Security Target
for JPKI applet on Connected eSE 5.3.4 ST54L
Version 1.4
Contents
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1
TOE scope........................................................................................................ 3
Operation and major security features ............................................................. 5
JPKI preparation stage..................................................................................... 6
JPKI operational use stage............................................................................... 7
2. Conformance claims.............................................................................................................. 8
3. Security problem definition................................................................................................... 9
4. Security objectives............................................................................................................... 12
5. Extended components definition ....................................................................................... 20
6. Security requirements ......................................................................................................... 21
User data protection (FDP)............................................................................. 21
Security assurance requirements taken from the PP Part 2.......................... 21
Security functional requirements taken from the PP Part 4 ........................... 26
Security functional requirements defined in the ST ....................................... 27
Security requirement coverage ...................................................................... 30
7. TOE summary specification................................................................................................ 37
8. References ............................................................................................................................ 41
1
1. Introduction
The Japanese Public Key Infrastructure (JPKI), a substitute name for the Public Certification Service for
Individuals operated by the Japan Agency for Local Authority Information Systems (J-LIS). JPKI provides public
ID authentication for user identification and provides document signing and user authentication. JPKI issue two
kinds of electronic certificate, one is electronic certificate for signing and another is electronic certificate for user
certification.
ST reference
Table 1-1 ST reference
ST reference
Title Security Target for JPKI applet on Connected eSE 5.3.4 ST54L
Version 1.4
Authors FeliCa Networks, Inc.
Reference SJP-CC-FN-240227-001
TOE reference
Table 1-2 TOE reference
TOE reference
TOE name JPKI applet on Connected eSE 5.3.4 ST54L
TOE version V1.0
TOE reference JPKI applet on Connected eSE 5.3.4 ST54L
TOE developer FeliCa Networks, Inc.
Product Type Java Card Applet on Java Card OS
Platform Name Connected eSE 5.3.4 ST54L
IC Name ST54L
IC certification number NSCIB CC-23-0638980
Definitions
Table 1-3 Definitions
Definition
Administrator user who performs TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation, or other TOE
administrative functions
Advanced electronic
signature
digital signature which meets specific requirements in laws relating to Japanese
Public Key Infrastructure.
Authentication data information used to verify the claimed identity of a user
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Certificate digital signature used as electronic attestation binding an SVD to a person
confirming the identity of that person as legitimate signer
Certificate info information associated with a SCD/SVD pair that may be stored in a SSCD
Certificate generation
application
CGA
collection of application components that receive the SVD from the SSCD to
generate a certificate obtaining data to be included in the certificate and to create a
digital signature of the certificate
Certification service
provider
CSP
entity that issues certificates or provides other services related to electronic
signatures.
In this ST, CSP is called as SP-TSM.
Data to be signed
DTBS
all electronic data to be signed including a user message and signature attributes
Data to be signed or its
unique representation
DTBS/R
data received by a SSCD as input in a single signature creation operation
Individual Number
Card
a plastic card embedded with IC chip, and the holder’s name, address, date of birth,
sex, and Individual Number is printed on the face of the card.
JPKI application a mobile phone application responsible for CGA and SCA.
Legitimate user user of a SSCD who gains possession of it from an SSCD‐provisioning service
provider and who can be authenticated by the SSCD as its signatory
Qualified certificate public key certificate that meets the requirements laid down in laws relating to
Japanese Public Key Infrastructure and that is provided by a CSP that fulfils the
requirements laid down in laws relating to Japanese Public Key Infrastructure
Qualified electronic
signature
advanced electronic signature that has been created with an SSCD with a key
certified with a qualified certificate
Reference
authentication data
RAD
data persistently stored by the TOE for authentication of a user as authorised for a
particular role
Secure Channel
Protocol '03'
a protocol from GlobalPlatform for mutual authentication and encrypted transport.
The protocol allows for C-MAC, C-ENC, R-MAC and R-ENC modes of encryption
and authentication of data
Secure Signature
Creation Device
SSCD
hardware or software that is used in creating an electronic signature
Secure Element Issuer
Trusted Service
Manager
SEI-TSM
entity that loads JPKI applet on the secure element in the mobile phone
Signatory legitimate user of an SSCD associated with it in the certificate of the signature
3
verification and who is authorised by the SSCD to operate the signature creation
function
Signature attribute additional information that is signed together with a user message
Signature creation
application
SCA
application complementing an SSCD with a user interface with the purpose to create
an electronic signature
Signature creation data
SCD
private cryptographic key stored in the SSCD under exclusive control by the
signatory to create an electronic signature.
JPKI applet has two SCDs, which are “the private key for signing” and “the private
key for user certification”.
Signature creation
system
complete system that creates an electronic signature consists of the SCA and the
SSCD
Signature verification
data
SVD
public cryptographic key that can be used to verify an electronic signature.
JPKI applet has two SVDs, which are “the public key for signing” and “the public
key for user certification”.
SSCD-provisioning
service
service to prepare and provide an SSCD to a subscriber and to support the
signatory with certification of generated keys and administrative functions of the
SSCD
User entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE
User Message data determined by the signatory as the correct input for signing
Verification
authentication data
VAD
data provided as input to a SSCD for authentication by cognition or by data derived
from a user’s biometric characteristics
TOE Overview
The TOE, JPKI applet on Connected eSE 5.3.4 ST54L, is a Java Card system that provides a secure signature
creation device (SSCD) with key generation for creating an electronic signature and authenticating users. The
TOE is embedded as a secure element (eSE) on the mobile phone.
TOE scope
The following figure illustrates the physical scope of the TOE (indicated in yellow).;
4
Figure 1-1 TOE physical scope
The components of the TOE are explained as follows:
 JPKI applet constitutes the part of the TOE that is responsible for generating a key pair for digital
signature and for user certification. It manages the access control to use the signature creation function
and executes the cryptographic operation for generating an electronic signature. JPKI applet is
installed as a post-issuance in the operational environment.
 Connected eSE 5.3.4 ST54L is a Java Card Platform that manages and executes applets. It provides
APIs for developing applets in accordance with the Java Card specification [JP-SPEC]. Java Card
Platform has GlobalPlatform packages providing a common interface to communicate with a smart
card and manage applications in a secure way according to the GP specifications [GP].
 ST54L is an integrated circuit that is the hardware platform of the TOE. The hardware platform provides
the basic cryptographic functionalities and includes security detectors, sensors, and circuitry to protect
the TOE. The integrated circuit has been certified by Common Criteria against [BSI-PP-0084].
