconductors Netherlands B.V. Gerstweg 2 6534AE Nijmegen The Netherlands	Development and Manufacturing
NXP High Tech Campus Building 60, High Tech Campus Secure Room 131 5656AE, Eindhoven The Netherlands	Regional Quality Center - Europe, Tape Out Office, and Materials Management Department
Atos Bydgoszcz Building BETA Secure Room B20S1 Biznes Park ul. Kraszewskiego 1 85-240 Bydgoszcz Poland	IT Engineering and Generic Support
Ardentec Corporation (T Site) Ardentec Corporation No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd. Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou, Hsin-Chu Hsien Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.	Wafer Testing
NedCard (Shanghai) Microelectronics Co Ltd. Standardized Plant Building #8 No. 789 Puxing Road Caohejing Hi-Tech Park, EPZ 201114 Shanghai, People's Republic of China	Module Assembly

**Table 6: Production Sites**

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.