Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale
Schema nazionale per la valutazione e la certificazione della sicurezza nel settore della tecnologia
dell'informazione (DPCM del 30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004)
Il prodotto identificato in questo certificato è risultato conforme ai requisiti
ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria (CC) CC:2022 Release 1
Certificato n.
(Certificate No.)
10/2026
Rapporto di Certificazione
(Certification Report)
OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC, v1.0
Decorrenza
(Date of 1st
Issue)
13 febbraio 2026
Nome e Versione del Prodotto
(Product Name and Version)
Holley’s Smart Meters: model DDSD285/DDSY283SR
version D285WI0036002503:20-X33-11VS1.0, model
DTSD545/DTSY541 version D545WI0036002503:20-
X042-11V1.1
Sviluppatore
(Developer)
Holley Technology Ltd.
Tipo di Prodotto
(Type of Product)
Altre categorie – Smart meter
Livello di Garanzia
(Assurance Level)
EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.3) conforme a CC Parte 3
Conformità a PP
(PP Conformance)
Nessuna
Funzionalità di sicurezza
(Conformance of Functionality)
TDS specifico per il prodotto, CC Parte 2 estesa
Riconoscimento CCRA per componenti
fino a EAL2 e solo ALC_FLR
(CCRA recognition for components up to
EAL2 and ALC_FLR only)
Riconoscimento SOGIS MRA
per componenti fino a EAL4
(SOGIS MRA recognition
for components up to EAL4)
Roma, 13 febbraio 2026 Il Capo Servizio
Certificazione e Vigilanza
(A. Billet)
[ORIGINAL SIGNED]
Il prodotto IT (Information Technology) identificato nel presente certificato è stato valutato
presso un LVS (Laboratorio per la Valutazione della Sicurezza) accreditato e
abilitato/approvato utilizzando la Metodologia Comune per la Valutazione di Sicurezza
della Tecnologia dell’Informazione CEM:2022 revisione 1 per la conformità ai Criteri
Comuni per la Valutazione di Sicurezza della Tecnologia dell’Informazione CC:2022
revisione 1. Questo certificato si applica solo alla versione e al rilascio specifici del prodotto
nella sua configurazione valutata e unitamente al Rapporto di certificazione completo. La
valutazione è stata condotta in conformità alle disposizioni dello Schema nazionale per la
valutazione e la certificazione della sicurezza nel settore della tecnologia dell'informazione
(DPCM del 30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004) e le conclusioni dell’LVS nel
Rapporto di Fine Valutazione sono coerenti con le evidenze addotte. Il presente Certificato
non costituisce un sostegno o promozione del prodotto IT da parte della Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale o di qualsiasi altra organizzazione che riconosca o dia effetto a
questo certificato, e nessuna garanzia del prodotto IT, da parte della Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale o di qualsiasi altra organizzazione che riconosce o dà effetto a
questo certificato, è espressa o implicita.
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and
licensed/approved evaluation facility using Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation CEM:2022 release 1 for conformance to Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation CC:2022 release 1. This certificate applies only to the specific
version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete
Certification report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
National scheme for the evaluation and certification of the security in the sector of information
technology (Prime Ministerial Decree of 30 October 2003 - Official Journal no. 93 of 27 April 2004)
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product, by Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale or by
any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or
implied.
Page 1 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale
Servizio Certificazione e Vigilanza
Certification Report
Holley’s Smart Meters: model
DDSD285/DDSY283SR version
D285WI0036002503:20-X33-11VS1.0, model
DTSD545/DTSY541 version
D545WI0036002503:20-X042-11V1.1
OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC
Version 1.0
13 February 2026
Page 2 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
Courtesy translation
Disclaimer: This English language translation is provided for informational purposes only. It is not
intended to substitute the official document and has no legal value. The original Italian language
version of the document is the only approved and official version.
