KECS-CR-08-54
WEBS-RAY V2.5 Certification Report
Certification No. : KECS-NISS-0137-2008
December 2008
National Intelligence Service
IT Security Certification Center
This document is the certification report on WEBS-RAY V2.5
of Trinity Soft Co., Ltd.
Certification Committee
Certification Body
National Intelligence Service : IT Security Certification Center
Evaluation Body
Korea Information security Agency(KISA)
Table of Contents
1. Summary ······································································································1
2. Identification Information ·····································································2
3. Security Policy ··························································································5
4. Assumptions and Scope ········································································5
4.1 Assumptions ·····································································································5
4.2 Scope to counter a Threat ··········································································6
5. TOE Information ······················································································7
6. Guidance ····································································································10
7. TOE Test ··································································································10
7.1 Developer's Test ··························································································10
7.2 Evaluator's Test ···························································································11
8. Evaluation Configuration ····································································12
9. Evaluation Result ···················································································13
10. Recommendations ·················································································17
11. Acronyms and Glossary ···································································17
12. Reference ·································································································19
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1. Summary
This Report describes the certification result of Certification Body on the
result of the EAL4 evaluation of WEBS-RAY V2.5 with regard to Information
Security System Common Criteria (publicly announced on July 16, 2008,
hereinafter referred to as "CC"). This Report describes the evaluation result
and the adequacy and appropriateness of the evaluation result.
The evaluation on WEBS-RAY V2.5 was carried out by the Korea
Information Security Agency and was completed on December 5, 2008. This
report were written on the basis of the contents of the evaluation report
submitted by the Korea Information Security Agency. The evaluation has been
made that the product satisfies the CC V2.3 part 2 and EAL4 of the CC V2.3
part 3 assurance requirements, and is evaluated to be "appropriate" in
accordance with the Clause 191 of the CC V2.3 part 1.
WEBS-RAY V2.5 is a software-based web application firewall product that
provides interception function by detecting the attacks that can occur in the
web by collecting White URL and key contents information in order to detect
and intercept service attack on web-server, and was developed by the Trinity
Soft Co., Ltd.
WEBS-RAY V2.5 is composed of Agent, which performs detection and
interception function on the web attack, Master Server that manages the
security policy and stores audit report, and Admin Console that supplies GUI
to the administrator for security management including setting of security
policy. TOE provides the following key security functions:
• Security management function allowed only for the authorized personnel
• Generation and protection of security audit data
• User data security function that detects and intercepts web attack and
protects the web-contents in accordance with security policy
• Identification of external IT entity as well as identification and certification
of authorized administrator
• System security function that inspects flawlessness of the TSF execution
file and security policy, and verifies normal operation on TSF service
DAEMON and communication channel on regular basis
The certification body has examined the evaluation activities and test
procedures of the evaluator, provided guidelines on technical issues and
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evaluation procedures, and reviewed the contents of each evaluation work
package report and evaluation report. The certification body has confirmed that
the evaluation results assure that TOE satisfies all security functions required
and assurance requirements described in the Security Targets. Therefore, the
certification body has certified that the observations and evaluation results of
the evaluator are accurate and reasonable, and further that the evaluation result
on the appropriateness is correct.
Scope of Certification Validity : The information contained in this certification
report does not signify that WEBS-RAY V2.5 has been approved for application by
the government organizations of the Republic of Korea or quality assurance on
WEBS-RAY V2.5.
2. Identification Information
The following [Table 1] illustrates information for TOE identification.
Evaluation
Guidance
Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Guidance (July 16, 2008)
Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme (September. 1, 2008)
TOE WEBS-RAY V2.5
Protection
Profile
N/A
Security Target
WEBS-RAY V2.5 Security Target V2.8 (November 3, 2008),
Trinity Soft Co., Ltd.
ETR WEBS-RAY V2.5 ETR, V1.0 (December 5, 2008)
Evaluation
Results
Satisfies the CC V2.3 part 2
Satisfies the CC V2.3 part 3
Evaluation
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation V2.3
Evaluation
Methodology
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation V2.3
Sponsor Trinity Soft Co., Ltd.
