National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VD11615-2025
Dated: 9 September 2025
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Lisa Mitchell
Clare Parran
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Theo Ajibade
Rupal Gupta
Akshay Jain
Acumen Security, LLC
3
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 7
3.1 TOE Description.............................................................................................................................................7
3.2 TOE Evaluated Configuration ....................................................................................................................11
3.3 Physical Scope of the TOE...........................................................................................................................12
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 13
4.1 Logical Scope of the TOE ............................................................................................................................13
4.1.1 Security Audit ............................................................................................................................................13
4.1.2 Cryptographic Support...............................................................................................................................13
4.1.3 Identification and Authentication...............................................................................................................17
4.1.4 Security Management.................................................................................................................................17
4.1.5 TOE Access................................................................................................................................................18
4.1.6 Protection of the TSF .................................................................................................................................18
4.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels ...............................................................................................................................18
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................ 19
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................19
5.2 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................19
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 20
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 21
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................21
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................21
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 22
8.1 Developer Testing.........................................................................................................................................22
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................22
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 23
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................23
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................23
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................23
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................24
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................24
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................24
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................25
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 26
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 27
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12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 28
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 29
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 30
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Validation team’s
assessment of the evaluation of the Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms. It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report
(VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and
no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Acumen Security Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in
Rockville, Maryland, USA, and was completed in September 2025. The information in this report is largely
derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Acumen
Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the:
• PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, 2023-03-29
This PP-Configuration includes the following:
o Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e
[CPP_ND_V3.0E]
o PP-Module: PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0
[MOD_MACsec_V1.0]
• Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0 [PKG_SSH_V1.0]
The TOE is the Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms. The TOE identified in this
VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev.
5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS)
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on technical
issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the
ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the functional
requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation
team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with
the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS
24.10.R3, MACsec platforms Security Target, Version 1.2, August 22, 2025, and analysis performed by the
Validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the
Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security
evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee
for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, 2023-03-29
This PP-Configuration includes the following:
• Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e
[CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0
[MOD_MACsec_V1.0]
Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0 [PKG_SSH_V1.0]
Security Target Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms Security Target, Version
1.2, August 22, 2025
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec
platforms, Version 0.6, August 25, 2025
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Nokia corporation
Developer Nokia corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Lisa Mitchell, Clare Parran, Lori Sarem
7
3 Architectural Information
3.1 TOE Description
The Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms (herein referred to as the TOE) are a
network devices that utilizes Nokia’s SR operating system version 24.10.R3. The Nokia 7750 Service Router
(SR) & 7250 Interconnect Router (IXR) portfolios include a wide range of physical platforms that share a
mutual architecture and feature set. This allows Nokia customers to select the platform that best
addresses their unique business goals and fulfills their scale, density, space, power, and value-added
service requirements. The Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR portfolios are chassis-based routers.