Page 3 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
1 Document revisions
Version Author Information Date
1.0 OCSI First issue 13/02/2026
Page 4 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
2 Table of contents
1 Document revisions ....................................................................................................................3
2 Table of contents ........................................................................................................................4
3 Acronyms....................................................................................................................................6
3.1 National scheme.................................................................................................................6
3.2 CC and CEM......................................................................................................................6
3.3 Other acronyms..................................................................................................................6
4 References ..................................................................................................................................8
4.1 Normative references and national Scheme documents ....................................................8
4.2 Technical documents .........................................................................................................8
5 Recognition of the certificate ...................................................................................................10
5.1 European recognition of CC certificates (SOGIS-MRA)................................................10
5.2 International recognition of CC certificates (CCRA)......................................................10
6 Statement of certification..........................................................................................................11
7 Summary of the evaluation.......................................................................................................12
7.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................12
7.2 Executive summary .........................................................................................................12
7.3 Evaluated product ............................................................................................................12
7.3.1 TOE architecture ........................................................................................................13
7.3.2 TOE security features.................................................................................................17
7.4 Documentation.................................................................................................................20
7.5 Protection Profile conformance claims............................................................................20
7.6 Functional and assurance requirements...........................................................................20
7.7 Evaluation conduct ..........................................................................................................20
7.8 General considerations about the certification validity ...................................................21
8 Evaluation outcome..................................................................................................................22
8.1 Evaluation results.............................................................................................................22
8.2 Recommendations............................................................................................................23
9 Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product......................................................24
9.1 TOE delivery ...................................................................................................................24
9.2 Installation, configuration and secure usage of the TOE.................................................24
10 Annex B – Evaluated configuration .........................................................................................25
10.1 TOE operational environment .........................................................................................25
11 Annex C – Test activity............................................................................................................27
Page 5 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
11.1 Test configuration............................................................................................................27
11.2 Functional tests performed by the Developer..................................................................27
11.2.1 Testing approach ........................................................................................................27
11.2.2 Test coverage..............................................................................................................27
11.2.3 Test results..................................................................................................................27
11.3 Functional and independent tests performed by the Evaluators ......................................27
11.3.1 Test approach .............................................................................................................27
11.3.2 Test results..................................................................................................................28
11.4 Vulnerability analysis and penetration tests ....................................................................28
Page 6 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
3 Acronyms
3.1 National scheme
DPCM Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri
LGP Linea Guida Provvisoria
LVS Laboratorio per la Valutazione della Sicurezza
NIS Nota Informativa dello Schema
OCSI Organismo di Certificazione della Sicurezza Informatica
3.2 CC and CEM
CC Common Criteria
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOGIS-MRA Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security – Mutual Recognition
Agreement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
3.3 Other acronyms
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FAN Field Area Network
Page 7 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
HDLC High-Level Data Link Control
HES Head End System
HLMCS Holley Meter Communication System
LMN Local Management Network
NMS Network Management System
PCB Printed Circuit Board
Wi-SUN Wireless Smart Utility Network
Page 8 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
4 References
4.1 Normative references and national Scheme documents
[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-
11-001
[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-002
[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-003
[CC4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 4: Framework
for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, November 2022, CC:2022
Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-004
[CC5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 5: Pre-defined
packages of security requirements, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-
2022-11-005
[CCRA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates In the field of
Information Technology Security, July 2014
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-006
[NIS1] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 1/23 – Modifiche alla LGP1, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS2] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 2/23 – Modifiche alla LGP2, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS3] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 3/23 – Modifiche alla LGP3, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS4] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 3/23 – Gestione nel tempo delle garanzie di prodotti certificati, versione
1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[SOGIS] Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation
Certificates, Version 3, January 2010
4.2 Technical documents
[AGD] Holley Technology Ltd, Holley's Smart Meters: DDSD285, DDSY283SR,
DTSD545 and DTSY541 AGD Documentation, Version 1.6, 2026-01-21
Page 9 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
[ETRv2] Evaluation of Holley's Smart Meters: DDSD285, DDSY283SR, DTSD545 and
DTSY541, WONSECEVSM-029_ETR_v2, CCLab – The Agile Cybersecurity
Laboratory, Version: v2, 7 November 2025
[ETRv4] Evaluation of Holley's Smart Meters: DDSD285, DDSY283SR, DTSD545 and
DTSY541, WONSECEVSM-029_ETR_v4, CCLab – The Agile Cybersecurity
Laboratory, Version: v4, 23 January 2026
[PP] Protection Profile for Smart Meter Minimum Security requirements,
CEN/CLC/ETSI_SMCG/Sec/00156/DC, Version 1.0, 2019-10-30
[ST] Holley Technology Ltd, Holley's Smart Meters: DDSD285, DDSY283SR,
DTSD545 and DTSY541 Security Target, Version 1.9, 2026-01-21
Page 10 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
5 Recognition of the certificate
5.1 European recognition of CC certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA, version 3 [SOGIS]) became
effective in April 2010 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria
(CC) Evaluation Assurance Level up to and including EAL4 for all IT -Products. A higher recognition
level for evaluations beyond EAL4 is provided for IT -Products related to specific Technical Domains
only.
