National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Check Point Software Technologies LTD
Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 with HFA 30
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10329-2009
Dated: March 25, 2009
Version: 1.5
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6757
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6757
Check Point Validation Report
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jim Donndelinger
John Nilles
Scott Shorter
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Ms. Cynthia Reese
Mrs. Jean Petty
Science Applications International Corporation
Columbia, Maryland
Much of the material in this report was extracted from evaluation material prepared by the
CCTL. The CCTL team deserves credit for their hard work in developing that material. Many of
the product descriptions in this report were extracted from the Check Point Security Target.
Check Point Validation Report
3
Table of Contents
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 4
2 IDENTIFICATION .......................................................................................................... 5
3 SECURITY POLICY ....................................................................................................... 6
4 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.................................................. 7
4.1 Operating Environment .................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Clarification of Scope....................................................................................................... 8
5 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION............................................................................ 9
6 DOCUMENTATION ..................................................................................................... 11
7 IT PRODUCT TESTING ............................................................................................... 13
7.1 Vendor Testing ............................................................................................................... 13
7.1.1 Testing Approach............................................................................................................ 13
7.1.2 Test Descriptions ............................................................................................................ 13
7.1.3 Depth and Coverage ....................................................................................................... 15
7.1.4 Test Results..................................................................................................................... 15
7.2 Evaluator Testing............................................................................................................ 15
8 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .............................................................................. 17
9 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ............................................................................. 18
9.1 Evaluation of the Check Point Security Target (ST) (ASE)........................................... 18
9.2 Evaluation of the CM capabilities (ACM)...................................................................... 18
9.3 Evaluation of the Delivery and Operation documents (ADO) ....................................... 18
9.4 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).......................................................................... 18
9.5 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)............................................................. 18
9.6 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................................. 19
9.7 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............................. 19
9.8 Evaluation of the Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA) ........................................ 19
9.9 Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................................... 19
9.10 Assurance Requirement Results ..................................................................................... 19
9.10.1 Common Criteria Assurance Components ..................................................................... 19
9.10.2 Testing and Vulnerability Assessment ........................................................................... 20
9.11 Conclusions..................................................................................................................... 20
9.11.1 ST Evaluation ................................................................................................................. 20
9.11.2 TOE Evaluation .............................................................................................................. 20
9.12 Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................................... 20
10 VALIDATOR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................... 21
11 SECURITY TARGET.................................................................................................... 22
12 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................... 24
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report documents the results of the Validation Panel’s oversight of the evaluation of the
Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 product. It presents the evaluation results,
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the
Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE
is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) and was completed during February 2009. The
information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) written
by SAIC and submitted to the Validation Panel. The evaluation determined that the product
conforms to the Common Criteria Version 2.2, Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant and meets
the requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.3
(Systematic Flaw Remediation).
The Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 is a network perimeter security device that
provides controlled connectivity between two or more network environments. It mediates
information flows between clients and servers located on internal and external networks
governed by the firewall. The TOE provides information flow controls, including traffic
filtering, application-level proxies and intrusion detection and prevention capabilities. IPSec and
SSL VPN functionality encrypts and authenticates network traffic to and from selected peers, in
order to protect the traffic from disclosure or modification over untrusted networks. Management
can be performed either locally or remotely using the management GUI that is included in the
Target of Evaluation (TOE).
The Validation Team provided oversight on the activities of the evaluation team, provided
guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, reviewed successive versions of the
Security Target, reviewed selected evaluation evidence, reviewed test plans, reviewed
intermediate evaluation results (i.e., the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work units),
and reviewed successive versions of the ETR and test report. The Validators’ observations
support the CCTL's conclusion that the product satisfies the functional and assurance
requirements defined in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation Panel concludes that
the findings of the evaluation team are accurate, and the conclusions justified.
2 IDENTIFICATION
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL 4 in
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product.
