STMicroelectronics MIFARE® DESFire® EV2 on ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition Common Criteria for IT security evaluation SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 Rev 01.0 March 2022 I BLANK March 2022 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 Rev 01.0 3/81 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition Common Criteria for IT security evaluation 1 Introduction (ASE_INT) 1.1 Security Target reference 1 Document identification: MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04 SECURITY TARGET FOR COMPOSITION. 2 Version number: Rev 01.0, issued in March 2022. 3 Registration: registered at ST Microelectronics under number SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002. 1.2 TOE reference 4 This document presents the Security Target for composition (ST) of the technology library MIFARE® DESFire® EV2(a) on the Security IC ST31P450 A04. 5 This TOE is a composite TOE, built up with the combination of: • The Security IC ST31P450 A04, designed by STMicroelectronics, and used as certified platform, • The technology library MIFARE DESFire EV2, developed by STMicroelectronics, and built to operate with this Security IC platform. 6 Therefore, this Security Target is built on the Security IC Security Target Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, referenced BSI-CC- PP-0084-2014. The Security IC Security Target is called “Platform Security Target” in the following. 7 The precise reference of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is given in Section 1.4: TOE identification and the TOE features are described in Section 1.6: TOE description. 8 A glossary of terms and abbreviations used in this document is given in Appendix A: Glossary. a. MIFARE and DESFire are registered trademarks of NXP B.V. and are used under license. www.st.com Contents MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 4/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 Contents 1 Introduction (ASE_INT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1 Security Target reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 TOE reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4 TOE identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.5 TOE overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.6 TOE description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 1.6.1 TOE hardware description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.6.2 TOE software description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.6.3 TOE documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.7 TOE life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.7.1 TOE intended usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.7.2 Delivery format and method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2 Conformance claims (ASE_CCL, ASE_ECD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1 Common Criteria conformance claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2 PP Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2.1 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2.2 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2.3 PP Claims rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 Security problem definition (ASE_SPD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1 Description of assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3 Organisational security policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1 Security objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2 Security objectives for the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.3 Security objectives rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.3.1 Assumption "Usage of secure values" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4.3.2 Assumption "Terminal support" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Contents SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 5/81 4.3.3 Assumption "Usage of Key-dependent Functions" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.3.4 TOE threat "Unauthorised data modification for MFDFEV2" . . . . . . . . . 33 4.3.5 TOE threat "Impersonating authorised users during authentication for MFDFEV2" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.3.6 TOE threat "Cloning for MFDFEV2" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.3.7 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 resource availability" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.8 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 code confidentiality" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.9 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 data confidentiality" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.10 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 code integrity" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.11 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 data integrity" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3.12 Organisational security policy "Confidentiality during communication" . 35 4.3.13 Organisational security policy "Integrity during communication" . . . . . . 35 4.3.14 Organisational security policy "Un-traceability of end-users" . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3.15 Organisational security policy "Transaction mechanism" . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 Security requirements (ASE_REQ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.1.1 Additional Security Functional Requirements regarding access control 42 5.1.2 Additional Security Functional Requirements regarding confidentiality, authentication and integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5.1.3 Additional Security Functional Requirements regarding the robustness and correct operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5.2 TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.4 Security Requirements rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 5.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 6 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements realisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6.1.1 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6.1.2 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6.1.3 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . 67 6.1.4 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6.1.5 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . 67 Contents MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 6/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 6.1.6 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . 67 6.1.7 Import of user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2) / MFDFEV2 . . 68 6.1.8 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . 68 6.1.9 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) / MFDFEV2-DES . . . . . . . . . . . 68 6.1.10 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) / MFDFEV2-AES . . . . . . . . . . . 68 6.1.11 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . 68 6.1.12 User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . 68 6.1.13 User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . 68 6.1.14 Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . 68 6.1.15 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.1.16 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.1.17 Basic rollback (FDP_ROL.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.1.18 Replay detection (FPT_RPL.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.1.19 Unlinkability (FPR_UNL.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.1.20 Minimum and maximum quotas (FRU_RSA.2) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . . . . . 69 6.1.21 Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1) / MFDFEV2 . . . . . 69 6.2 Statement of compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.2.1 Compatibility of security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.2.2 Compatibility of Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 6.2.3 Compatibility of Security Assurance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 7 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Appendix A Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 A.1 Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 A.2 Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition List of tables SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 7/81 List of tables Table 1. TOE components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Table 3. Summary of security aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Table 4. Summary of security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Table 7. TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Table 8. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Table 9. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Table 11. Platform Security Objectives vs. TOE Security Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Table 12. Platform Security Objectives for the Environment vs. TOE Security Objectives for the Envi- ronment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Table 13. Platform Security Functional Requirements vs. TOE Security Functional Requirements. . 71 Table 14. TOE components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Table 15. Guidance documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Table 16. Sites list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Table 17. Common Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Table 18. Platform Security Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Table 19. Protection Profile and other related standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Table 20. Other standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Table 21. List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 List of figures MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 8/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 List of figures Figure 1. TOE overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Figure 2. Security IC Life-Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 9/81 1.3 Context 9 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) referred to in Section 1.4: TOE identification, is evaluated under the French IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme and is developed by the Secure Microcontrollers Division of STMicroelectronics (ST). 10 The assurance level of the performed Common Criteria (CC) IT Security Evaluation is EAL5 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.1. 11 The intent of this Security Target is to specify the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) applicable to the TOE, and to summarise its chosen TSF services and assurance measures. Since the TOE is a composite TOE, this Security Target is built on the Security IC Security Target ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition, referenced SMD_ST31P450_ST_19_006. 12 This ST claims to be an instantiation of the "Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages" (PP) registered and certified under the reference BSI- CC-PP-0084-2014 in the German IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme. 13 The Platform Security Target introduces the following augmentations: • Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from [AUG] • Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from [AUG]. • Additions specific to the Platform Security Target, some in compliance with [JILSR] and ANSSI-PP0084.03. 14 This Security Target introduces augmentations dedicated to MIFARE DESFire EV2. The original text of the PP is typeset as indicated here, its augmentations from [AUG] as indicated here, and text originating in [JILSR] as indicated here, when they are reproduced in this document. 15 This ST makes various refinements to the above mentioned PP and [AUG]. They are all properly identified in the text typeset as indicated here or here. The original text of the PP is repeated as scarcely as possible in this document for reading convenience. All PP identifiers have been however prefixed by their respective origin label: BSI for BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014, AUG1 for Addition #1 of [AUG], AUG4 for Addition #4 of [AUG] and JIL for [JILSR]. 1.4 TOE identification 16 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the technology library MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04. 17 “MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04” completely identifies the TOE including its components listed in Table 1: TOE components, its guidance documentation detailed in Table 15: Guidance documentation, and its development and production sites indicated in Table 16: Sites list. Refer also to the corresponding tables in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 10/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 18 All along the product life, the marking on the die, a set of accessible registers and a set of specific instructions allow the customer to check the product information, providing the identification elements, as listed in Table 1: TOE components, and the configuration elements as detailed in the Data Sheet, referenced in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. 19 In this Security Target, the term "MFDFEV2" means MIFARE® DESFire® EV2 1.0.4. 20 The MIFARE DESFire EV2 User Manual, referenced in Table 15: Guidance documentation, details how to check the library integrity and version. 1.5 TOE overview 21 This TOE consists of a certified hardware platform and an applicative embedded software, MIFARE DESFire EV2, stored in the hardware User NVM of the Platform. 22 The hardware platform is the ST31P450 with its firmware. It is identified as ST31P450 A04 which means it includes the components listed in the “Platform identification” columns inTable 1: TOE components, and detailed in the Security IC Security Target ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition, referenced SMD_ST31P450_ST_19_006. The ST31P450 is designed to enable an effective usage of MIFARE DESFire EV2, and underly its security functionality. The Platform Security Target references the guidance documentation directly related to the hardware platform. 23 Figure 1 provides an overview of the TOE. Figure 1. TOE overview 24 The TOE is primarily designed for secure contact-less transport applications, loyalty programs and access control systems. It fully complies with the requirements for fast and Table 1. TOE components Platform identification Library identification IC Maskset name IC version Master identification number Firmware version MIFARE DESFire EV2 version K410A C 0x01F1h 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 1.0.4 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 11/81 highly secure data transmission, flexible memory organization and interoperability with existing infrastructure. 25 The MIFARE technology library MIFARE DESFire EV2 features a mutual three pass authentication, a data encryption on RF channel, and a flexible self-securing file system. 26 MIFARE DESFire EV2 has its own guidance documentation, listed inTable 15: Guidance documentation. 27 The hardware platform is not fully described in the present Security Target, all useful information can be found in its dedicated Platform Security Target [PF-ST]. Nevertheless, the related assets, assumptions, threats, objectives and SFRs are reproduced in this document. 1.6 TOE description 1.6.1 TOE hardware description 28 The ST31P450 A04 is described in the Platform Security Target ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. 29 Note that the usage of the hardware platform and associated firmware is not limited or constrained when MIFARE DESFire EV2 is embedded. The functions provided by the Security IC platform remain normally accessible to the ES, as well as its life-cycle. 30 The only exception is the Library Protection Unit (LPU) of the hardware platform which is dedicated to the protection of MIFARE DESFire EV2, ensuring that no application can read, write, compare any piece of data or code belonging to MFDFEV2. Thus, the LPU is not available for any other usage. 1.6.2 TOE software description 31 The ST31P450 A04 firmware, included in the platform evaluation is described in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. 32 The TOE comprises a secure applicative Embedded Software, a MIFARE technology library, which is embedded in the User NVM of the Platform by ST, and protected for confidentiality and integrity of code and data by the LPU. MFDFEV2 is used in the User configuration mode of the hardware platform. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 12/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 33 MIFARE® DESFire® EV2, features: • flexible self-securing file system that groups user data into applications and files within each application, • support for different file types like values or data records, • mutual three pass authentication, • authentication on application level with fine-grained access conditions for files, • multi-application support that allows distributed management of applications and ensures application segregation, • delegated-application support that allows third party service providers to create their applications onto the issued TOE, • multiple application selection that allows transaction over files in two applications, • data encryption on RF channel, • message Authentication Codes (MAC) for replay attack protection, • transaction system with rollback that ensures consistency for complex transactions, • unique serial number for each device (UID) with optional random UID, • key set rolling feature per application to switch to a predefined key set, • transaction MAC feature to prevent fraudulent merchant attacks, • originality functionality that allows verifying the authenticity of the TOE, • Virtual Card architecture to allow multiple applications on one device, • proximity check feature against replay attacks on the TOE. 34 If privacy is an issue, the TOE can be configured not to disclose any information to unauthorized users. 35 The TOE supports a MIFARE DESFire EV0 backward compatible mode for authentication. The backward compatible mode for authentication is not part of any Security Functional Requirement of this Security Target and is therefore not in the scope of the evaluation. 36 The TOE supports a MIFARE DESFire EV1 backward compatible authentication with 2-key Tripe-DES. 2-key Triple-DES authentication is not part of any Security Functional Requirement of this Security Target and is therefore not in the scope of the evaluation. 37 Note: The ES is not part of the TOE and is out of the scope of the evaluation, except MIFARE DESFire EV2. 38 The TOE doesn’t need non-TOE hardware, software or firmware. 