The current list of signatory nations and of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies
and other details can be found on https://www.sogis.eu/.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by signatory nations.
This certificate is recognised under SOGIS-MRA for all claimed assurance components up to EAL4.
5.2 International recognition of CC certificates (CCRA)
The current version of the international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based
on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, [CCRA] was ratified on 08 September 2014.
It covers CC certificates compliant with collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP), up to and including
EAL4, or certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL2, with the possible
augmentation of Flaw Remediation family (ALC_FLR).
The current list of signatory nations and of collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) and other details
can be found on https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
The CCRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by signatory nations.
This certificate is recognised under CCRA for all claimed assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR only.
Page 11 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
6 Statement of certification
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the “Holley’s Smart Meters: model DDSD285/DDSY283SR
version D285WI0036002503:20-X33-11VS1.0, model DTSD545/DTSY541 version
D545WI0036002503:20-X042-11V1.1”, in the following also referred to as “Holley’s Smart
Meters: DDSD285, DDSY283SR, DTSD545 and DTSY541”, developed by Holley Technology
Ltd.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are smart meters, which are devices for measuring and recording
energy consumption, widely used in residential electricity, commercial electricity and industrial
fields. Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters not only have traditional energy metering
functions, but also integrate a variety of advanced functions, such as data storage, event monitoring,
rate management, remote Wi-SUN communication, local Optical Port and RS485 communication.
The Developer clarified that out of four smart meters in the TOE name, the TOE comprises actually
two distinct smart meters (ref. section 1.3 of [ST]). Namely, for business purposes a single phase
meter has been assigned two different names (DDSD285 and DDSY283SR) for distribution in
different markets. Likewise, a three phase meter has been assigned two different names (DTSD545
and DTSY541) for distribution in different markets. The single phase meter (DDSD285 and
DDSY283SR) is identified by the software version D285WI0036002503 and the hardware version
20-X33-11VS1.0, while the three phase meter (DTSD545 and DTSY541) is identified by the software
version D545WI0036002503 and the hardware version 20-X042-11V1.1.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the requirements established by the Italian
Scheme for the evaluation and certification of security systems and products in the field of
information technology and expressed in the and Scheme Information Notes [NIS1, NIS2, NIS3,
NIS4]. The Scheme is operated by the Italian Certification Body “Organismo di Certificazione della
Sicurezza Informatica (OCSI)”, established by the Prime Minister Decree (DPCM) of 30 October
2003 (O.J. n.98 of 27 April 2004).
The objective of the evaluation is to provide assurance that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated Security Target [ST]; the potential consumers of the product
should review also the Security Target, in addition to the present Certification Report, in order to gain
a complete understanding of the security problem addressed. The evaluation activities have been
carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Part 3 [CC3] and the Common Evaluation
Methodology [CEM].
The TOE resulted compliant with the requirements of Part 3 of the CC version CC:2022 Release 1
for the assurance level EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR.3 according to the information provided in
the Security Target [ST] and in the configuration shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration” of
this Certification Report.
The publication of the Certification Report is the confirmation that the evaluation process has been
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the evaluation criteria Common Criteria - ISO/IEC
15408 ([CC1], [CC2], [CC3] and [CC5]) and the procedures indicated by the Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement [CCRA] and that no exploitable vulnerability was found. However, the
Certification Body with such a document does not express any kind of support or promotion of the
TOE.
Page 12 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
7 Summary of the evaluation
7.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria evaluation of the product named
“Holley’s Smart Meters DDSD285, DDSY283SR, DTSD545 and DTSY541” to provide assurance
to the potential consumers that TOE security features comply with its security requirements.
In addition to the present Certification Report, the potential consumers of the product should also
review the Security Target [ST], specifying the functional and assurance requirements and the
intended operational environment.
7.2 Executive summary
TOE name Holley’s Smart Meters: model DDSD285/DDSY283SR
version D285WI0036002503:20-X33-11VS1.0, model
DTSD545/DTSY541 version D545WI0036002503:20-
X042-11V1.1
Security Target Holley Technology Ltd, Holley’s Smart Meters: DDSD285,
DDSY283SR, DTSD545 and DTSY541 Security Target,
Version 1.9, 2026-01-21 [ST]
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR.3
Developer Holley Technology Ltd.
Sponsor Zhejiang Wangan Technology Co., Ltd.
