BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009
for
IBM Tivoli Identity Manager
Version 5.0
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009
Identity Manager
IBM Tivoli Identity Manager
Version 5.0
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 08 June 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009
Contents
Certification..........................................................................................................................7
Specifications of the Certification Procedure...................................................................7
Recognition Agreements..................................................................................................7
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates.......................................................7
International Recognition of CC - Certificates..............................................................8
Performance of Evaluation and Certification....................................................................8
Validity of the certification result.......................................................................................8
Publication........................................................................................................................9
Certification Results...........................................................................................................11
Executive Summary.......................................................................................................12
Identification of the TOE.................................................................................................13
Security Policy................................................................................................................13
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.........................................................................13
Architectural Information.................................................................................................13
Documentation...............................................................................................................16
IT Product Testing...........................................................................................................16
Report on the Developer Testing Effort......................................................................16
Report on the Evaluator Testing Effort........................................................................17
Report on the Evaluator Penetration Testing..............................................................18
Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................................18
Results of the Evaluation................................................................................................19
CC specific results......................................................................................................19
Results of cryptographic assessment.........................................................................20
Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE............................................................20
Security Target................................................................................................................20
Definitions.......................................................................................................................20
Acronyms....................................................................................................................20
Glossary......................................................................................................................21
Bibliography....................................................................................................................26
Guidance documentation............................................................................................26
Excerpts from the Criteria..................................................................................................29
Annexes..............................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009 Certification Report
Certification
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Version 5.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Version 5.0 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 26. May 2009. The
atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: IBM Corporation
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009 Certification Report
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
Publication
The product IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Version 5.0 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Software Group, Tivoli
1540 Scenic Ave
Costa Mesa,
CA 92626-1408, USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009 Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Version 5.0. The
Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified Protection
Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Auditing of activities The TOE is capable of auditing internal events (e.g. the modification of
provisioning policies or the creation of new users) by generating audit records
for all transactions that are stored in a database provided by the IT
environment. The TOE also offers functionality to review these audit records.
Identification and
authentication
The TOE identifies users (including administrators) by user name and
authenticates them by password. ITIM users are persons with an account on
the TOE; they can be organized by memberships to ITIM groups.
Authorization (access
control)
The ITIM server performs authorization for user actions, commonly referred to
as requests, based on Access Control Item (ACI). ACIs can be assigned to
ITIM groups and ACI principals (e.g. administrators).
Provisioning Provisioning policies define the services the persons belonging to an
organizational role shall have access to. If a person belongs to an
organizational role defined within the TOE, and a provisioning policy specifies
the entitlement of this organizational role to a certain service, the person is
entitled to have an account on this service.
Service Reconciliation
and Identity Feeds
The TOE provides the capability of gathering account information from
managed resources. Reconciliation retrieves and compares user information
stored on a managed resource with the corresponding data stored in the ITIM
database.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'moderate' (SOF-moderate) for specific functions
as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Version 5.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Version 5.0 5 Download or CD
2 DOC Guidance documentation [9] - [18] Download or CD
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Provisioning access control and ITIM access control.
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance: OE.AUDIT, OE.COM_PROT, OE.DB_PROT, OE.DIR_PROT,
OE.ENFORCEMENT and OE.MANAGED. Details can be found in the Security Target [6]
chapter 4.2.
Architectural Information
General overview
Identity management is a commonly used term for the central management of user
identities that need to be available throughout a number of systems in a distributed
operating environment. In large computer networks operated by organizations with many
employees, an employee typically needs accounts on several operating systems and
applications provided across the network infrastructure. As a result, the problem of
managing the user accounts on each of those systems separately (e.g., an email system,
a work flow application, a collaboration solution, shared resources, etc.) becomes very
complex and costly. In addition, significant security risks arise from having each user
maintain many different account credentials.
The IBM Tivoli Identity Manager (ITIM) provides a solution for managing the identity
records that represent people in a business organization. ITIM is an identity management
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solution that centralizes the process of provisioning resources, such as provisioning
accounts on operating systems and applications to users. An ITIM identity represents the
subset of profile data that uniquely represents a person in one or more repositories, and
includes additional information related to the person. People, e.g. employees of an
organization, obtain user accounts within ITIM which link the person's identity with their
user profile and credentials.