Developer Trinity Soft Co., Ltd.
Evaluator
IT Security Evaluation Division, KISA
Yongsuk Oh, Heejun Yoo
Certification
Body
National Intelligence Service
[Table 1] TOE Identification
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System requirements of the WEBS-RAY V2.5 are illustrated in the [Table 2],
[Table 3] below.
Item Minimum Specification
GW-1000
Common
CPU Intel DuoCore 2.0GHz * 1EA
Memory 2GB
NIC 10/100M/1G bps (UTP*6)
HDD 160GB
OS Exclusive use OS (2.5)
Agent Proxy Server Apache 2.2.8
Master
Server
DB MySQL 4.1
GW-2500
Common
CPU Intel QuadCore 2.0GHz * 1EA
Memory 4GB
NIC 10/100M/1G bps (UTP*4, Fiber*4)
HDD 250GB
OS Exclusive use OS (2.5)
Agent Proxy Server Apache 2.2.8
Master
Server
DB MySQL 4.1
GW-3000
Common
CPU Intel QuadCore 2.5GHz * 2EA
Memory 8GB
NIC 10/100M/1G bps (UTP*4, Fiber*4)
HDD 250GB
OS Exclusive use OS (2.5)
Agent Proxy Server Apache 2.2.8
Master
Server
DB MySQL 4.1
Admin Console
CPU Greater than Intel Pentium IV 1GHz
Memory Greater than 256MB
NIC 10/100/1G bps
HDD Greater than 40GB
OS Windows XP SP2
[Table 2] WEBS-RAY V2.5(Stand-Alone Mode) System Specification
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Item Minimum Specification
GW-1000
Agent
CPU Intel DuoCore 2.0GHz * 1EA
Memory 2GB
NIC 10/100M/1G bps (UTP*6)
HDD 160GB
OS Exclusive use OS (2.5)
Proxy Server Apache 2.2.8
GW-2500
Agent
CPU Intel QuadCore 2.0GHz * 1EA
Memory 4GB
NIC 10/100M/1G bps (UTP*4, Fiber*4)
HDD 250GB
OS Exclusive use OS (2.5)
Proxy Server Apache 2.2.8
GW-3000
Agent
CPU Intel QuadCore 2.5GHz * 2EA
Memory 8GB
NIC 10/100M/1G bps (UTP*4, Fiber*4)
HDD 250GB
OS Exclusive use OS (2.5)
Proxy Server Apache 2.2.8
Master Server
CPU Greater than Intel DuoCore 2.0GHz * 1EA
Memory Greater than 2GB
NIC 10/100M/1G bps
HDD Greater than 160GB
OS FedoraCore 6 + Linux Kernel 2.6.20
DB MySQL 4.1
Admin Console
CPU Greater than Intel Pentium IV 1GHz
Memory Greater than 256MB
NIC 10/100/1G bps
HDD Greater than 40GB
OS Windows XP SP2
[Table 3] WEBS-RAY V2.5(Separated Mode) System Specification
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3. Security Policy
TOE is operated in compliance with the following security policies:
Security audit :
Security related events must be recorded and maintained in order to track the
responsibilities on activities related to security, and the recorded data must be
reviewed.
Secure administration :
The authorized administrator must manage TOE with secure method.
4. Assumptions and Scope
4.1 Assumptions
TOE evaluated shall be installed and operated in compliance with the
following presumptions:
A. Physical security :
TOE is located in secured environment, physically, that can only be accessed by
authorized personnel.
A. Security maintenance :
In the event of changes in the security environment due to change in network
composition, host composition, web-server and web application, the changed
environment and security policy must be reflected on the TOE operation policy
immediately in order to maintain security at level equivalent to the previous
environment.
A. Reliable administrator :
The authorized administrator of TOE is void of ill intentions, has been trained
appropriately on the TOE administrations functions, and executes responsibilities
accurately in accordance with the administrative guidelines.