LVS CCLab – The Agile Cybersecurity Laboratory (Debrecen
site)
CC version CC:2022 Release 1
PP conformance claim None
Evaluation starting date 24 February 2025
Evaluation ending date 7 November 2025
The certification results apply only to the version of the product shown in this Certification Report
and only if the operational environment assumptions described in the Security Target [ST] are
fulfilled, and in the configuration shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration” of this Certification
Report.
7.3 Evaluated product
This section summarizes the main functional and security requirements of the TOE. For a detailed
description it is possible to refer to the Security Target [ST].
The target of evaluation (TOE) is a smart electric energy meter delivered with models for single phase
and three phase devices. DDSD285 and DDSY283SR are single-phase meters, and DTSD545 and
DTSY541 are three-phase meters. Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters are electrical
Page 13 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
energy metering devices with the function of real-time monitoring and user electricity consumption
recording. Compared with traditional electric meters, Holley’s single phase and three phase smart
meters not only support two-way communication but also transmit electricity consumption data to
power companies in real time and receive relevant instructions and information.
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters communicate with users via local (direct) or
network interfaces, including configuration data, operating parameters, metrologically certified data,
keys, and other non-TSF parts.
TOE core security functions include:
• ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of data.
• ensure the secure transmission of information flows.
The security functions of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters are designed to ensure
that the user's electricity consumption data is stored and transmitted safely, ensuring that only
authorized and trusted AMI systems or maintenance personnel can access the meter. Effectively
prevents meter data from being maliciously tampered with, avoiding potential losses to users and
power systems.
For a detailed description of the TOE, refer to section 1.5 of the Security Target [ST].
7.3.1 TOE architecture
Smart electric energy meters are devices for measuring and recording energy consumption, widely
used in residential electricity, commercial electricity and industrial fields. Holley’s single phase and
three phase smart meters not only have traditional energy metering functions, but also integrate a
variety of advanced functions, such as data storage, event monitoring, rate management, remote Wi-
SUN communication, local Optical Port and RS485 communication. Through built-in software and
hardware systems, a high degree of intelligent and automated management is achieved.
Figure 1 illustrates the TOE architecture:
Figure 1 - TOE Architecture
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Components of Figure 1 are described in Table 1.
Components Description
Firmware It is used to store firmware and backup of updated firmware required
for Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters operation,
ensuring normal operation of equipment and support firmware update.
Configuration Data
Store the parameter data of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart
meters to maintain normal operation, including real-time clock (RTC)
and other operating parameters to ensure stable operation of the
equipment.
Metering Data
Record electricity consumption, instantaneous quantity and demand
and other metering data of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart
meters to provide accurate electricity consumption information for
users and systems.
Security Key
Store all cryptographic key data (including Master key, Global
Authentication key, Global Encryption key, Global Broadcast key，
Client Public Key, Server Private Key, and Server Public Key) in
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters to ensure the
security of equipment data and access control.
Audit Log
Record all monitoring and operation logs generated by Holley’s single
phase and three phase smart meters operation to provide complete
historical data for fault diagnosis and operation trail.
Direct Interface
Includes local display, human-computer interaction and maintenance
interfaces:
Display：Display metrologically certified data of Holley’s Single
Phase and Three Phase Smart Meters.
Keypad: Switch the display item, reset the demand of Holley’s Single
Phase and Three Phase Smart Meters.
P1 Port：Transmit meter data to the user display unit.
RS485：Used for local maintenance and configuration operations.
Optical Port：Used for local data reading and maintenance.
Network Interface
The AMI system is connected through the network to support the
transmission of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters
data and remote operation.
Table 1 - Components of TOE Architecture
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters can automatically measure and record power
consumption and send the data to the power company via communication technology (Wi-SUN).
Generally, Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters are installed in residential homes,
commercial buildings or industrial sites to measure and record power consumption. These meters can
not only be connected to the local power grid but also communicate bidirectionally with the power
company, transmitting power consumption data and receiving instructions such as relay control and
Page 15 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
power outage notifications. They also have real-time monitoring, time-of-use billing and fault
detection functions, helping users optimize energy usage and improving the operational efficiency of
the power company.
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in
the evaluation.
TOE refers to the whole electric energy meter product, including the following key parts:
Hardware
• Meter body: the core part responsible for measuring electric energy, including the metering
unit, circuit board, etc.
• Module body: usually refers to the additional function module, i.e. Wi-SUN communication
module.
