Acronis SCS
Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent
v12.5
Security
Target
Document Version: 6.0
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Acronis SCS Corsec Security, Inc.
1225 W. Washington St., Suite 250 12600 Fair Lakes Drive, Suite 210
Tempe, AZ 85288 Fairfax, VA 22003
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 781 782 9000 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
www.acronisscs.com www.corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Purpose .....................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Security Target and TOE References.........................................................................................................4
1.3 Product Overview......................................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Product Components........................................................................................................................5
1.4 TOE Overview............................................................................................................................................6
1.4.1 TOE Environment..............................................................................................................................6
1.5 TOE Description.........................................................................................................................................8
1.5.1 Physical Scope ..................................................................................................................................8
1.5.2 Logical Scope ....................................................................................................................................9
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE............................. 10
1.5.4 Scope of Evaluation....................................................................................................................... 10
2. Conformance Claims....................................................................................................................................... 11
3. Security Problem Definition............................................................................................................................ 13
3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Assumptions........................................................................................................................................... 13
3.3 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................................. 13
4. Security Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... 14
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................................. 14
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment........................................................................... 15
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................ 15
5. Extended Components ................................................................................................................................... 16
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Components ................................................................................... 16
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components.................................................................................... 16
6. Security Assurance Requirements.................................................................................................................. 17
7. Security Functional Requirements.................................................................................................................. 18
7.1 Conventions ........................................................................................................................................... 18
7.2 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................... 18
7.2.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.................................................................................................. 19
7.2.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection.................................................................................................... 22
7.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................. 23
7.2.4 Class FMT: Security Management................................................................................................. 24
7.2.5 Class FPR: Privacy .......................................................................................................................... 24
7.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................... 24
7.2.7 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channel................................................................................................... 26
8. TOE Summary Specification............................................................................................................................ 27
8.1 TOE Security Functionality ..................................................................................................................... 27
8.1.1 Cryptographic Support .................................................................................................................. 28
8.1.2 User Data Protection..................................................................................................................... 30
8.1.3 Identification and Authentication ................................................................................................. 30
8.1.4 Security Management ................................................................................................................... 31
8.1.5 Privacy ........................................................................................................................................... 31
8.1.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................... 32
8.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels.................................................................................................................. 33
8.2 Timely Security Updates ........................................................................................................................ 33
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9. Rationale......................................................................................................................................................... 35
9.1 Conformance Claims Rationale.............................................................................................................. 35
9.1.1 Variance Between the PP and this ST............................................................................................ 35
9.1.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ................................................................................ 35
10. Acronyms........................................................................................................................................................ 36
Appendix A: Supported Platform APIs..................................................................................................................... 38
Appendix B: Included Third-party Libraries............................................................................................................. 39
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical TOE Boundary ..............................................................................................................................8
List of Tables
Table 1 – ST and TOE References ...............................................................................................................................4
Table 2 – Environmental Components.......................................................................................................................6
Table 3 – Guidance Documentation...........................................................................................................................8
Table 4 – CC and PP Conformance .......................................................................................................................... 11
Table 5 - Relevant Technical Decisions.................................................................................................................... 11
Table 6 – Threats ..................................................................................................................................................... 13
Table 7 – Assumptions............................................................................................................................................. 13
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................................... 14
Table 9 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment............................................................................. 15
Table 10 – Extended TOE Security Assurance Components.................................................................................... 16
Table 11 – Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 17
Table 12 – TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................................. 18
Table 13 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements...................................... 27
Table 14 – Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes ............................................................................................... 28
Table 15 – Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 36
Table 16 – Included Third-party Windows Libraries................................................................................................ 39
Table 17 – Included Third-party Linux Libraries ...................................................................................................... 39
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1. Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the organization of the ST. The TOE
is the Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent developed by Acronis SCS and will hereafter be
referred to as the TOE throughout this document. The TOE is the Backup Agent component of the Acronis SCS
Backup Agent solution, which consists of a Management Server and multiple Backup Agents. Backup Agents are
responsible for performing specific backup, recovery, replication and data-manipulation tasks on their host
machines. The Backup Agents are able to work independently from the Management Server to run their scheduled
backup operations.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into 10 sections, as follows:
• Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the organization of
other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE security functionality and
describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE as well as the ST and TOE references.
• Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC), Protection
Profile (PP), and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies whether the ST contains
extended security requirements.
• Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and assumptions
that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
• Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its
environment.
• Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not included in CC
Part 2 or CC Part 3.
• Security Assurance Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SARs met by the TOE.
• Security Functional Requirements (Section 7) – Presents the SFRs met by the TOE.
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 8) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE that satisfy
the SFRs and objectives.
• Rationale (Section 9) – Presents the conformance claims rationale for the selected PP.
• Acronyms (Section 10) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 below shows the ST and TOE references.
Table 1 – ST and TOE References
ST Title Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent Security Target
ST Version Version 6.0
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
ST Publication Date October 11, 2023
TOE Reference Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent
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1.3 Product Overview
The Product Overview provides a high-level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation. The
following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product offering that are
specifically being evaluated.
Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent (also known as Acronis SCS Backup Agent) is part of an
advanced data protection solution that provides reliable backup and recovery of physical, virtual, and cloud
workloads with a wide range of storage options. It may be used to protect data residing on-premises, in remote
locations, in the cloud, and on mobile devices. Centralized and remote management of backups is performed via
the Management Server’s web-based Management Console, with customizable dashboards, advanced reporting,
and auditing. Backup Agents installed on protected platforms perform data backup and recovery of physical or
virtual machines, hypervisors, applications, and mobile devices. Acronis SCS Backup Agent supports application-
aware backup and recovery features for Oracle database, Microsoft Office 365, Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft
SQL1
Server, Microsoft SharePoint, and Microsoft Active Directory.
Acronis SCS Backup Agent may be deployed in an on-premise or cloud configuration. With the on-premise
configuration, the Management Server is installed on a customer’s local network. With the cloud configuration, it
is installed in a secure Acronis Data Center.
Acronis SCS Backup Agent includes the Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library and Acronis SCS Protocol Library in both
the Management Server and Backup Agents. They provide the underlying cryptographic and protocol functionality
necessary to support the use of secure communications protocols, encrypted backups, and secure file sharing.
1.3.1 Product Components
The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the product components.
1.3.1.1 Management Server
The Management Server, which is in the TOE environment, provides the means to configure, monitor, and manage
backups and provides the web server (Web UI) for the Management Console. The Management Server is
comprised of a number of management services responsible for management functions of Acronis SCS Backup
Agent. The Management Server also includes an API2
Gateway to communicate with the Backup Agents. The
Management Server does not actually perform backup, recovery, or other data-manipulation operations. These
are performed by the Backup Agents installed on each protected machine.
1.3.1.2 Backup Agents
Backup Agents are installed as a number of services to perform the actual backup and recovery operations on
each machine that requires protection. They are typically installed on each machine that requires protection and
then added to the Management Server. However, they are able to operate independently from the Management
Server. Backup Agents are supported on both Windows and Linux OS3
s. Different agent types are used to protect
different data sources, but they all share the same architecture, communication protocols, and the vast majority
of the functionality.
1 SQL – Structured Query Language
2 API – Application Programming Interface
3 OS – Operating System
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1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview provides a
context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the product, and defining the specific
evaluated configuration.
The software-only TOE is the Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent. It is a standalone software
application that runs on both Windows and Linux operating systems and provides backup and restore functionality
for the host machine. Its security features include securely storing the application token, using a digital signature
to protect the integrity of the installation and update files, versioning the software with SWID tags, and using anti-
exploitation capabilities such as not mapping memory to explicit addresses, file permission protections, and stack
buffer overflow protections. It also secures communications between itself and the Management Server. The TOE
implements the cryptographic functionality for cryptographic services, including TLS4
v1.2, through its embedded
Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library and Acronis SCS Protocol Library. The TOE also includes the separately
downloaded version-check tool that will query the current version of the TOE and report if an update is available.
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is setup in two configurations:
• Acronis SCS Backup Agent for Windows v12.5 software installed on a Windows 10 machine that is on a
network connected to the Management Server in the TOE environment, and
• Acronis SCS Backup Agent for Linux v12.5 software installed on a RHEL v7.9 machine on a network
connected to the Management Server in the TOE environment.
Note that both of these configurations can be setup and used on the same network and use the same
Management Server without interfering with each other. Both setups will also include separate installations of
the version-check tool on the same machine as the Backup Agent.
The Protection Profile for Application Software specifies several use cases that may be implemented by
conformant TOEs. The Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent is considered to implement both
content creation and content consumption.
1.4.1 TOE Environment
Table 2 defines the environmental component requirements. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is provided
as an Acronis SCS Backup Agent setup program. The TOE is installed on a computer running either Microsoft
Windows 10 or RHEL v7.9.
Table 2 – Environmental Components
Component Requirements
Management Server This machine is used to host the Management Server software and Monitoring Service. The following are required:
• Microsoft Windows Server 2016 OS
• Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Server software with licenses
• 200 MB5 of RAM6 and 1.7 GB7 of free space on the system volume
• Intel Xeon E-2136 (Coffee Lake) CPU8 with AES-NI
4 TLS – Transport Layer Security
5 MB – Megabyte
6 RAM – Random-Access Memory
7 GB – Gigabyte
8 CPU – Central Processing Unit
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Component Requirements
Windows Agent
Computer
This machine is a general-purpose computer that will have the Windows Agent installed on it. The following are
required:
• Microsoft Windows 10 OS
• 720 MB disk space and 130 MB RAM
• Intel Core i7-8650U (Kaby Lake R) CPU with AES-NI
Linux Agent Computer This machine is a general-purpose computer that will have the Linux Agent installed on it. The following are required:
• RHEL v7.9 OS
• 850 MB disk space and 150 MB RAM
• Intel Core i5-8350U (Kaby Lake R) CPU with AES-NI
CA9 Server A CA server is used for certificate creation/signing and to host the CRL10 for certificate validation. This connection is
over HTTP11. No specific CA server is required as long as it follows RFC 5280.
The TOE relies on an embedded SQLite database to store configuration data that is downloaded from the
Management Server. This database is part of the TOE.
9 CA – Certificate Authority
10 CRL – Certificate Revocation List
11 HTTP – Hypertext Transfer Protocol
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1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in the evaluation.
1.5.1 Physical Scope
Figure 1 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and ties together all of the
components of the software-only TOE and the constituents of the TOE environment.