39 Note that the notion of various different roles and privileges does not exist for the MFDFEV2 library. Only one role (the ES) is defined at the level of the MFDFEV2 library and there are no privileges, the ES having access to all the functions of the MFDFEV2 API. 1.6.3 TOE documentation 40 The user guidance documentation, part of the TOE, consists of: • the platform user guidance documentation listed in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition, • the MIFARE DESFire EV2 user manual, • the MIFARE DESFire EV2 interface specification. 41 The complete list and details of guidance documents is provided in Table 15, except those of the platform, listed in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 13/81 1.7 TOE life cycle 42 This Security Target is fully conform to the claimed PP. In the following, just a summary and some useful explanations are given. For complete details on the TOE life cycle, please refer to the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), section 1.2.3. 43 The composite product life cycle is decomposed into 7 phases. Each of these phases has the very same boundaries as those defined in the claimed protection profile. Figure 2. Security IC Life-Cycle 44 The life cycle phases are summarized in Table 2. 45 The security IC platform life cycle is described in the Platform Security Target, as well as its delivery format. 46 All the sites likely to be involved in the complete TOE life cycle are listed in Table 16, except those dedicated to the Security IC platform, already detailed in the Platform Security Target. In Table 16, the library development centers are denoted by the activity “ES-DEV”. The IT support centers are denoted by the activity "IT". 47 MFDFEV2 is developed as part of Phase 1, then embedded by ST in the User NVM of the platform, in Phase 3, in one of the sites denoted by the activity “EWS” in the Platform Security Target. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 14/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 48 The TOE is then delivered as described in the Platform Security Target, i.e. after Phase 3 in form of wafers or after Phase 4 in packaged form, depending on the customer’s order. 49 In the following, the term "TOE delivery" is uniquely used to indicate: • after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or • after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products. 50 The sites potentially involved in the complete TOE life cycle are listed in Table 16, except those dedicated to the Security IC platform, already detailed in the Platform Security Target. 1.7.1 TOE intended usage 51 In Phase 7, the TOE is in the end-user environments. Depending on the application, the composite products are used in a wide range of applications to assure authorised conditional access. Examples of such are secure contact-less transport applications and related loyalty programs, access control systems, closed loop payment systems. 52 The end-user environment therefore covers a wide range of very different functions. The TOE is designed to be used in unsecured and unprotected environments. 1.7.2 Delivery format and method 53 MIFARE DESFire EV2 is delivered with the Security IC, already embedded by ST, in phase 3 or 4. 54 The Security IC platform can be delivered in form of wafers, micromodules or packages, as described in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. 55 All the possible forms of delivery are equivalent from a security point of view. Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases Phase Name Description 1 IC embedded software development security IC embedded software development specification of IC pre-personalization requirements 2 IC development IC design IC dedicated software development 3 IC manufacturing integration and photomask fabrication IC production IC testing Initialisation pre-personalisation if necessary 4 IC packaging security IC packaging (and testing) pre-personalisation if necessary 5 Composite product integration composite product finishing process 6 Personalisation composite product personalisation composite product testing 7 Operational usage composite product usage by its issuers and consumers MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 15/81 56 All the guidance documents are delivered as ciphered pdf files. Conformance claims (ASE_CCL, ASE_ECD) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target 16/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 2 Conformance claims (ASE_CCL, ASE_ECD) 2.1 Common Criteria conformance claims 57 The MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04 Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5. 58 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 (CCMB-2017-04-002 R5) extended and CC Part 3 (CCMB-2017-04-003 R5) conformant. 59 The extended Security Functional Requirements are all defined in the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014): • FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers, • FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability, • FAU_SAS Audit data storage, • FDP_SDC Stored data confidentiality, • FIA_API Authentication proof of identity. The reader can find their certified definitions in the text of the "Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages". 60 The assurance level for the MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04 Security Target is EAL5 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.1. 61 The ST31P450 A04 platform has been evaluated according to the evaluation level EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5, thus ensuring compatibility between the assurance levels chosen for the platform and the composite evaluations. 2.2 PP Claims 2.2.1 PP Reference 62 The MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04 Security Target claims strict conformance to the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI- CC-PP-0084-2014), as required by this Protection Profile. 63 The following packages have been selected from the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, and completely addressed by the Security IC platform: • Package “Authentication of the Security IC”, • Packages for Loader: – Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in Secured Environment only, – Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only. 2.2.2 PP Additions 64 The main additions operated on the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 are: • Those described in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition, • Specific additions for MFDFEV2. 65 These additions are used to address additional functionality provided by the TOE, and not covered by the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Conformanceclaims SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 17/81 Packages, nor by the Platform Security Target ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. They address the additional security functionality provided by MFDFEV2. 66 All refinements are indicated with type setting text as indicated here, original text from the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 being typeset as indicated here and here. Text originating in [AUG] is typeset as indicated here. Text originating in [JILSR] is typeset as indicated here. 67 The security environment additions relative to the PP are summarized in Table 3. 68 The additional security objectives relative to the PP are summarized in Table 4. 69 The additional SFRs for the TOE relative to the PP are summarized in Table 6. 70 The additional SARs relative to the PP are summarized in Table 7. 2.2.3 PP Claims rationale 71 The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and those of BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, to which conformance is claimed, have been identified and justified in Section 4 and in Section 5. They have been introduced in the previous section. 72 In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives, and the security requirements are consistent with those of the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014. 73 The security problem definition presented in Section 3, clearly shows the additions to the security problem statement of the PP. 74 The security objectives rationale presented in Section 4.3 clearly identifies modifications and additions made to the rationale presented in the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014. 75 Similarly, the security requirements rationale presented in Section 5.4 has been updated with respect to the protection profile. 76 All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements whose completeness, consistency and soundness have been argued in the rationale sections of the present document. Security problem definition (ASE_SPD) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for 18/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 3 Security problem definition (ASE_SPD) 77 This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and addresses the description of the assets to be protected, the threats, the organisational security policies and the assumptions. 78 Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), all the security aspects defined in the Protection Profile apply to the TOE. In order to address complementary TOE security functionality not defined in the Protection Profile, some security aspects have been introduced in the Platform Security Target and in this one. 79 Note that the origin of each security aspect is clearly identified in the prefix of its label. Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), section 3. 80 A summary of all these security aspects with their respective origin and status of inclusion in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition is provided in Table 3. All the security aspects defined in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition are valid for the present Security Target. 81 Only the ones introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the following sections (column “In [PF-ST] ” = No). MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security problem definition SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 19/81 Table 3. Summary of security aspects Label Title Origin In [PF-ST] TOE threats BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage [PP0084] Yes BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing [PP0084] Yes BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress [PP0084] Yes BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation [PP0084] Yes BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage [PP0084] Yes BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality [PP0084] Yes BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers [PP0084] Yes BSI.T.Masquerade-TOE Masquerade the TOE [PP0084] Yes AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation [AUG] Yes JIL.T.Open-Samples-Diffusion Diffusion of open samples [JILSR] Yes T.Data-Modification-MFDFEV2 Unauthorised data modification for MFDFEV2 No T.Impersonate-MFDFEV2 Impersonating authorised users during authentication for MFDFEV2 No T.Cloning-MFDFEV2 Cloning for MFDFEV2 No T.Confid-Applic-Code- MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 code confidentiality No T.Confid-Applic-Data- MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 data confidentiality No T.Integ-Applic-Code-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 code integrity No T.Integ-Applic-Data-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 data integrity No T.Resource-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 resource availability No OSPs BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production [PP0084] Yes BSI.P.Lim-Block-Loader Limiting and blocking the loader functionality [PP0084] Yes BSI.P.Ctrl-Loader Controlled usage to Loader Functionality [PP0084] Yes AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality [AUG] Yes P.Encryption Confidentiality during communication No P.MAC Integrity during communication No P.No-Trace Un-traceability of end-users No P.Transaction Transaction mechanism No Assumptions BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation [PP0084] Yes BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data [PP0084] Yes A.Secure-Values Usage of secure values No A.Terminal-Support Terminal support No A.KeyFunction Usage of Key-dependent Functions No Security problem definition (ASE_SPD) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for 20/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 3.1 Description of assets 82 Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), the high-level concerns defined in section 3.1 of the Protection Profile are related to standard functionality and are applied and the assets regarding threats are clarified in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. • Integrity and confidentiality of User Data stored and in operation, • Integrity and confidentiality of the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation, • Correct operation of the Security Services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software, • Deficiency of random numbers. 83 To be able to protect the assets based on this concerns, the TOE shall protect its security functionality. Therefore, critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes: • Logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software and configuration data. • Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data, specific development aids, test and characterization related data, material for software development support, and photo masks. 84 Note that the keys for the cryptographic co-processors are seen as User Data. 3.2 Threats 85 These threats are described in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST], and just recalled here. BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers BSI.T.Masquerade-TOE Masquerade the TOE AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation JIL.T.Open-Samples-Diffusion Diffusion of open samples MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security problem definition SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 21/81 86 The following additional threats are related to MFDFEV2. T.Data-Modification- MFDFEV2 Unauthorised data modification for MFDFEV2: User data stored by the TOE may be modified by unauthorised subjects. This threat applies to the processing of modification commands received by the TOE, it is not concerned with verification of authenticity. T.Impersonate- MFDFEV2 Impersonating authorised users during authentication for MFDFEV2: An unauthorised subject may try to impersonate an authorised subject during the authentication sequence, e.g. by a man-in-the middle or replay attack. T.Cloning-MFDFEV2 Cloning for MFDFEV2: User and TSF data stored on the TOE (including keys) may be read out by an unauthorised subject in order to create a duplicate. T.Confid-Applic-Code- MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 code confidentiality: MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product code must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain read access to memory area where the MIFARE DESFire EV2 licensed product executable code is stored. The attacker executes an application to disclose code belonging to MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product. T.Confid-Applic-Data- MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 data confidentiality: MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain read access to the MIFARE DESFire EV2 licensed product data by another application. For example, the attacker executes an application that tries to read data belonging to MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product. T.Integ-Applic-Code- MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 code integrity: MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product code must be protected against unauthorized modification. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain write access to memory area where the MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product executable code is stored. The attacker executes an application that tries to alter (part of) the DESFire EV2 Licensed product code. T.Integ-Applic-Data- MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 data integrity: MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product data must be protected against unauthorized modification. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain write access to the MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product data by another application. The attacker executes an application that tries to alter (part of) the DESFire EV2 Licensed product data. Security problem definition (ASE_SPD) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for 22/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 3.3 Organisational security policies 87 These security policies are described in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST], and just recalled here. 88 The TOE provides specific security functionality that can be used by MFDFEV2. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment because it can only be decided in the context of the Security IC application, against which threats MFDFEV2 will use the specific security functionality. 89 New Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) are defined here below: 90 P.Confidentiality, P.MAC, P.Transaction and P.No-Trace are related to MFDFEV2. T.Resource-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 resource availability: The availability of the TOE resources for the MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product shall be controlled to prevent denial of service or malfunction. An attacker prevents correct execution of MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product through consumption of some resources of the card: e.g. RAM or non-volatile RAM. BSI.P.Process-TOE Identification during TOE Development and Production BSI.P.Lim-Block-Loader Limiting and blocking the loader functionality BSI.P.Ctrl-Loader Controlled usage to Loader Functionality AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality P.Encryption Confidentiality during communication: The TOE shall provide the possibility to protect selected data elements from eavesdropping during contact-less communication. P.MAC Integrity during communication: The TOE shall provide the possibility to protect the contact-less communication from modification or injections. This includes especially the possibility to detect replay or man-in-the-middle attacks within a session. P.Transaction Transaction mechanism: The TOE shall provide the possibility to combine a number of data modification operations in one transaction, so that either all operations or no operation at all is performed. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security problem definition SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 23/81 3.4 Assumptions 91 These assumptions are described in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST] and in the BSI- CC-PP-0084-2014, section 3.4. 