BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021
for
SDoT Security Gateway
Version 6.2i
from
INFODAS GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 (*)
Netzwerk- und Kommunikationsprodukte
SDoT Security Gateway
Version 6.2i
from INFODAS GmbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 27 September 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SDoT Security Gateway, Version 6.2i has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SDoT Security Gateway, Version 6.2i was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 21 September 2021.
atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: INFODAS GmbH.
The product was developed by: INFODAS GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 27
September 2021 is valid until 26 September 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SDoT Security Gateway, Version 6.2i has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
INFODAS GmbH
INFODAS Gesellschaft für Systementwicklung und Informationsverarbeitung mbH
Rhonestraße 2
50765 Köln
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is part of the product SDoT Security Gateway which
provides a secure interconnection between two IP networks, which could have different
types of security classifications. For a secure exchange of data between these networks
the SDoT Security Gateway serves as protection to not let confidential data, within a
potentially higher classified network (HIGH), unintentionally flow to a lower classified
network (LOW), which is not authorized to get hold of confidential information from the
higher classified network.
SDoT Security Gateway includes the TOE which provides the filtering functionalities to
check security labels for the transmission of data between the two differently classified
networks and provides mechanisms to validate structured data objects against a rule set.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
Labelling Mechanism The TOE provides mechanisms to perform labelling tasks. The ToE enforces data
validation on all data which have to be labelled by the TOE. The TOE performs a
syntax analysis on incoming structured data.
The supported formats are XML, ADEXP, FSD, ASTERIX, FORMDATA, and
JSON. All other formats will be rejected by the TOE.
The security labels have a strong binding to the corresponding data. Any
modification of the data or the related security label will invalidate both data and
security label. This will lead to a rejection and the data will not pass the TOE. This
feature is achieved with XML signatures.
The TOE provides configuration mechanisms to define the parameters regarding
the automatic labelling of the message data, in the case where a labelling
generation is initiated by the TOE, with cryptographic support of the HSM.
The TOE also re-builds (sanitisation) and converts (canonicalization) forwarded
security labels.
Filtering Mechanism The TOE provides filtering mechanisms which is the main security functionality of
the TOE. It enforces the flow control policy for all data messages that are sent
from the higher classified network to the lower classified network. The filtering
policies can verify:
whether the protocol is allowed (SMTP, HTTP, UDP, TCP) and refer to the
configured ports whether an externally provided security label attached the data
has accepted security categories, a known structure, and expected attributes
While the TOE is managed, it is in maintenance mode. During this mode, no data
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TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
communication is possible and all data messages are blocked.
Channel Protection The TOE supports several mechanisms to provide security functionalities related
to covert channel protection. It enforces the clean protocol policy on all protocol
data units which are sent from network HIGH to the lower classified network. Only
if the protocol data does not contain confidential information, the TOE will then
forward the data between the differently classified networks. The TOE controls
the bandwidth which can be configured by the operator of the TOE.
The TOE will then block all incoming and outgoing connections, if these exceed
the configured bandwidth. The TOE can limit the capacity of information flow from
the higher classified network to the network LOW.
Data Protection The TOE enforces the “check label policy” on all data messages with attached
external security labels. Security labels are extracted from the data message for
all data coming from the higher classified network.
Authentication and
Authorisation
The TOE includes security functionalities to provide authentication and
authorization mechanisms which address the related SFRs. The TOE supports a
secure channel initiated by the SDoT Adminstation within a dedicated network.
Only users who have the explicit permission to read the audit records of the TOE
have access to the audit records. Only the user with the user role “Auditor” can
access the GUI for auditing purposes. After successful identification and
authentication of the auditor, the GUI grants access to the audit functionalities.
The TOE enforces the dual control admin policy for all users trying to modify the
general TOE configuration. Only the role of the auditor can read, move or delete
audit records from the audit trail of the TOE. The TOE enforces that only two
different administrators can make changes to the TOE configuration. One
administrator temporarily stores the configuration data regarding any modification
of configuration parameters of the TOE. Afterwards, a different administrator must
confirm or reject the proposed changes. The changes will only apply if the second
administrator has confirmed the proposed modification of configuration data by the
first administrator.
