TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2021-3
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Certification Report
NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure Element
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0023577-CR3
Report version: 1
Project number: 0023577_3
Author(s): Denise Cater
Date: 14 June 2021
Number of pages: 18
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 8
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
2.3.1 Assumptions 9
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 9
2.4 Architectural Information 9
2.5 Documentation 10
2.6 IT Product Testing 11
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 11
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 12
2.6.3 Test configuration 12
2.6.4 Test results 12
2.7 Re-Used Evaluation Results 13
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 13
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 15
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 15
3 Security Target 17
4 Definitions 17
5 Bibliography 18
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC. Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition
of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and
including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be found at: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOG-IS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 effective since April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-
basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed
initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Italy joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations,
approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition
applies can be found at: http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure Element. The developer of the NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58
Secure Element is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also
act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE is a Java Card with GP functionality, extended with eUICC and CSP functionality. It can be
used to load, install, instantiate and execute off-card verified Java Card applets. The eUICC part is a
UICC embedded in a consumer device and may be in a removable form factor or otherwise. It
connects to a given mobile network, by means of its currently enabled MNO profile. The CSP part
offers Cryptographic Service Provider functionality.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 10 December 2019. A re-evaluation took place by Brightsight B.V. and was completed on
08 July 2020 and a maintenance activity was subsequently completed on 23 October 2020. This
further re-evaluation also took place by Brightsight and was completed on 14 June 2021 with the
approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This third issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are:
o Addition of a further TOE configuration, namely JCOP 5.2. R3.01.1 with plug-in 195 and with
plug-in 196, which is compliant to the GSMA SGP.22 version 2.2.2 June 2020 (instead of
version 2.2.1 that is used for the JCOP 5.2. R1 and JCOP 5.2. R2).
o Removal of CAT-TP support.
o Extension of UAI query to include Amendment H Status.
o Addition of 5th logic channel
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
Note that in first re-certification of the TOE (reported in the second issue of the Certification Report)
the major changes are the introduction of two new configurations (JCOP 5.2 R2.01.1 and JCOP 5.2
R2.02.1). A maintenance activity was then performed to include JCOP 5.2 R2.03.1.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure
Element, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which
the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP JCOP 5.2 on
SN100.C58 Secure Element are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ASE_TSS.2 “TOE summary
specification with architectural design summary”, ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures),
ALC_FLR.1 (flaw remediation) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure
Element from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Name Version
Hardware
(platform)
SN100x IC Package (as part of SN100 certificate) B2.1 C58
Data configuration
(platform)
Factory Page 18652
System Page Common 18468
BootOS Patch (part of SN100 certificate) 4.2.0 PL5 v16
Software
(platform)
Factory OS (part of SN100 certificate) 4.2.0
Boot OS (part of SN100 certificate) 4.2.0
Flash Driver Software (part of SN100 certificate) 4.0.8
Services Software (part of SN100 certificate, specific to C58) 4.14.0.1
Crypto Library (part of SN100 certificate, specific to C58) 2.0.0
Software JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 R1.01.1 with plugin version 129
JCOP5.2 OS, native applications, OS Update Component, eUICC
component and CSP component
R1.01.1
eUICC plug-in 1.5.129
JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 R2.01.1 with plugin version 146
JCOP5.2 OS, native applications, OS Update Component, eUICC
component and CSP component
R2.01.1
eUICC plug-in 1.5.146
JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 R2.02.1 with plugin version 148
JCOP5.2 OS, native applications, OS Update Component, eUICC
component and CSP component
R2.02.1
eUICC plug-in 1.5.148
JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 R2.03.1 with plugin version 148
JCOP5.2 OS, native applications, OS Update Component, eUICC
component and CSP component
R2.03.1
eUICC plug-in 1.5.148
JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 R3.01.1 with plugin version 195 or plugin version 196
JCOP5.2 OS, native applications, OS Update Component, eUICC
component and CSP component
R3.01.1
eUICC plug-in 1.5.195
eUICC plug-in 1.5.196
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP JCOP 5.2 on
SN100.C58 Secure Element. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.3.