The Nokia 7750 SR portfolio consists of hardware platforms intended for use in IP edge and core
networking environments. The portfolio includes the 7750 SR-s and 7750 SR series appliance families. The
following Table 2 lists the specifically evaluated Nokia platforms:
Table 2 – Nokia 7750 SR Platforms
Platforms (part number) CPU Speed Core
7750 SR-1 CPM in:
-7750 SR-1 (FP4) Marvell OCTEON III CN7360 (MIPS64) 1.8GHz 16
7750 SR-1 CPM in:
-7750 SR-1-24D
-7750 SR-1-48D
-7750 SR-1-46S
-7750 SR-1-92S AMD EPYC3251 (ZEN) 2.5GHz 8
7750 SR-1x in:
-7750 SR-1x-48D
-7750 SR-1x-92S AMD EPYC3251 (ZEN) 2.5GHz 8
7750 SR-1se CPM AMD EPYC3251 (ZEN) 2.5GHz 8
7750 SR-2se CPM-2se AMD EPYC3251 (ZEN) 2.5GHz 8
7750 SR-2s CPM Marvell OCTEON III CN7360 (MIPS64) 1.8GHz 16
7750 SR-14s/7s CPM-s v2 Marvell OCTEON III CN7890 (MIPS64) 1.8GHz 48
7750 SR-7/SR-12/SR-12e SR CPM5 Marvell OCTEON II CN6645 (MIPS64) 1.5GHz 10
The Nokia 7250 IXR portfolio includes the following appliance families: The 7250 IXR-R, IXR-e, IXR-X and
7250 IXR-s platforms. The following Table 3 lists the specifically evaluated Nokia 7250 IXR platforms:
Table 3 - Nokia 7250 IXR Platforms
Platforms (part number) CPU Speed Core
7250 IXR-R6d/dl CPIOM AMD EPYC3255 (ZEN) 2.5GHz 8
7250 IXR-e (Small) CPM Intel Atom C3708 (Goldmont) 1.7GHz 8
7250 IXR-R4 CPM Marvell OCTEON III CN7340 (MIPS64) 1.5GHz 8
7250 IXR-R6 CPIOM Marvell OCTEON III CN7360 1.5GHz 16
8
The TOE supports a full array of network functions and services. Every Nokia 7750 series routing appliance
is a whole routing system that provides a variety of high-speed interfaces (only Ethernet is within scope
of this evaluation) for various scales of networks and various network applications. The TOE utilizes a
common Nokia SR operating system, features, and technology for compatibility across all platforms.
Nokia SR OS is mainly responsible for all the functionalities and services provided by the routers. The
routers can be accessed either via a local console or via a network connection that is protected using the
SSH protocol. Each time a user accesses the routers, either via local console terminal connection or from
the network remotely using SSH, the user must ensure to successfully authenticate itself with the correct
credentials.
The TOE also supports MACsec functionality between compatible Nokia MACsec peer devices using the
Media Dependent Adapter (MDA). On the evaluated configuration, the TOE permits only EAPOL (PAE
EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5), and MAC control frames (EtherType 88-08) and
discards others.
The TOE provides AES-GCM MACsec encryption. The MACsec feature is powered by one or more of the
network processor chips listed in Table 4:
Table 4 – TOE’s MACsec PHYs
Network Chip Vendor
BCM82399
Broadcom
BCM81392
BCM81394
BCM81343
VSC8258
Microsemi
VSC8490
VSC8584
E5 Nokia
The MDAs are pluggable adapter cards. They provide physical interface connectivity to the devices. MDAs
can be different in terms of connectivity and density configuration settings. Additionally, the MDA
modules vary by chassis. Regardless, they provide the same functionality and security for the related
chassis. MDAs support ethernet and multiservice interfaces. For this evaluation, the following Table 5 lists
the TOE platforms and their compatible MDA card, in addition to the MACsec PHY:
Table 5 – MDA and MACsec cards used in the TOE's MACsec capable appliances
TOE platforms MACsec card
MACsec embedded (network processor)
PHY (ethernet PHY framer)
7750 SR-1se CPM ms36-800g-qsfpdd
Nokia E5
7750 SR-1-48D CPM m48-400g-qsfpdd-1