ITIM uses the user account information and interacts with services (i.e. the computer
systems) in a network infrastructure to provide user account services to these systems. To
manage the user accounts ITIM relies on connectors that direct the management of
accounts to so-called adapters: software components that sit either directly on the remote
system, e.g. on the operating system, interacting with the user management mechanisms
of the operating system, or on a central adapter server with network interfaces to the
managed system. Provisioning is the procedure for interacting with the connectors and
retrieving appropriate information for account creation for that identity to each of these
services, or managed resources. ITIM uses policies, which represent sets of rules
specifying within ITIM which identity shall have access to which of the services managed
by ITIM.
In general, identities within ITIM are managed by membership of Organizational Roles and
ITIM Groups:
● Organizational Roles – Identities within ITIM can be grouped by membership to
Organizational Roles, or roles. Such Organizational Roles are intended to reflect the
roles that exist within an organization that uses ITIM for identity management.
Organizational Roles are used by Provisioning Policies to determine which identities
shall have accounts on which managed resources. A Provisioning Policy defines a
number of services and attributes a user shall have on these services (e.g.
membership of groups on the service) and is associated with dedicated Organizational
Roles.
When an identity is added to an Organizational Role, this identity becomes a subject to
the Provisioning Policies referring to this role and therefore to the creation (or
modification, deletion) of accounts on the services defined within these policies.
Granting access to services is referred to as Entitlement.
● ITIM Groups – An identity may be a member of an ITIM Group. Membership in an ITIM
Group provides a set of default permissions and operations, as well as views, that
group members need. ITIM relies on fine-grained access control performed by
evaluating ACIs (Access Control Item, i.e. ITIM-specific access control policies) that
delegate specified rights to ITIM Groups.
In most environments, all identities will be members of at least one ITIM Group that
delegates the right to change account passwords via the web-based user interface
provided by the ITIM server to its members. The modified password will then be
provided by way of connectors to all managed resources the identity has an account
on. Only dedicated identities belong to ITIM Groups that delegate the right of system
administration or Organizational Role management to these users. Membership to the
predefined Administrator group exempts a user from all access control on the ITIM
server.
Note: while ITIM provides the necessary functionality to provision accounts to managed
resources, i.e. to provide a service with the necessary information to create an account
and to trigger this creation, the enforcement of (security) functionality on the managed
resources for such an account is by design left to the managed resource.
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TOE Boundary and Runtime Environment
The TOE consists of the ITIM server, which is comprised by the Core Services,
Applications and Web User Interface subsystems, and the adapters that provision the
managed resources, including the RMI dispatcher add-on for directory integrator-based
TIM adapters.
The ITIM server component is completely built on Java related technology; TDI-based
adapters are built on Java related technology and the Tivoli Directory Integrator
architecture, and ADK-based adapters are implemented in C and C++ utilizing the ADK to
communicate with ITIM. Therefore, the runtime environment provided by the IT
environment for running the TOE is a Web Application Server (WebSphere) for the ITIM
server, Tivoli Directory Integrator (including the necessary connectors) for the Oracle
adapter and Windows operating systems for the Active Directory adapter.
The Policy Directory (in fact an LDAP repository), the Workflow, or transaction, data base
and the external sources for person information (i.e. the identity stores) are part of the IT
environment.
TOE Security Functionality
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
● Auditing of activities
The TOE is capable of auditing internal events (e.g. the modification of provisioning
policies or the creation of new users) by generating audit records for all transactions
that are stored in a database provided by the IT environment. The TOE also offers
functionality to review these audit records.
● Identification and authentication
The TOE identifies users (including administrators) by user name and authenticates
them by password. ITIM users are persons with an account on the TOE; they can be
organized by memberships to ITIM groups.
The user identities are stored in a directory server provided by the IT environment.
Only hashes of the passwords are stored in the TOE. Password policies can be applied
to enforce requirements on the quality of the password that a user chooses. Lockout
mechanisms prevent password guessing attacks.
● Authorization (access control)
The ITIM server performs authorization for user actions, commonly referred to as
requests, based on Access Control Item (ACI). ACIs can be assigned to ITIM groups
and ACI principals (e.g. administrators). One pre-defined ITIM group exists for ITIM
administrators, other groups can be defined by the customer.
The TOE offers three groups of ACIs:
• organizational (access control to functions related to entities within an
organization or the organization itself)
• provisioning (access control to functions related to provisioning and other
policies)
• reporting (access control to functions related to the generation of reports)
ACIs can be created, modified, or deleted by either a system administrator or
explicitly entitled users. Members of the predefined Administrator group are not
subject to any access control.