Software
• Includes embedded software, implementing the functional logic, data processing,
communication protocol, etc. of the meter.
Structural
• Dust- and water-resistant, usually with a specific degree of protection (e.g. IP65 or higher).
• Designed to prevent external environmental factors (such as moisture, dust) from affecting
the hardware to ensure long-term stable operation.
• Prevent external damage through structural optimization, such as anti-disassembly design,
application of impact-resistant materials, etc.
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Figure 2 - Meter appearance
No. Description
1 Module cover & Screws
2 LCD display
3 Optical communication port
4 Alarm LED
5 Active pulse LED
6 Meter cover & Nameplate
7 Terminal cover & Screws
8 Module status LEDs
9 Scroll button
10 Config button (Sealable)
11 Reactive pulse LED
12 P1 port (RJ12)
Table 2 - Meter appearance description
Page 17 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
Figure 3 - Meter components
Components Description
Hardware Body
The core hardware part of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart
meters, including metering chips, circuit boards, power supply units, etc.,
is used to achieve electricity measurement and basic operation functions.
Firmware Body
The core software system of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart
meters operation, including operation logic, metering algorithm and
function module, is responsible for the normal operation and data
processing of the equipment.
Structure Body
The case and internal support structure of Holley’s single phase and three
phase smart meters provide physical protection and fixation and layout of
components.
Module Body
The communication module (including software and hardware) of
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters is used to realize the
connection with external systems, such as wireless communication
module or wired interface module.
Table 3 - Meter components description
7.3.2 TOE security features
The Security Problem of the TOE, including security objectives, assumptions, threats and
organizational security policies, is defined in sections 3 and 4 of the Security Target [ST].
For a detailed description of the TOE Security Functions, consult section 1.5.5 and Chapter 8 of the
Security Target [ST].
The major security features of the TOE are summarised in the following:
• Message Security
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When other devices communicate with Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters,
both parties must authenticate to ensure the security and legitimacy of the communication.
Holley’s Single Phase and Three Phase Smart Meters use identity authentication and message
encryption to ensure confidentiality, integrity and tamper-resistance of transmitted
information.
o Authentication: Both parties authenticate each other's identity through security
mechanisms (ECDSA based on ECC256) to prevent unauthorized devices from accessing
the communication network.
o Information encryption: AES-GCM-128 is used for information encryption to ensure that
data is protected from eavesdropping and tampering with during transmission, while
providing integrity verification functions.
This mechanism can effectively prevent man-in-the-middle attack and data forgery and ensure
the security of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters communication.
• TSF Protection
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters will activate the corresponding protection
mechanism to ensure the normal operation of the meter and timely alarm notification when
encountering faults or physical tampering.
Anti-replay mechanism is implemented to prevent malicious users from reusing previously
successfully executed requests.
The data in Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters will be stored in two
independent storage units at the same time, ensuring that even if one piece of data is damaged,
the other is still available. If an error occurs in a certain piece of data, it can be directly
recovered from the backup block to ensure the integrity and availability of the data. Each piece
of data is equipped with verification information to verify whether the data is correct. When
reading or processing data, data errors can be found through the verification mechanism, and
data errors can be quickly located and repaired without external intervention. Even if a piece
of data is damaged, the normal operation of the system can still be guaranteed through backup.
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters will detect firmware, random number
generator and functional modules during startup and after reset to ensure normal operation of
the meter.
Reliable timestamps are provided to provide trusted time for audit generation.
• Audit
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters can record security events, including
access control events, electric larceny events, grid monitoring events, parameter configuration
events, other energy meter operation security events, to achieve a complete log of energy
meters; each type of event record timestamp, event type, event ID, etc.; use structured format,
unify time format, and archive and storage by event type; complete logs facilitate system
analysis of user behaviour or grid status.
At the same time, the access control authority of audit records is defined, including reading,
modifying and deleting operations. In addition, Holley’s single phase and three phase smart
meters set a cap on the storage of audit records, and when the number of logs exceeds a
predefined storage limit, the system automatically overwrites the oldest audit records,
ensuring that new records are saved and important events are continuously tracked.
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• Authentication & Authorisation
Authentication is used to verify whether the identity of the user or system is legitimate. The
goal is to ensure that the party communicating is indeed who it claims to be. Access to data,
parameters, and logs must be authorized by the client. Permissions can be controlled through
access tokens (such as OAuth) or other authentication mechanisms.
