Page 0 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale
Schema nazionale per la valutazione e la certificazione della sicurezza nel settore della tecnologia
dell'informazione (DPCM del 30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004)
Il prodotto identificato in questo certificato è risultato conforme ai requisiti
ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria (CC) CC:2022 Release 1
Certificato n.
(Certificate No.)
09/2026
Rapporto di Certificazione
(Certification Report)
OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC, v1.0
Decorrenza
(Date of 1st
Issue)
11 febbraio 2026
Nome e Versione del Prodotto
(Product Name and Version)
Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0, X Series, E Series
Sviluppatore
(Developer)
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Tipo di Prodotto
(Type of Product)
Protezione dei dati (Data protection)
Livello di Garanzia
(Assurance Level)
EAL2 con l’aggiunta di ALC_FLR.2, Conforme a CC Parte
Parte 3
Conformità a PP
(PP Conformance)
Nessuna
Funzionalità di sicurezza
(Conformance of Functionality)
TDS specifico per il prodotto, Conforme a CC Parte 2
Riconoscimento CCRA per componenti
fino a EAL2 e solo ALC_FLR
(CCRA recognition for components up to
EAL2 and ALC_FLR only)
Riconoscimento SOGIS MRA
per componenti fino a EAL4
(SOGIS MRA recognition
for components up to EAL4)
Roma, 11 febbraio 2026 Il Capo Servizio
Certificazione e Vigilanza
(A. Billet)
[ORIGINAL SIGNED]
Il prodotto IT (Information Technology) identificato nel presente certificato è stato valutato
presso un LVS (Laboratorio per la Valutazione della Sicurezza) accreditato e
abilitato/approvato utilizzando la Metodologia Comune per la Valutazione di Sicurezza
della Tecnologia dell’Informazione CEM:2022 revisione 1 per la conformità ai Criteri
Comuni per la Valutazione di Sicurezza della Tecnologia dell’Informazione CC:2022
revisione 1. Questo certificato si applica solo alla versione e al rilascio specifici del prodotto
nella sua configurazione valutata e unitamente al Rapporto di certificazione completo. La
valutazione è stata condotta in conformità alle disposizioni dello Schema nazionale per la
valutazione e la certificazione della sicurezza nel settore della tecnologia dell'informazione
(DPCM del 30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004) e le conclusioni dell’LVS nel
Rapporto di Fine Valutazione sono coerenti con le evidenze addotte. Il presente Certificato
non costituisce un sostegno o promozione del prodotto IT da parte della Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale o di qualsiasi altra organizzazione che riconosca o dia effetto a
questo certificato, e nessuna garanzia del prodotto IT, da parte della Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale o di qualsiasi altra organizzazione che riconosce o dà effetto a
questo certificato, è espressa o implicita.
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and
licensed/approved evaluation facility using Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation CEM:2022 release 1 for conformance to Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation CC:2022 release 1. This certificate applies only to the specific
version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete
Certification report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
National scheme for the evaluation and certification of the security in the sector of information
technology (Prime Ministerial Decree of 30 October 2003 - Official Journal no. 93 of 27 April 2004)
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product, by Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale or by
any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or
implied.
Page 1 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale
Servizio Certificazione e Vigilanza
Certification Report
Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0,
X Series, E Series
OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC
Version 1.0
11 February 2026
Page 2 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
Courtesy translation
Disclaimer: This English language translation is provided for informational purposes only. It is not
intended to substitute the official document and has no legal value. The original Italian language
version of the document is the only approved and official version.