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A. Fortification of operating system :
Vulnerability within the operating system shall be removed in advance by
completely eliminating services (service port) or means within the operating system
that are not necessary by the TOE in order to assure reliability and security on
the operating system.
A. Fortification of Web-server :
Vulnerability shall be eliminated in advance by removing unnecessary programs
existing in the web-server and patching with the latest version by TOE in order
to assure reliability and security on web-server.
A. Secured external server :
Reliability and security on the server is assured by receiving the latest time from
the NTP server in order to maintain reliable time of TOE.
A. Secured SSL :
SSL to be used between TOEs shall be operated securely and the confidentiality of
data conveyed between the TOEs assured.
A. Secured DB :
Securely store the audit data generated at the TOE in order to assure the security
of DB used in search and arrangement of audit data.
4.2 Scope to counter a Threat
Although TOE provides means of coping with the security threats at a level
appropriate for the IT environment that TOE requires, TOE does not provide
means of coping with direct physical attack that makes it operate abnormally.
However, TOE provides means of coping with the logical attack that are
generated by source of threat with low level of specialized knowledge, resources
and motivation within the network connected to TOE.
All Security Targets and polices are described in order to provide means of
countermeasure against identified security threats.
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5. TOE Information
TOE is installed and operated within internal network or DMZ, which is
protected by network security product such as invasion interception system. The
operating environment is illustrated in the [Figure 1], [Figure 2] with fundamental
structure illustrated in the [Figure 3] below.
[Figure 1] WEBS-RAY V2.5(Stand-alone) Operating Environment
[Figure 2] WEBS-RAY V2.5(Separated Mode) Operating Environment
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[Figure 3] Basic Structure of TOE
TOE is composed of the following 5 sub-systems.
• Security Audit Subsystem(SA)
Audit record data can be verified for each log, contents alteration log, work log
and notice message even in the event of invasion by transmitting the audit data
generated by each subsystem (User data Protection subsystem, Identification and
Authentication subsystem, Security Management subsystem, System Protection
subsystem) to Master Server and by storing in the MySQL DB. Furthermore, in
the event of exceeding the limit set as the base value by examining the storage
and saturation limit of audit record data stored in MySQL DB, the disc of the
audit record storage shall be recognized as being exhausted and stop all TSF
service with the exception of access and back-up of authorized administrator, in
order to prevent storage of any more audit record information.
• User Data Protection Subsystem(UP)
Invasion and traffic analysis process on HTTP(S) request that accesses the web
application and HTTP(S) response transmitted to the user domain is being carried
out, as well as prevents detoured access and rejection of service for such. In the
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event of occurrence of abnormal attack, corresponding attacks are detected and
intercepted with audit record generated on such abnormal access. Key contents
files are registered as target of monitoring and hash value stored for the
registered files in order to examine presence of changes in accordance with period
of examination for flawlessness and to generate audit record in the vent of
changes.
• Identification and Authentication Subsystem(IA)
It performs identification and certification functions for the administrator who
manages TOE, and identification of external IT entity (client). It provides
identification and certification function for administrator through log-in page
provided in the Admin Console, and reflects number of failure to access the
administrator and monitor account, and details of certification setting on
termination of account with the exception of the super-administrator account. In
the event of failure to log-in, it conveys the details of such failure to the security
Management subsystem (SM).
• Security Management Subsystem(SM)
It provides GUI that can generate, change and delete TSF data including
policies on control of information flow and alteration of contents. Furthermore, it
performs examination of flawlessness of execution code of TSF of TOE and
information of properties of various security policies, setting of policies, status
inquiry and changes on TSF and TSF data.
• System Protection Subsystem(SP)
Regularly (30 seconds) verifies TSF service DAEMON disability and
communications disability at the time of operation and during regular operation in
order to maintain normal operation as well as secured status of Agent, Master
Server and Admin Console. In the event of occurrence of DAEMON disability,
enable maintenance of secured status by re-operating the corresponding service
DAEMON by monitoring process. In the event of occurrence of problems in the
control channel by verifying the status of the control channel on regular basis, it
is assessed as problem in the communication status, and transmits the stored
audit record to Master Server once the communication is resumed after having
stored the audit record until the communication is resumed. In addition, it
performs flawlessness examination on execution code of TSF, security policy file,
system operation file and security policy table file at the time of start-up and at
every designated period (base value of 5 minutes). In the event of occurrence of
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error on flawlessness, security alarm contents are conveyed to the authorized
personnel in accordance with the prescribed countermeasure activity information,
and the administrator shall execute verification on the flawlessness error through
viewing of the outcome.