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters use ECDSA based on ECC256 (ECC Key
Pair Generation) for mutual authentication for enhanced security. The client and the server
exchange authentication messages using AES-GCM-128 encryption and ensure that the
messages are not tampered with through authentication labels. When the number of
authentication times exceeds the preset number of times, the user is restricted from continuing
authentication until the preset time expires.
After authentication, encryption is used to protect the data access path according to the
permission policy to avoid unauthorized access. This combination provides reliable
authentication and access control assurance for secure communication, while ensuring re-
authentication after a preset period of time to ensure security.
• Data Protection
Data access in Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters will go through a strict
authentication mechanism. Only the subject who has passed the authentication mechanism
can access the energy meter data. In addition, different permissions are set for different
subjects, and only subjects with corresponding permissions can read or modify the data.
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters have four independent operable interfaces,
and different subjects can access the data through different interfaces. However, when
accessing data, the subject using the interface needs to be authenticated to access the data to
avoid data leakage. In addition, when using the interface for data transmission, the data will
be encrypted using an encryption algorithm to prevent data leakage or tampering caused by
transmission in plain text.
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters can ensure that after some sensitive data
is released, any previous content of the data is unusable, avoiding the reuse of sensitive data
after release.
• Underlying Cryptography
The data and information of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters are encrypted
with AES-GCM-128 to protect the real-time readings, historical data and other information
from larceny, to ensure that the data has not been tampered with during transmission, to
prevent unauthorized equipment from forging the data. No duplication during each encryption
is guaranteed, to ensure that even if the same data information is informed, there will not be
the same encryption result. Keys are regularly rotated to prevent key leakage.
A detailed description of the TOE security functionality is provided in section 8 of the Security Target
[ST].
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7.4 Documentation
The guidance documentation specified in “Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product”
is delivered to the customer together with the product.
The guidance documentation contains all the information for secure initialization, configuration, and
secure usage the TOE in accordance with the requirements of the Security Target [ST].
Customers should also follow the recommendations for the secure usage of the TOE contained in
section 8.2 of this report.
7.5 Protection Profile conformance claims
No conformance to Protection Profile is claimed even though security requirements and evaluation
conduct have been derived from the Protection Profile for Smart Meter Minimum Security
requirements, CEN/CLC/ETSI_SMCG/Sec/00156/DC, Version 1.0, dated October 30th
, 2019 (Ref.
[PP]).
7.6 Functional and assurance requirements
All Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) have been selected from CC Part 3 [CC3] and are from
EAL 4 assurance package, augmented with the CC part 3 component ALC_FLR.3.
All the SFRs have been selected or derived by extension from CC Part 2 [CC2]. The following
extended components are described in section 5 of [ST]: FAU_ARP.2, FPT_TSU.1, FPT_BST.1 and
FPT_TNN.1.
It is possible to refer to the Security Target [ST] for the complete description of all security objectives,
the threats that these objectives should address, the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) and the
security functions that realize the same objectives.
7.7 Evaluation conduct
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the requirements established by the Italian
Scheme for the evaluation and certification of security systems and products in the field of
information technology and expressed in the Scheme Information Note [NIS3] and in accordance
with the requirements of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement [CCRA].
The purpose of the evaluation is to provide assurance on the effectiveness of the TOE to meet the
requirements stated in the relevant Security Target [ST]. Initially the Security Target has been
evaluated to ensure that constitutes a solid basis for an evaluation in accordance with the requirements
expressed by the standard CC. Then, the TOE has been evaluated on the basis of the statements
contained in such a Security Target. Both phases of the evaluation have been conducted in accordance
with the CC Part 3 [CC3] and the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].
The Certification Body OCSI has supervised the conduct of the evaluation performed by the
evaluation facility (LVS) CCLab – The Agile Cybersecurity Laboratory (Debrecen site).
The evaluation was completed on 7 November 2025, with the issuance by the LVS of the approved
Evaluation Technical Report in version 2 of the ETR ([ETRv2]). Following some editorial updates
to the evaluation documentation a final version 4 of the ETR ([ETRv4]) was acquired. The
Certification Body has then issued the certification report.
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7.8 General considerations about the certification validity
The evaluation focused on the security features declared in the Security Target [ST], with reference
to the operational environment specified therein. The evaluation has been performed on the TOE
configured as described in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration”.
Potential customers are advised to check that this corresponds to their own requirements and to pay
attention to the recommendations contained in this Certification Report.