GitHub
Microsoft Windows 10
or
RHEL v7.9
Acronis SCS Cyber Backup Hardened
Edition Agent
Server Hardware
Agent Core Services
Legend
TOE
TOE Boundary
Environmental
Components
Microsoft
Windows Server
2016
Acronis Backup
Hardened
Edition Server
Server Hardware
TLS
Local
Management
Services
Updater
CLI
Backup
Agent
Kernel
Drivers
HTTP
CA Server
SQLite
Database
HTTPS
Figure 1 – Physical TOE Boundary
The TOE Boundary includes all the Acronis SCS developed parts of the Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened
Edition Agent product. Any third-party source code or software that Acronis SCS has modified is considered to be
TOE Software.
1.5.1.1 Guidance Documentation
Table 3 lists the TOE Guidance Documentation to install, configure, and maintain the TOE.
Table 3 – Guidance Documentation
Document Name Description
Acronis Cyber Backup SCS 12.5, Update 4.7 Contains steps for the basic initialization and setup of the TOE. Also
contains guidance on how to use and maintain the TOE.
Acronis SCS Cyber Backup 12.5 Hardened Edition Agent Guidance
Documentation Supplement Document Version: 0.7
Contains information regarding specific configuration for the TOE
evaluated configuration.
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1.5.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE is broken down into the following security classes, which are further described in
Sections 7 and 8 of this ST. The logical scope also provides the description of the security features of the TOE. The
SFRs implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the following Security Function Classes.
1.5.2.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic functions to secure sessions between the Management Server and the TOE using
TLS v1.2. The Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library and Acronis SCS Protocol Library are used to provide the required
algorithms and protocols for all cryptographic operations. The TOE also stores its application token in the Windows
Data Protection API (DPAPI) and the Linux keyring, depending on the OS.
1.5.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE protects sensitive data in non-volatile memory according to the requirements in FCS_STO_EXT.1. The
TOE restricts its access to network connectivity provided by the platform’s hardware resources. Specifically, it will
only use network connectivity for connections from itself to the Management Server and from itself to the CA
server. The TOE does not access any of the platform’s sensitive information repositories.
1.5.2.3 Identification and Authentication
To facilitate secure communications using TLS, the TOE provides a mechanism to validate X.509v3 certificates as
defined by RFC12
5280. The TOE uses a CRL to check the certificate’s revocation status and will not permit
certificates to be used when the CRL is not available or if the certificate is invalid.
1.5.2.4 Security Management
The TOE does not provide default credentials. It uses the service accounts on the platform and does not have an
authenticated user interface. The TOE does not provide any management features that write or change settings.
Non-security-related settings are stored on the Management Server and are queried when performing tasks. The
TOE and its data are protected against unauthorized access by default file permissions. Section 8.1.4 provides a
list of security-relevant management functions provided by the TOE.
1.5.2.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit personally identifiable information (PII).
1.5.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE does not allocate memory with both write and execute permissions and does not write user-modifiable
files to directories that contain executable files. The TOE is compiled with the /GS flag to enable stack-based buffer
overflow protection on the Windows Agent and Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) on the Linux Agent. Both agents
are compatible with their platform’s security features. The TOE uses standard platform APIs and includes only the
third-party libraries it needs to perform its functionality. The TOE is versioned with SWID13
tags that comply with
the minimum requirements from ISO14
/IEC15
19770-2:2015 and provides the ability to check for updates to the
application software.
12 RFC – Request for Comments
13 SWID – Software Identification
14 ISO – International Organization for Standardization
15 IEC – International Electrotechnical Commission
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The TOE is distributed as an additional software package to the platform OS. The TOE is packaged such that its
removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, except for configuration settings, output files, and
audit/log events. The TOE does not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
1.5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides trusted channels using its cryptographic functions to encrypt transmitted sensitive data. The
TOE secures communications using TLS v1.2 between itself and the Management Server.
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TOE
Features and Functionality that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
• Remote and cloud storage locations
• Cloud configuration deployments
• Functionality of the Management Server
• The backup features of the Agent
• Command line interface
1.5.4 Scope of Evaluation
The evaluation is limited in scope to the secure features described in the Protection Profile for Application
Software v1.4; October 07, 2021 (App PP) and the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version
1.1, 12 February 2019 (TLS-PKG) and detailed in Section 1.5.2.
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2. Conformance Claims
This section provides the identification for any CC, PP, Technical Decisions (TD), and EAL package conformance
claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance claims. Rationale for CC
and PP conformance claims can be found in Section 9.1.
Table 4 – CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria (CC)
Identification and
Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017; CC Part 2 extended; CC Part 3 extended; PP claim to the Protection Profile for Application
Software v1.4; October 07, 2021 conformant; Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
PP Identification
Exact Conformance16 to the Protection Profile for Application Software v1.4; October 07, 2021 and
the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
Table 5 - Relevant Technical Decisions
Technical Decisions Applicable (Y/N) Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
AS PP
TD0780 – FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification Yes
TD0756 – Update for platform-provided full disk encryption Yes
TD0747 – Configuration Storage Option for Android Yes
TD0743 – FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity Yes
TD0736 – Number of elements for iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
No The TOE does not claim FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
TD0719 – ECD for PP APP v1.3 and 1.4 Yes
TD0717 – Format changes for PP_APP_v1.4 Yes
TD0669 – FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Interpretation No Archived by NIAP
TD0664 – Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 Yes
TD0659 – Change to Required NIST Curves for FCS_CKM.1/AK Yes Archived in TD0717
TD0655 – Mutual authentication in FTP_DIT_EXT.1 for SW App No Archived by NIAP
TD0650 – Conformance claim sections updated to allow for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
No The PP-Module added is not claimed by the TOE
TD0628 – Addition of Container Image to Package Format Yes
TD0626 – FCS_COP.1 Keyed Hash Selections Yes Archived in TD0717
TD0624 – Addition of DataStore for Storing and Setting
Configuration Options
No Archived by NIAP
TLS-PKG
TD0770 – TLSS.2 connection with no client cert No The TOE does not claim FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
TD0739 – PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2 different publication dates No The TOE only implements TLS as a client and is not a TLS
server.