Audit Trail The TOE creates audit records. Upon detection of a potential security violation the
TOE takes the following actions:
● the TOE sends an e-mail to a configurable list of addressees
● generates an audit entry into the audit trail
● indicates the potential security violation on the audit GUI
For each auditable event resulting from an action of the authenticated human
user, the TOE associates the audit record unambiguously with the user role who
performed any auditable action. The TOE stores the DN of the certificate of the
user role who caused the auditable event.
Self Protection The TOE includes several functionalities to provide self-protection mechanisms.
Part of architecture includes functions like the dual control administration policy
and that no data flow is possible in maintenance mode.
The TOE provides restrictive default values for parameters of the general TOE
configuration, configuration for allowed security labels, rule sets for automatic data
inspection, valid classifications and categories.
The TOE preserves a secure state by switching into maintenance mode when the
following failures occur:
● software failures
● hardware failures
● out of memory error
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 Certification Report
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
● audit trail full
● power outage
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details, please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.2 . Based on these assets, the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SDoT Security Gateway, Version 6.2i
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW
ISO
Software for installation of the TOE on the
SDoT Security Gateway
6.2.15252. 29203 DVD
2 DOC Manual for SDoT Filter 1.5 All guidance documents are
provided digitally via
encrypted email attachment
in Portable Document
Format or via the infodas
download portal.
3 DOC DOC Manual for SDoT Adminstation 1.0
4 DOC Product Information – Requirements for
Secure Operation
1.2
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The SDoT Security Gateway comprises the SDoT Filter Platform (HW with HSM, FW, OS)
and the SDoT Filter SW which is the TOE. The SDoT Security Gateway includes an SDoT
Adminstation for Administration of the SDoT Filter. Therefore, the TOE is an application
delivered together with a set of software and hardware components to the customer. The
hardware parts and software parts besides the TOE are partially customized for SDoT
Security Gateway to make sure that the TOE operates properly as intended with the
dedicated delivery parts only.
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The TOE itself is delivered via DVD. The software is signed with the INFODAS key and the
related hash is verified during the secure boot process.
The guidance is delivered using an encrypted e-mail or downloaded online over HTTPS.
Hashes are also made available to verify the integrity of the obtained guidance documents.
The TOE version is printed on the screen before confirming the installation, and can also
later be reviewed under the "About SDoT" menu item in the Administration GUI as follows:
SDoT-Version: 6.2.15252.29203 P1 Kurt7
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: audit access control, admin
access control, policy admin access control, dual control admin, dual control policy admin,
data validation, check label, data to low, pre-filtering, supported protocol and clean
protocol. Details can be found in chapter 5 of the Security Target [6] and [8].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
OE.DIFF_NET
The TOE shall be connected to two networks with different classifications. The two
networks are classified as HIGH and LOW.
OE.TRUSTW_ONLY
If besides the TOE, there are other connections between the two networks HIGH and
LOW, these are established using trustworthy components only and do not violate the
security policy of the TOE.
OE.HIGH_PROTECTION
The TOE and all physical parts outside the TOE which are scope of the delivery of the
SDoT Security Gateway shall be connected within the higher classified network HIGH only.
OE.ACCESS
All access to the TOE and its physical operational environment is restricted to authorised
persons only. These include the auditor, administrators and human users.
OE.TRUSTW_STAFF
The operational environment shall make sure that all privileged users of the TOE are
trusted by the organisation operating the TOE.
OE.AUDIT_ENFORCE
The operational environment shall ensure that the audit data is regularly checked by an
authorised and well-trained auditor in accordance with the security policy defined by the
organisation operating the TOE.
7
Note that "P1 Kurt" is the internal name and patch level. It is not part of the TOE version.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 Certification Report
OE.ROLE_SEPARATION
The operational environment shall ensure that the roles of the administrator and the
auditor are owned by different persons.
OE.HSM
The operational environment shall ensure that the TOE is operated with IT systems which
are capable of properly assigning labels to the corresponding data. Only appropriate data
are signed with labels. The labelling mechanism is sufficiently cryptographically supported
by hardware related security mechanisms.
Since generation of cryptographic keys is not in scope of the TOE, the operational
environment shall ensure that state-of-the-art cryptographic mechanisms are used. The
HSM and Smartcards which are in scope of delivery of the SDoT Security Gateway ensure
that adequate cryptographic operations are used. Further, the output from the Random Bit
Generator of the HSM shall be used directly without further post-processing by software.