92 The following assumptions are added for MFDFEV2. They are required for the correct functioning of MFDFEV2 security functionality. They do not contradict with the security problem definition of the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, since they are only related to assets which are out of the scope of this PP. 93 In consequence, the addition of these assumptions does not contradict with the strict conformance claim on the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014. P.No-Trace Un-traceability of end-users: The TOE shall provide the ability that authorised subjects can prevent that end-user of TOE may be traced by unauthorised subjects without consent. Tracing of end-users may happen by performing a contact-less communication with the TOE when the end-user is not aware of it. Typically this involves retrieving the UID or any freely accessible data element. BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE A.Secure-Values Usage of secure values: Only confidential and secure cryptographically strong keys shall be used to set up the authentication. These values are generated outside the TOE and they are downloaded to the TOE. A.Terminal-Support Terminal support: The terminal verifies information sent by the TOE in order to ensure integrity and confidentiality of the communication. Furthermore, the terminal shall provide random numbers according to AIS20 or AIS31 [1] for the authentication A.KeyFunction Usage of Key-dependent Functions: Key-dependent Functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak- Inherent and T.Leak-Forced). Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Security IC Embedded Software. In contrast to this, the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE (ii) the processing of User Data including cryptographic keys. Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composi- 24/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 4 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) 94 The security objectives of the TOE cover principally the following aspects: • integrity and confidentiality of assets, • protection of the TOE and associated documentation during development and production phases, • provide random numbers, • provide access control functionality, • provide cryptographic support. 95 Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), all the security objectives defined in the Protection Profile apply to the TOE. In order to address complementary TOE security functionality not defined in the Protection Profile, some security objectives have been introduced in the Platform Security Target and in this one. 96 Note that the origin of each security objective is clearly identified in the prefix of its label. Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), section 3. 97 A summary of all the TOE security objectives with their respective origin and status of inclusion in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition is provided in Table 4. All the security objectives defined in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition are valid for the present Security Target. 98 Only the ones introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the following sections. Table 4. Summary of security objectives Label Title Origin In [PF-ST] TOE BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.RND Random Numbers [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Cap-Avail-Loader Capability and Availability of the Loader [PP0084] Yes BSI.O.Ctrl-Auth-Loader Access control and authenticity for the Loader [PP0084] Yes MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security objectives (ASE_- SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 25/81 TOE JIL.O.Prot-TSF-Confidentiality Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF [JILSR] Yes JIL.O.Secure-Load-ACode Secure loading of the Additional Code [JILSR] Yes JIL.O.Secure-AC-Activation Secure activation of the Additional Code [JILSR] Yes JIL.O.TOE-Identification Secure identification of the TOE [JILSR] Yes O.Secure-Load-AMemImage Secure loading of the Additional Memory Image [PF-ST] Yes O.MemImage-Identification Secure identification of the Memory Image [PF-ST] Yes BSI.O.Authentication Authentication to external entities [PP0084] Yes AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality [AUG] Yes AUG4.O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control [AUG] Yes O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 Access Control for MFDFEV2 No O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 Authentication for MFDFEV2 No O.Encryption-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Confidential Communication No O.MAC-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Integrity-protected Communication No O.Type-Consistency-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Data type consistency No O.Transaction-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Transaction mechanism No O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2 Preventing Traceability for MFDFEV2 No O.Resource-MFDFEV2 Resource availability for MFDFEV2 No O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 firewall No O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 data cleaning for resource sharing No O.Verification-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 code integrity check No Table 4. Summary of security objectives (continued) Label Title Origin In [PF-ST] Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composi- 26/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 4.1 Security objectives for the TOE 99 These security objectives are described in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST] Environments BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE [PP0084] Yes BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing [PP0084] Yes BSI.OE.Lim-Block-Loader Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader [PP0084] Yes BSI.OE.Loader-Usage Secure communication and usage of the Loader [PP0084] Yes BSI.OE.TOE-Auth External entities authenticating of the TOE [PP0084] Yes OE.Composite-TOE-Id Composite TOE identification [PF-ST] Yes OE.TOE-Id TOE identification [PF-ST] Yes OE.Enable-Disable-Secure- Diag Enabling or disabling the Secure Diagnostic [PF-ST] Yes OE.Secure-Diag-Usage Secure communication and usage of the Secure Diagnostic [PF-ST] Yes OE.Secure-Values Generation of secure values No OE.Terminal-Support Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers No Table 4. Summary of security objectives (continued) Label Title Origin In [PF-ST] BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification BSI.O.RND Random Numbers BSI.O.Cap-Avail-Loader Capability and Availability of the Loader BSI.O.Ctrl-Auth-Loader Access control and authenticity for the Loader BSI.O.Authentication Authentication to external entities MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security objectives (ASE_- SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 27/81 100 The following objectives are added for MFDFEV2: JIL.O.Prot-TSF-Confidentiality Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF JIL.O.Secure-Load-ACode Secure loading of the Additional Code JIL.O.Secure-AC-Activation Secure activation of the Additional Code JIL.O.TOE-Identification Secure identification of the TOE O.Secure-Load-AMemImage Secure loading of the Additional Memory Image O.MemImage-Identification Secure identification of the Memory Image AUG4.O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 Access Control for MFDFEV2: The TOE must provide an access control mechanism for data stored by it. The access control mechanism shall apply to read, modify, create and delete operations for data elements and to reading and modifying security attributes as well as authentication data. It shall be possible to limit the right to perform a specific operation to a specific user. The security attributes (keys) used for authentication shall never be output. O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 Authentication for MFDFEV2: The TOE must provide an authentication mechanism in order to be able to authenticate authorised users. The authentication mechanism shall be resistant against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. O.Encryption-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Confidential Communication: The TOE must be able to protect the communication by encryption. This shall be implemented by security attributes that enforce encrypted communication for the respective data elements. O.MAC-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Integrity-protected Communication: The TOE must be able to protect the communication by adding a MAC. This shall be implemented by security attributes that enforce integrity protected communication for the respective data elements. Usage of the protected communication shall also support the detection of injected and bogus commands within the communication session before the protected data transfer. O.Type-Consistency-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Data type consistency: The TOE must provide a consistent handling of the different supported data types. This comprises over- and underflow checking for values, for data file sizes and record handling. O.Transaction-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 Transaction mechanism: The TOE must be able to provide a transaction mechanism that allows to update multiple data elements either all in common or none of them. Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composi- 28/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 4.2 Security objectives for the environment 101 The following security objectives for the environment are detailed in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition and still valid in the same terms for this Security Target. The clarifications made there also apply. 102 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment (phase 1): O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2 Preventing Traceability for MFDFEV2: The TOE must be able to prevent that the TOE end-user can be traced. This shall be done by providing an option that disables the transfer of any information that is suitable for tracing an end-user by an unauthorised subject. O.Resource-MFDFEV2 Resource availability for MFDFEV2: The TOE shall control the availability of resources for MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product. O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 firewall: The TOE shall ensure isolation of data and code between MIFARE DESFire EV2 and the other applications. An application shall not read, write, compare any piece of data or code belonging to the MIFARE DESFire EV2 Licensed product. O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 data cleaning for resource sharing: It shall be ensured that any hardware resource, that is shared by MIFARE DESFire EV2 and other applications or by any application which has access to such hardware resource, is always cleaned (using code that is part of the MIFARE DESFire EV2 system and its certification) whenever MIFARE DESFire EV2 is interrupted by the operation of another application. The only exception is buffers as long as these buffers do not contain other information than what is communicated over the contactless interface or has a form that is no different than what is normally communicated over the contacless interface. For example, no data shall remain in a hardware crytographic coprocessor (e.g. DES or AES coprocessor) when MIFARE DESFire EV2 is interrupted by another application. O.Verification-MFDFEV2 MFDFEV2 code integrity check: The TOE shall ensure that MIFARE DESFire EV2 code is verified prior being executed. BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security objectives (ASE_- SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 29/81 103 Security Objectives for the operational Environment (phase 4 up to 7): 104 The following security objectives for the operational environment (phase 5 up to 7) are added for MFDFEV2: 4.3 Security objectives rationale 105 The main line of this rationale is that the inclusion of all the security objectives of the BSI- CC-PP-0084-2014 protection profile, those already introduced in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition and those introduced in this ST, guarantees that all the security environment aspects identified in Section 3 are addressed by the security objectives stated in this chapter. BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing Up to phase 6 BSI.OE.Lim-Block-Loader Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader Up to phase 6 BSI.OE.Loader-Usage Secure communication and usage of the Loader Up to phase 7 BSI.OE.TOE-Auth External entities authenticating of the TOE Up to phase 7 OE.Composite-TOE-Id Composite TOE identification Up to phase 7 OE.TOE-Id TOE identification Up to phase 7 OE.Enable-Disable- Secure-Diag Enabling or disabling the Secure Diagnostic Up to phase 7 OE.Secure-Diag-Usage Secure communication and usage of the Secure Diagnostic Up to phase 7 OE.Secure-Values Generation of secure values: The environment shall generate confidential and cryptographically strong secure keys for authentication purpose. These values are generated outside the TOE and they are downloaded to the TOE during the personalisation or usage in phase 5 to 7. OE.Terminal-Support Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers: The terminal shall verify information sent by the TOE in order to ensure integrity and confidentiality of the communication. This involves checking of MAC values, verification of redundancy information according to the cryptographic protocol and secure closing of the communication session.Furthermore, the terminal shall provide random numbers according to AIS20 or AIS31 [1] for the authentication. Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composi- 30/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 106 Thus, it is necessary to show that: • security environment aspects from this ST, are addressed by security objectives stated in this chapter, • security objectives from this ST, are suitable (i.e. they address security environment aspects), • security objectives from this ST, are consistent with the other security objectives stated in this chapter (i.e. no contradictions). 107 All security aspects are already justified in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST], except the ones denoted by “New” in Table 5. 108 The augmentation made in this ST introduces the following security environment aspects: • TOE threats "Unauthorised data modification for MFDFEV2, (T.Data-Modification- MFDFEV2)", "Impersonating authorised users during authentication for MFDFEV2, (T.Impersonate-MFDFEV2)", "Cloning for MFDFEV2, (T.Cloning-MFDFEV2)", "MFDFEV2 code confidentiality, (T.Confid-Applic-Code-MFDFEV2)", "MFDFEV2 data confidentiality, (T.Confid-Applic-Data-MFDFEV2)", "MFDFEV2 code integrity, (T.Integ- Applic-Code-MFDFEV2)", "MFDFEV2 data integrity, (T.Integ-Applic-Data-MFDFEV2)", and "MFDFEV2 resource availability, (T.Resource-MFDFEV2)". • organisational security policies "Confidentiality during communication, (P.Encryption)", “Integrity during communication, (P.MAC)", "Un-traceability of end-users, (P.No-Trace)", and "Transaction mechanism, (P.Transaction)". • assumptions "Usage of secure values, (A.Secure-Values)", "Terminal support, (A.Terminal-Support)", and “Usage of Key-dependent Functions, (A.KeyFunction)”. 109 The justification of the additional policies, additional threats, and additional assumptions provided in the next subsections shows that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 and ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there. 110 In particular, the added assumptions do not contradict with the policies, threats and assumptions of the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 Protection Profile, to which strict conformance is claimed, because they are all exclusively related to MFDFEV2, which is out of the scope of this protection profile. 111 Only the security aspects denoted by “New” in Table 5 will be detailed in the following. Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy Security Objective Notes BSI.T.Leak-Inherent BSI.O.Leak-Inherent BSI.T.Phys-Probing BSI.O.Phys-Probing BSI.T.Malfunction BSI.O.Malfunction BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation BSI.T.Leak-Forced BSI.O.Leak-Forced BSI.T.Abuse-Func BSI.O.Abuse-Func OE.Enable-Disable-Secure-Diag OE.Secure-Diag-Usage MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security objectives (ASE_- SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 31/81 BSI.T.RND BSI.O.RND BSI.T.Masquerade-TOE BSI.O.Authentication BSI.OE.TOE-Auth AUG4.T.Mem-Access AUG4.O.Mem-Access JIL.T.Open-Samples-Diffusion JIL.O.Prot-TSF-Confidentiality BSI.O.Leak-Inherent BSI.O.Leak-Forced T.Data-Modification-MFDFEV2 O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 O.Type-Consistency-MFDFEV2 OE.Terminal-Support New T.Impersonate-MFDFEV2 O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 New T.Cloning-MFDFEV2 O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 New T.Confid-Applic-Code-MFDFEV2 O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 New T.Confid-Applic-Data-MFDFEV2 O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 New T.Integ-Applic-Code-MFDFEV2 O.Verification-MFDFEV2 O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 New T.Integ-Applic-Data-MFDFEV2 O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 New T.Resource-MFDFEV2 O.Resource-MFDFEV2 New BSI.P.Process-TOE BSI.O.Identification Phase 2-3 optional Phase 4 BSI.P.Lim-Block-Loader BSI.O.Cap-Avail-Loader BSI.OE.Lim-Block-Loader BSI.P.Ctrl-Loader BSI.O.Ctrl-Auth-Loader JIL.O.Secure-Load-ACode JIL.O.Secure-AC-Activation JIL.O.TOE-Identification O.Secure-Load-AMemImage O.MemImage-Identification BSI.OE.Loader-Usage OE.TOE-Id OE.Composite-TOE-Id AUG1.P.Add-Functions AUG1.O.Add-Functions P.Encryption O.Encryption-MFDFEV2 New Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies (continued) Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy Security Objective Notes Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composi- 32/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 4.3.1 Assumption "Usage of secure values" 112 The justification related to the assumption “Usage of secure values, (A.Secure-Values)” is as follows: 113 OE.Secure-Values is an immediate transformation of this assumption, therefore it covers the assumption. 114 A.Secure-Values and OE.Secure-Values do not contradict with the security problem definition of the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, because they are only related to MFDFEV2, which is out of the scope of this protection profile. 4.3.2 Assumption "Terminal support" 115 The justification related to the assumption “Terminal support, (A.Terminal-Support)” is as follows: 116 The objective OE.Terminal-Support is an immediate transformation of the assumption, therefore it covers the assumption. The TOE can only check the integrity of data received from the terminal. For data transferred to the terminal, the receiver must verify the integrity of the received data. Furthermore the TOE cannot verify the entropy of the random number sent by the terminal. The terminal itself must ensure that random numbers are generated with appropriate entropy for the authentication. This is assumed by the related assumption, therefore the assumption is covered. 