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● Provisioning
Provisioning policies define the services the persons belonging to an organizational
role shall have access to. If a person belongs to an organizational role defined within
the TOE, and a provisioning policy specifies the entitlement of this organizational role
to a certain service, the person is entitled to have an account on this service. Such an
account may be created upon user request by interaction with the TOE (if the person
belongs to an ITIM group), or it may be manually created by administrator request, or
may be automatically created for the person during periodic policy enforcement.
● Service Reconciliation and Identity Feeds
The TOE provides the capability of gathering account information from managed
resources. Reconciliation retrieves and compares user information stored on a
managed resource with the corresponding data stored in the ITIM database. Data can
be imported via Identity Feeds. For example, user data (e.g. person, or identity
information) can be imported into an Organization managed by the TOE.
This functionality eliminates the need for manual entry of a potentially large number of
persons to the TOE’s database and allows automated reconciliation with systems used
for human resource management within an organization.
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 and listed in section 13.1 is being
provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required
information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
IT Product Testing
Report on the Developer Testing Effort
Test Configuration
The test configurations used for testing is outlined in “Platforms” sheet of the testmapping
document and covers different permutations of:
● Operating systems: Windows 2003 R2 32/64 Bit Kernel, Solaris 10 64 Bit Kernel,
Redhat 4 32/64 Bit Kernel, AIX 5.3 64 Bit Kernel, SUSE 10 32Bit Kernel
● WebSphere application server (WAS) version 64bit 6.1, 64bit WAS 6.1 FP9 +
PK37456, 64bit WAS 6.1 FP15, 64bit WAS 6.1 FP17, 32bit WAS 6.1, 32bit WAS 6.1
FP5, WAS 6.1 FP9, 32bit WAS 6.1 FP15
● Databases: DB2 9.1, DB2 9.1 FP2, DB2 9.1 FP3, Oracle 10g (10.2.0.1.0), MS SQL
Server 2005, MS SQL Server 2005 SP2
● LDAP servers: ITDS 6.0.0.1, ITDS 6.0.0.3, ITDS 6.1, ITDS 6.1 FP1, SunOne 5.2
● Browsers: Internet Explorer 6, IE 6.0 SP1, IE 6.0 SP2, IE 7.0, Firefox 1.5.0.10, FireFox
1.5.0.12, Firefox 2.0.0.4, Mozilla 1.7
● Configuration: single system or systems allocated on several servers
In addition, the adapter test documents outline the configuration needed for testing the
adapters. This includes the specification of the software components needed for testing.
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These documents also the state which adapter versions have been tested: Windows AD
adapter build version 5.0.2 (identical with the release version 5.0.1) and Oracle adapter
build version 5.0.001 (identical with the release version 5.0.1).
The evaluator verified that testing covers the different implementations of security
functionality offered by the software (storing of TOE data, protection of TOE execution
domain, providing of reliable time stamps). Since all different implementations have been
sufficiently tested, all software systems defined in the Security Target do not differ in their
security functionality.
The evaluator verified also that the only software components that provide security
functionality as required by the SFRs for the TOE environment are the WebSphere
Application Server, ITDI server, ITDS LDAP server, and RDBMS that interfaces DB2 or
and Oracle databases. This is consistent with the assumptions stated in the Security
Target about the TOE IT environment.
Conclusion
The evaluator verified that the developer testing was performed on software configurations
consistent with the set stated in the Security Target.
The evaluator was able to follow and fully understand the developer testing approach
based on the information provided by the developer.
The evaluator analysed the developer testing coverage and depth by reviewing all test
cases as demonstrated in the test coverage analysis. The evaluator found the testing of
the TSF to be extensive and covering the TSFI as identified in the functional specification.
The evaluator reviewed the test results provided by the developer and found them to be
consistent with the test plan.
Report on the Evaluator Testing Effort
TOE Test Configuration
The evaluator installed and used Windows 2003 server operating system. The following
software has been installed by the evaluator :
● DB2 9.1 FixPack 2
● ITDS 6.1
● WebSphere application server (WAS) 6.1 with FP9
● ITIM server version 5.0 (build 1559 according to the footer shown with the WebGUI)
● IBM Tivoli Directory Integrator Version 6.1.1
• Windows AD adapter 5.2.3790
The evaluator chose to install and test only the Windows AD adapter. The adapter API of
ITIM 5.0 is not changed with respect to ITIM 4.6. In the previously evaluated version of the
product both adapters were implemented as local components to ITIM 5.0 exporting the
same API. In ITIM 5.0 the adapter API is kept the same but both adapters are now
implemented as TDI-based adapters whose interfaces are invoked through Java RMI. The
correct functional behavior of the Oracle TDI-based adapter is asserted by the developer
test evidence and also by the fact that it is a commercial product used by many ITIM 5.0
customers. Since both adapters depend on the same technology to inter-operate with ITIM
5.0, it is sufficient to test only one of them.