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2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a composite product on top of CC certified Hardware, Firmware and Crypto Library. The
overall product consists of a Secure Micro-Controller and a software stack. The Micro-Controller
provides an Integrated NFC controller and an embedded Secure Element core. The software stack
creates 2 separate domains to provide a converged product consisting of a familiar Java Card Secure
Element domain and an eUICC domain providing UICC functionality and external ISO-7816
connectivity.
The TOE has the following features:
 Cryptographic algorithms and functionality:
o 3DES for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and MAC generation and verification (2-key3DES, 3-
key 3DES, Retail-MAC, CMAC and CBC-MAC)
o AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) for en-/decryption (GCM, CBC and ECB) and MAC
generation and verification (CMAC, CBC-MAC)
o RSA and RSA CRT for en-/decryption and signature generation and verification
o RSA and RSA CRT key generation
o SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithm
o Secure SHA-1, Secure SHA-224, Secure SHA-256, Secure SHA-384, Secure SHA-512 hash
algorithm
o HMAC
o ECC over GF(p) for signature generation and verification (ECDSA)
o ECC over GF(p) key generation for key agreement
o Random number generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20
 Java Card 3.0.5 functionality
 GlobalPlatform 2.3 functionality including Amendments A,B,C,D,E,F,H and I and is compliant with
the Common Implementation Configuration
 GSMA ’Remote SIM Provisioning Architecture for consumer Devices’
 Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) features
 NXP Proprietary Functionality:
o MiFare functionality accessible via Applets using the MiFare API – no security functionality is
claimed
o OSSCA (Chinese Crypto) functionality accessible via Applets using the OSSCA API – No
security functionality is claimed
o Felica functionality accessible via Applets using the Felica API - no security functionality is
claimed for this functionality
o Config Applet: JCOP5.2 OS includes a Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the
TOE
o OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP5.2 OS or UpdaterOS
o UAI update component: Proprietary functionality that is can update JCOP5.2 OS- no security
functionality is claimed
o Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is available
such as, e.g.: reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter
o Error Detection Code (EDC) API
The following functionality was added (and assessed) with the JCOP 5.2 R2 configuration
 CAT-TP, with limitations as described in the UGM [AGD_UGMR2], Section 8.1(20)
 5G features as per SIM Alliance 2.3, see [AGD_UGMR2]Section 2.4.4. and 8.1(15)
 Extension to Global Platform Amendment H, UGM see [AGD_UGMR2] Section 3.5.7
 CPLC data made available through SystemInfo, UGM see [AGD_UGMR2] Section 2.1.3.22
The following functionality was changed (and assessed) with the JCOP 5.2 R3 configuration:
 R3 is compliant to the GSMA SGP.22 version 2.2.2 June 2020, whilst previous versions are (R1
and R2) are compliant to GSMA SGP.22 version 2.2.1 Dec 2018
 CAT-TP is not supported in the R3 product
 UAI query extended to include Amendment H Status [AGD UGMR301] Section 7.1.2
 Addition of 5th Logical Channel [AGD UGMR301] Section8.4
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that proprietary applications have been included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims
on these functionalities, this application functionality has not been assessed, only the self-protection of
the TSF.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of a certified Hardware IC, with Micro Controller Firmware (Boot OS, Factory OS
and Flash driver software) and certified security software library consisting of a crypto library and
services software. All these parts are depicted in the figure below with the shaded box marked
SE100_SE. Since, this TOE is a composite on top of this certified platform, this block is not depicted
in more detail.
The Software stack consists of the JCOP Core parts marked with salmon coloured blocks
implementing the Native OS, Global platform functionality and the Java Card 3.05 functionality. The
TOE also implements a Cryptographic Service Provider marked with an orange coloured block. It
implements a number of NXP proprietary features like the JCOP extension APIs for MiFare, Felica,
Updater OS and Config applet (note there are no security claims relating to MiFare and Felica).
