National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
KeyW Corporation
KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version
1.2.1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11061-2020
Dated: June 9, 2020
Version: 0.4
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
KeyW Protect for Samsung Validation Report Version 0.4, June 9, 2020
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
John Butterworth
Jenn Dotson
Patrick Mallett
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 2
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ......................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................... 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries.................................................................................................. 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Cryptographic support .............................................................................................. 4
4.2 User data protection .................................................................................................. 4
4.3 Identification and authentication............................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management................................................................................................ 5
4.5 Privacy ...................................................................................................................... 5
4.6 Protection of the TSF................................................................................................ 5
4.7 Trusted path/channels ............................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 5
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 6
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 6
8.1 Developer Testing..................................................................................................... 7
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ..................................................................... 7
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 7
10 Results of the Evaluation ........................................................................................ 7
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)................................................................ 7
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) .................................................................. 7
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ..................................................... 8
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)......................................... 8
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ..................... 8
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)............................................................. 8
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.............................................................................. 9
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations ................................................................ 9
12 Annexes................................................................................................................... 9
13 Security Target...................................................................................................... 10
14 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 10
15 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 10
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation Team of the evaluation of KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0
solution provided by KeyW Corporation. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement
of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in June 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019 (PP_APP_V1.3)
with PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (MOD_FE_V1.0).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation Team monitored the activities of the Evaluation Team, provided guidance
on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation Team found that the evaluation showed
that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements
stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation Team concludes that the
testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance
results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the KeyW Protect for
Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0 (PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0) Security Target, Version 0.4,
06/04/2020 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0
PP-Configuration
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
PP-Configuration for Application Software and File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25
July 2019
ST KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0 (PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0)
Security Target, Version 0.4, 06/04/2020
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0,
Version 0.3, June 4, 2020
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
Developer KeyW Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant, John Butterworth, Jenn Dotson, Patrick Mallett
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The KeyW Protect for Samsung application (i.e., the TOE) is a file encryption tool that
runs on a Samsung mobile device with Android OS 9.0, Knox 3.3 and DualDAR 1.0. The
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Samsung Knox DualDAR API is used to relay all file operations within the Android
Enterprise workspace to the TOE, which encrypts or decrypts the file contents
automatically. The TOE is a headless Android OS Suite B Data-At-Rest (DAR) encryption
application on the Samsung mobile device, which is designed to auto-run and register at
mobile device startup for protection of files that reside within the Android Enterprise
workspace. Therefore, the Android operating system will ensure that the mobile device
features are available only when the TOE is running.
The TOE utilizes the Android OS 9.0 for storage of keys while the TOE includes the Suite
B Cryptographic Algorithms library, which implements its own random bit generation,
AES encryption/decryption, AES key wrapping, keyed-hashing functions, password-based
key derivation, key pair generation, key establishment and cryptographic hashing, which
have been certified through CAVP.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The KeyW Protect for Samsung 1.2.1.0 TOE is also known as KEYWprotect. The
following table shows the model numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation
testing of KEYWprotect:
Device Name Model
Number
CPU Android
Version
Samsung Galaxy S10e SM-G970 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy S10e SM-G970 Samsung Exynos 9820 Android 9.0
Table 1 - Tested Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent
since they have the same processors and run the same KEYWprotect software.
Device Name Model
Number
CPU Android
Version
Samsung Galaxy S10 SM-G973 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy S10 SM-G973 Samsung Exynos 9820 Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy S10+ SM-G975 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy S10+ SM-G975 Samsung Exynos 9820 Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy S10 5G SM-G977 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy S10 5G SM-G977 Samsung Exynos 9820 Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy Note10 SM-N970 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy Note10 5G SM-N971 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy Note10+ SM-N975 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy Note10+ 5G SM-N976 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy A90 5G SM-A908 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy Fold SM-F900 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Galaxy Fold 5G SM-F907 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Tab S6 (Wi-Fi) SM-T860 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Samsung Tab S6 (LTE) SM-T865 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Table 2 - Equivalent Devices
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3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is an application that is installed as a required headless application when the
Samsung mobile device is activated for Android Enterprise for use. Being a required
application, the Android OS 9.0 platform with Knox 3.3 and DualDAR 1.0 ensures that the
TOE is running prior to presenting the home screen to the user, and prevents all actions,
which could uninstall the application. The TOE provides its own cryptographic
functionality via the existing Suite B Cryptographic Module, which has been FIPS-
validated through CAVP and CMVP certifications.