TD0726 – Corrections to (D)TLSS SFRs in TLS 1.1 FP No The TOE only implements TLS as a client and is not a TLS
server.
16 Exact Conformance is a type of strict conformance such that the set of SFRs and the SPD/Objectives are exactly as presented within the
accepted PP and Extended PP without changes.
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Technical Decisions Applicable (Y/N) Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
TD0588 – Session Resumption Support in TLS package No The TOE does not claim FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
TD0513 – CA Certificate loading Yes
TD0499 – Testing with pinned certificates No The TOE does not support certificate pinning.
TD0469 – Modification of test activity for FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test
4.1
No The TOE does not claim FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
TD0442 – Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package Yes
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3. Security Problem Definition
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the manner in
which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statements for the TOE security environment’s threats,
assumptions, and Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) as identified in the App PP.
3.1 Threats
Table 6 describes the threats that the TOE is expected to address as defined in the App PP.
Table 6 – Threats
Threat Description
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform on which the
application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the form of
files or other local communications.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure.
Attackers may engage in communications with the application software or alter communications between
the application software and other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure.
Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the application and other endpoints.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
3.2 Assumptions
Table 7 describes the assumptions that are assumed to exist in the TOE’s operating environment as defined in the
App PP.
Table 7 – Assumptions
Assumption Description
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its execution. This
includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no OSPs defined in the App PP.
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4. Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Table 8 describes the security objectives that the TOE is required to meet as defined in the App PP.
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Description
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages, and also leverage execution
environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever, shipped without errors. The ability to deploy
patches and updates to fielded software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Processor
manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment vendors, and operating system vendors have
developed execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity
to the task of compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of these mechanisms by
using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the mechanism through compiler or linker
options.
Addressed by: FDP_DEC_EXT.1, FMT_CFG_EXT.1, FPT_AEX_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported
interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of
applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and
formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes providing control to the user
regarding disclosure of any PII.
Addressed by: FMT_SMF.1, FPR_ANO_EXT.1, FPT_IDV_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1/Sig
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats, conformant
TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and
any other data specific to the application that should not be exposed outside of the application.
Addressed by: FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM_EXT.1, FTP_DIT_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1/AK, FCS_CKM.2,
FCS_COP.1/SKC, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/Sig, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_RBG_EXT.2, FDP_NET_EXT.1,
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of physical control of the storage
medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This involves encrypting data and keys stored by the
TOE in order to prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary network
communications whose consequence may be the loss of data.
Addressed by: FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_STO_EXT.1, FDP_DAR_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1/SK, FCS_COP.1/SKC,
FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_RBG_EXT.2
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and APIs provided by the runtime
environment rather than implementing their own versions of these services and APIs. This is especially
important for cryptographic services and other complex operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging
this platform behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.
Addressed by: FCS_CKM_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_STO_EXT.1, FMT_MEC_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.1,
FPT_LIB_EXT.1, FTP_DIT_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1/AK, FCS_CKM.2, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 9 describes the security objectives that the TOE’s operating environment is required to meet as defined in
the App PP.
Table 9 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Assumption Description
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes the underlying
operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
Please refer to section 4.3 of the App PP for a description of how the assumptions, threats, and organizational
security policies map to the security objectives defined in the App PP.
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5. Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Components
Table 12 in section 7.2 below identifies the extended SFRs implemented by the TOE. These extended SFRs’
definitions are not repeated in this ST because they are taken directly from the App PP, PP_APP_v1.4-ECD17
, and
TLS-PKG.
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components
Table 10 identifies the extended SARs claimed for the TOE. These extended SARs’ definitions are taken directly
from the App PP and are not repeated in this ST.
Table 10 – Extended TOE Security Assurance Components
Name Description
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
17 Added to meet TD0719 and include the PP_APP_V1.4-ECD.pdf
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6. Security Assurance Requirements
The App PP identifies the SARs to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable
for the evaluation and performs independent testing.
This section lists the set of SARs that are required in evaluations against the App PP. The App PP is conformant to
Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended) of CC V3.1, Revision 5.
As a functional package, the TLS Package does not define its own SARs. The expectation is that all SARs required
by the App PP will apply to the entire TOE, including the portions addressed by the TLS Package. Consequently,
the evaluation activities specified in the App PP apply to the entire TOE evaluation, including any changes made
to them by subsequent NIAP Technical Decisions as summarized in Section1.2.
The TLS Package does contain evaluation activities for how to evaluate its SFR claims as part of the evaluation of
AES_TSS.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, and ATE_IND.1. All Security Functional Requirement specified by the TLS
Package will be evaluated in the manner specified in that package.
The TOE security assurance requirements are identified in Table 11.