6. Guidance
Manual provided by TOE is as follows:
- WEBS-RAY V2.5 Administrator Guidance V2.7, Nov. 3, 2008
- WEBS-RAY V2.5 Installation Guidance V2.8, Nov. 19, 2008
7. TOE Test
7.1 Developer's Test
• Test Method
The developer has derived at the test items with consideration for the
security functions of the product. Each test item is described in the test
manual. Each test item described in the test manual includes the following
detailed items:
- Test No./testing entity: Person identifying the test item and developer
who participated in the test
- Test goal: Describes the test goal including security function and
security module being subjected to test
- Test environment: Detailed test environment for execution of test
- Detailed test procedure: Detailed procedures for testing the security
functions
- Anticipated result: Outcome of test anticipated to be obtained upon
execution of test procedures
- Actual result: Outcome of test obtained upon actual execution of test
procedures
- Comparison of anticipated and actual results: Outcome of comparison of
anticipated and actual results
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The evaluator has evaluated the validity of test including the test
environment, test procedures, analysis of scope of test and detailed design
test of the test manual. The evaluator has verified that the test and test
results of the developer were appropriate for the evaluation environment.
• Test Configuration
Test environment described in the test manual includes detailed
environment such as composition, TOE, server to which TOE is installed or
system subjected to security control. Furthermore, it describes detailed test
environment such as necessary test tools for testing of each test item.
• Test Scope Analysis/Low-Level Design Test
Detailed evaluation results are described in the ATE_COV and ATE_DPT
evaluation results.
• Test Result
Test manual describes anticipated and actual results of each test item.
Actual result can be verified not only through the video clips of the actual
product but also audit record.
7.2 Evaluator's Test
The evaluator installed TOE by using the evaluation environment and tools
that are same as those of developer’s test, and tested entire test items
provided by the developer. The evaluator has verified that the actual results
coincide with anticipated result in all test items.
Furthermore, the evaluator has confirmed that the actual results coincided
with the anticipated result by devising and testing separate evaluator’s test
items on the basis of the developer’s test.
The evaluator has verified that, as the result of execution of vulnerability
test, no vulnerability can be abused under the evaluation environment.
The test results of the evaluator have assured that TOE operates normally
as described in the design document.
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8. Evaluation Configuration
The evaluator has composed test environment, which is coherent with the
environment composition specified in the [ST], for the test.
[Figure 5] Evaluator's Test Environment(Stand-alone)
[Figure 6] Evaluator's Test Environment(Separated Mode)
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9. Evaluation Result
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation V2.3 and
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation V2.3
have been applied to evaluation. Evaluation concluded that TOE satisfies the
EAL4 Evaluation Assurance Level requirements of the Part 2 and 3 of
Common Criteria for Information Security System. Details of evaluation
results are described in the evaluation report.
• ST evaluation (ASE)
The evaluator made its evaluation by applying the working unit of ASE
Common Evaluation Methodology.
Introduction of the Security Target is perfect with coherence with other parts of
the Security Target and accurately identifies the Security Target. TOE explanation
enables one to understand the goal and functionality of the TOE, is logical and
perfect with internal coherence, as well as being described with coherence with
other parts of Security Target.
Security environment provides the clearly defined and consistent security issues
induced from the TOE and TOE security environment by defining it into
presumptions, threats and security policies of the organization, and is described
completed and coherently. Security targets satisfy the identified threats, accomplish
identified security policy of the organization, and satisfied the described
presumptions.