117 A.Terminal-Support and OE.Terminal-Support do not contradict with the security problem definition of the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, because they are only related to MFDFEV2, which is out of the scope of this protection profile. P.MAC O.MAC-MFDFEV2 New P.No-Trace O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2 O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 New P.Transaction O.Transaction-MFDFEV2 New BSI.A.Resp-Appl BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1 BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 5-6 optional Phase 4 A.KeyFunction BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1 A.Secure-Values OE.Secure-Values New Phases 5-7 A.Terminal-Support OE.Terminal-Support New Phase 7 Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies (continued) Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy Security Objective Notes MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security objectives (ASE_- SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 33/81 4.3.3 Assumption "Usage of Key-dependent Functions" 118 The justification related to the assumption “Usage of Key-dependent Functions, (A.KeyFunction)” is as follows: 119 BSI.OE.Resp-Appl requires the Security IC Embedded Software to implement measures to manage the cryptographic keys appropriately to ensure the strength of the cryptographic operation, therefore it covers the assumption. 120 A.KeyFunction does not contradict with the security problem definition of the BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014, because it is only related to MFDFEV2, which is out of the scope of this protection profile. 4.3.4 TOE threat "Unauthorised data modification for MFDFEV2" 121 The justification related to the threat “Unauthorised data modification for MFDFEV2, (T.Data-Modification-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 122 According to threat T.Data-Modification-MFDFEV2, the TOE shall avoid that user data stored by the TOE may be modified by unauthorised subjects. The objective O.Access- Control-MFDFEV2 requires an access control mechanism that limits the ability to modify data and code elements stored by the TOE. O.Type-Consistency-MFDFEV2 ensures that data types are adhered, so that TOE data cannot be modified by abusing type-specific operations. The terminal must support this by checking the TOE responses, which is required by OE.Terminal-Support. Therefore T.Data-Modification-MFDFEV2 is covered by these three objectives. 123 The added objectives for the TOE O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 and O.Type-Consistency- MFDFEV2 do not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE. 4.3.5 TOE threat "Impersonating authorised users during authentication for MFDFEV2" 124 The justification related to the threat “Impersonating authorised users during authentication for MFDFEV2, (T.Impersonate-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 125 The threat is related to the fact that an unauthorised subject may try to impersonate an authorised subject during authentication, e.g. by a man-in-the middle or replay attack. O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 requires that the authentication mechanism provided by the TOE shall be resistant against attack scenarios targeting the impersonation of authorized users. Therefore the threat is covered by O.Authentication-MFDFEV2. 126 The added objective for the TOE O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE. 4.3.6 TOE threat "Cloning for MFDFEV2" 127 The justification related to the threat “Cloning for MFDFEV2, (T.Cloning-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 128 The concern of T.Cloning-MFDFEV2 is that all data stored on the TOE (including keys) may be read out in order to create a duplicate. O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 requires that unauthorized users can not read any information that is restricted to the authorized subjects. The cryptographic keys used for the authentication are stored inside the TOE and are protected by this objective. This objective states that no keys used for authentication shall ever be output. O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composi- 34/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 requires that users are authenticated before they can read any information that is restricted to authorized users. Therefore the two objectives cover T.Cloning-MFDFEV2. 4.3.7 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 resource availability" 129 The justification related to the threat “MFDFEV2 resource availability, (T.Resource- MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 130 The concern of T.Resource-MFDFEV2 is to prevent denial of service or malfunction of MFDFEV2, that may result from an unavailability of resources. The goal of O.Resource- MFDFEV2 is to control the availability of resources for MFDFEV2. Therefore the threat is covered by O.Resource-MFDFEV2. 131 The added objective for the TOE O.Resource-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE. 4.3.8 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 code confidentiality" 132 The justification related to the threat “MFDFEV2 code confidentiality, (T.Confid-Applic-Code- MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 133 Since O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 requires that the TOE ensures isolation of code between MFDFEV2 and the other applications, the code of MFDFEV2 is protected against unauthorised disclosure, therefore T.Confid-Applic-Code-MFDFEV2 is covered by O.Firewall-MFDFEV2. 134 The added objective for the TOE O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE. 4.3.9 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 data confidentiality" 135 The justification related to the threat “MFDFEV2 data confidentiality, (T.Confid-Applic-Data- MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 136 Since O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 requires that the TOE ensures isolation of data between MFDFEV2 and the other applications, the data of MFDFEV2 is protected against unauthorised disclosure, therefore T.Confid-Applic-Data-MFDFEV2 is covered by O.Firewall-MFDFEV2. 4.3.10 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 code integrity" 137 The justification related to the threat “MFDFEV2 code integrity, (T.Integ-Applic-Code- MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 138 The threat is related to the alteration of MFDFEV2 code by an attacker. O.Verification- MFDFEV2 requires that the TOE verifies the code integrity before its execution. Complementary, O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 requires that the TOE ensures isolation of code between MFDFEV2 and the other applications, thus protecting the code of MFDFEV2 against unauthorised modification. Therefore the threat is covered by O.Verification- MFDFEV2 together with O.Firewall-MFDFEV2. 139 The added objective for the TOE O.Verification-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Security objectives (ASE_- SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 35/81 4.3.11 TOE threat "MFDFEV2 data integrity" 140 The justification related to the threat “MFDFEV2 data integrity, (T.Integ-Applic-Data- MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 141 The threat is related to the alteration of MFDFEV2 data by an attacker. Since O.Firewall- MFDFEV2 and O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 require that the TOE ensures isolation of data between MFDFEV2 and the other applications, the data of MFDFEV2 is protected against unauthorised modification, therefore T.Integ-Applic-Data-MFDFEV2 is covered by O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 together with O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2. 142 The added objective for the TOE O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE. 4.3.12 Organisational security policy "Confidentiality during communication" 143 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Confidentiality during communication, (P.Encryption)” is as follows: 144 O.Encryption-MFDFEV2 is an immediate transformation of the security policy, therefore it covers the Security Policy. 145 The added objective for the TOE O.Encryption-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives. 4.3.13 Organisational security policy "Integrity during communication" 146 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Integrity during communication, (P.MAC)” is as follows: 147 O.MAC-MFDFEV2 is an immediate transformation of the security policy, therefore it covers the Security Policy. 148 The added objective for the TOE O.MAC-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives. 4.3.14 Organisational security policy "Un-traceability of end-users" 149 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Un-traceability of end-users, (P.No-Trace)” is as follows: 150 This policy requires that the TOE has the ability to prevent tracing of end-users. Tracing can be performed with the UID or with any freely accessible data element stored by the TOE. 151 O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 provides means to implement access control to data elements on the TOE and O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 provides means to implement authentication on the TOE, in order to prevent tracing based on freely accessible data elements. O.No- Trace-MFDFEV2 requires that the TOE shall provide an option to prevent the transfer of any information that is suitable for tracing an end-user by an unauthorized subject, which includes the UID. Therefore the policy is covered by these three objectives. 152 The added objective for the TOE O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives. Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composi- 36/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 4.3.15 Organisational security policy "Transaction mechanism" 153 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Transaction mechanism, (P.Transaction)” is as follows: 154 O.Transaction-MFDFEV2 is an immediate transformation of the security policy, therefore it covers the Security Policy. 155 The added objective for the TOE O.Transaction-MFDFEV2 does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 37/81 5 Security requirements (ASE_REQ) 156 This chapter on security requirements contains a section on security functional requirements (SFRs) for the TOE (Section 5.1), a section on security assurance requirements (SARs) for the TOE (Section 5.2), a section on the refinements of these SARs (Section 5.3) as required by the "BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014" Protection Profile. This chapter includes a section with the security requirements rationale (Section 5.4). 5.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE 157 The selected security functional requirements (SFRs) for this TOE (MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 A04) are summarized in Table 6. This table also specifies: • Their type i.e. drawn from CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 or extended, • Their origin i.e. defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 Protection Profile, in [AUG], or in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST]. All SFRs are inherited from [PF-ST], except those identified by “This ST”. 158 The extended SFRs are defined in the "BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014" Protection Profile. 159 All extensions to the SFRs of the "BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014" Protection Profiles (PPs) are exclusively drawn from CCMB-2017-04-002 R5. 160 All iterations, assignments, selections, or refinements on SFRs have been performed according to section C.4 of CCMB-2017-04-001 R5. They are easily identified in the following text since they appear as indicated here. Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE Label Title Addressing Origin Type FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance Malfunction BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state FMT_LIM.1 / Test Limited capabilities Abuse of Test functionality BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Extended FMT_LIM.2 / Test Limited availability FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage Lack of TOE identification BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Operated Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 38/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality Physical manipulation & probing BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Operated Extended FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection Leakage FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation Weak cryptographic quality of random numbers BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Operated Extended FCS_COP.1 / TDES Cryptographic operation - TDES Cipher scheme support [AUG] #1 Operated / [PF-ST] CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FCS_COP.1 / AES Cryptographic operation - AES FDP_ACC.1 / Memories Subset access control Memory access violation [PF-ST] FDP_ACF.1 / Memories Security attribute based access control [AUG] #4 Operated FMT_MSA.3 / Memories Static attribute initialisation Correct operation FMT_MSA.1 / Memories Management of security attribute FMT_SMF.1 / Memories Specification of management functions [PF-ST] FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity Masquerade BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Operated Extended FMT_LIM.1 / Loader Limited capabilities Abuse of Loader functionality FMT_LIM.2 / Loader Limited availability Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued) Label Title Addressing Origin Type MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 39/81 FTP_ITC.1 / Loader Inter-TSF trusted channel - Loader Loader violation BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Operated CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FDP_UCT.1 / Loader Basic data exchange confidentiality - Loader FDP_UIT.1 / Loader Data exchange integrity - Loader FDP_ACC.1 / Loader Subset access control - Loader FDP_ACF.1 / Loader Security attribute based access control - Loader FMT_MSA.3 / Loader Static attribute initialisation - Loader Correct Loader operation [PF-ST] FMT_MSA.1 / Loader Management of security attribute - Loader FMT_SMR.1 / Loader Security roles - Loader FIA_UID.1 / Loader Timing of identification - Loader FIA_UAU.1 / Loader Timing of authentication - Loader FMT_SMF.1 / Loader Specification of management functions - Loader FPT_FLS.1 / Loader Failure with preservation of secure state - Loader FAU_SAR.1 / Loader Audit review - Loader Lack of TOE identification FAU_SAS.1 / Loader Audit storage - Loader Extended Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued) Label Title Addressing Origin Type Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 40/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 FTP_ITC.1 / Sdiag Inter-TSF trusted channel - Secure Diagnostic Abuse of Secure Diagnostic functionality [PF-ST] CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FAU_SAR.1 / Sdiag Audit review - Secure Diagnostic FMT_LIM.1 / Sdiag Limited capabilities - Secure Diagnostic Extended FMT_LIM.2 / Sdiag Limited availability - Secure Diagnostic FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2 Security roles MFDFEV2 access control This ST CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 Subset access control FDP_ACF.1 / MFDFEV2 Security attribute based access control FMT_MSA.3 / MFDFEV2 Static attribute initialisation FMT_MSA.1 / MFDFEV2 Management of security attribute FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2 Specification of management functions FDP_ITC.2 / MFDFEV2 Import of user data with security attributes FPT_TDC.1 / MFDFEV2 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued) Label Title Addressing Origin Type MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 41/81 161 All these SFRs have already been stated in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition, and are satisfied by the ST31P450 platform, except the following ones, dedicated to MFDFEV2: FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2, FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2, FDP_ACF.1 / MFDFEV2, FMT_MSA.3 / MFDFEV2, FMT_MSA.1 / MFDFEV2, FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2, FDP_ITC.2 / MFDFEV2, FPT_TDC.1 / MFDFEV2, FIA_UID.2 / MFDFEV2, FIA_UAU.2 / MFDFEV2, FIA_UAU.5 / MFDFEV2, FMT_MTD.1 / MFDFEV2, FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2, FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-DES, FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-AES, FCS_CKM.4 / MFDFEV2, FDP_ROL.1 / MFDFEV2, FPT_RPL.1 / MFDFEV2, FPR_UNL.1 / MFDFEV2, FRU_RSA.2 / MFDFEV2, FDP_RIP.1 / MFDFEV2. 162 The SFRs from the Platform Security Target are detailed in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition [PF-ST]. 163 The following SFRs are extensions to "BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014" Protection Profile (PP), related to the capabilities and protections of MFDFEV2. FIA_UID.2 / MFDFEV2 User identification before any action MFDFEV2 confidentiality, authentication and integrity This ST CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FIA_UAU.2 / MFDFEV2 User authentication before any action FIA_UAU.5 / MFDFEV2 Multiple authentication mechanisms FMT_MTD.1 / MFDFEV2 Management of TSF data FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2 Trusted path FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-DES Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-DES FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-AES Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-AES FCS_CKM.4 / MFDFEV2 Cryptographic key destruction FDP_ROL.1 / MFDFEV2 Basic rollback MFDFEV2 robustness FPT_RPL.1 / MFDFEV2 Replay detection FPR_UNL.1 / MFDFEV2 Unlinkability FRU_RSA.2 / MFDFEV2 Minimum and maximum quotas MFDFEV2 correct operation FDP_RIP.1 / MFDFEV2 Subset residual information protection MFDFEV2 intrinsic confidentiality and integrity Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued) Label Title Addressing Origin Type Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 42/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 5.1.1 Additional Security Functional Requirements regarding access control Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) / MFDFEV2 164 The TSF shall maintain the roles Admin, AppMgr, DelAppMgr, AppUser, AppChangeUser, AppRollUser, OrigKeyUser and Anybody. 