 The associated guidance documentations are as follows:
 Commercial Applet for Mobile JPKI Projects External Interface Specification [JPKI-IF]
 JPKI applet Installation procedure [JPKI-IP]
 JPKI applet Delivery and acceptance procedure [JPKI-PRE]
 JPKI applet User guidance [JPKI-UGM]
 Table 1-4 The components of the TOE
Name Version Form of delivery Delivery method
Hardware ST54L Rev C eSE HW By courier
Software Thales Connected eSE
5.3.4 ST54L
V1.0 embedded in the
above
By courier
Contactless
card reader
Other Java
Applets
Mobile Phone
Integrated circuit
BCM_SPS02
Antenna
CLF
Host
Controller
JPKI
Applet
Java Card platform
TOE (inside the yellow box)
GP-SE
5
JPKI applet 1.0 binary Procedures in accordance
with [JPKI-PRE].
Guidance JPKI applet, Delivery and
acceptance procedure
1.0 PDF Procedures in accordance
with [JPKI-PRE].
JPKI applet, Installation
procedure
1.1 PDF Procedures in accordance
with [JPKI-PRE].
JPKI applet User
guidance
1.0 PDF Procedures in accordance
with [JPKI-PRE].
Operation and major security features
This section presents a functional overview of the TOE in its distinct operational environments.
 The preparation environment where JPKI application interacts with the SEI-TSM to load JPKI applet,
and where the TOE interacts with a certification service provider (SP-TSM) to obtain a certificate for
the signature verification data (SVD) corresponding with the signature creation data (SCD) generated
by the TOE.
 The signing environment where it interacts with a signer through JPKI application to sign data after
authenticating the signer as its signatory. The signature creation application (SCA) provides the data
to be signed, or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R) as input to the TOE signature creation
function and obtains the resulting digital signature.
The TOE performs the following functions:
 to generate SCD for digital signature and the correspondent SVD;
 to generate SCD for user certification and the correspondent SVD;
 to export the SVDs for certification;
 to receive and store certificate info;
 to switch the TOE from a non-operational state to an operational state; and
 to create digital signatures through the following steps:
A) select a SCD for digital signature in the SSCD,
B) authenticate the signatory and determine its intent to sign,
C) receive DTBS,
D) apply an appropriate cryptographic signature creation function using the selected SCD to the
DTBS.
 to authenticate user for user certification through the following steps:
A) select a SCD for user certification in the SSCD,
B) authenticate the signatory and determine its intent to sign,
C) receive DTBS,
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D) apply an appropriate cryptographic signature creation function using the selected SCD to the
DTBS.
Lifecycle
The TOE life cycle distinguishes phases for development and usage. The development phase is subject of CC
evaluation according to ALC class. The development phase ends with the delivery of the TOE (the delivery of
the eSE to a mobile phone manufacturer and delivery of JPKI applet to SEI-TSM). The eSE is delivered to a
mobile phone user. The usage phase has two stages: the JPKI preparation stage and JPKI operational use
stage, in usage phase. JPKI applet is loaded and installed by SEI-TSM in the JPKI preparation stage. The TOE
lifecycle and the two stages are described in the following figure and sections.
Figure 1-2 TOE lifecycle
JPKI preparation stage
During JPKI preparation stage, SEI-TSM performs the following tasks:
7
 Load and install JPKI applet to the eSE embedded in the mobile phone held by the user.
 Generate a temporary PIN and store it as RAD in the TOE
After installing JPKI applet, SP-TSM performs the following tasks:
 Obtain information on the intended recipient of the device as required for the preparation process and
identification as a legitimate user by authenticating the user’s Individual Number Card.
 Perform the mutual authentication with the TOE and establish the secure channel between SP-TSM
and the TOE.
 Request the TOE to generate SCD/SVD pairs for digital signature and user certification
 Request the TOE to export SVD from the TOE and import certificate information corresponding to the
SVD to the TOE via a secure channel between the TOE and SP-TSM.
 Change RAD to a PIN specified by the legitimate user.
JPKI operational use stage
In this lifecycle stage, the signatory can use the TOE to create electronic signatures.
The JPKI operational use stage begins when the signatory has obtained the TOE and SCD/SVD pair and set
RAD. Enabling the TOE for signing requires at least one set of SCD stored in its memory.
The signatory can also interact with the TOE to perform management tasks, such as reset an RAD value or
use a counter if the password/PIN in the reference data has been lost or blocked. Such management tasks
require a secure environment.
The signatory can render an SCD in the TOE permanently unusable. Rendering the last SCD in the TOE
permanently unusable ends the life of the TOE as SSCD.
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2. Conformance claims
CC conformance claim
The evaluation is based on the following:
 "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation", Version 3.1 Release 5 (composed
of Parts 1-3, [CC Part 1], [CC Part 2], and [CC Part 3])
 "Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology",
Version 3.1 [CC CEM]
This Security Target claims the following conformances:
 [CC Part 2] extended
 [CC Part 3] conformant
Package claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package:
 Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
PP claim
This Security Target and the TOE claim strict conformance to the following Protection Profiles (PP):
 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation [SSCD2]
 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 4: Extension for device with key
generation and trusted channel to certificate generation application [SSCD4]
This ST does not claim the Java Card PP conformance, but the security functionalities of the platform are
implemented in accordance with Java Card PP [JC-PP].
PP claim rationale
This ST includes all the security objectives and requirements claimed by section 2.3, and all the operations
applied to the SFRs are in accordance with the requirements of these PPs.
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3. Security problem definition
Assets
CC defines assets as entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon. The term “asset” is
used to describe the threats in the operational environment of the TOE.
Assets has been taken from [SSCD2] adding some descriptions for JPKI.
Table 3-1 Assets and objects
Assets Description
SCD private key used to perform an electronic signature operation. The
confidentiality, integrity and signatory’s sole control over the use of the SCD
shall be maintained.
In JPKI, SCD corresponds “the private key for digital signature” and “the
private key for user certification”.
SVD public key linked to the SCD and used to perform electronic signature
verification. The integrity of the SVD when it is exported shall be maintained.
In JPKI, SVD corresponds “the public key for digital signature” and “the
public key for user certification”.
DTBS and DTBS/R set of data, or its representation, which the signatory intends to sign. Their
integrity and the unforgeability of the link to the signatory provided by the
electronic signature shall be maintained.
Subjects
Table 3-2 Subjects
Subjects Definition
User End user of the TOE who can be identified as administrator or signatory. The subject
S.User may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin or as S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
Administrator User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation or other
TOE administrative functions. The subject S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for
this user after successful authentication as administrator.
Signatory User who hold the TOE and use it on their own behalf or on behalf of the natural or
legal person or entity they represent. The subject S.Sigy is acting in the role R.Sigy
for this user after successful authentication as signatory.