If TLS is used for communication to external systems the operational environment shall
ensure that the digital signature for TLS used by the web server and communication
proxies is generated by the HSM. Further, it shall be ensured that keys used for audit data
protection is generated by the HSM.
OE.PKI
The operator of the TOE shall use a trustworthy PKI for digital signing certificates (CSRs)
and generating and administrating CAs and CRLs.
OE.NTP_SERVER
The operator of the TOE shall use a trustworthy NTP server which is capable to reliably
synchronise the time between all components in the operational environment of the TOE.
OE.USER_IDENT
The operational environment shall identify and authenticate all privileged users within the
higher classified network HIGH before any actions can be performed.
OE.L4_PLATFORM
The operational environment regarding the operating system on which the TOE is running
shall be an L4Re microkernel OS where each logically separated part of the TOE runs in a
dedicated compartment. Within each compartment an own L4Linux, which is a para-
virtualised Linux kernel within the provided hypervisor of L4Re, shall be used without
privileges, and execute the processes of the TOE. The process separation properties of
the L4Linux Kernel are shall be properly used.
OE.DEDICATED_ADMIN_NET
The TOE shall be connected to the SDoT Adminstation only through a dedicated network
for administration purposes. The dedicated admin network shall be an isolated network
within the higher classified domain HIGH.
OE.HIGH_AVAILABILITY
The operational environment shall ensure that if the operator of the TOE decides to use
the optional functionality, namely the HA variant of the SDoT Filter, the operator will
provide a physically separated network. The physically separated network shall be the only
connection via the Heartbeat interface of the SDoT Filter designed to operate a cluster of
redundant SDoT Filters.
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OE.BOOT
The TOE shall use the secure start-up and initialisation mechanisms provided by the UEFI
based secure boot process of the SDoT Filter platform. Further, the administrators shall
follow the Guidance Documents to not modify the pre-configured BIOS-settings.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The system platform required by the TOE provides multiple environments for the
implementation of compartments with strong separation mechanisms. Each compartment
represents an isolated security domain with its own underlying L4Linux. The microkernel
architecture provides control mechanisms to restrict the communication between the
compartments. Each compartment houses an agent process which implements specific
tasks. The short description of all components is given below:
• COMPARTMENT FI_GUI: provides access to the Administration GUI and Audit GUI
• COMPARTMENT FI_CFG: manages main configuration and performs monitoring
tasks
• COMPARTMENT FI_ADT: this compartment provides functions for logging security
relevant events.
• COMPARTMENT FI_H2L: all data which are sent from the higher classified network
HIGH to the lower classified network LOW are processed by the so called “H2L
SchemaValidator”
• COMPARTMENT FI_L2H: forwards data from network LOW to network HIGH
• COMPARTMENT FI_HGH: provides proxies for the supported components
• COMPARTMENT FI_LOW: performs the tasks analogous to the COMPARTMENT
FI_HGH
For some cryptographic functions, an HSM in the TOE environment (resides inside the
appliance hardware) is used.
Internally, the processes communicate with different protocols. The audit agent receives
requests via the audit protocol while the admin agents receive commands using the
MGMT protocol. Business data received from the LOW or HIGH network is wrapped in
ICAP packets. With that, meta data is added to it that can be uniformly interpreted by the
processes within different compartments.
The compartments contain several processes. The distribution of the processes over the
compartment follows the rule that processes of the same trust level are part of the same
compartment. Based on that, the proxies for example reside in their own compartments
(FI_HGH and FI_LOW). The proxies themselves do not implement security functions, but
they are be separated from other processes that do so.
For more information see the ST [6] and [8], section 1.4.2.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
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Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
The developer tests were all specified in the test plan and grouped in several test areas:
• Authentication
• Data protection and cryptographic support
• Labelling
• Filtering
• Covert Channels
• Logging
• TOE Self Protection
• Admin commands
• Audit commands
The test plan contains a total of 113 tests, including test variations with different
parameters.
Test Approach
The developer performed all tests against the user-visible interfaces of the TOE. In some
cases, data is analysed or manipulated outside the TOE:
• verify the contents of the audit hard disk after detaching it from the TOE
• manipulate the contents of the audit hard disk after detaching it from the TOE
• manipulating the system hard disk through booting into another system
In one case, the developer relies on his own code reviews to be sure that certain
properties apply to the audit data (AES-GCM encryption of the audit data).