Furthermore the TOE implements GSMA ‘Remote SIM Provisioning Architecture for consumer
Devices’, referred to as eUICC. The JCOP OS supports the eUICC APIs and uses the Broker API to
forward to the eSIM/SIM/UICC/ISIM commands to the eUICC Plugin Library.
The TOE supports two domains, the eSE for the Java Card Secure Element domain and an eUICC
domain providing UICC functionality in accordance with the GSMA Specification.
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
The following table details the guidance components delivered to the customer for JCOP 5.2 R1.01.1:
Reference Name Version Date
[AGD_UGMR1] JCOP 5.2 R1.01.1 User Guidance
Manual
1.8 2019-10-30
[AGD_UGMSEMSR
1]
JCOP 5.2 R1.01.1 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for SEMS API
1.1 2019-10-17
[AGD_CSPR1] JCOP 5.2 R1.01.1 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for CSPAPI
1.6 2019-10-15
The following table details the guidance components delivered to the customer for JCOP 5.2 R2.01.1
and JCOP 5.2 R2.02.1:
Reference Name Version Date
[AGD_UGMR2] JCOP 5.2 R2User Guidance
Manual
1.3 2020-06-08
[AGD_UGMSEMSR2] JCOP 5.2 R2 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for SEMS API
1.2 2020-06-08
[AGD_CSPR2] JCOP 5.2 R2 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for CSPAPI
1.2 2020-06-08
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The following table details the guidance components delivered to the customer for JCOP 5.2 R2.03.1:
Reference Name Version Date
[AGD UGMR203] JCOP 5.2 R2.03.1 User Guidance
Manual
1.0 2020-09-18
[AGD
UGMSEMSR203]
JCOP 5.2 R2.03.1 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for SEMS API
1.0 2020-09-16
[AGD CSPR203] JCOP 5.2 R2.03.1 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for CSPAPI
1.0 2020-09-16
The following table details the guidance components delivered to the customer for JCOP 5.2 R3.01.1
with plugin 195 and plugin 196:
Reference Name Version Date
[AGD UGMR301] JCOP 5.2 R3.01.1.User Guidance
Manual
1.1 2021-05-03
[AGD
UGMSEMSR301]
JCOP 5.2 R3.01.1 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for SEMS API
1.0 2021-01-15
[AGD CSPR301] JCOP 5.2 R3.01.1 User Guidance
Manual Addendum for CSPAPI
1.0 2021-01-15
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
TOE is tested both in its physical implementation and using simulator and emulator platforms in order
to cover all relevant aspects. During testing, the TOE is identified by its SVN number.
Code coverage analysis is used by NXP to verify overall test completeness. Test benches for the
various TOE parts are executed using code coverage measurement and analysis tools to determine
the code coverage (i.e. lines, branches and/or instructions, depending on tool) of each test bench.
Cases with incomplete coverage are analysed. For each tool, the developer has investigated and
documented inherent limitations that can lead to coverage being reported as less than 100%. In such
cases the developer provided a “gap” analysis with rationales (e.g. attack counter not hit due to
redundancy checks).
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
The developer tests witnessed by the evaluators were selected to cover various aspects of the TOE,
as well as areas where the code coverage approach has limitations. The selection was designed to
focus on TOE parts that differ from previous releases (e.g. eUICC and CSP). The tests were executed
in the test environment of the developer.
As developer functional testing is quite rigorous, the selection was chosen to primarily target eUICC
and CSP aspects. For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples
and a test environment. The evaluator tested on the TOE version to be certified but also on
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intermediate versions and re-used test results of earlier versions of the TOE. The evaluator provided
an analysis to demonstrate that the results of the test cases performed on earlier versions and
intermediate versions also hold for this TOE.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers whether
potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified behaviour in
such an early stage of the evaluation.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE. During
this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained
from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential
vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to the attack methods in [JIL-AM]. An
important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [HW-ETRfC] of the underlying
platform. The Code Review on this TOE was performed as a delta code review on the
predecessor of this TOE JCOP5.1 R1.00.1 certified under [CR2-221699]. For each identified
Potential Vulnerability identified the evaluator analysed whether the code implementing this
potential vulnerability is also part of this TOE version and still exists.