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The evaluator installed the software as outlined in the installation guidance for the ITIM 5.0
server as well as for the adapters. After successful installation the evaluator applied the
configuration outlined in [9]. Every configuration aspect was covered by the evaluator to
bring the system to the evaluated configuration.
Summary of Evaluator Test Results
The evaluator testing effort consisted of two parts: i) a re-run of a subset of the developer
test cases; ii) execution of the tests created by the evaluator.
The evaluator performed all tests at the atsec Common Criteria Lab in Austin (Texas, USA)
using the selected platforms listed above. All actual test results obtained by the evaluator
matched the expected results as documented in the evaluator test descriptions.
Report on the Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator performed the penetration testing on the very same system and
configuration used for testing. Therefore, the configuration and installation description
given in the previous section above applies.
The evaluator devised the penetration tests by first identifying preconditions that must be
met in order to successfully continue and execute a penetration attack. Therefore, if any of
the preconditions for the devised test cases showed a negative result (i.e. the test failed
showing that the precondition does not hold), the evaluator concluded that further analysis
was not necessary as the chosen approach for penetration was invalid.
Summary of the Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised a set of penetration tests based on the developer's vulnerability
analysis, well-known attacks for the class of products that the TOE represents, and on the
evaluator's knowledge of the TOE gained through the evaluation activities.
All penetration tests were based on suspected obvious vulnerabilities. The evaluator
conducted those tests and did not find any vulnerability that resulted in a penetration of the
TOE with moderate attack potential. Also, the vulnerability analysis did not identify any
vulnerability that could be exploited by attackers with moderate attack potential.
Therefore, the evaluator determined that the TOE is resistant against attacks with
moderate attack potential.
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Only adapters that are part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE (i.e. the adapters
identified in section 2.7 of [6]) are to be used. No other adapters in the IT environment
may be connected to the TOE, including LDAP or vendor specific adapters. The
adapters that are part of the evaluated configuration use the following protocols for
communication with the ITIM server: DAML for the Windows AD adapter, and RMI for
the Directory Integrator-based Oracle Database adapter.
● The ITIM server component of the TOE is installed and operated on a dedicated Web
Application Server that communicates via network connections with clients, adapters
and the resources in the IT environment (e.g. LDAP registry, RDBMS) as supportive to
the TOE.
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● Tivoli Directory Integrator is installed and operated either on a separate dedicated
machine or in the same machine where the ITIM server is hosted; in the former case a
secure channel between the servers must be provided by the IT environment (in any
case both the TOE and TDI run on separate java runtime environments). The RMI
dispatcher add-on (which is part of the TOE) shall also be installed and configured as
documented. TDI is expected to be used as a supporting application for the TOE; a
dedicated TDI server instance is used exclusively for supporting each of the services
implemented through a Directory Integrator-based adapter.
● “Event notifications” of adapters (remote password synchronization) and identity feeds
are not supported in the evaluated configuration. Identity feeds are operated by using
their reconciliation functionality.
● Only the English user interface (and guidance) is to be used.
● The usage of low-level APIs (as opposed to the exported API) to extend the
functionality of the TOE’s Core Services by plugging in user-specific extensions is
prohibited.
● The Web Application Server is installed on one dedicated machine that is physically
and logically protected. Clustering is disabled.
● The Directory Server and RDBMS are installed either together on one or separated on
two systems. They are for dedicated use by the TOE only and configured accordingly
(e.g. restricted network availability). The underlying machine(s) are dedicated to run
only these applications.
● All network communication is protected, either by cryptographic (SSL / TLS) or
organizational (restricted network access) means.
● Access to network sockets opened by adapters for configuration with the agentCfg tool
is restricted to “root” users, or administrators, on the local operating system hosting the
adapter. High quality passwords must be set for the adapter configuration.
● Single Sign-On is not supported.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE restricts the choice of products that can be
selected by the customer to fulfil the dependencies of the ITIM server on its IT
environment, such as described in the Security Target [6], chapter 2.8.