7750 SR-1x-92S CPM m80-200g-sfpdd+12-800g-qsfpdd-1x
9
TOE platforms MACsec card
MACsec embedded (network processor)
PHY (ethernet PHY framer)
7750 SR-1-92S CPM m80-200g-sfpdd+12-400g-qsfpdd-1
7750 SR-1-24D CPM m24-800g-qsfpdd-1
7750 SR-1x-48D CPM m48-800g-qsfpdd-1x
7750 SR-1-46S CPM m40-200g-sfpdd+6-800g-qsfpdd-1
7750 SR-2se CPM
x2-s36-800g-qsfpdd-18.0t
Nokia E5
x2-s18-800g-qsfpdd
x2-s36-800g-qsfpdd-12.0t
mse24-200g-sfpdd
mse6-800g-cfp2-dco
mse14-800g+4-400g
m36-800g-qsfpdd
mse6-800g-qsfpdd
m36-400g-qsfp112
7250 IXR-R6d/R6dl CPIOM
m20-10g-sfp+ VSC8258
m18-25g-sfp28 BCM81392 and BCM81394
m1-400g-qsfpdd+1-100g-qsfp28 BCM81343
m46-10g-sfp+ VSC8258
m2-cfp2 BCM81343
m32-1g-csfp VSC8584
m80-1g-csfp VSC8584
m2-100g-qsfp28+16-10g-sfp+ BCM81392 and VSC8258
7750 SR-14s/7s CPM-s v2
(SR-s CPM-2S)
x2-s36-800g-qsfpdd-18.0t
Nokia E5
x2-s18-800g-qsfpdd
x2-s36-800g-qsfpdd-12.0t
ms16-sdd+4-qsfp28-b BCM81343
ms8-sdd+2-qsfp28-b BCM81343
mse24-200g-sfpdd
Nokia E5
mse6-800g-cfp2-dco
10
TOE platforms MACsec card
MACsec embedded (network processor)
PHY (ethernet PHY framer)
mse14-800g+4-400g
m36-800g-qsfpdd
mse6-800g-qsfpdd
m36-400g-qsfp112
7750 SR-2s CPM
ms16-sdd+4-qsfp28-b BCM81343
ms8-sdd+2-qsfp28-b BCM81343
7750 SR-7 & SR-12 & SR-12e
SR CPM5
me16-25gb-sfp28+2-100gb-qsfp-b BCM81343
7750 SR-1 CPM me16-25gb-sfp28+2-100gb-qsfp-b BCM81343
7250 IXR-R6 CPIOM
m10-10g-sfp+ VSC8258
m20-1g-csfp VSC8584
m6-10g-sfp++1-100g-qsfp28 BCM82399 and VSC8258
m4-10g-sfp++1-100g-cfp2 BCM82399 and VSC8258
m6-10g-sfp++4-25g-sfp28 BCM82399 and VSC8258
7250 IXR-R4 CPM
m10-10g-sfp+ VSC8258
m20-1g-csfp VSC8584
m6-10g-sfp++1-100g-qsfp28 BCM82399 and VSC8258
m4-10g-sfp++1-100g-cfp2 BCM82399 and VSC8258
m6-10g-sfp++4-25g-sfp28 BCM82399 and VSC8258
7250 IXR-e CPM (small) m14-10g-sfp++4-1g-tx VSC8490
Some TOE models, such as the 7250 IXR-R4 and 7250 IXR-R6, can be equipped with an MDA that includes
two types of MACsec PHYs. These MDAs use both PHYs to handle MACsec protocols, resulting in certain
ports on the MDA card using different PHYs for MACsec traffic encryption.
The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol uses the Connectivity Association Key (CAK) to derive a Key
Encryption Key (KEK), which secures the distribution of transient session keys called Secure Association
Keys (SAKs). SAKs and other MKA parameters are required to sustain communication over secure channel
and to perform encryption and other MACsec security functions. SAKs, along with other essential control
information, are distributed in MKA protocol control packets, also referred to as MKPDUs. MACsec can be
deployed in two modes:
• Point-to-point mode
• Multipoint-to-multipoint mode
11
In the evaluated configuration, MACsec is configured individually on a point-to-point Ethernet link. A pair
of MACsec devices can be connected via bridge or a direct connection. To enable secure MACsec
communication, devices use the pre-shared Connectivity Association Key (CAK) to authenticate each other
and execute the MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol. MKA negotiates and distributes transient Secure
Association Keys (SAKs), which are then used to encrypt/decrypt data traffic over the MACsec-secured
channel.
In order to determine an authorized peer, both devices must first exchange an MKA frame, and these
devices must agree upon a shared key and MACsec cipher suite in order to set up both receive and
transmit Security Associations (SA). Once the connections are established, the MACsec frames will be
transmitted between devices. Error! Reference source not found. depicts the TOE boundary.