Attacker Human or process acting on their behalf located outside the TOE. The main goal of
the attacker is to access the SCD or to falsify the electronic signature. The attacker
has got a high attack potential and knows no secret.
Threats
Threats are as defined in [SSCD2] and [SSCD4].
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Table 3-3 Threats
Threats Description
T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature creation data
An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD
during generation, storage and use for signature creation in the TOE.
T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature creation data
An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to
the SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data exported outside
the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts physically with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in
arbitrary security compromises. This threat is directed against SCD, SVD and DTBS.
T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD
integrity in the certificate of the signatory.
T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
An attacker misuses the signature creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data
the signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts
possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and
concepts employed by the TOE.
T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS/R
An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE
for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.
T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges a signed data object, maybe using an electronic signature that has
been created by the TOE, and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is
not detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature created by the TOE is
subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced
knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
Organisational security policies
Organisational security policies are as defined in [SSCD2] and [SSCD4]. P.RND and P.Hash are additional
operational security policies in this ST.
Table 3-4 Organisational security policies (OSP)
OSP Description
P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified
certificate (cf. the directive, Article 2, Clause 9, and Annex I) for the SVD generated by the
SSCD. The certificates contain at least the name of the signatory and the SVD matching
the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures
that the use of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or other
publicly available information.
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P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures
The signatory uses a signature creation system to sign data with an advanced electronic
signature (cf. the directive, Article 1, Clause 2), which is a qualified electronic signature if it
is based on a valid qualified certificate (according to the directive Annex I). The DTBS are
presented to the signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD
creates the electronic signature created with a SCD implemented in the SSCD that the
signatory maintain under their sole control and is linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner
that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.
P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature creation device
The TOE meets the requirements for an SSCD laid down in Annex III of the directive. This
implies the SCD is used for digital signature creation under sole control of the signatory
and the SCD can practically occur only once.
P.Sig_Non-
Repud
Non-repudiation of signatures
The lifecycle of the SSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the
signatory is not able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully verified with
the SVD contained in their unrevoked certificate.
P.RND Sufficient quality of random numbers
The TSF generates random numbers to be used for the TSF itself. The quality of random
numbers is sufficient to prevent prediction by an attacker.
P.Hash Capability of hash calculator
The TSF calculates a secure hash value.
Application note: SSCD PP is for use by the European Commission in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 9 of the Directive 1999/93/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures as generally recognised standard for electronic-
signature products in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The ST is for use by the Japanese
Government in accordance with laws relating to Japanese Public Key Infrastructure.
Assumptions
Assumptions are as defined in [SSCD2].
Table 3-5 Assumptions
Assumptions Description
A.CGA Trustworthy certificate generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name or pseudonym and the SVD in the
(qualified) certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP.
A.SCA Trustworthy signature creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of the
data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
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4. Security objectives
Security objectives for the TOE
Security objectives for the TOE are as defined in [SSCD2] and [SSCD4]. OT.RND and OT.Hash are additional
ecurity objectives for the TOE in this ST.
Table 4-1 Security objectives for the TOE
Security objectives for the
TOE
Description
OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and
operational usage. The TOE shall securely destroy the SCD on demand of the
signatory.
Application note: The TOE may contain more than one set of SCD. There is no
need to destroy the SCD in case of repeated SCD generation. The signatory
shall be able to destroy the SCD stored in the SSCD, e.g. after the (qualified)
certificate for the corresponding SVD has been expired.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorised SCD/SVD generation
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may
invoke the generation of the SCD and the SVD
OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of an SCD/SVD pair it creates as
suitable for the advanced or qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for
signature creation shall practically occur only once and shall not be
reconstructable from the SVD. In that context 'practically occur once' means that
the probability of equal SCDs is negligible.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD
generated by the TOE. This includes unambiguous reference of a created
SVD/SCD pair for export of the SVD and in creating an electronic signature
creation with the SCD
OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature creation data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature creation) shall be reasonably
assured against attacks with a high attack potential.
Application note: The TOE shall keep the confidentiality of the SCD at all times,
in particular during SCD/SVD generation, signature creation operation, storage
and secure destruction.
OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge
of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be
reconstructable using the digital signatures or any other data exportable from the
TOE. The digital signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when
executed with a high attack potential.
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OT.Sigy_SigF Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only
The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate
signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall
resist attacks with high attack potential.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE
The TOE shall not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may
consist of the DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature
creation process where the TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely)
for signature creation.
OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security
The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production
of intelligible emanations within specified limits.
OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection
The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its
components, and uses those features to limit security breaches.
OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance
The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices
and components.
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth Authentication proof as SSCD
The TOE shall hold unique identity and authentication data as SSCD and provide
security mechanisms to identify and to authenticate itself as SSCD.
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp TOE trusted channel for SVD export
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the CGA to protect the integrity of the
SVD exported to the CGA. The TOE shall enable the CGA to detect alteration of
the SVD exported by the TOE.
OT.RND Provide sufficient quality of random numbers
The TSF shall generate random numbers meeting the quality metric depending
on purposes. Furthermore, the TSF shall prevent itself from leaking information
so that an attacker cannot guess the random number generated.
OT.Hash Provide capability of hash calculation
The TSF shall provide capability of hash calculation meeting the standard
algorithm.
Security objectives for the operational environment
Security objectives for the operational environment are as defined in [SSCD2] and [SSCD4].
Table 4-2 Security objectives for the operational environment
Security objectives for the
operational environment
Description
OE.SVD_Auth Authenticity of the SVD
The operational environment shall ensure the integrity of the SVD sent to the
CGA of the CSP. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in
the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate.
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OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes (amongst others):
a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE;
b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control
of the signatory;
c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD
corresponding to the SVD is stored in a SSCD.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD-provisioning service
The SSCD-provisioning service handles authentic devices that implement the
TOE, prepares the TOE for proof as SSCD to external entities, personalises
the TOE for the legitimate user as signatory, links the identity of the TOE as
SSCD with the identity of the legitimate user, and delivers the TOE to the
signatory. Note: This objective replaces OE.SSCD_Prov_Service from the core
PP, which is possible as it does not imply any additional requirements for the
operational environment when compared to OE.SSCD_Prov_Service
(OE.Dev_Prov_Service is a subset of OE.SSCD_Prov_Service).
OE.HID_VAD Protection of the VAD
If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this
device shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the
authentication method employed from import through its human interface until
import through the TOE interface. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted
channel for import of the VAD, the HID shall support usage of this trusted
channel.
OE.DTBS_Intend SCA sends data intended to be signed
The signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that:
 generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and
which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for
signing by the TOE;
 sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of
the DTBS/R by the TOE;
 attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it
separately.