Results of the Evaluation
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL3 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
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● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the drop of the conformance
claims to the IMPP (Identity Manager Protection Profile); the inclusion of several new TSF
interfaces; the adaptation of new versions of adapters, either with more functionality or
with a different underlying technology (TDI server); new versions and products as part of
the IT environment and new guidance documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 3 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function :
moderate F.I&A: – Password policy enforcement
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 and listed in section 13.1 contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered.
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
Definitions
Acronyms
ACI Access Control Item
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
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ITIM IBM Tivoli Identity Manager. Also: TIM
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JMS Java Messaging Service
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LDAP v3 LDAP Version 3
PP Protection Profile
RDBMS Relational Data Base Management System
RMI Remote Method Invocation
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TDI IBM Tivoli Directory Integrator. Also: ITDI
TIM IBM Tivoli Identity Manager. Also: ITIM
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
WAS Web Application Server
XML Extensible Markup Language
Glossary
Access Control Item Controls user access by defining the access privileges of an ITIM
Group or ACI principal. An ACI grants or denies the ability to perform Tivoli Identity
Manager functions.
Account Object that represents the information defined for a user, or identity, within the
context of a managed resource. This information may be security and/or profile
characteristics for the user specific to the resource.
Adapter Software module that is part of ITIM, but distributed remotely from the ITIM server
as the part of a connector that interacts directly with the managed resource (service). The
module implements the connector commands by translating them in to resource specific
commands.
Administrator An ITIM User being member of the Administrator Group. An Administrator is
not subject to any access control.
Assets Information or resources to be protected by the countermeasures of a TOE.
Assurance Grounds for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives.
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Attack potential The perceived potential for success of an attack, should an attack be
launched, expressed in terms of an attacker’s expertise, resources and motivation.
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Authentication data Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorized user A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
BPOrganization Business Partner Organization. One of the types of subsidiary entities
that can be added to an Organization.
BPPerson Business Partner Person. A Person in a Business Partner Organization.
Business Unit A subsidiary entity of an Organization.
Component The smallest selectable set of elements that may be included in a PP, an ST,
or a package.
Connector Connectors support a specific resource. One element of the connector, the
service provider, executes at the ITIM Server machine to cause data to be delivered to the
managed resource. The other element of the connector, the adapter, executes at the
managed resource. The connector is responsible for receiving directives from the ITIM
Server and implementing changes at the managed resource, using the primitives of the
managed resource.
Dependency A relationship between requirements such that the requirement that is
depended upon must normally be satisfied for the other requirements to be able to meet
their objectives.
Element An indivisible security requirement.
Entitlement A construct to define a set of permissions, or privileges, on a managed
resource. This construct will be organized into a Provisioning Policy to grant those
permissions to a set of identities (represented by roles).
Entity 1) A Person or object for which information is stored. 2) One of the following
classes, as referred to by the Tivoli Identity Manager system: Person, BPPerson,
Organization, BPOrganization
Evaluation Assessment of a PP, an ST or a TOE, against defined criteria.
Evaluation Assurance Level A package consisting of assurance components from Part 3
that represents a point on the CC predefined assurance scale.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
External IT entity Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside of the TOE that
interacts with the TOE.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Identity Feed An automated process in which the Tivoli Identity Manager system imports
user data from a human resources database or file and feeds the information into the Tivoli
Identity Manager directory.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Internal communication channel A communication channel between separated parts of
TOE.
Internal TOE transfer Communicating data between separated parts of the TOE.
Inter-TSF transfers Communicating data between the TOE and the security functions of
other trusted IT products.
Iteration The use of a component more than once with varying operations.
ITIM Group An ITIM Group delegates management rights to ITIM Users on the ITIM
server. Management can be restricted to only change its own password, over being able to
manage Organizational Roles and membership of other identities to those roles, up to
being allowed to perform system management for the TOE. Adding an identity to at least
one ITIM Group implies creation of an account for that identity on the ITIM server.
ITIM User A Person provisioned with an ITIM account, i.e. an account to access the TOE.
This requires an entitlement for the Person to the ITIM Service. Users can be delegated
(by membership of an ITIM Group) to perform certain management actions within ITIM.
Managed Resource An item that can be owned or accessed by a set of identities. This
resource will be represented as a service in ITIM. Provisioning policies will entitle the
appropriate identities to ownership of, or access to, a resource. Adapters enforce the
entitlements on the resources. Examples of resources are NT domains, SAP systems,
RACF systems, mail servers, and databases.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Organization A logical construct that stands on the top of an organizational hierarchy
(Organization Tree) managed with Tivoli Identity Manager. Generally, an organization
represents a company.