Figure 1 – TOE Boundary Diagram
3.2 TOE Evaluated Configuration
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE consists of the platforms as stated in Section 3.1. The TOE
supports secure connectivity with other IT environment devices as stated in Table 6.
Table 6– IT Environment Components
Components Required
(Y/N)
Protocols
used
Usage
Audit server Yes
TLS The audit server supports Syslog over TLS v1.2 to receive audit
events securely from the TOE.
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Components Required
(Y/N)
Protocols
used
Usage
LDAP server Yes TLS This server will provide the authentication mechanism to
authenticate users.
RADIUS Server Yes TLS This server will provide the authentication mechanism to
authenticate users.
MACsec peer Yes MACsec This peer is required to test MACsec functionality.
Management
workstation with
console access/SSH
client
Yes CLI-SSH
This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with
console access and an SSH client.
Certificate Authority
server
Yes HTTP The Certificate Authority server is used for issuing, generation
and management of X509 certificates to be used with the TOE.
3.3 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE boundary is the hardware appliance, which is comprised of hardware and software components.
The software component is SROS v24.10.R3 running on TiMOS SMP v2.5 and using the SR Crypto Module
(SRCM) version 5.0. It is deployed in an environment that contains the various IT components as depicted
in Figure 1 above. SROS version 24.10.R3 is a software that includes various router applications, the SR
Cryptographic Module (SRCM) and the TiMOS SMP Kernel. The TiMOS SMP Kernel serves as the main
interface between the router’s physical hardware and the router’s applications running on it. The kernel
enables multiple applications to share hardware resources by providing access to CPU, memory, mass
storage and networking.
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4 Security Policy
4.1 Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE implements the following security functional requirements:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
Each of these security functionalities are listed in more detail in the sections below.
4.1.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions and all auditable events as
specified in Table 20 of the ST. Audit events are also generated for management actions specified in
FAU_GEN.1. The TOE is capable of storing audit events locally and exporting them to an external audit
server using Syslog protocol over TLS v1.2 protocol. The TOE uses the Syslog protocol over TLS to transmit
audit events in real-time, as they are generated, to an external audit server. Each audit record includes
the date and time of the event, the event type, the identity of the subject, and any relevant event data.
4.1.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic support for the services described in the tables below. The related CAVP
validation details are provided in Table 7. The operating system is SROS version 24.10.R3 running on
TiMOS SMP version 2.5. The TOE leverages Nokia SR Cryptographic Module (SRCM) version 5 which is
based on OpenSSL v3.1 library and incorporates the FIPS module 3.1.6-nokia.1.0 as its FIPS provider, to
provide its cryptographic functionality.
Table 7: TOE’s CAVP Algorithm references
SFRs Algorithm in ST Implementation
Name
CAVP Alg CAVP Cert
FCS_CKM.1 RSA schemes using
cryptographic key sizes of [2048,
3072 and 4096 bits] that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.3 or FIPS PUB
186-5, "Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)", A.1.
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5455
ECC schemes using ‘NIST curves’
[P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4,
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5455
14
“Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.4, or FIPS
PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Appendix A.2,
or ISO/IEC 14888-3, “IT Security
techniques - Digital signatures
with appendix - Part 3: Discrete
logarithm based mechanisms”,
Section 6.6.
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’
groups that meet the following:
“NIST Special Publication 800-
56A Revision 3,
Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” and [RFC 3526]
Lab tested using
known good
implementation
No NIST CAVP, CCTL
has performed all
assurance/evaluation
activities and
documented in the
ETR and AAR
accordingly.
FCS_CKM.2 RSA-based key establishment
schemes that meet the
following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC
8017, “Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.2”
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
Lab tested using
known good
implementation
No NIST CAVP, CCTL
has performed all
assurance/evaluation
activities and
documented in the
ETR and AAR
accordingly.