Table 1 Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Target of Evaluation Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 with HFA 30
Protection Profile Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile, Version 1.6, April 4, 2006
Security Target Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 Security Target, Version 1.0; March
4, 2009
Evaluation Technical Report Final Evaluation Technical Report For Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX
R65 , Part1 (Non Proprietary), Version 0.2, 4 February 2009
Final Evaluation Technical Report For Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX
R65 , Part 1 (Proprietary), Version 0.2, 4 February 2009
Final Evaluation Technical Report For Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX
R65 , Part 2 (Proprietary), Version 0.5, 4 February 2009
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 2.2, January 2004
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 2.2 Revision 256, January 2004
Conformance Result Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented
Sponsor Check Point Software Technologies LTD.
Developer Check Point Software Technologies LTD
Evaluators SAIC, Columbia, MD
Validators Jim Donndelinger, The Aerospace Corporation
John Nilles, The Aerospace Corporation
Scott Shorter, Orion Security Solutions
3 SECURITY POLICY
The explicit TOE security policy consists of the UNAUTHENTICATED SFP that controls the
HTTP and SMTP traffic filter functionality of the firewall, and the AUTHENTICATED SFP that
controls FTP and Telnet traffic filter functionality of the firewall, and the TRAFFIC FILTER
SFP that is applied to all traffic sent through the TOE.
In addition, the TOE implements the following implied security policies:
Stateful Inspection: security analysis of network traffic at the network layer, and
performing information flow control based on any part of the data being mediated, as
well as on state information. An IDS/IPS capability is integrated with the product’s
traffic-filtering functionality, matching traffic with predefined attack signatures, and
providing recording, analysis, and reaction capabilities.
Security Servers: inspection of FTP, telnet, HTTP and/or SMTP traffic to verify protocol
conformance
Virtual Private Network: IPSec and SSL virtual private network gateway
Audit: generation, storage, analysis and notification of audit events
Security Management: administrative management and administrator access control
functions
Secure Internal Communications: protection for management traffic using the TLS
protocol
Identification and Authentication: authentication of external IT entities, administrators
and users via IKE, TLS, single-use or static passwords.
TSF Protection: protection mechanisms such as domain separation, packet
defragmentation, self testing, reference mediation and a hardware clock.
4 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following conditions are assumed to exist in the operational environment:
A.PHYSEC The TOE is physically secure.
A.MODEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable
vulnerabilities is considered moderate.
A.GENPUR There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to
execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository capabilities
on the TOE.
A.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data.
A.NOEVIL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance; however, they are capable of error.
A.SINGEN Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless
it passes through the TOE.
A.DIRECT Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE
may attempt to access the TOE from some direct connection (e.g., a
console port) if the connection is part of the TOE.
A.NOREMO Human users who are not authorized administrators can not access the
TOE remotely from the internal or external networks1.
A.REMACC Authorized administrators may access the TOE remotely from the internal
and external networks.
4.1 Operating Environment
Table 2 lists the security functional requirement that must be satisfied by the IT Environment as
presented in the ST.
Table 2 IT Environment Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional Class Security Functional Components
User Data Protection (FDP) FDP_UCT.1.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
1
This assumption means that the TOE does not provide remote services to human users, other than use of identification and
authentication functions. The objective for the non-IT environment O.NOREMO upholds this assumption. Note however that both PPs allow the
TOE to provide a limited number of security functions to remote (identified and authenticated) authorized external IT entities. These are listed in
section Error! Reference source not found. above.
Security Functional Class Security Functional Components
Identification and authentication (FIA) FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Trusted path/channels (FTP) FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target specified the security requirements of the TOE, which determined the scope
of the evaluation. The security requirements allocated to the IT environment have not been
verified as part of the Check Point evaluation—it is the responsibility of the integrator to ensure
the IT environment satisfies those requirements. The IT security services provided by the
environment support the User Data Protection (FDP), the Identification and Authentication
(FIA), and the Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
There is functionality included in the product which is excluded from the evaluation and is
identified in section 2.4.7 (Functionality Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration) of the
Security Target. The following list is condensed from that section.