OE.DTBS_Protect SCA protects the data intended to be signed
The operational environment shall ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered
in transit between the SCA and the TOE. In particular, if the TOE requires a
trusted channel for import of the DTBS/R, the SCA shall support usage of this
trusted channel.
OE.Signatory Security obligation of the signatory
The signatory shall check that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from
SSCD-provisioning service is in non-operational state. The signatory shall
keep their VAD confidential.
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth Pre-initialisation of the TOE for SSCD authentication
The CSP shall check by means of the CGA whether the device presented for
application of a (qualified) certificate holds unique identification as SSCD,
successfully proved this identity as SSCD to the CGA, and whether this identity
is linked to the legitimate holder of the device as applicant for the certificate.
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OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp CGA trusted channel for SVD import
The CGA shall detect alteration of the SVD imported from the TOE with the
claimed identity of the SSCD.
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Security objectives rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
Table 4-3 Mapping of security problem definition to security objectives
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.RND
OT.Hash
OE.CGA_QCert
OE.SVD_Auth
OE.Dev_Prov_Service
OE.HID_VAD
OE.DTBS_Intend
OE.DTBS_Protect
OE.Signatory
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp
T.SCD_Divulg X
T.SCD_Derive X X
T.Hack_Phys X X X X
T.SVD_Forgery X X X X
T.SigF_Misuse X X X X X X X
T.DTBS_Forgery X X X
T.Sig_Forgery X X X
P.CSP_QCert X X X X X
P.QSign X X X X
P.Sigy_SSCD X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
P.Sig_Non-Repud X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
P.RND X
P.Hash X
A.CGA X X
A.SCA X
T.SCD_Divulg (Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature creation data) addresses the threat against the
legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of SCD outside the TOE. This threat is countered
by OT.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD used for signature creation.
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via public known data
produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and the signatures created with the SCD.
17
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen counters this threat by implementing cryptographically secure generation of the
SCD/SVD pair. OT.Sig_Secure ensures cryptographically secure electronic signatures.
T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting physical
vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD. OT.EMSEC_Design counters
physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and observation of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper_ID and
OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat T.Hack_Phys by detecting and by resisting tampering attacks.
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature verification data) deals with the forgery of the SVD exported by the
TOE to the CGA for the generation of the certificate. T.SVD_Forgery is addressed by OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp,
which ensures correspondence between SVD and SCD and unambiguous reference of the SVD/SCD pair for
the SVD export and signature creation with the SCD, and OE.SVD_Auth that ensures the integrity of the SVD
exported by the TOE to the CGA and verification of the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the
signatory and the SVD in the input it provides to the certificate generation function of the CSP. Additionally,
T.SVD_Forgery is addressed by OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp, which ensures that the TOE sends the SVD in a
verifiable form through a trusted channel to the CGA, as well as by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp, which provides
verification of SVD authenticity by the CGA.
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat of misuse of the
TOE signature creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to create an electronic signature on
data for which the signatory has not expressed the intent to sign, as required by paragraph 1(c) of Annex III.
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation,
personalisation and operational usage including secure destruction of the SCD, which may be initiated by the
signatory. OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) ensures that the TOE provides
the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.DTBS_Intend (Data intended to be signed)
ensures that the SCA sends the DTBS/R only for data the signatory intends to sign and OE.DTBS_Protect
counters manipulation of the DTBS during transmission over the channel between the SCA and the TOE.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) prevents the DTBS/R from alteration inside the TOE.
If the SCA provides a human interface for user authentication, OE.HID_VAD (Protection of the VAD) provides
confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed. OE.Signatory
ensures that the signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD when received from an SSCD-provisioning
service provider is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes control
over the SSCD. OE.Signatory ensures also that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from modifications of the data sent as
input to the TOE's signature creation function that does not represent the DTBS as presented to the signatory
and for which the signature has expressed its intent to sign. The TOE IT environment addresses
T.DTBS_Forgery by the means of OE.DTBS_Intend, which ensures that the trustworthy SCA generates the
DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form
appropriate for signing by the TOE, and by means of OE.DTBS_Protect, which ensures that the DTBS/R cannot
be altered in transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters this threat by the means of
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE by ensuring the integrity of the DTBS/R inside the TOE.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the electronic signature.
OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Unique and OE.CGA_QCert address this threat in general. OT.Sig_Secure
(Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) ensures by means of robust cryptographic techniques that the
signed data and the electronic signature are securely linked together. OT.SCD_Unique ensures that the same
SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding SVD cannot be included in another certificate
by chance. OE.CGA_QCert prevents forgery of the certificate for the corresponding SVD, which would result in
false verification decision concerning a forged signature.
18
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to
sign data with (qualified) electronic signatures, as defined by the Directive, article 5, paragraph 1. Directive,
recital (15) refers to SSCDs to ensure the functionality of advanced signatures. The OE.CGA_QCert addresses
the requirement of qualified (or advanced) electronic signatures as being based on qualified (or non-qualified)
certificates. According to OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth the copies of the TOE will hold unique identity and
authentication data as SSCD and provide security mechanisms enabling the CGA to identify and to authenticate
the TOE as SSCD to prove this identity as SSCD to the CGA. The OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth ensures that the SP
checks the proof of the device presented of the applicant that it is a SSCD. The OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures
that the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA corresponds to the SCD stored in the TOE and used by the
signatory. The OT.Lifecycle_Security ensures that the TOE detects flaws during the initialisation,
personalisation and operational usage.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to sign data
with an advanced electronic signature, which is a qualified electronic signature if based on a valid qualified
certificate. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures signatory’s sole control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to provide the
signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others.
OT.Sig_Secure ensures that the TOE creates electronic signatures, which cannot be forged without knowledge
of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. OE.CGA_QCert addresses the requirement of qualified or
non-qualified electronic certificates building a base for the electronic signature. OE.DTBS_Intend ensures that
the SCA provides only those DTBS to the TOE, which the signatory intends to sign.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature creation device) requires the TOE to meet Annex III of the Directive.
The paragraph 1(a) of Annex III is ensured by OT.SCD_Unique requiring that the SCD used for signature
creation can practically occurs only once. The OT.SCD_Secrecy OT.Sig_Secure and OT.EMSEC_Design and
OT.Tamper_Resistance address the secrecy of the SCD (cf. paragraph 1(a) of Annex III). OT.SCD_Secrecy
and OT.Sig_Secure meet the requirement in paragraph 1(b) of Annex III by the requirements to ensure that the
SCD cannot be derived from SVD, the electronic signatures or any other data exported outside the TOE.