Page 3 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
1 Document revisions
Version Author Information Date
1.0 OCSI First issue 11/02/2026
Page 4 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
2 Table of contents
1 Document revisions ....................................................................................................................3
2 Table of contents ........................................................................................................................4
3 Acronyms....................................................................................................................................6
3.1 National scheme.................................................................................................................6
3.2 CC and CEM......................................................................................................................6
3.3 Other acronyms..................................................................................................................6
4 References ..................................................................................................................................8
4.1 Normative references and national Scheme documents ....................................................8
4.2 Technical documents .........................................................................................................8
5 Recognition of the certificate ...................................................................................................10
5.1 European recognition of CC certificates (SOGIS-MRA)................................................10
5.2 International recognition of CC certificates (CCRA)......................................................10
6 Statement of certification..........................................................................................................11
7 Summary of the evaluation.......................................................................................................12
7.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................12
7.2 Executive summary .........................................................................................................12
7.3 Evaluated product ............................................................................................................12
7.3.1 TOE architecture ........................................................................................................13
7.3.2 TOE description .........................................................................................................14
7.3.3 TOE security features.................................................................................................15
7.4 Documentation.................................................................................................................16
7.5 Protection Profile conformance claims............................................................................16
7.6 Functional and assurance requirements...........................................................................16
7.7 Evaluation conduct ..........................................................................................................16
7.8 General considerations about the certification validity ...................................................17
8 Evaluation outcome..................................................................................................................18
8.1 Evaluation results.............................................................................................................18
8.2 Recommendations............................................................................................................19
9 Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product......................................................20
9.1 TOE delivery ...................................................................................................................20
9.2 Installation, configuration and secure usage of the TOE.................................................22
10 Annex B – Evaluated configuration .........................................................................................23
10.1 TOE operational environment .........................................................................................24
Page 5 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
11 Annex C – Test activity............................................................................................................25
11.1 Test configuration............................................................................................................25
11.2 Functional tests performed by the Developer..................................................................25
11.2.1 Testing approach ........................................................................................................25
11.2.2 Test coverage..............................................................................................................25
11.2.3 Test results..................................................................................................................25
11.3 Functional and independent tests performed by the Evaluators ......................................25
11.3.1 Test approach .............................................................................................................25
11.3.2 Test results..................................................................................................................25
11.4 Vulnerability analysis and penetration tests ....................................................................26
Page 6 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
3 Acronyms
3.1 National scheme
DPCM Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri
LGP Linea Guida Provvisoria
LVS Laboratorio per la Valutazione della Sicurezza
NIS Nota Informativa dello Schema
OCSI Organismo di Certificazione della Sicurezza Informatica
3.2 CC and CEM
CC Common Criteria
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOGIS-MRA Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security – Mutual Recognition
Agreement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
3.3 Other acronyms
AD Active Directory
ADFS Active Directory Federation Services
CIFS Common Internet File System
CPU Central Processing Unit
DNS Domain Name System
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
iBMC Intelligent Baseboard Management Controller
IDOR Insecure Direct Object Reference
Page 7 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
IP Internet Protocol
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NFS Network File System
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PAM Privileged Access Management
PDM Product Data Management
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
REST Representational State Transfer
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TAC Technical Assistance Center
UI User Interface
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
XML eXtensible Markup Language
XSS Cross Site Scripting
XXE External XML entity
Page 8 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
4 References
4.1 Normative references and national Scheme documents
[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-
11-001
[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-002
[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-003
[CC4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 4: Framework
for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, November 2022, CC:2022
Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-004
[CC5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 5: Pre-defined
packages of security requirements, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-
2022-11-005
[CCRA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates In the field of
Information Technology Security, July 2014
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1 CCMB-2022-11-006
[NIS1] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 1/23 – Modifiche alla LGP1, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS2] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 2/23 – Modifiche alla LGP2, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS3] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 3/23 – Modifiche alla LGP3, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS4] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 4/23 – Gestione nel tempo delle garanzie di prodotti certificati, versione
1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[SOGIS] Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation
Certificates, Version 3, January 2010
4.2 Technical documents
[AGD_OPE] CC Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0 AGD_OPE, Version: 1.1, 09 December
2025
[AGD_PRE] CC Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0 AGD_PRE, Version: 1.1, 09 December
2025
Page 9 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
[ETR] Evaluation of Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0, HUAWEIEVOP-
026_ETR_v2, CCLab – The Agile Cybersecurity Laboratory, Version: v2, 15
December 2025
[ST] Security Target CC Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0 Security Target, Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd, Issue: 1.10, Date: 2025-12-09
Page 10 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
5 Recognition of the certificate
5.1 European recognition of CC certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA, version 3 [SOGIS]) became
effective in April 2010 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria
(CC) Evaluation Assurance Level up to and including EAL4 for all IT -Products. A higher recognition
level for evaluations beyond EAL4 is provided for IT -Products related to specific Technical Domains
only.