ClusterXL
SmartUpdate
OPSEC client APIs
Remote Management via SNMP
Remote Management via WebUI
Nokia Network Voyager software management utility
CLIs and SSH not supported for post-installation administration
Extended Remote Access VPN Modes (hybrid mode and MS IPSec/L2TP clients)
LDAP User Management
Dynamic Routing Protocols
Transparent Mode
DShield Storm Center
Content Inspection
5 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
The high level architecture of the TOE is shown in Figure 2. The Check Point Check Point
VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 Appliance, the rightmost block of the figure, consists of
compliance tested hardware, a specially developed Linux operating system with enhanced
protections against bypassability, and the firewall software application.
Figure 2 - TOE Architecture
The SmartConsole subsystem is user level software running on a general purpose PC that
provides a management GUI that enables authorized administrators to configure the TOE and
receive log, alert and system status data. The SmartConsole subsystem consists of the following
software applications:
• SmartDashboard: TOE configuration capability
• SmartView Tracker: audit log review capability
• SmartView Monitor: real time TOE status monitoring and alert capability
The SmartCenter Server subsystem is user level software running on a general purpose PC that
manages the TOE data, serves as a central point of administration of the TOE, and provides an
internal certification authority (ICA) to support Secure Internal Communications (SIC).
The Appliance Subsystem provides all security functionality other than management and audit.
In particular, the following security functions are implemented by the Appliance Subsystem:
• Stateful Inspection
• Security Servers
• VPN
• Audit Generation
• User Identification and Authentication
• TSF Protection
6 DOCUMENTATION
The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the TOE.
Configuration
Item (CI)
CI Unique Identifier CI Description
Analysis of
Correspondence
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Analysis of
Correspondence, Version 0.1,
February 21, 2008
Analysis of Correspondence
(RCR)
Analysis of
Guidance
Documentation
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Analysis of Guidance
Documentation, Version 0.2,
August 18, 2008
Analysis of Guidance
Documentation (MSU)
Configuration
Management
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Configuration
Management, Version 4,
February 3, 2009
Configuration Management
(ACM)
Functional
Specification
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Functional Specification,
Version 0.4, August 15, 2008
Functional Specification (FSP)
Guidance
Documentation
CC Evaluated Configuration
Administration Guide, Check
Point Part No.: 702796, August
2008
Administration Guide (ADM)
CC Evaluated Configuration
Installation Guide, Check Point
Part No.: 702795, August 2008
Installation Guide (IGS)
CC Evaluated Configuration
User Guide, Check Point Part
No.: 702797, August 2008
User Guide (USR)
High-level
Design
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX High-level Design,
Version 0.3, August 15, 2008
High-level Design (HLD)
Lifecycle
Model
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Life Cycle, Version 0.2,
August 18, 2008
Life Cycle (ALC)
Low-level
Design
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Low-level Design,
Version 0.2, August 15, 2008
Low-level Design (HLD)
Security Policy
Model
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Security Policy Model,
Version 0.1, February 11, 2008
Security Policy Model (SPM)
Security Target Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Security Target, Version
1.0, March 4, 2009
Security Target (ST)
Test Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1 Test Documentation (ATE)
Configuration
Item (CI)
CI Unique Identifier CI Description
Documentation NGX Test Documentation,
Version 0.7, December 31, 2008
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Actual Test Results,
Version 0.5, February 4, 2009
Vulnerability
Assessment
Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
NGX Vulnerability Analysis,
Version 0.2, August 15, 2008
Vulnerability Analysis (VLA)
7 IT PRODUCT TESTING
7.1 Vendor Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team
7.1.1 Testing Approach
The developer testing approach is described in the ―Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1 NGX Test
Documentation”
The testing of the security functions was performed by a series of automated tests and manual
tests. To ensure test reproducibility, automated tests form the core of the CC tests. Automated
tests always restore the test environment to a known configuration as an initial step. This feature
was used to ensure that manual tests are also reproducible, by performing each test on an
environment that has been generated by running an identified automated test.
The vendor test documentation shows the correspondence between security functions and TSFI.
The vendor test suite demonstrates the security-relevant behavior at the interfaces defined in the
design documentation. The results of the tests demonstrated that the TOE meets the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target.