OT.Sigy_SigF meets the requirement in paragraph 1(c) of Annex III by the requirements to ensure that the TOE
provides the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use
of others. OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirements in paragraph 2 of Annex III as the TOE shall not
alter the DTBS/R. The usage of SCD under sole control of the signatory is ensured by OT.Lifecycle_Security,
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen and OT.Sigy_SigF.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the legitimate user obtains a TOE sample as an authentic, initialised and
personalised TOE from an SSCD-provisioning service through the TOE delivery procedure. If the TOE
implements SCD generated under control of the SSCD-provisioning service, the legitimate user receives the
TOE as SSCD. If the TOE is delivered to the legitimate user without SCD in the operational phase he or she
applies for the (qualified) certificate as the Device holder and legitimate user of the TOE. The CSP will use the
TOE security feature (addressed by the security objectives OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp)
to check whether the device presented is a SSCD linked to the applicant as required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth
and the received SVD is sent by this SSCD as required by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. Thus the obligation of the
SSCD-provision service for the first SCD/SVD pair is complemented in an appropriate way by the CSP for the
SCD/SVD pair generated outside the secure preparation environment.
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data by the signatory,
although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in their certificate valid at the
time of signature creation. This policy is implemented by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE
and its operational environment, which ensures the aspects of signatory’s sole control over and responsibility
for the electronic signatures created with the TOE.
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service ensures that the signatory obtains an authentic copy of the TOE, initialised and
personalised as SSCD from the SSCD-provisioning service.
19
OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD to the
signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure authenticity of the SVD as
being exported by the TOE and used under sole control of the signatory. OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that
the SVD exported by the TOE corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD_Unique
provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically occur just once.
OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory checks that the SCD, stored in the SSCD received from an SSCD-
provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes into
sole control over the SSCD). The TOE security feature addressed by the security objectives
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp supported by OE.Dev_Prov_Service enables the
verification whether the device presented by the applicant is a SSCD as required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth and
the received SVD is sent by the device holding the corresponding SCD as required by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp.
OT.Sigy_SigF provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature creation. As prerequisite
OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential. OE.DTBS_Intend, OE.DTBS_Protect
and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE ensure that the TOE generates electronic signatures only for a DTBS/R that the
signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust cryptographic techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure
ensure that only this SCD may generate a valid electronic signature that can be successfully verified with the
corresponding SVD used for signature verification. The security objective for the TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security
(Lifecycle security), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of the signature creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide
physical emanations security), OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) and OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper
resistance) protect the SCD against any compromise.
P.RND (Sufficient quality of random numbers) requires the TOE to provide good quality of random numbers. If
OT.RND is enforced, random numbers with a quality sufficient for the TSF will be generated, and it will prevent
an attacker from retrieving information helpful to guess random numbers.
P.Hash (Capability of hash calculator) requires the TOE to provide capability of hash calculation. If OT.Hash is
enforced, hash is calculated in accordance with the standard algorithm.
Application note: SSCD PP is for use by the European Commission in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 9 of the Directive 1999/93/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures as generally recognised standard for electronic-
signature products in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The ST is for use by the Japanese
Government in accordance with laws relating to Japanese Public Key Infrastructure.
20
5. Extended components definition
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined in
[SSCD2]. This ST uses the component FPT_EMS.1 as defined in [SSCD2]. The additional family FIA_API
(Authentication Proof of Identity) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined in [SSCD4]. This
ST uses the component FIA_API.1 as defined in [SSCD4]. The additional family FCS_RNG (Generation of
random numbers) of Class FCS (Cryptographic support) is defined in [PP-PN]. This ST uses the component
FCS_RNG as defined in [PP-PN].
21
6. Security requirements
This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance requirements for the TOE.
Security functional requirements
The Security Objectives result in a set of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs).
Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 describes the SFRs which are defined in the PPs [SSCD2] and [SSCD4], respectively.
Section 6.1.4 describes the additional SFRs in this ST.
About the notation used for Security Functional Requirements (SFRs):
Refinements are denoted as bold.
Selections are denoted as underlined text.
Assignments are denoted as underlined text and bold.
User data protection (FDP)
Table 6-1 : Subjects and security attributes for access control
Subject or object the security
attribute is associated with
Security attribute type Value of the security attribute
S.User Role R.Admin – S.User acts as S.Admin
R.Sigy – S.User acts as S.Sigy
S.User SCD/SVD Management authorised, not authorised
SCD SCD Operational no, yes
SCD SCD identifier arbitrary value
SVD (This ST does not define
security attributes for SVD)
(This ST does not define security
attributes for SVD)
Security assurance requirements taken from the PP Part 2
FCS_CKM.1/SCD Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/SCD The TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD pair in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and specified cryptographic key
sizes 2048 bit that meet the following: [FIPS 186-4].
FCS_CKM.4/SCD Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1/SCD The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method either overwriting with new SCD or
deleting SCD when JPKI applet deletion that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/SCD Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SCD The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit that meet the
following: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
22
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP on:
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SCD, SVD,
(3) operations: generation of SCD/SVD pair.
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP to objects based on the
following: the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD / SVD
Management”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD Management” set to
“authorised” is allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD management” set to “not
authorised” is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on:
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SVD,
(3) operations: export.
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on the following:
(1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role,
(2) the SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: R.Admin is allowed to
export SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none
23
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/Signature_Creation The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP on:
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD,
(3) operations: signature creation.
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/Signature_Creation The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to objects based on
the following:
(1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role”,
and
(2) the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/Signature_Creation The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with
SCD which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”.
FDP_ACF.1.3/Signature_Creation The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/Signature_Creation The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R
with SCD which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “no”.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following
objects: SCD.
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_SDI.2.1/Persistent The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for
integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity
checked stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/Persistent Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall:
(1) prohibit the use of the altered data,
(2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_SDI.2.1/DTBS The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for
integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked
stored DTBS.
24
FDP_SDI.2.2/DTBS Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall:
(1) prohibit the use of the altered data,
(2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow:
(1) self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
(2) establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and the TOE by means
of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SVD,
(3) select File, read some file without authentication and generate random
number
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow:
(1) self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
(2) identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1,
(3) establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SVD,
(4) select File, read file without authentication, and generate random
number
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 5 in user authentication for digital signature or 3
in user authentication for user certification unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met, the TSF shall block RAD.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
25
FMT_SMF.1 Security management functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
(1) Creation and modification of RAD,
(2) Enabling the signature creation function,
(3) Modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD
operational,
(4) Change the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier,
(5) none.
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions signature creation
function to R.Sigy.