Test Configuration
The evaluated configuration was performed according to the ST and the guide that details
the CC-related requirements.
The TOE and environment configuration was:
Component Version
SDot Security Gateway, SDoT Filter (TOE) 6.2.15252.29203
SDoT Adminstation version 1.5 (based on CentOS 6.9)
Test client HIGH/LOW CentOS 8.2
Smartcard Smartcard with CardOS 5.4 QES and Middleware
v5.4 from ATOS
Table 3: Test Configuration
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Results
All developer tests showed the expected results.
7.2. Evaluator Testing
The testing applied to two versions of the product. The first testing was performed on a
previous revision (revision 6.2.14883.27405). After findings during the penetration testing,
the TOE was slightly updated. As the updated TOE (revision 6.2.15252.29203) does not
completely invalidate the previous test run where functionality was not affected by the
update, the tests against the previous revision are mentioned here as well.
The evaluator rerun about 50% of the the developer tests on the previous revision and
20% on the final TOE version.
He further devised nine additional independent tests that he ran on the previous TOE
revision. From these nine tests he reran three on the final TOE version. These were tests
of functions that were affected by the TOE changes. The results of the remaining
independent tests were considered to be still applicable to the final TOE version.
All tests that were performed on the final TOE version are marked with "P1" in the
evaluator testplan.
Test Approach and Depth
As for the developer tests, the evaluator used the user-visible external interfaces of the
TOE for most tests. In one case, he did a review of the code to verify that the AES-
encryption is applied for audit events.
The tests were mainly defined to exercise TSFI specifications, but also to verify claims
made in the architecture/design documentation.
After the TOE was updated, the evaluator rerun parts of the developer sample (20 tests)
and two of the additional evaluator tests.
Test Configuration
The evaluated configuration was performed according to the ST and the guide that details
the CC-related requirements.
The TOE and environment configuration was equivalent to the developer test setup (see
table 3).
Test results
All tests were successfully executed without relevant deviation.
7.3. Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator performed 14 penetration tests. Some existing open-source tools were
used. In addition, the evaluator created a custom program that systematically generates
new security labels based on a valid label.
Test approach
The evaluator used the MITRE CVE portal and general Google searches for finding
publicly documented vulnerabilities against the TOE or its involved components.
Test depth
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All tests used the external interfaces of the TOE, covering a wide range of security
functions. Specifically in the area of certificates and label validation, the test approach was
more focused to also exercise detailed TOE behavior.
Configuration
The initial run of the penetration tests identified some issues which required a TOE update
(P1). After provision of the update, the majority of the penetration tests were rerun. The P1
update is the TOE version 6.2.15252.29203 as defined in the ST. Further configuration
requirements as defined in the guidance for the secure use of the TOE were applied where
relevant for the testing.
Test results
All tests were successfully executed without relevant deviation.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the configuration of the TOE with the version 6.2i and with the
exact revision number being 6.2.15252.29203. More information can be found in the
SecurityTarget [6] and [8], section 1.3.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
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considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ADEXP ATS Data Exchange Presentation
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
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AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certification Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSR Certificate Signing Request
DN Distinguished Name
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FSD Field Structured Data
GUI Graphical User Interface
H2L High-to-Low
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HSM Hardware Security Module
HTTP/S Hypertext Transfer Protocol / Secure
ICAP Internet Content Adaptation Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JSON Java Script Object Notification
L2H Low-to-high
L4 Implementation of microkernel L4
L4Linux Modified kernel of Linux running on top of L4
L4Re L4 Runtime environment
Net SPIF Network Security Policy Information File
NTP Network Time Protocol
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SDoT Security Inter-Domain Transition
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SMTP MTA SMTP Message/Mail Transfer Agent
SPIF Security Policy Information File
SSD Solid State Drive
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UEFI Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
XML Extensible Markup Language
XSD XML Schema Definition
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021, Version 2, 06.07.2021, SDoT Security
Gateway Security Target, INFODAS GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, 20.09.2021, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec (confidential document)
[8] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021, Version 2, 08.07.2021, SDoT Security
Gateway Security Target Lite, INFODAS GmbH (sanitised public document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, 19.07.2021, Main Configuration List (confidential
document)
[10] SDoT Security Gateway - Produktinformation - Anforderungen an den sicheren
Betrieb Product,Version SDoT SGW-62-I-PI-DE-1.2, July 2021
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen
nach CC
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler (Collection of Developer
Evidence)
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 X.509 certificates [RFC5246] (TLS1.2)
[RFC5758]
n/a n/a Certificates are
generated
externally and
imported into the
TOE by a
competent
administrator.