The security functions that were tested are the same as those mentioned in the Security Target:
Stateful Inspection, Security Servers, VPN, Audit, Security Management, SIC, Identification &
Authentication, and Protection of the TSF.
7.1.2 Test Descriptions
The vendor test documentation includes detailed test procedures in section 4 of the test
documentation; both automated and manual tests. Each test procedure includes detailed setup
instructions, prerequisites, test steps, and expected results in the body of the test procedures.
The actual results are captured in a separate vendor test document.
The developer tested the interfaces identified in the high level design documentation and mapped
each test to the security function tested. The scope of the developer tests included all TOE
Security Functions. The evaluation team determined that the developer’s actual test results
matched the expected results and witnessed a subset of the tests. Testing consisted of a suite of
automated tests as well as a number of manual tests.
In particular, developer testing contained the following types of tests:
• Stateful Inspection Security Function Tests
o Anti-spoofing – Demonstrates automatic dropping of packets that do not
correspond to the network topology as defined by the administrator
o Packet Inspection - Demonstrates accept, drop and reject behavior as a function of
combination of values of the information flow security attributes
o Post-Inspect – Demonstrates intrusion detection system analysis and reaction
o Residual Information Protection – Demonstrates that residual information is not
leaked from one packet to another
o FTP Security Server – Demonstrates the capability to restrict the set of acceptable
FTP commands that can traverse the TOE
o Telnet Security Server – Demonstrates the validation of Telnet option codes
o HTTP Security Server – Demonstrates the HTTP validation checks performed by
the TOE
o SMTP Security Server – Demonstrates the validation of SMTP traffic and the
enforcement of administrator defined restrictions on attachment types and mail
size
o User Authentication – Demonstrates the capability to authenticate FTP and Telnet
users via remote authentication server in the IT Environment
• Virtual Private Network Security Function Tests
o Cryptographic Algorithm – Demonstrates interoperable behavior of the claimed
cryptographic algorithms
o IKE/IPSec – Demonstrates adherence to relevant RFC requirements
- SSL VPN – demonstrates the SSL VPN functionality
o Audit – Demonstrates the logging of rejected IKE and IPSec packets
• Audit Security Function
o Traffic Related Audit Generation – Demonstrates selective audit record generation
for events and specified logging of security-relevant information
o Security Server Audit Generation – Demonstrates selective audit record generation
for successful and unsuccessful authentication events, protocol validation errors,
and HTTP and SMTP connections
o VPN-related audit generation – Demonstrates that the TOE selectively logs VPN
key exchanges and encrypted communications and VPN errors
o Audit Collection and Recording – Demonstrates monitoring of system resources,
audit threshold behavior, and resource exhaustion alerts
o SmartCenter Server Audit – Demonstrates logging of management operations
o Audit Review – Demonstrates restriction of audit review to users explicitly granted
the right, and search and sort capability
o Status Monitoring – Demonstrates appliance status monitoring capabilities
o Alerts – Demonstrates alerts can be generated for auditable events and resource
monitoring
• Security Management Security Function
o Management Functions – Demonstrates TOE management capabilities, including
startup and shutdown, multiple authentication mechanisms, audit trail
management, backup and restore, control of communication with authorized
external IT entities, management of IDS system behavior, VPN rules, information
flow control rules, user security attributes, and audit storage thresholds.
o Administrator Access Control – Demonstrates user management and permission
profiles, restriction of management functionality to authorized administrators
• Secure Internal Communications Security Function
o Internal CA – Demonstrates certificate management capabilities
o Secure Internal Communications – Demonstrates the proper function of the SIC
capability
• Identification and Authentication Security Function
o Single User Password – Demonstrates the use of Radius or SecureID for FTP or
Telnet authentication
o Administrator Authentication – Demonstrates SIC certificate based administrator
authentication
o User Authentication – Demonstrates IKE authentication, and FTP and Telnet
authentication
o External IT Entity Authentication – Demonstrates IKE authentication of peer IPSec
VPN gateways and hosts, and NTP single use authentication
o User Identification – Demonstrates that administrators are correctly identified in
audit trail, identification of IP addresses of communicating entities in logs, and
logging of user identities for FTP, Telnet and IKE.