Elliptic curve-based key
establishment schemes that
meet the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography”
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A5455
FFC Schemes using “safe-prime”
groups that meet the following:
‘NIST Special Publication 800-
56A Revision 3,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” and [groups
listed in RFC 3526]
Lab tested using
known good
implementation
No NIST CAVP, CCTL
has performed all
assurance/evaluation
activities and
documented in the
ETR and AAR
accordingly.
FCS_COP.1/
DataEncryption
GCM mode and cryptographic
key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that
meet: AES as specified in ISO
18033-3 and GCM as specified in
ISO 19772
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
AES-GCM A5455
15
CBC mode and cryptographic
key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that
meet: AES as specified in ISO
18033-3, CBC as specified in ISO
10116.
AES-CBC
CTR mode and cryptographic
key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that
meet: AES as specified in ISO
18033-3, and CTR as specified in
ISO 10116.
AES-CTR
FCS_COP.1/
SigGen
RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
using key sizes of 2048, 3072
and 4096 bits that meets FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5,
using PKCS #1 v2.1 or FIPS PUB
186-5, "Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)", Section 5.4
using PKCS #1 v2.2 Signature
Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or
RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC
9796-2, Digital signature
scheme 2 or Digital Signature
scheme 3
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5455
ECDSA schemes implementing
[P-256, P-384, P-521] curves
that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing
“NIST Recommended" curves ;
or FIPS PUB 186-5, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)",
Section 6 and NIST SP 800-186
Section 3.2.1, Implementing
Weierstrass curves; or ISO/IEC
14888-3, "IT Security techniques
- Digital signatures with
appendix - Part 3: Discrete
logarithm based mechanisms",
Section 6.6.
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
FCS_COP.1/
Hash
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512 and message digest
sizes 160, 256, 384 and 512 bits
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
SHA-1
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
A5455
16
FCS_COP.1/
KeyedHash
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-
512 with key sizes 160 bits, 256
bits, 384 bits, 512 bits and
message digest 160, 256, 384,
512 bits that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7
“MAC Algorithm 2”
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
HMAC-SHA2-
384
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A5455
FCS_COP.1/
CMAC
keyed-hash message
authentication with AES-CMAC
and key sizes 128, 256 bits and
message digest size of 128 bits
that meets: NIST SP 800-38B.
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
AES-CMAC A5455
FCS_COP.1/
MACSEC
Encryption and decryption in
accordance with AES used in
AES Key Wrap and key sizes 128
, 256 bits that meets AES as
specified in ISO 18033-3, AES
Key Wrap as specified in NIST
SP 800-38F.
Encryption and decryption in
accordance with GCM and key
sizes 128 , 256 bits that meets
AES as specified in ISO 18033-3,
GCM as specified in ISO 19772.
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
AES-KW
AES-GCM
A5455
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG (AES) in accordance
with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 with a
minimum of 256-bits
Nokia SR
Cryptographic
Module (SRCM)
version 5.0
Counter DRBG A5455
The Broadcom PHY BCM81394 integrates two BCM81392 dies. As a result, each BCM81392 supports half
the data rate per channel on the system side and half the number of 100G/10G ports. Additionally, PHY
chips from Broadcom, Microsemi (now part of Microchip), and Nokia’s E5 series are used to perform AES-
GCM encryption and decryption for the MACsec protocol. These PHYs have undergone CAVP testing by
NIST to validate their cryptographic compliance.