FMT_MSA.1/Admin Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1/Admin The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP to restrict the ability
to modify the security attributes SCD / SVD management to R.Admin.
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signatory The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to restrict the ability to
modify the security attributes SCD operational to R.Sigy.
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for SCD / SVD
Management and SCD operational.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP, SVD Transfer SFP and
Signature Creation SFP to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the R.Admin to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.4 Security attribute value inheritance
FMT_MSA.4.1 The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:
(1) If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without S.Sigy
being authenticated the security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD”
shall be set to “no” as a single operation.
(2) If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute
“SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “yes” as a single operation.
26
FMT_MTD.1/Admin Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Admin The TSF shall restrict the ability to create the RAD to R.Admin.
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Signatory The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the RAD to R.Sigy.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit side channel emission in excess of limits specified
by the state-of-the-art attacks on smart card IC enabling access to RAD and
SCD.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface
physical chip contact or contactless I/O to gain access to RAD and SCD.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
(1) self-test according to FPT_TST fails,
(2) IC environmental sensors detection (Temperature out of range, Supply
Voltage of chip)
(3) IC internal error detection sensors failure (Parity, RNG, operation)
FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might
compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering
with the TSF’s devices or TSF’s elements has occurred.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
hardware of the TOE and software composing the TSF by responding
automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up or before running
a secure operation to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF.
Security functional requirements taken from the PP Part 4
27
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide an asymmetric device authentication mechanism to
prove the identity of the SSCD.
FDP_DAU.2/SVD Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
FDP_DAU.2.1/SVD The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of SVD.
FDP_DAU.2.2/SVD The TSF shall provide CGA with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information and the identity of the user that generated the
evidence.
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/SVD The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product CGA that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides ensured identification of its end points and protection of
the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/SVD The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/SVD The TSF or the CGA shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
(1) data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor according to FIA_API.1
and FDP_DAU.2/SVD,
(2) import of certificate info from the GCA.
Application note: Trusted channel mandates both a successful device authentication and an active secure
messaging session. The TOE provides an asymmetric device authentication mechanism and secure messaging
session in accordance with GlobalPlatform Technology Secure Channel Protocol '03' [GP-D]. The established
secure messaging session along with device authentication helps identify the SSCD itself as required by
FIA_API.1.
Security functional requirements defined in the ST
FCS_CKM.4/Ext_Auth Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1/Ext_Auth The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method either overwriting with new key for
external authentication or deleting key for external authentication when
JPKI applet deletion that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/Ext_Auth Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/Ext_Auth The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit that
meet the following: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
28
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform hash calculation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the
following: FIPS180-4.
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generator
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a hybrid random number generator that implements:
none.
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet the NIST test suite [SP800-
22].
FDP_ACC.1/Ext_Auth Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/Ext_Auth The TSF shall enforce the public key import SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: public key,
(3) operations: write
FDP_ACF.1/Ext_Auth Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/Ext_Auth The TSF shall enforce the public key import SFP to objects based on the
following:
(1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role” and (2)
the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”
FDP_ACF.1.2/Ext_Auth The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role” and (2)
the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”
FDP_ACF.1.3/Ext_Auth The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none
FDP_ACF.1.4/Ext_Auth The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
S.User is not allowed to write a public key for External authentication which
security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “no”.
FDP_ITC.1/Ext_Auth Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/Ext_Auth The TSF shall enforce the public key import SFP when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/Ext_Auth The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/Ext_Auth The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
29
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to External
authentication using public key.
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
(1) Password authentication,
(2) External authentication using public key
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
(1) Default authentication mechanism is “Password authentication”,
(2) If the user activates alternative methods via SCA, “External
authentication using public key” is used.
FMT_MSA.1/Ext_Auth Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1/Ext_Auth The TSF shall enforce the public key import SFP to restrict the ability to
modify the security attributes SCD operational to R.Sigy.
FMT_MSA.3/Ext_Auth Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3.1/Ext_Auth The TSF shall enforce the public key import SFP to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Ext_Auth The TSF shall allow the R.Admin to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
Security assurance requirements
The Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4
(EAL4) and augmented by the component ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The assurance requirements are
shown in the following table.
Table 6-2 Assurance requirements: EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Assurance Class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Architectural Design with domain separation and non-
bypassability
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
30
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Security functional requirements rationale
Security requirement coverage
Table 6-3 Functional requirement to TOE security objective mapping
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.RND
OT.Hash
FCS_CKM.1/SCD X X X X
FCS_CKM.4/SCD X X
FCS_COP.1/SCD X X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_ X X
31
Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_
Generation
X X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Tran
sfer
X X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Trans
fer
X X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_
Creation
X X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_
Creation
X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X X X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X
FIA_UID.1 X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X X
FMT_MTD.1/Signaory X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FPT_EMS.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X X
FIA_API.1 X
FDP_DAU.2/SVD X
FTP_ITC.1/SVD X
FCS_CKM.4.1/Ext_Auth X
FCS_COP.1.1/Ext_Auth X
32
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the SFR for SCD/SVD generation FCS_CKM.1, SCD
usage FCS_COP.1 and SCD destruction FCS_CKM.4 which ensure cryptographically secure lifecycle of the
SCD. The SCD/SVD generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation. The SVD transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF according
to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer. The SCD usage is ensured by access control
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation, FDP_AFC.1/Signature_Creation which is based on the security attribute
secure TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.1/ Signatory, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_MTD.1/Admin, FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1. The
test functions FPT_TST.1 provides failure detection throughout the lifecycle.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorised SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a SCD/SVD pair
requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 provide user identification
and user authentication prior to enabling access to authorised functions. The SFR
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation provide access control for the
SCD/SVD generation. The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. The SFR FMT_MSA.4 defines rules for
inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature creation data) implements the requirement of practically unique
SCD as laid down in Annex III, paragraph 1(a), which is provided by the cryptographic algorithms specified by
FCS_CKM.1.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD corresponds to the
SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1 to generate
corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys
are not modified, so to retain the correspondence. Moreover, the SCD Identifier allows the environment to
identify the SCD and to link it with the appropriate SVD. The management functions identified by FMT_SMF.1
and by FMT_MSA.4 allow R.Admin to modify the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of signature creation data) is provided by the security functions specified by the
following SFR. FCS_CKM.1 ensures the use of secure cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD generation.
Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pair shall prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks using the
publicly known SVD. The security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual
information on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has been use for signature creation and that destruction of SCD
leaves no residual information. The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical
data is modified which could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of the SCD.
FPT_TST.1 tests the working conditions of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 guarantees a secure state when integrity
is violated and thus assures that the specified security functions are operational. An example where
compromising error conditions are countered by FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for differential fault analysis (DFA).