165 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) / MFDFEV2 166 The TSF shall enforce the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy on all subjects, objects, operations and attributes defined by the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy. Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) / MFDFEV2 167 The TSF shall enforce the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy to objects based on the following: all subjects, objects and attributes. 168 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: • The Admin is allowed to perform Application.Create and Application.Delete. • The Admin is allowed to perform DelApplication.Delete. • The AppMgr is allowed to perform File.Create and File.Delete. • The DelAppMgr is allowed to perform DelApplication.Create with valid DAMMAC and valid DAMENC. 169 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: • The AppMgr is allowed to perform Application.Delete if the attribute PICCLevelData.PICCKeySettings grants this right. • The AppUser is allowed to perform File.Read or File.Write or File.ReadWrite or File.Change on File if the File.AccessRights grant these rights. • The Anybody is allowed to perform Application.Create if the attribute PICCLevelData.PICCKeySettings grant this right. • The Anybody is allowed to perform File.Create and File.Delete if the Application.AppKeySettings grant these rights. • The Anybody is allowed to perform File.Read or File.Write or File.ReadWrite or File.Change on File if the File.AccessRights grant these rights. 170 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: • No one but Nobody is allowed to perform File.Read or File.Write or File.ReadWrite or File.Change on File if the File.AccessRights do not grant this right. • OrigKeyUser is not allowed to perform any operation on objects. • No one but Nobody is allowed to perform any operation on OriginalityKey. 171 The following SFP MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) / MFDFEV2": 172 SFP_1: MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 43/81 The Security Function Policy (SFP) MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy uses the following definitions: The subjects are: • Admin: Administrator The Admin is the subject that owns or has access to the PICCMasterKey. The Admin is the subject that distributes the PICCDAMAuthKey, DAMMACs, and DAMENCs containing the AppDAMDefaultKey, to the DelAppMgr. • AppMgr: Application Manager The AppMgr is the subject that owns or has access to an AppMasterKey. Note that the TOE supports multiple Applications and therefore multiple AppMgr, however for one Application there is only one AppMgr. • DelAppMgr: Delegated Application Manager The DelAppMgr is the subject that has access to a valid DAMMAC, the PICCDAMAuthKey, and a DAMENC containing the AppDAMDefaultKey. Note that the TOE supports multiple DelApplications and therefore multiple DelAppMgr. • AppUser: Application User The AppUser is the subject that owns or has access to an AppKey. Note that the TOE supports multiple AppUser within each Application and the assigned rights to the AppUser can be different, xwhich allows to have more or less powerful AppUser. • AppChangeUser: Application Change User The AppChangeUser is the subject that owns or has access to an AppChangeKey. • AppRollUser: Application Roll Key Set User The AppRollUser is the subject that owns or has access to an AppRollKey. • OrigKeyUser: Originality Key User The OrigKeyUser is the subject that owns or has access to an OriginalityKey. The OrigKeyUser can authenticate with the TOE to prove the authenticity of the Security IC. • Anybody: Anybody Any subject that does not belong to one of the roles Admin, AppMgr, DelAppMgr, AppUser, AppChangeUser, AppRollUser or OrigKeyUser belongs to the role Anybody. This role includes the card holder (also referred to as end-user), and any other subject like an attacker for instance. The subjects belonging to Anybody do not possess any key and therefore are not able to perform any operation that is restricted to one of the roles which are explicitly excluded from the role Anybody. • Nobody: Nobody Any subject that does not belong to one of the roles Admin, AppMgr, DelAppMgr, AppUser, AppChangeUser, AppRollUser, OrigKeyUser or Anybody, belongs to the role Nobody. Due to the definition of Anybody, the set of all subjects belonging to the role Nobody is the empty set. The objects are: • PICCLevelData: PICC Level Data The PICC level is the lowest level of the MFDFEV2 Software (PICC level, Application Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 44/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 level, File level). On the PICC level Application and DelApplication can be created or deleted. Hence to the PICCLevelData belong Application and DelApplication. • Application: Application The card can store a number of Application. An Application can store a number of File. • DelApplication: Delegated Application The card can store a number of DelApplication. After creation the DelApplication has the same attributes as an Application. • File: File An Application can store a number of File of different types. • PICCMasterKey: PICC Master Key The Card Master Key. • PICCAppDefaultKey: PICC Application Default Key The Default Application Master Key and Application Keys that are used when an Application is created and when a KeySet is initialized. • PICCDAMAuthKey: PICC DAM Authentication Key Delegated Application Management Authentication Key. • PICCDAMENCKey: PICC DAM Encryption Key Delegated Application Management Encryption Key to generate DAMENC. • PICCDAMMACKey: PICC DAM MAC Key Delegated Application Management MAC Key to generate DAMMAC. • OriginalityKey: Originality Key Key to check the originality of the card. • AppMasterKey: Application Master Key Application Master Key. • AppChangeKey: Application Change Key Application Change Key. • AppKey: Application Key Application Key. • AppTransactionMACKey: Application Transaction MAC Key Application Transaction MAC Key. • AppRollKey: Application Roll Keyset Key Application Roll Key Set Key. • AppDAMDefaultKey: Application DAM Default Key Delegated Application Management Default Authentication Key. • KeySet: Key Set AppKeys are grouped into KeySets. The security attributes are: • PICCLevelData.PICCKeySettings: Generic PICC key settings. • Application.AppKeySettings: Generic Application key settings. • File.AccessRights:Generic access rights for File. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 45/81 The operations that can be performed with the objects are: • PICCLevelData.Modify: Modify attribute PICCLevelData.PICCKeySettings. • PICCLevelData.Freeze: Freeze attribute PICCLevelData.PICCKeySettings. • Application.Modify: Modify attribute Application.AppKeySettings. • Application.Freeze: Freeze attribute Application.AppKeySettings. • Application.Create: Create an Application. • Application.Delete: Delete an Application. • Application.Select: Select an Application. • DelApplication.Create: Create a DelApplication. • DelApplication.Delete: Delete a DelApplication. • File.Create: Create a File. • File.Delete: Delete a File. • File.Freeze: Freeze attributes of File. • File.Read: Read operations accessing the content of a File. • File.Write: Write operations accessing the content of a File. • File.ReadWrite: ReadWrite operations accessing the content of a File. • File.Change: Change operation to change the attribute File.AccessRights. • PICCMasterKey.Change: Change the PICCMasterKey. • PICCMasterKey.Freeze: Freeze the PICCMasterKey. • PICCAppDefaultKey.Change: Change the PICCAppDefaultKey. • PICCDAMAuthKey.Change: Change the PICCDAMAuthKey. • PICCDAMENCKey.Change: Change the PICCDAMENCKey. • PICCDAMMACKey.Change: Change the PICCDAMMACKey. • AppMasterKey.Change: Change the AppMasterKey. • AppMasterKey.Freeze: Freeze the AppMasterKey. • AppChangeKey.Change: Change the AppChangeKey. • AppKey.Change: Change the AppKey. • AppTransactionMACKey.Create: Create the AppTransactionMACKey. • AppTransactionMACKey.Delete: Delete the AppTransactionMACKey. • AppRollKey.Change: Change the AppRollKey. • KeySet.Roll: Roll the KeySet. Note that subjects are authorised by cryptographic keys. These keys are considered as authentication data and not as security attributes of the subjects. The card has a card master key PICCMasterKey. Every application has an AppMasterKey and a variable number of AppKeys organized in KeySet used for operations on Files (all these keys are called Application Keys). The Application Keys and Key Sets within an application are numbered. Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 46/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 Implications of the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy: The MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy has some implications, that can be drawn from the policy and that are essential parts of the TOE security functions. • The TOE end-user does normally not belong to the group of authorised users (Admin, AppMgr, DelAppMgr, AppUser), but regarded as Anybody by the TOE. This means that the TOE cannot determine if it is used by its intended end-user (in other words: it cannot determine if the current card holder is the owner of the card). • The Admin can have the exclusive right to create and delete Applications on the Card, however he can also grant this privilege to Anybody. In the case of DelApplications the Admin can grant this privilege to the AppMgr. Additionally, changing the PICCLevelData is reserved for the Admin. AppKeys, at delivery time should be personalized to a preliminary, temporary key only known to the Admin and the AppMgr. • At Application personalization time, the AppMgr uses the preliminary AppKey in order to personalize the AppKeys, whereas all keys, except the AppMasterKey, can be personalized to a preliminary, temporary key only known to the AppMgr and the AppUser. Furthermore, the AppMgr has the right to create Files within his Application scope. Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) / MFDFEV2 173 The TSF shall enforce the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy to provide permissive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. 174 The TSF shall allow the no one but Nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object is created. 175 Application note: The only initial attributes are the card attributes. All other attributes have to be defined at the same time the respective object is created. Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) / MFDFEV2 176 The TSF shall enforce the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to modify or freeze and change the security attributes of the objects PICCLevelData, Application and the security attribute File.AccessRights to the Admin, AppMgr and AppChangeUser, respectively. 177 Refinement: The detailed management abilities are: • Only the Admin is allowed to perform PICCLevelData.Modify or PICCLevelData.Freeze on PICCLevelData.PICCKeySettings. • Only the AppMgr is allowed to perform Application.Modify or Application.Freeze on Application.AppKeySettings. • The AppChangeUser is allowed to perform File.Freeze on File.AccessRights. Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) / MFDFEV2 178 The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the operations PICCMasterKey.Change, PICCMasterKey.Freeze, PICCAppDefaultKey.Change, AppMasterKey.Change, AppMasterKey.Freeze, AppChangeKey.Change to the Admin, AppMgr and AppUser. 179 Refinement: MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 47/81 The detailed management abilities are: • Only the Admin is allowed to perform PICCMasterKey.Change or PICCMasterKey.Freeze. • The Admin is allowed to perform PICCAppDefaultKey.Change. • The Admin is allowed to perform PICCDAMAuthKey.Change. • The Admin is allowed to perform PICCDAMENCKey.Change. • The Admin is allowed to perform PICCDAMMACKey.Change. • The AppMgr is allowed to perform AppMasterKey.Change and AppMasterKey.Freeze. • The AppMgr is allowed to perform AppChangeKey.Change. • The AppMgr is allowed to perform AppKey.Change. • The AppMgr is allowed to perform AppRollKey.Change. • The AppMgr is allowed to perform AppTransactionMACKey.Create and AppTransactionMACKey.Delete. • The AppChangeUser is allowed to perform AppChangeKey.Change. • The AppChangeUser is allowed to perform AppKey.Change. • The AppUser is allowed to perform AppKey.Change on AppKey if Application.AppKeySettings grant this right. • The AppUser is allowed to perform AppTransactionMACKey.Create and AppTransactionMACKey.Delete on AppTransactionMACKey if Application.AppKeySettings grant this right. • The AppRollUser is allowed to perform KeySet.Roll. Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) / MFDFEV2 180 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: • Authenticating a user, • Invalidating the current authentication state based on the functions: Selecting an application or the card, Changing the key corresponding to the current authentication, Occurrence of any error during the execution of a command, Starting a new authentication, Rolling key set, Failed Proximity Check, Deleting an Application as AppMgr, Reset, • Changing a security attribute, • Rolling the key set, • Creating or deleting an application, a delegated application or a file, • Selection of the Virtual Card. Import of user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2) / MFDFEV2 181 The TSF shall enforce the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. 182 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data. 183 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received. 184 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data. Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 48/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 185 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: no additional rules. 5.1.2 Additional Security Functional Requirements regarding confidentiality, authentication and integrity Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) / MFDFEV2-DES 186 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption used for authentication in accordance with the specified algorithm Triple-DES in one of the following modes of operation: CBC and 3-key Triple-DES and cryptographic key sizes 168 bits that meet the following standards: NIST SP 800-67 (TDES), NIST SP 800-38A (CBC mode). Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) / MFDFEV2-AES The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption and cipher based MAC for authentication and communication in accordance with the specified algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in one of the following modes of operation: CBC, CMAC and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits that meet the following standards: FIPS 197 (AES), NIST SP 800-38A (CBC mode), NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC mode). 187 Refinement: For the MIFARE DESFire EV1 secure messaging, the TOE uses the cryptographic algorithm for CMAC according to NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC mode) with the following modification: the TOE does not use the standard zero byte IV, instead it uses an IV defined by the previous cryptographic operation (chaining mode). Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) / MFDFEV2 188 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting that meets the following: none. User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2) / MFDFEV2 189 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF- mediated actions on behalf of that user. Application note: Identification of a user is performed upon an authentication request based on the currently selected context and the key number. For example, if an authentication request for key number 0 is issued after selecting a specific application, the user is identified as the Application Manager of the respective application. Before any authentication request is issued, the user is identified as “Everybody”. User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2) / MFDFEV2 190 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5) / MFDFEV2 191 The TSF shall provide ‘none’ and cryptographic authentication to support user authentication. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 49/81 192 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules: • The ‘none’ authentication is performed with anyone who communicates with the TOE without issuing an explicit authentication request. The ‘none’ authentication implicitly and solely authorises the “Everybody” subject. • The cryptographic authentication is used to authorise the Administrator, Application Manager, Delegated Application Manager and Application User. Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) / MFDFEV2 193 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification, disclosure or only modification. 194 The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via the trusted path. 195 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for authentication requests with 3-key Triple-DES or AES, confidentiality and/or integrity verification for data transfers protected with AES based on a setting in the file attributes. Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1) / MFDFEV2 196 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret data files and values when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product. 197 The TSF shall use the rule: data files or values can only be modified by their dedicated type-specific operations honouring the type-specific boundaries when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product. 5.1.3 Additional Security Functional Requirements regarding the robustness and correct operation Basic rollback (FDP_ROL.1) / MFDFEV2 198 The TSF shall enforce the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy to permit the rollback of the operations that modify the value or data file objects on the backup files. 199 The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the scope of the current transaction, which is defined by the following limitative events: chip reset, select command, deselect command, explicit commit, explicit abort, command failure. Replay detection (FPT_RPL.1) / MFDFEV2 200 The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: authentication requests with 3-key Tripe-DES or AES, confidentiality and/or data integrity verification for data transfers protected with AES and based on a setting in the file attributes. 201 The TSF shall perform rejection of the request when replay is detected. Unlinkability (FPR_UNL.1) / MFDFEV2 202 The TSF shall ensure that unauthorised subjects other than the card holder are unable to determine whether any operation of the TOE were caused by the same user. Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 50/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 Minimum and maximum quotas (FRU_RSA.2) / MFDFEV2 203 The TSF shall enforce maximum quotas of the following resources NVM and RAM that subjects can use simultaneously. 