The certification is not a guarantee that no vulnerabilities exist; there is a probability, however small,
that exploitable vulnerabilities can be discovered after the issuance of the certificate. This
Certification Report reflects the conclusions of the certification at the time of issuance. Potential
customers are invited to regularly check the arising of any new vulnerability after the issuance of this
Certification Report, and if the vulnerability can be exploited in the operational environment of the
TOE, check with the Developer if security updates have been developed and if those updates have
been evaluated and certified.
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8 Evaluation outcome
8.1 Evaluation results
Following the analysis of the Evaluation Technical Report [ETRv2] issued by the LVS CCLab – The
Agile Cybersecurity Laboratory (Debrecen site) and documents required for the certification, and
considering the evaluation activities carried out, the Certification Body OCSI concluded that TOE
named “Holley’s Smart Meters DDSD285, DDSY283SR, DTSD545 and DTSY541” meets the
requirements of Part 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria [CC3] provided for the evaluation assurance
level EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.3 with respect to the security features described in the
Security Target [ST] and the evaluated configuration, shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration”.
Table 4 summarizes the final verdict of each activity carried out by the LVS in accordance with the
assurance requirements established in [CC3] for the evaluation assurance level EAL4 augmented with
ALC_FLR.3 (augmentation in italics in Table 4).
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation Class ASE Pass
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 Pass
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 Pass
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 Pass
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 Pass
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Pass
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 Pass
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 Pass
Development Class ADV Pass
Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 Pass
Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.4 Pass
Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 Pass
Modular design ADV_TDS.3 Pass
Guidance documents Class AGD Pass
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 Pass
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 Pass
Life cycle support Class ALC Pass
Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.4 Pass
Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Pass
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 Pass
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 Pass
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 Pass
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 Pass
Systematic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.3 Pass
Test Class ATE Pass
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 Pass
Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 Pass
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 Pass
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 Pass
Vulnerability assessment Class AVA Pass
Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Pass
Table 4 - Final verdicts for assurance requirements
8.2 Recommendations
The conclusions of the Certification Body (OCSI) are summarized in section 6 (Statement of
Certification).
Potential customers of the product “Holley’s Smart Meters DDSD285, DDSY283SR, DTSD545 and
DTSY541” are suggested to properly understand the specific purpose of the certification by reading
this Certification Report together with the Security Target [ST].
The TOE must be used according to the “Security Objectives” specified in section 4 of the Security
Target [ST]. It is assumed that, in the operational environment of the TOE, all Assumptions described
in section 3.5 of the Security Target [ST] shall be satisfied.
This Certification Report is valid for the TOE in its evaluated configuration; in particular, “Annex A
– Guidelines for the secure usage of the product” includes a number of recommendations relating to
delivery, installation, configuration and secure usage of the product, according to the guidance
documentation provided together with the TOE ([AGD]).
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9 Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product
This annex provides considerations particularly relevant to the potential customers of the product.
9.1 TOE delivery
After receiving Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters provided by the manufacturer, the
customer should power up and start the equipment and read the software version number and software
check code of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters through the PC software to confirm
whether it is consistent with the information provided by the manufacturer. At the same time, the
customer is required to verify the functions of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters
through the PC software to ensure that it is consistent with the performance and specifications
described in the guide (Ref. [AGD]).
In addition, Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters are disassembled by sampling to
check whether the PCB version number is consistent with the information provided. After the above
verification steps, the customer can complete the acceptance of Holley’s single phase and three phase
smart meters.
Through the above procedures, the secure transmission of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart
meters firmware and configuration files from the development to the production process to the client
is ensured to prevent unauthorized and illegal firmware loading and running, and Holley’s single
phase and three phase smart meters meeting the requirements are finally delivered safely.
9.2 Installation, configuration and secure usage of the TOE
TOE installation, configuration and operation should be done following the instructions in the
appropriate sections of the guidance documentation provided with the product to the customer.
In particular, the Common Criteria guidance [AGD] contains detailed information for the secure
initialization of the TOE, the preparation of its operational environment and the secure operation of
the TOE in accordance with the security objectives specified in the Security Target [ST].
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10 Annex B – Evaluated configuration
The Evaluators followed the preparation steps defined in the [AGD] document for the TOE being in
the evaluated configuration.