 All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by
penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate. For the
potential vulnerabilities that were identified during JCOP 5.1 R1.00.1 certified under [CR2-
221699], the assurance and the test result, providing it was not outdated, was re-used. In cases
where the test evidence is outdated, the test was in the meantime redone or a representative test
was performed and used to validate the test and provide the assurance. The additional test
results, to renew outdated tests or to validate outdated tests originate from the JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0
and JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0 evaluation, certified under [CR2-195714-CR2].
During this re-certification the vulnerability analysis was refreshed. As a result some representative
tests were performed to provide ongoing assurance of penetration testing performed in earlier
evaluation of the TOE.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during this re-certification was 12 weeks. During that
test campaign, 34% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 46% on side-channel testing,
and 20% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The developer and evaluator tested the TOE in the following configuration:
 SMB-Mail box Wired Mode, Card Emulation mode, SPI of SN100 to test eSE domain of Secure
Element
 ISO7816 T=0/T=1 of SN100 to test eUICC domain of Secure Element
The developer and evaluator tested on the TOE version to be certified but also on intermediate
versions of the TOE. The evaluator provided an analysis to demonstrate that the results of the test
cases performed on earlier versions and intermediate versions also hold for this TOE. Hence, the test
configurations used were deemed to be consistent with those documented in [ST].
During this re-certification where the JCOP 5.2 R3 configuration was added, the tests were performed
on JCOP 5.2 R3.01.1 and JCOP 5.2 R1.01.1, as well as a predecessor (intermediate) version. Again,
the evaluator provided an analysis to demonstrate that the results of the test cases performed on the
intermediate versions also hold for this TOE.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
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No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced from an algorithmic security level above 100 bits to a
practical remaining security level lower than 100 bits. The remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
so this is considered sufficient. Therefore, no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Re-Used Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
re-used, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
It is noted that although the original evaluation NSCIB-CC-0023577 was a “Full-evaluation” of the TOE
(not a re-certification), Code review results and test results of the preceding and succeeding versions
of the TOE were re-used.
The JCOP5.2 base and JC are a delta from JCOP5.1 on SN100.C48 ([CR2-221699]), which is in turn
also a delta from the JCOP5.0 on SN100.C25 ([CR3-195714]). Test results where applicable are re-
used from the earlier certifications. For those test cases where the test results were more than 6
months old, the test results have been revalidated through re-execution of the test case or a
representative test case.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Site Re-use Reports (STARs) resulting from other evaluations have been utilized). Sites
involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were re-used by composition. No
sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure
Element.
The TOE can be identified using the Platform Identifier as explained in Section 1.3 of [AGD_UGM].
The term ‘Platform’ is being used for the entire TOE. In particular this means that the DF20 tag as
returned shall have the value in ASCII format:
JCOP 5.2 Revision Identifier
JCOP 5.2 R1.01.1 N5C2M00261A70600
JCOP 5.2 R2.01.1 N5C2M0029E7D0600
JCOP 5.2 R2.02.1 N5C2M002A62D0600
JCOP 5.2 R2.03.1 N5C2M002CA640600
JCOP 5.2 R3.01.1 N5C2M002F8770600
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®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
The identifier of the Plugin, can be verified with the EF10 tag, it shall have the format.