SFR FPT_EMS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure the confidentiality
of the SCD.
FCS_COP.1/Hash X
FCS_RNG.1 X
FDP_ACC.1.1/Ext_Auth X
FDP_ACF.1.1/Ext_Auth X
FDP_ITC.1/Ext_Auth X
FIA_UAU.4 X
FIA_UAU.5 X
FMT_MSA.1/Ext_Auth X
FMT_MSA.3/Ext_Auth X
33
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the cryptographic algorithms
specified by FCS_COP.1, which ensures the cryptographic robustness of the signature algorithms.
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE and FPT_TST.1
ensures self-tests ensuring correct signature creation.
OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) is provided by an SFR for
identification authentication and access control. FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 ensure that no signature creation
function can be invoked before the signatory is identified and authenticated. The security functions specified by
FMT_MTD.1/Admin and FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication function. SFR FIA_AFL.1 provides
protection against a number of attacks, such as cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force
attacks against authentication. The security function specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity of
stored DTBS and FDP_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources containing the SCD after de-allocation (e.g.
after the signature creation process). The security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation and
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation provide access control based on the security attributes managed according to
the SFR FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.4. The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1 list these management functions and the roles. These ensure that the signature process is
restricted to the signatory. FMT_MOF.1 restricts the ability to enable the signature creation function to the
signatory. FMT_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attributes SCD operational to the
signatory. To authenticate user for user certification, user can activate alternative authentication methods in
accordance with FIA_UAU.5. FIA_UAU.4 makes sure that unique authentication sessions shall be used every
time. The authentication method is provided by the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1/Ext_Auth,
which ensures the verification of the user. The cryptographic key is imported in accordance with
FDP_ITC.1/Ext_Auth and FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4/Ext_Auth ensure that residual information on the key is
destroyed after the the key has been use for verification of user and that destruction of the key leaves no residual
information. FDP_ACC.1/Ext_Auth and FDP_ACF.1/Ext_Auth provide access control based on the security
attributes managed according to the FMT_MSA.1/Ext_Auth and FMT_MSA.3/Ext_Auth. These ensure that the
key import process is restricted to the signatory.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R is not altered by the
TOE. The integrity functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS require that the DTBS/R has not been altered by
the TOE.
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible information is emanated.
This is provided by FPT_EMS.1.1.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by the means of passive detection of physical
attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical attacks.
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (Authentication proof as SSCD) requires the TOE to provide security mechanisms to
identify and to authenticate themselves as SSCD, which is directly provided by FIA_API.1 (Authentication Proof
of Identity). The SFR FIA_UAU.1 allows (additionally to the core PP) establishment of the trusted channel before
(human) user is authenticated.
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (TOE trusted channel for SVD export) requires the TOE to provide a trusted channel
to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD exported to the CGA, which is directly provided by - The SVD
transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer. - FDP_DAU.2/SVD (Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor), which requires
the TOE to provide CGA with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the SVD and the identity of the user
that generated the evidence. - FTP_ITC.1/SVD (Inter-TSF trusted channel), which requires the TOE to provide
a trusted channel to the CGA.
OT.RND (Provide sufficient quality of random numbers) requires countermeasures that a random number to be
generated has sufficient quality and makes it difficult to be guessed by an attacker. FCS_RNG.1 requires
generation of random numbers satisfying a quality metric needed.
OT.Hash (Provide capability of hash calculation) requires capability of the hash calculation. FCS_COP.1/Hash
requires calculation of hash that meet the secure hash standard.
34
Table 6-4 Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements
SFRs Dependencies Satisfied by
FCS_CKM.1/SCD
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SCD,
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/SCD
FCS_COP.1/SCD
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1], FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/SCD,
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Gener
ation
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Gener
ation
FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creati
on
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creatio
n
FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies n/a
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent No dependencies n/a
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS No dependencies n/a
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n/a
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.2
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
, FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation,
FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.4
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
, FDP_ACC.1/ Signature_Creation
35
FMT_MTD.1/Admin FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n/a
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies n/a
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n/a
FPT_PHP.1 No dependencies n/a
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n/a
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n/a
FIA_API.1 No dependencies n/a
FDP_DAU.2/SVD FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FTP_ITC.1/SVD No dependencies n/a
FCS_CKM.4.1/Ext_Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FDP_ITC.1/Ext_Auth
FCS_COP.1.1/Ext_Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1], FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/Ext_Auth,
FCS_CKM.4.1/Ext_Auth
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1], FCS_CKM.4
Non-satisfied dependency because
no key generation and destruction
for hash necessary
FCS_RNG.1 No dependencies n/a
FDP_ACC.1.1/Ext_Auth FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1.1/Ext_Auth
FDP_ACF.1.1/Ext_Auth
FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACF.1.1/Ext_Auth,
FMT_MSA.3/Ext_Auth
FDP_ITC.1/Ext_Auth
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1.1/Ext_Auth,
FMT_MSA.3/Ext_Auth
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies n/a
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n/a
FMT_MSA.1/Ext_Auth
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1.1/Ext_Auth,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3/Ext_Auth
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1/Ext_Auth,
FMT_SMR.1
Security assurance requirements rationale
To meet the assurance expectations of customers, the assurance level EAL4 and the augmentation with the
requirements ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 are chosen. The assurance level of EAL4 is selected because it
provides a sufficient level of assurance for this type of TOE, which is expected to protect high value assets.
Explanation of the security assurance component ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 follows:
 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures: This Security Target selects ALC_DVS.2 instead of
36
ALC_DVS.1 because it verifies the security measures that provide the necessary level of protection to
maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its user data.
 AVA_VAN.5 Highly resistant: The TOE might be in danger of high-level attacks such as those it might
encounter in a university laboratory. Therefore, AVA_VAN.5 is augmented to confirm that TOE has a high
level of resistance against such attacks.
37
7. TOE summary specification
This section describes how the TOE is intended to comply with the Security Functional Requirements.
Table 7-1 Summary specification of the security functional requirements in the TOE
SFR Summary specification
Security assurance requirements taken from the PP Part 2
FCS_CKM.1/SCD
The TOE provides the RSA key generation algorithm and
specified cryptographic key size of 2048 bit according to FIPS
186-4.
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
Deletion of the cryptographic key for signature creation
requires either overwriting it with a new key or deleting the key
when JPKI applet deletion.
FCS_COP.1/SCD
The TOE provides the cryptographic operation for digital
signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes
2048 bit that meet the following: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation The TOE provides the access control to generate SCD/SVD
against S.User associated with the security attribute “SCD /
SVD Management”. S.User with the security attribute “SCD /
SVD Management” set to “authorised” is allowed to generate
SCD/SVD pairs.