Organizational Element Organization, Organizational Unit, Location, Business Partner
Organization, or Administrative Domain.
Organizational Role A named set (group) of identities. The determination of which
identities should belong to a role is specific to the customer’s business objectives.
Organizational security policies One or more security rules, procedures, practices, or
guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations.
Orphan Accounts Accounts on a Managed Resource whose owner in the Tivoli Identity
Manager system cannot be determined.
Person Object within ITIM representing a human or computing entity that is being
managed, or controlled, and audited. Persons can be entitled (by membership of an
Organizational Role that is subject to a Provisioning Policy) to use services in the IT
environment. In such case of account provisioning, a Person will be represented as a user
on a resource. This relationship is modelled in ITIM as a Person owning zero up to many
accounts.
Product A package of IT software, firmware and/or hardware, providing functionality
designed for use or incorporation within a multiplicity of systems.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Refinement The addition of details to a component.
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Relational Data Base Management System ITIM employs a RDBMS in the IT
environment as transaction database, which includes storage of audit records.
Secret Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to
enforce a specific SFP.
Security attribute Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used
for the enforcement of the TSP.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Function Policy The security policy enforced by an SF.
Security objective A statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy
identified organisation security policies and assumptions.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Selection The specification of one or more items from a list in a component.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Service Object that represents a managed resource that supports actual users. A service
is protected via the creation of policies. The user information on the service is represented
with accounts. These accounts are updated by ITIM through a connector.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
System A specific IT installation, with a particular purpose and operational environment.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE resource Anything useable or consumable in the TOE.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Functions Interface A set of interfaces, whether interactive (man-machine
interface) or programmatic (application programming interface), through which TOE
resources are accessed, mediated by the TSF, or information is obtained from the TSF.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
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TOE security policy model A structured representation of the security policy to be
enforced by the TOE.
Trusted channel A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can
communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
User data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF.
View A set of tasks that a particular type of user can see, but not necessarily perform, on
the graphical user interfaces (self service and administrative consoles).
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Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0556-2009, Version 1.12, 10.04.2009, IBM Tivoli Identity
Manager 5.0 Security Target, IBM
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 26.05.2009, Evaluation Technical Report,
atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE:
- Configuration lists for design documents, 23.07.2008
- CMVC list for Product documentation, 02.07.2008
- Configuration lists for evaluation specific documents, 23.07.2008
- Security flaw CMVC list, 12.12.2007
- Archive with source code configuration lists, 18.06.2008
- CM-Evidence-tim50-TestProjects-CVS-Log.zip, 07.08.2008
- ITIM_5x_CVT_Execution_DB_IBM_C.pdf, 03.10.2008
- ITIM_5x_SVT_Execution_DB-IBM.pdf, 03.10.2008
- CVT-SVT-TP-SS.JPG, 17.09.2008
Guidance documentation
[9] IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Common Criteria Guide Version 5.0, First Edition
(SC23-9978-00), 2009
[10] Guidance [INST], IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, What's New for This
Release Tivoli Identity Manager Server Version 5.0 Installation and Configuration
Guide, First Edition (SC32-1562-00), December 2007
[11] Tivoli Identity Manager Server Version 5.0 Manager Directory Integrator- Based
Oracle Database Adapter Installation and Configuration Guide, First Edition (SC23-
6157-00), 2007
8
specifically
• AIS1 Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers.
Version 13, Stand: 14.08.2008
• AIS14 Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria). Version 4, Stand: 02.04.2007
• AIS23 Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler. Version 2, Stand:11.03.2009
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
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[12] Tivoli Identity Manager Server Version 5.0 Manager Manager Active Directory
Adapter Installation and Configuration Guide, Version 5 (SC23-6175-00), 2007
[13] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Programming Reference ITIM Online Help
and Information Center, Version 5, http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/tivi help/
v2r1/index.jsp?topic=/com.ibm.itim.doc/welcome.htm
[14] IBM Tivoli Identity Manager Version 5 Problem Determination Guide, 2007
[15] Administering, 27.03.2008
[16] Configuring, 27.03.2008
[17] Customer API documentation, Version 5, 15.10.2008
[18] Java Doc API documentation, Version 5, 28.08.2008
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Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009 Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0556-2009
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