IT security requirements are completely and coherently described, and provide
foundation appropriate for development of TOE for accomplishment of security
targets. TOE summary specifications accurately and coherently defines the security
functions and assurance criteria, and satisfy the TOE security requirement
described. Security Target accurately realizes the protection profile accommodated.
Therefore, Security Target is complete, coherent, technically appropriate, and is
valid for usage as resultantly corresponding basic material of TOE evaluation.
• Configuration Management evaluation (ACM)
The evaluator made its evaluation by applying working unit of ACM Common
Evaluation Methodology. It has been confirmed thatthe developer performs its
control by suing automation tool for corrections on expression of realization from
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the configuration management documents. From the configuration management
documents, it was confirmed that the developer clearly and definitively identifies
configuration items related to TOE and TOE, ability to changes such items are
appropriately controlled. From the configuration management documents, it was
verified that the developer executed configuration management on expression of
minimum realization of TOE, evaluation evidences required in the assurance
component of ST, and security defects.
Therefore, configuration management documents enable the consumer to identify
evaluated TOE, assure unique identification of configuration items, and assure that
the procedures used to control and track the TOE changes by the developer are
appropriate.
• Delivery and Operation evaluation (ADO)
The evaluator made evaluation by applying the working unit of ADO Common
Evaluation Methodology. Distributed documents, in the event of distributing the
TOE to user, describe all procedures for maintenance of the security of TOE, and
detection of changes and replacement of TOE. Procedures and phases for secured
installation and start-up of generation of TOE are documented. As the result, it
has been verified that environment for TOE is safely composed.
Therefore, distribution and operational documents are appropriate for assuring
installation, generation and start-up of TOE in the manner same as that intended
by the developer and distribution without changes in TOE.
• Development evaluation (ADV)
The evaluator made evaluation by applying the working unit of ADV Common
Evaluation Methodology. Functional specification appropriately describes the TOE
security functions, and explains that TOE security functions are sufficient to
satisfy the security function requirements for Security Target. Furthermore, it
appropriately describes the external interface of TOE. Security policy model is clear
and definitive with coherence in describing the rules and properties of the security
policy, and describes to enable coping with the security functions described in the
functional specifications.
The fundamental design describes the TSF as sub-system, which is a key
composition element, appropriately describes the interface of the sub-system and
accurately realizes functional specification. Detailed design describes the internal
actions of the TOE security functions as mutual relationship as well as dependency
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relationship between modules. Detailed design is sufficient to satisfy the security
function requirement of Security Target, and is accurately and effectively elaborates
the basic design.
Expression of realization is sufficient to satisfy the security function requirement
of Security Target, and accurately realizes the detailed design. Accordance of
expression illustrates that the developer has accurately and perfectly realized the
requirements of the Security Target as functional specification, basic design,
detailed design and expression of realization.
Therefore, documents that accord the functional specification, which explains the
external interface of TOE, basic design that explains the TOE structure as internal
sub-system, detailed design that explains the TOE structure as internal module,
expression of realization, which is source code level explanation, and expressions
that copes with each other in order to assure coherence of such means of
expression of TOE in the development are appropriate for understanding of the
methods provide TOE security functions.
• Guidance evaluation (AGD)
The evaluator made evaluation by applying the working unit of AGD Common
Evaluation Methodology. Administrator Manual describes the methods of accessing
the security administrations interface by the administrator, explanations and
precautions on each menu provided in the security administrations interface with
examples. It has been confirmed that the details described in the administrator
manual are executed accurately.
• Life Cycle Support evaluation (ALC)
The evaluator made evaluation by applying the working unit of ALC Common
Evaluation Methodology. It was confirmed that the security control of the developer
on development environment was appropriate for TOE design necessary for secured
operation of TOE and in provision of confidentiality and flawlessness of realization
of TOE. It was also confirmed that the developer is using documented TOE life
cycle model. It was confirmed that the developer has used well-defined
development tool that can generate results that are coherent and predictable.
Therefore, life cycle support appropriately describes the procedures used by the
developer during development, maintenance and repair of TOE including security
procedures and tools used in all processes of TOE development.