The current list of signatory nations and of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies
and other details can be found on https://www.sogis.eu/.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by signatory nations.
This certificate is recognised under SOGIS-MRA for all claimed assurance components up to EAL4.
5.2 International recognition of CC certificates (CCRA)
The current version of the international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based
on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, [CCRA] was ratified on 08 September 2014.
It covers CC certificates compliant with collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP), up to and including
EAL4, or certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL2, with the possible
augmentation of Flaw Remediation family (ALC_FLR).
The current list of signatory nations and of collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) and other details
can be found on https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
The CCRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by signatory nations.
This certificate is recognised under CCRA for all claimed assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR only.
Page 11 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
6 Statement of certification
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product named “Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0, X
Series, E Series” (also referred as Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0 or Huawei OceanProtect),
developed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the requirements established by the Italian
Scheme for the evaluation and certification of security systems and products in the field of
information technology and expressed in the and Scheme Information Notes [NIS1, NIS2, NIS3,
NIS4]. The Scheme is operated by the Italian Certification Body “Organismo di Certificazione della
Sicurezza Informatica (OCSI)”, established by the Prime Minister Decree (DPCM) of 30 October
2003 (O.J. n.98 of 27 April 2004).
The objective of the evaluation is to provide assurance that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated Security Target [ST]; the potential consumers of the product
should review also the Security Target, in addition to the present Certification Report, in order to gain
a complete understanding of the security problem addressed. The evaluation activities have been
carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Part 3 [CC3] and the Common Evaluation
Methodology [CEM].
The TOE resulted compliant with the requirements of Part 3 of the CC:2022 Release 1 for the
assurance level EAL2, augmented with ALC_FLR.2 according to the information provided in the
Security Target [ST] and in the configuration shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration” of this
Certification Report.
The publication of the Certification Report is the confirmation that the evaluation process has been
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the evaluation criteria Common Criteria - ISO/IEC
15408 ([CC1], [CC2], [CC3] and [CC5]) and the procedures indicated by the Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement [CCRA] and that no exploitable vulnerability was found. However, the
Certification Body with such a document does not express any kind of support or promotion of the
TOE.
Page 12 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
7 Summary of the evaluation
7.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria evaluation of the product named
“Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0” to provide assurance to the potential consumers that TOE
security features comply with its security requirements.
In addition to the present Certification Report, the potential consumers of the product should also
review the Security Target [ST], specifying the functional and assurance requirements and the
intended operational environment.
7.2 Executive summary
TOE name Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0, X Series, E Series
Security Target CC Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0 Security Target,
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd, Issue: 1.10, Date: 2025-12-
09 [ST]
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2, augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Developer Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
LVS CCLab – The Agile Cybersecurity Laboratory (Debrecen
site)
CC version CC:2022 Release 1
PP conformance claim No conformance claimed
Evaluation starting date 24 February 2025
Evaluation ending date 15 December 2025
The certification results apply only to the version of the product shown in this Certification Report
and only if the operational environment assumptions described in the Security Target [ST] are
fulfilled and in the configuration shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration” of this Certification
Report.
7.3 Evaluated product
This section summarizes the main functional and security requirements of the TOE. For a detailed
description it is possible to refer to the Security Target [ST].
The TOE is a data protection software designed to back-up data of mission-critical services.