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer The TOE provides the access control to transfer SVD against
S.User associated with the security attribute Role. R.Admin is
allowed to export SVD.
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation The TOE provides the access control to create an electronic
signature against S.User associated with the security attribute
“Role” and the SCD with the security attribute “SCD
Operational”. R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures
for DTBS/R with SCD in which the security attribute “SCD
operational” is set to “yes.”
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
FDP_RIP.1
Any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the
cryptographic buffer.
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
The TOE monitors user data stored in containers controlled by
the TOE for integrity errors on all objects, based on the
following attributes: integrity checked stored data. Upon
detection of a data integrity error, the TOE prohibits the
sending of the altered data and informs the S.Sigy about the
integrity error.
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
The TOE monitors user data stored in containers controlled by
the TOE for integrity error on all objects, based on following
attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS. Upon detection of a
data integrity error, the TOE prohibits the send of the altered
data and informs the S.Sigy about integrity error.
38
SFR Summary specification
FIA_AFL.1
If the counter reaches its maximum value, the RAD is blocked
and cannot be used anymore.
FIA_UAU.1 No signature creation function can be invoked before the
signatory is identified and authenticated.
TOE allows self-test according to FPT_TST, selecting File,
reading some files without authentication, and generating
random numbers before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1 Only authenticated signatory can create digital signature.
FMT_MSA.1/Admin The SCD usage is ensured by access control which is based
on the security attribute secure TSF management according to
these SFRs.
The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided
by FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute
initialisation.
The security attribute SCD/SVD management can be modified
by R.Admin only by FMT_MSA.1/Admin.
The security attribute SCD operational can be modified by
R.Sigy only by FMT_MSA.1/Signatory.
The security attribute SCD operational can be modified by
R.Sigy only by FMT_MSA.4.
The security functions specified by FMT_MTD.1/Admin and
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication function.
Administrator can create the RAD, and signatory can modify
the RAD.
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.4
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 list management functions and
the role.
The administrator and signatory roles are distinguished by
security conditions.
The TOE provides the following management functions:
The creation and modification of the RAD, enables the
signature creation function, modification of the security
attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD operational, and
modification of the default value of the security attribute SCD
Identifier.
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_EMS.1
Leakage of confidential data through side channels is
prevented by the security features of the platform.
FPT_FLS.1
In case self-test fails or a physical attack is detected, the TOE
resets the session and returns an error.
FPT_PHP.1 Detection of physical attack and resistance to physical attack
39
SFR Summary specification
FPT_PHP.3
are achieved by platform functionalities.
FPT_TST.1
Self-testing is provided by the Java Card platform during initial
start-up or before running a secure operation.
Security assurance requirements taken from the PP Part 4
FIA_API.1
The TOE provides an asymmetric device authentication
mechanism in accordance with [GP_D] to prove the identity of
the SSCD.
FDP_DAU.2/SVD
The TOE provides a capability to generate evidence that can
be used as a guarantee of the validity of SCD. SCD is sent to
CGA via a trusted channel in accordance with
FTP_ITC.1/SVD.
FTP_ITC.1/SVD
FTP_ITC.1/SVD requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel
established by the CGP to export the SVD to the CGP in
accordance with [GP_D]. Moreover, the TSF requires the use
of the same trusted channel for the import of certificate info
from the CGP.
Security assurance requirements defined in the ST
FCS_CKM.4.1/Ext_Auth
Deletion of the cryptographic key for signature creation
requires either overwriting it with a new key for External
authentication or deleting the key when JPKI Applet deletion.
FCS_COP.1.1/Ext_Auth
The TOE provides the cryptographic operation for digital
signature verification for External authentication in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and
cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit that meet the following:
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
FCS_COP.1/Hash
The TOE provides the cryptographic operation for hash
calculation in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-256 that meets the following: FIPS 180-4.
The Hash is used in signature creation and signature
verification for the external authentication.
FCS_RNG.1
The TSF shall provide a hybrid random number generator, and
the quality metrics of the random numbers shall meet NIST
[SP800-22].
The random number is used in External authentication.
FDP_ACC.1.1/Ext_Auth
The TOE provides the access control to write a public key for
External authentication against S.User associated with the
security attribute “Role” and the SCD with the security attribute
“SCD Operational”. R.Sigy is allowed to write a public key for
External authentication with the security attribute “SCD
operational” set to “yes.”
FDP_ACF.1.1/Ext_Auth
FDP_ITC.1/Ext_Auth
A public key for External authentication is imported in
accordance with the public key import SFP.
40
SFR Summary specification
FIA_UAU.4
The random numbers are generated anew each time External
authentication using a public key for External authentication is
started and are discarded each time the TOE exits the
authenticated state.
FIA_UAU.5
The TOE provides multiple authentication mechanisms. The
default authentication mechanism is “Password
authentication”. If the user activates alternative methods via
SCA, “External authentication with public key” is used.
FMT_MSA.1/Ext_Auth
The security attribute SCD operational can be modified by
R.Sigy only.
FMT_MSA.3/Ext_Auth
The TOE enforces the public key for External authentication
import SFP to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and allow the
R.Admin to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
41
8. References
[BSI-PP-0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with augmentation Packages– BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014
[CC CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017.
[CC Part 1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017
[CC Part 2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017
[CC Part 3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017.
[GP] GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2.1 GlobalPlatform:2011
[GP_D] GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 － Amendment D Version 1.1.1 GlobalPlatform
Card Technology Secure Channel Protocol '03' :2014
[JC-PP] Java card protection profile - open configuration, certified under the reference BSI-CC-
PP-0099-2017, Version 3.0.5, December 2017
[JC-SPEC] Java Card Platform Virtual Machine Specification, Classic Edition Version 3.1:2021
[JPKI-IF] Commercial Applet for Mobile JPKI Projects Version 1.0
[JPKI-IP] JPKI applet Installation procedure Version 1.0
[JPKI-PRE] JPKI applet Delivery and acceptance procedure Version 1.0
[JPKI-UGM] JPKI applet User guidance Version 1.0
[PP-PN] Personal Number card protection profile version, certified under the reference JISEC ITC-
4485, version 1.00, April 2014
[SP800-22] A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for
Cryptographic Applications, Revised: April 2010
[SSCD2] BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 Common Criteria Protection Profile: EN 419211-2:2013 -
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key
generation, CEN/ISSS - Information Society Standardization System, 18 May 2013
[SSCD4] BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01 Common Criteria Protection Profile: EN 419211-4:2013 -
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 4: Extension for device with
key generation and trusted channel to certificate generation application, CEN/ISSS -
Information Society Standardization System, 12 October 2013