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• Tests evaluation (ATE)
The evaluator made evaluation by applying the working unit of ATE Common
Evaluation Methodology. The test manual describes the test goal, test procedures
and outcome for each phase as well as illustrates examples of outcome on the
security functions specified in the security target. It was confirmed that the details
of test described in the test manual are accurate by repeatedly performing the test
procedures including function test and module test for each phase of development
provided. It was further confirmed that the operation of security function that was
realized during the development process coincides, and the accuracy of the
developer’s test confirmed through independent execution of the evaluator’s test.
• Vulnerability Assessment evaluation (AVA)
The evaluator made evaluation by applying the working unit of AVA Common
Evaluation Methodology. It was confirmed that the manual is not misunderstood, is
not irrational and is not contracted in misuse analysis. It was also confirmed that
secured procedures have been taken on all operation modes, and that unsecured
status can be prevented and detected if the manual is used. Declaration of Strength
of Function was made on all probabilities and permutation mechanism of Security
Target, and it was confirmed that the analysis on Strength of Function declaration
of the developer was accurate.
Analysis of vulnerability appropriately describes clearly known vulnerabilities of
TOE and its countermeasures through realization of functions or clear indication of
operating environment in the guidelines or manual. The evaluator has confirmed the
accuracy of vulnerability analysis by performing independent vulnerability analysis.
In the vulnerability analysis, it was confirmed that TOE does not have
vulnerability of possibility of abuse by attacker with low level of attack within
intended environment.
Therefore, it was confirmed that, on the basis of the vulnerability analysis of the
developer and evaluator as well as penetration test of the evaluator, there is no
defectiveness or weakness that can be abused within intended environment in TOE.
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10. Recommendations
• This product is a web application firewall product that can detect and
intercept attacks using HTTP/HTTPS protocol, and may be fragile towards
attacks using protocols other than HTTP/HTTPS. Therefore, network
security products such as invasion interception system, invasion prevention
system and invasion detection system must be installed and operated in
front of network inorder to elevate the security effect of this TOE.
• This product has WhiteURL collection/management function that
collects/manages web documents that are normally operated and services
in web server. Web documents that are collected/managed in WhiteURL
can be accessed externally. Therefore, in the event of collection and
management of key directory and documents in WhiteURL, precautions
must be taken in the event of selection of target of management by
WhiteURL since it can be exposed to ill-intended attacker. That is, at the
time of installation and operation of this TOE, selection on the target of
WhiteURL must be preceded.
• Trinity Soft Co., Ltd., in the event of occurrence of new web-related
vulnerability, provides up-dating rule for this TOE in order to renew the
web attack rule. As such, the administrator shall maintain the latest web
attack detection rule by verifying up-dates through the web-site of Trinity
Soft Co., Ltd. on regular basis.
• Although this product provides administrator notification function in the
event of reaching the critical value due to exhaustion of storage space for
audit record, the administrator ought to continuously monitor the usage of
the storage space and secure storage space for audit report without fully
relying on the notification function.
11. Acronyms and Glossary
Abbreviations & terms below were used in the report.
(1) Abbreviation
CC Common Criteria
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
(2) Terms
TOE
An IT product or system and its associated guidance documentation that is the
subject of an evaluation
Audit Record
The audit data to store the event records which are related to the security of
TOE
User
Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts
with the TOE
Authorised user
A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation
External IT entity
Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside of the TOE that
interacts with the TOE
WhiteURL
Registration of page that is normally operated and serviced on web-server is
referred to as White URL collection, and the collected files are referred to as
White URL
Web Application Firewall
Information security product that audits the HTTP/HTTPS packet and controls
the flow in order to detect and intercept attacks using the vulnerabilities of
web-server or web application
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12. Reference
Certification body has used the following documents to produce the
certification report :
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation V2.3
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation V2.3
[3] Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Guidance (July 16, 2008)
[4] Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme (September 1, 2008)
[5] WEBS-RAY V2.5 Security Target V2.8 (November 3, 2008)
[6] WEBS-RAY V2.5 ETR V1.0 (December 5, 2008)