Huawei OceanProtect provides backup, recovery and high reliability with concurrent data flows and
high backup bandwidth.
Major security features of the TOE include:
Page 13 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
• backup and recovery of user data;
• audit generation and reviewing functions;
• secure, role-based administration with access control;
• identification and authentication.
The TOE runs on specific hardware devices, i.e. series X and series E versions. All products of the
series run the same software and differ only in storage and computing resources. The evaluated
models of Huawei OceanProtect are:
• X Series: X3000, X6000, X8000, X9000;
• E Series: E1000, E6000, E8000;
For a detailed description of the TOE, refer to section 1.4 of the Security Target [ST].
The TOE is made up of the OceanProtect DataBackup (hereinafter DataBackup), OceanProtect
Storage (hereinafter Storage) Systems and PAM, OpenSSH, lftp and NTP components and the
Euler OS V2.0 SP12 based on Kernel 5.10.The DataBackup software component is used to manage
the backups, archives, and restores. The software contains the backup catalog, which contains the
internal database with information about OceanProtect' s backed-up data and configuration.
The Storage software component is deployed on OceanProtect Backup Storage Hardware Platform,
which is designed to manage the storage hardware.
7.3.1 TOE architecture
The TOE includes the following subsystems:
• OceanProtect DataBackup (hereinafter DataBackup),
• OceanProtect Storage System (hereinafter Storage),
• components of the Euler OS (OpenSSH, PAM, lftp, NTP).
The DataBackup implements user management, configuration, and maintenance operations,
including configuration, monitoring, alarm, statistics, user management, and license management,
while Storage is responsible for file system management, network configuration, and its own user
management. Euler OS supports the overall underlying system operations.
Interfaces include:
• RESTful,
• SSH,
• LDAP
• SFTP (1 and 2),
• Syslog,
• NTP,
• SAML,
• SMTP
• NFS,
Page 14 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
• CIFS.
Each interface serves specific functions, such as remote management, authentication, and file transfer.
The interfaces are designed to enhance security through protocols like HTTPS and SSH.
7.3.2 TOE description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included
in the evaluation.
7.3.2.1 Physical Scope
An example deployment of the TOE (boundary is framed in red) is shown in the below Figure.
Figure 1 - TOE deployment and boundary.
The TOE boundary in the red frame includes the three distinct components (applications):
OceanProtect DataBackup and Storage and Euler OS (components PAM, OpenSSH, lftp and NTP).
• DataBackup: In the X series, the OceanProtect Databackup software is deployed on the
appliance. In the E series, the OceanProtect Databackup is deployed on the Huawei Taishan
server.
• Storage: In the X series Storage is deployed on the appliance. In the E series, Storage is
deployed on OceanProtect Backup Storage Hardware Platform, which is designed to manage
the storage hardware.
• Euler OS: Running on the underlying hardware of all TOE appliances.
The Clients in Figure 1 (Windows and Linux) are used to communicate with the TOE and are out of
the TOE scope.
The evaluated configuration assumes a network environment that provides internal connectivity
between all components.
Page 15 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
7.3.2.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE includes the interfaces and functions within the physical boundary.
The TOE boundary from a logical point of view is represented by the elements that are displayed with
a red dotted box within the rectangle in the Figure 2.
Figure 2 - Logical boundary of the TOE
The logical boundary of the TOE may be broken down by the security features, comprehensive
described in section 5.2 of ST and grouped under the following Security Function Classes:
• Security Audit
• Access Control
• Identification and Authentication
• Authorization
• Security Management
7.3.3 TOE security features
The major security features of the TOE are summarised in the following:
1) Security Audit
Audit entries are generated by TOE for security-related backup events.
2) Access Control
The TOE provides a role-based access control capability both in DataBackup and Storage, to
ensure that only authorized administrators are able to administer the TOE.
3) Identification and Authentication
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The TOE ensures that users are identified and authenticated prior to being granted access to TOE
functions.