204 The TSF shall ensure the provision of minimum quantity of the NVM and the RAM that is available for subjects to use simultaneously. Application note: The subjects addressed here are MFDFEV2, and all other applications running on the TOE. The goal is to ensure that MFDFEV2 always have enough NVM and RAM for its own usage. Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1) / MFDFEV2 205 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: MFDFEV2. 5.2 TOE security assurance requirements 206 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following components: • ALC_DVS.2, • AVA_VAN.5, • ASE_TSS.2, • ALC_FLR.1. 207 Regarding application note 22 of BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, the continuously increasing maturity level of evaluations of Security ICs justifies the selection of a higher-level assurance package. 208 The component ASE_TSS.2 is chosen as an augmentation in this ST to give architectural information on the security functionality of the TOE. 209 The component ALC_FLR.1 is chosen as an augmentation in this ST because a solid flaw management is key for the continuous improvement of the security IC platforms, especially on markets which need highly resistant and long lasting products. 210 The set of security assurance requirements (SARs) is presented in Table 7, indicating the origin of the requirement. Table 7. TOE security assurance requirements Label Title Origin ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information EAL5 ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals EAL5 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design EAL5 AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 51/81 5.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements 211 As BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 defines refinements for selected SARs, these refinements are also claimed in this Security Target. 212 Regarding application note 23 of BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, the refinements for all the assurance families have been reviewed for the hierarchically higher-level assurance components selected in this Security Target. 213 An impact summary is provided in Table 8. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage EAL5 ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation Security Target ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards EAL5 ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ASE_INT.1 ST introduction EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary Security Target ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design EAL5 ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample EAL5/BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 Table 7. TOE security assurance requirements (continued) Label Title Origin Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 52/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 5.4 Security Requirements rationale 5.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements 214 Just as for the security objectives rationale of Section , the main line of this rationale is that the inclusion of all the security requirements of the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 protection profile, together with those introduced in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST], and those introduced in this Security Target, guarantees that all the security objectives identified in Section 4 are suitably addressed by the security requirements stated in this chapter, and that the latter together form an internally consistent whole. Table 8. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 refinements Assurance Family BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Level ST Level Impact on refinement ALC_DVS 2 2 None ALC_CMS 4 5 None, refinement is still valid ALC_CMC 4 4 None ADV_ARC 1 1 None ADV_FSP 4 5 None, presentation style changes ADV_IMP 1 1 None ATE_COV 2 2 None AGD_OPE 1 1 None AVA_VAN 5 5 None Table 9. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Basic internal transfer protection FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection FPT_ITT.1 Subset information flow control FDP_IFC.1 BSI.O.Phys-Probing Stored data confidentiality FDP_SDC.1 Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3 BSI.O.Malfunction Limited fault tolerance FRU_FLT.2 Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1 BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Stored data integrity monitoring and action FDP_SDI.2 Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3 BSI.O.Leak-Forced All requirements listed for BSI.O.Leak-Inherent FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 plus those listed for BSI.O.Malfunction and BSI.O.Phys- Manipulation FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FDP_SDI.2, FPT_PHP.3 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 53/81 BSI.O.Abuse-Func Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1 / Test Limited availability FMT_LIM.2 / Test Limited capabilities - Secure Diagnostic FMT_LIM.1 / Sdiag Limited availability - Secure Diagnostic FMT_LIM.2 / Sdiag Inter-TSF trusted channel - Secure Diagnostic FTP_ITC.1 / Sdiag Audit review - Secure Diagnostic FAU_SAR.1 / Sdiag plus those for BSI.O.Leak-Inherent, BSI.O.Phys-Probing, BSI.O.Malfunction, BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation, BSI.O.Leak-Forced FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_SDC.1, FDP_SDI.2, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1 BSI.O.Identification Audit storage FAU_SAS.1 BSI.O.RND Random number generation FCS_RNG.1 plus those for BSI.O.Leak-Inherent, BSI.O.Phys-Probing, BSI.O.Malfunction, BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation, BSI.O.Leak-Forced FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_SDI.2, FDP_SDC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1 BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Not applicable BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Not applicable BSI.OE.Lim-Block-Loader Not applicable BSI.OE.Loader-Usage Not applicable BSI.OE.TOE-Auth Not applicable OE.Enable-Disable-Secure-Diag Not applicable OE.Secure-Diag-Usage Not applicable BSI.O.Authentication Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1 BSI.O.Cap-Avail-Loader Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1 / Loader Limited availability FMT_LIM.2 / Loader BSI.O.Ctrl-Auth-Loader “Inter-TSF trusted channel - Loader” FTP_ITC.1 / Loader “Basic data exchange confidentiality - Loader” FDP_UCT.1 / Loader “Data exchange integrity - Loader” FDP_UIT.1 / Loader “Subset access control - Loader” FDP_ACC.1 / Loader “Security attribute based access control - Loader” FDP_ACF.1 / Loader “Static attribute initialisation - Loader” FMT_MSA.3 / Loader “Management of security attribute - Loader” FMT_MSA.1 / Loader “Specification of management functions - Loader” FMT_SMF.1 / Loader “Security roles - Loader” FMT_SMR.1 / Loader “Timing of identification - Loader” FIA_UID.1 / Loader “Timing of authentication - Loader” FIA_UAU.1 / Loader Table 9. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 54/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 JIL.O.Prot-TSF-Confidentiality “Inter-TSF trusted channel - Loader” FTP_ITC.1 / Loader “Basic data exchange confidentiality - Loader” FDP_UCT.1 / Loader “Data exchange integrity - Loader” FDP_UIT.1 / Loader “Subset access control - Loader” FDP_ACC.1 / Loader “Security attribute based access control - Loader” FDP_ACF.1 / Loader “Static attribute initialisation - Loader” FMT_MSA.3 / Loader “Management of security attribute - Loader” FMT_MSA.1 / Loader “Specification of management functions - Loader” FMT_SMF.1 / Loader “Security roles - Loader” FMT_SMR.1 / Loader “Timing of identification - Loader” FIA_UID.1 / Loader “Timing of authentication - Loader” FIA_UAU.1 / Loader JIL.O.Secure-Load-ACode “Inter-TSF trusted channel - Loader” FTP_ITC.1 / Loader “Basic data exchange confidentiality - Loader” FDP_UCT.1 / Loader “Data exchange integrity - Loader” FDP_UIT.1 / Loader “Subset access control - Loader” FDP_ACC.1 / Loader “Security attribute based access control - Loader” FDP_ACF.1 / Loader “Static attribute initialisation - Loader” FMT_MSA.3 / Loader “Management of security attribute - Loader” FMT_MSA.1 / Loader “Specification of management functions - Loader” FMT_SMF.1 / Loader “Security roles - Loader” FMT_SMR.1 / Loader “Timing of identification - Loader” FIA_UID.1 / Loader “Timing of authentication - Loader” FIA_UAU.1 / Loader “Audit storage - Loader” FAU_SAS.1 / Loader JIL.O.Secure-AC-Activation “Failure with preservation of secure state - Loader” FPT_FLS.1 / Loader JIL.O.TOE-Identification “Audit storage - Loader” FAU_SAS.1 / Loader “Audit review - Loader” FAU_SAR.1 / Loader “Stored data integrity monitoring and action” FDP_SDI.2 Table 9. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 55/81 O.Secure-Load-AMemImage “Inter-TSF trusted channel - Loader” FTP_ITC.1 / Loader “Basic data exchange confidentiality - Loader” FDP_UCT.1 / Loader “Data exchange integrity - Loader” FDP_UIT.1 / Loader “Subset access control - Loader” FDP_ACC.1 / Loader “Security attribute based access control - Loader” FDP_ACF.1 / Loader “Static attribute initialisation - Loader” FMT_MSA.3 / Loader “Management of security attribute - Loader” FMT_MSA.1 / Loader “Specification of management functions - Loader” FMT_SMF.1 / Loader “Security roles - Loader” FMT_SMR.1 / Loader “Timing of identification - Loader” FIA_UID.1 / Loader “Timing of authentication - Loader” FIA_UAU.1 / Loader “Audit storage - Loader” FAU_SAS.1 / Loader O.MemImage-Identification “Failure with preservation of secure state - Loader” FPT_FLS.1 / Loader “Audit storage - Loader” FAU_SAS.1 / Loader “Audit review - Loader” FAU_SAR.1 / Loader “Stored data integrity monitoring and action” FDP_SDI.2 OE.Composite-TOE-Id Not applicable OE.TOE-Id Not applicable AUG1.O.Add-Functions “Cryptographic operation - TDES” FCS_COP.1 / TDES “Cryptographic operation - AES” FCS_COP.1 / AES AUG4.O.Mem-Access “Subset access control” FDP_ACC.1 / Memories “Security attribute based access control” FDP_ACF.1 / Memories “Static attribute initialisation” FMT_MSA.3 / Memories “Management of security attribute” FMT_MSA.1 / Memories “Specification of management functions” FMT_SMF.1 / Memories O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 “Security roles” FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2 “Subset access control” FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 “Security attribute based access control” FDP_ACF.1 / MFDFEV2 “Static attribute initialisation” FMT_MSA.3 / MFDFEV2 “Management of security attribute” FMT_MSA.1 / MFDFEV2 “Specification of management functions” FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2 “Import of user data with security attributes” FDP_ITC.2 / MFDFEV2 “Cryptographic key destruction” FCS_CKM.4 / MFDFEV2 “Management of TSF data“ FMT_MTD.1 / MFDFEV2 Table 9. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 56/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 215 All justifications for Security Objectives and SFRs have been already provided in the Platform Security Target [PF-ST], except for O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2, O.Authentication-MFDFEV2, O.Encryption-MFDFEV2, O.MAC-MFDFEV2, O.Type- Consistency-MFDFEV2, O.Transaction-MFDFEV2, O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2, O.Resource- MFDFEV2, O.Verification-MFDFEV2, O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 and O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 and their associated SFRs. O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 “Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-DES” FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-DES “Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-AES” FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-AES “User identification before any action” FIA_UID.2 / MFDFEV2 “User authentication before any action” FIA_UAU.2 / MFDFEV2 “Multiple authentication mechanisms” FIA_UAU.5 / MFDFEV2 “Specification of management functions” FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2 “Trusted path” FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2 “Replay detection” FPT_RPL.1 / MFDFEV2 O.Encryption-MFDFEV2 “Cryptographic key destruction” FCS_CKM.4 / MFDFEV2 “Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-AES” FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-AES “Trusted path” FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2 O.MAC-MFDFEV2 “Cryptographic key destruction” FCS_CKM.4 / MFDFEV2 “Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-AES” FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-AES “Trusted path” FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2 “Replay detection” FPT_RPL.1 / MFDFEV2 O.Type-Consistency-MFDFEV2 “Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency” FPT_TDC.1 / MFDFEV2 O.Transaction-MFDFEV2 “Basic rollback” FDP_ROL.1 / MFDFEV2 O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2 “Unlinkability” FPR_UNL.1 / MFDFEV2 O.Resource-MFDFEV2 “Minimum and maximum quotas” FRU_RSA.2 / MFDFEV2 O.Verification-MFDFEV2 “Failure with preservation of secure state” FPT_FLS.1 “Subset access control” FDP_ACC.1 / Memories “Security attribute based access control” FDP_ACF.1 / Memories “Static attribute initialisation” FMT_MSA.3 / Memories O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 “Subset access control” FDP_ACC.1 / Memories “Security attribute based access control” FDP_ACF.1 / Memories “Static attribute initialisation” FMT_MSA.3 / Memories O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 “Subset residual information protection” FDP_RIP.1 / MFDFEV2 OE.Secure-Values Not applicable OE.Terminal-Support Not applicable Table 9. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 57/81 216 This rationale must show that security requirements suitably address these objectives. 217 The justification that the additional security objectives are suitably addressed, that the additional security requirements are mutually supportive and that, together with those already in BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 and in [PF-ST], they form an internally consistent whole, is provided in the next subsections. 5.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed Security objective “Access control for MFDFEV2 (O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2)” 218 The justification related to the security objective “Access control for MFDFEV2 (O.Access- Control-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 219 The security functional requirement "Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) / MFDFEV2" defines the roles of the MFDFEV2 Access Control Policy. The security functional requirements "Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) / MFDFEV2" and "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) / MFDFEV2" define the rules and "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) / MFDFEV2" and "Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) / MFDFEV2" the attributes that the access control is based on. The security functional requirement "Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) / MFDFEV2" provides the rules for the management of the authentication data. The management functions are defined by "Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) / MFDFEV2". Since the TOE stores data on behalf of the authorised subjects, import of user data with security attributes is defined by "Import of user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2) / MFDFEV2". Since cryptographic keys are used for authentication (refer to O.Authentication-MFDFEV2), these keys have to be removed if they are no longer needed for the access control (i.e. an application is deleted). This is required by "Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) / MFDFEV2". These nine SFRs together provide an access control mechanism as required by the objective O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2. Security objective “Authentication for MFDFEV2 (O.Authentication-MFDFEV2)” 220 The justification related to the security objective “Authentication for MFDFEV2 (O.Authentication-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 221 The two security functional requirements "Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-DES" and "Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-AES" require that the TOE provides the basic cryptographic algorithms that can be used to perform the authentication. The security functional requirements "User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2) / MFDFEV2", "User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2) / MFDFEV2" and "Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5) / MFDFEV2" together define that users must be identified and authenticated before any action. The ‘none’ authentication of "Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5) / MFDFEV2" also ensures that a specific subject is identified and authenticated before an explicit authentication request is sent to the TOE. "Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) / MFDFEV2" defines security management functions the TSF shall be capable to perform. "Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) / MFDFEV2" requires a trusted communication path between the TOE and remote users; FTP_TRP.1.3 especially requires “authentication requests”. Together with "Replay detection (FPT_RPL.1) / MFDFEV2" which requires a replay Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 58/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 detection for these authentication requests, the eight security functional requirements fulfil the objective O.Authentication-MFDFEV2. Security objective “MFDFEV2 Confidential Communication (O.Encryption- MFDFEV2)” 222 The justification related to the security objective “MFDFEV2 Confidential communication (O.Encryption-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 223 The security functional requirement "Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-AES" requires that the TOE provides the basic cryptographic algorithm AES that can be used to protect the communication by encryption. "Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) / MFDFEV2" requires a trusted communication path between the TOE and remote users; FTP_TRP.1.3 especially requires “confidentiality and/or data integrity verification for data transfers protected with AES and based on a setting in the file attributes”. "Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) / MFDFEV2" requires that cryptographic keys used for encryption have to be removed after usage. These three security functional requirements fulfill the objective O.Encryption-MFDFEV2. Security objective “MFDFEV2 Integrity-protected Communication (O.MAC- MFDFEV2)” 224 The justification related to the security objective “MFDFEV2 Integrity-protected Communication (O.MAC-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 225 The security functional requirement "Cryptographic operation - MFDFEV2-AES" requires