Table 11 – Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.1)
Security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Security problem definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM18 coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
18 CM – Configuration Management
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7. Security Functional Requirements
The individual SFRs are specified in the sections below. SFRs in this section are mandatory SFRs that any
conformant TOE must meet. Based on selections made in these SFRs, it will also be necessary to include some of
the selection-based SFRs in Appendix B. Optional or Objective SFRs may also be adopted from those listed in
Appendix A and Appendix C respectively.
The Assurance Activities defined in App PP describe actions that the evaluator will take in order to determine
compliance of a particular TOE with the SFRs. The content of these Assurance Activities will therefore provide
more insight into deliverables required from TOE Developers.
7.1 Conventions
The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows:
• Refinement: Indicated with bold text (e.g., [refinement]).
• Selection: Indicated with underlined text surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
• Assignment: Indicated with italicized text surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]).
• Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text surrounded by brackets (e.g.,
[assignment within a selection]).
• Refinement within a Selection: Indicated with bold and underlined text surrounded by brackets (e.g.,
[assignment within a selection]).
• Iteration operation: is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting
the purpose of the operation, e.g. “/EXAMPLE1.”
• Extended SFRs are identified by having a label ‘EXT’ at the end of the SFR name.
Operations such as assignments and selections performed by the PP author are identified as shown above;
however, they do not appear within brackets. This is done intentionally to delineate between selections or
assignments made by the PP author and those made by the ST author. No refinements have been made by the ST
author other than grammatical and formatting corrections, or those made in places where a table reference differs
from that of the PP.
7.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE and organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 12 identifies all SFRs
implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each requirement. Note that some column
headers use the following abbreviations: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration.
Table 12 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
Required SFRs
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services ✓
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services ✓
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials ✓ ✓
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data ✓
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources ✓ ✓
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Name Description S A R I
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications ✓ ✓
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ✓ ✓
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information ✓
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities ✓ ✓
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions ✓ ✓
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 User of Third Party Libraries ✓
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update ✓
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit ✓
Selection-based SFRs
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application ✓
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol ✓
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol ✓
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension ✓
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation ✓
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication ✓
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
7.2.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK
The application shall [
• implement functionality
] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [
• [RSA19
schemes] using cryptographic key sizes of 2048 bit or greater that meet the following:
[FIPS PUB20
186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3],
19 RSA – Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
20 PUB – Publication
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• [ECC21
schemes] using [“NIST22
curves” P-384 and [P-256, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4]23
].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”,
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,
].
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• implement asymmetric key generation
].
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC
The application shall perform [encryption/decryption]24
in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [
• AES25
-GCM26
(as defined in NIST SP27
800-38D) mode
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit] .
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash
The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
• SHA28
-256
• SHA-384
] and message digest sizes [
• 256
• 384
] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4]29
.
21 ECC – Elliptic Curve Cryptography
22 NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
23
Non-impactful updates as per TD0717: Format changes for PP_APP_v1.4
24
Updated as per TD0717: format changes for PP_APP_V1.4
25 AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
26 GCM – Galois Counter Mode
27 SP – Special Publication
28 SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
29
Non-impactful updates as per TD0717: Format changes for PP_APP_v1.4
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FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig
The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: [FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5]
].30
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash
The application shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm
• HMAC31
-SHA-256
• HMAC-SHA-384
] and [
• no other algorithms
] with key sizes [256, 384] and message digest sizes 256 and [384] and [no other size] bits that
meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code’ and FIPS
Pub 180-4 ‘Secure Hash Standard’.]32
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement DRBG33
functionality] for its cryptographic operations.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1
The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance with
NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR34
_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2
The deterministic RBG35
shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a platform-
based DRBG and [a hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal
to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [the application
token]] to non-volatile memory.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement [TLS as a client].
30
Updated as per TD0717: format changes for PP_APP_V1.4
31 HMAC – Hash-based Message Authentication Code
32
Updated as per TD0717: Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4
33 DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
34 CTR – Counter Mode
35 RBG – Random Bit Generation
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FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that supports the
cipher suites [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_ECDHE36
_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
] and also supports functionality for [session renegotiation].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC
6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [with no exceptions].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.1
The product shall support secure renegotiation through use of the “renegotiation_info” TLS extension in
accordance with RFC 5746.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLS_EXT.5.1
The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups
[
• secp256r1,
• secp384r1,
• secp521r1,
].
7.2.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1] in non-volatile memory.37
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [network connectivity].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [no sensitive information repositories].
36 ECDHE – Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral
37
TD0756: Update for platform-provided full disk encryption applies
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FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict network communication to [
• [application-initiated TLS connections to the Management Server for configuration updates and
HTTP network communication for access to a CA server]
].
7.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following
rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and
that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the
key usage field.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [CRL as
specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3]
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall
have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose
(id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-
kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the
Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.38
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA)
purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present
and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
38
TD0780: FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification Applies
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FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the
application shall [not accept the certificate].
7.2.4 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with
default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application binaries
and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and
setting configuration options.]39
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
• no management functions]
].
7.2.5 Class FPR: Privacy
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
7.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [OpenSSL runtime
integrity test].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions].
39
Non-impactful updates as a result of TD0747: Configuration Storage Option for Android as there is no change to how it is
evaluated
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FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless
explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [SWID tags that comply with minimum requirements from
ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015].