Table 8: MACsec PHYs CAVP Algorithm Testing References
Cryptographic
Algorithms
CAVPS Implementation Library PHY devices Operational Environment (OE)
AES-GCM AES 3969 Microsemi Intellisec 10G PHY VSC8258 Microsemi Intellisec 10G PHY
AES 3191 Vitesse Intellisec 10G PHY VSC8258 Vitesse Intellisec 10G PHY
AES 3504 Microsemi Intellisec 1G PHY VSC85xx Microsemi Intellisec 1G PHY
17
Cryptographic
Algorithms
CAVPS Implementation Library PHY devices Operational Environment (OE)
AES 2781 Vitesse Intellisec 10G PHY VSC8490/91 Mentor Graphics Questasim 10.0d
AES 4545 AES ECB 128bit & 256bit
Encryption/Decryption Engine
BCM82396,
BCM59202,
BCM82399
AES ECB 128bit & 256bit
Encryption/Decryption Engine
C1877 AES ECB 128bit & 256bit
Encryption/Decryption Engine
BCM81343,
BCM81392,
BCM81394,
BCM81398
AES ECB 128bit & 256bit
Encryption/Decryption Engine
A5786 400G MACsec
Encryption/Decryption Engine
on Nokia E5
Nokia E5 Synopsys VCS 2023.03-SP2
4.1.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports Role Based Access Control. All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior to carrying
out any management actions. The TOE supports password-based authentication and public key-based
authentication. Based on the assigned role, a user is granted a set of privileges to access the system.
4.1.4 Security Management
The TOE supports local and remote management of its security functions including:
• Ability to administer the TOE remotely
• Ability to configure the access banner
• Ability to configure the remote session inactivity time before session termination
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to
installing those updates
• Ability to configure local audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to
behaviour when local audit storage space is full; changes to local audit storage size)
• Ability to modify the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity
• Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality
• Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying
• Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps
• Ability to manage the cryptographic keys
• Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors
• Ability to generate Certificate Signing Request (CSR) and process CA certificate response
• Ability to administer the TOE locally
• Ability to configure the local session inactivity time before session termination or locking
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1
• Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
• Ability to configure the list of supported (D)TLS ciphers;
18
• Manage a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device
• Manage the key server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants [as specified in IEEE
802.1X-2020, Sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaParticipant Entry) and
section 12.2 (cf. function createMKA()]
• Specify the lifetime of a CAK
• Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using [[CLI management command]]
• Manage generation of a PSK-based CAK
4.1.5 TOE Access
Prior to establishing an administration session with the TOE, a banner is displayed to the user. The banner
messaging is customizable. The TOE will terminate an interactive session after configurable number of
minutes of session inactivity. A user can terminate their local CLI session and remote CLI session by
entering the appropriate command at the prompt.
4.1.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from unauthorized
disclosure. Pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys are stored in encrypted format. Passwords
are stored as a non-reversible hash value generated using a configurable hash function. The TOE executes
self-tests during initial start-up to ensure correct operation and enforcement of its security functions. An
administrator can install software updates to the TOE. The TOE internally maintains the date and time.
4.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports syslog protocol over TLS v1.2 for secure communication to the audit server. The TOE
supports TLS v1.2 for secure communication to LDAP and Radius servers for authentication. The TOE
supports local CLI and uses SSH v2 for secure remote administration.
19
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023 [MOD_MACsec_V1.0]
• Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_V1.0]
That information has not been reproduced here and the CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/
PKG_SSH_V1.0 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0 as described for this TOE in the ST. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0 and performed by the Evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this document,
and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guides identified in Section 6, additional customer documentation for the
specific TOE models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be
relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified
in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0 and applicable Technical Decisions.
Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
20
6 Documentation
The following document was provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms Common Criteria Supplement Guide,
Version 0.7, August 22, 2025
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the
Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guide
from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online, was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
21
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE models and evaluated configuration can be found in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this report.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following interfaces are not included as part of the evaluated configuration:
o NTP server
o gRPC is disabled
o telnet is disabled
o MPLS is not evaluated
o SNMP is not evaluated
o Netconf is not evaluated
22
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in the following proprietary document:
• Evaluation Technical Report for Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms,
Version 0.6, August 25, 2025
A non-proprietary summary of the assurance activities is provided in the following document:
• Assurance Activity Report for Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms,
Version 0.7, August 28, 2025
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance documentation and
ran the tests specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0. The Independent
Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
23
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR. The reader of this
document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 Rev.5
and CEM version 3.1 Rev.5. The Evaluation team determined the Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS
24.10.R3, MACsec platforms to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally,
the Evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP/MOD/PKG.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements
claimed to be met by the Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST and
Guidance document. Additionally, the Evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0 related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team
was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the
user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the Evaluation team ensured
the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All the
guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0 related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
24
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team
was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the TOE was
identified.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests specified
by the Assurance Activities in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the Evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the proprietary
Vulnerability Analysis Report prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search
for vulnerabilities.