4) Authorization
The TOE ensures that proper permissions is granted to identify sessions which are generated with
subset of identified users' attributes.
5) Security Management
The TOE provides management capabilities via ProtectManager. Management functions allow
the administrators to configure users and roles and manage backup and recovery functionality.
A detailed description of the TOE security functionality is provided in Chapter 6 of the Security
Target [ST].
7.3.3.1 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE
The TOE provides all the security features.
7.4 Documentation
The guidance documentation specified in “Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product”
is delivered to the customer together with the product.
The guidance documentation contains all the information for secure initialization, configuration, and
secure usage the TOE in accordance with the requirements of the Security Target [ST].
Customers should also follow the recommendations for the secure usage of the TOE contained in
section 8.2 of this report.
7.5 Protection Profile conformance claims
The TOE does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.
7.6 Functional and assurance requirements
All Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) have been selected from CC Part 3 [CC3] and are from
EAL 2 assurance package, augmented with the CC part 3 components ALC_FLR.2.
All the SFRs have been selected from CC Part 2 [CC2].
It is possible to refer to the Security Target [ST] for the complete description of all security objectives,
the threats that these objectives should address, the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) and the
security functions that realize the same objectives.
7.7 Evaluation conduct
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the requirements established by the Italian
Scheme for the evaluation and certification of security systems and products in the field of
information technology and expressed in the Provisional Guideline [LGP3] and the Scheme
Information Note [NIS3] and in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement [CCRA].
The purpose of the evaluation is to provide assurance on the effectiveness of the TOE to meet the
requirements stated in the relevant Security Target [ST]. Initially the Security Target has been
Page 17 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
evaluated to ensure that constitutes a solid basis for an evaluation in accordance with the requirements
expressed by the standard CC. Then, the TOE has been evaluated on the basis of the statements
contained in such a Security Target. Both phases of the evaluation have been conducted in accordance
with the CC Part 3 [CC3] and the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].
The Certification Body OCSI has supervised the conduct of the evaluation performed by the
evaluation facility (LVS) CCLab – The Agile Cybersecurity Laboratory (Debrecen site).
The evaluation was completed on December 15, 2025, with the issuance by the LVS of the approved
Evaluation Technical Report [ETR].
7.8 General considerations about the certification validity
The evaluation focused on the security features declared in the Security Target [ST], with reference
to the operational environment specified therein. The evaluation has been performed on the TOE
configured as described in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration”.
Potential customers are advised to check that this corresponds to their own requirements and to pay
attention to the recommendations contained in this Certification Report.
The certification is not a guarantee that no vulnerabilities exist; there is a probability, however small,
that exploitable vulnerabilities can be discovered after the issuance of the certificate. This
Certification Report reflects the conclusions of the certification at the time of issuance. Potential
customers are invited to regularly check the arising of any new vulnerability after the issuance of this
Certification Report, and if the vulnerability can be exploited in the operational environment of the
TOE, check with the Developer if security updates have been developed and if those updates have
been evaluated and certified.
Page 18 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
8 Evaluation outcome
8.1 Evaluation results
Following the analysis of the Evaluation Technical Report [ETR] issued by the LVS CCLab – The
Agile Cybersecurity Laboratory (Debrecen site) and documents required for the certification, and
considering the evaluation activities carried out, the Certification Body OCSI concluded that TOE
named “Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0” meets the requirements of Part 2 and 3 of the Common
Criteria [CC3] provided for the evaluation assurance level EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with
respect to the security features described in the Security Target [ST] and the evaluated configuration,
shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration”.
Table 1 summarizes the final verdict of each activity carried out by the LVS in accordance with the
assurance requirements established in [CC3] for the evaluation assurance level EAL2 augmented with
ALC_FLR.2 (augmentation in italics in Table 1).
