National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and
EX9214, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10939-2018
Dated: February 21, 2019
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6740
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6740
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Meredith Hennan
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................. 4
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information....................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy......................................................................................................................... 8
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope.................................................................... 10
5.1 Assumptions...................................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Threats ...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope.....................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation ..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................ 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration ................................................................................................................................15
7.2 Excluded Functionality...................................................................................................................................17
8 IT Product Testing ................................................................................................................. 18
8.1 Developer Testing..........................................................................................................................................18
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .........................................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 19
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target ........................................................................................................................19
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation ................................................................................................19
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents ..............................................................................................................20
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities....................................................................................................20
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity.............................................................................20
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity.................................................................................................................20
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.....................................................................................................................22
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ......................................................................... 23
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 24
12 Security Target ...................................................................................................................... 25
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................. 26
14 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 27
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information
Technology (IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which
describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the
evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of
the evaluation of the Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020,
EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This
VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and
documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in February 2019. The information in this
report is largely derived from the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated
test report, as summarized in the publicly Assurance Activities Report (AAR) for this evaluation;
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements defined
in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314
(NDcPPv2.0e).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the
NDcPP. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report.
The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target. Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards effort to
establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program,
security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria
Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile containing
Assurance Activities, which are interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology
described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010,
MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214
Protection Profile Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, 14 March 2018 (NDcPPv2.0e)
Security Target Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010,
MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 Security Target
Evaluation
Technical Report
Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010,
MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 ETR
CC Version Version 3.1 Revision 4
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Juniper Networks, Inc.
Developer Juniper Networks, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Meredith Hennan, Kenneth Stutterheim
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3 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 18.1R3 executing on MX-
Series 3D Universal Edge Routers and EX9200 Ethernet Switch. The supported chassis are:
 MX240
 MX480
 MX960
 MX2008
 MX2010
 MX2020
 EX9204
 EX9208
 EX9214
The supported Routing Engines employed by the MX-Series Router and EX9200-Series switches
are:
 MX-Series Routers
o RE1800 generation Routing Engines:
 RE-S-1800x4-YYG1 for MX240, MX480 and MX960
 RE-MX2000-1800X4 and REMX2K-1800-32G-S for MX2010 and MX2020
o Next Generation Routing Engines (RE-NG):
 RE-S-X6-64G for MX240, MX480 and MX960
 REMX2K-X8-64G for MX2008, MX2010 and MX2020
 EX9200-Series Ethernet Switches
o EX9200-RE (RE1800)
o EX9200-RE2 (RE-NG)
Each of the MX-Series/EX9200 appliances is a secure network device that protects itself by
offering only a minimal logical interface to the network and attached nodes. All MX-
Series/EX9200-Series appliances are powered by the Junos OS software, Junos OS 18.1R3,
which is a special purpose OS that provides no general-purpose computing capability. Junos OS
provides both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.
1
YY = 8, 16or 32 GB memory)
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The MX-Series/EX9200-Series appliances primarily support the definition and enforcement
of information flow policies among network nodes. All information flow from one network
node to another passes through an instance of the TOE. Information flow is controlled
based on network node addresses and protocol. In support of the information flow security
functions, the TOE ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and provides the
security tools to manage the security functions.
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4 Security Policy
The logical boundary of the TOE includes those security functions implemented exclusively by
the TOE.
Protected Communications
The TOE provides an SSH server to support protected communications which allow
administrators and external syslog servers to establish secure sessions to the TOE. The TOE
requires that applications exchanging information with it are successfully authenticated prior to
any exchange (i.e. applications connecting over SSH). The TOE includes cryptographic modules
that provide the underlying cryptographic services, including key management, protection of
stored keys, algorithms, random bit generation and crypto-administration. The cryptographic
modules provide confidentiality and integrity services for authentication and for protecting
communications with connecting applications.
Administrator Authentication
Administrative users must provide unique identification and authentication data before any
administrative access to the system is granted. Authentication data entered and stored on the
TOE is protected. The TOE can be configured to terminate interactive user sessions and to
present an access banner prior to authentication.
Correct Operation
The TOE provides for both cryptographic and non-cryptographic self-tests, and is capable of
automated recovery from failure states via a TOE reboot.
Trusted Update
The administrator can initiate update of the TOE firmware. The integrity of any firmware
updates is verified prior to installation of the updated firmware.
Audit
Junos auditable events are stored in the syslog files on the appliance, and can be transferred to
an external log server which is configured to use Netconf over SSH. Auditable events include
start-up and shutdown of the audit functions, authentication events, as well as the events listed
in Table 4. Audit records include the date and time, event category, event type, username, and
the outcome of the event (success or failure). Local syslog storage limits are configurable and
are monitored. In the event of local storage limits being reached the oldest logs will be
overwritten.
Management
The TOE provides a Security Administrator role that is responsible for:
• the configuration and maintenance of cryptographic elements related to the
establishment of secure connections to and from the evaluated product
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• the regular review of all audit data;
• initiation of trusted update function;
• all administrative tasks (e.g., creating the security policy).