• The Evaluation team performed a search of the following public vulnerability databases:
• https://nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln.search
• http://cve.mitre.org/cve
• https://www.cisa.gov
• https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/
The Evaluation team performed vulnerability searches using the following key words. The search was
performed on August 29, 2025:
• 7750 SR-1 (FP4), 7750 SR-1-24D, 7750 SR-1-48D, 7750 SR-1-46S, 7750 SR-1-92S, 7750 SR-1x-48D,
7750 SR-1x-92S, 7750 SR-1se CPM, 7750 SR-2se CPM-2se, 7750 SR-2s CPM, 7750 SR-14s/7s CPM-
s v2 (SR-s CPM-2S), 7750 SR-7/SR-12/SR-12e SR CPM5
• 7250 IXR-R6d/dl CPIOM, 7250 IXR-e CPM (Small), 7250 IXR-R4 CPM, 7250 IXR-R6 CPIOM
• Nokia SR OS, Nokia SR OS 24.10.R3
• TiMOS SMP version 2.5
• Nokia SR Cryptographic Module (SRCM) version 5
• Broadcom BCM82399, Broadcom BCM81392, Broadcom BCM81394, Broadcom BCM81343
25
• Microsemi VSC8258, Microsemi VSC8490, Microsemi VSC8584
• Nokia E5
• Marvell OCTEON II CN6645 (MIPS64), Marvell OCTEON III CN7340 (MIPS64) , Marvell OCTEON III
CN7360 (MIPS64), Marvell OCTEON III CN7890 (MIPS64)
• AMD EPYC3251 (ZEN), AMD EPYC3255 (ZEN)
• Intel Atom C3708 (Goldmont)
• OpenSSL 3.1.7
• OpenSSH 8.9
The Evaluation team conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities
exist that are exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in
accordance with the guidance in the CEM.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team
was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met. Additionally, the Evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in
the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, performed the Assurance Activities
in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_MACsec_V1.0/PKG_SSH_V1.0, and correctly verified that the product meets
the claims in the ST.
26
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the instructions in the Guidance document defined in Section 6. No other versions of the TOE and
software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
The evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the
ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionalities provided by devices in the operational environment need to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. Specifically, Section 7.2 defines functionality
that was excluded from or not allowed in the evaluated configuration.
Per NIAP Scheme Policy Letter #22, user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security patches is
encouraged between completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance Date; with such
updates properly installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in its evaluated configuration.
27
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
28
12 Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is the Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms
Security Target, Version 1.2, August 22, 2025.
29
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is
correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation
Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence
suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer
by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
30
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and general
model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, 2023-03-29
6. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, December 06, 2023
7. PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, March 2, 2023
8. Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, May 13, 2021
9. Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms Security Target, Version 1.2, August
22, 2025
10. Assurance Activity Report for Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms,
Version 0.7, August 28, 2025
11. Evaluation Technical Report for Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms,
Version 0.6, August 25, 2025
12. Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms Common Criteria Supplement Guide,
Version 0.7, August 22, 2025
13. Vulnerability Assessment for Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24.10.R3, MACsec platforms,
Version 0.6, August 29, 2025
14. Test Plan for Nokia 7250 IXR-E CPM (small), Version 1.2, August 25, 2025
15. Test Plan for Nokia 7250 IXR-R4 CPM, Version 1.2, August 25, 2025
16. Test Plan for Nokia 7750 SR1-58D, Version 1.2, August 25, 2025
17. Nokia 7750 SR & 7250 IXR, SROS 24,10.R3, MACsec platforms Equivalency Analysis Report, Version
1.5, July 11, 2025