TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-01
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Certification Report
Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series NGFW and StoneOS 5.5R9
Sponsor and developer: Hillstone Network Corp.
5201 Great America Parkway, # 420,
Santa Clara, CA 95054
USA
Evaluation facility: Secura B.V.
Karspeldreef 8
1101 CJ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0476172
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 27 September 2022
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 2/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 4/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series NGFW and StoneOS 5.5R9. The developer of the Hillstone SG-6000 A-
Series NGFW and StoneOS 5.5R9 is Hillstone Network Corp. located in Santa Clara, CA, USA. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a network security device that protects a network by controlling the traffic that comes in
and out of that network, allowing or denying the data packet by identifying whether it matches the
policy rules or not. Besides security functions, the TOE can also work as a bridging device to connect
a trust zone (internal network) and untrust zone (external network).
The TOE has been evaluated by Secura B.V. located in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 15 September 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has
been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the
Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series NGFW and
StoneOS 5.5R9, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Hillstone SG-
6000 A-Series NGFW and StoneOS 5.5R9 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series NGFW and
StoneOS 5.5R9 from Hillstone Network Corp. located in Santa Clara, CA, USA.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software StoneOS, build FR25098-YS-V6-r0614 5.5R9
Hardware
SG-6000-A200
SG-6000-A200W
SG-6000-A1000
SG-6000-A1100
SG-6000-A2000
SG-6000-A2600
SG-6000-A2700
SG-6000-A2800
SG-6000-A3000
SG-6000-A3600
SG-6000-A3700
SG-6000-A3800
SG-6000-A5100
SG-6000-A5200
SG-6000-A5500
SG-6000-A5600
SG-6000-A5800
SG-6000-A6800
SG-6000-A7600
In the certified configuration, the TOE supports transparent mode, routing mode and mix mode
deployment running on A-Series appliances. The A-Series appliances, which is the underlying TOE
hardware, is comprised of a set of different hardware models with variations in throughput, processing
speed, number and type of network connections supported, number of concurrent connections
supported, and amount of storage as identified in the [ST], chapter 1.4.
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Hillstone SG-6000
A-Series NGFW and StoneOS 5.5R9. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
All the hardware models share the same OS, the StoneOS 5.5R9.
The Hillstone Next Generation Firewall TOE is comprised of several security features, all implemented
by StoneOS:
1. Security Audit
2. Cryptographic Support
3. User Data Protection
4. Identification and Authentication
5. Security Management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. Trusted Path/Channels
Page: 7/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The software is comprised of the operating system StoneOS with software version 5.5R9.
The StoneOS system architecture is constituted by:
• Zones, dividing network into multiple segments.
• Interface, the inlet and outlet for traffic going through security zones.
• Policy, which is used to control the traffic flow in security zones/segments.
Each instantiation of the physical TOE has two or more network interfaces and can filter IP traffic to
and through those interfaces.
The TOE can optionally connect to an NTP server for clock updates, where NTP can be configured
with authentication. If the StoneOS is to be remotely administered, the management station can
connect using SSH or HTTPS. A syslog server can also be used to store audit records to a syslog
server for UNIX or Windows, and the syslog server must support syslog over SSL/TLS. The TOE can
filter connections to/from these external servers, including authentication servers, using its IP traffic
filtering and can encrypt traffic where necessary using SSL/TLS and/or IPsec.
The three supported deployment scenarios for the TOE are:
1. Transparent mode. This is used when the IT administrator does not wish to change the
existing network layout. Normally, the existing network has already set up routers and
switches. In this deployment mode the TOE will be used as a security device.
2. Routing mode. This deployment often uses the NAT function, so it is also called NAT mode.
In routing mode, each interface has its IP address which means interfaces are in the layer 3
zone. The TOE in routing mode can work as a router and a security device.
3. Mix Mode. To configure a mix mode, it is necessary to combine the routing mode of the
deployment methods with the transparent mode.
Visual depictions of these deployment scenarios are provided in [ST] sections 1.4.1.1 to 1.4.1.3.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Stone OS CLI User guide, dated 20 October 2021 Version 5.5R9
StoneOS Web UI User Guide, dated 20 October 2021 Version 5.5R9
Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series Hardware Reference Guide, dated 30
November 2021
Version 1.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
Page: 8/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed testing on functional specification and subsystem level. The evaluator
confirmed that the behaviour of all TSFI and all TSF subsystems have been demonstrated through the
developer testing.
The majority of the developer testing was manual. The evaluator sampled a subset of the developer
test suite, and also performed additional functional tests to further demonstrate the behaviour of the
critical security functionality of the TOE.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
During the evaluation activities a vulnerability analysis was performed to ascertain the presence of
potential vulnerabilities. Penetration testing was performed to confirm that the potential vulnerabilities
cannot be exploited in the operational environment for the TOE. Penetration testing was performed
assuming an attack potential of Enhanced Basic.
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• A public vulnerability analysis was performed that focused on:
o Known vulnerability reports for the product and product type
o Hardware components embedded into the device
o Specific libraries and tools embedded into the underlying kernel.
• An independent vulnerability analysis which started with the identification of the main threat
factor for the TOE was performed. Based on the environmental assumptions in the ST, the
threat factor is defined as malicious known users and admin, as well as unknown users,
already part of the network and organization where the TOE is deployed.
• Based on this threat factor definition, the analysis and resulted independent AVA tests are
focused on deriving attacks aimed to bypass or modify the security features of the product, as
defined in the ST.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 37 days. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
SG-6000-A2600 with StoneOS 5.5R9 in Routing mode was used for most of the testing. For a few test
cases, the SG-6000-A1000 and SG-6000-A3800 devices were used.
The StoneOS 5.5R9 is installed in the same version on all the products in various families of the A-
Series appliances with variations in throughput, processing speed, number and type of network
connections supported, number of concurrent connections supported, and amount of storage only.
Therefore, the evaluator concluded that the testing conducted on a subset of the hardware devices is
applicable across the hardware variations.
Similarly, the evaluator assessed that from a testing perspective there was no difference whether the
TOE is deployed in transparent mode, routing mode or mix mode as the network plane configuration is
the configuration in the environment and has no effect on the operation of the TOE itself. Thus, the
test results achieved using Routing mode are considered equally applicable to Transparent mode or
Mix mode.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
Page: 9/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series NGFW and
StoneOS 5.5R9 build FR25098-YS-V6-r0614 running on the A-Series appliances identified in the
Hardware section of the table in chapter 2.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series
NGFW and StoneOS 5.5R9, to be CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the
security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Page: 10/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The Common Criteria Security Target for Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series NGFW and StoneOS 5.5R9,
Version 1.1, dated 09 September 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NAT Network Address Translation
NGFW Next Generation Firewall
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
SSH Secure Shell
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 11/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0476172-CR, dated 27 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Hillstone NGFW with Stone OS 5.5R9, Version
1.2, 07 September 2022.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] Common Criteria Security Target for Hillstone SG-6000 A-Series NGFW and
StoneOS 5.5R9, Version 1.1, dated 09 September 2022
(This is the end of this report.)