The devices are managed through a Command Line Interface (CLI). The CLI is accessible through
local (serial) console connection or remote administrative (SSH) session.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Description
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically
protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the
security and/or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection
is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and
the data it contains. As a result, the [NDcPP] will not
include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The
[NDcPP] will not expect the product to defend against
physical access to the device that allows unauthorized
entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or
otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking
functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general
purpose computing. For example, the device should
not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide
any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that
traverses it. The intent is for the network device to
protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit
data. Traffic that is traversing the network device,
destined for another network entity, is not covered by
the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices
(e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device
are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best
interest of security for the organization. This includes
being appropriately trained, following policy, and
adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators
are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have
11
sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious
intent when administering the device. The network
device is not expected to be capable of defending
against a malicious Administrator that actively works to
bypass or compromise the security of the device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed
to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to
known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the network device are protected by the
platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material,
PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Threat Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINI
STRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the
network device by nefarious means such as masquerading as
an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to
an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its
entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-
middle attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between network devices.
Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious
actions that compromise the security functionality of the
device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or
perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly
chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force
exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access
allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic
with minimal effort.
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T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNIC
ATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do
not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the
critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly
designed protocols or poor key management to successfully
perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc.
Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and
integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could
lead to a compromise of the network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION
_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use
weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared
password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The
consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the
attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another
device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the
network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The
result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could
be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the
network device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update
of the software or firmware which undermines the security
functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates
validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the
update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify
the security functionality of the network device without
Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker
finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product)
to compromise the device and the Administrator would have
no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALIT
Y_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data
enabling continued access to the network device and its
critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing
existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying
existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device
credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may
allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with
other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALIT
Y_FAILURE
Security mechanisms of the network device generally build up
from roots of trust to more complex sets of mechanisms.
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Failures could result in a compromise to the security
functionality of the device. A network device self-testing its
security critical components at both start-up and during run-
time ensures the reliability of the device’s security
functionality.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance
for this evaluation is defined within the NDcPPv2.0e.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204,
EX9208 and EX9214 Security Target
 Junos OS Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480,
MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208, and EX9214 Series Devices
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon
when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified
in the Junos OS Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480,
MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208, and EX9214 Series Devices.
Consumers are encouraged to download that guidance document from the NIAP website to
ensure the device is configured using the same instructions used by the evaluation team.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of one or more of the physical devices listed in section 3, running Junos OS
18.1 R3 firmware, in an environment consisting of an administrative workstation with an SSH
client and a syslog server with a SSH client with NETCONF support configured to receive
streamed syslog messages from the TOE. Also part of the TOE is the Junos OS Common Criteria
and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010,
MX2020, EX9204, EX9208, and EX9214 Series Devices.
Physical Boundary:
The TOE is the Junos OS 18.1R3 firmware running on the appliance chassis listed in Table 1.
Hence the TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance chassis, as
shown in Figures 1 and 2.
The physical boundary of the TOE is the entire chassis of the appliance (defined in Table 1.)
Figure 1 TOE Boundary with RE1800
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Figure 2 TOE Boundary with Next Generation RE (RE-NG)
The TOE interfaces are comprised of the following:
i. Network interfaces which pass traffic
ii. Management interface through which handle administrative actions.
Chassis
Model
Routing Engine Network Ports Firmware
MX240 RE-S-1800X4-YYG
(YY = 8, 16 or 32 GB
memory)
or
RE-S-X6-64G
3 x (MPCs and DPCs)
Junos OS
18.1R3
MX480 6 x (MPCs and DPCs)
MX960 12 x (MPCs and DPCs)
MX2010 RE-MX2000-1800X4 or
REMX2K-1800-32G-S or
REMX2K-X8-64G
10 x MPCs
MX2020 20 x MPCs
MX2008 REMX2K-X8-64G 8 X MPCs
EX9204
EX9208
EX9214
EX9200-RE
or
EX9200-RE2
EX9200-2C-8XS
EX9200-4QS
EX9200-6QS
EX9200-MPC
EX9200-12QS
EX9200-32XS
EX9200—40T
EX9200-40F
EX9200-40F-M
EX9200-40XS
Table 1 TOE Chassis Details
Separate jinstall images are provided for MX-Series and EX9200-Series chassis, for each RE1800
and RE-NG Routing Engine, namely:
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 MX with RE1800 (RE-S-1800X4-YYG, RE-MX2000-1800X4 and REMX2K-1800-32G-S):
o junos-install-mx-x86-64-18.1R3.3.tgz
 MX with RE-NG (RE-S-X6-64G and REMX2K-x8-64G):
o junos-vmhost-install-mx-x86-64-18.1R3.3.tgz
 EX9200 with RE 1800 (EX9200-RE):
o junos-install-ex92xx-x86-64-18.1R3-S3.4.tgz
 EX9200 with RE-NG (EX9200-RE2):
o junos-vmhost-install-ex92xx-x86-64-18.1R3-S3.4.tgz
7.2 Excluded Functionality
 Use of telnet
 Use of FTP
 Use of SNMP
 Use of SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope
 Use of CLI account super-user and shell root account.