that the TOE provides the basic cryptographic algorithms that can be used to compute a MAC which can protect the integrity of the communication. "Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) / MFDFEV2" requires a trusted communication path between the TOE and remote users; FTP_TRP.1.3 especially requires “confidentiality and/or data integrity verification for data transfers on request of the file owner”. "Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) / MFDFEV2" requires that cryptographic keys used for MAC operations have to be removed after usage. Together with "Replay detection (FPT_RPL.1) / MFDFEV2" which requires a replay detection for these data transfers, the four security functional requirements fulfill the objective O.MAC-MFDFEV2. Security objective “MFDFEV2 Data type consistency (O.Type-Consistency- MFDFEV2)” 226 The justification related to the security objective “MFDFEV2 Data type consistency (O.Type- Consistency-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 227 The security functional requirement "Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1) / MFDFEV2" requires the TOE to consistently interpret data files and values. The TOE will honor the respective file formats and boundaries (i.e. upper and lower limits, size limitations). This meets the objective O.Type-Consistency-MFDFEV2. Security objective “MFDFEV2 Transaction mechanism (O.Transaction- MFDFEV2)” 228 The justification related to the security objective “MFDFEV2 Transaction mechanism (O.Transaction-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 59/81 229 The security functional requirement "Basic rollback (FDP_ROL.1) / MFDFEV2" requires the possibility to rollback a set of modifying operations on backup files in total. The set of operations is defined by the scope of the transaction, which is itself limited by some boundary events. This fulfills the objective O.Transaction-MFDFEV2. Security objective “Preventing traceability for MFDFEV2 (O.No-Trace- MFDFEV2)” 230 The justification related to the security objective “Preventing traceability for MFDFEV2 (O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 231 The security functional requirement "Unlinkability (FPR_UNL.1) / MFDFEV2" requires that unauthorised subjects other than the card holder are unable to determine whether any operation of the TOE were caused by the same user. This meets the objective O.No-Trace- MFDFEV2. Security objective “NVM resource availability for MFDFEV2 (O.Resource- MFDFEV2)” 232 The justification related to the security objective “Resource availability for MFDFEV2 (O.Resource-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 233 The security functional requirement "Minimum and maximum quotas (FRU_RSA.2) / MFDFEV2" requires that sufficient parts of the NVM and RAM are reserved for MFDFEV2 use. This fulfills the objective O.Resource-MFDFEV2. Security objective “MFDFEV2 code integrity check (O.Verification-MFDFEV2)” 234 The justification related to the security objective “MFDFEV2 code integrity check O.Verification-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 235 The security functional requirements "Subset access control FDP_ACC.1 / Memories " and "Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1 / Memories", supported by "Static attribute initialisation FMT_MSA.3 / Memories", ensure that MFDFEV2 code integrity is protected. In addition, the security functional requirement "Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1" ensures that in case of error on NVM, MFDFEV2 execution is stopped. This meets the objective O.Verification-MFDFEV2. Security objective “MFDFEV2 firewall (O.Firewall-MFDFEV2)” 236 The justification related to the security objective “MFDFEV2 firewall (O.Firewall- MFDFEV2)” is as follows: 237 The security functional requirements "Subset access control FDP_ACC.1 / Memories" and "Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1 / Memories", supported by "Static attribute initialisation FMT_MSA.3 / Memories", require that no application can read, write, compare any piece of data or code belonging to MFDFEV2. This meets the objective O.Firewall-MFDFEV2. Security objective “MFDFEV2 data cleaning for resource sharing (O.Shr-Res- MFDFEV2)” 238 The justification related to the security objective “MFDFEV2 data cleaning for resource sharing (O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2)” is as follows: Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 60/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 239 The security functional requirement "Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1) / MFDFEV2" requires that the information content of a resource is made unavailable upon its deallocation from MFDFEV2. This meets the objective O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2. 5.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent "Security roles (FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2), Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2), Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1 / MFDFEV2), Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3 / MFDFEV2), Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1 / MFDFEV2), Specification of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1 / MFDFEV2) Specification of management function (FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2) Import of user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2 / MFDFEV2) Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4 / MFDFEV2)" 240 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective “Access control for MFDFEV2 (O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2)” above. "User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2 / MFDFEV2), User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2 / MFDFEV2), Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5 / MFDFEV2)" 241 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective “Authentication for MFDFEV2 (O.Authentication-MFDFEV2)” above. "Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2), Replay detection (FPT_RPL.1 / MFDFEV2)" 242 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective “MFDFEV2 Integrity-protected Communication (O.MAC-MFDFEV2)” above. "Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1 / MFDFEV2)" 243 This security requirement has already been argued in Section : Security objective “MFDFEV2 Confidential Communication (O.Encryption-MFDFEV2)” above. "Basic rollback (FDP_ROL.1 / MFDFEV2)" 244 This security requirement has already been argued in Section : Security objective “MFDFEV2 Transaction mechanism (O.Transaction-MFDFEV2)” above. "Unlinkability (FPR_UNL.1 / MFDFEV2)" 245 This security requirement has already been argued in Section : Security objective “Preventing traceability for MFDFEV2 (O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2)” above. "Minimum and maximum quotas (FRU_RSA.2 / MFDFEV2)" 246 This security requirement has already been argued in Section : Security objective “NVM resource availability for MFDFEV2 (O.Resource-MFDFEV2)” above. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 61/81 "Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1 / MFDFEV2)" 247 This security requirement has already been argued in Section : Security objective “MFDFEV2 data cleaning for resource sharing (O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2)” above. 5.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements 248 All dependencies of Security Functional Requirements have been fulfilled in this Security Target except : • those justified in the BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 protection profile security requirements rationale, • those justified in the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition [PF-ST] security requirements rationale, • those justified in [AUG] security requirements rationale. 249 Details are provided in Table 10 below. 250 Note that in order to avoid repetitions of the SFRs iterated in this Security Target, and improve readability, some are mentioned in a generic form in this table. Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements Label Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target Dependency already in BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, in [PF-ST] or in [AUG] FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FPT_FLS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.1 / Test FMT_LIM.2 / Test Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.2 / Test FMT_LIM.1 / Test Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.1 / Loader FMT_LIM.2 / Loader Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.2 / Loader FMT_LIM.1 / Loader Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.1 / Stest FMT_LIM.2 / Stest Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.2 / Stest FMT_LIM.1 / Stest Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.1 / Sdiag FMT_LIM.2 / Sdiag Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FMT_LIM.2 / Sdiag FMT_LIM.1 / Sdiag Yes Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FAU_SAS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FDP_SDC.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FDP_SDI.2 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FPT_PHP.3 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / Memories and FDP_IFC.1 Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FPT_ITT.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 62/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 No, see BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014 Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FCS_RNG.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FCS_COP.1 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, by FCS_CKM.1, see [PF-ST] Yes, [AUG] #1 FCS_CKM.4 No, see [PF-ST] FCS_CKM.1 [FDP_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] Yes, by FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4 No, see [PF-ST] FDP_ACC.1 / Memories FDP_ACF.1 / Memories Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FDP_ACF.1 / Memories FDP_ACC.1 / Memories Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / Memories Yes, [PF-ST] FMT_MSA.3 / Memories Yes FMT_MSA.3 / Memories FMT_MSA.1 / Memories Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FMT_SMR.1 / Memories No, see [AUG] #4 FMT_MSA.1 / Memories [FDP_ACC.1 / Memories or FDP_IFC.1] Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / Memories and FDP_IFC.1 Yes, [PF-ST] FMT_SMF.1 / Memories Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FMT_SMR.1 / Memories No Yes, [PF-ST] FMT_SMF.1 / Memories None No dependency Yes, [PF-ST] FIA_API.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FTP_ITC.1 / Loader None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FDP_UCT.1 / Loader [FTP_ITC.1 / Loader or FTP_TRP.1 / Loader] Yes, by FTP_ITC.1 / Loader Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [FDP_ACC.1 / Loader or FDP_IFC.1 / Loader] Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / Loader Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued) Label Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target Dependency already in BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, in [PF-ST] or in [AUG] MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 63/81 FDP_UIT.1 / Loader [FTP_ITC.1 / Loader or FTP_TRP.1 / Loader] Yes, by FTP_ITC.1 / Loader Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [FDP_ACC.1 / Loader or FDP_IFC.1 / Loader] Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / Loader FDP_ACC.1 / Loader FDP_ACF.1 / Loader Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FDP_ACF.1 / Loader FDP_ACC.1 / Loader Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FMT_MSA.3 / Loader Yes FMT_MSA.3 / Loader FMT_MSA.1 / Loader Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FMT_SMR.1 / Loader Yes FMT_MSA.1 / Loader [FDP_ACC.1 / Loader or FDP_IFC.1] Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FDP_SMF.1 / Loader Yes FDP_SMR.1 / Loader Yes FMT_SMR.1 / Loader FIA_UID.1 / Loader Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FIA_UID.1 / Loader None No dependency Yes, [PF-ST] FIA_UAU.1 / Loader FIA_UID.1 / Loader Yes Yes, [PF-ST] FDP_SMF.1 / Loader None No dependency Yes, [PF-ST] FPT_FLS.1 / Loader None No dependency Yes, [PF-ST] FAU_SAS.1 / Loader None No dependency Yes, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 FAU_SAR.1 / Loader FAU_GEN.1 No, by FAU_SAS.1 / Loader instead, see [PF- ST] Yes, [PF-ST] FTP_ITC.1 / Sdiag None No dependency Yes, [PF-ST] FAU_SAR.1 / Sdiag FAU_GEN.1 No, see [PF-ST] Yes, [PF-ST] Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued) Label Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target Dependency already in BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, in [PF-ST] or in [AUG] Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 64/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2 FIA_UID.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes, by FIA_UID.2 / MFDFEV2 No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 FDP_ACF.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FDP_ACF.1 / MFDFEV2 FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FMT_MSA.3 / MFDFEV2 Yes FMT_MSA.3 / MFDFEV2 FMT_MSA.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes FMT_MSA.1 / MFDFEV2 [FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 or FDP_IFC.1] Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FDP_ITC.2 / MFDFEV2 [FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 or FDP_IFC.1] Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 [FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2] Yes, by FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2 FPT_TDC.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes FPT_TDC.1 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FIA_UID.2 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FIA_UAU.2 / MFDFEV2 FIA_UID.1 Yes, by FIA_UID.2 / MFDFEV2 No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FIA_UAU.5 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued) Label Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target Dependency already in BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, in [PF-ST] or in [AUG] MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Securityrequirements SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 65/81 5.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements Security assurance requirements added to reach EAL5 251 Regarding application note 22 of BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, this Security Target chooses EAL5 because developers and users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques. 252 EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, extensive testing, and improved mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered during development. 253 The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal consistency is still guaranteed. FMT_MTD.1 / MFDFEV2 FMT_SMR.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FMT_SMF.1 / MFDFEV2 Yes FTP_TRP.1 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FCS_CKM.4 / MFDFEV2 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 / MFDFEV2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, by FDP_ITC.2 / MFDFEV2 No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FDP_ROL.1 / MFDFEV2 [FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 or FDP_IFC.1] Yes, by FDP_ACC.1 / MFDFEV2 No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FPT_RPL.1 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FPR_UNL.1 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FRU_RSA.2 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 FDP_RIP.1 / MFDFEV2 None No dependency No, CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued) Label Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target Dependency already in BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, in [PF-ST] or in [AUG] Security requirements (ASE_REQ)MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for compo- 66/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 254 Note that detailed and updated refinements for assurance requirements are given in Section 5.3. Dependencies of assurance requirements 255 Dependencies of security assurance requirements are fulfilled by the EAL5 package selection. 256 The augmentation to this package identified in Section 5.2 does not introduce dependencies not already satisfied by the EAL5 package, and is considered as consistent augmentation: • ASE_TSS.2 dependencies (ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1 and ADV_ARC.1) are fulfilled by the assurance requirements claimed by this ST, • ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 dependencies have been justified in BSI-CC-PP-0084- 2014, • ALC_FLR.1 has no dependency. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition TOE summary specification SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 67/81 6 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) 257 This section demonstrates how the TOE meets each Security Functional Requirement, and includes a statement of compatibility vs. the Platform Security Target [PF-ST]. 6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements realisation 258 This section argues how the TOE meets each SFR. 259 The TOE is evaluated as a composite TOE, made of the underlying hardware platform and the MIFARE DESFire EV2 library on top of it. 260 Consequently, the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition details how all the platform SFRs are met, and in the following only the SFRs related to MFDFEV2 are addressed. 6.1.1 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) / MFDFEV2 261 MFDFEV2 supports the assignment of roles to users through the assignment of different keys for the different roles and through the structure and configuration of the access rights. This allows to distinguish between the roles of Admin, AppMgr, DelAppMgr, AppUser, AppChangeUser, AppRollUser and OrigKeyUser. 6.1.2 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) / MFDFEV2 262 For each MFDFEV2 command subject to access control, the MFDFEV2 library verifies if the MFDFEV2 access conditions are satisfied and returns an error when this is not the case. 6.1.3 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) / MFDFEV2 263 The MFDFEV2 library verifies the MFDFEV2 security attributes during the execution of MFDFEV2 commands to enforce the Access Control Policy defined by the MFDFEV2 interface specification. 6.1.4 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) / MFDFEV2 264 The MFDFEV2 library initialises all the static attributes to the values defined by MFDFEV2 interface specifications before they can be used by the Embedded Software. 6.1.5 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) / MFDFEV2 265 The MFDFEV2 library verifies the MFDFEV2 security attributes during the execution of MFDFEV2 commands to enforce the Access Control Policy on the security attributes. 