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 User of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
The application shall be packaged with only [the list of third-party libraries in Appendix B: Included Third-
Party Libraries].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [leverage the platform] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
The Application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such that it’s the application
platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The application shall be distributed using [the format of the platform-supported package manager].40
40 Updated as per TD0628: Addition of Container Image to Package Format
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FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the
application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
7.2.7 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channel
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [TLS as a client as defined in the Functional Package
for TLS for [the Management Server]41
]
] between itself and another trusted IT42
product.
41
TD0743: FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity applies
42 IT – Information Technology
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8. TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in previous
sections of this ST.
8.1 TOE Security Functionality
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the security functions. Hence,
each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This serves to both
describe the security functions and rationalize that the security functions satisfy the necessary requirements.
Table 13 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Function SFR Description
Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
User Data Protection FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
Identification and Authentication FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
Security Management FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
Protection of the TSF FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
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TOE Security Function SFR Description
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 User of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
Trusted Path / Channels FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
8.1.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements the Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library to provide the required algorithms for all cryptographic
operations. Each of the cryptographic algorithms supported by the TOE have been tested and certified by the
CAVP43
. See Table 14 below for the cryptographic operations implemented by the TOE.
Table 14 – Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes
Cryptographic Operation Usage Algorithm Key Lengths / Curves / Moduli Certificate
Encryption/Decryption TLS AES-GCM 128, 256 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
Key Pair Generation TLS RSA 2048, 3072 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
ECDSA NIST P curves with sizes 256, 384, and 521 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
Digital Signature Generation
Digital Signature Verification
TLS RSA 2048, 3072 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
Key Establishment TLS RSA 2048, 3072, 4096 None
ECDHE NIST P curves with sizes 256, 384, and 521 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
Message Digest TLS SHA-256,
SHA-384
256, 384 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
Message Authentication TLS HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
256, 384 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
Deterministic Random Bit Generation DRBG CTR_DRBG (AES) 256 CAVP C1351
CAVP A4299
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 and FCS_CKM.1/AK
The TOE implements asymmetric key generation. The schemes implemented by the TOE to generate asymmetric
cryptographic keys for key establishment and entity authentication are the RSA and ECC schemes. The RSA keys
and key sizes listed in Table 14 are generated for key establishment and entity authentication for TLS. The ECDHE
keys and NIST P curves listed in Table 14 are generated for key establishment and entity authentication for TLS.
Both RSA and ECC key generation schemes that are implemented by the TOE meet FIPS PUB 186-4.
FCS_CKM.2
The TOE implements both RSA and elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes for TLS. The RSA-based
schemes meet RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017. The elliptic-curve based schemes for
ECDHE meet NIST SP-800 56A. The key sizes and curves used for the key establishment schemes are listed in Table
14.
43 CAVP – Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
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FCS_COP.1/SKC
The TOE performs AES encryption and decryption for TLS v1.2 trusted channel communications. The AES algorithm
operates in GCM mode with key sizes of 128 and 256 bits. In TLS sessions, the TOE acts as a TLS client for
connections to the Management Server from itself. Please refer to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 for more information on the
implementation of the TLS protocol.
FCS_COP.1/Hash and FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
Hashing services are performed by the TOE with the SHA-256 and SHA-384 algorithms and the message digest
sizes of 256 and 384 in accordance with FIPS Pub 180-4. The hash functions are used with other TOE cryptographic
functions, including digital signature verification and MACs44
. The HMAC-SHA-256 cryptographic algorithm uses
the SHA-256 hash function with a cryptographic key size of 256 bits and 256-bit message digest size in accordance
with FIPS Pub 198-1. The HMAC-SHA-384 cryptographic algorithm uses the SHA-384 hash function with a
cryptographic key size of 384 bits and 384-bit message digest size in accordance with FIPS Pub 198-1.
FCS_COP.1/Sig
For signature generation and verification, the TOE uses the RSA algorithm. The RSA algorithm meets FIPS PUB 186-
4 Section 4 and uses the key sizes of 2048 and 3072 bits. The RSA algorithm is used for TLS connections.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and FCS_RBG_EXT.2
The TOE implements the SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG (AES) for all deterministic random bit generation services. The
CTR_DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy via RDRAND that accumulates entropy from the Intel
DRNG. The entropy received from the Intel DRNG is assumed to be 100% entropic. The amount of entropy used
to seed the CTR_DRBG corresponds to the greatest security strength of the algorithms included in the ST (AES-
256). Refer to Tables 2 and 3 of NIST SP 800-57A for more information on the algorithm security strengths.
FCS_STO_EXT.1
The TOE leverages the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to securely store the TOE’s application token for the
Windows Agent. On Linux, the application token is securely stored using the Linux keyring. The application token
is used by the TOE to identify itself to the Management Server when downloading configuration settings. The
initial application token is generated by the Management Server when the TOE is installed and added as a device
to the Management Server.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4, and FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
The TOE only implements TLS as a client and is not a TLS server.
The TOE implements client-side TLS v1.2 for secure connections from itself to the Management Server. The client-
side TLS v1.2 connections support the following cipher suites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
The TOE looks for the common name in the subject name or the DNS name in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
of the server’s certificate as the identifier for the Management Server. The reference identifier is established
during installation when the Management Server’s name is entered in the connection information. Use of IP
addresses and wildcards as the identifiers is supported but are discouraged as identifiers. When constructing the
44 MAC – Message Authentication Code
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certificate, the SAN is mandated for IP identifiers and not mandated for DNS identifiers. The use of certificate
pinning is not supported.
If the server’s certificate is not valid, the TOE will not establish a connection.