• TSF Protection Security Function
o Domain Separation – Demonstrate that the TSF maintains a security domain for its
own execution, enforces separation between subjects, protection of intra-OTE
management communications,
o Reference Mediation – Demonstrates non-bypassability of traffic mediation
o Hardware Clock – Demonstrates correct timestamping of audit records
o Self Testing – Demonstrates FIPS 140-2 self tests, monitoring of operational status,
and watchdog revival of critical processes.
7.1.3 Depth and Coverage
The amount of testing performed as it relates to the required functionality is described in the
rationale for ATE_COV work units. The depth of testing performed as it relates to the High
Level design is described in the rationale for the ATE_DPT work units in the Evaluation
Technical Report.
7.1.4 Test Results
The actual results are captured in a separate vendor test document. For each description included
in the ―Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1 NGX Test Documentation”, there are actual results
included in the “Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1 NGX Actual Test Results.”
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluation team ensured that the TOE performed as described in the design documentation
and demonstrated that the TOE enforces the TOE security functional requirements. Specifically,
the evaluation team ensured that the developer test documentation sufficiently addresses the
security functions as described in the functional specification. The evaluation team also ensured
that all subsystem interfaces were tested by the developer. The evaluation team performed a
sample of the developer’s test suite, representative of the TOE Security Functions, and devised
an independent set of team tests and penetration tests.
The independent tests run by the evaluation team included the following types of tests:
• Confirming auditing of dropped packets
• Attempting to force residual information from one packet to another by manipulating
packet headers
• Testing the audit resource exhaustion
• Confirming that invalid certificates cannot be used for administrator login
Based upon further validation review, the following test cases were added to the vendor test
suite:
demonstration of the blocking of overlapping IP fragments.
demonstration of the handling of invalid and large Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)
8 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM is a software product produced by Check Point. The product is
installed on a hardware platform in combination with an operating system (OS), in accordance
with TOE guidance, in a FIPS 140-2 compliant mode.
The consumer installs the software on commodity hardware platforms identified in Appendix A -
TOE Hardware Platforms section A.1 section of the ST. Alternatively, the consumer can
purchase the software pre-installed on the security appliances identified in sections A.2 and A.3
of the ST.
All platforms identified in Appendix A provide an AMD or Intel-based CPU as well as memory,
disk, local console and network interface facilities that are tested by Check Point as providing
sufficient service and reliability for the normal operation of the software. A hardware clock/timer
with on-board battery backup supports the operating system in maintaining reliable timekeeping.
9 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 2.2 and CEM version 2.2. The evaluation
determined the Check Point TOE to be Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant, and that the TOE
meets the Part 3 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 4) requirements augmented with
ALC_FLR.3
9.1 Evaluation of the Check Point Security Target (ST) (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Check Point product that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
9.2 Evaluation of the CM capabilities (ACM)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 4 ACM CEM work unit. The ACM evaluation ensured
the TOE is identified such that the consumer is able to identify the evaluated TOE. The
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the procedures used by the developer to accept, control
and track changes made to the TOE implementation, design documentation, test documentation,
user and administrator guidance, security flaws and the CM documentation. The evaluation team
ensured the procedure included automated support to control and track changes to the
implementation representation. The procedures reduce the risk that security flaws exist in the
TOE implementation or TOE documentation.
9.3 Evaluation of the Delivery and Operation documents (ADO)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 4 ADO CEM work unit. The ADO evaluation ensured
the adequacy of the procedures to deliver, install, and configure the TOE securely. The
evaluation team ensured the procedures addressed the detection of modification, the discrepancy
between the developer master copy and the version received, and the detection of attempts to
masquerade as the developer.