 Multi-Service MPCs (which provide IPsec and VPN functionality for these platforms)
 Routing, switching, inline services, subscriber management and advanced hierarchical
quality of service (HQoS) functionality of the PFE/MPCs is not evaluated
 Network and Security Manager (NSM) and Junos Space; CLI is included
 Network Time Protocol (NTP)
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Evaluation Test Report for Junos OS 18.1R3 for
MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214, which is not
publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP. The Independent Testing activity is
documented in the publicly available Assurance Activities Report, and is not duplicated here.
19
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Junos OS 18.1R3 for
MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP and SD.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960,
MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally,
the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP and
SD.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
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9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
was provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test
activities in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
the TOE.
The evaluator searched the Internet for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE using the web sites
listed below. The sources of the publicly available information are provided below.
 http://nvd.nist.gov/
 http://www.us-cert.gov
21
 http://www.securityfocus.com/
The evaluator performed the public domain vulnerability searches using the following key
words. The search was originally performed on January 4, 2019 and was updated on January
30, 2019.
 JunOS 18.1R3
 MX240
 MX480
 MX960
 MX2008
 MX2010
 MX2020
 EX9204
 EX9208
 EX9214
 RE-S-1800x4-YYG
 RE-MX2000-1800X4
 REMX2K-1800-32G-S
 RE-S-X6-64G
 REMX2K-X8-64G
 EX9200-RE
 EX9200-RE2
 SSH
 RE1800 – OpenSSL
 OpenSSL
The evaluator selected the search key words based upon the following criteria.
 The vendor name was searched,
 The software running on the TOE devices were searched. Further, the version the TOE
software in evaluation was searched,
 The name of the hardware devices within the TOE,
 The secure protocols supported by the TOE,
 The type of TOE device.
In accordance with NIAP policy Letter #17, the vulnerability analysis conducted on January 30,
2019 revealed a security vulnerability that was addressed by the vendor resulting in a firmware
revision change. The security related change was regression tested by the CCTL. The security
related change and non-security related bug fixes were acceptability tested by the vendor.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e,
and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
23
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
Administrators of the devices are cautioned to pay careful attention to the instructions
provided in the Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480,
MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 Series Devices Release 18.1
R2, 2018-12-14; especially to note that the FIPS mode configuration is NOT equivalent to
Common Criteria evaluated configuration. FIPS mode compliance was not evaluated as part of
this evaluation. In particular; although approved for FIPS mode, 3DES-CBC, AES192-CBC and
AES192-CTR are not to be used in the evaluated configuration.
SSHV2 is the only permitted remote management protocol that can be used in the evaluated
configuration.
Administrators should note that the TOE does not automatically reestablish broken netconf
sessions with an audit server; to reestablish a session the administrator must establish a new
session from the audit server to the TOE.
24
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
25
12 Security Target
Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and
EX9214 Security Target
26
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by
the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria
using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete,
consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements
for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
27
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata, 14 March
2018
6. Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, Evaluation Activities for
Network Device cPP, March 2018, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314 [SD]
7. Security Target Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010,
MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214, Version 1.4, February 7, 2019. [ST]
8. Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204,
EX9208 and EX9214 Common Criteria NDcPP Assurance Activity Report, Version 3.2,
February 2019. [AAR]
9. Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480, MX960,
MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 Series Devices Release 18.1
R3, 2019-02-12. [AGD]
10. Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204,
EX9208 and EX9214 Security Target Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.0 February
2019. <Evaluation Sensitive> [ASE-ETR]
11. Vulnerability Assessment for Junos OS 18.1R2 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008,
MX2010, MX2020, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214, Version 1.1, January 2019. <Evaluation
Sensitive> [AVA]
12. Junos OS 18.1R2 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204,
EX9208 and EX9214 Equivalency Analysis, Version 1.0 September 2018, <Evaluation
Sensitive>
13. Junos OS 18.1R3 for MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2008, MX2010, MX2020, EX9204,
EX9208 and EX9214 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, February 2019.
<Evaluation Sensitive> [TOE-ETR]
14. Test Plan for a Target of Evaluation, (Appliance EX9208, Routing Engine EX9200-RE),
Version 1.2, February 2019. <Evaluation Sensitive>
15. Test Plan for a Target of Evaluation, (Appliance EX9208, Routing Engine EX9200-RE2),
Version 1.2, February 2019. <Evaluation Sensitive>
16. Test Plan for a Target of Evaluation, (Appliance MX240/Routing Engine: RE-S-1800x4-
YYG), Version 1.2, February 2019. <Evaluation Sensitive>
28
17. Test Plan for a Target of Evaluation, (Appliance MX240/Routing Engine: RE-S-X6-64G),
Version 1.2, February 2019. <Evaluation Sensitive>
18. National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme, NIAP Policy Letter #17, Effects of Vulnerabilities in Evaluated Products, 29
August, 2014.