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation Class ASE Pass
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 Pass
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 Pass
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 Pass
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 Pass
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Pass
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 Pass
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 Pass
Development Class ADV Pass
Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 Pass
Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Pass
Basic design ADV_TDS.1 Pass
Guidance documents Class AGD Pass
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 Pass
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 Pass
Life cycle support Class ALC Pass
Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.2 Pass
Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Pass
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 Pass
Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 Pass
Test Class ATE Pass
Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.1 Pass
Page 19 of 26 OCSI/CERT/CCL/04/2025/RC Ver. 1.0
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 Pass
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 Pass
Vulnerability assessment Class AVA Pass
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 Pass
Table 1 - Final verdicts for assurance requirements
8.2 Recommendations
The conclusions of the Certification Body (OCSI) are summarized in section 6 (Statement of
Certification).
Potential customers of the product “Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0” are suggested to properly
understand the specific purpose of the certification by reading this Certification Report together with
the Security Target [ST].
The TOE must be used according to the “Security Objectives for the Operational Environment”
specified in section 4.2 of the Security Target [ST]. It is assumed that, in the operational environment
of the TOE, all Assumptions described in section 3.4 of the Security Target [ST] shall be satisfied.
The Certification Body recommends reviewing the assumptions in the [ST], section 3.4, which are
necessary conditions to be implemented for the TOE security:
• A.MANAGE - It is assumed that the administrators of the TOE are non-hostile, sufficiently
trained, and follow all administrator guidance. They will not write down their passwords.
• A.PHYSICAL - It is assumed that the TOE and its operational environment are protected against
unauthorized physical access.
• A.NETWORK - The TOE environment will provide a secure network communication to protect
user data that is sent to and received from the TOE.
• A.TIMESTAMP - the TOE environment will provide reliable time to the TOE.
This Certification Report is valid for the TOE in its evaluated configuration; in particular, “Annex A
– Guidelines for the secure usage of the product” includes a number of recommendations relating to
delivery, installation, configuration and secure usage of the product, according to the guidance
documentation provided together with the TOE ([AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE]).
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9 Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product
This annex provides considerations particularly relevant to the potential customers of the product.
9.1 TOE delivery
The following procedural steps define how the TOE is delivered to the customer. The delivery
procedures can be distinguished into two separate phases:
• verify and install the software package,
• deliver the TOE hardware appliance to the customer’s end.
Software Delivery (internal process):
The download, verification, and installation of software packages are all completed on Huawei's
production line. The hardware equipment the Developer delivers has the original TOE software
installed.
This section summarizes describes the internal download and verification of the TOE software
package before pre installation.
The software of the TOE is downloaded to the Huawei’s production software server through
Huawei’s Product Data Management (PDM) system. The production software server is secured by
IPsec which protect the TOE components’ confidentiality, authenticity and integrity while in transport
from the development area to the production area. The software is then written into the OceanProtect
system, and the software’s integrity is checked by comparing its signature and version number.
To verify the Software Package details the steps required to check the integrity of the received
software package (e.g.: “OceanProtect_DataProtect_1.6.0_image_ARM_64.tgz”) include utilizing
the signature file of the received software package (file with the “.asc” extension), and Huawei’s own
public key, which was used for signing the signature file.
The verifier is required to download the public key file from Huawei’s internal site and import it into
their own list of PGP certificates to verify the key’s validity.
The verification process for the TOE software package by the customer is the same, with the
difference being that the customer needs to download the software package from the support website,
but this does not necessarily happen, as the verification of the TOE software happens before delivery
to the customer, as an internal process if the TOE software is delivered pre-installed.
To access the public key file at Huawei support site:
https://support.huawei.com/enterprise/en/tool/pgp-verify-TL1000000054/TV1000000016
The key is generated using RSA 2048.
To verify the signature file of the received software package (file with the “.asc” extension), and
Huawei’s own public key the “GnuPG” software is recommended by the Developer.