9.4 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 4 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification, a high-
level design document, a low-level design document, and a security policy model. The
evaluation team also ensured that the correspondence analysis between the design abstractions
correctly demonstrated that the lower abstraction was a correct and complete representation of
the higher abstraction.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured that the security policy model document clearly
describes the security policy rules that were found to be consistent with the design
documentation.
9.5 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 4 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured
the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE.
9.6 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 4 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the developer procedures to protect the TOE and the TOE documentation during
TOE development and maintenance to reduce the risk of the introduction of TOE exploitable
vulnerabilities during TOE development and maintenance. The evaluation team ensured the
procedures described the life-cycle model and tools used to develop and maintain the TOE.
The evaluation team also applied the ALC_FLR.3 related work units from the Flaw Remediation
CEM Supplement (Evaluation Methodology, Supplement: ALC_FLR - Flaw Remediation,
Version 1.1, February 2002, CEM-2001/0015R). The evaluation team ensured the developer has
a process to systematically track flaws, document flaws, address flaws, and provide flaw
information to TOE users.
9.7 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 4 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured
that the TOE performed as described in the design documentation and demonstrated that the
TOE security functional requirements are enforced by the TOE. Specifically, the evaluation
team ensured that the vendor test documentation sufficiently addresses the security functions as
described in the functional specification and high level design specification. The evaluation
team performed a sample of the vendor test suite, and devised an independent set of team test
and penetration tests. The results of the vendor tests, team tests, and penetration tests
substantiated the security functional requirements in the ST.
9.8 Evaluation of the Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 4 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured
that the TOE does not contain exploitable flaws or weaknesses in the TOE based upon the
developer strength of function analysis, the developer vulnerability analysis, the developer
misuse analysis, and the evaluation team’s misuse analysis and vulnerability analysis, and the
evaluation team’s performance of penetration tests.
9.9 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s performance of a subset of the vendor tests
suite, the independent tests, and the penetration test also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims
in the ST.
9.10 Assurance Requirement Results
The assurance requirements for the TOE evaluation are those required by EAL4.
9.10.1 Common Criteria Assurance Components
The CEM work units associated with EAL4 are distributed amongst the ETR sections in chapter
15 of the ETR. Collectively, the ETR sections in chapter 15 encompass all CEM work units for
EAL4. Each ETR section includes the CEM work units associated with that ETR section title
(e.g. ACM). Within each ETR section, for each CEM work unit the following is provided:
• Verdict
• Verdict Rationale
The rationale justifies the verdict using the CC, the CEM, and any interpretations and the
evaluation evidence examined. The rationale demonstrates how the evaluation evidence meets
each aspect of the criteria.
The work performed contains a description of the action performed or the method used to apply
the work unit.
9.10.2 Testing and Vulnerability Assessment
In addition to ETR sections the evaluators developed a Test Plan/Report Part to capture the detail
beyond the CEM work unit information. This detail is described within the CEM guidance for
the testing and vulnerability assessment work units. Primarily, the additional detail is focused on
team test procedures, penetration test procedures, results from running the vendor’s sample, and
the justification of running the vendor’s sample.
The evaluation team prepared a Draft of the Test Plan/Report prior to testing that addressed the
selection of vendor tests to run, the team test procedures, and the penetration test procedures.
After performing the test, the Test Report Part was updated to include the actual results from the
vendor sample run and the team test. The Test Report is included in the ―Check Point VPN-1
Power/UTM Part 2 Final ETR Proprietary‖ ETR document, chapter "Test Report".
9.11 Conclusions
The conclusions for the ST evaluations and the TOE evaluations are addressed below.
9.11.1 ST Evaluation
Each verdict for each CEM work unit in the ASE ETR is a ―PASS‖. Therefore, the Check Point
VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 Security Target is a CC compliant ST.
9.11.2 TOE Evaluation
The verdicts for each CEM work unit in the ETR sections included in chapter 15 are each
―PASS‖. Therefore, the TOE (see below product identification) satisfies the Check Point VPN-1
Power/UTM NGX R65 Security Target, when configured according to the following guidance
documentation:
NGX R65 CC Evaluated Configuration Installation Guide, Part No. 702795, October
2008
9.12 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s performance of a subset of the vendor test suite,
the independent tests, and the penetration test further demonstrated the claims in the ST.