The TOE also supports functionality for session renegotiation. The TOE supports the renegotiation_info
TLS extension in accordance with RFC 5746. It includes the renegotiation_info extension in
ClientHello messages.
The TOE uses its Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library to support elliptic curves in TLS and presents the Supported
Groups Extension in the ClientHello with NIST curves secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FCS_CKM.1/AK, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1/SKC,
FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/Sig, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.2, FCS_STO_EXT.1,
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4, FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
8.1.2 User Data Protection
FDP_DAR_EXT.1
The TOE protects sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1 when it is stored in non-volatile memory. The
application token used to identify the TOE to the Management Server is the only sensitive data that the TOE stores.
No other forms of sensitive data are stored by the TOE. The TOE runs as a service in the evaluated configuration
and does not require any user credentials to operate.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 and FDP_NET_EXT.1
The TOE restricts its access to platform hardware resources to network connectivity. This is for the TLS connections
described in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and the HTTP connections to the CA server in the TOE environment. The TLS
connection includes the TOE initiating a TLS v1.2 connection to the Management Server’s API Gateway. The TOE
initiates communication with the CA server when performing certificate revocation checking. The ports utilized
by the TOE are as follows:
• Port 9877: Management Server authentication and token retrieval
• Port 7780: Asynchronous communication between the Management Server and the TOE
The TOE does not access any of the sensitive information repositories on the host platform.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_DAR_EXT.1, FDP_DEC_EXT.1, FDP_NET_EXT.1
8.1.3 Identification and Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 and FIA_X509_EXT.2
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 when it acts as a TLS client for TLS. The TOE does not
support TLS mutual authentication but will validate the Management Server’s certificate before establishing a
connection. The TOE implements the following rules when validating the Management Server’s certificate when
connecting to it:
• Certificate validation and certificate path validation as per RFC 5280.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension,
that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
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• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes the caSigning purpose in the key usage
field.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using a CRL as specified in RFC 5280
Section 6.3.
• The application shall reject expired certificates.
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
If the TOE cannot establish a connection to the CA server’s CRL to determine the revocation status of a certificate,
it does not accept the certificate.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2
8.1.4 Security Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1
The TOE does not install with any default credentials. Rather, it uses the platform’s service accounts to run and is
available to any user logged into the platform. It is configured by default with file permissions that protect the
application binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users. This prevents a standard user
from modifying the application or its data files.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1
The TOE does not store or set any security-related settings. Non-security-related settings are stored on the
Management Server and are queried when performing tasks. The TOE does not provide any management features
that write or change settings.
FMT_SMF.1
The TOE does not perform any management functions.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_CFG_EXT.1, FMT_MEC_EXT.1, FMT_SMF.1
8.1.5 Privacy
FPR_ANO_EXT.1
The products primary function is to backup and restore data, which may include PII. The TOE does not prompt for
or require user-supplied PII to perform its designed functionality, nor does it transmit any such PII over a network;
therefore, the requirement does not apply to this PII.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPR_ANO_EXT.1
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8.1.6 Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1
The TOE does not make requests to map memory at an explicit address, except for the OpenSSL integrity test, and
is compiled with ASLR enabled. The TOE does not allocate any memory regions with write and execute permissions.
The TOE is compatible with the platform’s security features. More specifically, the application can run successfully
with Windows Defender Exploit Guard configured with the following minimum mitigations enabled: Control Flow
Guard (CFG), Randomize memory allocations (Bottom-Up ASLR), Export address filtering (EAF), Import address
filtering (IAF), and Data Execution Prevention (DEP). The TOE is also compatible with SELinux enabled and in
enforcing mode. The TOE does not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files. The
Windows Agent is compiled with the /GS flag enabled by default for stack-based buffer overflow protection and
the /NXCOMPAT flag to enable DEP protections for the application. The Linux Agent uses the __stack_chk_fail
symbol in ELF executable files for stack-based buffer overflow protection.
FPT_API_EXT.1
The TOE uses only the documented platform APIs listed in Appendix A: Supported Platform APIs.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1
The TOE is versioned with SWID tags that comply with the minimum requirements from ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1
The TOE is packaged with the third-party libraries listed in Appendix B: Included Third-Party Libraries.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TOE leverages the platform to check for updates and patches to the application software. To check for an
update, the user of the platform runs a set of commands. If the version in the Acronis repository matches the
version of the TOE, then no action is required. If the version in the repository is greater than the TOE version, then
the updated should be downloaded to the platform.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 and FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
The TOE does not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code. The TOE’s Windows and Linux
installation packages and its updates are digitally signed so that the platform can verify their signatures before
installation. The packages are digitally signed using a 2048-bit RSA key and SHA-256 digest algorithm. The
authorized sources of the Linux and Windows installer signatures are Acronis International GmbH, issued by
GlobalSign and Acronis SCS, Inc., issued by DigiCert respectively.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 and FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The TOE is distributed as an additional software package to the platform OS. The Windows Agent is packaged in
the standard executable (.exe) format and the Linux Agent is packaged as an executable binary (.x86_64). The TOE
is packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of
configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_AEX_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.1, FPT_IDV_EXT.1, FPT_LIB_EXT.1,
FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2
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8.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1
The TOE encrypts all transmitted sensitive data between itself and the Management Server with TLSv1.2. Please
refer to the section FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 for more details. Sensitive data is defined as all data except communications
with the CA server to check for certificate revocation.