The following are the TOE version numbers of Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters
(section 1.3 of [ST]):
Holley’s Single Phase Smart Meters: DDSD285/ DDSY283SR
TOE Software Version: D285WI0036002503
TOE Hardware Version: 20-X33-11VS1.0
Holley’s Three Phase Smart Meters: DTSD545/ DTSY541
TOE Software Version: D545WI0036002503
TOE Hardware Version: 20-X042-11V1.1
The software identification is viewed by the user through the PC Software (HLMCS). The hardware
version can be found by disassembling Holley's single phase and three phase smart meters and looking
at the PCB.
The items described in section 10.1 “TOE operational environment” must be available before
performing the installation.
10.1 TOE operational environment
Holley’s single phase and three phase smart meters needs to be installed in the normal power grid, or
in a laboratory connected to the standard power supply test equipment (power supply specification
between 220V and 240V), Wi-SUN module is connected to the Internet through the link gateway, PC
is connected to TOE via RS485 converter of RJ12 interface, or PC is connected to TOE via contactless
optical port communication adapter.
The TOE located in the LMN network communicates with the Gateway through the Wi-SUN
interface using the encrypted information of the HDLC/WRAPPER protocol (Figure 4).
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Figure 4 – TOE operational environment
Page 27 of 28 OCSI/CERT/CCL/05/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
11 Annex C – Test activity
This annex describes the task of both the Evaluators and the Developer in testing activities.
11.1 Test configuration
Testing activities have been carried out from the LVS premises.
The Evaluators verified the configuration of the test environment, including the TOE, and found it to
be consistent with the guidance documentation [AGD] and the Security Target [ST].
11.2 Functional tests performed by the Developer
11.2.1 Testing approach
The developer performed extensive tests to verify the functionality of the TOE. The tests cover all
Subsystems, Modules and TSFIs of the TOE.
11.2.2 Test coverage
The following aspects of the TSF are covered by the tests:
1. Message Security
2. TSF Protection
3. Audit
4. Authentication & Authorisation
5. Data Protection
6. Underlying Cryptography
The Developer provided 42 manual test cases. The Evaluators have examined the test plan presented
by the Developer and verified the complete coverage of the functional requirements (SFRs) and the
TSFIs described in the functional specification. The Evaluators verified that the test cases are
sufficient to demonstrate the internal behaviour and the properties of the TSF.
11.2.3 Test results
The actual test results of all Developer’s tests were consistent with the expected ones.
11.3 Functional and independent tests performed by the Evaluators
11.3.1 Test approach
In addition to the 42 Developer’s test Evaluator created and performed 4 more independent test cases
to test the TSF more in depth.
These are:
1. WONSECEVSM-TEST01: The purpose of the test was to verify whether the functions identified
in [ST] section 6.2.5.2 Management of Security Functions Behaviour (FMT_MOF.1) as “Not
configurable” truly cannot be configured.
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2. WONSECEVSM-TEST02: The purpose of the test was to verify that load data, frozen data, and
event log data were truly deleted upon a deletion request, and that after deletion, the objects
identified in the FDP_RIP.1 SFR could not be accessed via at least one of the functions that would
previously be used to access it.
3. WONSECEVSM-TEST03: The purpose of the test was to verify the TOE protected itself against
messages that have a frame counter with the highest possible 32-bit value, and the lowest possible
32-bit value. Every message must have a higher frame counter value than the previously received
one accepted by the TOE smart meter.
4. WONSECEVSM-TEST04: The purpose of this test was to verify that the TOE stores the amount
of consumed power persistently, even after multiple reboots, and prolonged periods of being
powered off.
The Evaluator conducted exhaustive testing on the TOE and on its functionalities and aimed with
these independent tests to connect these two and observe their impact on each other.
11.3.2 Test results
All Developer’s tests were run successfully, and the Evaluators verified the correct behaviour of the
TSFIs and TSFs and the correspondence between expected results and achieved results for each test.
All test cases devised by the Evaluators were passed successfully and all the test results were
consistent to the expected test results.
11.4 Vulnerability analysis and penetration tests
For the execution of these activities, the Evaluators worked with the TOE already used for the
functional test activities and verified that the TOE and the test environment were properly configured.
The Evaluators designed the following attack scenarios:
• Replay attack.
• Manipulation of keys in the TOE.
• Power on process.
• Store the blocking condition.
• Interface examination.
• Brute force attack.
• Manipulating or guessing the Smart Meter's Random Number Generator (RNG).
• Change the “allowed failed attempts” value on the TOE.
• Insecure remote Wi-SUN communication.
The Evaluators has concluded that the TOE is resistant to “Enhanced-basic” attack potential in its
intended operating environment. No exploitable or residual vulnerabilities were identified.