6.1.6 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) / MFDFEV2 266 The MFDFEV2 library implements the management functions defined by the MFDFEV2 interface specifications for authentication, changing security attributes and creating or deleting an application, a value or a data file. TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for 68/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 6.1.7 Import of user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2) / MFDFEV2 267 The MFDFEV2 library implements the MFDFEV2 interface specifications and enforces the Access Control Policy to associate the user data to the security attributes. 6.1.8 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1) / MFDFEV2 268 The MFDFEV2 library implements the MFDFEV2 interface specifications, supporting consistent interpretation and modification control of inter-TSF exchanges. 6.1.9 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) / MFDFEV2-DES 269 The MFDFEV2 library uses Triple DES as cryptographic operation (EDES+ accelerator), to perform encryption and decryption used for authentication in accordance with NIST SP 800- 67 and NIST SP 800-38A, in one of the following modes of operation: CBC and 3-key Triple- DES with a cryptographic key size of 168 bits. 6.1.10 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) / MFDFEV2-AES 270 The MFDFEV2 library uses AES as cryptographic operation (AES accelerator), to perform encryption and decryption and cipher based MAC for authentication and communication in accordance with FIPS 197, NIST SP 800-38A and NIST SP 800-38B, in one of the following modes of operation: CBC, CMAC with a cryptographic key size of 128 bits. 271 Cryptographic operations are used for setting up the mutual authentication, for encryption and message authentication. 6.1.11 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) / MFDFEV2 272 The MFDFEV2 library erases key values from memory after their context becomes obsolete. 6.1.12 User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2) / MFDFEV2 273 The MFDFEV2 library identifies the user through the key selected for authentication as specified by the MFDFEV2 Interface Specification. 6.1.13 User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2) / MFDFEV2 274 During the authentication, the MFDFEV2 library verifies that the user knows the selected key. 275 After this authentication, both parties share a session key. 6.1.14 Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5) / MFDFEV2 276 The MFDFEV2 library implements the MFDFEV2 Interface Specification, that has a mechanism to authenticate Admin, AppMgr, DelAppMgr, AppUser, AppChangeUser, AppRollUser and OrigKeyUser, while Anybody is assumed when there is no valid authentication state. 277 Two types of authentication are supported: the native MFDFEV2 3-pass authentication and the ISO authentication. MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition TOE summary specification SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 69/81 6.1.15 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) / MFDFEV2 278 The MFDFEV2 library implements the MFDFEV2 Interface Specification, restricting key modifications in ways configurable through the security attributes to authenticated users, or disabling key modification capabilities. 6.1.16 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) / MFDFEV2 279 The MFDFEV2 library implements the MFDFEV2 Interface Specification allowing to establish and enforce a trusted path between itself and remote users. 6.1.17 Basic rollback (FDP_ROL.1) / MFDFEV2 280 The MFDFEV2 library implements the MFDFEV2 transaction mechanism ensuring that either all or none of the (modifying) file commands within a transaction are performed. If not, they are rolled back. 6.1.18 Replay detection (FPT_RPL.1) / MFDFEV2 281 The MFDFEV2 library implements the MFDFEV2 authentication command, and authenticated commands, that allow replay detection. 6.1.19 Unlinkability (FPR_UNL.1) / MFDFEV2 282 MFDFEV2 provides an Administrator option to use random UID during the ISO 14443 anti- collision sequence, preventing the traceability through UID. At higher level, the MFDFEV2 access control - when configured for this purpose - provides traceability protection. 6.1.20 Minimum and maximum quotas (FRU_RSA.2) / MFDFEV2 283 The MFDFEV2 library ensures the memory required for its operation is available. 6.1.21 Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1) / MFDFEV2 284 At the end of commands execution or upon interrupt, the MFDFEV2 library cleans the confidential data from registers it uses. 6.2 Statement of compatibility 285 This section details the statement of compatibility between this Security Target and the Platform Security Target [PF-ST]. 286 The following mappings regarding SFRs, objectives and assurance requirements demonstrate that there is no inconsistency between this composite Security Target and the ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition. 6.2.1 Compatibility of security objectives 287 There is no conflict between the security objectives of this Security Target and those of the Platform Security Target [PF-ST]: TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for 70/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 288 There is no conflict between the security objectives for the environment of this Security Target and those of the Platform Security Target [PF-ST]: Table 11. Platform Security Objectives vs. TOE Security Objectives Platform Security Objectives TOE Security Objectives BSI.O.Leak-Inherent BSI.O.Leak-Inherent BSI.O.Phys-Probing BSI.O.Phys-Probing BSI.O.Malfunction BSI.O.Malfunction BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation BSI.O.Leak-Forced BSI.O.Leak-Forced BSI.O.Abuse-Func BSI.O.Abuse-Func BSI.O.Identification BSI.O.Identification BSI.O.RND BSI.O.RND BSI.O.Authentication BSI.O.Authentication BSI.O.Cap-Avail-Loader BSI.O.Cap-Avail-Loader BSI.O.Ctrl-Auth-Loader BSI.O.Ctrl-Auth-Loader JIL.O.Prot-TSF-Confidentiality JIL.O.Prot-TSF-Confidentiality JIL.O.Secure-Load-ACode JIL.O.Secure-Load-ACode JIL.O.Secure-AC-Activation JIL.O.Secure-AC-Activation JIL.O.TOE-Identification JIL.O.TOE-Identification O.Secure-Load-AMemImage O.Secure-Load-AMemImage O.MemImage-Identification O.MemImage-Identification AUG1.O.Add-Functions AUG1.O.Add-Functions O.Authentication-MFDFEV2 O.Encryption-MFDFEV2 O.MAC-MFDFEV2 AUG4.O.Mem-Access AUG4.O.Mem-Access O.Firewall-MFDFEV2 O.Verification-MFDFEV2 Additional objectives: O.Access-Control-MFDFEV2 O.Type-Consistency-MFDFEV2 O.Transaction-MFDFEV2 O.No-Trace-MFDFEV2 O.Resource-MFDFEV2 O.Shr-Res-MFDFEV2 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition TOE summary specification SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 71/81 6.2.2 Compatibility of Security Functional Requirements 289 All platform SFRs are relevant for this Composite ST. 290 The Composite ST SFRs do not show any conflict with the platform SFRs. 291 The following platform SFRs are used by this Composite ST because of their security properties providing protection against attacks to the TOE as a whole: • FRU_FLT.2, • FDP_SDC.1, • FDP_SDI.2, • FPT_PHP.3, • FDP_ITT.1, • FPT_ITT.1, • FDP_IFC.1, FPT_FLS.1 in order to generate a software reset, FCS_RNG.1 for the provision of random numbers, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 for side-channel protection. 292 Complementary, the Table 13 below shows the mapping between the Platform SFRs specifically used to implement a security service by SFRs of this Composite ST. Table 12. Platform Security Objectives for the Environment vs. TOE Security Objectives for the Environment Platform Security Objectives for the Environment TOE Security Objectives for the Environment BSI.OE.Resp-Appl BSI.OE.Resp-Appl BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC BSI.OE.Lim-Block-Loader BSI.OE.Lim-Block-Loader BSI.OE.Loader-Usage BSI.OE.Loader-Usage BSI.OE.TOE-Auth BSI.OE.TOE-Auth OE.Enable-Disable-Secure-Diag OE.Enable-Disable-Secure-Diag OE.Secure-Diag-Usage OE.Secure-Diag-Usage OE.Composite-TOE-Id OE.Composite-TOE-Id OE.TOE-Id OE.TOE-Id Additional objectives for the environment: OE.Secure-Values OE.Terminal-Support Table 13. Platform Security Functional Requirements vs. TOE Security Functional Requirements Platform SFR Composite ST SFRs FRU_FLT.2 FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for 72/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 FMT_LIM.1 / Test FMT_LIM.1 / Test FMT_LIM.2 / Test FMT_LIM.2 / Test FAU_SAS.1 FAU_SAS.1 FDP_SDC.1 FDP_SDC.1 FDP_SDI.2 FDP_SDI.2 FPT_PHP.3 FPT_PHP.3 FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 FCS_RNG.1 FCS_RNG.1 FCS_COP.1 / TDES FCS_COP.1 / TDES FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-DES FCS_COP.1 / AES FCS_COP.1 / AES FCS_COP.1 / MFDFEV2-AES FDP_ACC.2 / Memories FDP_ACC.2 / Memories FDP_ACF.1 / Memories FDP_ACF.1 / Memories FMT_MSA.3 / Memories FMT_MSA.3 / Memories FMT_MSA.1 / Memories FMT_MSA.1 / Memories FMT_SMF.1 / Memories FMT_SMF.1 / Memories FIA_API.1 FIA_API.1 FMT_LIM.1 / Loader FMT_LIM.1 / Loader FMT_LIM.2 / Loader FMT_LIM.2 / Loader FTP_ITC.1 / Loader FTP_ITC.1 / Loader FDP_UCT.1 / Loader FDP_UCT.1 / Loader FDP_UIT.1 / Loader FDP_UIT.1 / Loader FDP_ACC.1 / Loader FDP_ACC.1 / Loader FDP_ACF.1 / Loader FDP_ACF.1 / Loader FMT_MSA.3 / Loader FMT_MSA.3 / Loader FMT_MSA.1 / Loader FMT_MSA.1 / Loader FMT_SMR.1 / Loader FMT_SMR.1 / Loader FIA_UID.1 / Loader FIA_UID.1 / Loader FIA_UAU.1 / Loader FIA_UAU.1 / Loader Table 13. Platform Security Functional Requirements vs. TOE Security Functional Requirements (continued) Platform SFR Composite ST SFRs MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition TOE summary specification SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 73/81 6.2.3 Compatibility of Security Assurance Requirements 293 The level of assurance of the TOE is EAL5 augmented with ASE_TSS.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.1, while the level of assurance of the Platform is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. 294 Therefore, the set of Security Assurance Requirements of this composite evaluation is identical to the Security Assurance Requirements of the underlying platform, except ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1 which are specific to the Security Target. 295 There is no conflict regarding the Security Assurance Requirements. FMT_SMF.1 / Loader FMT_SMF.1 / Loader FPT_FLS.1 / Loader FPT_FLS.1 / Loader FAU_SAR.1 / Loader FAU_SAR.1 / Loader FAU_SAS.1 / Loader FAU_SAS.1 / Loader FTP_ITC.1 / Sdiag FTP_ITC.1 / Sdiag FAU_SAR.1 / Sdiag FAU_SAR.1 / Sdiag FMT_LIM.1 / Sdiag FMT_LIM.1 / Sdiag FMT_LIM.2 / Sdiag FMT_LIM.2 / Sdiag Table 13. Platform Security Functional Requirements vs. TOE Security Functional Requirements (continued) Platform SFR Composite ST SFRs Identification MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 74/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 7 Identification Table 14. TOE components Platform identification Library identification IC Maskset name IC version Master identification number Firmware version MIFARE DESFire EV2 version K410A C 0x01F1h 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 1.0.4 Table 15. Guidance documentation Component description Reference Version MIFARE® DESFire® EV2 library v1.0 for the ST31P platform devices - User manual UM_ST31P_MFD_EV2_1.0 2 MIFARE DESFire EV2 interface specification - Technical note TN_MIFARE_DESFire_EV2 1 Release note: MIFARE DESFire® EV2 library 1.0.4 on ST31P450 RN_ST31P_MFD_EV2_1.0 .4 1 Table 16. Sites list Site Address Activities(1) ST Grenoble STMicroelectronics 12 rue Jules Horowitz, BP 217 38019 Grenoble Cedex France ES-DEV ST Rousset STMicroelectronics 190 Avenue Célestin Coq ZI de Rousset-Peynier 13106 Rousset Cedex France ES-DEV MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Identification SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 75/81 ST Tunis STMicroelectronics Elgazala Technopark, Raoued, Gouvernorat de l’Ariana, PB21, 2088 cedex, Ariana, Tunisia IT ST Zaventem STMicroelectronics Green Square, Lambroekstraat 5, Building B 3d floor 1831 Diegem/Machelen Belgium ES-DEV 1. ES-DEV = development, IT = Network infrastructure Table 16. Sites list (continued) Site Address Activities(1) References MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 76/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 8 References Table 17. Common Criteria Component description Reference Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and general model, April 2017 CCMB-2017-04-001 R5 3.1 Rev 5 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional components, April 2017 CCMB-2017-04-002 R5 3.1 Rev 5 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance components, April 2017 CCMB-2017-04-003 R5 3.1 Rev 5 Table 18. Platform Security Target Ref Component description Reference Version [PF-ST] ST31P450 A04 Security Target for composition SMD_ST31P450_ST_19 _006 A04.1 Table 19. Protection Profile and other related standards Ref Component description Reference Version [PP0084] Eurosmart - Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 1.0 [AUG] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, March 2002. 1.0 [JILSR] Security requirements for post-delivery code loading, Joint Interpretation Library, February 2016 1.0 Table 20. Other standards Ref Identifier Description [1] BSI-AIS20/AIS31 A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, W. Killmann & W. Schindler BSI, Version 2.0, 18-09-2011 [2] NIST SP 800-67 NIST SP 800-67 Rev.2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, November 2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology [3] FIPS 197 FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), November 2001 [4] NIST SP 800-38A NIST SP 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001, with Addendum Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode, October 2010 MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition References SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 77/81 [5] NIST SP 800-38B NIST special publication 800-38B: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), June 2016 [6] ANSSI-PP0084.03 PP0084: Interpretations, ANSSI, April 2016 Table 20. Other standards Ref Identifier Description Glossary MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 78/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 Appendix A Glossary A.1 Terms Authorised user A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation. Composite product Security IC product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation. End-consumer User of the Composite Product in Phase 7. Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. IC Dedicated Software IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and developed by ST. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software). IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter. IC developer Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development. IC manufacturer Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and pre- personalization. IC packaging manufacturer Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and testing. Initialisation data Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC’s production and further life-cycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for TOE identification (identification data) Object An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations. Packaged IC Security IC embedded in a physical package such as micromodules, DIPs, SOICs or TQFPs. Pre-personalization data Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases. If "Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only" is used the Pre-personalisation Data MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition Glossary SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 79/81 may contain the authentication reference data or key material for the trusted channel between the TOE and the authorized users using the Loader. Secret Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to enforce a specific SFP. Security IC Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data, and the package. Security IC Embedded SoftWare (ES) Software embedded in the Security IC and not developed by the IC designer. The Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3. Security IC embedded software (ES) developer Institution (or its agent) responsible for the security IC embedded software development and the specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, if any. Security attribute Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the enforcement of the TSP. Sensitive information Any information identified as a security relevant element of the TOE such as: – the application data of the TOE (such as IC pre-personalization requirements, IC and system specific data), – the security IC embedded software, – the IC dedicated software, – the IC specification, design, development tools and technology. Smartcard A card according to ISO 7816 requirements which has a non volatile memory and a processing unit embedded within it. Subject An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed. Test features All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Software and/or hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as part of the TOE. TOE Delivery The period when the TOE is delivered which is after Phase 3 or Phase 1 in this Security target. TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE. User Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE. User data All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context. User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data. Glossary MIFARE DESFire EV2 on ST31P450 Security Target for composition 80/81 SMD_MFDFEV2_ST31P450_ST_21_002 A.2 Abbreviations Table 21. List of abbreviations Term Meaning AIS Application notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (BSI). BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. CBC Cipher Block Chaining. CC Common Criteria Version 3.1. R5. CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code DES Data Encryption Standard. EAL Evaluation Assurance Level. ES Security IC Embedded Software. ES-DEV Embedded Software Development. FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard. IC Integrated Circuit. ISO International Standards Organisation. IT Information Technology. NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology. NVM Non Volatile Memory. OSP Organisational Security Policy. PP Protection Profile. PUB Publication Series. RAM Random Access Memory. SAR Security Assurance Requirement. SFP Security Function Policy. SFR Security Functional Requirement. ST Context dependent : STMicroelectronics or Security Target. TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard TOE Target of Evaluation. TRNG True Random Number Generator. TSC TSF Scope of Control. TSF TOE Security Functionality. TSP TOE Security Policy. TSS TOE Summary Specification. 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