10 VALIDATOR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the evaluated configuration the TOE is a useful product – a traffic filter firewall, application proxy
firewall, intrusion detection system and VPN gateway – and meets the requirements of the Intrusion
Detection System System Protection Profile. A network protection system based on the TOE can be
centrally administered using the SmartConsole application; in the evaluated configuration this requires a
separate management LAN.
The product contains more functionality than was covered by the evaluation, including web-based,
command line and SNMP management, LDAP based user administration, the SmartUpdate online
software upgrade process, failover and load balancing capabilities, and some VPN modes, See section
2.4.7 of the Security Target for more detail on functionality that was omitted from the TOE. During the
evaluation, no evidence was found that pointed to any specific security vulnerabilities associated with the
features that were not evaluated, but since they were not evaluated, and not covered by any claims in the
Security Target, no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
The validation team was impressed with the quality of the functional specification for the TOE, it
provided a very thorough and well organized presentation of the required information.
Users must purchase and follow the procedures for Check Point’s Enterprise Software Subscription plan
in order to operate in the evaluated configuration and achieve the systematic flaw remediation
requirements cited in the Security Target. This will enable users to download security patches as they
become available.
The TOE includes a flexible, intuitive and usable management system, including certificate based
administrator authentication, customizable administrator permissions, a graphical user interface, and
support for remote management. The product also includes a standards compliant IKE/IPSec
implementation that may be used in the evaluated configuration, something that not all firewall TOEs
include. The IKE/IPSec implementation was tested by ICSA Labs for the correctness of the protocol
implementation and for interoperability with other VPN products.
This evaluation used evidence and analysis from the prior evaluation (VID 10091) of Check Point VPN-
1/Firewall-1 NGX R60, with the changes to the TOE between R60 and R65 receiving the greatest amount
of scrutiny and analysis. The validators worked with the evaluation team to ensure that the analysis and
testing performed for the R65 features was commensurate with EAL4 requirements and the prior R60
evaluation and that analysis and testing of the R60 features was updated as necessary to reflect the new
product's security functionality. The changes from R60 to R65 include the addition of the SSL VPN
security function (including the inclusion of new TOE components and interfaces) as well as some
updates to the R60 interfaces, including support of Office Mode for IKE and Topology Updates for
remote access IPSec VPN.
11 SECURITY TARGET
The Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1 NGX Security Target, Version 1.0, March 4, 2009
is included here by reference.
GLOSSARY
CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCTL Common Evaluation Testing Laboratory
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CM Configuration Management
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DDL Data Definition Language
DML Data Manipulation Language
DRDA Distributed Relational Database Architecture
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
LBAC Label Based Access Control
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards & Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RDBMS Relational Database Management System
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SQL Structured Query Language
ST Security Target
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
TSFI TOE Security Function Interface
12 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 2.2, January 2004
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 2.2 Revision 256, January 2004
[3] COMMON CRITERIA PROJECT SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS. Common Evaluation
Methodology for Information Technology Security: Evaluation Methodology, January
2004, Version 2.2, CCMB-2004-01-004.
[4] COMMON CRITERIA PROJECT SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS. Part 2: Evaluation
Methodology, Supplement: ALC_FLR - Flaw Remediation, Version 1.1, February 2002,
CEM-2001/0015R
[5] SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Evaluation Technical Report for
Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 Part 1 (Non-Proprietary), Revision 0.2, 4 February
2009.
[6] SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Evaluation Technical Report for
Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 Part 1 (Proprietary), Revision 0.2, 4 February
2009.
[7] SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Evaluation Technical Report for
Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 Part 2 (Proprietary), Revision 0.5, 4 February
2009.
[8] Check Point VPN-1 Power/UTM NGX R65 Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 March 2009.
[9] COMMON CRITERIA EVALUATION AND VALIDATION SCHEME. NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security, Guidance to Common Criteria Testing
Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001, Scheme Publication #4.