When the Android Enterprise workspace is unlocked, all workspace data created by other
applications is automatically encrypted by the TOE and stored in the workspace file system
via the Samsung Knox DualDAR API. Therefore, no clear text version of the file is ever
created on the workspace file system.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the physical perimeter of the evaluated device
(Samsung mobile device with Android OS 9.0, Knox 3.3 and DualDAR 1.0) on which the
TOE resides.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Privacy
6. Protection of the TSF
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE operates on a Samsung mobile device and uses features provided by the platform
for key storage. The TOE includes the Suite B Cryptographic Algorithms library, which
implements its own algorithms for random bit generation, AES encryption/decryption, AES
key wrapping, keyed-hashing functions, password-based Key Derivation, key pair
generation, key establishment and cryptographic hashing.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE protects user data by providing an integrated file encryption capability that
automatically encrypts new files and decrypts files upon user demand. The TOE utilizes
256-bit AES encryption for confidentiality.
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4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE authenticates a user by requiring a password before any file data decryption
operation is initiated. Without the correct password, the user is unable to decrypt the keys
necessary to obtain clear text data from the Android Enterprise workspace file system.
4.4 Security management
The TOE does not allow encryption/decryption operations while in the locked state until
the user authenticates to the device upon first use of the TOE. The TOE allows the
following user management capabilities:
 Change workspace password.
 Reset workspace password using a reset token from the Unified Endpoint
Management (UEM) console. Samsung Knox DualDAR by default does not
disable reset passwords thereby enabling key recovery. To disable all key
recovery mechanisms simply do not set a password using a token, which will
prevent a password reset from the IT admin.
 Configure password/passphrase complexity settings including the minimum and
maximum lengths.
 Perform a cryptographic erase of the data.
 Configure the corrective behavior (wipe/disable workspace) and number of
failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective behavior.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network
interfaces, nor does it request access to any applications that may contain such information.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE relies on the physical boundary of the evaluated platform as well as the Android
9.0 operating system for the protection of the TOE’s application components.
Updates to the TOE are handled via the UEM console.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE does not transmit any data between itself and another network entity. All of the
data managed by the TOE resides on the evaluated platform (Samsung mobile device with
Android OS 9.0, Knox 3.3, and DualDAR 1.0).
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
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 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019
(PP_APP_V1.3) with PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019
(MOD_FE_V1.0)
That information has not been reproduced here and the PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 and performed by the
Evaluation Team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
7 Documentation
The following document was available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Android OS Suite B Data At Rest v1.2.1.0 – User Guide, Document Version 1.3,
05/19/2020
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for KeyW
Protect for Samsung, Version 0.2, May 19, 2020 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation
Assurance Activity Report.
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8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation Team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 including the
tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 and 3.4.1, lists the
tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
9 Evaluated Configuration
See Section 3.1.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the KeyW
Protect for Samsung TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation Team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the
ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a
statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the KeyW Protect for Samsung
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation Team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF
provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the
Evaluation Team performed the assurance activities specified in the
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PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 related to the examination of the information contained in
the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation Team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team ensured
the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the Evaluation Team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation Team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team found that
the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation Team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation Team ran the set
of tests specified by the assurance activities in the PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation Team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The evaluator searched the
National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search), Vulnerability
Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 5/15/2020 with the following search
terms: "KeyW Protect", "KeyWProtect", "KeyW", "libKEYWcrypto", "libKEYWprotect",
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"Samsung DualDaR", "DualDaR", "Knox", "containercore", “Suite B Cryptographic
Algorithms”. No residual vulnerabilities exist in the TOE.
Additionally, the evaluator installed the Avast Mobile Security antivirus app on each TOE
device, checked to ensure the definitions were current, and ran a scan on each device. In
each case no issues were identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation Team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation Team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation Team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation Team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation Team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation Team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation Team is that
it demonstrates that the Evaluation Team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the installation
guidance to ensure the product is placed into the evaluated configuration.
As was noted in the Clarification of Scope section of this report, the product provides more
functionality than was covered by the evaluation. Only the functionality claimed in the
SFR’s in the Security Target, on the supported devices described in section 3.1, was
evaluated. All other functionality provided by the product needs to be assessed separately
and no further conclusions should be drawn as to effectiveness, nor can any claims be made
relative to their security based upon this evaluation.
Note: Per the information in Section 2 of the TOE’s guidance documentation (Android
OS Suite B Data At Rest v1.2.1.0 – User Guide), the following Blackberry products are
required for operating and managing the TOE in the evaluated configuration:
1. Blackberry Unified Endpoint Manager 12.12.1 (Service Pack 12 Maintenance
Release 1)
2. Blackberry Unified Endpoint Manager Client 12.36.1.156359
12 Annexes
Not applicable
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13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0
(PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0) Security Target, Version 0.4, 06/04/2020.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
KeyW Protect for Samsung Validation Report Version 0.4, June 9, 2020
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[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019
(PP_APP_V1.3) with PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019
(MOD_FE_V1.0).
[5] KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0 (PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0)
Security Target, Version 0.4, 06/04/2020 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (PP_APP_V1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0) for KeyW Protect for
Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0, Version 0.3, June 4, 2020 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report for KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 0.2, May 19, 2020
(DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for KeyW Protect for Samsung, Version 1.2.1.0,
Version 0.3, June 4, 2020 (ETR).