TOE preinstalled on hardware delivery:
The packaging operation of TOE is performed by Huawei production site staff. TOE parts and
packaged TOEs are securely stored at the Dongguan production site. Before delivery of the TOE, the
correctness and integrity of the anti-tamper tags that are applied to the TOE boxes are checked. If the
verification is successful, the TOE delivery process to the customer will be initiated, and it is ensured
that the TOE version is correct.
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The Developer relies on third party shipping companies to deliver products from the facility to
customers with contracts ensuring security during transport.
Huawei discloses information about the shipping company used for particular deliveries on a need-
to-know basis. By this, it is difficult for an attacker to predict which shipping company will be used
for a particular delivery and by this reduces the risk of fake deliveries by an attacker.
The recipient of a delivery is informed about the shipping company used and is advised to check that
the delivery is carried out by the correct shipping company. the TOE finally leaves the Developer
premises and is shipped to the customer.
Customers shall check the TOE as follows when receiving the products:
• check that the cargo boxes are not damaged,
• check that none of the anti-tamper tags are damaged or warped,
• check if there are traces of duplicate sealing;
• check that all parts of the TOE and guidance documentation are delivered.
The guidance documentation is published to the OceanProtect device's help information. Customers
can access it through the OceanProtect system's Web portal under Help --> Online Help. The delivery
parts can also be obtained via the Huawei TAC service https://e.huawei.com/en/about/service-hotline
or through the sales team.
The list of deliverables as follows:
Type Delivery Item Version
Storage Subsystem Software OceanProtect_BackupStorage_1.6.0_Software.tgz 1.6.0
DataBackup Subsystem
Software
OceanProtect_DataProtect_1.6.0_image_ARM_64.tgz 1.6.0
OceanProtect_DataProtect_1.6.0_chart_ARM_64.tgz 1.6.0
Product guidance CC Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0 AGD_PRE
1.0.pdf
1.0
CC Huawei OceanProtect Software 1.6.0 AGD_OPE
1.0.pdf
1.0
OceanProtect DataBackup 1.5.0-1.6.0 Error Code
Reference.pdf
01
OceanProtect Backup Storage 1.x Error Code
Reference.pdf
01
OceanProtect Appliance 1.6.0 REST Interface
Reference.pdf
05
OceanProtect Backup Storage 1.6.0 REST Interface
Reference.pdf
02
OceanProtect DataBackup 1.5.0-1.6.0 Administrator
Guide.pdf
09
OceanProtect DataBackup 1.5.0-1.6.0 Command
Reference.pdf
01
Table 2 - TOE deliverables
Documents of the product have unique version numbers. The version information of documents of
the product is specified in the [ST] section 1.4.1 Table 1-3 for the product. The ST shall be obtained
from the website of the certification body. The version shall be verified by comparing the document
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version information of the product with the version numbers in the ST. The links for the exact
documents are also found in the ST as well.
9.2 Installation, configuration and secure usage of the TOE
TOE installation, configuration and secure usage should be done by following the instructions in the
appropriate sections of the guidance documentation provided with the product to the customer.
In particular, the documents [AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE] contain detailed information for the
secure initialization of the TOE, the preparation of its operational environment and the secure usage
of the TOE in accordance with the security objectives specified in the Security Target [ST].
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10 Annex B – Evaluated configuration
The Evaluators followed the preparation steps defined in the [AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE]
documents for the TOE being in the evaluated configuration.
The TOE is identified in the Security Target [ST] with the version number 1.6.0. The evaluation of
the TOE was conducted on configuration 1.6.0. The name, version and configuration number
uniquely identify the TOE and the set of its subsystems, constituting the evaluated configuration of
the TOE, verified by the Evaluators at the time the tests are carried out and to which the results of the
evaluation are applied.
The OceanProtect software is available in two series: X Series and E Series, each with distinct models.
• X Series includes models X3000, X6000, X8000, and X9000, differing in CPU, cache, and
I/O modules.
• E Series includes models E1000, E6000, and E8000, also varying in CPU, cache, and I/O
modules.
All models fulfil the minimum hardware requirements for the software.