JCOP 5.2 R1.01.1 Plugin version:
Tag Len Description Value
EF10 3E Tag Len Value Description
81 1D Plugin label (“IDEMIA.eSIM_MERCURY_V2.2+_APP”)
“4944454D49412E6553494D5F4D455243
5552595F56322E322B5F415050”
82 07 eUICC plugin version (“1.5.129”)
“312E352E313239”
83 0F JCOPX API label (“JCOPX eUICC API”)
“4A434F505820655549434320415049”
84 03 JCOPX API version (“5.2”)
“352E32”
JCOP 5.2 R2.01.1 and JCOP 5.2 R2.02.1 Plugin version
:Tag Len Description Value
EF10 3E Tag Len Value Description
81 1D Plugin label (“IDEMIA.eSIM_MERCURY_V2.2+_APP”)
“4944454D49412E6553494D5F4D455243
5552595F56322E322B5F415050”
82 07 eUICC plugin version R2.01.1->“1.5.146”
“312E352E313436”
R2.02.1->“1.5.148”
“312E352E313438
83 0F JCOPX API label (“JCOPX eUICC API”)
“4A434F505820655549434320415049”
84 03 JCOPX API version (“5.3”)
“352E33””
JCOP 5.2 R2.03.1 Plugin version:
Tag Len Description Value
EF10 3E Tag Len Value Description
81 1D Plugin label (“IDEMIA.eSIM_MERCURY_V2.2+_APP”)
“4944454D49412E6553494D5F4D455243
5552595F56322E322B5F415050”
82 07 eUICC plugin version “312E352E313438
83 0F JCOPX API label (“JCOPX eUICC API”)
“4A434F505820655549434320415049”
84 03 JCOPX API version (“5.3”)
“352E33””
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requires
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JCOP 5.2 R3.01.1 Plugin versions
Tag Len Description Value
EF10 3E Tag Len Value Description
81 1D Plugin label (“IDEMIA.eSIM_MERCURY_V2.2+_APP”)
“4944454D49412E6553494D5F4D455243
5552595F56322E322B5F415050”
82 07 eUICC plugin version 1.5.195
“312E352E313935”
1.5.196
“312E352E313936”
83 0F JCOPX API label (“JCOPX eUICC API”)
“4A434F505820655549434320415049”
84 03 JCOPX API version (“5.4)
“352E34”
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a
composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP JCOP 5.2 on
SN100.C58 Secure Element, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 5 augmented with ASE_TSS.2, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.5.
This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP0104], and demonstrable
conformance to the Protection Profiles [PP0099] and [PP0100].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
Page: 16/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0023577-CR3, dated 14 June 2021
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cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
Page: 17/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0023577-CR3, dated 14 June 2021
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3 Security Target
The NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure Element Security Target, v3.3, 14 June 2021 [ST] is
included here by reference.
Please note that for the need of publication a public version [ST-lite] has been created and verified
according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
DES Data Encryption Standard
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
eUICC embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card
GP Global Platform
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GSMA Groupe Speciale Mobile Association
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MNO Mobile Network Operators
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 18/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0023577-CR3, dated 14 June 2021
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CR2-195714] Certification Report NXP JCOP 5.0 on SN100.C25 Secure Element, NSCIB-
CC-195714-CR2, version 2, 06 December 2019
[CR2-221699] Certification Report NXP JCOP 5.1 eSE on SN100.C48 Secure Element,
NSCIB-CC-221699-CR2, 25 November 2019
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure Element on
SN100.C58” – EAL5+, 19-RPT-537, Version 13.0, 14 June 2021
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58
Secure Element” – EAL5+, 19-RPT-939, Version 12.0, 14 June 2021
[HW-CERT] CC-21-174263, 31 May 2021
Certification Report SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library
SN100_SE B2.1 C25/C48/C58, NSCIB-CC-174263_4, version 1.0, 31 May
2021
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for Composition SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library B2.1
C25, C48 and C58 Product Update E, 21-RPT-401, v3.0, 25 May 2021
[HW-ST] SN100 Series – Secure Element with Crypto Library, Rev. 3.4, 11 September
2019
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019
[NSI-11] NSCIB Scheme Instruction 11 Remaining strength of cryptographic
implementations, version 1.1, 1 October 2017
[PP0099] Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, version 3.0.5 (December
2017), published by Oracle, Inc. (BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017)
[PP0100] Embedded UICC for Consumer Devices, GSMA Association, Version 1.0 05-
June-2018, 05 June 2018 (BSI-CC-PP-0100-2018)
[PP0104] Common Criteria Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider version
0.9.8 (BSI-CC-PP-0104-2019)
[ST] NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure Element Security Target, v3.3, 14 June
2021
[ST-Lite] NXP JCOP 5.2 on SN100.C58 Secure Element Security Target Lite, v3.1, 14
June 2021
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)