2 Authentica-
tion (Server)
ECDSA signature
verification and
generation using SHA-2
[ANSIX9.62]
[FIPS186-4] , B.4
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
secp256r1
secp384r1
brainpoolP256r1
brainpoolP384r1
brainpoolP512r1
yes Signature
generation: done
by HSM
Signature
verification: done
by TOE
Hashing: done by
TOE
3 Authentica-
tion (Client)
ECDSA signature
verification and
generation using SHA-2
[ANSIX9.62]
[FIPS186-4] , B.4
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
secp256r1
secp384r1
brainpoolP256r1
brainpoolP384r1
brainpoolP512r1
yes
4 Key estab-
lishment: Key
agreement
Ephemeral
TLS_ECDHE [IEEE1363]
(ECKAS_DH1)
secp384r1
brainpoolP384r1
brainpoolP512r1
yes
5 Key deriva-
tion
PRF: HMAC with SHA-
256, SHA-384
(default: prf_sha256 for
TLSv1.2, also
prf_sha384 possible)
[RFC2104] (HMAC)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
variable yes
6 Authen-
ticated
Encryption
AES in GCM mode
(AES_128_GCM,
AES_256_GCM)
[FIPS197 ] (AES)
[SP800-38D] (GCM)
[RFC5288] (AES
GCM within TLS)
Key Length: 128,
256
yes
7 Trusted
channel
FTP_TRP.1 [8] , Sec.
7.1.2
cf. all lines above see above yes
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functions used for TLS protocol
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1129-2021 Certification Report
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Authen-
tication
x.509 certificates n/a n/a Certificates are
generated
externally and
imported into the
TOE by a
competent
administrator.
2 RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
using SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512
[FIPS186-4] , B.3
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC3447]
Modulus length:
2048 to 8192
yes Signature
generation: done
by HSM
Signature
verification: done
by TOE
Hashing: done by
TOE
3 ECDSA signature
generation and
verification using SHA-2
[ANSIX9.62]
[FIPS186-4] , B.4
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
secp256r1
secp384r1
brainpoolP256r1
brainpoolP384r1
brainpoolP512r1
yes Signature
generation: done
by HSM
Signature
verification: done
by TOE
Hashing: done by
TOE
4 Integrity SHA-2
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[RFC6234]
(cf. [FIPS180-4] )
n/a yes
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functions used for security labelling
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Audit data
encryption
AES in GCM mode [FIPS197] (AES)
[SP800-38D] (GCM)
Key length: 256 yes The HSM provides
the AES key used
by the TOE.
2 HMAC
computa-tion
for the audit
records
HMAC-SHA-384 [RFC2104] Key length: 384 yes Private key stored
on the HSM.
3 SHA-2
SHA-384
[RFC6234]
(cf. [FIPS180-4] )
n/a yes
Table 6: TOE cryptographic functions used for the audit data protection
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References to cryptographic algorithms
[ANSI X9.62] Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), Version American National Standard X9.62-
2005, Date 2005-11-16, https://standards.globalspec.com/std/1955141/ANSI%20X9.62
[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), 2015-08-04,
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/4/final
[FIPS186-4] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2013-07-19,
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/4/final
[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 2001-11-26,
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/197/final
[IEEE Std 1363-2000] IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography, Version
IEEE Std 1363-2000, 2000-08-29, https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1363-2000.html
[RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare,
R. Canetti, 1997-02-01, Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
[RFC3447] Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1, Jonsson, B. Kaliski, 2003-02-01,
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
[RFC5246] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, T. Dierks, E.
Rescorla, 2008-08-01, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
[RFC5288] AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS, J. Salowey, A.
Choudhury, D. McGrew, 2008-08-01, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
[RFC5758] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithms and Identifiers
for DSA and ECDSA, Q. Dang, S. Santesson, K. Moriarty, D. Brown, T. Polk, 2010-01-01,
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5758.txt
[RFC6234] US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF), D.
Eastlake 3rd, T. Hansen, 2011-05-01, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6234.txt
[SP800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/ Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC, 2007-11-28,
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/final
Note: End of report
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