The X Series models have specific configurations for CPU, cache, I/O modules, and power supply.
CPU configurations range from 2 x Kunpeng 920 24-core to 2 x Kunpeng 920 64-core and 8 x
Kunpeng 920 48-core 2.6 GHz. Cache sizes vary from 256 GB to 1024 GB. I/O module support
ranges from 4 to 28 modules depending on the model.
All models share identical power supply specifications of 2,000 W.
The E Series models also have distinct configurations for CPU, cache, I/O modules, and power
supply. CPU configurations range from 2 x Kunpeng 920 32-core to 2 x Kunpeng 920 128-core.
Cache sizes vary from 128 GB to 2048 GB. I/O module configurations differ, with a maximum of 10
modules for E8000.
The E1000 has a power supply of 900 W, while E6000 and E8000 share a 2,000 W power supply.
All models are compatible and identical from an evaluation perspective. Variations in hardware
specifications do not impact the software's security functionalities.
The test environment contains X8000 and E1000 appliances of the TOE.
The most essential steps for the installation of each device are as follows:
As a preparative step the customer has to conclude obtaining the public key file, importing it and
verifying the public key and signature. However, in this evaluation case this section is not applicable
as the TOE arrived pre-installed.
OceanProtect X8000:
• installing and mounting the hardware chassis into a 2U enclosure, connecting the cables,
• powering-on,
• changing IP Addresses, configuring the network,
• initializing the system,
• setting device time,
• logging in to the Web UI,
• modifying the backup network.
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OceanProtect E1000:
• installing and mounting the hardware chassis into a 2U enclosure, connecting the cables,
• powering-on,
• changing IP Addresses of the iBMC, configuring the network,
• configuring users,
• configuring port bonding,
• initializing the system,
• logging in to the Web UI,
• modifying the service network,
• creating Backup Storage Device and Backup Storage Unit.
10.1 TOE operational environment
The assumptions about the technical environment in which the TOE is intended to be used are
reported in section 3.4 of [ST].
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11 Annex C – Test activity
This annex describes the task of both the Evaluators and the Developer in testing activities.
11.1 Test configuration
The Evaluators conducted the tests in the LVS premise. The test configuration was installed by the
Evaluators who followed the steps described in [AGD_PRE] and the [AGD_OPE] document.
11.2 Functional tests performed by the Developer
11.2.1 Testing approach
The Developer performed extensive tests to verify the functionality of the TOE. The tests cover all
Subsystems, Modules and TSFIs of the TOE.
11.2.2 Test coverage
Developer’s tests were grouped in the following categories:
• Auditing;
• User Data Protection;
• Identification and Authentication;
• Security Management;
• Network Services.
11.2.3 Test results
All Developer’s tests were run successfully, and the Evaluators verified the correct behaviour of the
TSFIs and TSFs and the correspondence between expected results and achieved results for each test.
11.3 Functional and independent tests performed by the Evaluators
11.3.1 Test approach
In addition to the Developer’s tests, the Evaluators created and performed three more independent
test cases to test the TSF more in depth.
The independent tests were related to
1. login event audit data;
2. user identification and authentication mechanisms for newly created users;
3. rejection of invalid configuration changes of SFTP, SMTP and DNS services.
11.3.2 Test results
All test cases devised by the Evaluators were passed successfully and all the test results were
consistent with the expected test results.
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11.4 Vulnerability analysis and penetration tests
For the execution of these activities, the Evaluators worked with the TOE already used for the
functional test activities and verified that the TOE and the test environment were properly configured.
The Evaluators designed the following attack scenarios:
• authentication bypass;
• user enumeration;
• privilege escalation and authorization bypass;
• cross-site scripting (XSS);
• insecure direct object reference (IDOR);
• external XML entity (XXE) injection;
• SSH service attack;
• password recovery service attack.
The Evaluators has concluded that the TOE is resistant to BASIC attack potential in its intended
operational environment.