The Acronis Managed Machine Service provides backup, recovery, replication, retention, and validation
functionality. The port used by this service is port 9850, and it is required to be running for the TOE to function.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTP_DIT_EXT.1
8.2 Timely Security Updates
To keep the TOE secure, Acronis SCS plans to fix security issues depending on the following severity:
• Critical: hotfix and workaround are immediately required.
• High: hotfix or nearest update, if update is within 3-4 weeks (15-20 business days).
• Low-Medium: next major version or update.
Issue severity is calculated according to CVSSv3 methodology. For some issues a custom severity can be set by
security team when CVSSv3 is not appropriate. For example, privacy issues may be prioritized far higher than the
CVSS score.
If issue was reported by a 3rd-party and therefore is subject to public disclosure, the fixes are released within the
negotiated disclosure period.
Acronis SCS discloses the following information for vulnerabilities:
• Release Notes will contain information that security issues were fixed in a specific release or update.
• Release Notes will contain issue IDs and severity in a qualitative form if they are worth mentioning.
• In special cases, the details of security issues may be disclosed to customers when it's important to let
customers know if their systems/data are at risk.
• Acronis SCS will not disclose details of vulnerabilities in documentation.
The Acronis SCS Support team notifies customers about security issues related to the TOE in following cases:
1. Issue severity is Critical
2. Issue severity is High and the issue is known to 3rd-party (external report or a known exploitation).
The notification will be sent to the most relevant group of customers and include enough information to
understand the following:
1. The risk associated with the issue
2. Conditions under which a customer’s system is vulnerable
3. Necessary steps to mitigate the risk
Customers that purchase the TOE may email appsupport@acronisscs.com to report security issues pertaining to
the TOE. A public key and disclosure policy are posted to the Acronis SCS GitHub
(https://github.com/acronisscs/public_disclosure) for use in securing the contents of any security related email.
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Any update that is released, related to security fixes or not, is deployed to the Acronis SCS website for download.
Customers may refer to the email or use the check for update process to see if a new version is available for their
installation. Updates can then be downloaded and applied to the TOE as needed.
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9. Rationale
9.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target extends Part 2 and extends to Part 3 of the Common Criteria Standard for Information
Technology Security Evaluations, Version 3.1 Revision 5. This ST conforms to the App PP and TLS-PKG.
9.1.1 Variance Between the PP and this ST
There is no variance between the App PP, TLS-PKG, and this ST.
9.1.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The assumptions, threats, OSPs, and objectives defined in this ST are those specified in the App PP and TLS-PKG.
This ST maintains exact conformance to the App PP and TLS-PKG, including the assurance requirements listed in
Section 5 of the App PP. The TOE is a standalone application that runs on a Windows and Linux desktop platforms
and is applicable to the App PP and TLS-PKG.
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10. Acronyms
Table 15 defines the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 15 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
App PP Protection Profile for Application Software v1.4; October 07, 2021
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CFG Control Flow Guard
CM Configuration Management
CTR Counter Mode
DEP Data Execution Protection
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS Digital Signature Standard
EAF Export address filtering
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GB Gigabyte
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transport Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure
IAF Import address filtering
ID Identification
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
MAC Message Authentication Code
MB Megabyte
N/A Not Applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
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Acronym Definition
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PP Protection Profile
PUB Publication
RAM Random Access Memory
RBG Random Bit Generation
RFC Request for Comments
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
SQL Structured Query Language
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
SWID Software Identification
TD Technical Decisions
TLS Transport Layer Security
TLS-PKG Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019
TOE Target of Evaluation
UI User Interface
VM Virtual Machine
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Appendix A: Supported Platform APIs
The following is a list of the supported platform APIs that the TOE uses:
• For Windows:
o ReadFile
o WriteFile
o NtQueryInformationFile
o UnlockFile
o LockFile
o Send
o Recv
o RegQueryInfoKeyA
o RegOpenKey
o RegSetInfoKey
o RegQueryValue
o RegCloseKey
o RegQueryMutlipleValueKey
o ExitThread
o CreateThread
• For Linux:
o mount
o mkdir
o exec
o mv
o sudo
o chroot
o uname
o gawk
o echo
o cp
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Appendix B: Included Third-party Libraries
Table 16 provides a list of the included third-party libraries that the Windows Agent uses.
Table 16 – Included Third-party Windows Libraries
Library Library Library
curl.dll libevent.dll re2.dll
expat.dll libmagic.dll sqlite3.dll
python35.dll xerces_c.dll tcmalloc.dll
icu38.dll mspack.dll ulxmlrpcpp.dll
icudt38.dll onig.dll winpthreads4.dll
libcrypto10.dll libssl10.dll
Table 17 provides a list of the included third-party libraries that the Linux Agent uses.
Table 17 – Included Third-party Linux Libraries
Library Library Library
_ctypes.so libcurl.so libsqlite3.so
_multiprocessing.so libdbus-1.so libssl10.so
_psycopg.so liblibevent.so libtcmalloc.so
_socket.so libexpat.so ujson.so
_sqlite3.so libjwt.so libulxmlrpcpp.so
_ssl.so pyexpat.so unicodedata.so
libaio.so libpython35.so libunwind.so
libcrypto10.so libre2.so libzstd.so
libicu38.so select.so liblibcrypto10.so
libicudt38.so liblibssl10.so
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
12600 Fair Lakes Drive, Suite 210
Fairfax, VA 22003
United States of America
Phone: +1 703 267 6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com